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they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence

Kappeler 95

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

'We are the war, I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere . I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords or upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon political disillusionment. our insight that indeed we are not responsible tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions we participate in 'organized irresponsibility' we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the president, the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make war possible universal responsibility becomes universal acquittal Decisions to unleash war are taken at particular levels of power focusing on the stage where major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our own competence leading to 'powerlessness' and disillusionment. it seems to absolve us from having to see any relation between our actions and events we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, 'What would I do if I were the president we regard mega spheres as the only worthwhile ones we shape 'our values' according war and violence.

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

<h4>they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence</h4><p><u><strong>Kappeler 95</u></strong> (Susanne, The Will to Violence<u>, pgs 9-11)</p><p></u>War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.<u> 'We are the war,</u>' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': <u><mark>I do not know what war is</u></mark>, I want to tell my friend, <u><mark>but I see it everywhere</mark> . </u>It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And <u>I am afraid that <mark>we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make</mark> this <mark>war possible</mark> , we permit it to happen</u>. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. '<u>We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords </u>and politicians and profiteers<u> or</u>, as Ulrich Beck says, <u>upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and</u> where the conception of<u> <mark>universal responsibility becomes</mark> the equivalent of a <mark>universal acquittal</u></mark>. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations.<u> <mark>Decisions to unleash</mark> a <mark>war are</mark> indeed <mark>taken at particular levels of power</mark> by those in a position to make them </u>and to command such collective action. <u>We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of <mark>focusing on the stage where</mark> the <mark>major dramas of power take place</mark> <mark>tends to obscure our</mark> sight in relation to our <mark>own</mark> sphere of <mark>competence</mark>, our own power and our own responsibility - <mark>leading to</mark> the </u>well- known<u> illusion of our </u>apparent<u> <mark>'powerlessness' and</mark> its accompanying phenomenon </u>- our so-called<u> political <mark>disillusionment.</mark> </u>Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet<u> our insight that indeed we are not responsible</u> for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president <u>tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action</u>. In particular, <u><mark>it seems to absolve us from having to</mark> try to <mark>see any relation between our</mark> own <mark>actions and</mark> those <mark>events</mark>, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions</u>. It not only shows that <u>we participate in</u> what Beck calls <u>'organized irresponsibility'</u>, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For<u> we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything</u> , say, <u>about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because <mark>we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why</mark> many of <mark>those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics,</mark> in the style of <mark>'What would I do if I were the</mark> general, </u>the prime minister,<u> the <mark>president</mark>, </u>the foreign minister or<u> the minister of defence?' Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega spheres</mark> of action <mark>as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, </u>and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. <u>We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way <mark>we shape 'our</mark> feelings, our relationships, our <mark>values' according</mark> to the structures and the values of <mark>war and violence.</p></u></mark>

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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

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ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

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Discourse of the Mexican narco-state under siege by cartels instantiates waves of racialized colonialism by positioning Mexico as culturally inferior and in need of development – these representations undergird violent neoliberal apparatuses which makes structural violence and Mexican instability inevitable

Carlos 14

Carlos 14 (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz

Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Clinton described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency The Los Angeles Times suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful Foucault argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it Said says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges. Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth. Dominant discourses, meta-narratives and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites Western powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North and scholars from the South and even between white and nonwhite scholars Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003). It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives. The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when Mexicans were depicted as an “uncivilized species—dirty, unkempt, immoral, diseased, lazy, unambitious and despised for being peons This discourse set the stage for the creation of a “culture of empire,” in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests This narrative depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it continues to dominate U.S. understandings of Mexico The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. Mexico is suffering much more from extreme economic inequality, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), than from drug-related violence While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact. Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.” The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified The importance of the drug-related violence story lies in its masking the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s social and economic problems It perpetuates a relationship of imperialism between the United States and Mexico that manifests itself in NAFTA, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, and direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and military assistance to help bring order to Mexico free trade has led only to the enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates NAFTA is just one of the most recent examples of U.S. domination over Mexico and how it continues to misdevelop and tear apart the socioeconomic integrity of that society They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico this means continuing Mexico’s long history as a U.S. economic colony, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State investment in agriculture was reduced by 95.5 percent and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for Mexican national agricultural producers. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands NAFTA has resulted in the “complete inability of the Mexican nation to produce the food required to feed its own people free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital Poverty in rural areas has risen significantly from 37 percent in 1992 to 52.4 percent in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people we can only call this imperialism. the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico. economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people.

The L A Times suggested Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels Drug-related violence is not Mexico’s foremost problem, and it obscures economic and social problems it masks their origin in U.S. policy while providing justification for domination It is linked to discourses surrounding colonization the white man’s burden extermination of the native population Manifest Destiny racial segregation and prejudice against immigrants discourse serves to make possible interventions power produces discourse that justifies and increases it literature elaborates empire representations have precise political consequences narrative separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism Discourses they become “regimes of truth put into circulation representations Dominant discourses construct “realities” that are acted upon dominant narratives validate norms deemed intersubjectively legitimate Western powers maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized Through repetition, a racialized “other” is constructed literature describes Latin America as “backward” development literature becomes the justification for underdevelopment non-Western scholarship is not regarded as legitimate There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North and South It is important to deconstruct discourses expose power relationships and examine counterhegemonic alternatives Mexicans were depicted as uncivilized dirty diseased and despised This narrative continues to dominate Mexico is suffering much more from economic inequality than from drug violence Representing Mexico as a “failing state” provides justification for economic paternalism the U S contrasted its liberty with barbaric brutality there were 23 million crimes of violence in the U S statistics do not justify that the U S is a “failing state.” Yet jumps to that conclusion about Mexico Mexico is far from an outlier more people kill themselves in the U S Mexico’s violence has remained constant over 25 years drug violence does not make Mexico a “failing state.” the drug story perpetuates imperialism that manifests in NAFTA and military assistance free trade has led to enrichment of monopolistic corporations NAFTA continues to misdevelop and tear apart socioeconomic integrity continuing Mexico’s history as a U.S. economic colony The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater investment was reduced by 95.5 percent The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for agricultural producers NAFTA resulted in the “complete inability to feed its own people Poverty has risen from 37 percent to 52.4 percent discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for military intervention NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a violent Mexico needing development to solve its social problems, when it is capital that has caused those problems Focusing on drugs obscures this

According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (quoted in Dibble, 2010) described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. The Los Angeles Times (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces. More important, it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination. The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story. In that regard discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful. Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses Michel Foucault (1972–1977: 120) argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth.” Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power. This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” In essence, power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it. Similarly, Edward Said (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. He says that literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” (Said, 1994: xiii). They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges. Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance (36). Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action. For Said, there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge.” They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth. Dominant discourses, meta-narratives (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites. Western1 powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies (Dunn, 2003). Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” Consequently, dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions, particularly economic ones. Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism. Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations. This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North (the United States) and scholars from the South (Latin America, Africa, et al.) and even between white and nonwhite (American Latino) scholars. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003). It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal, as Lynch (1999) points out, is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives. The U.S. Discourse on Mexico The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when Mexicans were depicted as an “uncivilized species—dirty, unkempt, immoral, diseased, lazy, unambitious and despised for being peons” (Gonzalez, 2004: 8). This discourse set the stage for the creation of what Gonzalez calls a “culture of empire,” in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests (2004: 6). This narrative depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it continues to dominate U.S. understandings of Mexico. Sometimes this is done with the help of Mexican politicians themselves, as in President Felipe Calderón’s extension of the hegemonic discourse of the “war on drugs.” The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. Mexico is suffering much more from extreme economic inequality, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), than from drug-related violence. The great migration that has occurred since 1994 has been the result of a decimated economy. While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families. The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact. Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has dedicated a web site to the series “Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep.” It has reported, among other things, that President Calderón deployed 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to 18 states (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2010) and that there were 10,031 deaths from drug-related violence between January 1, 2007, and June 5, 2009 (Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2012). (One may question the reliability of these figures, given that on February 3, 2010, the paper had reported 9,903 such deaths since January 2007 and that on August 18 of that year it had reported a total of 28,228.) As far back as 1997, M. Delal Baer (1997: 138), the director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, suggested that “skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico.” He asserted that “drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, leaping from 338 in 1991, to 515 in 1996, and 538 during the first eight months of 1997 alone” (138). This was 16 years ago; one can only imagine what the numbers are today as the drug problem in Mexico is depicted more and more as a U.S. national security problem. The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico (Gomez, 2010). The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.” Within days of the outbreak Mexico was under pressure from the world community and especially the United States to close down schools and heavily populated areas in order to avert the spread of the flu. The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations that Gonzalez discusses. Lost on the majority of the U.S. media and, consequently, on average Americans, however, was the fact that the outbreak originated in a town where the Smithfield Corporation, an American company with massive hog-raising operations known to improperly handle its waste, had a factory farm (Morales, 2009). The CDCP (2010) reported that only around 11,000 people died of the H1N1 virus between April through December of 2009, in comparison with the average of 36,000 people dying in the United States each year of the “regular” seasonal flu. If the H1N1 flu was such an epidemic, why was no one reporting on the deaths from the regular seasonal flu in the United States, which were clearly more numerous? A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35): The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999). Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s. Deconstructing the Dominant Discourse Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others” (Said, 1994). This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it. In 2010 there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico. In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state.” Furthermore, while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period. The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs. There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence. Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination. Implications of the Dominant Discourse The importance of the drug-related violence story lies in its masking the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s social and economic problems. It perpetuates a relationship of imperialism between the United States and Mexico that manifests itself in NAFTA, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, and direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and military assistance to help bring order to Mexico. Mexican politicians have bought the story and have been willing collaborators with economic development to “help” Mexico. Former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his Institutional Revolutionary Party vigorously pursued NAFTA as a mechanism for injecting foreign capital into Mexico’s ailing economy (Castañeda, 1993). Jaime Serra, a former secretary of trade, and J. Enrique Espinoza, an economist formerly on the council of economic advisers to the president of Mexico, have fervently proclaimed NAFTA a resounding success (Serra and Espinoza, 2002a), pointing to increased foreign direct investment as evidence. However, free trade has led only to the enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates (Robledo, 2006). Gilbert Gonzalez and Raul Fernandez (2003: 54) argue that “NAFTA is just one of the most recent examples of U.S. domination over Mexico and how it continues to misdevelop and tear apart the socioeconomic integrity of that society.” They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico.” In effect this means continuing Mexico’s long history as a U.S. economic colony, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 55). This process was supposed to lead to an opening for investment, economic growth, and access to diversified export markets for Mexico. The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State investment in agriculture was reduced by 95.5 percent and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent (Quintana, 2004: 251). Disinvestment in Mexican agriculture has meant that agricultural enterprises are unable to compete with subsidized U.S. commodities. The United States maintains domestic subsidies that allow it to export corn at 30 percent below the cost of production, wheat at 40 percent below, and cotton at 57 percent below—a practice known as “asymmetrical trading” and “dumping” and deemed illegal in world commerce (Fernandez and Whitesell, 2008). Serra and Espinoza (2002b) suggest that this is a nonissue because of NAFTA’s tariff-rate quota system, which charges tariffs for exceeding the import quotas. However, Cavanaugh and Anderson (2002) point out that under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for Mexican national agricultural producers. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent (Quintana, 2004: 256). Despite these figures the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR, 2006) points to the growth of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States by US$5.6 billion during the past 12 years as proof of the success of NAFTA. However, producers continue to abandon agricultural endeavors en masse, vacating 1.6 million previously cultivated hectares (3.95 million acres) in the first eight years of NAFTA (Quintana, 2004: 256). Peter Goodman (2007) tells the story of Ruben Rivera, who sat on a bench in a forlorn plaza, rather than working on his seven-acre farm. He used to grow tomatoes and onions, hiring 150 workers to help at harvest. Now he doesn’t even bother to plant. He can buy onions in the supermarket more cheaply than he can grow them. A crop of tomatoes yields less than the taxes. He lives off the $800 sent home monthly by his three sons, who run a yard work business in Macon, Ga. Stories like this have become all too common. As Quintana (2004: 256) puts it, “One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands.” Mexico now imports 95 percent of its edible oils, 40 percent of its beef, pork, and other meat products, 30 percent of its corn, and 50 percent of its rice. NAFTA has resulted in the “complete inability of the Mexican nation to produce the food required to feed its own people” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 57). In the end, “free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital. It was promoted by huge U.S. multinational corporations as benevolent economic development to allow them to integrate themselves into the Mexican market without having to deal with that country’s requirements and legislative issues. Mark Weisbrot (2004) of the Center of Economic Policy Research in Washington suggests that, had Mexico’s economy grown at the same pace from 1980 to the present as it did in the period from 1960 to 1980, today it would have the same standard of living as Spain. . . . To have 25 years of this rotten economic performance, you’d have to conclude something is wrong. . . . It is hard to make the case that Mexico’s aggregate economic performance would have been even worse without NAFTA. Not only has NAFTA not accomplished the growth propulsion its supporters promised in Mexico but it has had devastating social costs for Mexican society. Poverty in rural areas has risen significantly from 37 percent in 1992 to 52.4 percent in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty (Quintana, 2004: 257). NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration (Dickerson, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Since 1994 an average of 600 peasants a day (at least 1.78 million people) have migrated from rural areas, many to northern cities along the U.S.-Mexican border and others into the United States (Quintana, 2004: 258). Migration means family disintegration and the destruction of the social fabric of Mexico. Many of these jobless displaced workers will try their luck at crossing a militarized border into the United States. Peter Goodman (2007), interviewing Luz Maria Vazquez, a tomato picker from Jalisco, reports that six of her brothers and sisters are in the United States, most of them without papers. More than 11 million Mexicans (a conservative estimate) now live in the United States without documents, and 7 million of them immigrated after NAFTA, between 1994 and 2005 (Passel, 2006).4 Clearly the politics in Mexico are much more complex than the drug story in the United States makes them out to be. Conclusion The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones (O’Reilly, 2013), and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people. Even at its most basic level, we can only call this imperialism. While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico. The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism. For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary. The irony of it all is that NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest. In the end, the way Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people. This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.

<h4>Discourse of the Mexican narco-state under siege by cartels instantiates waves of racialized colonialism by positioning Mexico as culturally inferior and in need of development – these representations undergird violent neoliberal apparatuses which makes structural violence and Mexican instability inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Carlos 14</u></strong> (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz</p><p>According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, <u>Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.”</u> Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary <u>Clinton</u> (quoted in Dibble, 2010) <u>described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency</u>” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. <u><mark>The L</mark>os <mark>A</mark>ngeles <mark>Times</u></mark> (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it <u><mark>suggested</mark> that <mark>Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels</u></mark>. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” <u>A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. <mark>Drug-related violence is not</mark>, however, <mark>Mexico’s foremost problem, and</mark> the reporting on <mark>it <strong>obscures</mark> the more serious and immediate <mark>economic and social problems</strong></mark> it faces</u>. More important, <u><mark>it <strong>masks their origin in U.S.</mark> economic foreign <mark>policy</strong> while providing justification for</mark> continued and future <strong>U.S. paternalism and <mark>domination</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. <mark>It is linked to discourses surrounding</mark> the <strong><mark>colonization</mark> of the Americas, <mark>the white man’s burden</mark>, the <mark>extermination of the native population</mark>, <mark>Manifest Destiny</mark>, the Mexican-American War, <mark>racial segregation</mark> in the United States, <mark>and prejudice against immigrants</u></strong></mark>. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the <u>current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story</u>. In that regard <u>discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful</u>.</p><p>Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses</p><p>Michel <u>Foucault</u> (1972–1977: 120) <u>argues that “<strong><mark>discourse serves to make possible</mark> a whole series of <mark>interventions</mark>, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth</u></strong>.” <u>Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power</u>. <u>This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth</u>” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “<u>what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse</u>.” In essence, <u><mark>power produces discourse that justifies</mark>, legitimates, <mark>and increases it</u></mark>. Similarly, Edward <u>Said</u> (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, <u>says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics.</u> He says that <u><mark>literature</mark> <strong>supports, <mark>elaborates</mark>, and consolidates the practices of <mark>empire</strong></mark>. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, <strong>creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them”</u></strong> (Said, 1994: xiii). <u>They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.</p><p>Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons</u>. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, <u><mark>representations have</mark> <strong>very <mark>precise political consequences</strong></mark>.</u> <u>They either legitimize or delegitimize power</u>, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). <u>Said asserts that a <mark>narrative</mark> emerges that <mark>separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a <strong>justification for imperialism</strong></mark> and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance</u> (36). <u><mark>Discourses</mark> are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action</u>. For Said, <u>there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful</u>. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, <u>through repetition <strong><mark>they become “regimes of truth</mark> and knowledge</u></strong>.” <u>They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which <mark>put into circulation representations</mark> that are taken as truth.</p><p><mark>Dominant discourses</mark>, meta-narratives</u> (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), <u>and cultural representations are important because they <strong><mark>construct “realities” that are</mark> taken seriously and <mark>acted upon</u></strong></mark>. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “<u><mark>dominant narratives</mark> do ‘work’ <strong>even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence</strong>, to the degree that their conceptual foundations <strong>call upon or <mark>validate norms</strong></mark> that are <mark>deemed intersubjectively legitimate</mark>.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be <strong>constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed</strong> by actual people</u> (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that <u>the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites</u>. <u><mark>Western</u></mark>1 <u><mark>powers</mark>, including the United States, have <mark>maintained hegemony by <strong>establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized</strong></mark> are identities that have provided <strong>justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism</u></strong> (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). <u>The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies</u> (Dunn, 2003). <u><mark>Through</mark> constant <mark>repetition, a racialized </mark>identity of the non-American, barbaric <mark>“other” is constructed</mark>, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.”</u> Consequently, <u>dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide <strong>a veil for “imperial encounters</strong>,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control</u> (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that <u>dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions</u>, particularly economic ones.</p><p><u>Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly <mark>literature</mark> that <strong><mark>describes Latin America as</mark> a <mark>“backward”</strong></mark> region that “irrationally” resists modernization</u>. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, <u>the discourse created by the modernization and <mark>development literature</mark> focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and <mark>becomes the</mark> West’s <strong><mark>justification for</mark> the continued <mark>underdevelopment</mark> of the region</strong>.</u> These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. <u><strong>They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism</u></strong>.</p><p>Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of <u>imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations</u>.</p><p>This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which <u><strong><mark>non-Western scholarship is</mark> excluded</strong> because it is <mark>not regarded as legitimate</u></mark>. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. <u><mark>There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North</u></mark> (the United States) <u><mark>and</mark> scholars from the <mark>South</u></mark> (Latin America, Africa, et al.) <u>and even between white and nonwhite</u> (American Latino) <u>scholars</u>. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly <u>Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003).</p><p><mark>It is important</mark>, then, <strong><mark>to</mark> understand and <mark>deconstruct discourses</strong></mark>, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal</u>, as Lynch (1999) points out, <u>is to <strong><mark>expose</mark> the material and ideological <mark>power relationships</strong></mark> that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—<mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>examine counterhegemonic alternatives</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>The U.S. Discourse on Mexico</p><p><u>The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when <mark>Mexicans were depicted as</mark> an “<strong><mark>uncivilized</mark> species—<mark>dirty</mark>, unkempt, immoral, <mark>diseased</mark>, lazy, unambitious <mark>and despised</mark> for being peons</u></strong>” (Gonzalez, 2004: 8). <u>This discourse set the stage for the creation of </u>what Gonzalez calls<u> <strong>a “culture of empire,”</strong> in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and <strong>subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests</u></strong> (2004: 6). <u><mark>This narrative</mark> depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it <strong><mark>continues to dominate</mark> U.S. understandings of Mexico</u></strong>. Sometimes this is done with the help of Mexican politicians themselves, as in President Felipe Calderón’s extension of the hegemonic discourse of the “war on drugs.” <u>The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. <mark>Mexico is suffering <strong>much more from</mark> extreme <mark>economic inequality</strong></mark>, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), <mark>than from drug</mark>-related <mark>violence</u></mark>. The great migration that has occurred since 1994 has been the result of a decimated economy. <u>While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families</u>. <u>The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact.</p><p>Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past</u>. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has dedicated a web site to the series “Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep.” It has reported, among other things, that President Calderón deployed 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to 18 states (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2010) and that there were 10,031 deaths from drug-related violence between January 1, 2007, and June 5, 2009 (Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2012). (One may question the reliability of these figures, given that on February 3, 2010, the paper had reported 9,903 such deaths since January 2007 and that on August 18 of that year it had reported a total of 28,228.) As far back as 1997, M. Delal Baer (1997: 138), the director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, suggested that “<u>skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico</u>.” He asserted that “<u>drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal</u>, leaping from 338 in 1991, to 515 in 1996, and 538 during the first eight months of 1997 alone” (138). This was 16 years ago; one can only imagine what the numbers are today as the drug problem in Mexico is depicted more and more as a U.S. national security problem.</p><p><u>The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico</u> (Gomez, 2010). <u>The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.”</u> Within days of the outbreak Mexico was under pressure from the world community and especially the United States to close down schools and heavily populated areas in order to avert the spread of the flu. <u>The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations</u> that Gonzalez discusses. Lost on the majority of the U.S. media and, consequently, on average Americans, however, was the fact that the outbreak originated in a town where the Smithfield Corporation, an American company with massive hog-raising operations known to improperly handle its waste, had a factory farm (Morales, 2009). The CDCP (2010) reported that only around 11,000 people died of the H1N1 virus between April through December of 2009, in comparison with the average of 36,000 people dying in the United States each year of the “regular” seasonal flu. If the H1N1 flu was such an epidemic, why was no one reporting on the deaths from the regular seasonal flu in the United States, which were clearly more numerous?</p><p>A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but <u>it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports</u>. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35):</p><p>The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.</p><p>Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, <u>it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels</u>. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that <u>the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions</u>. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. <u>The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos</u>.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999).</p><p><u><strong><mark>Representing Mexico as a</mark> potential <mark>“failing state”</strong></mark> in the midst of violent anarchy <mark>provides</mark> the U.S. <mark>justification for</mark> continued <mark>economic paternalism</mark>. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus <strong>manufacturing consent</strong> as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further <strong>neoliberal economic development or military intervention</u></strong>. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s.</p><p>Deconstructing the Dominant Discourse</p><p>Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has <mark>contrasted its</mark> supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, <mark>liberty</mark>, and self-determination <mark>with </mark>the <strong><mark>barbaric brutality </mark>of the “others</u></strong>” (Said, 1994). <u>This American exceptionalism has been used to <strong>legitimate its domination</strong> over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors</u>. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it.</p><p>In 2010 <u><mark>there were</mark> an estimated <mark>23 million</mark> reported <mark>crimes of violence</mark> and/or theft <mark>in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these <u><mark>statistics</mark> clearly <mark>do not justify</mark> any assertion <mark>that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is a “failing state.” Yet </mark>such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that <mark>jumps to that conclusion about Mexico</u></mark>.</p><p>In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, <u><mark>Mexico is far from</mark> being <mark>an</mark> extreme <mark>outlier</u></mark>. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the <u>United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state</u>.”</p><p>Furthermore, <u>while more people are killed in Mexico, <mark>more people kill themselves in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, <u><mark>Mexico’s violence</mark> problem <mark>has remained</mark> relatively <mark>constant over</mark> the course of the past <mark>25 years</mark>, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period</u>.</p><p>The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, <u>there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives</u>. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “<u>the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse</u> . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that <u>Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US</u>.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs.</p><p>There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence.</p><p><u>Is there <mark>drug violence</mark> in Mexico? Yes, but this <strong><mark>does not make Mexico a “failing state.”</u></strong></mark> While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. <u>Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified</u>. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination.</p><p>Implications of the Dominant Discourse</p><p><u>The importance of <mark>the drug</mark>-related violence <mark>story</mark> lies in its <strong>masking the nature of U.S. involvement</strong> in Mexico’s social and economic problems</u>. <u>It <mark>perpetuates</mark> a <strong>relationship of <mark>imperialism</strong></mark> between the United States and Mexico <mark>that manifests</mark> itself <mark>in <strong>NAFTA</strong></mark>, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, <mark>and</mark> direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and <mark>military assistance</mark> to help bring order to Mexico</u>. Mexican politicians have bought the story and have been willing collaborators with economic development to “help” Mexico. Former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his Institutional Revolutionary Party vigorously pursued NAFTA as a mechanism for injecting foreign capital into Mexico’s ailing economy (Castañeda, 1993). Jaime Serra, a former secretary of trade, and J. Enrique Espinoza, an economist formerly on the council of economic advisers to the president of Mexico, have fervently proclaimed NAFTA a resounding success (Serra and Espinoza, 2002a), pointing to increased foreign direct investment as evidence. However, <u><mark>free trade has led</mark> only <mark>to</mark> the <strong><mark>enrichment of</mark> a few <mark>monopolistic corporations</strong></mark> in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates</u> (Robledo, 2006). Gilbert Gonzalez and Raul Fernandez (2003: 54) argue that “<u><mark>NAFTA</mark> is just one of the most recent examples of <strong>U.S. domination over Mexico </strong>and how it <mark>continues to misdevelop and <strong>tear apart</mark> the <mark>socioeconomic integrity</mark> of that society</u></strong>.” <u>They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “<strong>guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises</strong> willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico</u>.” In effect <u>this means <mark>continuing Mexico’s</mark> long <mark>history as <strong>a U.S. economic colony</strong></mark>, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers</u>” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 55). This process was supposed to lead to an opening for investment, economic growth, and access to diversified export markets for Mexico.</p><p><u><mark>The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater</mark> because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State <mark>investment</mark> in agriculture <mark>was <strong>reduced by 95.5 percent</strong></mark> and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent</u> (Quintana, 2004: 251). Disinvestment in Mexican agriculture has meant that agricultural enterprises are unable to compete with subsidized U.S. commodities. The United States maintains domestic subsidies that allow it to export corn at 30 percent below the cost of production, wheat at 40 percent below, and cotton at 57 percent below—a practice known as “asymmetrical trading” and “dumping” and deemed illegal in world commerce (Fernandez and Whitesell, 2008). Serra and Espinoza (2002b) suggest that this is a nonissue because of NAFTA’s tariff-rate quota system, which charges tariffs for exceeding the import quotas. However, Cavanaugh and Anderson (2002) point out that <u>under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. <mark>The outcome has been the <strong>disappearance of profitability for</mark> Mexican national <mark>agricultural producers</strong></mark>. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent</u> (Quintana, 2004: 256). Despite these figures the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR, 2006) points to the growth of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States by US$5.6 billion during the past 12 years as proof of the success of NAFTA. However, producers continue to abandon agricultural endeavors en masse, vacating 1.6 million previously cultivated hectares (3.95 million acres) in the first eight years of NAFTA (Quintana, 2004: 256). Peter Goodman (2007) tells the story of Ruben Rivera,</p><p>who sat on a bench in a forlorn plaza, rather than working on his seven-acre farm. He used to grow tomatoes and onions, hiring 150 workers to help at harvest. Now he doesn’t even bother to plant. He can buy onions in the supermarket more cheaply than he can grow them. A crop of tomatoes yields less than the taxes. He lives off the $800 sent home monthly by his three sons, who run a yard work business in Macon, Ga.</p><p>Stories like this have become all too common. As Quintana (2004: 256) puts it, “<u>One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands</u>.” Mexico now imports 95 percent of its edible oils, 40 percent of its beef, pork, and other meat products, 30 percent of its corn, and 50 percent of its rice. <u><mark>NAFTA</mark> has <mark>resulted in the “<strong>complete inability</mark> of the Mexican nation to produce the food required <mark>to feed its own people</u></strong></mark>” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 57).</p><p>In the end, “<u>free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of <strong>deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital</u></strong>. It was promoted by huge U.S. multinational corporations as benevolent economic development to allow them to integrate themselves into the Mexican market without having to deal with that country’s requirements and legislative issues. Mark Weisbrot (2004) of the Center of Economic Policy Research in Washington suggests that, had Mexico’s economy</p><p>grown at the same pace from 1980 to the present as it did in the period from 1960 to 1980, today it would have the same standard of living as Spain. . . . To have 25 years of this rotten economic performance, you’d have to conclude something is wrong. . . . It is hard to make the case that Mexico’s aggregate economic performance would have been even worse without NAFTA.</p><p>Not only has NAFTA not accomplished the growth propulsion its supporters promised in Mexico but it has had devastating social costs for Mexican society. <u><mark>Poverty</mark> in rural areas <mark>has risen </mark>significantly <mark>from 37 percent</mark> in 1992 <mark>to 52.4 percent</mark> in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty</u> (Quintana, 2004: 257). <u>NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration</u> (Dickerson, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Since 1994 an average of 600 peasants a day (at least 1.78 million people) have migrated from rural areas, many to northern cities along the U.S.-Mexican border and others into the United States (Quintana, 2004: 258). Migration means family disintegration and the destruction of the social fabric of Mexico. Many of these jobless displaced workers will try their luck at crossing a militarized border into the United States. Peter Goodman (2007), interviewing Luz Maria Vazquez, a tomato picker from Jalisco, reports that six of her brothers and sisters are in the United States, most of them without papers. More than 11 million Mexicans (a conservative estimate) now live in the United States without documents, and 7 million of them immigrated after NAFTA, between 1994 and 2005 (Passel, 2006).4 Clearly the politics in Mexico are much more complex than the drug story in the United States makes them out to be.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. <u>The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south</u> (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). <u>It employs a foreign policy that advances its <strong>imperialist interests</strong>. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a <mark>discourse of a <strong>“chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” </strong>has provided justification for</mark> direct U.S. <mark>military intervention</mark>, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones</u> (O’Reilly, 2013), <u>and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people</u>. Even at its most basic level, <u><strong>we can only call this imperialism</strong>.</p><p></u>While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But <u>the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about <strong>“othering” Mexico</strong>.</p><p></u>The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its <u>economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has <strong>stunted Mexican economic growth</strong> and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity</u>. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since <u>the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism</u>.</p><p>For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. <u>Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to <strong>evade responsibility</strong> for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary</u>.</p><p>The irony of it all is that <u><mark>NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a</mark> chaotic and <mark>violent Mexico needing</mark> economic programs of <mark>development to solve its social problems, when</mark> in fact <mark>it is</mark> the penetration of <strong>U.S. <mark>capital that has caused</mark> many of <mark>those problems</strong></mark>. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the <strong>veil for this “imperial encounter”</strong> to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest</u>. In the end, the way <u>Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is <strong>a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism</strong> in Mexico.</u> Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. <u><strong><mark>Focusing on drugs</mark> and violence <mark>obscures this</u></strong></mark>. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. <u>Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people.</u> This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.</p>

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ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

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CP solves all benefits of legalization trhough unionization and is the best alt to criminalization

Thompson 2k

Thompson 2k

. ETB] Decriminalizing prostitution and all associated activities empower prostitutes to control over their lives and work conditions Decriminalization will permit prostitutes to organize and form unions in order to voice their needs and concern prostitutes would improve working conditions Recognition as a legal activity would permit prostitutes to demand implementation of satisfactory health and safety standards, which would legally have to be followed by those who employ prostitutes. Training in "self-defense, sexual techniques, money management ... and the creation of mutual aid and support networks" would empower prostitutes with formal control over themselves and their environment under a system of criminalization, prostitutes are unable to gain access to adequate health care or become eligible for workmen's compensation or disability. under a model of decriminalization, recognizing prostitution as a legal profession would alter this grim reality.¶ From a health perspective, many benefits would develop decriminalization would make private health insurance available to all prostitutes Since prostitution would no longer be illegal, private insurers would be able to provide legal coverage to prostitutes who could afford it Secondly, decriminalization would make employer-based health coverage available to prostitutes who were employed in brothels Lastly, eliminating the illegality of prostitution may allow prostitutes to have access to state sponsored health care coverage, such as Social Security Disability Insurance or worker's compensation¶ enforcing the laws against prostitution is costly and a waste of valuable resources and manpower Increasing technology and advanced methods of communication have made the easy arrest of the streetwalker virtually obsolete In order to keep up, governments have to invest more time and money to enforce prostitution laws police costs account for 40% of all public fund sixteen cities spent a total of $ 35,627,496 [million] to prosecute women for prostitution and 31,770,211 on incarcerating prostitutes In New York, prostitutes accounted for over 50% of the population in women's jails and in California they accounted for at least 30 prostitutes usually serve longer sentences than women convicted of other misdemeanors. policing prostitution is inherently lengthy Decrimin would allow costs and resources used for prostitution enforcement to be transferred to enforce more pressing legal concerns. Not only would this be a more efficient use of presently scarce resources and precious police manpower, the costs to local taxpayers would decrease tremendously, saving Americans millions. decriminalization involve equal protection selective enforcement places a disproportionate blame on women for the problems of prostitution Decriminalization would grant prostitutes a privacy right to engage in consensual commercial sex, thereby affording them legal protection and rights The decriminalization of voluntary prostitution is not only the best alternative, it is the only alternative. Only within a system of decriminalization would prostitutes be free to demand the equal justice and representation under the law they so rightly deserve. Decriminalization would empower prostitutes with the ability to demand recognition of their work as labor worthy of receiving all the benefits and protections afforded to any other profession. When society allows prostitutes to organize and form support networks, it gives them a voice to shout out against any abuse and injustice. Decriminalization acknowledges that prostitutes are not the enemies, but rather a system that marginalizes their existence and defines them as criminals is the enemy. demand for decrim sends a message that society will no longer support a system that arbitrarily selects who will be protected from abuse and who will not. Decrim may not be perfect but it is the answer that makes the most sense.

. ETB] Decrim will permit prostitutes to form unions prostitutes would improve working conditions Recognition would permit prostitutes to demand health and safety standards which would have to be followed decrim would make health insurance available insurers would be able to provide coverage decrim would make employer-based health coverage available eliminating illegality may allow prostitutes to have state sponsored coverage enforcing the laws against prostitution is costly and waste resources techn made the arrest of the streetwalker obsolete keep up, governments have to invest more time and money sixteen cities spent 35 million] to prosecute prostitution In New York, prostitutes accounted for 50% of the population in women's jails in California they accounted for 30 Decrimin would costs and resources to be transferred to enforce more pressing legal concerns. costs to taxpayers would decrease saving millions Decrim would grant prostitutes a privacy right decrim is the best alt Decrim would empower demand for decrim sends a message that society will no longer support a system that arbitrarily selects who will be protected from abuse and who will not. Decrim may not be perfect but it is the answer that makes the most sense.

[Susan, J.D. Candidate, Capital University Law School May 2000; 21 Women's Rights L. Rep. 217. ETB] Decriminalizing the act of prostitution and all associated activities is directly aimed at empowering prostitutes to take control over their lives and their work conditions. n518 Prostitute's lives are dependent upon healthy, safe, and economically viable work conditions. Protection alone is meaningless if prostitutes are continually denied the right to work, organize, and participate in social security programs. n519¶ Decriminalization will permit prostitutes to organize and form unions in order to voice their needs and concerns. As a professional union, prostitutes would be better able to fight for improved working conditions and even develop standard professional codes of ethics and behavior that regulate their occupation. n520 Recognition as a legal activity would permit prostitutes to demand implementation of satisfactory health and safety standards, which would legally have to be followed by those who employ prostitutes. n521 Prostitutes would be able to request a leave of absence for illness and vacations when the stress of the job become too much to handle. Additionally, decriminalization would give prostitutes the opportunity to create and operate job-related training programs publicly for new prostitutes and refresher courses for the more experienced prostitute. Training in "self-defense, sexual techniques, money management ... and the creation of mutual aid and support networks" would empower prostitutes with formal control over themselves and their environment. n522¶ Presently, under a system of criminalization, prostitutes are unable to gain access to adequate health care or become eligible for workmen's compensation or disability. If prostitutes are injured or become sick on the job, they have no insurance to compensate them while they are unable to work. n523 However, under a model of decriminalization, recognizing prostitution as a legal profession would alter this grim reality.¶ From a health perspective, many benefits would develop from decriminalizing prostitution. Firstly, decriminalization would make private health insurance available to all prostitutes. n524 Since prostitution would no longer be illegal, private insurers would be able to provide legal coverage to prostitutes who could afford it. n525 Secondly, decriminalization would make employer-based health coverage available to prostitutes who were employed in brothels. n526 Economic incentives or legal sanctions could mandate that employers provide health insurance to their employees at affordable rates. n527 Lastly, eliminating the illegality of prostitution may allow prostitutes to have access to state sponsored health care coverage, such as Social Security Disability Insurance or worker's compensation¶ As noted earlier, enforcing the laws against prostitution is costly and a waste of valuable resources and manpower. n530 Increasing technology and advanced methods of communication have made the easy arrest of the streetwalker virtually obsolete. n531 In order to keep up, governments have to invest more time and money to enforce prostitution laws. According to the New York Times, "the internet, pagers, cellular phones and subterfuges like escort services have enabled more discreet forms of prostitution [*246] to thrive beyond the reach of the street-level crackdown ...." n532¶ A 1985 study of sixteen of the nation's largest cities, indicated that each city had spent approximately $ 7.5 million to enforce prostitution laws. n533 This came out to an estimated $ 120 million spent for all sixteen cities combined. n534 The study further detailed that police officers working in pairs, spent an average of twenty-one hours per prostitution arrest. n535 This included the time necessary to,¶ ¶ (1) obtain a solicitation from, and make an arrest of, a suspected prostitute or customer; (2) transport the arrestee to the police station or detention center; (3) complete finger-¶ printing and identification processes; (4) write and file a report; and (5) testify in court. This fifth duty absorbs the majority of each arresting officer's twenty-one hours. n536¶ ¶ After spending all those hours on one arrest, it is not surprising that police costs account for 40% of all public funds. n537 All sixteen of the cities studied, had spent a total of $ 35,627,496 [million] to prosecute women for prostitution and an estimated $ 31,770,211 was spent on incarcerating prostitutes. n538 In New York, prostitutes accounted for over 50% of the population in women's jails and in California they accounted for at least 30%. n539 The reasoning behind these figures, is simply that prostitutes usually serve longer sentences than women convicted of other misdemeanors. n540¶ It is clear that the costs and resources wasted on enforcing prostitution laws are ridiculous. The process of policing prostitution is an inherently lengthy and tedious one. n541 Decriminalization would allow costs and resources used for prostitution enforcement to be transferred to enforce more pressing legal concerns. n542 Not only would this be a more efficient use of presently scarce resources and precious police manpower, the costs to local taxpayers would decrease tremendously, saving Americans millions. n543¶ A final argument in favor of decriminalization involves the equal protection violations against women prosecuted for solicitation. n544 Prostitutes and support organizations citing an equal protection violation, address the statutory discriminatory treatment as applied to clients, married couples, and prostitutes. n545 Although many states have statutes that make illegal both the solicitation and the procurement of commercial sex, prostitutes often face unfair treatment under the law. n546 This selective enforcement places a disproportionate blame on women for the problems of prostitution. n547 Decriminalization would grant prostitutes a privacy right to engage in consensual commercial sex, thereby affording them legal protection and rights. n548 However, the state courts have failed to recognize a privacy interest to engage in commercial sex. n549 Roe II v. Butterworth, ruled that although the Florida statute did not deny adults the right to engage in consensual sex, there was no fundamentally protected right of privacy to engage in sex for money. n550¶ Additionally, the state courts have refused to recognize any discriminatory treatment, regarding the ways the laws treat prostitutes as compared to married couples. n551 When a husband offers to pay his wife for sexual services, that transaction will be afforded constitutional protection. However, the exchange of monetary compensation for sex between unmarried, consenting adults, is prosecuted under the laws [*247] of prostitution. n552 The court in People v. Mason ruled that states have a rational basis for discriminatory treatment between unmarried and married adults since there exists a heightened privacy interest for all marital relationships. n553 Theorists in favor of prostitution argue that there is essentially no difference between the exchange of money for sex in a marriage or within a prostitute-client relationship. n554 According to Simone de Beauvoir, "for both [marriage and prostitution] the sexual act is a service; the one is hired for life by one man; the other has several clients who pay her by the piece." n555¶ The decriminalization of voluntary prostitution is not only the best alternative, it is the only alternative. Only within a system of decriminalization would prostitutes be free to demand the equal justice and representation under the law they so rightly deserve. Decriminalization would empower prostitutes with the ability to demand recognition of their work as labor worthy of receiving all the benefits and protections afforded to any other profession. When society allows prostitutes to organize and form support networks, it gives them a voice to shout out against any abuse and injustice. Decriminalization acknowledges that prostitutes are not the enemies, but rather a system that marginalizes their existence and defines them as criminals is the enemy.¶ To deny any individual access to satisfactory health care, fair wages, and a safe work environment is inhumane. Continued criminalization of prostitution justifies such inhumane treatment of prostitutes, under the pretext that "they" are different from "us." The demand for decriminalization sends out a message that society will no longer support a system that arbitrarily selects who will be protected from abuse under the law and who will not. Decriminalization may not be the perfect solution to all the problems associated with prostitution, but it is the answer that makes the most sense.

<h4>CP solves all benefits of legalization trhough unionization <u><strong>and is the best alt to criminalization </h4><p>Thompson 2k</p><p></u></strong>[Susan, J.D. Candidate, Capital University Law School May 2000; 21 Women's Rights L. Rep. 217<u><mark>. ETB]</p><p></mark>Decriminalizing</u> the act of <u>prostitution</u> <u>and all associated activities</u> is directly aimed at <u>empower</u>ing <u>prostitutes</u> <u>to</u> take <u>control over their lives and</u> their <u>work conditions</u>. n518 Prostitute's lives are dependent upon healthy, safe, and economically viable work conditions. Protection alone is meaningless if prostitutes are continually denied the right to work, organize, and participate in social security programs. n519¶ <u><mark>Decrim</mark>inalization <mark>will permit prostitutes to </mark>organize and <mark>form unions </mark>in order to voice their needs and concern</u>s. As a professional union, <u><mark>prostitutes would </u></mark>be better able to fight for<u> <mark>improve</u></mark>d<u> <mark>working conditions </u></mark>and even develop standard professional codes of ethics and behavior that regulate their occupation. n520 <u><mark>Recognition </mark>as a legal activity <mark>would permit prostitutes to demand </mark>implementation of satisfactory <strong><mark>health and safety standards</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>which would</strong> </mark>legally <strong><mark>have to be followed</strong> </mark>by those who employ prostitutes.</u> n521 Prostitutes would be able to request a leave of absence for illness and vacations when the stress of the job become too much to handle. Additionally, decriminalization would give prostitutes the opportunity to create and operate job-related training programs publicly for new prostitutes and refresher courses for the more experienced prostitute. <u>Training in "self-defense, sexual techniques, money management ... and the creation of mutual aid and support networks" would empower prostitutes with formal control over themselves and their environment</u>. n522¶ Presently, <u>under a system of criminalization, prostitutes are unable to gain access to adequate health care or become eligible for workmen's compensation or disability.</u> If prostitutes are injured or become sick on the job, they have no insurance to compensate them while they are unable to work. n523 However, <u>under a model of decriminalization, recognizing prostitution as a legal profession would alter this grim reality.¶ From a health perspective, many benefits would develop</u> from decriminalizing prostitution. Firstly, <u><strong><mark>decrim</strong></mark>inalization <strong><mark>would make</strong> </mark>private <strong><mark>health</strong> <strong>insurance available</strong> </mark>to all prostitutes</u>. n524 <u>Since prostitution would no longer be illegal, private <mark>insurers would be able to provide </mark>legal <mark>coverage </mark>to prostitutes who could afford it</u>. n525 <u>Secondly, <mark>decrim</mark>inalization <mark>would make employer-based</mark> <mark>health coverage available </mark>to prostitutes who were employed in brothels</u>. n526 Economic incentives or legal sanctions could mandate that employers provide health insurance to their employees at affordable rates. n527 <u>Lastly, <mark>eliminating </mark>the <mark>illegality </mark>of prostitution <mark>may allow prostitutes to have </mark>access to <mark>state sponsored </mark>health care <mark>coverage</mark>, such as Social Security Disability Insurance or worker's compensation¶<strong> </u></strong>As noted earlier, <u><mark>enforcing the laws against prostitution is costly and </mark>a <mark>waste </mark>of valuable <mark>resources </mark>and manpower</u>. n530 <u>Increasing <mark>techn</mark>ology and advanced methods of communication have <mark>made the </mark>easy <mark>arrest of the streetwalker </mark>virtually <mark>obsolete</u></mark>. n531 <u>In order to <mark>keep up, governments have to invest more time and money </mark>to enforce prostitution laws</u>. According to the New York Times, "the internet, pagers, cellular phones and subterfuges like escort services have enabled more discreet forms of prostitution [*246] to thrive beyond the reach of the street-level crackdown ...." n532¶ A 1985 study of sixteen of the nation's largest cities, indicated that each city had spent approximately $ 7.5 million to enforce prostitution laws. n533 This came out to an estimated $ 120 million spent for all sixteen cities combined. n534 The study further detailed that police officers working in pairs, spent an average of twenty-one hours per prostitution arrest. n535 This included the time necessary to,¶ ¶ (1) obtain a solicitation from, and make an arrest of, a suspected prostitute or customer; (2) transport the arrestee to the police station or detention center; (3) complete finger-¶ printing and identification processes; (4) write and file a report; and (5) testify in court. This fifth duty absorbs the majority of each arresting officer's twenty-one hours. n536¶ ¶ After spending all those hours on one arrest, it is not surprising that <u>police costs account for 40% of all public fund</u>s. n537 All <u><mark>sixteen</u> </mark>of the <u><mark>cities</u> </mark>studied, had <u><mark>spent </mark>a total of $ <mark>35</mark>,627,496 [<mark>million] to prosecute </mark>women for <mark>prostitution </mark>and</u> an estimated $ <u>31,770,211</u> was spent <u>on</u> <u>incarcerating</u> <u>prostitutes</u>. n538 <u><mark>In New York, prostitutes accounted for</mark> over <mark>50% of the population in women's jails </mark>and <mark>in California they accounted for </mark>at least <mark>30</u></mark>%. n539 The reasoning behind these figures, is simply that <u>prostitutes usually serve longer sentences than women convicted of other misdemeanors.</u> n540¶ It is clear that the costs and resources wasted on enforcing prostitution laws are ridiculous. The process of <u>policing prostitution is </u>an <u>inherently lengthy </u>and tedious one. n541 <u><strong><mark>Decrimin</u></strong></mark>alization <u><strong><mark>would</strong> </mark>allow <strong><mark>costs and resources</strong> </mark>used for prostitution enforcement <strong><mark>to be transferred to enforce more pressing legal concerns.</u></strong></mark> n542 <u>Not only would this be a more efficient use of presently scarce resources and precious police manpower, the <mark>costs to </mark>local <mark>taxpayers would decrease </mark>tremendously, <mark>saving </mark>Americans <mark>millions</mark>.</u> n543¶ A final argument in favor of <u>decriminalization involve</u>s the <u>equal protection</u> violations against women prosecuted for solicitation. n544 Prostitutes and support organizations citing an equal protection violation, address the statutory discriminatory treatment as applied to clients, married couples, and prostitutes. n545 Although many states have statutes that make illegal both the solicitation and the procurement of commercial sex, prostitutes often face unfair treatment under the law. n546 This <u>selective enforcement places a disproportionate blame on women for the problems of prostitution</u>. n547 <u><mark>Decrim</mark>inalization <mark>would grant prostitutes a privacy right </mark>to engage in consensual commercial sex, thereby affording them legal protection and rights</u>. n548 However, the state courts have failed to recognize a privacy interest to engage in commercial sex. n549 Roe II v. Butterworth, ruled that although the Florida statute did not deny adults the right to engage in consensual sex, there was no fundamentally protected right of privacy to engage in sex for money. n550¶ Additionally, the state courts have refused to recognize any discriminatory treatment, regarding the ways the laws treat prostitutes as compared to married couples. n551 When a husband offers to pay his wife for sexual services, that transaction will be afforded constitutional protection. However, the exchange of monetary compensation for sex between unmarried, consenting adults, is prosecuted under the laws [*247] of prostitution. n552 The court in People v. Mason ruled that states have a rational basis for discriminatory treatment between unmarried and married adults since there exists a heightened privacy interest for all marital relationships. n553 Theorists in favor of prostitution argue that there is essentially no difference between the exchange of money for sex in a marriage or within a prostitute-client relationship. n554 According to Simone de Beauvoir, "for both [marriage and prostitution] the sexual act is a service; the one is hired for life by one man; the other has several clients who pay her by the piece." n555¶ <u>The <strong><mark>decrim</strong></mark>inalization of voluntary prostitution <strong><mark>is</strong> </mark>not only <strong><mark>the best alt</mark>ernative</strong>, it is the only alternative. Only within a system of decriminalization would prostitutes be free to demand the equal justice and representation under the law they so rightly deserve.</u> <u><mark>Decrim</mark>inalization <mark>would empower </mark>prostitutes with the ability to demand recognition of their work as labor worthy of receiving all the benefits and protections afforded to any other profession. When society allows prostitutes to organize and form support networks, it gives them a voice to shout out against any abuse and injustice. Decriminalization acknowledges that prostitutes are not the enemies, but rather a system that marginalizes their existence and defines them as criminals is the enemy.</u>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>To deny any individual access to satisfactory health care, fair wages, and a safe work environment is inhumane. Continued criminalization of prostitution justifies such inhumane treatment of prostitutes, under the pretext that "they" are different from "us." The <u><mark>demand for decrim</u></mark>inalization <u><mark>sends </u></mark>out <u><mark>a</u></mark> <u><mark>message that society will no longer support a system that arbitrarily selects who will be protected from abuse </u></mark>under the law <u><mark>and who will not. Decrim</u></mark>inalization <u><mark>may not be</u></mark> the <u><mark>perfect </u></mark>solution to all the problems associated with prostitution, <u><mark>but it is the answer that makes the most sense.</p></u></mark>

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Emory BD

Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round4.docx

EvZo

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college

Economic disaster is the quilting point for modern virtualized preemption; the transformation of economics into a risk factory – this operative logic of speculative mastery ensures cycles of death-making and self-actualization

Calkivik 10

Calkivik 10 (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/99479/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) gz

the contemporary politics of security is additionally characterized by its futurity and virtuality Reaching beyond the question of the actual, the realm of security has now expanded to include “the potential to become dangerous”—a phenomenon that the notion of “virtual security” aims to capture Virtual is real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially immanent in every object. The non-existence of what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has observably taken place Operative logic designates an abstract matrix of power that combines its own ontology and epistemology. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence epistemology of preemption is one of contingency and uncertainty; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that neither the nature of the threat nor the enemy can be specified. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, nothing is perceived to be safe the enemy is no longer “a who, where, when or even what. The enemy is a whatnot this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project. Preemption is also the point where security meets capital in a world interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy since the late 1970s preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance and speculative capitalism new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. Ruled by risk management and harvesting volatility for gain, finance creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that the future will not be unpredictably different, but that it will be calculably the same preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts making “contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value governing through contingency by rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics of security and capital accumulation neoliberalism is premised on non-equilibrium models neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the non-normalizable accident and the fractal curve Preemption entails bringing the future into the present rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future the consequences precede the actualization of the event: potential threats —the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible presence that call for preemptive strikes Preemption, hence, puts in place a specific form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of future—future as what is yet to come—arrives in its coded form as an already written future Future as present risk gets integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable. Codified as risk, uncertainty becomes an opportunity to be cashed in the market place of global values

contemporary security is characterized by futurity and virtuality Reaching beyond the actual to the potential Virtual is immanent in every object what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has taken place an abstract matrix that combines its own ontology and epistemology one of contingency and uncertainty neither threat nor the enemy can be specified nothing is safe The enemy is a whatnot Preemption is where security meets capital interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt speculative capitalism Ruled by risk and volatility the future will be calculably the same preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics consequences precede actualization Preemption arrives in its coded form as an already written future. Future as present risk integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable uncertainty becomes cashed in the market place of global values

In addition to its enduring religiosity, the contemporary politics of security is additionally characterized by its futurity and virtuality. The politics of security no longer merely revolve around the question of being, of securing a life as it is. Reaching beyond the question of the actual, the realm of security has now expanded to include “the potential to become dangerous”—a phenomenon that the notion of “virtual security” aims to capture.79 As opposed to the actual, “virtual” here does not denote the non-existent. Virtual is real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially immanent in every object. The non-existence of what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has observably taken place. Massumi explores the concept of the virtual in his discussion of preemption as the primary operative logic of the contemporary politics of security.80 Operative logic designates an abstract matrix of power that combines its own ontology and epistemology. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence. Like deterrence, where mutually assured destruction assures the present stockpiling of nuclear bombs so as to defer the potential of global annihilation, preemption also entails action in the present against a future threat. Yet, unlike its predecessor that relies on epistemological certainty that assumes knowable, objective measurability, epistemology of preemption is one of contingency and uncertainty; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that neither the nature of the threat nor the enemy can be specified. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, nothing is perceived to be safe. Consequently, the global situation becomes not threatening, but threat-generating; the enemy is no longer “a who, where, when or even what. The enemy is a whatnot.”81 While Massumi focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror in his discussion of preemption, this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project. Taking as its ground a potential, preemption makes up for its absent cause by putting to work an actual affect in its fight against enemies of “global humanity”, whether it be fundamentalist terrorists or infected birds. As I elaborated in the prelude to the first chapter, in the case of the avian flu, states, international organizations, philanthropic actors, and media mobilized across local, national, regional, and global networks and rendered the flu an emergency before it became an emergency.82 The future threat of a pandemic is held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergency. Hence, the fact that the pandemic has not yet happened does not mean that it is no less present and real. Preemption is also the point where security meets capital in a world interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt. As Randy Martin notes, preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy since the late 1970s.83 Before it becomes a blueprint for action against terrorists, preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance and speculative capitalism. Martin argues that the new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. Ruled by risk management and harvesting volatility for gain, finance, as Martin explains, creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that the future will not be unpredictably different, but that it will be calculably the same.84 In this context, inflation is treated as a distortion to the economic environment that renders loss unpredictable. Monetarism, which emphasizes regulating the amount of money in circulation, is the form preemptive action takes in the realm of political economy. It becomes the predominant policy tool to guarantee that the worth of investment portfolios would not be undermined. What makes the fight against inflation resemble contemporary wars against undefined enemies is that, like terror, Martin notes, inflation needs only to be present in prospect for its menacing effects to be felt. In both cases, preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts making “contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now.”85 It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value. In her account of biotechnology and capitalism under contemporary neoliberal rule, Melinda Cooper provides a similar account to Martin’s and explores the way in which governing through contingency by rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics of security and capital accumulation.86 Distinguishing neoliberalism from Keynesian understanding of growth, Cooper suggests that unlike the latter—where the neoclassical presumption of market equilibrium is treated as a law of nature—neoliberalism is premised on non-equilibrium models. As she explains Where welfare state biopolitics speaks the language of Gaussian curves and normalizable risk, neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the non-normalizable accident and the fractal curve. Where Keynesian economics attempts to safeguard the productive economy against fluctuations of financial capital, neoliberalism installs speculation at the very core of production. 87 What is striking in these analyses of risk and government through contingency is the temporal framework that is enacted through the hegemonic articulation of preemption as the meeting point of accumulation strategies and global governance of in/securities. Security entails a relation to the future, but the nature of this relation does not remain the same because the way in which the future is assessed, calculated, and mastered can take different forms.88 As Massumi usefully notes, “[p]reemption is not prevention.” 89 Preemption entails bringing the future into the present rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future. In the preemptive framework, the consequences precede the actualization of the event: potential threats —the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible presence that call for preemptive strikes. Preemption, hence, puts in place a specific form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of future—future as what is yet to come—arrives in its coded form as an already written future. Future as present risk gets integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable. Codified as risk, uncertainty becomes an opportunity to be cashed in the market place of global values.90

<h4>Economic disaster is the quilting point for modern virtualized preemption; the transformation of economics into a risk factory – this operative logic of speculative mastery ensures cycles of death-making and self-actualization</h4><p><u><strong>Calkivik 10</u></strong> (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/99479/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) gz</p><p>In addition to its enduring religiosity, <u>the <mark>contemporary</mark> politics of <mark>security is</mark> additionally <mark>characterized by</mark> its <strong><mark>futurity and virtuality</u></strong></mark>. The politics of security no longer merely revolve around the question of being, of securing a life as it is. <u><mark>Reaching <strong>beyond the</mark> question of the <mark>actual</strong></mark>, the realm of security has now expanded <mark>to</mark> include “<strong><mark>the potential</mark> to become dangerous</strong>”—a phenomenon that the notion of “virtual security” aims to capture</u>.79 As opposed to the actual, “virtual” here does not denote the non-existent. <u><mark>Virtual is</mark> real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially <strong><mark>immanent in every object</strong></mark>. The non-existence of <mark>what has not yet happened becomes <strong>more real than what has</mark> observably <mark>taken place</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>Massumi explores the concept of the virtual in his discussion of preemption as the primary operative logic of the contemporary politics of security.80 <u>Operative logic designates <mark>an abstract matrix</mark> of power <mark>that <strong>combines its own ontology and epistemology</strong></mark>. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence</u>. Like deterrence, where mutually assured destruction assures the present stockpiling of nuclear bombs so as to defer the potential of global annihilation, preemption also entails action in the present against a future threat. Yet, unlike its predecessor that relies on epistemological certainty that assumes knowable, objective measurability, <u>epistemology of preemption is <mark>one of <strong>contingency and uncertainty</strong></mark>; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that <strong><mark>neither</mark> the nature of the <mark>threat nor the enemy can be specified</strong></mark>. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, <strong><mark>nothing is</mark> perceived to be <mark>safe</u></strong></mark>. Consequently, the global situation becomes not threatening, but threat-generating; <u>the enemy is no longer “a who, where, when or even what. <strong><mark>The enemy is a whatnot</u></strong></mark>.”81</p><p>While Massumi focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror in his discussion of preemption, <u>this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project.</u> Taking as its ground a potential, preemption makes up for its absent cause by putting to work an actual affect in its fight against enemies of “global humanity”, whether it be fundamentalist terrorists or infected birds. As I elaborated in the prelude to the first chapter, in the case of the avian flu, states, international organizations, philanthropic actors, and media mobilized across local, national, regional, and global networks and rendered the flu an emergency before it became an emergency.82 The future threat of a pandemic is held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergency. Hence, the fact that the pandemic has not yet happened does not mean that it is no less present and real.</p><p><u><mark>Preemption is</mark> also the point <mark>where <strong>security meets capital</strong></mark> in a world <strong><mark>interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt</u></strong></mark>. As Randy Martin notes, <u>preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the <strong>guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy</strong> since the late 1970s</u>.83 Before it becomes a blueprint for action against terrorists, <u>preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance and <strong><mark>speculative capitalism</u></strong></mark>. Martin argues that the <u>new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. <mark>Ruled by risk </mark>management <mark>and</mark> harvesting <mark>volatility</mark> for gain, finance</u>, as Martin explains, <u>creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that <mark>the future will</mark> <strong>not be unpredictably different, but that it will <mark>be calculably the same</u></strong></mark>.84 In this context, inflation is treated as a distortion to the economic environment that renders loss unpredictable. Monetarism, which emphasizes regulating the amount of money in circulation, is the form preemptive action takes in the realm of political economy. It becomes the predominant policy tool to guarantee that the worth of investment portfolios would not be undermined. What makes the fight against inflation resemble contemporary wars against undefined enemies is that, like terror, Martin notes, inflation needs only to be present in prospect for its menacing effects to be felt. In both cases, <u><mark>preemption <strong>converts potential threats into actual conflicts</strong></mark> making “contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now</u>.”85 <u>It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value</u>. </p><p>In her account of biotechnology and capitalism under contemporary neoliberal rule, Melinda Cooper provides a similar account to Martin’s and explores the way in which <u>governing through contingency by <strong><mark>rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit</strong> becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics</mark> of security and capital accumulation</u>.86 Distinguishing neoliberalism from Keynesian understanding of growth, Cooper suggests that unlike the latter—where the neoclassical presumption of market equilibrium is treated as a law of nature—<u>neoliberalism is premised on <strong>non-equilibrium models</u></strong>. As she explains</p><p>Where welfare state biopolitics speaks the language of Gaussian curves and normalizable risk, <u>neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the <strong>non-normalizable accident</strong> and the fractal curve</u>. Where Keynesian economics attempts to safeguard the productive economy against fluctuations of financial capital, neoliberalism installs speculation at the very core of production. 87</p><p>What is striking in these analyses of risk and government through contingency is the temporal framework that is enacted through the hegemonic articulation of preemption as the meeting point of accumulation strategies and global governance of in/securities. Security entails a relation to the future, but the nature of this relation does not remain the same because the way in which the future is assessed, calculated, and mastered can take different forms.88 As Massumi usefully notes, “[p]reemption is not prevention.” 89 <u>Preemption entails bringing the future into the present <strong>rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future</u></strong>. In the preemptive framework, <u><strong>the <mark>consequences precede</mark> the <mark>actualization</mark> of the event:</strong> potential threats —the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible presence that <strong>call for preemptive strikes</u></strong>. <u><mark>Preemption</mark>, hence, puts in place a specific form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of future—future as <strong>what is yet to come—<mark>arrives in its coded form as an already written future</u></strong>. <u><strong>Future as present risk</u></strong></mark> <u>gets <mark>integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable</mark>. Codified as risk, <mark>uncertainty becomes</mark> an opportunity to be <strong><mark>cashed in the market place of global values</u></strong></mark>.90</p>

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Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

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Academy is the root cause of all of their impacts

Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States During World War I some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on racial statecraft, militarized science, and civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through scholarly theories staked out in conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures has been a cornerstone of the management of “difference” as well as the conquest of native populations inclusion “there,” became governmentality “here,” universities must be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” constructed by anthropology constructions such as “savage” helped create the scaffoldings of imperial cartographies During World War I archaeologists worked as spies to offer “on ground geographical knowledges The Manhattan Project and the bomb sealed this inextricable link between research and militarism U.S. forces recognized they needed training about the peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for teaching the languages of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 campuses anthropologists monitored Native American reservations were involved in studying Japanese American concentration camps McCarthyism ensured questions were not asked about the reasons the business of war was becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of D o D Pentagon, and research interests shifted the fiscal nature of patronage to the defense establishment the CIA supported research to perfect psychological torture social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations and became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

<h4>Academy is the root cause of all of their impacts</h4><p><u><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</u></strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Empires of knowledge</strong> rest on</mark> the foundation of <strong><mark>racial statecraft, militarized science</strong>, and</mark> enduring notions of <strong><mark>civilizational superiority</u></strong></mark>. What we call “<u><strong><mark>imperial cartographies</strong>” can be traced through</mark> the meshed contours of research methods and <mark>scholarly theories</mark> as they are <mark>staked out in</mark> the pragmatic mappings of <strong><mark>conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire</u></strong></mark>.14 It is important to note that <u><strong><mark>expert knowledge</strong> on “other” cultures</mark> and civilizations <mark>has been a <strong>cornerstone</strong> of</mark> the development of academic disciplines and used in <mark>the <strong>management of “difference”</strong></mark> within the nation <mark>as well as the <strong>conquest</mark> and management <mark>of native populations</strong></mark> by the United States, here and overseas</u>.</p><p>For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how <u>educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex <strong>colonizing mission</u></strong>. <u>Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct <strong>racial and gendered lens</strong>, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for <mark>inclusion</mark> and civilization <mark>“there,”</mark> on the periphery, <mark>became</mark> a laboratory for <strong>new regimes of <mark>governmentality</strong> “here,”</mark> within the immediate territorial borders of the United States</u>.</p><p><u>If <mark>universities</mark> of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes <mark>must </mark>also <mark>be understood within the <strong>epistemologies of “othering”</strong></mark> being <mark>constructed by</mark> disciplines such as <mark>anthropology</u></mark>. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 <u>Theoretical <mark>constructions</mark> of categories <mark>such as <strong>“savage”</mark> and “primitive”</u></strong> were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but <u><mark>helped create the</mark> very <strong><mark>scaffoldings of</mark> European and later U.S. <mark>imperial cartographies</u></strong></mark>.17</p><p>If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, <u>what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the <strong>subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities</strong>, within and beyond the United States</u>, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period.</p><p><u><mark>During World War I</u></mark>, for instance, <u>some <mark>archaeologists worked as spies to</mark> literally <mark>offer “on ground geographical knowledges</mark>” that</u>, as David Price argues, <u>were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles</u>.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association.</p><p>The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert<u> Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22</p><p>It is</u>, of course, <u>World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. <mark>The <strong>Manhattan Project</strong> and the</mark> <strong>development of the atom <mark>bomb</strong> sealed this</mark> intimate and soon <mark>inextricable link</mark> <mark>between</mark> scientific <mark>research and militarism</u></mark>. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “<u>It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field</u>. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 <u>As <mark>U.S.</mark> and Allied <mark>forces</mark> launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they <mark>recognized</mark> that <mark>they needed</mark> condensed, accelerated <mark>training about the</mark> geographies and <mark>peoples they were encountering</u></mark>. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based <u><mark>linguistic anthropology</u></mark> that <u><mark>created the capacity for</mark> “quickly learning and <mark>teaching the languages of</mark> the new theatres of <mark>warfare</u></mark>.”24 Further, <u><mark>Army Specialized Training Programs</u></mark> (ASTPs) <u><mark>were established on 227</mark> college and university <mark>campuses</mark>, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces</u>. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 <u>early predecessors to the <strong>post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind</strong>” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror.</p><p></u>If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, <u>other sets of research skills were used for the <strong>surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state</u></strong>. For instance, <u><mark>anthropologists</mark> at the Bureau of Indian Affairs <mark>monitored</mark> and influenced war-related opinion on <strong><mark>Native American reservations</u></strong></mark>. 27 Some <u>anthropologists <mark>were involved in studying</mark> <mark>Japanese American</mark> communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the <strong><mark>concentration camps</u></strong></mark> set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 <u>Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world</u>.</p><p><u>By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured</u>. Noam Chomsky has argued that <u>by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history</u>.”29 <u>Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that <strong>state (and corporate) funding</strong> for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities</u>.30</p><p>Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but <u><mark>McCarthyism</mark> and a new wave of political repression <mark>ensured</mark> that <mark>questions were not asked about</mark> the business of war—or <mark>the reasons</mark> that <mark>the business of war was</mark> also <mark>becoming an academic business.34</p><p>This intersection of<strong> D</strong></mark>epartment <strong><mark>o</strong></mark>f <strong><mark>D</strong></mark>efense, <mark>Pentagon, and research </mark>university <mark>interests</p><p> </mark>resulted in massive amounts of funding and <mark>shifted the fiscal nature of</mark> universities’ state <mark>patronage</mark> from land-grant, agricultural resources <mark>to the</mark> huge <strong>war chest of the <mark>defense establishment</u></strong></mark>. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that <u>in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on <strong>pacification projects</strong> for doctoral dissertations</u>.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “<u><mark>the CIA supported</mark> social science <mark>research</mark> throughout the 1950s and 1960s <mark>to <strong>perfect psychological torture</strong></mark> techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the <strong>prime “condition for the socialization of research and education</u></strong>.”36 At the height of the Cold War, <u><mark>social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations</mark>—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—<mark>and</mark> after 9/11, <mark>became <strong>“embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq</u></strong></mark>.37</p>

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We must refuse the politics of liberalism and the economization of injury and suffering. Our politics does not ignore the violence of the world, it refuses a particular set of represetations and values which enframe said suffering against the movement of becoming, of life. The alternative does not wish away suffering, nor can it resolve all of the violence of modernity, but it can open us up to experiencing the world, not as zombies or vampires, but as creatures of sensuous life.

Abbas 2010

Abbas 2010

Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 183 - 187/ The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political as long as the aesthetic follows this logic—that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind—it will be limited in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation. the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). The resulting essential, ontic, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, interests, and rights. The elements of a historical materialism of suffering reconsider woundedness and victimhood in order to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are, and can be, had to our own and others’ suffering. the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations that come from codified knowledges and certitudes, such as those pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it one only has to question the imperatives these knowledges and certitudes pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, and desire for a markedly different world. not giving liberal institutions or fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring the suffering and hope of others, and not giving them the power to corner our pathos, in a moment of ethical noblesse, by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself It is imperative to reject both the righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings and the touch-me-not version of seemingly other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings and our labors as coconstitutive of the world we inhabit What would it mean to “incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go,” to convoke a politics that is “good with death” but asks for “more life Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death. It is not that there are no sufferings to be named, interpreted, and tended to it is important to remember that this is not a random, altruistic, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency and position to act on another’s suffering. Perhaps politics should be able to speak to, and for, the reserve army of those with abject, yet-to-be-interpreted-and-recompensed sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse Perhaps politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering. Perhaps if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different perhaps liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as altogether questioning the reality or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it. The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life; when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward a politics that is not modeled on the liberal, capitalist, and colonizing ideals of healthy agents who are asked to live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning victim-centered politics. The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be striven for, grasped anew, and salvaged from the arbitrary dissipations imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern schemes for solving the problem of human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and sorrow, love and death, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining. Maybe these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. It is time that we confront the nauseating exploitations and self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and where it must die these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim If it is indeed the case that the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles today ought to make us wonder whether our problem as people of this world is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that, at best, liberalism is insufficient, and, at worst, it is complicit. Perhaps the majority of the world needs a politics that is material enough to speak to, and with, their silences, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their self-injuries, their fidelities, their betrayals, their memories, their justice, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself.

The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political as long as the aesthetic follows this logic it will be limited The resulting essential, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, a historical materialism of suffering reconsider woundedness and victimhood to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are had to suffering. the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations from codified knowledges pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it. one only has to question the imperatives these pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions and desire for a markedly different world. not giving fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring suffering and not giving them the power to corner our pathos by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. It is imperative to reject both the righteous and touch-me-not version of other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings as coconstitutive It is not that there are no sufferings to be named it is important to remember that this is not a random, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency to act politics should speak to the reserve army of those with yet-to-be-interpreted sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as questioning the reality a politics not modeled on the liberal, ideals of healthy agents who live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning politics. it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be salvaged from arbitrary dissipations schemes for solving human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and death these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly It is time that we confront self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and die If it is hat the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles ought to make us wonder whether our problem is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that liberalism is complicit. a politics material enough to speak to their silences self-injuries fidelities justice

/Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 183 - 187/ In Martha Nussbaum’s celebration of cosmopolitanism, the familiar move of the invocation of the worst sufferings of mankind is bound to shut up and line everyone else in submission, not to the pain of others (as it may appear), but more fundamentally to iterations of who I am as one who suffers, as one who responds to suffering, and as one troubled by each of those questions rather than having settled them.47 Nussbaum or Shklar, in their philosophical commitments to different metaphysics (even in explicit noncommitments to metaphysics), do not even consider that their invocation of events of unimaginable suffering as cautionary tales for all of humanity is beholden to the sublime in ways complicit with liberalism’s political economy of suffering. In being so, they inadvertently evacuate the political in favor of some formalistic ethical certitude that may carry its own violent obliterations, dysfunctionalizing political judgment in submission to ethical judgments already made for us. The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political. Similarly, as long as the aesthetic follows this logic—that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind—it will be limited in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation. Beyond considering aesthetics at play in the artistry of rights and interests that privileges the Western scopic and rhetoricist regimes, the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). The resulting essential, ontic, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, interests, and rights. The elements of a historical materialism of suffering introduced over the course of this chapter—necessity, hope, and a materialist sensuous ethos—reconsider woundedness and victimhood in order to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are, and can be, had to our own and others’ suffering. They expose the presumptions and certainties regarding the imperatives suffering poses for sufferers that codify a basic distance from suffering and an inability to insinuate the question of suffering in our comportments, orientations, and internal relations of simultaneity to the world. A righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings, enacted wounds, and relations to our own and others’ suffering is not my objective here. One only has to consider, to build to a different end, how the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations that come from codified knowledges and certitudes, such as those pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it. Then, one only has to question the imperatives these knowledges and certitudes pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, and desire for a markedly different world. This may involve not giving liberal institutions or fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring the suffering and hope of others, and not giving them the power to corner our pathos, in a moment of ethical noblesse, by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself—perversely reminiscent of the confusing touch-me-not of the Christ back from the dead, a Christ whose triumph over death ironically inspires entire cultures built on surplus fear, suffering, and death as offerings for those with terminal senses but endless lives (often the courtesy of the same historical cryogenics). It is imperative to reject both the righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings and the touch-me-not version of seemingly other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings and our labors as coconstitutive of the world we inhabit. What would it mean, as Louis puts it to the Rabbi, to “incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go,” to convoke a politics that is “good with death” but asks for “more life”? Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that, too. Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics of diseases, mortalities, and morbidities, calculated in terms of the loss in human productivity, on the one hand, and those of prison populations and philanthropic gifts, on the other, are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death. It is not that there are no sufferings to be named, interpreted, and tended to. However, it is important to remember that this is not a random, altruistic, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency and position to act on another’s suffering. Perhaps politics should be able to speak to, and for, the reserve army of those with abject, yet-to-be-interpreted-and-recompensed sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse. Perhaps politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering. Perhaps, still, if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different. Ultimately, perhaps liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as altogether questioning the reality or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it. The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether. The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life; when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward a politics that is not modeled on the liberal, capitalist, and colonizing ideals of healthy agents who are asked to live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning victim-centered politics. The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone. Rather, it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be striven for, grasped anew, and salvaged from the arbitrary dissipations imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern schemes for solving the problem of human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and sorrow, love and death, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining. Maybe these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. It is time that we confront the nauseating exploitations and self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and where it must die—these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim. There are many other exceptions that confront these dominations, not the least of which are the forms of acculturations, past and present, that see the realm of ethics as deeper and richer than the space of individual moralities acted out. Similarly, some of these exceptions to learn from hold and honor suffering as an inherently social act, as a welcome burden to carry with and for each other. If it is indeed the case that the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles today ought to make us wonder whether our problem as people of this world is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that, at best, liberalism is insufficient, and, at worst, it is complicit. Perhaps the majority of the world needs a politics that is material enough to speak to, and with, their silences, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their self-injuries, their fidelities, their betrayals, their memories, their justice, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself.

<h4><u><strong>We must refuse the politics of liberalism and the economization of injury and suffering. Our politics does not ignore the violence of the world, it refuses a particular set of represetations and values which enframe said suffering against the movement of becoming, of life. The alternative does not wish away suffering, nor can it resolve all of the violence of modernity, but it can open us up to experiencing the world, not as zombies or vampires, but as creatures of sensuous life.</h4><p>Abbas 2010</p><p></u></strong>/Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, <u>Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics<strong>, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 183 - 187/</p><p></u></strong>In Martha Nussbaum’s celebration of cosmopolitanism, the familiar move of the invocation of the worst sufferings of mankind is bound to shut up and line everyone else in submission, not to the pain of others (as it may appear), but more fundamentally to iterations of who I am as one who suffers, as one who responds to suffering, and as one troubled by each of those questions rather than having settled them.47 Nussbaum or Shklar, in their philosophical commitments to different metaphysics (even in explicit noncommitments to metaphysics), do not even consider that their invocation of events of unimaginable suffering as cautionary tales for all of humanity is beholden to the sublime in ways complicit with liberalism’s political economy of suffering. In being so, they inadvertently evacuate the political in favor of some formalistic ethical certitude that may carry its own violent obliterations, dysfunctionalizing political judgment in submission to ethical judgments already made for us. <u><mark>The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political</u></mark>. Similarly, <u><mark>as long as the aesthetic follows this logic</mark>—that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind—<mark>it will be limited</mark> in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation.</u> Beyond considering aesthetics at play in the artistry of rights and interests that privileges the Western scopic and rhetoricist regimes, <u>the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). <mark>The resulting essential,</mark> ontic, <mark>and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, </mark>interests, and rights.</u> <u>The elements of <mark>a historical materialism of suffering</u></mark> introduced over the course of this chapter—necessity, hope, and a materialist sensuous ethos—<u><mark>reconsider woundedness and victimhood</mark> in order <mark>to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are</mark>, and can be, <mark>had to </mark>our own and others’ <mark>suffering.</u></mark> They expose the presumptions and certainties regarding the imperatives suffering poses for sufferers that codify a basic distance from suffering and an inability to insinuate the question of suffering in our comportments, orientations, and internal relations of simultaneity to the world. A righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings, enacted wounds, and relations to our own and others’ suffering is not my objective here. One only has to consider, to build to a different end, how <u><mark>the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations</mark> that come <mark>from codified knowledges</mark> and certitudes, such as those <mark>pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it</u>.</mark> Then, <u><mark>one only has to question the imperatives these</mark> knowledges and certitudes <mark>pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions</mark> and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, <mark>and desire for a markedly different world.</u></mark> This may involve <u><mark>not giving</mark> liberal institutions or <mark>fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring</mark> the <mark>suffering</mark> and hope of others, <mark>and not giving them the power to corner our pathos</mark>, in a moment of ethical noblesse, <mark>by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable.</u></mark> <u>As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself</u>—perversely reminiscent of the confusing touch-me-not of the Christ back from the dead, a Christ whose triumph over death ironically inspires entire cultures built on surplus fear, suffering, and death as offerings for those with terminal senses but endless lives (often the courtesy of the same historical cryogenics). <u><mark>It is imperative to reject both the righteous</mark> or tolerant pluralism of sufferings <mark>and</mark> the <mark>touch-me-not version of</mark> seemingly <mark>other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings</mark> and our labors <mark>as coconstitutive</mark> of the world we inhabit</u>. <u>What would it mean</u>, as Louis puts it to the Rabbi, <u>to “incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go,” to convoke a politics that is “good with death” but asks for “more life</u>”? <u>Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that</u>, too. <u>Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics</u> of diseases, mortalities, and morbidities, calculated in terms of the loss in human productivity, on the one hand, and those of prison populations and philanthropic gifts, on the other, <u>are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death. <mark>It is not that there are no sufferings to be named</mark>, interpreted, and tended to</u>. However, <u><mark>it is important to remember that this is not a random,</mark> altruistic, <mark>or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency</mark> and position <mark>to act</mark> on another’s suffering. Perhaps <mark>politics should</mark> be able to <mark>speak to</mark>, and for, <mark>the reserve army of those with</mark> abject, <mark>yet-to-be-interpreted</mark>-and-recompensed <mark>sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured</mark> outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse</u>. <u>Perhaps <mark>politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering</mark> in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering. Perhaps</u>, still, <u>if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different</u>. Ultimately, <u>perhaps <mark>liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as</mark> altogether <mark>questioning the reality</mark> or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it.</u> <u>The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether</u>. <u>The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life; when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward <mark>a politics</mark> that is <mark>not modeled on the liberal, </mark>capitalist, and colonizing <mark>ideals of healthy agents who</mark> are asked to <mark>live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction</mark>, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, <mark>and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning</mark> victim-centered<mark> politics.</mark> The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone</u>. Rather, <u><mark>it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be</mark> striven for, grasped anew, and <mark>salvaged from</mark> the <mark>arbitrary dissipations</mark> imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern <mark>schemes for solving</mark> the problem of <mark>human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy</mark> and sorrow, love <mark>and death</mark>, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining.</u> <u>Maybe <mark>these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly</mark>, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. <mark>It is time that we confront </mark>the nauseating exploitations and <mark>self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and</mark> where it must <mark>die</u></mark>—<u>these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim</u>. There are many other exceptions that confront these dominations, not the least of which are the forms of acculturations, past and present, that see the realm of ethics as deeper and richer than the space of individual moralities acted out. Similarly, some of these exceptions to learn from hold and honor suffering as an inherently social act, as a welcome burden to carry with and for each other. <u><mark>If it is </mark>indeed the case t<mark>hat the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles</mark> today <mark>ought to make us wonder whether our problem</mark> as people of this world <mark>is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that</mark>, at best, <mark>liberalism is</mark> insufficient, and, at worst, it is <mark>complicit.</u></mark> <u>Perhaps the majority of the world needs <mark>a politics</mark> that is <mark>material enough to speak to</mark>, and with, <mark>their silences</mark>, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their <mark>self-injuries</mark>, their <mark>fidelities</mark>, their betrayals, their memories, their <mark>justice</mark>, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself.</p></u>

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Their description of the terrorist justifies endless war

Jackson 9

Jackson 9 Richard Jackson 9, Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence, 2009, “Knowledge, power and politics in the study of political terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 70-77

these frequent narratives within the literature construct widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat these narratives construct knowledge’ which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures to defeat which cannot be dealt with using negotiation the ‘war on terror’ is based on defining narratives the notion that responding to terrorism requires war and torture has come to assume a form of widely accepted ‘knowledge’. assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices make up much of the widely accepted body of terrorism ‘knowledge’, This ‘knowledge’ is reproduced with little deviation from the central assumptions continuously in literally thousands of publications every year by academics and think tanks. most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is highly debatable and unstable this ‘knowledge’ functions ideologically in society to reify existing power structures and advance particular political projects employing the same social scientific modes of analysis and empirical categories employed within terrorism studies it can be argued virtually all the narratives and assumptions are contestable and subject to doubt The assumption that terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is highly questionable and complex terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through discursive practices which make it a contingent ‘reality’ terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it the threat of terrorism to international security is vastly over-exaggerated much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is of dubious provenance a major review of the field, has described it as a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ This critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and pursue alternative intellectual and political projects

narratives which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures to defeat which cannot be dealt with using negotiation the ‘war on terror’ is based on narratives the notion responding to terrorism requires war has come to assume widely accepted ‘knowledge’ assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices make up the body of terrorism ‘knowledge’ knowledge’ is reproduced, with little deviation from central assumptions in thousands of publications by academics and think tanks knowledge’ in terrorism studies functions ideologically to reify power structures The assumption terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is highly questionable terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon ‘terrorism’ is constituted by discursive practices terrorism does not exist outside the definitions and practices which enclose it what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is of dubious provenance a major review described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths critical destabilisation is useful for opening up space to ask new questions and pursue alternative intellectual and political projects

In sum, these frequent narratives within the literature construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat to the international community and to democratic societies in particular, in part because their inherent freedoms make them more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and attack. Moreover, these narratives construct a common sense and widely, though not totally, accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is a new and deadlier form of terrorism than any encountered previously, one which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures to defeat and which cannot be dealt with using negotiation and dialogue, methods which have been previously successful in dealing with the ‘old’ ideological and nationalist terrorism.¶ The origins and causes of terrorism6¶ A surprising number of terrorism studies texts promote the view that the roots and causes of terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality, and religious or ideological extremism engendered through processes of ‘radicalisation’. Although theories of individual psychopathology among terrorists have fallen out of favour among most leading scholars in recent years, the notion that terrorist behaviour is rooted in the personality defects of individuals remains close to the surface of most texts, not least in the notion that weak-minded, uneducated, or emotionally vulnerable young Muslims fall prey to indoctrination and brainwashing – so-called ‘radicalisation’ – by terrorist recruiters operating through madrasahs, radical mosques, or extremist internet sites (see Haqqani, 2002). Related to this, it is not uncommon to find texts which argue that ‘Islamic’ suicide bombers are primarily young men driven by sexual frustration and impotence. In a much-cited text on contemporary ‘religious terrorism’ for example, Mark Juergensmeyer states that ‘the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement .. . expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 201). In any case, such narratives construct the accepted knowledge that terrorists are different and abnormal and, more importantly, that their actions are rooted in their personalities rather than other factors related to their political situation, strategic calculation or experiences of oppression and humiliation.¶ During the cold war, many terrorism studies texts suggested that the roots and causes of terrorism lay within communist ideology and the direct involvement of the Soviet Union (see Raphael, this volume). Claire Sterling’s (1981) popular book, The Terror Network, for example, posited the existence of a global terrorist network sponsored by the Soviets that was behind many of the revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. As Sam Raphael illustrates in this volume, a great many of the leading terrorism studies scholars at the time subscribed to the ‘Soviet network theory’ of terrorism.¶ In many ways, the cold war focus on left-wing ideology was replaced by what is now a vast and growing literature on the religious origins of terrorism, particularly as it relates to Islam (see Jackson, 2007a). Based on David Rapoport’s (1984) initial formulation of ‘religious terrorism’, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ argues that the roots and causes of much of the al-Qaeda-related terrorism today can be found in ‘Islamic extremism’. Walter Laqueur for example, suggests that while there is ‘no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism . . . the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking’ (Laqueur, 1999: 129). Similarly, a prominent counterterrorism think tank publication argues that ‘in the Islamic world one cannot differentiate between the political violence of Islamic groups and their popular support derived from religion . . . the present terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature’ (Paz, 1998, emphasis added). Marc Sageman argues in relation to al-Qaeda: ‘Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics’ (Sageman, 2004: 1). In sum, and similar to narratives of individual deviance, these narratives construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is primarily rooted in and caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and not in rational calculation or other political, cultural, and sociological factors.¶ Responding to terrorism¶ A final set of assumptions and narratives within the broader literature relates to questions about how to respond to terrorism. Following the logic of the preceding notions of the existential threat posed by the ‘new terrorism’, as well as the fanatical nature and origins of religiously-inspired terrorism, it is frequently argued in the literature that ‘new’ methods of counterterrorism are required for its control, and that there are justifiable reasons to employ any means necessary, including torture, targeted killings, and restrictions on human rights, to deal with the threat (see Jackson, 2007d). Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson, and Daniel Byman, all major figures in the field, for example, have openly condoned the extra-judicial assassination of terrorist leaders as a potentially effective method of counterterrorism (see Gunaratna, 2003: 233–235; Wilkinson, 2002: 68; Byman, 2006, 2007). At the very least, it is commonly accepted that coercive instruments, including sanctions, pre-emption and military force, are both legal and effective forms of counterterrorism (see for example, Shultz and Vogt, 2003; Byman, 2003). Often unstated, but appearing as a subtext, it is implicitly assumed that non-violent responses to terrorism such as dialogue and political reform are simply bound to fail in the current context (see Toros, forthcoming).¶ More specifically, as I have shown elsewhere (Jackson, 2005), the global counterterrorism campaign known as the ‘war on terror’ is based on a particular series of defining narratives. The most important narrative at the heart of the war on terror is the notion that the attacks of 11 September 2001 amounted to an ‘act of war’. This narrative in turn, logically implies that a war-based counterterrorism strategy is both necessary to counter the threat and legal under international law. Consequently, a great many terrorism studies texts take it as axiomatic or common sense that the war on terror, and force-based counterterrorism in general, is both legitimate and efficacious. In this way, the notion that responding to terrorism requires force and counter-violence, and sometimes even war and torture, has come to assume a form of widely accepted ‘knowledge’. In short, the assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices I have described above, and quite a few more besides, collectively make up much of the widely accepted body of terrorism ‘knowledge’, or, the discourse of terrorism studies. This ‘knowledge’ is reproduced, often with little deviation from the central assumptions and narratives, continuously in the field’s journals, conferences, and in literally thousands of publications every year by academics and think tanks. Furthermore, as Michael Stohl has recently illustrated, many of these core narratives or ‘myths’, as he terms them, have proved to be extremely durable over several decades (see Stohl, 1979, 2008).¶ A critical analysis of the terrorism studies discourse¶ Having briefly outlined some of its main characteristics, the purpose of this section is to provide a critical analysis of the broader terrorism studies discourse employing a first and second order critique. The main argument I wish to advance here is that most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable. More importantly, this ‘knowledge’ functions ideologically in society to reify existing power structures and advance particular political projects.¶ First order critique¶ As explained earlier, a first order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientific modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead suffice to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives.¶ In the first instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial definition within the field and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002).¶ The assumption that terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identifiable set of discursive practices MARKED – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field.¶ Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the field, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

<h4>T<u><strong>heir description of the terrorist justifies endless war</h4><p>Jackson 9</p><p></u></strong>Richard Jackson 9, Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence, 2009, “Knowledge, power and politics in the study of political terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 70-77</p><p>In sum, <u>these frequent <mark>narratives </mark>within the literature construct</u> the <u>widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat</u> to the international community and to democratic societies in particular, in part because their inherent freedoms make them more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and attack. Moreover, <u>these narratives construct</u> a common sense and widely, though not totally, accepted ‘<u>knowledge’</u> that contemporary terrorism is a new and deadlier form of terrorism than any encountered previously, one <u><mark>which creates an</u> <u><strong>exceptional state of emergency</u></strong> <u>requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures</u></mark> <u><mark>to defeat</u></mark> and <u><mark>which</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>cannot be dealt with using negotiation</u></strong></mark> and dialogue, methods which have been previously successful in dealing with the ‘old’ ideological and nationalist terrorism.¶ The origins and causes of terrorism6¶ A surprising number of terrorism studies texts promote the view that the roots and causes of terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality, and religious or ideological extremism engendered through processes of ‘radicalisation’. Although theories of individual psychopathology among terrorists have fallen out of favour among most leading scholars in recent years, the notion that terrorist behaviour is rooted in the personality defects of individuals remains close to the surface of most texts, not least in the notion that weak-minded, uneducated, or emotionally vulnerable young Muslims fall prey to indoctrination and brainwashing – so-called ‘radicalisation’ – by terrorist recruiters operating through madrasahs, radical mosques, or extremist internet sites (see Haqqani, 2002). Related to this, it is not uncommon to find texts which argue that ‘Islamic’ suicide bombers are primarily young men driven by sexual frustration and impotence. In a much-cited text on contemporary ‘religious terrorism’ for example, Mark Juergensmeyer states that ‘the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement .. . expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 201). In any case, such narratives construct the accepted knowledge that terrorists are different and abnormal and, more importantly, that their actions are rooted in their personalities rather than other factors related to their political situation, strategic calculation or experiences of oppression and humiliation.¶ During the cold war, many terrorism studies texts suggested that the roots and causes of terrorism lay within communist ideology and the direct involvement of the Soviet Union (see Raphael, this volume). Claire Sterling’s (1981) popular book, The Terror Network, for example, posited the existence of a global terrorist network sponsored by the Soviets that was behind many of the revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. As Sam Raphael illustrates in this volume, a great many of the leading terrorism studies scholars at the time subscribed to the ‘Soviet network theory’ of terrorism.¶ In many ways, the cold war focus on left-wing ideology was replaced by what is now a vast and growing literature on the religious origins of terrorism, particularly as it relates to Islam (see Jackson, 2007a). Based on David Rapoport’s (1984) initial formulation of ‘religious terrorism’, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ argues that the roots and causes of much of the al-Qaeda-related terrorism today can be found in ‘Islamic extremism’. Walter Laqueur for example, suggests that while there is ‘no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism . . . the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking’ (Laqueur, 1999: 129). Similarly, a prominent counterterrorism think tank publication argues that ‘in the Islamic world one cannot differentiate between the political violence of Islamic groups and their popular support derived from religion . . . the present terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature’ (Paz, 1998, emphasis added). Marc Sageman argues in relation to al-Qaeda: ‘Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics’ (Sageman, 2004: 1). In sum, and similar to narratives of individual deviance, these narratives construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is primarily rooted in and caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and not in rational calculation or other political, cultural, and sociological factors.¶ Responding to terrorism¶ A final set of assumptions and narratives within the broader literature relates to questions about how to respond to terrorism. Following the logic of the preceding notions of the existential threat posed by the ‘new terrorism’, as well as the fanatical nature and origins of religiously-inspired terrorism, it is frequently argued in the literature that ‘new’ methods of counterterrorism are required for its control, and that there are justifiable reasons to employ any means necessary, including torture, targeted killings, and restrictions on human rights, to deal with the threat (see Jackson, 2007d). Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson, and Daniel Byman, all major figures in the field, for example, have openly condoned the extra-judicial assassination of terrorist leaders as a potentially effective method of counterterrorism (see Gunaratna, 2003: 233–235; Wilkinson, 2002: 68; Byman, 2006, 2007). At the very least, it is commonly accepted that coercive instruments, including sanctions, pre-emption and military force, are both legal and effective forms of counterterrorism (see for example, Shultz and Vogt, 2003; Byman, 2003). Often unstated, but appearing as a subtext, it is implicitly assumed that non-violent responses to terrorism such as dialogue and political reform are simply bound to fail in the current context (see Toros, forthcoming).¶ More specifically, as I have shown elsewhere (Jackson, 2005), the global counterterrorism campaign known as <u><mark>the ‘war on terror’ is based on</u></mark> a particular series of <u>defining <mark>narratives</u></mark>. The most important narrative at the heart of the war on terror is the notion that the attacks of 11 September 2001 amounted to an ‘act of war’. This narrative in turn, logically implies that a war-based counterterrorism strategy is both necessary to counter the threat and legal under international law. Consequently, a great many terrorism studies texts take it as axiomatic or common sense that the war on terror, and force-based counterterrorism in general, is both legitimate and efficacious. In this way, <u><mark>the notion</mark> that</u> <u><strong><mark>responding to terrorism requires</u></strong></mark> force and counter-violence, and sometimes even <u><strong><mark>war</mark> and torture</u></strong>, <u><mark>has come to assume</mark> a form of <mark>widely accepted ‘knowledge’</mark>.</u> In short, the <u><mark>assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices</u></mark> I have described above, and quite a few more besides, collectively <u><mark>make up</mark> much of <mark>the</mark> widely accepted <mark>body of terrorism ‘knowledge’</mark>,</u> or, the discourse of terrorism studies. <u>This</u> <u><strong>‘<mark>knowledge’ is reproduced</u></strong>,</mark> often <u><mark>with little deviation from</mark> the <mark>central assumptions</u></mark> and narratives, <u>continuously <mark>in</u></mark> the field’s journals, conferences, and in <u><strong>literally <mark>thousands of publications</mark> every year</u></strong> <u><mark>by academics and think tanks</mark>.</u> Furthermore, as Michael Stohl has recently illustrated, many of these core narratives or ‘myths’, as he terms them, have proved to be extremely durable over several decades (see Stohl, 1979, 2008).¶ A critical analysis of the terrorism studies discourse¶ Having briefly outlined some of its main characteristics, the purpose of this section is to provide a critical analysis of the broader terrorism studies discourse employing a first and second order critique. The main argument I wish to advance here is that <u>most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘<mark>knowledge’ in terrorism studies</mark> is</u>, in fact, <u><strong>highly debatable and unstable</u></strong>. More importantly, <u>this ‘knowledge’</u> <u><strong><mark>functions ideologically</u></strong></mark> <u>in society <mark>to reify</mark> existing <mark>power structures</mark> and advance</u> <u>particular political projects</u>.¶ First order critique¶ As explained earlier, a first order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and <u>employing the same social scientific modes of analysis</u>, terminology, <u>and empirical</u> and analytical <u>categories employed within terrorism studies</u>, as well as many of its own texts and authors, <u>it can be argued</u> that <u><strong>virtually all the narratives and assumptions</u></strong> described in the previous section <u>are</u> <u><strong>contestable and subject to doubt</u></strong>. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead suffice to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives.¶ In the first instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial definition within the field and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002).¶ <u><mark>The assumption</mark> that</u> <u><strong><mark>terrorism can be objectively defined and studied</u></strong> <u>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>highly questionable</mark> and</u> far more <u>complex</u> than this. It can be argued that <u><strong><mark>terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon</u></strong></mark> <u>which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself</u> (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, <u><mark>‘terrorism’ is constituted by</mark> and through</u> an identifiable set of <u><mark>discursive practices</u></mark> </p><p>MARKED</p><p>– such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law – <u>which</u> thus <u>make it a contingent ‘reality’</u> for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, <u><strong><mark>terrorism does not exist outside</mark> of <mark>the definitions and practices which</mark> seek to <mark>enclose it</u></strong></mark>, including those of the terrorism studies field.¶ Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that <u>the threat of terrorism to</u> Western or <u>international security is</u> <u><strong>vastly over-exaggerated</u></strong> (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, <u>much of <mark>what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is</u></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>of dubious provenance</u></strong></mark>. In <u><mark>a</mark> <mark>major review</mark> of the field,</u> Andrew Silke <u>has <mark>described it as</u> ‘<u><strong>a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths</u></strong></mark> <u>whose reach extends</u> <u>even to the most learned and experienced’</u> (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. <u>This</u> kind of <u><mark>critical destabilisation is useful for</u> <u>opening up</mark> the <mark>space</mark> needed <mark>to ask new</mark> kinds of analytical and normative <mark>questions and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>pursue alternative intellectual and political projects</u></strong></mark>.</p>

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The alternative makes room for an individual and ethical approach to environmental politics

Deudney, 90

Deudney, 90 (Daniel Deudney, assistant professor of political science at John Hopkins’; “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 1990, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/07.2/07.2.Deudney1990The-Case.pdf, pg. 469)

environmental awareness need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as sources of motivation and mobilization. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both ineffective, and to the extent effective, counterproductive. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a radical rethinking environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters . It also entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection as the practice of national security

awareness need not depend upon co-opted security thinking. Integral into ecological concerns are powerful interests health and property religions and ethics Efforts to raise awareness can connect directly with strong, basic, and diverse values as sources of motivation and mobilization Transposing security thinking is ineffective, and counterproductive Fully grasping the ramifications requires radical rethinking environmentalists are redefining in ways that subvert ecological parameters It entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection

Fortunately, environmental awareness need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as sources of motivation and mobilization. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie Earth Nationalism Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both ineffective, and to the extent effective, counterproductive. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a radical rethinking and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment. With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity, environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics. It also entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection as the practice of national security.

<h4>The alternative makes room for an individual and ethical approach to environmental politics</h4><p><u><strong>Deudney, 90</u></strong> (Daniel Deudney, assistant professor of political science at John Hopkins’; “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 1990, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/07.2/07.2.Deudney1990The-Case.pdf, pg. 469)</p><p>Fortunately, <u>environmental <mark>awareness <strong>need not depend upon co-opted </mark>national <mark>security thinking</strong>. Integral</mark>ly woven <mark>into ecological concerns are</mark> a <mark>powerful</mark> set of <mark>interests</mark> and values—most notably human <mark>health and property</mark> values, <mark>religions and ethics</mark>, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. <mark>Efforts to raise awareness</mark> of environmental problems <mark>can</mark> thus <mark>connect directly with</mark> these <mark>strong, basic, and diverse</mark> human interests and <mark>values as <strong>sources of motivation and mobilization</strong></mark>. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie</u> Earth Nationalism <u><mark>Transposing</mark> existing national <mark>security thinking</mark> and approaches to environmental politics <mark>is</mark> likely to be both <strong><mark>ineffective</strong>, and</mark> to the extent effective, <strong><mark>counterproductive</strong></mark>. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. <mark>Fully grasping the ramifications</mark> of the emerging environmental problems <mark>requires</mark> a <strong><mark>radical rethinking</u></strong></mark> and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment. With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity,<u> <mark>environmentalists are</mark> recovering and <mark>redefining</mark> topophilia and geopiety <mark>in ways that subvert</mark> the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by <mark>ecological parameters</u></mark>, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics<u>. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>entails a <strong>powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection</strong></mark> as the practice of national security</u>.</p>

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This is a particular manifestation of operationalized preemption which creates the conditions of possibility

Massumi 14

Massumi 14 (Brian Massumi, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, 2013-2014, “The Remains of the Day,” On Violence Volume 1) gz

If you wait for the emergence, you'll have waited too long -- too late A terrorist threat can strike like lightning anywhere and any time This time it might be planes crashing into buildings. Next time it might be an improvised explosive device. Or a bomb in a subway. Or anthrax in the mail. No one knows. This only makes the urgency of action all the more acute Faced with urgent need to act in the face of the unknown-unknown of a threat that has not yet emerged, there is only one reasonable thing to do: flush it out Stir things up and see what starts to emerge. Create the conditions for the emergence of threat Start the threat on the way to becoming a clear and present danger, and then nip it in the bud with your superior rapid-response capabilities Make it real so you can really eliminate it. It is fundamental to the logic of preemption to produce what it is designed to avoid go kinetic" in response to threat something positive to attack. Deterrence exercises a negative power. In a way, it's logic is the inverse of the logic of preemption. Its aim is to prevent the unthinkable from happening by transforming a clear and present danger into a threat, then to hold the threat in abeyance, so that it continues to loom over the present indefinitely, so that it doesn't follow any action path back to the future. The aim of deterrence aim was to suspend threat. Preemption, by contrast, suspends the present. It puts us and our actions in that conditional time-loop of the would have/could have The job of preemption is to translate the unknown-unknown into a foregone conclusion. Preemption always will have been right, because it exercises a positive power, a reality-producing power to make things emerge. The logic of preemption is a tautological logic that has the power to produce the reality to which it responds It operationalizes the future of threat in a way that really, positively produces a future An ontopower is a power that makes things come to be: that moves a futurity felt in the present, into a presence in the future The global war on terror [begun by Bush has not only] continued [under Obama] .. it has metastasized It has turned cancerous It has turned into a self-driving tendency that has swept Obama up in it The operative logic of preemption is not a logic he has – it has him. It has proven itself a self-propagating historical force, an operative historical logic whose "rightness" is still, as always, a foregone conclusion Al-Qaeda in Iraq is just one example in the operative logic of preemption more-or-less unforeseen effects are precisely what is and must be produced If the situation is really one full of unknown-unknowns, in a perpetually crisis-ridden, ungraspably complex, increasingly chaotic world, then unforeseen effects will always accompany any action carried out according to any logic of the foregone conclusion. It turns this problem into something positive as well. It turns it into a mechanism that fosters its own continuation and proliferation it can field the effects it brings into being, by immediately going kinetic in a follow-up action There will be threat again Preemption can then re-legitimate itself affectively, and redeploy the operative logic of preemption "leverages" uncertainty. What preemptive power must do is remain poised to go kinetic again and again, in serial response to the exercise of its own ontopower each of its actions will contain within it the seeds of the next action, and that action, the action after, so that the deployment of preemption cascades, bringing its affective legitimation by threat with it, step by step Preemptive action has become self-driving. if terrorist threat is ever-present and proliferates in unforeseen ways, then the power mobilized against it must be similarly ever-present and proliferating No government can afford not to be in a posture of preemption The operative logic of preemptive is not only self-driving; it is self-expanding. Iraq was in fact used as a terror training ground. Terrorist techniques such as the improvised explosive device and suicide bombings were perfected there, then carried to the other front, Afghanistan, where they fueled a resurgent insurgency This escalation began under Bush, but was taken to new levels by Obama The blowback from US cross-border drone attacks and special operations in Pakistan have energized activity elsewhere in the world: in Somalia, in Yemen nowhere has terrorist threat stopped looming. Last month was the bloodiest for months for US military personnel in Iraq presence has unprecedented reach more spread-out and tentacular almost industrial scale killing machine Preemption doesn't go away. It spreads its tentacles. the operative logic of preemption only becomes more widespread and insidious Preemption octopuses on

A terrorist threat can strike like lightning planes crashing into buildings a bomb in a subway anthrax in the mail No one knows Faced with need to act only one thing to do: flush it out Make it real so you can eliminate it It is fundamental to preemption to produce what it is designed to avoid Preemption suspends the present. It puts us in that time-loop of the would have/could have translate the unknown-unknown into a foregone conclusion a tautological logic that has the power to produce the reality to which it responds An ontopower that moves futurity felt in the present, into presence in the future The war on terror has metastasized a self-driving tendency that has swept Obama up preemption is not a logic he has – it has him What preemptive power must do is go kinetic again and again each of its actions contain the seeds of the next Iraq was a terror training ground. Terrorist techniques were perfected there blowback from drone attacks and spe op s energized activity elsewhere nowhere has terrorist threat stopped looming Preemption spreads its tentacles Preemption octopuses on

This isn't just stupidity or faulty reasoning. There is a perverse logic to it. Because if you accept that it's paramount to respond to threat, and that you have to act in response to it even if it has not yet fully emerged, or even if it is hasn't really even begun to emerge, then you're facing a real conundrum. If you wait for the emergence, you'll have waited too long -- too late. A terrorist threat can strike like lightning. Like lightning it can strike anywhere and any time. But worse than lightning, it can strike anywhere at any time in any guise. This time it might be planes crashing into buildings. Next time it might be an improvised explosive device. Or a bomb in a subway. Or anthrax in the mail. No one knows. This only makes the urgency of action all the more acute. Faced with urgent need to act in the face of the unknown-unknown of a threat that has not yet emerged, there is only one reasonable thing to do: flush it out. Poke the soft tissue. Prod the terrain. Stir things up and see what starts to emerge. Create the conditions for the emergence of threat. Start the threat on the way to becoming a clear and present danger, and then nip it in the bud with your superior rapid-response capabilities. Make it real so you can really eliminate it. I'm not saying that the Bush administration consciously decided to make Iraq a staging ground for terrorism. I'm only saying that the fact that their preemptive actions did in fact do that fits perfectly into the logic of preemption, and says something fundamental about what that logic implies. It is fundamental to the logic of preemption to produce what it is designed to avoid. That is the only way to give its urgent need to "go kinetic" in response to threat something positive to attack. This is what distinguishes preemption from the logic presiding over the previous age of conflict, the Cold War. The logic of the Cold War was deterrence: making something not happen. The goal, faced with the clear and present danger of nuclear Armageddon, was to hold it in potential, to make sure the threat was never realized, precisely by refraining from preemptive attack. What was fundamental to the logic of deterrence was the impossibility of a first strike – exactly what preemption requires. Deterrence exercises a negative power. In a way, it's logic is the inverse of the logic of preemption. Its aim is to prevent the unthinkable from happening by transforming a clear and present danger into a threat, then to hold the threat in abeyance, so that it continues to loom over the present indefinitely, so that it doesn't follow any action path back to the future. The aim of deterrence aim was to suspend threat. Preemption, by contrast, suspends the present. It puts us and our actions in that conditional time-loop of the would have/could have. It hangs us on a thread of futurity. It does this in order to make the would-have-been/could-have-been a "will-have-been-in-any-case." The job of preemption is to translate the unknown-unknown into a foregone conclusion. Preemption always will have been right, because it exercises a positive power, a reality-producing power to make things emerge. There is a word for a reasoning that is always right regardless of the objective situation, and that always leads a foregone conclusion in any case. The word is tautological. The logic of preemption is a tautological logic. But that's just the half of it. The logic of preemption is a tautological logic that has the power to produce the reality to which it responds. In spite of being tautological, or because of the particular way it is tautological, preemption works. It operates. It operationalizes the future of threat in a way that really, positively produces a future. It is an operative logic. I call an operative logic that is positively productive of what will really come to be, an ontopower – "onto-" meaning being. An ontopower is a power that makes things come to be: that moves a futurity felt in the present, into a presence in the future. When threat becomes effectively tautological, and power becomes ontopower, everything has changed. We've entered a brave new world, a new regime of power, and a new political era And yes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. In a recent book, Andrew Bacevich, a life-long military careerist turned military critic, laments that "since taking office, President Obama has acted on many fronts to adjust the way the United States exercized that leadership. Yet these adjustments have seldom risen above the cosmetic. … The global war on terror [begun by Bush has not only] continued [under Obama] .. it has metastasized." It has turned cancerous. It has turned into a self-driving tendency that has swept Obama up in it. The operative logic of preemption is not a logic he has – it has him. It has proven itself a self-propagating historical force, an operative historical logic whose "rightness" is still, as always, a foregone conclusion. It has proven its ability to continue, as a tendency, across the break between administrations and the changes on the level of explicitly stated doctrine. I will briefly go into how Bush's 9-11-fueled-"everything-changed" is now Obama's "more off the same," despite the differences in doctrine, the change in the cast of characters, and the obvious differences in personal quality and leadership style. But before I do that, I want to draw out a bit more some of the implications of the recentering of war and politics on threat. On the way, I want to respond to an objection I've left my account open to. The example of Al-Qaeda in Iraq that was central to my argument that preemptive power is a productive power is just one example. In many eyes it might seem a weak one, since it could be laid to unforeseen collateral effects, and dismissed as a mere anomaly or accident, or simply a product of a miscalculation. The point I want to make is that in the operative logic of preemption more-or-less unforeseen effects are precisely what is and must be produced. If the situation is really one full of unknown-unknowns, in a perpetually crisis-ridden, ungraspably complex, increasingly chaotic world, then unforeseen effects will always accompany any action carried out according to any logic. That's a corrollary of the foregone conclusion. What's particular about preemption is that makes a virtue of this. It turns this problem into something positive as well. It turns it into a mechanism that fosters its own continuation and proliferation. It can't make the unknown-unknown known. It can't pre-form or fore-see the exact nature of the reality it will produce. But if it is ready with fast-adapting rapid response capabilities, it can field the effects it brings into being, by immediately going kinetic in a follow-up action. When it flushes out threat, it can contrive to keep the emergence within parameters it can handle, more-or-less. There will be threat again. But if all goes well it will be in more controllable parameters. Preemption can then re-legitimate itself affectively, and redeploy. In this way, to use the military theory jargon, the operative logic of preemption "leverages" uncertainty. What preemptive power must do is remain poised to go kinetic again and again, in serial response to the exercise of its own ontopower. Every time it acts, it must already be poising itself to act again, with equal urgency. In that way, each of its actions will contain within it the seeds of the next action, and that action, the action after, so that the deployment of preemption cascades, bringing its affective legitimation by threat with it, step by step. Preemptive action has become self-driving. It only stands to reason that if terrorist threat is ever-present and proliferates in unforeseen ways, then the power mobilized against it must be similarly ever-present and proliferating. ow could anyone argue that we shouldn't be capable of fielding uncertainty? We must always be poised for threat. We must assume the posture -- even if the stated doctrine has changed. If we sit on our hands, all it will take to delegitimate a government would be another terror attack that happened on its watch. No government can afford not to be in a posture of preemption. We must assume the posture at every moment – we must be poised to go kinetic at a moment's notice, whenever and wherever in the world that threat is felt to loom. Whenever and wherever. The realignment on time I mentioned earlier ends up driving a a tendency for the logic set in motion to turn space-filling. The operative logic of preemptive is not only self-driving; it is self-expanding. We watched this happen. Iraq was in fact used as a terror training ground. Terrorist techniques such as the improvised explosive device and suicide bombings were perfected there, then carried to the other front, Afghanistan, where they fueled a resurgent insurgency. The preemptive follow-up response on the part of the US was to expand the use of counter-terrorist tactics that matched the IED attack in terms of their ability to strike by surprise with lightning speed, and to morph themselves to the shape any kind of circumstance, taking any number of guises. The use of these techniques by the US military exploded. Chief among them were targeted assassinations using rapidly-deployed special operations forces, and unmanned drone attacks. This escalation began under Bush, but was taken to new levels by Obama, who had criticized the war in Iraq and called for its winding down only in order to shift attention to Afghanistan, which he defined as the "good war" and the right war. The right war overflowed to the wrong side of the border, into Pakistan. The blowback from US cross-border drone attacks and special operations in Pakistan have energized activity elsewhere in the world: in Somalia, in Yemen. Yet another proliferation. US drone attacks and special ops have followed. Preemptive US military intervention has expanded to yet another continent. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan may be winding down. But the preemptive military posture of the US has only spread. And nowhere has terrorist threat stopped looming. Last month (July 2011) was the bloodiest for months for US military personnel in Iraq, and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan picked up spectacularly with the assassinations of the governor of Kandahar province and the mayor of Kandahar city. Even after the "withdrawal" of US troops from Iraq, there will be a continuing US presence indefinitely into the future, as Obama's Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, in order to "fill the gap in Iraqi Security Force operations." This continuing presence will be in the form of five high-tech compounds outfitted for drone operations and housing aircraft and armored vehicles for rapid-response forays. The withdrawal from Afghanistan will similarly leave a permanent preemption-ready presence. That presence has unprecedented reach. According to best estimates, the US preemptive presence stretches across more than 750 bases around the world. The less focused it becomes on outright invasion, the more spread-out and tentacular it becomes. US special operations forces are now active in no less than 75 countries around the world and carry out an average of 70 missions a day. The number of countries "serviced" is slated to rise to 120. A key to advisor to General Petraeus, the commander of US troops in Iraq, then Afghanistan, and now incoming CIA director, was recently quoted marvelling at the reach of this "almost industrial scale killing machine". Preemption doesn't go away. It spreads its tentacles. Things change. Boots on the ground may recede as drones advance, following the rhythms of public opinion and the electoral cycle of politicians' engrossment in domestic affairs. Nation-building might get backgrounded in favor of targeted assassination campaigns. But the operative logic of preemption only becomes more widespread and insidious. The more it changes, the more it stays the same, ever-expanding. To the point that it can be said to become the dominant operative logic of our times. Preemption octopuses on. Ontopower rules.

<h4>This is a particular manifestation of operationalized preemption which creates the conditions of possibility</h4><p><u><strong>Massumi 14</u></strong> (Brian Massumi, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, 2013-2014, “The Remains of the Day,” On Violence Volume 1) gz</p><p>This isn't just stupidity or faulty reasoning. There is a perverse logic to it. Because if you accept that it's paramount to respond to threat, and that you have to act in response to it even if it has not yet fully emerged, or even if it is hasn't really even begun to emerge, then you're facing a real conundrum. <u><strong>If you wait for the emergence, you'll have waited too long -- too late</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>A terrorist threat can strike like lightning</u></strong></mark>. Like lightning it can strike <u>anywhere and any time</u>. But worse than lightning, it can strike anywhere at any time in any guise. <u>This time it might be <strong><mark>planes crashing into buildings</strong></mark>. Next time it might be an <strong>improvised explosive device</strong>. Or <mark>a <strong>bomb in a subway</strong></mark>. Or <strong><mark>anthrax in the mail</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>No one knows</strong></mark>. This only makes the urgency of action all the more acute</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Faced with </mark>urgent <mark>need to act</mark> in the face of the unknown-unknown of a threat that has not yet emerged, there is <mark>only one</mark> reasonable <mark>thing to do: <strong>flush it out</u></strong></mark>. Poke the soft tissue. Prod the terrain. <u>Stir things up and see what starts to emerge.</u> <u><strong>Create the conditions for the emergence of threat</u></strong>. <u>Start the threat on the way to becoming a clear and present danger, and then nip it in the bud with your superior rapid-response capabilities</u>. <u><strong><mark>Make it real so you can</mark> really <mark>eliminate it</strong></mark>. </p><p></u>I'm not saying that the Bush administration consciously decided to make Iraq a staging ground for terrorism. I'm only saying that the fact that their preemptive actions did in fact do that fits perfectly into the logic of preemption, and says something fundamental about what that logic implies. <u><mark>It is fundamental to</mark> the logic of <mark>preemption to <strong>produce what it is designed to avoid</u></strong></mark>. That is the only way to give its urgent need to "<u><strong>go kinetic</strong>" in response to threat something positive to attack. </p><p></u>This is what distinguishes preemption from the logic presiding over the previous age of conflict, the Cold War. The logic of the Cold War was deterrence: making something not happen. The goal, faced with the clear and present danger of nuclear Armageddon, was to hold it in potential, to make sure the threat was never realized, precisely by refraining from preemptive attack. What was fundamental to the logic of deterrence was the impossibility of a first strike – exactly what preemption requires. <u>Deterrence exercises a negative power. In a way, it's logic is the inverse of the logic of preemption. Its aim is to prevent the unthinkable from happening by transforming a clear and present danger into a threat, then to hold the threat in abeyance, so that it continues to loom over the present indefinitely, so that it doesn't follow any action path back to the future. The aim of deterrence aim was to suspend threat.</p><p><mark>Preemption</mark>, by contrast, <strong><mark>suspends the present</strong>. It puts us</mark> and our actions <mark>in that</mark> <strong>conditional <mark>time-loop of the would have/could have</u></strong></mark>. It hangs us on a thread of futurity. It does this in order to make the would-have-been/could-have-been a "will-have-been-in-any-case." <u>The job of preemption is to <mark>translate the unknown-unknown into a <strong>foregone conclusion</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Preemption <strong>always will have been right</strong>, because it exercises a positive power, a <strong>reality-producing power</strong> to make things emerge.</p><p></u>There is a word for a reasoning that is always right regardless of the objective situation, and that always leads a foregone conclusion in any case. The word is tautological. The logic of preemption is a tautological logic. But that's just the half of it. <u>The logic of preemption is <mark>a <strong>tautological logic that has the power to produce the reality to which it responds</u></strong></mark>. In spite of being tautological, or because of the particular way it is tautological, preemption works. It operates. <u>It operationalizes the future of threat in a way that really, <strong>positively produces a future</u></strong>. It is an operative logic.</p><p>I call an operative logic that is positively productive of what will really come to be, an ontopower – "onto-" meaning being. <u><mark>An <strong>ontopower</strong></mark> is a power that makes things <strong>come to be</strong>: <mark>that moves</mark> a <mark>futurity felt in the present, into</mark> a <mark>presence in the future</u></mark>. When threat becomes effectively tautological, and power becomes ontopower, everything has changed. We've entered a brave new world, a new regime of power, and a new political era </p><p>And yes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. </p><p>In a recent book, Andrew Bacevich, a life-long military careerist turned military critic, laments that "since taking office, President Obama has acted on many fronts to adjust the way the United States exercized that leadership. Yet these adjustments have seldom risen above the cosmetic. … <u><mark>The</mark> global <mark>war on terror</mark> [begun by Bush has not only] continued [under Obama] .. it <mark>has <strong>metastasized</u></strong></mark>." <u><strong>It has turned cancerous</u></strong>. <u>It has turned into <mark>a self-driving tendency that has <strong>swept Obama up</mark> in it</u></strong>. <u>The operative logic of <mark>preemption is <strong>not a logic he has – it has him</strong></mark>. It has proven itself a <strong>self-propagating historical force</strong>, an operative historical logic whose "rightness" is still, as always, a foregone conclusion</u>. It has proven its ability to continue, as a tendency, across the break between administrations and the changes on the level of explicitly stated doctrine.</p><p>I will briefly go into how Bush's 9-11-fueled-"everything-changed" is now Obama's "more off the same," despite the differences in doctrine, the change in the cast of characters, and the obvious differences in personal quality and leadership style. But before I do that, I want to draw out a bit more some of the implications of the recentering of war and politics on threat. On the way, I want to respond to an objection I've left my account open to.</p><p>The example of <u>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</u> that was central to my argument that preemptive power is a productive power <u>is just one example</u>. In many eyes it might seem a weak one, since it could be laid to unforeseen collateral effects, and dismissed as a mere anomaly or accident, or simply a product of a miscalculation. The point I want to make is that <u>in the operative logic of preemption more-or-less <strong>unforeseen effects are precisely what is and must be produced</u></strong>. <u>If the situation is really one full of unknown-unknowns, in a perpetually crisis-ridden, ungraspably complex, increasingly chaotic world, then unforeseen effects will always accompany any action carried out according to any logic</u>. That's a corrollary<u><strong> of the foregone conclusion. </p><p></u></strong>What's particular about preemption is that makes a virtue of this. <u>It turns this problem into something positive as well. It turns it into a mechanism that fosters <strong>its own continuation and proliferation</u></strong>. It can't make the unknown-unknown known. It can't pre-form or fore-see the exact nature of the reality it will produce. But if it is ready with fast-adapting rapid response capabilities, <u>it can field the effects it brings into being, by <strong>immediately going kinetic</strong> in a follow-up action</u>. When it flushes out threat, it can contrive to keep the emergence within parameters it can handle, more-or-less. <u><strong>There will be threat again</u></strong>. But if all goes well it will be in more controllable parameters. <u>Preemption can then <strong>re-legitimate itself affectively</strong>, and redeploy</u>. In this way, to use the military theory jargon, <u>the operative logic of preemption "leverages" uncertainty. <mark>What preemptive power must do is</mark> remain poised to <strong><mark>go kinetic again and again</strong></mark>, in serial response to the exercise of its own ontopower</u>. Every time it acts, it must already be poising itself to act again, with equal urgency. In that way,<u> <mark>each of its actions</mark> will <mark>contain</mark> within it <mark>the <strong>seeds of the next</mark> action, and that action, the action after</strong>, so that the deployment of preemption cascades, bringing its affective legitimation by threat with it, step by step</u>. <u>Preemptive action has become self-driving. </p><p></u>It only stands to reason that <u>if terrorist threat is ever-present and proliferates in unforeseen ways, then the power mobilized against it must be <strong>similarly ever-present and proliferating</u></strong>. ow could anyone argue that we shouldn't be capable of fielding uncertainty? We must always be poised for threat. We must assume the posture -- even if the stated doctrine has changed. If we sit on our hands, all it will take to delegitimate a government would be another terror attack that happened on its watch. <u>No government can afford not to be in a posture of preemption</u>. We must assume the posture at every moment – we must be poised to go kinetic at a moment's notice, whenever and wherever in the world that threat is felt to loom. Whenever and wherever. The realignment on time I mentioned earlier ends up driving a a tendency for the logic set in motion to turn space-filling. <u>The operative logic of preemptive is not only self-driving; it is <strong>self-expanding</strong>.</p><p></u>We watched this happen. <u><mark>Iraq was</mark> in fact used as <mark>a <strong>terror training ground</strong>. Terrorist techniques</mark> such as the improvised explosive device and suicide bombings <mark>were <strong>perfected there</strong></mark>, then carried to the other front, Afghanistan, where they fueled a resurgent insurgency</u>. The preemptive follow-up response on the part of the US was to expand the use of counter-terrorist tactics that matched the IED attack in terms of their ability to strike by surprise with lightning speed, and to morph themselves to the shape any kind of circumstance, taking any number of guises. The use of these techniques by the US military exploded. Chief among them were targeted assassinations using rapidly-deployed special operations forces, and unmanned drone attacks. <u>This escalation began under Bush, but was taken to new levels by Obama</u>, who had criticized the war in Iraq and called for its winding down only in order to shift attention to Afghanistan, which he defined as the "good war" and the right war. The right war overflowed to the wrong side of the border, into Pakistan.</p><p><u>The <strong><mark>blowback</strong> from</mark> US cross-border <mark>drone attacks and spe</mark>cial <mark>op</mark>eration<mark>s</mark> in Pakistan have <mark>energized activity elsewhere</mark> in the world: in <strong>Somalia</strong>, in <strong>Yemen</u></strong>. Yet another proliferation. US drone attacks and special ops have followed. Preemptive US military intervention has expanded to yet another continent.</p><p>The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan may be winding down. But the preemptive military posture of the US has only spread. And <u><strong><mark>nowhere has terrorist threat stopped looming</strong></mark>. Last month</u> (July 2011) <u>was the <strong>bloodiest for months</strong> for US military personnel in Iraq</u>, and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan picked up spectacularly with the assassinations of the governor of Kandahar province and the mayor of Kandahar city. Even after the "withdrawal" of US troops from Iraq, there will be a continuing US presence indefinitely into the future, as Obama's Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, in order to "fill the gap in Iraqi Security Force operations." This continuing presence will be in the form of five high-tech compounds outfitted for drone operations and housing aircraft and armored vehicles for rapid-response forays. The withdrawal from Afghanistan will similarly leave a permanent preemption-ready presence.</p><p>That <u><strong>presence has unprecedented reach</u></strong>. According to best estimates, the US preemptive presence stretches across more than 750 bases around the world. The less focused it becomes on outright invasion, the<u> more spread-out and tentacular </u>it becomes. US special operations forces are now active in no less than 75 countries around the world and carry out an average of 70 missions a day. The number of countries "serviced" is slated to rise to 120. A key to advisor to General Petraeus, the commander of US troops in Iraq, then Afghanistan, and now incoming CIA director, was recently quoted marvelling at the reach of this "<u><strong>almost industrial scale killing machine</u></strong>".</p><p><u><mark>Preemption</mark> doesn't go away. It <strong><mark>spreads its tentacles</strong></mark>.</u> Things change. Boots on the ground may recede as drones advance, following the rhythms of public opinion and the electoral cycle of politicians' engrossment in domestic affairs. Nation-building might get backgrounded in favor of targeted assassination campaigns. But <u>the operative logic of preemption only becomes more <strong>widespread and insidious</u></strong>. The more it changes, the more it stays the same, ever-expanding. To the point that it can be said to become the dominant operative logic of our times. <u><strong><mark>Preemption octopuses on</u></strong></mark>. Ontopower rules.</p>

2NC

Security

Link – Afghanistan

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Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Decrim sufficient to solve

Carrasquillo ‘14

Carrasquillo ‘14 (Tesla Carrasquillo J.D. Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2011 in Philosophy, City University of New York, Queens College. “TOURO LAW CENTER STUDENT COLLOQUIUM: Understanding Prostitution and the Need for Reform” 2014 Touro Law Review 30 Touro L. Rev. 697, Lexis, TSW)

Decriminalizing prostitution is not the same as legalizing prostitution decriminalization, there would be no regulations or standards put in place Simply put, the act of buying or selling sex would not be a crime leaving prostitutes free to control their business without the interference of the government. Countries that have decriminalized prostitution have found that many of the problems that have resulted from the criminalization of prostitution have been eliminated Prostitutes would no longer fear convictions giving them the freedom to report abuse and crimes Eliminating prosecution and offering police would reduce the need for pimps, reducing the number of women exploited Decriminalization would protect prostitutes' rights in regard to "wage and hour laws, social security, insurance and pension laws, safety and health protections and collective bargaining rights. Prostitution would be seen in the same light as any other occupation Decriminalizing prostitution would allow for the forming a union providing even more protections for prostitutes. Some argue that agents and managers would exploit prostitutes in the same way that pimps and madams have done historic if decriminalized the risk of exploitation would be no greate than between an athlete or actor and his or her agent

Decriminalizing prostitution is not the same as legalizing prostitution Countries that have decriminalized prostitution have found that many of the problems that have resulted from the criminalization of prostitution have been eliminated Prostitutes would no longer fear convictions giving them the freedom to report abuse and crimes Eliminating prosecution and offering police would reduce the need for pimps, reducing the number of women exploited Decriminalization would protect prostitutes' rights Prostitution would be seen in the same light as any other occupation Decriminalizing prostitution would allow for the forming a union if decriminalized the risk of exploitation would be no greate than between an athlete or actor and his or her agent

A. Decriminalization Decriminalizing prostitution is not the same as legalizing prostitution. With decriminalization, there would be no regulations or standards put in place. Simply put, the act of buying or selling sex would not be a crime, leaving prostitutes free to control their business without the interference of the government. n160 The majority of developed countries today do not criminalize prostitution, although many do prohibit running brothels, pimping, and public solicitation. n161 Countries that have decriminalized prostitution have found [*713] that many of the problems that have resulted from the criminalization of prostitution have been reduced or eliminated. n162 Prostitutes would no longer have a fear of criminal convictions if prostitution were not illegal, giving them the freedom to report abuse and crimes perpetrated against them. Eliminating the threat of prosecution and offering police protection would also reduce the need for pimps, in turn, reducing the number of women exploited by pimps. Women would have control over their bodies and "control of their own destinies." n163 Decriminalization would protect prostitutes' rights in regard to "wage and hour laws, social security, insurance and pension laws, safety and health protections and collective bargaining rights." n164 Prostitution would be seen in the same light as any other occupation that uses contracts where one may hire an agent or manager to assist with one's business. n165 Decriminalizing prostitution would allow for the possibility of prostitutes forming a union, providing even more protections for prostitutes. n166 Some argue that agents and managers would exploit prostitutes in the same way that pimps and madams have done historically. n167 However, if prostitution were decriminalized, the risk of exploitation would be no greater between a prostitute and her agent or manager than between an athlete or actor and his or her agent or manager. n168

<h4><u><strong>Decrim sufficient to solve</h4><p>Carrasquillo ‘14</p><p></u></strong>(Tesla Carrasquillo J.D. Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2011 in Philosophy, City University of New York, Queens College. “TOURO LAW CENTER STUDENT COLLOQUIUM: Understanding Prostitution and the Need for Reform” 2014 Touro Law Review 30 Touro L. Rev. 697, Lexis, TSW)</p><p>A. Decriminalization <u><strong><mark>Decriminalizing prostitution is not the same as legalizing prostitution</u></strong></mark>. With <u><strong>decriminalization, there would be no regulations or standards put in place</u></strong>. <u><strong>Simply put, the</u></strong> <u><strong>act of buying or selling sex would not be a crime</u></strong>, <u><strong>leaving prostitutes free to control their business without the interference of the government.</u></strong> n160 The majority of developed countries today do not criminalize prostitution, although many do prohibit running brothels, pimping, and public solicitation. n161 <u><strong><mark>Countries</mark> <mark>that have decriminalized prostitution have</mark> <mark>found</mark> </u></strong>[*713]<u><strong> <mark>that many of the problems that have resulted from the criminalization of prostitution have been</u></strong></mark> reduced or <u><strong><mark>eliminated</u></strong></mark>. n162 <u><strong><mark>Prostitutes would no longer</u></strong></mark> have a <u><strong><mark>fear</u></strong></mark> of criminal <u><strong><mark>convictions</u></strong></mark> if prostitution were not illegal, <u><strong><mark>giving them the freedom to report abuse</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and crimes</u></strong></mark> perpetrated against them. <u><strong><mark>Eliminating</u></strong></mark> the threat of <u><strong><mark>prosecution</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>offering police</u></strong></mark> protection <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>reduce the need for pimps,</u></strong></mark> in turn, <u><strong><mark>reducing</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the number of women exploited</u></strong></mark> by pimps. Women would have control over their bodies and "control of their own destinies." n163 <u><strong><mark>Decriminalization would</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>protect prostitutes' rights</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in regard to "wage and hour laws, social security, insurance and pension laws, safety and health protections and collective bargaining rights.</u></strong>" n164 <u><strong><mark>Prostitution would be seen in the same light as any other occupation</u></strong></mark> that uses contracts where one may hire an agent or manager to assist with one's business. n165 <u><strong><mark>Decriminalizing prostitution would allow for</mark> <mark>the</u></strong></mark> possibility of prostitutes <u><strong><mark>forming a union</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>providing even more protections for prostitutes.</u></strong> n166 <u><strong>Some argue that agents and managers would exploit prostitutes in the same way that pimps and madams have done historic</u></strong>ally. n167 However, <u><strong><mark>if</u></strong></mark> prostitution were <u><strong><mark>decriminalized</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the risk of exploitation would be no greate</u></strong></mark>r between a prostitute and her agent or manager <u><strong><mark>than between an athlete or actor and his or her agent</u></strong></mark> or manager. n168</p>

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AT: No Solve Rights

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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China threat discourse is a fantasy constructed upon a western-propagated differentiation which is profoundly racist and actualizes the threat

Turner 13

Turner 13—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]

Pan argues the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers. the PRC's capabilities appear threatening from understandings about the U S itself T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’ China ‘threats’ to the U St have always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements. American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence Campbell suggests dangers in the international realm are threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’ interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a U S defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’ when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. they have always existed as dangers to that identity a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity racial and ideological deemed most fundamental to its being representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such a Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western U S this discursive process of separating China from the U S has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies such crises were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U S was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the U S are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign. This is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth. this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved They assume the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded US China policy must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states. it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies. Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the U S it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China. the U S has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the U S have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the U S functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced

T]here is no “Chinese reality” that can speak for itself’ interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign through discourses of difference American discourses have made the US foreign from China nineteenth-century racial discourses separated China from a U S defined by Caucasian foundations Cold War discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the US. These discourses constitute a boundary ‘dangers’ from China have been perceived through the lens of American identity a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect American identity racial and ideological the capabilities and intentions are only part of the story. the processes by which China is made foreign are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy American discourses of China have never been produced objectively US China policy perpetuates discursive difference ‘threats’ from China have been fantasised, socially constructed products of discourse China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions they have framed the boundaries of political possibility

In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan argues that the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.15 Pan does not deny the importance of the PRC's capabilities but asserts that they appear threatening from understandings about the United States itself. ‘[T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself’, Pan argues. ‘[T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17¶ The analysis which follows demonstrates that China ‘threats’ to the United States have to some extent always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence.¶ The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible … is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21¶ Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States.¶ It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated.¶ As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.24¶ Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced.¶ US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then, US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the United States. As the case study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30¶ In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced.

<h4>China threat discourse is a fantasy constructed upon a western-propagated differentiation which is profoundly racist and actualizes the threat</h4><p><u><strong>Turner 13</u></strong>—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]</p><p>In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin <u>Pan argues</u> that <u>the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.</u>15 Pan does not deny the importance of <u>the PRC's capabilities</u> but asserts that they <u>appear threatening from understandings about the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>itself</u>. ‘[<u><mark>T]here is no</mark> such thing as <mark>“Chinese reality” that can</mark> automatically <mark>speak for itself</u>’</mark>, Pan argues. ‘[<u>T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’</u>.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17¶ The analysis which follows demonstrates that <u>China ‘threats’ to the U</u>nited <u>St</u>ates <u>have</u> to some extent <u>always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse.</u> Michel <u>Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.</u>18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, <u>American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence</u>.¶ The article draws in part from the work of David <u>Campbell</u> who <u>suggests</u> that <u>dangers in the international realm are</u> invariably <u>threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible</u> … <u>is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’</u>19 As a result, <u><strong><mark>interpretations of global danger</strong> can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign</mark> from one another <mark>through discourses of</mark> separation and <mark>difference</u></mark>.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that <u>particular <mark>American discourses have</mark> historically <mark>made the US foreign from China</mark>.</u> Case study one for example demonstrates that <u><mark>nineteenth-century racial discourses</mark> of non-white immigrant Chinese <mark>separated China from a U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates largely <u><mark>defined by</mark> its presumed <mark>Caucasian foundations</mark>.</u> In case study two we see that <u><mark>Cold War</mark> ideological <mark>discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the</mark> democratic-capitalist <mark>US. These</mark> types of <mark>discourses</mark> are shown to have <strong><mark>constitute</mark>d <mark>a</mark> ‘specific sort of <mark>boundary</strong></mark> producing political performance’</u>.21¶ Across the history of Sino-US relations then <u>when <mark>‘dangers’ from China</mark> have emerged, they <mark>have</mark> always <mark>been perceived through the lens of American identity</mark>.</u> In consequence, <u>they have always existed as dangers to that identity</u>. In this analysis it is argued that <u><mark>a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to <strong>protect</mark> components of <mark>American identity</u></strong></mark> (primarily <u><strong><mark>racial and ideological</u></strong></mark>) <u>deemed most fundamental to its being</u>. As such, <u>representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity.</u> The case study analyses which follow reveal that <u>this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such a</u>s those within the administration of President Harry <u>Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.¶ It is demonstrated that, twice before, <u>this <strong>discursive process</strong> of separating China from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has <strong>resulted in a crisis of American identity</strong>. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies</u>.22 Case studies one and two expose how <u>such crises</u> have previously emerged. These moments <u>were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War.</u> Case study three shows that <u>while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated</u>.¶ As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then <u><mark>the capabilities and intentions </mark>of a ‘rising’ China <mark>are only part of the story.</mark> International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and <mark>the <strong>processes by which China is made foreign</strong></mark> from, and potentially dangerous to, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>are <strong>inseparable from the enactment of US China policy</strong></mark>. This is because</u>, to reaffirm, <u><mark>American discourses of China have never been produced objectively</mark> or in the absence of purpose or intent.</u> <u>Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.</u>23 <u>This is</u> not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is <u>to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.</u>24¶ Accordingly, <u>this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved</u>.25 <u>They assume</u>, for instance, <u>the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure</u> that <u>particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded</u>.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced.¶ <u>US China policy</u>, however, <u>must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.</u>27 In fact, <u>it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.</u>28 <u>Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes</u>, then, <u><mark>US China policy</mark> itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. As the case study analyses show, <u>it <mark>perpetuates discursive difference</mark> through the rhetoric and actions</u> (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) <u>by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.</u>29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity</u>.30¶ In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, <u>throughout history <mark>‘threats’ from China</mark> towards the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They <mark>have</u></mark> in part <u><mark>been fantasised, socially constructed products of</mark> American <mark>discourse</mark>. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that <mark>China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions</u></mark>. Second, <u>representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, <mark>they have <strong>framed the boundaries of political possibility</strong></mark> so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded.</u> Third, <u>US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced</u>.</p>

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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

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Harvard DH

Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

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Baylor EvZo

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix

Bifo 11.

Bifo 11. Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108

Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The prolif of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken , from which every moral consideration victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac No need for a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects The West has become suicidal exhaustion is seen as the inability body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: exhaustion could become a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much , and outrageously too much during the last thirty years is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out economic growth the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth

Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

<h4>We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix</h4><p><u><strong>Bifo 11.</u></strong> Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. <u>104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective</mark> subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> which has given soul to modern social dynamics is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>prolif</mark>eration <mark>of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche to <strong><mark>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only way of escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains</u>. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</strong> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane<mark>, from which every moral consideration</mark> of the innocence of the <mark>victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute</mark>, the alter-ego of the terrorist, <mark>the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may thereafter become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u><mark>No need</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u>A <strong>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></mark>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><mark>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong></mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u><mark>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></mark>. <u>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u>

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Brian Lain

1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx

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The affirmative has misidentified the source of racial domination – the audio-centric regime of harmony as a principle of normative identity formation provided the conditions for a racial machine known as faciality – their refusal to question the underlying onto-epistemic structures of harmonic monism guarantees the failure of their project and re-inscription of imperialism

Hight 3 , Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 13–17)

Hight 3 (Christopher Hight , Associate Professor of Architecture at Rice, 2003, “Stereo Types: The Operation of Sound in the Production of Racial Identity” LEONARDO, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 13–17)

this essay explores the territorializing of bodies—black and white—by Western European codes by examining a few of the intersections in the complex network of sonic and visual representation for there to be racialized subjects, there must be a framework in which they can be categorized and controlled as such. This schema of whiteness provided a crucial part of the ideological infrastructure required for the ongoing administration of racially subjected peoples old diagrams of colonial and post-colonial control are being supplanted by more elusive regimes of power that act as much by sound as by vision. By remixing the story of racism as the soundtrack of whiteness, I attempt to locate new modes of productive resistance, in which different improvisations of identity may begin Race politics have often referred to the ideal of “racial harmony.” harmony itself can be read as integral to the story of racial representation the harmonic system of polyphonic music was inseparable from the techniques of navigation, land measurement and accounting that allowed the conquering and administration of empires Crosby has recently placed music at the center of the rise of Western Europe as an imperial power the rise of musical notation symptomatic of the rise of the same quantifiable mode of vision that allowed European power to eventually conquer as yet unknown lands and peoples via cartography and bookkeeping these notational systems deferred to a harmonic system Harmony was a global similitude that transcended all disciplines and senses and was thought directly to reflect the organization of divine nature Harmony provided an epistemological measurement for the organization of the world visual quantification must be understood as mere points of emergence in this organization of knowledge according to a harmonic topos. The canons of ideal proportions of the human body and of architecture were established through reference to the harmonic proportions of the diachronic scale The face and body were represented through analogies to a harmonious piece of music visual quantification is secondary to the conceptual organization of the world according to harmonics; visual representation is always already effused with a musical model, which itself is premised upon an a priori concept of harmonic order. the harmonic system of representation provided a consensual and preconscious norm for “whiteness.” the equation of harmony with the beautiful, the good and the true: The task of science was to reveal this harmony and unity of all of nature Stanton employed harmonic measures as the criteria for discerning a natural order of the races Dürer thought one should draw the human face according to a harmonic system of order Olmstead sought to order real bodies by reading them through the grid of harmony Under this system white bodies were taken as the finest examples of harmonic form because they were a de facto standard of judgment Galton’s eugenics racial types were derived by averaging the features of individuals into a generic image Galton employed various visual measures to discern this standard, all of which depended in some degree on a reference to natural law, promising purification of the races by the elimination of physical and mental deviants. the harmonic system depends on the idea of a whole, a unified order without an exterior. it was crucial that the black body could be measured upon the same scale as the white for their practices to be understood as empirically valid and scientific This system does not operate through a binary essential opposition such as white versus black, or us and the Other it is monist a “logic of the Same From the viewpoint of [this] racism there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should look like us and whose crime it is not to be Racism ... propagates waves of sameness until all those who resist identification have been wiped out Harmony provided a conceptual apparatus by which bodies that seem totally “other” and foreign cultures could be assimilated and controlled according to their degree of likeness. Deviance would have been always judged in reference to this common measure. deviants, not “others.” This sameness is crucial not simply at an ideological level, but also in the ability to administrate the economy of empire in which all the elements of its domain, including colonized populations, could be treated as material for economic development harmony was an early example of capital’s conversion of base material into a common “exchange value.” Through the trope of harmony, races were no longer seen as incommensurable and converted into resources and goods, sometimes as slaves. If harmonic representation established a “consensual representation of the world” supposed resistance often conformed to its logic, retaining a harmonic principle. This tacit consent to harmonic representation has characterized many attempts to correct the degradation of the African-American “face-lifts” sought a better position but left the ordering system itself intact meant that they could only operate within the spectrum of whiteness. representation is not, in the first instance, based on a visual stereotype, but on the harmonic organization of racial identity. This did not occur via a superficial resemblance or a cultural bias but an analogy built into the very foundations of Western metaphysical and epistemological systems racial harmony operates as a technique of white domination, integration being merely the final assimilation to whiteness because it accedes to the sense of this system’s naturalness and inalterability, and because it depends on the fantasy of erecting a different totalizing system elsewhere, separatism must be understood as the product of harmonic regimes of whiteness just as eugenic purification Before identity, there is the measured grid of sameness before there are representations, there must be the frameworks through which they can be recognized as representations harmony can be said to construct assemblages of sound and vision.

for there to be racialized subjects, there must be a framework in which they can be categorized and controlled old diagrams of control are being supplanted by elusive regimes of power that act as much by sound as by vision. harmony can be integral to racial representation the harmonic system was inseparable from empires Harmony was a global similitude that transcended all disciplines and senses visual quantification must be mere points of emergence in this harmonic topos. proportions of the body were established through the harmonic visual representation is effused with a musical model white bodies were the finest examples of harmonic form because they were a de facto standard of judgment the harmonic depends on a unified order without exterior. it was crucial that the black body could be measured upon the same scale This system does not operate through a binary such as white versus black it is monist a “logic of the Same There are only people who should look like us and whose crime it is not to Racism ... propagates waves of sameness until all who resist identification have been wiped out bodies that seem “other” could be assimilated according to likeness. sameness is crucial to administrate empire Through harmony, races were no longer seen as incommensurable and converted into resources and slaves. resistance often conformed to its logic, retaining a harmonic principle. . “face-lifts” sought a better position but left the ordering system intact . representation is based on an analogy built into the very foundations of Western metaphysical and epistemological systems. it accedes to the sense of this system’s naturalness and depends on the fantasy of erecting a different totalizing system elsewhere, separatism must be understood as the product of harmonic regimes of whiteness

Acamera pulls back slowly from a face to reveal a body strutting—in time with the soundtrack—down an urban boulevard. The shot expands to reveal a musical entourage playing wah-wah guitars and staccato horns, a pastiched Isaac Hayes groove that offers a ready stereo-type. Without any other context or narrative, these sounds announce that “this cat’s a bad mother,” the superhero of the ghetto, Shaft [1] or Super y. When I originally viewed this scene from I’m Gonna Git You Sucka! the mixed audience exploded in laughter at this audiovisual gag [2]. It offered the only memorable image in an otherwise forgettable Ž lm because it allowed the subliminal effects of cinematic sound to surface, suggesting that sound is equally as implicated as visual representation in constructions of racial identity. However, most discourses on race and representation continue to privilege visual themes and metaphors, especially in film and literary studies, relying on a repertoire of visually based stereotypes (Sambo, King Kong) and tropes (“white veils,” masks, invisibility). While there is a relatively large body of work on music and racial identity in African-American and postcolonial discourse, these studies tend to highlight the “alternative” music of the Other and more rarely address how Western “white” noise might be implicated in narratives of imperial domination. Yet, hearing immigrants from former British colonies in Africa proudly sing “Rule Britannia” and “God Save the Queen” (as this writer has), one becomes immediately aware of sound’s complex function in the institutions of colonialism and its production of racialized subjects. Like the parody above, this essay explores the territorializing of bodies—black and white—by Western European codes. It does so by examining a few of the intersections in the complex network of sonic and visual representation. A now-classic novel, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, and a theoretical text, Jacques Attali’s Noise: A Political Economy of Music, provide audiovisual case studies played in counterpoint to each other. I am not directly mobilizing the usual discourse of otherness and alterity found in mainstream post-colonial theory [3]. Nor am I here concerned with the problematic idea of “ethnic” music, but rather with the equally difficult question of “whiteness.” That is, the concern of the present essay is restricted to the construction and constitution of “white” as an identity and “whiteness” as a category and the way “others” were—and are—assimilated to this dominant order. This investigation is based on the critical premise that for there to be racialized subjects, there must be a framework in which they can be categorized and controlled as such. This schema of whiteness provided a crucial part of the ideological infrastructure required for the ongoing administration of racially subjected peoples. This paper explores a small part of the sonic component in such a regime of codification and in doing so attempts to displace the visual diagrams of control that have obsessed cultural critics at least since Foucault’s infamous example (in Surveiller et Punir) of Bentham’s panoptic discipline. I offer a sketch of another diagram of power that passes, as it were, not through the lens of the white gaze but vibrates the surfaces of whiteness itself. This seems increasingly necessary as the old diagrams of colonial and post-colonial control are being supplanted by more elusive regimes of power that, through multimedia technology, act as much by sound as by vision. By remixing the story of racism as the soundtrack of whiteness, I attempt to locate new modes of productive resistance, in which different improvisations of identity may begin.¶ RACIST HARMONY¶ Race politics have often referred to the ideal of “racial harmony.” However, harmony itself can be read as integral to the story of racial representation. Jacques Attali’s text suggests such a reading, which I will develop. Noise not only challenges the autonomy of musical discourse, but reverses the traditional treatment of sound as a passive register of culture. For Attali, music is not symptomatic of supposedly “deeper” cultural conditions, nor does it represent meaning that originates elsewhere; instead, the organization of sound into musical forms precedes the gradual accretions of power, such as law. Attali delineates three modern European musical stages: harmonic representation, repetition and composition. The Ž rst is defined largely through the mathematics of the diachronic scale and the aesthetics of polyphonic harmony [4]. It is based on proportional ratios between units’ places on a single axis of variation (pitch), an organic unity of these increments in both pitch and time, and a rich mathematics of their combinations in whole units. This harmonic system, I suggest, contributed to the conceptual organization of the colonial world. As a technique for the organization of sonic material, the harmonic system of polyphonic music was inseparable from the techniques of navigation, land measurement and accounting that allowed the conquering and administration of empires [5]. Alfred Crosby has recently placed music at the center of the rise of Western Europe as an imperial power, arguing that the development of new notational systems allowed for the visualization of compositions too complex to compose or learn acoustically. For him, the musical staff is one of the first graphs in the West, charting pitch and time on its two axes. He understands the rise of musical notation in the 13th to 15th centuries as symptomatic of the rise of the same quantifiable mode of vision that allowed European power to eventually conquer as yet unknown lands and peoples via cartography and bookkeeping. However, insofar as these notational systems deferred to a harmonic system, we should question Crosby’s immediate privileging of visual order. Harmony was a principle of then-pervasive Neo- Platonic thought and was restricted neither to vision nor to music. Harmony, like proportion and analogy, was a global similitude that transcended all disciplines and senses and was thought directly to reflect the organization of divine nature [6]. Harmony never constituted simply a tool of musical composition, but neither was it merely a symptom of the rise of uniquely Western forms of visuality, as Crosby argues. As Attali suggests, music was not a surrogate for measure but was itself “a system of measurement; in other words a system for the scientific, quantified representation of nature . . . the isomorphism of all representations” [7]. This measuring measure provided a preconscious formal ideal against which all things were understood and judged. Harmony provided an epistemological measurement for the organization of the world. Both the representational system of music and visual quantification must be understood as mere points of emergence in this organization of knowledge according to a harmonic topos.¶ However, music did provide an especially potent manifestation of the harmonic representation, for what could seem more natural than the tonal progression of the diachronic scale? It is this sense of intuitive naturalness that allowed musical harmony to operate as a privileged signature of a cosmic harmonics. For example, in 15th- and 16th-century Italy, analogies to music were central to architecture, astronomy and philosophy, passing from the architecture of Palladio, through Copernican cosmologies, to Dürer’s Treatise on Proportion. The canons of ideal proportions of the human body and of architecture were established through reference to the harmonic proportions of the diachronic scale. Copernicus argued for his system not because it was more accurate or easily quantifiable than an earth-centered universe. In fact, by the observations then possible, it was neither more empirically accurate nor easier to calculate. This undermines the idea that an easily quantified vision was the prime mover of the West’s rapid rise to dominance through scientific and technological advance. Instead, Copernicus demonstrated how his system better represented the harmonic ideal. The world was to be read like a musical score for evidence of this similitude. Dürer, meanwhile, sought to depict different characters and emotions in artistic representations of the human face and body by changing the proportional relations of its elements. The face and body—like the universe itself— were represented through analogies to a harmonious piece of music [8]. Here we can see how Crosby’s rise of visual quantification is secondary to the conceptual organization of the world according to harmonics; visual representation is always already effused with a musical model, which itself is premised upon an a priori concept of harmonic order. I am not foolishly suggesting that Dürer’s etchings or music composed with the harmonic system is inherently racist or “white” but that the harmonic system of representation provided a consensual and preconscious norm for “whiteness.” This harmonic system was as pervasive as it was robust. In the early 20th century, for example, the otherwise iconoclastic naturalist D’Arcy Thompson reiterated the equation of harmony with the beautiful, the good and the true: “the harmony of the world is made manifest by Form and Number . . . the poetry of Natural Philosophy is embodied in the concept of mathematical beauty” (emphasis added) [9]. He made central reference to Dürer’s Treatise as a model for the classification of species in both growth and evolution. The task of science was to reveal this harmony and unity of all of nature. Similar elisions of the aesthetic and the scientific pervade the discourse of racial science. Mary Olmstead Stanton, a late-19th-century physiognomist, employed harmonic measures as the criteria for discerning a natural order of the races. For her, harmonic “form is a universal and determining principle. . . . The form and shape of everything testifies to its character and rank among creations” [10]. If Dürer thought one should draw the human face according to a harmonic system of order, Olmstead sought to order real bodies by reading them through the grid of harmony. Under this system white bodies were taken as the finest examples of harmonic form, not necessarily because they were thought perfect but because they were a de facto standard of judgment. In Francis Galton’s eugenics, for example, racial types were derived by averaging the features of individuals into a generic image. The ideal was also an average, and the body was represented and read as a symptom of deviation from this norm [11]. Galton employed various visual measures to discern this standard, all of which depended in some degree on a reference to natural law, promising purification of the races by the elimination of physical and mental deviants. He believed this statistic racial norm was as real and as natural as the human voice. Perhaps it is no mere accident that the bell curve Galton made famous traces the same geometry as a pure note’s sine wave as visually represented on an oscilloscope. The harmonic organizations of matter, be they in music, visual arts or science, are integral to the production of racialized subjects. Importantly, the harmonic system depends on the idea of a whole, a unified order without an exterior. For Dürer, an artist could represent any expression and character, beautiful or ugly, employing the fixed harmonic ratios alone. Thompson sought to demonstrate the harmonic continuum of nature by revealing how the form and structure of rather different species can be generated by altering the proportional relationship of their organs in a coordinate system, modulating as it were, the amplitude and frequency of their formal organization. For example, a femur bone of one species can be transformed into that of another through such harmonic distortions. All the species thus could be said to emerge from a continuum of natural forces rather than be the result of separate, incommensurable creations. Likewise, for race scientists, it was crucial that the black body could be measured upon the same scale as the white for their practices to be understood as empirically valid and scientific. Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, argued that all the “races” derived from a common ancestry and therefore could be subjected to the same normative criteria. This system does not operate through a binary essential opposition such as white versus black, or us and the Other. Instead, it is monist—there is only one point of view and one order—what Deleuze has called a “logic of the Same”: From the viewpoint of [this] racism there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should look like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to the simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices. Racism ... propagates waves of sameness until all those who resist identification have been wiped out [12]. Because it provides a measuring measure, the harmonic system works through a meta-analogy in which all things are compared with a model tautologically derived through the use of the measure itself, as in Galton’s work. Harmony provided a conceptual apparatus by which bodies that seem totally “other” and foreign cultures could be assimilated and controlled according to their degree of likeness. Deviance would have been always judged in reference to this common measure. There were deviants, not “others.” This sameness is crucial not simply at an ideological level, but also in the ability to administrate the economy of empire in which all the elements of its domain, including colonized populations, could be treated as material for economic development. As Attali implies, harmony was an early example of capital’s conversion of base material into a common “exchange value.” Through the trope of harmony, races were no longer seen as incommensurable (in contrast to early global explorations that often represented indigenous peoples as discrete species) and converted into resources and goods, sometimes as slaves.¶ FABLES OF THE RECONSTRUCTION¶ If harmonic representation established a “consensual representation of the world” [13], supposed resistance often conformed to its logic, retaining a harmonic principle. This tacit consent to harmonic representation has characterized many attempts to correct the degradation of the African-American. Henry Louis Gates has described how the visual signs of African-American identity were over-coded by the white grid as exaggerated caricatures: The features of African-Americans— mouth shape and lip size, the unique shape of the head . . . skin color, kinky hair—had been characterized and stereotyped so severely in popular American art, black intellectuals seemed to feel that nothing less than a full makeover or face-lift could . . . could begin to ameliorate the social conditions of the modern black American [14]. Gates cites John Henry Adams as an example of such a racial makeover. Adams appropriated physiognomic rhetoric to re-code the features of the black man as beautiful and noble: “Here is the new Negro man, tall, erect, commanding, with a face as strong as Anglo Moses and yet every whit as pleasing and handsome as Rubens’s favorite model. There is that penetrative eye . . . that broad forehead and firm chin. . . . ” [15] The reference to Rubens’s models reveals the same assemblage of scientific knowledge and aesthetic practices found in “white” discourses of racial science. Because such “face-lifts” sought a better position but left the ordering system itself intact meant that they could only operate within the spectrum of whiteness. But what Adams could not have seen, perhaps because he was too enclosed by it—and what Gates ignores—is that this representation is not, in the first instance, based on a visual stereotype, but on the harmonic organization of racial identity. This did not occur via a superficial resemblance or a cultural bias but an analogy built into the very foundations of Western metaphysical and epistemological systems. Under this system, racial harmony operates as a technique of white domination, integration being merely the final assimilation to whiteness. Yet, because it accedes to the sense of this system’s naturalness and inalterability, and because it depends on the fantasy of erecting a different totalizing system elsewhere, separatism must be understood as the product of harmonic regimes of whiteness, just as was Galton’s eugenic purification. Before identity, there is the measured grid of sameness and analogy; before there are representations, there must be the frameworks through which they can be recognized as representations. In this sense then, concepts such as harmony can be said to construct assemblages of sound and vision.

<h4>The affirmative has misidentified the source of racial domination – the audio-centric regime of <u>harmony</u> as a principle of normative identity formation provided the conditions for a racial machine known as <u>faciality</u> – their refusal to question the underlying onto-epistemic structures of harmonic monism guarantees the failure of their project and re-inscription of imperialism</h4><p><u><strong>Hight 3</u></strong> (Christopher Hight , Associate Professor of Architecture at Rice, 2003, “Stereo Types: The Operation of Sound in the Production of Racial Identity” LEONARDO<u><strong>, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 13–17)</p><p></u></strong>Acamera pulls back slowly from a face to reveal a body strutting—in time with the soundtrack—down an urban boulevard. The shot expands to reveal a musical entourage playing wah-wah guitars and staccato horns, a pastiched Isaac Hayes groove that offers a ready stereo-type. Without any other context or narrative, these sounds announce that “this cat’s a bad mother,” the superhero of the ghetto, Shaft [1] or Super y. When I originally viewed this scene from I’m Gonna Git You Sucka! the mixed audience exploded in laughter at this audiovisual gag [2]. It offered the only memorable image in an otherwise forgettable Ž lm because it allowed the subliminal effects of cinematic sound to surface, suggesting that sound is equally as implicated as visual representation in constructions of racial identity. However, most discourses on race and representation continue to privilege visual themes and metaphors, especially in film and literary studies, relying on a repertoire of visually based stereotypes (Sambo, King Kong) and tropes (“white veils,” masks, invisibility). While there is a relatively large body of work on music and racial identity in African-American and postcolonial discourse, these studies tend to highlight the “alternative” music of the Other and more rarely address how Western “white” noise might be implicated in narratives of imperial domination. Yet, hearing immigrants from former British colonies in Africa proudly sing “Rule Britannia” and “God Save the Queen” (as this writer has), one becomes immediately aware of sound’s complex function in the institutions of colonialism and its production of racialized subjects. Like the parody above, <u>this essay explores the territorializing of bodies—black and white—by Western European codes</u>. It does so <u>by examining a few of the intersections in the complex network of sonic and visual representation</u>. A now-classic novel, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, and a theoretical text, Jacques Attali’s Noise: A Political Economy of Music, provide audiovisual case studies played in counterpoint to each other. I am not directly mobilizing the usual discourse of otherness and alterity found in mainstream post-colonial theory [3]. Nor am I here concerned with the problematic idea of “ethnic” music, but rather with the equally difficult question of “whiteness.” That is, the concern of the present essay is restricted to the construction and constitution of “white” as an identity and “whiteness” as a category and the way “others” were—and are—assimilated to this dominant order. This investigation is based on the critical premise that <u><mark>for there to be racialized subjects, there must be a framework in which they can be categorized and controlled </mark>as such. This schema of whiteness provided a crucial part of the ideological infrastructure required for the ongoing administration of racially subjected peoples</u>. This paper explores a small part of the sonic component in such a regime of codification and in doing so attempts to displace the visual diagrams of control that have obsessed cultural critics at least since Foucault’s infamous example (in Surveiller et Punir) of Bentham’s panoptic discipline. I offer a sketch of another diagram of power that passes, as it were, not through the lens of the white gaze but vibrates the surfaces of whiteness itself. This seems increasingly necessary as the <u><mark>old diagrams of</mark> colonial and post-colonial <mark>control are being supplanted by </mark>more <mark>elusive regimes of power that</u></mark>, through multimedia technology, <u><mark>act <strong>as much by sound as by vision</strong>.</mark> By remixing the story of racism as the soundtrack of whiteness, I attempt to locate new modes of productive resistance, in which different improvisations of identity may begin</u>.¶ RACIST HARMONY¶ <u>Race politics have often referred to the ideal of “racial harmony.”</u> However, <u><mark>harmony</mark> itself <mark>can be </mark>read as <mark>integral to</mark> the story of <mark>racial representation</u></mark>. Jacques Attali’s text suggests such a reading, which I will develop. Noise not only challenges the autonomy of musical discourse, but reverses the traditional treatment of sound as a passive register of culture. For Attali, music is not symptomatic of supposedly “deeper” cultural conditions, nor does it represent meaning that originates elsewhere; instead, the organization of sound into musical forms precedes the gradual accretions of power, such as law. Attali delineates three modern European musical stages: harmonic representation, repetition and composition. The Ž rst is defined largely through the mathematics of the diachronic scale and the aesthetics of polyphonic harmony [4]. It is based on proportional ratios between units’ places on a single axis of variation (pitch), an organic unity of these increments in both pitch and time, and a rich mathematics of their combinations in whole units. This harmonic system, I suggest, contributed to the conceptual organization of the colonial world. As a technique for the organization of sonic material, <u><mark>the harmonic system </mark>of polyphonic music <mark>was inseparable from </mark>the techniques of navigation, land measurement and accounting that allowed the conquering and administration of <mark>empires</u></mark> [5]. Alfred <u>Crosby has recently placed music at the center of the rise of Western Europe as an imperial power</u>, arguing that the development of new notational systems allowed for the visualization of compositions too complex to compose or learn acoustically. For him, the musical staff is one of the first graphs in the West, charting pitch and time on its two axes. He understands <u>the rise of musical notation</u> in the 13th to 15th centuries as <u>symptomatic of the rise of the same quantifiable mode of vision that allowed European power to eventually conquer as yet unknown lands and peoples via cartography and bookkeeping</u>. However, insofar as <u>these notational systems deferred to a harmonic system</u>, we should question Crosby’s immediate privileging of visual order. Harmony was a principle of then-pervasive Neo- Platonic thought and was restricted neither to vision nor to music. <u><mark>Harmony</u></mark>, like proportion and analogy, <u><mark>was a global similitude that transcended all disciplines and senses</mark> and was thought directly to reflect the organization of divine nature</u> [6]. Harmony never constituted simply a tool of musical composition, but neither was it merely a symptom of the rise of uniquely Western forms of visuality, as Crosby argues. As Attali suggests, music was not a surrogate for measure but was itself “a system of measurement; in other words a system for the scientific, quantified representation of nature . . . the isomorphism of all representations” [7]. This measuring measure provided a preconscious formal ideal against which all things were understood and judged. <u>Harmony provided an epistemological measurement for the organization of the world</u>. Both the representational system of music and <u><mark>visual quantification must be </mark>understood as <strong><mark>mere points of emergence</strong> in this </mark>organization of knowledge according to a <mark>harmonic topos.</u></mark>¶ However, music did provide an especially potent manifestation of the harmonic representation, for what could seem more natural than the tonal progression of the diachronic scale? It is this sense of intuitive naturalness that allowed musical harmony to operate as a privileged signature of a cosmic harmonics. For example, in 15th- and 16th-century Italy, analogies to music were central to architecture, astronomy and philosophy, passing from the architecture of Palladio, through Copernican cosmologies, to Dürer’s Treatise on Proportion. <u>The canons of <strong>ideal <mark>proportions of the</mark> human <mark>body</strong></mark> and of architecture <mark>were established through </mark>reference to <mark>the harmonic </mark>proportions of the diachronic scale</u>. Copernicus argued for his system not because it was more accurate or easily quantifiable than an earth-centered universe. In fact, by the observations then possible, it was neither more empirically accurate nor easier to calculate. This undermines the idea that an easily quantified vision was the prime mover of the West’s rapid rise to dominance through scientific and technological advance. Instead, Copernicus demonstrated how his system better represented the harmonic ideal. The world was to be read like a musical score for evidence of this similitude. Dürer, meanwhile, sought to depict different characters and emotions in artistic representations of the human face and body by changing the proportional relations of its elements. <u>The face and body</u>—like the universe itself— <u>were represented through analogies to a harmonious piece of music</u> [8]. Here we can see how Crosby’s rise of <u>visual quantification is secondary to the conceptual organization of the world according to harmonics; <mark>visual representation is <strong></mark>always already <mark>effused with a musical model</strong></mark>, which itself is premised upon an a priori concept of harmonic order.</u> I am not foolishly suggesting that Dürer’s etchings or music composed with the harmonic system is inherently racist or “white” but that <u>the harmonic system of representation provided a consensual and preconscious norm for “whiteness.”</u> This harmonic system was as pervasive as it was robust. In the early 20th century, for example, the otherwise iconoclastic naturalist D’Arcy Thompson reiterated <u>the equation of harmony with the beautiful, the good and the true:</u> “the harmony of the world is made manifest by Form and Number . . . the poetry of Natural Philosophy is embodied in the concept of mathematical beauty” (emphasis added) [9]. He made central reference to Dürer’s Treatise as a model for the classification of species in both growth and evolution. <u>The task of science was to reveal this harmony and unity of all of nature</u>. Similar elisions of the aesthetic and the scientific pervade the discourse of racial science. Mary Olmstead <u>Stanton</u>, a late-19th-century physiognomist, <u>employed harmonic measures as the criteria for discerning a natural order of the races</u>. For her, harmonic “form is a universal and determining principle. . . . The form and shape of everything testifies to its character and rank among creations” [10]. If <u>Dürer thought one should draw the human face according to a harmonic system of order</u>, <u>Olmstead sought to order real bodies by reading them through the grid of harmony</u>. <u>Under this system <mark>white bodies were </mark>taken as <mark>the finest examples of harmonic form</u></mark>, not necessarily because they were thought perfect but <u><mark>because <strong>they were a de facto standard of judgment</u></strong></mark>. In Francis <u>Galton’s eugenics</u>, for example, <u>racial types were derived by averaging the features of individuals into a generic image</u>. The ideal was also an average, and the body was represented and read as a symptom of deviation from this norm [11]. <u>Galton employed various visual measures to discern this standard, all of which depended in some degree on a reference to natural law, promising purification of the races by the elimination of physical and mental deviants.</u> He believed this statistic racial norm was as real and as natural as the human voice. Perhaps it is no mere accident that the bell curve Galton made famous traces the same geometry as a pure note’s sine wave as visually represented on an oscilloscope. The harmonic organizations of matter, be they in music, visual arts or science, are integral to the production of racialized subjects. Importantly, <u><mark>the harmonic </mark>system <mark>depends on </mark>the idea of a whole, <mark>a unified order <strong>without</mark> an <mark>exterior.</u></strong></mark> For Dürer, an artist could represent any expression and character, beautiful or ugly, employing the fixed harmonic ratios alone. Thompson sought to demonstrate the harmonic continuum of nature by revealing how the form and structure of rather different species can be generated by altering the proportional relationship of their organs in a coordinate system, modulating as it were, the amplitude and frequency of their formal organization. For example, a femur bone of one species can be transformed into that of another through such harmonic distortions. All the species thus could be said to emerge from a continuum of natural forces rather than be the result of separate, incommensurable creations. Likewise, for race scientists, <u><mark>it was <strong>crucial</strong> that the black body could be <strong>measured upon the same scale</strong></mark> as the white for their practices to be understood as empirically valid and scientific</u>. Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, argued that all the “races” derived from a common ancestry and therefore could be subjected to the same normative criteria. <u><mark>This system <strong>does not operate through a binary</mark> essential opposition <mark>such as white versus black</strong></mark>, or us and the Other</u>. Instead, <u><mark>it is monist</u></mark>—there is only one point of view and one order—what Deleuze has called <u><mark>a “logic of the Same</u></mark>”: <u>From the viewpoint of [this] racism there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. <mark>There are only people who should look like us and whose crime it is not to </mark>be</u>. The dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to the simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices. <u><mark>Racism ... propagates <strong>waves of sameness</strong> until all </mark>those <mark>who resist identification have been wiped out</u></mark> [12]. Because it provides a measuring measure, the harmonic system works through a meta-analogy in which all things are compared with a model tautologically derived through the use of the measure itself, as in Galton’s work. <u>Harmony provided a conceptual apparatus by which <mark>bodies that seem </mark>totally <mark>“other” </mark>and foreign cultures <mark>could be assimilated </mark>and controlled <mark>according to </mark>their degree of <mark>likeness.</mark> Deviance would have been always judged in reference to this common measure.</u> There were <u>deviants, not “others.” This <mark>sameness is crucial</mark> not simply at an ideological level, but also in the ability <mark>to administrate </mark>the economy of <mark>empire</mark> in which all the elements of its domain, including colonized populations, could be treated as material for economic development</u>. As Attali implies, <u>harmony was an early example of capital’s conversion of base material into a common “exchange value.” <mark>Through</mark> the trope of <mark>harmony, races were no longer seen as incommensurable</u></mark> (in contrast to early global explorations that often represented indigenous peoples as discrete species) <u><mark>and <strong>converted into resources and</mark> goods, sometimes as <mark>slaves</strong>.</u><strong></mark>¶<u></strong> </u>FABLES OF THE RECONSTRUCTION¶ <u>If harmonic representation established a “consensual representation of the world”</u> [13], <u>supposed <strong><mark>resistance often conformed to its logic, retaining a harmonic principle</strong>.</u> <u></mark>This tacit consent to harmonic representation has characterized many attempts to correct the degradation of the African-American</u><mark>.</mark> Henry Louis Gates has described how the visual signs of African-American identity were over-coded by the white grid as exaggerated caricatures: The features of African-Americans— mouth shape and lip size, the unique shape of the head . . . skin color, kinky hair—had been characterized and stereotyped so severely in popular American art, black intellectuals seemed to feel that nothing less than a full makeover or face-lift could . . . could begin to ameliorate the social conditions of the modern black American [14]. Gates cites John Henry Adams as an example of such a racial makeover. Adams appropriated physiognomic rhetoric to re-code the features of the black man as beautiful and noble: “Here is the new Negro man, tall, erect, commanding, with a face as strong as Anglo Moses and yet every whit as pleasing and handsome as Rubens’s favorite model. There is that penetrative eye . . . that broad forehead and firm chin. . . . ” [15] The reference to Rubens’s models reveals the same assemblage of scientific knowledge and aesthetic practices found in “white” discourses of racial science. Because such <u><mark>“face-lifts” sought a better position but <strong>left the ordering system </mark>itself <mark>intact</strong></mark> meant that they could only operate within the spectrum of whiteness<mark>.</u></mark> But what Adams could not have seen, perhaps because he was too enclosed by it—and what Gates ignores—is that this <u><mark>representation is</mark> not, in the first instance, <mark>based on</mark> a visual stereotype, but on the harmonic organization of racial identity. This did not occur via a superficial resemblance or a cultural bias but <mark>an analogy built into the <strong>very foundations of Western metaphysical and epistemological systems</u></strong>.</mark> Under this system, <u>racial harmony operates as a technique of white domination, integration being merely the final assimilation to whiteness</u>. Yet, <u>because <mark>it accedes to the sense of this system’s naturalness</mark> and inalterability, <mark>and</mark> because it <mark>depends on the fantasy of <strong>erecting a different totalizing system elsewhere</strong>, separatism must be understood as the product of harmonic regimes of whiteness</u></mark>, <u>just as</u> was Galton’s <u>eugenic purification</u>. <u>Before identity, there is the measured grid of sameness</u> and analogy; <u>before there are representations, there must be the frameworks through which they can be recognized as representations</u>. In this sense then, concepts such as <u>harmony can be said to construct assemblages of sound and vision.</p></u>

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1ac was black anti-hairity 1nc was university k liberalism k and case 2nc was university k 1nr was liberalism k and case 2nr was university k liberalism k and case

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Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political

Spanos 8

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)

We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas

We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

<h4>Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>

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1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case

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Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence

Gulli 13 , pg. 5

Gulli 13 Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5

we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in Gaza or France from once again trying its luck in Africa though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007 the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony this killing, just like Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.

sovereign power and authority rest on violence and terror struggle for dominance is impaired and made brutal by lack of heg U S heg has vanished drive for domination has to show raw violence traditional justifications democracy and freedom have now become weak because the contempt the (the US show toward morality punishment remains a limit Not so for dominant nations: who will stop the U S from striking anywhere these nations are aware of their structural, ontological historical, weakness they rely on a military machine drones and diplomacy, is an outpost for military operations and global policing incarnated by Africom Domination without hegemony’ captures the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty in the light of the bifurcation of financial and military power with the catastrophic war against Iraq US hegemony entered terminal crisis.” the U S relationship to the world is best described ‘domination without heg ’ What can the US do ? Not much, short of brutal dominance you can kill the bin Ladens without gaining heg Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of al-Awlaki, who many have compared to Trayvon Martin the ill-concealed fury for loss of heg becomes visible power as care is what should replace hegemony

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony.¶ ‘Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” He continues:¶ Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.

<h4>Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence</h4><p><u><strong>Gulli 13</u></strong> Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence<u><strong>, pg. 5</p><p></u></strong>I think that <u>we have now an understanding of what the situation is: <strong>The <mark>sovereign </mark>everywhere</strong>, be it the political or financial elite, <strong>fakes the legitimacy</strong> on which its <mark>power and authority </mark>supposedly rest</u>. <u>In truth, they <strong><mark>rest on violence and terror</strong></mark>, or the threat thereof</u>. <u>This is an <strong>obvious and essential aspect</strong> of the singularity of the present crisis</u>. In this sense, <u>the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the <mark>struggle for dominance is </mark>at one and the same time <mark>impaired and made </mark>more <mark>brutal by <strong></mark>the <mark>lack of heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. This is true in general, but <u>it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, <strong>the <mark>U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates</strong>, whose <mark>heg</mark>emony <mark>has</mark> <strong>diminished or <mark>vanished</strong></mark>.</u> <u>It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard</u>. <u>Lacking hegemony, the <strong>sheer <mark>drive for domination</strong> has to show</mark> <strong>its true face</strong>, its <strong><mark>raw violence</u></strong></mark>. <u>The usual, <mark>traditional <strong></mark>ideological <mark>justifications </mark>for dominance</strong> (such as bringing <mark>democracy and freedom</mark> here and there) <mark>have now become <strong></mark>very <mark>weak</strong> because </u></mark>of <u><strong><mark>the contempt</strong> </mark>that <mark>the </mark>dominant nations <mark>(the US </mark>and its most powerful allies) <strong>regularly <mark>show</strong> toward </mark>legality, <mark>morality</mark>, and humanity</u>. Of course, <u>the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of <mark>punishment</mark>, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the <strong>I</strong>nternational <strong>C</strong>riminal <strong>C</strong>ourt, <mark>remains a </u></mark>clear<u><mark> limit</mark>, a possibility.</u> <u><strong><mark>Not so for </mark>the <mark>dominant nations</u></strong>: <u>who will stop the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> from striking anywhere </mark>at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in</u> the <u>Gaza</u> Strip, <u>or</u> envious <u>France from once again trying its luck in Africa</u>? Yet, <u>though still dominant, <mark>these nations are </mark>painfully <mark>aware of their <strong>structural, ontological </mark>and <mark>historical, weakness</u></strong></mark>. <u>All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) <strong>only heighten the brutality</strong> in the exertion of <strong>what remains of their dominance</u></strong>. <u>Although <mark>they rely on a <strong></mark>highly sophisticated <mark>military machine</strong></mark> (the technology of <mark>drones</mark> is a clear instance of this) <mark>and </mark>on an equally sophisticated <mark>diplomacy, </mark>which has <strong>traditionally</strong> been and <strong>increasingly</strong> <mark>is an outpost for <strong>military operations and global policing</strong></mark> (now excellently <strong><mark>incarnated by Africom</strong></mark>), <strong>they know that they have lost their hegemony</u></strong>.¶ ‘<u><strong><mark>Domination without hegemony’</u></strong></mark> <u>is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007</u>). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), <u>the phrase <mark>captures the </mark>singularity of the <mark>global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty</mark>, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future</u>” (1994/2010: 221). <u>It acquires particular meaning <mark>in the light of</mark> Arrighi’s notion of <strong><mark>the bifurcation of financial and military power</mark>.</u></strong> Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, <u>early in the twenty-first century, and certainly <mark>with the </mark>ill-advised and <mark>catastrophic war against Iraq</mark>, “the US belle époque came to an end and <mark>US </mark>world <mark>hegemony entered <strong></mark>what in all likelihood is its <mark>terminal crisis.”</u></strong></mark> He continues:¶ <u>Although <mark>the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its <mark>relationship to </mark>the rest of <mark>the world is </mark>now <mark>best described </mark>as one of <strong><mark>‘domination without heg</mark>emony<mark>’</u></strong></mark> (1994/2010: 384). <u><mark>What can the US do </mark>next<mark>? <strong>Not much, short of brutal dominance</u></strong></mark>. In the last few years, <u>we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too</u> (Noam Chomsky has often noted that <u>bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime</u>), <u>it is certain that <mark>you can kill <strong></mark>all <mark>the bin Ladens </mark>of the world <mark>without gaining </mark>back a bit of <mark>heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. In fact, <u>this killing, just like</u> G. W. <u>Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a <strong>Mafia-style</strong> regolamento di conti more than any other thing</u>. Barack <u><mark>Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of</mark> 16-year-old</u> Abdulrahman <u><mark>al-Awlaki, who</mark>se fate <mark>many have <strong></mark>correctly <mark>compared</strong> to <strong></mark>that of</strong> 17-year-old <mark>Trayvon Martin</u></mark> (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), <u>but it is precisely in cases like this one that <strong>the weakness at the heart of empire</strong>, <mark>the ill-concealed</mark> and uncontrolled <strong><mark>fury for</mark> the <mark>loss of heg</mark>emony</strong>, <mark>becomes visible</u></mark>. <u>The frenzy denies the possibility of <strong><mark>power as care</strong></mark>, which <mark>is <strong>what should replace hegemony</strong></mark>, let alone domination</u>. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about <u>the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence</u>. <u>What is needed is rather <strong>a radical alternative</strong> in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, <strong>a poetic rather than military and financial shift.</p></u></strong>

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Michigan AP

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Footnoting DA

Der Derian 95

Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes

A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the contested' nature of realism with a footnote and then business as usual This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to commit worse epistemological crimes

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

<h4>Footnoting DA</h4><p><u><strong>Der Derian 95</u></strong> (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)</p><p>But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? <u><mark>A stop-gap solution is to supplement the</u></mark> definitional <u><mark>gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist</u></mark>, mindful of a creeping pluralism, <u><mark>will note the</mark> 'essentially <mark>contested' nature of realism</mark> - duly backed up <mark>with a footnote</u></mark> to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - <u><mark>and then</mark> get down to <mark>business as usual</u></mark>, that is, <u>using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. <mark>This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere</mark>: in exchange for not contesting</u> the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, <u><mark>the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to</mark> then turn around and <mark>commit worse epistemological crimes</u></mark>. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.</p>

2NC

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Perm

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Kentucky

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UTD LO

Kristen Stout

1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

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Err neg- prostitutes don’t think prostitution should be legal bc of the risk of increased sexual violence

Raymond ‘3

Raymond ‘3 [Ph.D. Janice Raymond is a professor at the University of Massachusetts.¶ “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution ¶ And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution.” (Published in simultaneously in hard copy in Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: ¶ pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley ¶ (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003. ETB]

Women in prostitution do not want the industry legalized In a 5-country study most of the trafficked and prostituted women interviewed in the Philippines, Venezuela and the United States (3) strongly stated their opinion that prostitution should not be legalized and considered legitimate work, warning that legalization would create more risks and harm for women from already violent customer and pimps One woman said, “No way. It’s not a profession. It is humiliating, and violence from the men’s side.” Not one woman we interviewed wanted her children, family or friends to have to earn money by entering the sex industry. Another woman stated: “Prostitution stripped me of my life, my health, everything

Women in prostitution do not want the industry legalized In a 5-country study most women interviewed strongly stated that prostitution should not be legalized warning that legalization would create more risks from violent customer and pimps

10. Women in systems of prostitution do not want the sex industry legalized or decriminalized. ¶ ¶ In a 5-country study on sex trafficking, most of the trafficked and prostituted ¶ women interviewed in the Philippines, Venezuela and the United States (3) ¶ strongly stated their opinion that prostitution should not be legalized and ¶ considered legitimate work, warning that legalization would create more risks and ¶ harm for women from already violent customer and pimps (Raymond et al, 2002). ¶ One woman said, “No way. It’s not a profession. It is humiliating, and violence from the men’s side.” Not one woman we interviewed wanted her children, family ¶ or friends to have to earn money by entering the sex industry. Another woman ¶ stated: “Prostitution stripped me of my life, my health, everything” (Raymond et ¶ al., 2002).

<h4><u><strong>Err neg- prostitutes don’t think prostitution should be legal bc of the risk of increased sexual violence</h4><p>Raymond ‘3</p><p></u></strong>[Ph.D. Janice Raymond is a professor at the University of Massachusetts.¶ “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution ¶ And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution.” (Published in simultaneously in hard copy in Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: ¶ pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley ¶ (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003. ETB]</p><p>10. <u><strong><mark>Women in</u></strong> </mark>systems of <u><strong><mark>prostitution do not want the</u></strong></mark> sex <u><strong><mark>industry legalized</u></strong> </mark>or decriminalized. ¶ ¶ <u><strong><mark>In a 5-country study</u></strong></mark> on sex trafficking, <u><strong><mark>most</strong> </mark>of the trafficked and prostituted </u>¶<u> <strong><mark>women interviewed</strong> </mark>in the Philippines, Venezuela and the United States (3) </u>¶<u> <strong><mark>strongly stated</strong> </mark>their opinion <strong><mark>that prostitution should not be legalized</strong> </mark>and </u>¶<u> considered legitimate work, <strong><mark>warning that legalization would create more risks</strong></mark> and </u>¶<u> harm for women <strong><mark>from</strong> </mark>already <strong><mark>violent customer and pimps</u></strong> </mark>(Raymond et al, 2002). ¶ <u>One woman said, “No way. It’s not a profession. It is humiliating, and violence from the men’s side.” Not one woman we interviewed wanted her children, family </u>¶<u> or friends to have to earn money by entering the sex industry. Another woman </u>¶<u> stated: “Prostitution stripped me of my life, my health, everything</u>” (Raymond et ¶ al., 2002). </p>

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AT: No Solve Rights

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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the affirmative’s emphasis on material objects and organs can only serve as a distraction from wonder and the holy.

Hatab 1985

Lawrence J. Hatab. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. 1985. Page 56-57.

The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness. Hence the lower admonitions cannot take the soul to the Truth The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul has become blind to that state. Memory is never a vision in the past. It is an illumination in the present we find in Augustine the soul as both fallen and unfallen In the soul's unfallenness The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within “Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.

The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness lower admonitions cannot take the soul to Truth The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul has become blind to that state we find in Augustine the soul as both fallen and unfallen The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.

The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness. Hence the lower admonitions cannot take the soul directly to the Truth, and it has to pass through the levels of the soul's nature. Here is where the nature of contemplation comes to light, as the vehicle for the soul's ascent and return. With the notion of remembrance and recognition it is obvious that the soul is never entirely fallen. The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul in its attachment has become blind to that state. Memory, given precision in Book X of the Confessions, is never merely a vision in the past. It is also an illumination in the present. Here we find in Augustine the Plotinian paradox of the soul seen as both fallen and unfallen, which incidentally never ceased to give Augustine problems. From this paradox can be viewed Augustine's two main sources of revelation. In the soul's unfallenness can be seen the workings of illumination. The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within to the basis of its being still upholding it. Here appears one of Augustine's basic insights – the inwardness of spiritual experience. “Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.”

<h4>the affirmative’s emphasis on material objects and organs can only serve as a distraction from wonder and the holy.</h4><p>Lawrence J. <u><strong>Hatab</u></strong>. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. <u><strong>1985</u></strong>. Page 56-57.</p><p><u><mark>The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness</mark>. Hence the <mark>lower admonitions cannot take the soul</u></mark> directly <u><mark>to</mark> the <mark>Truth</u></mark>, and it has to pass through the levels of the soul's nature. Here is where the nature of contemplation comes to light, as the vehicle for the soul's ascent and return.</p><p>With the notion of remembrance and recognition it is obvious that the soul is never entirely fallen. <u><mark>The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul</u></mark> in its attachment <u><mark>has become blind to that state</mark>. Memory</u>, given precision in Book X of the Confessions, <u>is never</u> merely <u>a vision in the past. It is</u> also <u>an illumination in the present</u>. Here <u><mark>we find in Augustine</u></mark> the Plotinian paradox of <u><mark>the soul</u></mark> seen <u><mark>as both fallen and unfallen</u></mark>, which incidentally never ceased to give Augustine problems. From this paradox can be viewed Augustine's two main sources of revelation. <u>In the soul's unfallenness</u> can be seen the workings of illumination. <u><mark>The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within</u></mark> to the basis of its being still upholding it. Here appears one of Augustine's basic insights – the inwardness of spiritual experience. <u>“<mark>Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.</u></mark>”</p>

1NC

Off

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Iowa HS

Brian Lain

1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

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Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

CP: The United States should legalize nearly all cannabis in the United States.

<h4>CP: The United States should legalize nearly all cannabis in the United States.</h4>

1NC

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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

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Kentucky

2

Mary Washington SY

Rebecca Steiner

1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

This instantiates a form of permanent war – security apparatuses militarize subjectivity so citizens must always be on guard against attack

Masco 14

Masco 14 Masco, Joseph, “Theater of Operations : National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror” Duke University Press Books, November 2014, KB

Perceptions of the future are affectively laden as well as tied to expert judgment and information; they are based on feelings that can be nonrational but that link people together through threat-based projection. one can be afraid only of that which one knows to fear. Fear requires a familiarity with danger that the future does not allow us full access to. In the realm of esoteric military technologies the general public has no expert knowledge to draw on and must instead be educated to think and feel a particular way about technological capacities and worst-case outcomes Rehearsing the end of the nation-state at the level of imagination has been a core American project since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with each generation embracing its own concept of nation- ending apocalyptic danger, consolidated most powerfully in the image of the mushroom cloud. The innovation of the War on Terror is that it formally rejects deterrence, with its focus on global stability, as an objective in favor of preemption—an unending manipulation of the future for national advantage. The counter- terror state is devoted to locating and/or conjuring up images of dangers from an unrealized future and then combating each of those alternate futures as if they were material and imminent threats imagined futures and the affects they produce have become institutionalized as national security policy, creating a form of expert judgment that is at war with its own apocalyptic imaginary before it meets the real world, creating a massively productive form of militarization that is easily delinked from evidence, facts, or the observable in the name of confronting and eliminating potentially cataclysmic future danger. The nuclear arms race, with its minute-to-minute calculation of threat and advantage and the always ready-to-launch nuclear war machine, was an effort to stabilize the present by loading nuclear destruction into the everyday and continually displacing it by a few minutes into the future. To make this system work, US. defense experts not only built nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could function in any en vironment but they also gamed, modeled, and fantasized future war scenarios incessantly Locating security in intercontinental missile systems that were never fully tested and trusting a vast web of machines, institutions, and people to respond perfectly in the first moments of global crisis, the nuclear war machine was designed first and foremost to produce fear of the near future in adversaries and to harness that fear to produce a stable bipolar world The Cold War system was saturated with affective and imaginary recruitments as well as anticipatory logics. Deterrence restrained both sides of the conflict, putting a break on U.S. and Soviet desires and aggressions The Cold War focus on nuclear weapons focused experts’ attention on the numbers and types of Soviet weapons, their deployments and machinic capabilities as well as on the psychologies of nuclear command and control. although nuclear war remained at the conceptual stage after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it was fought incessantly at the level of the imagination with an unending state-based commitment to trying to model, game, intuit, and assess the likely actions of all parties in a nuclear conflict. the future imagined by counterterror officials today is an endless spectrum of threat with a proliferating set of objects, vectors, scales, and possibilities—a spectrum that is literally not bounded by time, space, technology, or the rules of evidence By defining terror as constantly emergent, the counterterror state assumes an open-ended futurity that cannot be deterred by external forces. the counterterror state needs to make not-yet-visible dangers its central concern because Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because there are known knowns; there are things we know we know there are known unknowns we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns the ones we dont know we don’t know it is the latter category that tend to be the diffi cult ones. And so people who have the omniscience that they can say with high certainty that something has not happened or is not being tried, have capabilities... they can do things I can’t do. Unknown unknowns can now be the basis for war. Rumsfeld transforms a catastrophic future at the level of the speculative imaginary into an urgent problem of counterterror. Security is constituted as both a necessity and as an unachievable goal a perverse logic that the counterterror state uses to drive increasing calls for resources, technical capacities, and agency strategic mobilization by security officials of the unknown, not yet emergent, or invisible danger has overturned American democratic values about the rule of law, the treatment of captives, the surveillance of citizens, and the necessity of covert actions It has transformed intuitions and desires into policy invalidated long-standing forms of expert judgment that worked to constrain official fears by attending to material reality, and has enabled deadly actions in the absence of facts Rumsfeld’s vision validates and eliminates the possibility of factual evidence creating a rationale for unrestrained American power and a security apparatus of constantly expanding capacities and infrastructures. This logic renders security itself obsolete replacing it with a constant conceptual agitation and physical mobilization. Threat (as pure potential) is used to enable a radically active and ever emerging counterterror state, allowing action to be favored over restraint, possibilities over capabilities, hypotheticals over knowledge. the first and most powerful effect of the nuclear revolution in the United States was the constitution of a new affective politics, one that informs the evolution of the national security state to this day and that is key to the formation of the counterterror state in the age of thermo nuclear war, the security state became a committed affect theorist, investing substantial multidisciplinary resources in efforts to understand public morale, contagious affects resilience, resolve, and the long-term effects of stress. The nuclear balance of terror was always an all— encompassing formation, creating a new executive a president preauthorized to start a nuclear war any second of the day and a new citizen-subject recruited to reorganize everyday life around the minute-to-minute reality of nuclear danger National security affect has become a new kind of infrastructure—a “structure of feeling’ that is historically produced, shared, and officially constituted as a necessary background condition of everyday life It is based on fears that are officially sanctioned and promoted as a means of coordinating citizens as members of a national security state certain kinds of fear are now coded into social life as potentials that can be triggered by small events National security affect relies on a specific political aesthetic, one that rehearses certain forms and images to produce a “sensuous shock” that limits thought as much as expands it The goal of a national security system is to produce a citizen-subject who responds to officially designated signs of danger automatically, instinctively activating logics and actions learned over time through drills and media indoctrination. the production of a fearful and docile public in the nuclear age has been historically matched by the rise of vibrant activist movements counterpublics that mirror the intensities of officially sanctioned nuclear terror in pursuit of different collective futures An affective atmosphere of everyday anxiety is transformed into individualized emotion by specific events, becoming a personalized and deeply felt experience. “what affects us—the sentience of a situation—is also a dwelling, a worlding born from an atmospheric attunement” national security affect has a specific form in the United States, one that is tied to a deep structural investment in the atomic bomb and that has been recalibrated and expanded to address a new concept of terror American citizens have been taught through official and mass-media campaigns to attune themselves to the possibility of terroristic violence as an unlimited daily potential image of the United States, computer hacking, infectious disease, and disruptions to daily life, to name but a few) and treats them all as equally imminent, equally catastrophic. Counterterror today requires a continual expansion of the security state, reaching a limit only when its key objects attain planetary scale or when federal monies run out counterterror sets no conceptual or territorial limit to defense, scaling its problems up to the ultimate spatial unit offering an unlimited call for resources to secure life from the species to the population to the individual to the microbe. counterterror produces a highly mobile sovereignty one that uses the potential of catastrophic future events as a means of overcoming legal, ethical, and political barriers in the here and now and that is endlessly searching for new objects of concern. this commitment to total security creates an unending bureaucratic circuit where shock requires ever more militarization and normalization in the name of warding off future shock. A war on shock locates national security within the human nervous system itself, constituting a peculiarly embodied psycho-politics that fuses an energetic apocalyptic imagination with both an immediate and deep future the counterterror state have attempted to endeavoring to produce a new citizen who is tuned to the specific threats of the age and psychologically capable of supporting permanent war, while simultaneously mobilizing U.S. economic and military power to change the international system, in the hope of eradicating threat on a planetary basis. However, the impossibility of this dual effort to produce a completely compliant citizen incapable of resisting the national security state or to eliminate danger on a planetary scale creates an endless feedback loop of shock, normalization, and militarization. this recursive system is what constitutes the United States as a global hyperpower, but an increasingly fragile one—as experts see danger coming in all physical dimensions as well as in all temporal conditions This requires a new kind of expert psychopolitics that is not grounded in the effort to establish facts but rather is committed to generating speculative futures that it will then need to counter Threat assessment becomes the chief domain of counterterror. The inability to perfectly predict and counter threat creates in the American security system the opportunity to constitute nearly every domain and object of everyday life as a potential vector of attack, creating a national security project that performs as a nearly perfect paranoid system, but one with planetary reach a nervous condition is an attribute of globalization, which he sees as: the establishment of the system of synchronous stress on a global scale. those who do not make themselves continuously available for synchronous stress seem asocial. Excitability is now the foremost duty of all citizens. This is why we no longer need military service. What is required is the general theme of duty a readiness to play your role as a conductor of excitation for collective, opportunist psychoses Excitability is the foremost duty of all citizens. The circulation of affect, the ability to be coordinated as subjects through felt intensities rather than reason at a mass level, is a core aspect of modern life A security culture of existential threat was embedded in American society and U.S. security institutions by decades of Cold War, allowing national politics of every kind be positioned as a matter of collective life or collective death. National security affect is productive whether it is reinforced by material or verifiable dangers or simply exists as a background register in everyday life. It can start from the top down, creating lines of intensity between the national leadership and the citizenry, or short circuits in the democratic process by raising the stakes of critiquing official action. Citizens can opt out of the national security public sphere all together by nonattention or generate specific counterpublics to it. Official White House statements draw on a classified universe of infor mation that citizens know exists but cannot interrogate, making counter- terror often a one-way communication. the classified threat matrix and the mass media combined to generate a national nervous system, one that promoted a growing sense of vulnerability transformed the basic structures of everyday life into vectors of possible terrorist attack. Mass transit systems, nuclear power plants, elec trical grids, the banking system, food, air, and water all became objects of mounting hysteria as possible targets of the next strike The ability to shape public fears is one of the key powers of the counterterror state and one of its pri mary domains of sovereignty citizens are left with only two options: acquiescence or denial This on-off struc ture of engagement inevitably works to enable security state actions, as it functions to [diminish] political resistance and countermobilizations National security affect requires cultural work to maintain; its intensities decay over time, and the rehearsal of specific forms of threat can become normalized, a background condition of everyday life. Counterterror attempts to turn feelings into a national infrastructure, a set of ideas, images, and affective intensities that can be instrumentalized.

The counter- terror state is devoted to conjuring up images of dangers and then combating each as if they were imminent threats imagined futures become institutionalized nuclear war fought incessantly at the level of the imagination an endless spectrum of threat not bounded by time, space or evidence Unknown unknowns can now be the basis for war. danger has overturned democratic values Rumsfeld’s vision eliminates the possibility of factual evidence This renders security obsolete replacing it with a constant agitation and mobilization. National security affect is a background condition of everyday life fear coded into social life as potentials triggered by small events National security affect rehearses images to produce a “sensuous shock” The goal is to produce a citizen-subject who responds to signs of danger mobile sovereignty is endlessly searching for new objects of concern. commitment to total security creates an unending bureaucratic circuit where shock requires ever more militarization endeavoring to produce a citizen capable of supporting permanent war an endless feedback loop of shock, normalization, and militarization. a perfect paranoid system with planetary reach. Excitability is the foremost duty of all citizens. What is required is a readiness to play your role as a conductor of psychoses a growing sense of vulnerability transformed everyday life into possible terrorist attack.

Perceptions of the future are affectively laden, as well as tied to expert judgment and information; they are based on feelings and intensities that can be nonrational but that link people together through threat-based projection. Put differently one can be afraid only of that which one knows to fear. Fear requires a kind of familiarity with danger that the future does not allow us full access to. In the realm of esoteric military technologies—weapons of mass destruction, for example—the general public has no expert knowledge to draw on and must instead be educated to think and feel a particular way about technological capacities and worst-case outcomes. Rehearsing the end of the nation-state at the level of imagination has consequently been a core American project since the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with each generation embracing its own concept of nation- ending apocalyptic danger, consolidated most powerfully in the image of the mushroom cloud. The innovation of the War on Terror is that it formally rejects deterrence, with its focus on global stability, as an objective in favor of preemption—an unending manipulation of the future for national advantage. The counter- terror state is devoted to locating and/or conjuring up images of dangers from an unrealized future and then combating each of those alternate futures as if they were material and imminent threats. In this way, imagined futures and the affects they produce have become institutionalized as national security policy, creating a form of expert judgment that is at war with its own apocalyptic imaginary before it meets the real world, creating a massively productive form of militarization that is easily delinked from evidence, facts, or the observable in the name of confronting and eliminating potentially cataclysmic future danger. How did this kind of governance come to be? The origins of the preemptive, counterterror state reside in the logics and lessons of the Cold War. The nuclear arms race, with its minute-to-minute calculation of threat and advantage and the always ready-to-launch nuclear war machine, was an effort to stabilize the present by loading nuclear destruction into the everyday and continually displacing it by a few minutes into the future. Mutual assured destruction promised that any state that started a nuclear war would only minutes later be destroyed by ¡t, an unpre cedented compression of time, space, and destructive capability in the naine of global defense. To make this system work, US. defense experts not only built nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could function in any en vironment, launch within Inmutes, and operate on a planetary scale, but they also gamed, modeled, and fantasized future war scenarios incessantly (see Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005). Locating security in intercontinental missile systems that were never fully tested and trusting a vast web of machines, institutions, and people to respond perfectly in the first moments of global crisis, the nuclear war machine was designed first and foremost to produce fear of the near future in adversaries and to harness that fear to produce a stable bipolar world. The Cold War system was therefore saturated with affective and imaginary recruitments as well as anticipatory logics. Deterrence, however, restrained both sides of the conflict, putting a break on both U.S. and Soviet desires and aggressions. The Cold War focus on nuclear weapons and delivery systems also set material parameters for the speculative expert imaginary; it focused experts’ attention on the numbers and types of Soviet weapons, their deployments and machinic capabilities (speed and force), as well as on the psychologies of nuclear command and control. These technoscientific forms were never free of political calcula tion but had a material basis: Donald MacKenzie (1990) has shown how the accuracy of intercontinental missiles was determined in the United States not by exacting experimental proof but rather by a political consen sus among all the interested scientific, military, and industrial parties (add ing an unacknowledged uncertainty to nuclear targeting going forward). Similarl) Lynn Eden (2004) has shown how the urban consequences of fire from nuclear explosions fell out of formal nuclear war planning in the l9óos, enabling the development of nuclear war and civil defense concepts that vastly underestimated the material effects of each detonation and allowed far greater numbers of U.S. weapons to be deployed globally (see also Gusterson 2008). In other words, although nuclear war remained at the conceptual stage after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it was fought incessantly at the level of the imagination, with an unending state-based commitment to trying to model, game, intuit, and assess the likely actions of all parties in a nuclear conflict. By contrast the future imagined by counterterror officials today is an endless spectrum of threat, with a proliferating set of objects, vectors, scales, and possibilities—a spectrum that is literally not bounded by time, space, technology, or the rules of evidence. By defining terror as constantly emergent, the counterterror state also assumes an open-ended futurity that cannot be deterred by external forces. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfekt (2002) famously put ¡tin a press conference about the (ultimately fictional) threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the US. invasion, the counterterror state needs to make not-yet-visible dangers its central concern because: Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we dont know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the diffi cult ones. And so people who have the omniscience that they can say with high certainty that something has not happened or is not being tried, have capabilities... they can do things I can’t do. “Unknown unknowns can now be the basis for war. Here, Rumsfeld transforms a catastrophic future at the level of the speculative imaginary into an urgent problem of counterterror. Security is thus constituted as both a necessity (to defend against catastrophic shock) and as an unachievable goal (as the future is an inexhaustible source of threat), a perverse logic that the counterterror state uses to drive increasing calls for resources, technical capacities, and agency. In the first decade of counterterror, a strategic mobilization by security officials of the unknown, not yet emergent, or invisible danger has powerfully overturned long-standing American democratic values about the rule of law, the treatment of captives, the surveillance of citizens, and the necessity of covert actions. It has transformed intuitions and desires into policy, invalidated long-standing forms of expert judgment that worked to constrain official fears by attending to material reality, and—as a result—has enabled deadly actions in the absence of facts. Rumsfeld’s vision—precisely because It transforms the unknown into a space of terror requiring immediate action—simultaneously validates and eliminates the possibility of factual evidence, creating both a rationale for unrestrained American power and a security apparatus of constantly expanding capacities and infrastructures. This logic renders security itself obsolete, replacing it with a constant conceptual agitation and physical mobilization. Threat (as pure potential) is used to enable a radically active and ever emerging counterterror state, allowing action to be favored over restraint, possibilities over capabilities, hypotheticals over knowledge. Excitable Subjects The uniquely destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the speed of their potential delivery constituted a new kind of technologically mediated existential threat after 1945, one that made feelings (fear, terror, shock, ag gression, futility, revenge) a new national project. I argue in this book that the first and most powerful effect of the nuclear revolution in the United States was the constitution of a new affective politics, one that informs the evolution of the national security state to this day and that is key to the formation of the counterterror state. Put differently, in the age of thermo nuclear war, the security state became a committed affect theorist, investing substantial multidisciplinary resources in efforts to understand public morale, contagious affects (panic, fear, terror), resilience, resolve, and the long-term effects of stress. The nuclear balance of terror was always an all— encompassing formation, creating a new executive (a president preauthorized to start a nuclear war any second of the day) and a new citizen-subject (recruited to reorganize everyday life around the minute-to-minute reality of nuclear danger). Military science funded extensive research on affects, feelings, and emotions with the goal of both psychologically strengthening and militarizing American society, using nuclear fear to calibrate officials and citizens alike through a new image of collective death. National security affect has thus become a new kind of infrastructure—a “structure of feeling’ to use Raymond Williams’s felicitous phrase (1978, 132)—that is historically produced, shared, and officially constituted as a necessary background condition of everyday life (see Stoler 2009). It is based on fears that are officially sanctioned and promoted as a means of coordinating citizens as members of a national security state. It can be a specific and negative form of what Kathleen Stewart calls “ordinary affects” (2007), in the sense that certain kinds of fear are now coded into social life as potentials that can be triggered by small events—fear of the unattended suitcase in the airport, for example—or directly recruited by official state ments, such as terrorist alert warnings. National security affect also relies on a specific political aesthetic, one that rehearses certain forms and images to produce what Jacques Rancière calls a “sensuous shock” that limits thought as much as expands it (2009, 6; see also M. Hansen 2004). The goal of a national security system is to produce a citizen-subject who responds to officially designated signs of danger automatically, instinctively activating logics and actions learned over time through drills and media indoctrination. An individual’s response to this kind of emotional call (in either the affirmative or negative) reveals his or her membership in a national corn munitv. Indeed, the production of a fearful and docile public in the nuclear age has been historically matched by the rise of vibrant activist movements (across the antinuclear, peace, justice, and environmental spectrum), counterpublics that mirror the intensities of officially sanctioned nuclear terror in pursuit of different collective futures.6 An affective atmosphere of everyday anxiety (Anderson 2009), grounded in an understanding that accidents, disasters, and attacks can happen at any moment of the da) is transformed into individualized emotion by specific events, becoming a personalized and deeply felt experience. As Stewart puts it, “what affects us—the sentience of a situation—is also a dwelling, a worlding born from an atmospheric attunement” (2011, 449). ¡ argue in this book that national security affect has a specific form in the United States, one that is tied to a deep structural investment in the atomic bomb and that has been recalibrated and expanded since 2001 to address a new concept of terror (consolidated in the logic of the WMD). American citizens have been taught through official and mass-media campaigns to attune themselves to the possibility of terroristic violence as an unlimited daily potential. This new concept of terror maintains the minute-to-minute threat made famil iar by decades of Cold War nuclear culture, but it is different in that it is an open-ended concept, one that links hugely diverse kinds of threats (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to be sure, but also attacks on the pub lic image of the United States, computer hacking, infectious disease, and disruptions to daily life, to name but a few) and treats them all as equally imminent, equally catastrophic. Counterterror today requires a continual expansion of the security state, reaching a limit only when its key objects attain planetary scale (exhaust ing space) or when federal monies run out (exhausting resources). That is, counterterror sets no conceptual or territorial limit to defense, scaling its problems up to the ultimate spatial unit—the earth—while offering an unlimited call for resources to secure life from the species to the population to the individual to the microbe. In this mannei counterterror produces a highly mobile sovereignty, one that uses the potential of catastrophic future events as a means of overcoming legal, ethical, and political barriers in the here and now and that is endlessly searching for new objects of concern. However, this commitment to total security—and the constant failure to achieve it—creates an unending bureaucratic circuit where shock requires ever more militarization and normalization in the name of warding off future shock. A war on shock, like a war on terror, locates national security within the human nervous system itself, constituting a peculiarly embodied psycho-politics (Orr 2006) that fuses an energetic apocalyptic imagination with both an immediate and deep future. Conceptually, a national security project of this kind would seem to offer only two means of achieving stability: first, by changing the nature of the individual at the level of emotions, senses, and psychology so that he or she experiences threat in a different manner—a project of normalization through militarization; and second, by changing the global environment in the hope of eliminating the possibility of dan ger. The Cold War state and the counterterror state in specific formulations have attempted to do both: endeavoring to produce a new citizen who is tuned to the specific threats of the age and psychologically capable of supporting permanent war, while simultaneously mobilizing U.S. economic and military power to change the international system, in the hope of eradicating threat on a planetary basis. However, the impossibility of this dual effort to produce a completely compliant citizen incapable of resisting the national security state or to eliminate danger on a planetary scale creates an endless feedback loop of shock, normalization, and militarization. We could say that this recursive system is what constitutes the United States as a global hyperpower, but an increasingly fragile one—as experts see danger coming in all physical dimensions (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) as well as in all temporal conditions (past, present, and future). This requires a new kind of expert psychopolitics that is not grounded in the effort to establish facts but rather is committed to generating speculative futures (imagined dangers of cataclysmic scale) that it will then need to counter. Security thus becomes a highly conceptual enterprise, one that moves past statistical, fact-based, or capability-based assessments of risk (see Collier 2008; De Goede 2008). Threat assessment—with all its imaginative, affec tive recruitments—becomes the chief domain of counterterror. The inability to perfectly predict and counter threat creates in the American security system the opportunity to constitute nearly every domain and object of everyday life as a potential vector of attack, creating a national security project that performs as a nearly perfect paranoid system, but one with planetary reach. Peter Sloterdijk has noted that a nervous condition is an attribute of globalization, which he sees as: the establishment of the system of synchronous stress on a global scale. This has progressed to such an extent that those who do not make themselves continuously available for synchronous stress seem asocial. Excitability is now the foremost duty of all citizens. This is why we no longer need military service. What is required is the general theme of duty, that is to say, a readiness to play your role as a conductor of excitation for collective, opportunist psychoses. (Sloterdijk and Henrichs 2001, 82) Excitability is the foremost duty of all citizens. The circulation of affect, the ability to be coordinated as subjects through felt intensities rather than reason at a mass level, is a core aspect of modern life (see Mazzarella 2010; dough 2007, ‘9; Orr 2006). The atomic bomb is one key origin of this kind of governance (see Lutz 1997 247), a WMD that greatly expanded American power but that also created a world of constant existential danger, one that as quite formally managed for generations by suturing collective life to an imminent destruction located in each minute of the day. A security culture of existential threat was embedded quite thoroughly in American society and U.S. security institutions by decades of Cold War, allowing national politics of every kind (domestic, international, activist) to be positioned as a matter of collective life or collective death. From this perspective, terror is a familiar mode of governance in the United States, one that was merely reconstituted in 2001 with a new set of objects, ambitions, and concerns. National security affect is productive whether it is reinforced by material or verifiable dangers or simply exists as a background register in everyday life. It is an atmosphere (Stewart 2on; Anderson 2009) that can become a deeply felt emotional structure when directed by mass media or official declarations into a collective event. It can start from the top down, creating lines of intensity between the national leadership and the citizenry, or short circuits in the democratic process by raising the stakes of critiquing official action. Citizens can also opt out of the national security public sphere all together by nonattention or generate specific counterpublics to it. Official White House statements, however, draw on a classified universe of infor mation that citizens know exists but cannot interrogate, making counter- terror often a one-way communication. After the 2001 attacks, the classified threat matrix and the mass media combined to generate a national nervous system, one that promoted a growing sense of vulnerability in the United States and transformed the basic structures of everyday life into vectors of possible terrorist attack. Mass transit systems, nuclear power plants, elec trical grids, the banking system, food, air, and water all became objects of mounting hysteria as possible targets of the next strike. White House of ficials incited this affective environment as part of a larger political strategy that would culminate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to rid that country of fictitious weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, it is important to rec ognize that when the national security leadership appears scared and tells citizens to be scared, there are few options open to the public. The ability to shape public fears—to give image and form to threat—is one of the key powers of the counterterror state today, and one of its pri mary domains of sovereignty. When security state officials announce an imminent, existential threat based on classified material who, or what, can push back on that statement in real time? In such moments, citizens are left with only two options: acquiescence or denial. This on-off struc ture of engagement inevitably works to enable security state actions, as it functions to [diminish] political resistance and countermobilizations (easily dismissed by officials as uninformed about the true nature of risk in the world and working on vastly slower time scales). National security affect, however, also requires cultural work to maintain; its intensities decay over time, and the rehearsal of specific forms of threat can become normalized, a background condition of everyday life. Counterterror attempts to turn feelings—the ability to be called to an image of danger and be excited by it—into a national infrastructure, a set of ideas, images, and affective intensities that can be instrumentalized.

<h4><u><strong>This instantiates a form of permanent war – security apparatuses militarize subjectivity so citizens must always be on guard against attack </h4><p>Masco 14</p><p></u></strong>Masco, Joseph, “Theater of Operations :<u><strong> National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror” Duke University Press Books, November 2014, KB</p><p></strong>Perceptions of the future are <strong>affectively laden</u></strong>, <u>as well as tied to expert judgment and information; they are based on feelings</u> and intensities <u>that can be nonrational but that link people together through threat-based projection. </u>Put differently <u>one can be afraid only of that which one knows to fear.</u> <u>Fear</u> <u>requires a</u> kind of <u>familiarity with danger that the future does not allow us full access to.</u> <u>In the realm of esoteric military technologies</u>—weapons of mass destruction, for example—<u>the general public has no expert knowledge to draw on <strong>and must instead be educated</strong> to think and feel a particular way about technological capacities and worst-case outcomes</u>. <u><strong>Rehearsing</strong> the end of the nation-state at the level of imagination has</u> consequently <u><strong>been a core American project</u></strong> <u>since the</u> U.S. <u>atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with each generation embracing its own concept of nation- ending apocalyptic danger, consolidated most powerfully <strong>in the image of the mushroom cloud.</p><p></strong>The innovation of the War on Terror is that it formally rejects deterrence, with its focus on global stability, as an objective <strong>in favor of preemption</strong>—an unending manipulation of the future for national advantage. <mark>The counter- terror state is devoted to</mark> locating and/or <strong><mark>conjuring up images</u></strong> <u>of dangers </mark>from an unrealized future <mark>and then combating each </mark>of those alternate futures <mark>as if they were </mark>material and <mark>imminent threats</u></mark>. In this way, <u><mark>imagined futures </mark>and the affects they produce <strong>have <mark>become institutionalized</strong></mark> as national security policy, creating a form of expert judgment that is at war with its own apocalyptic imaginary before it meets the real world, <strong>creating a massively productive form of militarization</strong> that is easily <strong>delinked from evidence, facts, or the observable</u></strong> <u>in the name of confronting and eliminating potentially cataclysmic future danger.</u> How did this kind of governance come to be?</p><p>The origins of the preemptive, counterterror state reside in the logics and lessons of the Cold War. <u>The nuclear arms race, with its minute-to-minute calculation of threat and advantage and the always ready-to-launch nuclear war machine, was an effort to stabilize the present by <strong>loading nuclear destruction into the everyday</u></strong> <u>and continually displacing it by a few minutes into the future. </u>Mutual assured destruction promised that any state that started a nuclear war would only minutes later be destroyed by ¡t, an unpre cedented compression of time, space, and destructive capability in the naine of global defense. <u>To make this system work, US. defense experts not only built nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could function in any en vironment</u>, launch within Inmutes, and operate on a planetary scale, <u>but they also gamed, modeled, and fantasized future war scenarios incessantly</u> (see Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005). <u>Locating security in intercontinental missile systems that were never fully tested and trusting a vast web of machines, institutions, and people to respond perfectly in the first moments of global crisis, <strong>the nuclear war machine</strong> was designed first and foremost to produce fear of the near future in adversaries and to harness that fear to produce a stable bipolar world</u>. <u>The Cold War system was</u> therefore <u><strong>saturated with affective and imaginary recruitments as well as anticipatory logics.</u></strong> <u>Deterrence</u>, however, <u>restrained both sides of the conflict, putting a break on</u> both <u>U.S. and Soviet desires and aggressions</u>. <u>The Cold War focus on nuclear weapons</u> and delivery systems also set material parameters for the speculative expert imaginary; it <u>focused experts’ attention on the numbers and types of Soviet weapons, their deployments and machinic capabilities</u> (speed and force), <u>as well as on the psychologies of nuclear command and control. </u>These technoscientific forms were never free of political calcula tion but had a material basis: Donald MacKenzie (1990) has shown how the accuracy of intercontinental missiles was determined in the United States not by exacting experimental proof but rather by a political consen sus among all the interested scientific, military, and industrial parties (add ing an unacknowledged uncertainty to nuclear targeting going forward). Similarl) Lynn Eden (2004) has shown how the urban consequences of fire from nuclear explosions fell out of formal nuclear war planning in the l9óos, enabling the development of nuclear war and civil defense concepts that vastly underestimated the material effects of each detonation and allowed far greater numbers of U.S. weapons to be deployed globally (see also Gusterson 2008).</p><p>In other words, <u>although <mark>nuclear war</mark> remained at the conceptual stage after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki</u> in 1945, <u>it was <mark>fought incessantly <strong>at the level of the imagination</u></strong></mark>, <u>with an unending state-based commitment to trying to model, game, intuit, and assess the likely actions of all parties in a nuclear conflict.</u> By contrast <u>the future imagined by counterterror officials today is <strong><mark>an endless spectrum of threat</u></strong></mark>, <u>with a proliferating set of objects, vectors, scales, and possibilities—a spectrum that is literally <strong><mark>not bounded</strong> by time, space</mark>, technology, <mark>or</mark> the rules of <mark>evidence</u></mark>. <u>By defining terror as constantly emergent, the counterterror state</u> also <u>assumes an <strong>open-ended futurity</u></strong> <u>that cannot be deterred by external forces.</u> As Secretary of Defense Rumsfekt (2002) famously put ¡tin a press conference about the (ultimately fictional) threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the US. invasion, <u>the counterterror state needs to make not-yet-visible dangers its central concern because</u>:</p><p><u>Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because</u> as we know, <u>there are known knowns; there are things we know we know</u>. We also know <u>there are known unknowns</u>; that is to say <u>we know there are some things we do not know.</u> <u>But there are also unknown unknowns</u>—<u>the ones we dont know we don’t know</u>. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, <u>it is the latter category that tend to be the diffi cult ones. And so people who have the omniscience that they can say with high certainty that something has not happened or is not being tried, have capabilities... they can do things I can’t do. </p><p></u>“<u><strong><mark>Unknown unknowns can now be the basis for war.</u></strong></mark> Here, <u>Rumsfeld transforms a catastrophic future at the level of the speculative imaginary into an urgent problem of counterterror. Security is</u> thus <u>constituted as both a necessity </u>(to defend against catastrophic shock) <u>and as an unachievable goal</u> (as the future is an inexhaustible source of threat), <u>a perverse logic that the counterterror state uses to drive increasing calls for resources, technical capacities, and agency</u>. In the first decade of counterterror, a <u>strategic mobilization by security officials of the unknown, not yet emergent, or invisible <mark>danger</u> <u><strong>has</u></strong></mark> powerfully <u><strong><mark>overturned</u></strong></mark> long-standing <u><strong>American <mark>democratic values</u></strong></mark> <u>about the rule of law, the treatment of captives, the surveillance of citizens, and the necessity of covert actions</u>. <u><strong>It has transformed intuitions and desires into policy</u></strong>, <u>invalidated long-standing forms of expert judgment that worked to constrain official fears by attending to material reality, and</u>—as a result—<u>has <strong>enabled deadly actions in the absence of facts</u></strong>. <u><mark>Rumsfeld’s vision</u></mark>—precisely because It transforms the unknown into a space of terror requiring immediate action—simultaneously <u><strong>validates and <mark>eliminates the possibility of factual evidence</u></strong></mark>, <u>creating</u> both <u>a rationale for unrestrained American power and a security apparatus of constantly expanding capacities and infrastructures. <strong><mark>This</mark> logic <mark>renders</mark> <mark>security</mark> itself <mark>obsolete</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>replacing it with a constant </mark>conceptual <mark>agitation and</mark> physical <mark>mobilization. </mark>Threat (as pure potential) is used to enable a radically active and ever emerging counterterror state, allowing action to be favored over restraint, possibilities over capabilities, hypotheticals over knowledge.</p><p></u>Excitable Subjects</p><p>The uniquely destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the speed of their potential delivery constituted a new kind of technologically mediated existential threat after 1945, one that made feelings (fear, terror, shock, ag gression, futility, revenge) a new national project. I argue in this book that <u>the first and most powerful effect of the nuclear revolution in the United States was <strong>the constitution of a new affective politics</strong>,</u> <u>one that informs the evolution of the national security state to this day and that is key to the formation of the counterterror state</u>. Put differently, <u>in the age of thermo nuclear war, the security state became a committed affect theorist,</u> <u>investing substantial multidisciplinary resources in efforts to understand public morale, contagious affects</u> (panic, fear, terror), <u>resilience, resolve, and the long-term effects of stress.</u> <u>The nuclear balance of terror was always an all— encompassing formation, creating a new executive</u> (<u>a president preauthorized to start a nuclear war any second of the day</u>) <u>and a new citizen-subject</u> (<u>recruited to reorganize everyday life around the minute-to-minute reality of nuclear danger</u>). Military science funded extensive research on affects, feelings, and emotions with the goal of both psychologically strengthening and militarizing American society, using nuclear fear to calibrate officials and citizens alike through a new image of collective death.</p><p><u><mark>National security affect </mark>has</u> thus <u>become a new kind of infrastructure—a “structure of feeling’</u> to use Raymond Williams’s felicitous phrase (1978, 132)—<u>that <mark>is</mark> historically produced, shared, and officially constituted as <mark>a</mark> necessary <mark>background <strong>condition of everyday life</u></strong></mark> (see Stoler 2009). <u>It is based on fears that are officially sanctioned and promoted as a means of coordinating citizens as members of a national security state</u>. It can be a specific and negative form of what Kathleen Stewart calls “ordinary affects” (2007), in the sense that <u>certain kinds of <mark>fear </mark>are now <mark>coded into social life as potentials </mark>that can be <mark>triggered by small events</u></mark>—fear of the unattended suitcase in the airport, for example—or directly recruited by official state ments, such as terrorist alert warnings. <u><mark>National security affect</u></mark> also <u>relies on a specific political aesthetic, one that <mark>rehearses </mark>certain forms and <mark>images to produce</u></mark> what Jacques Rancière calls <u><mark>a “sensuous shock” </mark>that <strong>limits thought</strong> as much as expands it</u> (2009, 6; see also M. Hansen 2004). <u><mark>The goal </mark>of a national security system <strong><mark>is to produce a citizen-subject</strong> who responds to</mark> officially designated <mark>signs of danger</mark> automatically, instinctively activating logics and actions learned over time through drills and media indoctrination.</u> An individual’s response to this kind of emotional call (in either the affirmative or negative) reveals his or her membership in a national corn munitv. Indeed, <u>the production of a fearful and docile public in the nuclear age has been historically matched by the rise of vibrant activist movements</u> (across the antinuclear, peace, justice, and environmental spectrum), <u><strong>counterpublics that mirror the intensities of officially sanctioned nuclear terror</strong> in pursuit of different collective futures</u>.6</p><p><u>An affective atmosphere of everyday anxiety</u> (Anderson 2009), grounded in an understanding that accidents, disasters, and attacks can happen at any moment of the da) <u>is transformed into individualized emotion by specific events, becoming a personalized and deeply felt experience.</u> As Stewart puts it, <u>“what affects us—the sentience of a situation—is also a dwelling, a worlding born from an atmospheric attunement”</u> (2011, 449). ¡ argue in this book that <u>national security affect has a specific form in the United States, one that is tied to a deep structural investment in the atomic bomb and that has been recalibrated and expanded</u> since 2001 <u>to address a new concept of terror</u> (consolidated in the logic of the WMD). <u>American citizens have been taught through official and mass-media campaigns to attune themselves to the possibility of terroristic violence as an unlimited daily potential</u>. This new concept of terror maintains the minute-to-minute threat made famil iar by decades of Cold War nuclear culture, but it is different in that it is an open-ended concept, one that links hugely diverse kinds of threats (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to be sure, but also attacks on the pub lic<u><strong> image of the United States, computer hacking, infectious disease, and disruptions to daily life, to name but a few) and treats them all as equally imminent, equally catastrophic.</p><p></strong>Counterterror today requires a continual expansion of the security state, reaching a limit only when its key objects attain planetary scale</u> (exhaust ing space) <u>or when federal monies run out</u> (exhausting resources). That is, <u><strong>counterterror sets no conceptual or territorial limit</strong> to defense, scaling its problems up to the ultimate spatial unit</u>—the earth—while <u>offering an unlimited call for resources to secure life from the species to the population to the individual to the microbe.</u> In this mannei <u><strong>counterterror produces a highly <mark>mobile sovereignty</u></strong></mark>, <u>one that uses the potential of catastrophic future events as a means of overcoming legal, ethical, and political barriers in the here and now and that <mark>is endlessly searching for new objects of concern.</u></mark> However, <u>this <mark>commitment to total security</u></mark>—and the constant failure to achieve it—<u><mark>creates <strong>an unending bureaucratic circuit where shock requires ever more militarization </mark>and normalization </strong>in the name of warding off future shock.</p><p>A war on shock</u>, like a war on terror, <u>locates national security within the human nervous system itself, constituting a peculiarly <strong>embodied psycho-politics</u></strong> (Orr 2006) <u>that fuses an energetic apocalyptic imagination with both an immediate and deep future</u>. Conceptually, a national security project of this kind would seem to offer only two means of achieving stability: first, by changing the nature of the individual at the level of emotions, senses, and psychology so that he or she experiences threat in a different manner—a project of normalization through militarization; and second, by changing the global environment in the hope of eliminating the possibility of dan ger. The Cold War state and <u>the counterterror state</u> in specific formulations <u>have attempted to</u> do both: <u><mark>endeavoring to produce a</mark> new <mark>citizen</mark> who is tuned to the specific threats of the age and psychologically <mark>capable of <strong>supporting permanent war</strong></mark>, while simultaneously mobilizing U.S. economic and military power to change the international system, in the hope of eradicating threat on a planetary basis. However, the impossibility of this dual effort to produce a completely compliant citizen incapable of resisting the national security state or to eliminate danger on a planetary scale <strong>creates <mark>an endless feedback loop of shock, normalization, and militarization.</u></strong></mark> We could say that <u>this recursive system is what constitutes the United States as a global hyperpower, but an increasingly fragile one—as experts see danger coming in all physical dimensions</u> (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) <u>as well as in all temporal conditions</u> (past, present, and future). <u>This requires a new kind of expert psychopolitics that is not grounded in the effort to establish facts but rather <strong>is committed to generating speculative futures</u></strong> (imagined dangers of cataclysmic scale) <u>that it will then need to counter</u>. Security thus becomes a highly conceptual enterprise, one that moves past statistical, fact-based, or capability-based assessments of risk (see Collier 2008; De Goede 2008). <u>Threat assessment</u>—with all its imaginative, affec tive recruitments—<u>becomes the chief domain of counterterror. </p><p>The inability to perfectly predict and counter threat creates in the American security system the opportunity to constitute nearly every domain and object of everyday life as a potential vector of attack, creating a national security project <strong>that performs as <mark>a </mark>nearly <mark>perfect paranoid system</strong></mark>, but one <mark>with planetary reach</u>.</mark> Peter Sloterdijk has noted that <u>a nervous condition is an attribute of globalization, which he sees as: </p><p>the establishment of the system of synchronous stress on a global scale.</u> This has progressed to such an extent that <u>those who do not make themselves continuously available for synchronous stress <strong>seem asocial.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Excitability is </mark>now <mark>the foremost duty of all citizens.</u></strong></mark> <u>This is why we no longer need military service. <mark>What is required is</mark> the general theme of duty</u>, that is to say, <u><strong><mark>a readiness to play your role</strong> as a conductor of</mark> excitation for collective, opportunist <mark>psychoses</u></mark>. (Sloterdijk and Henrichs 2001, 82)</p><p><u>Excitability is the foremost duty of all citizens.</u> <u>The circulation of affect, the ability to be coordinated as subjects through felt intensities rather than reason at a mass level, is a core aspect of modern life</u> (see Mazzarella 2010; dough 2007, ‘9; Orr 2006). The atomic bomb is one key origin of this kind of governance (see Lutz 1997 247), a WMD that greatly expanded American power but that also created a world of constant existential danger, one that as quite formally managed for generations by suturing collective life to an imminent destruction located in each minute of the day. <u>A security culture of existential threat was embedded</u> quite thoroughly <u>in American society and U.S. security institutions by decades of Cold War, allowing national politics of every kind</u> (domestic, international, activist) to <u>be positioned as a matter of collective life or collective death. </u>From this perspective, terror is a familiar mode of governance in the United States, one that was merely reconstituted in 2001 with a new set of objects, ambitions, and concerns.</p><p><u>National security affect is productive whether it is reinforced by material or verifiable dangers or simply exists as a background register in everyday life.</u> It is an atmosphere (Stewart 2on; Anderson 2009) that can become a deeply felt emotional structure when directed by mass media or official declarations into a collective event. <u>It can start from the top down, creating lines of intensity between the national leadership and the citizenry, or short circuits in the democratic process by raising the stakes of critiquing official action. Citizens can</u> also <u>opt</u> <u>out of the national security public sphere all together by nonattention or generate specific counterpublics to it.</u> <u>Official White House statements</u>, however, <u>draw on a classified universe of infor mation that citizens know exists but cannot interrogate, making counter- terror often <strong>a one-way communication.</u></strong> After the 2001 attacks, <u>the classified threat matrix and the mass media combined to generate a national nervous system, one that promoted <mark>a growing sense of vulnerability</u></mark> in the United States and <u><strong><mark>transformed </mark>the basic structures of <mark>everyday life</strong> into </mark>vectors of <mark>possible terrorist attack.</mark> Mass transit systems, nuclear power plants, elec trical grids, the banking system, food, air, and water all became objects of mounting hysteria as possible targets of the next strike</u>. White House of ficials incited this affective environment as part of a larger political strategy that would culminate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to rid that country of fictitious weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, it is important to rec ognize that when the national security leadership appears scared and tells citizens to be scared, there are few options open to the public.</p><p><u>The ability to shape public</u> <u>fears</u>—to give image and form to threat—<u>is one of the key powers of the counterterror state</u> today, <u>and one of its pri mary domains of sovereignty</u>. When security state officials announce an imminent, existential threat based on classified material who, or what, can push back on that statement in real time? In such moments, <u>citizens are left with only two options: acquiescence or denial</u>. <u>This on-off struc ture of engagement inevitably <strong>works to enable security state actions,</u></strong> <u>as it functions to [diminish] political resistance and countermobilizations</u> (easily dismissed by officials as uninformed about the true nature of risk in the world and working on vastly slower time scales). <u>National security affect</u>, however, also <u><strong>requires cultural work to maintain</strong>; its intensities decay over time, and the rehearsal of specific forms of threat can become normalized, a background condition of everyday life. Counterterror attempts to turn feelings</u>—the ability to be called to an image of danger and be excited by it—<u>into a national infrastructure, a set of ideas, images, and affective intensities that can be instrumentalized.</p></u>

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This failure of the affirmative is further demonstrated by their faith in dialectics as a model to illuminate racial discrimination – racism has never operated by exclusion but rather by waves of assimilation – the faciality machine marks deviance through subtle processes of territorialization rather than an a priori banishment of blackness – the aff’s dyadic understanding of race cannot account for the infinite proliferation of identities within the faciality machine, ensuring the reproduction of colonial domination

Saldanha 7

Saldanha 7 (Arun Saldanha, Associate Professor of Geography, Environment, and Society at University of Minnesota, Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster University, 2007, “Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” pg.194-196)

My disagreement is not with Fanon’s insistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of recognition to explain encounter. Because of this they tend to treat white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant, how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope D and G distance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis it isn’t consciousness but an abstract machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains faciality’s imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization faciality originated in humanism If the face is in fact Christ ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man They are inscribed on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance MARKED in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm Where it differs is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihilation of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorializations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a); they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

My disagreement is not with embodiment but with a Hegelian notion of recognition they treat white and nonwhite as naturally opposed There is little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant faciality is not based on dialectics an abstract machine of faciality arranges bodies into relations of power faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries faciality’s imperialism arose with Christianity. If the face is ordinary White Man the first deviances are racial They are on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. racism never operated by exclusion Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance to integrate nonconforming traits into backward waves, sometimes tolerating sometimes erasing them there is no exterior the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the standard measuring acceptability through meticulous signs: a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable Faciality explains why after colonialism there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” everyone is facialized. White Man remains the global standard deviance is based not on negation but on subtle machinic territorializations virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a) Racism can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

My disagreement is not with Fanon’s and Martín Alcoff’s insistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of recognition to explain encounter. Because of this they tend to treat white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant, that is, how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari strongly distance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis. First of all, for them, it isn’t consciousness but an abstract machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power. And second, faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect). That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains. Deleuze and Guattari believe faciality’s imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality originated in Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of contemporary racism: If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance MARKED in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.5 For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there were “no people on the outside.” Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeonholed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable—more or less. It would seem to me that to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man (Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our “post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihilation of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorializations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a); they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

<h4>This failure of the affirmative is further demonstrated by their faith in <u>dialectics</u> as a model to illuminate racial discrimination – racism has never operated by exclusion but rather by <u>waves of assimilation</u> – the faciality machine marks deviance through subtle processes of territorialization rather than an a priori banishment of blackness – the aff’s dyadic understanding of race cannot account for the infinite proliferation of identities within the faciality machine, ensuring the reproduction of colonial domination</h4><p><u><strong>Saldanha 7</u></strong> (Arun Saldanha, Associate Professor of Geography, Environment, and Society at University of Minnesota, Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster University<u>, 2007, “Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” pg.194-196)</p><p><mark>My disagreement is not with</mark> Fanon’s</u> and Martín Alcoff’s <u>insistence on <mark>embodiment </mark>and emotion, <mark>but with</u></mark> <u>their reliance on <mark>a Hegelian notion of recognition </mark>to explain encounter.</u> <u>Because of this <mark>they </mark>tend to <mark>treat white and nonwhite <strong></mark>not only as a dyad, but <mark>as</mark> almost <mark>naturally opposed</mark> entities</strong>. <mark>There is</mark>, then, <strong><mark>little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant</strong></mark>,</u> that is, <u>how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other</u>. <u>Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of <strong><mark>faciality is not based on </mark>an intersubjective <mark>dialectics</strong> </mark>enlarged to world-historical scope</u>. In fact, <u>D</u>eleuze <u>and G</u>uattari strongly <u>distance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis</u>. First of all, for them, <u>it isn’t consciousness but <mark>an abstract machine of faciality</mark> that <mark>arranges bodies into relations of power</u></mark>. And second, <u><mark>faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, <strong>multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries</strong></mark> such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect</u>). That is precisely its strength. <u>There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains</u>. Deleuze and Guattari believe <u><mark>faciality’s imperialism arose with</mark> institutional <mark>Christianity.</mark> Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization</u>. That <u>faciality originated in</u> Renaissance <u>humanism</u> and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of contemporary racism: <u><strong><mark>If the face is</mark> in fact Christ</u></strong>, in other words, your average <u><mark>ordinary <strong>White Man</strong></mark>, then <mark>the first deviances</mark>, the first divergence-types, <mark>are racial</mark>: yellow man, black man</u>, men in the second or third category. <u><mark>They are</u></mark> also <u>inscribed <mark>on <strong>the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity].</u></strong></mark> <u>They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized.</u> <u>European <mark>racism </mark>as the white man’s claim has <strong><mark>never operated by exclusion</strong></mark>, or by the designation of someone as Other</u>: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” <u><mark>Racism operates by the <strong>determination of degrees of deviance</strong></mark> </p><p><strong>MARKED</p><p></strong>in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors <mark>to integrate nonconforming traits into </mark>increasingly eccentric and <mark>backward waves, sometimes tolerating</mark> them</u> at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, <u><mark>sometimes erasing them</mark> from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, <strong><mark>there is no exterior</strong></mark>, there are no people on the outside</u>. <u>There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be</u>.5 For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there were “no people on the outside.” Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, <u><mark>the faciality machine would place all bodies <strong>in relation</strong> to the</mark> </u>Goa freak <u><mark>standard</mark>, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, <mark>measuring </mark>their <mark>acceptability through <strong></mark>increasingly <mark>meticulous signs</u></strong>:</mark> sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeonholed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was <u>viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable</u>—more or less. It would seem to me that <u>to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, <mark>a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable </mark>to a dialectical model. <mark>Faciality</mark> also <mark>explains why after colonialism</u></mark>, with television and tourism, <u><mark>there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.”</mark> Everyone is included; <strong><mark>everyone is facialized.</strong></mark> At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and <mark>White Man</mark> </u>(Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) <u><mark>remains the global standard</mark> against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm</u>, even in our “post”-colonial era. <u>Where it differs</u>, however, <u>is that <mark>deviance is based not on </mark>lack of recognition or <mark>negation </mark>or annihilation of the other, <mark>but on <strong>subtle machinic </mark>differentiations and <mark>territorializations</strong></mark>. The <mark>virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a)</mark>; they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. <strong><mark>Racism</mark>, then, <mark>can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

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JV Reed

1ac was black anti-hairity 1nc was university k liberalism k and case 2nc was university k 1nr was liberalism k and case 2nr was university k liberalism k and case

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Rejection is key

Neocleous 08

Neocleous 08

Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] Security politics is, , an anti-politics,"' reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, learning to tolerate the uncertainties, that come with being human; 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

Security politics is anti-politics," We need to get beyond security politics not add more 'sectors' to it The task is not to fill the hole with another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not throw us into the arms of the state. demanding 'more security' while hoping this increased security doesn't damage our liberty is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition

Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sewnse, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

<h4>Rejection is key</h4><p><u><strong><mark>Neocleous 08</u></strong></mark> </p><p><u>Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6]</p><p></u>could be told - what might count as having achieved it. <u><mark>Security politics is</mark>,</u> in this sewnse<u>, an <mark>anti-politics,"</mark>'</u> dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, <u>reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <mark>We</mark> therefore <mark>need to get beyond security politics</mark>, <mark>not add</mark> yet <mark>more 'sectors' to it</u></mark> in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if <u>you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever</u>. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. <u><mark>The</mark> real <mark>task is</mark> <mark>not to fill the</mark> supposed <mark>hole with</mark> yet <mark>another vision of security, but</mark> <mark>to fight for an alternative political language which</mark> </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u><mark>does not</mark> constantly <mark>throw us into the arms of the state.</mark> That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language</u> more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that <u>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep <mark>demanding 'more security'</mark> (<mark>while</mark> meekly <mark>hoping</mark> that <mark>this increased security doesn't damage our liberty</mark>) <mark>is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives</mark> to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <mark>To situate ourselves against security politics would</mark> </u>allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also<u> <mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics </mark>centred on a different conception of the good. </u>We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; <mark>it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition</mark>, </u>and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead <u>learning to tolerate the uncertainties, </u>ambiguities and 'insecurities'<u> that come with being human;</u> it requires accepting that <u>'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it<strong> </strong>out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p></u>

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Security

Alt

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Michigan AP

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico ensures economic instability, mass social injustice, and enlarged cartel profits which turns the case

Mercille 14

Mercille 14 (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz

neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70 the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”

NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry to find work out of desperation Whereas before reforms the economy grew at 3.5 percent this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases average wage decreased from 4.50 to 3.70 manufacturing has added 500,000 jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of 2.3 million in agriculture because of cheaper corn from U.S. agrobusinesses many had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking as low-level dealers, to make ends meet neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering enlarging the market

Since the 1980s, neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 (annual per capita rate), this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70. Since NAFTA went into effect, the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”

<h4>Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico ensures economic instability, mass social injustice, and enlarged cartel profits which turns the case</h4><p><u><strong>Mercille 14</u></strong> (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives<u> Volume 41 Number 2) gz</p><p></u>Since the 1980s, <u>neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry</u> (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, <u>reforms such as <mark>NAFTA <strong>pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry</strong></mark>, both <mark>to find work</mark> and <mark>out of desperation</mark>. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. <mark>Whereas before reforms</mark> were implemented <mark>the economy grew at</mark> a rate of <mark>3.5 percent</mark> between 1960 and 1979</u> (annual per capita rate), <u><mark>this dropped to <strong>a meager 0.1 percent</strong> </mark>in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. <strong><mark>NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases</strong></mark>: for example, in Juárez, the <mark>average wage decreased <strong>from</mark> US$<mark>4.50</mark> a day <mark>to</mark> US$<mark>3.70</u></strong></mark>. Since NAFTA went into effect, <u>the <mark>manufacturing</mark> sector <mark>has added</mark> some <mark>500,000</mark> to 600,000 net <mark>jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of</mark> around <strong><mark>2.3 million</mark> jobs <mark>in agriculture </strong>because of cheaper corn</mark> imports <mark>from</mark> subsidized <mark>U.S. agrobusinesses</mark>. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures</u> (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, <u><mark>many</mark> Mexicans <mark>had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking</mark>, often <mark>as low-level dealers, to make ends meet</u></mark>. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. <u>Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by <mark>neoliberal reforms has <strong>increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering</strong></mark>, thereby <mark>enlarging the market</u></mark>. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “<u>Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”</p></u>

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K

Link – Mexico

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Kristen Stout

1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

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That takes out the whole aff

Hatab 85

Lawrence J. Hatab. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. 1985. Page 54-56.

We cannot express God through temporal expressions The eternity of God is a pure present without succession What man knows as divided into anticipation, attention and memory is to God a pure, undivided Now. Time is succession; but in God there is no succession; He is every-complete and indivisible in an ever-present eternity The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments Time is negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost. The soul is dispersed in time, after turning away from God, and suffers as a result (from the negativity of change) the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity time is the rejection and covering up of truth. Man in time is a soul fallen through the sin of pride . Let us now briefly consider this moral foundation of Augustine's thought.

The eternity of God is a pure present without succession The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments Time is negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity

In chapter xxx Augustine returns to the problem that generated his investigation of time in the first place – the nature of God. We cannot express God through any temporal expressions, i.e. “before,” “after,” “never.” The eternity of God is a pure present without succession of passage. The eternity of God can not in any way be thought of as having any “divisions” of awareness. What man knows as divided into anticipation, attention and memory, no matter how comprehensive, is known to God in a pure, undivided Now. Time is succession; but in God there is no succession; He is every-complete and indivisible in an ever-present eternity. And eternity precedes time, not in a temporal sense, but is prior as cause. Without eternity there is no time. The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments it measures, and therefore the notion of soul as extended cannot be taken literally. But its knowledge is piecemeal and operates through time-divisions, so the soul is extended when compared with the simplicity of God's knowledge. The soul is permanent in regard to the motion is measures, but it is in flux in regard to the perfect permanence of God. But the soul possesses this permanent standard of measure because its true essence is to be found in the permanence of eternity; its life in flux is merely a departure from its essence. Time and eternity, for Augustine, are totally different and separate. From our interpretation of Plato, seen as the explication of something implicit in the thought of Heraclitus, we can recall that in the Platonic cosmos time exists necessarily as the eternally manifesting reflection of an eternal ground. But for Augustine, time proceeds from the will of a Creator; time is not necessarily implied in eternity, though eternity is necessary to uphold time. For Plato, eternity does imply time; only thus can time be the image of eternity. But Augustine proceeds through empirical investigation (like Aristotle, though in psychological terms) and can find no transcendental ground necessarily connected with temporality. What must be recognized is that Augustine's strict separation of time and eternity does not issue from an analytic ground but a moral one. Time for Augustine is essentially negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost. The soul is dispersed in time, after turning away from God, and suffers as a result (from the negativity of change). Time has its seat in the soul; only thus can Augustine maintain that the placement of the soul in a changing universe is ultimately the soul's own responsibility, i.e. a fall, and is not necessarily connected with God, a connection that would violate the unchangeability of eternity. The life of man is an extension, because it grasps things in succession, and morally so because the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity. Augustine's purpose in considering time in the Confessions is not merely to understand time as such, but to see time as evidence of a fall, creating a temporal dispersal of an eternity once seen and turned from; i.e. time is the rejection and covering up of truth. Man in time is a soul fallen through the sin of pride – this is the main theme of the Confessions. Let us now briefly consider this moral foundation of Augustine's thought.

<h4>That takes out the whole aff</h4><p>Lawrence J. <u><strong>Hatab</u></strong>. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. 19<u><strong>85</u></strong>. Page 54-56.</p><p>In chapter xxx Augustine returns to the problem that generated his investigation of time in the first place – the nature of God. <u> We cannot express God through</u> any <u>temporal expressions</u>, i.e. “before,” “after,” “never.” <u><mark>The eternity of God is a pure present without succession</u></mark> of passage. The eternity of God can not in any way be thought of as having any “divisions” of awareness. <u>What man knows as divided into anticipation, attention and memory</u>, no matter how comprehensive, <u>is</u> known <u>to God</u> in <u>a pure, undivided Now. Time is succession; but in God there is no succession; He is every-complete and indivisible in an ever-present eternity</u>. And eternity precedes time, not in a temporal sense, but is prior as cause. Without eternity there is no time. <u><mark>The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments</u></mark> it measures, and therefore the notion of soul as extended cannot be taken literally. But its knowledge is piecemeal and operates through time-divisions, so the soul is extended when compared with the simplicity of God's knowledge. The soul is permanent in regard to the motion is measures, but it is in flux in regard to the perfect permanence of God. But the soul possesses this permanent standard of measure because its true essence is to be found in the permanence of eternity; its life in flux is merely a departure from its essence.</p><p>Time and eternity, for Augustine, are totally different and separate. From our interpretation of Plato, seen as the explication of something implicit in the thought of Heraclitus, we can recall that in the Platonic cosmos time exists necessarily as the eternally manifesting reflection of an eternal ground. But for Augustine, time proceeds from the will of a Creator; time is not necessarily implied in eternity, though eternity is necessary to uphold time. For Plato, eternity does imply time; only thus can time be the image of eternity. But Augustine proceeds through empirical investigation (like Aristotle, though in psychological terms) and can find no transcendental ground necessarily connected with temporality.</p><p>What must be recognized is that Augustine's strict separation of time and eternity does not issue from an analytic ground but a moral one. <u><mark>Time</u></mark> for Augustine <u><mark>is</u></mark> essentially <u><mark>negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost</mark>. The soul is dispersed in time, after turning away from God, and suffers as a result (from the negativity of change)</u>. Time has its seat in the soul; only thus can Augustine maintain that the placement of the soul in a changing universe is ultimately the soul's own responsibility, i.e. a fall, and is not necessarily connected with God, a connection that would violate the unchangeability of eternity. The life of man is an extension, because it grasps things in succession, and morally so because <u><mark>the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity</u></mark>. Augustine's purpose in considering time in the Confessions is not merely to understand time as such, but to see time as evidence of a fall, creating a temporal dispersal of an eternity once seen and turned from; i.e. <u>time is the rejection and covering up of truth. Man in time is a soul fallen through the sin of pride</u> – this is the main theme of the Confessions<u>. Let us now briefly consider this moral foundation of Augustine's thought.</p></u>

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1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx

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Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political

Spanos 8

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)

We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas

We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

<h4>Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>

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Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

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Halberstam 13

Halberstam 13 (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study,” pp 5-9) gz

If we do not seek to fix what has been broken, then what? How do we resolve to live with brokenness, with being broke, which is also what Moten and Harney call “debt Can debt “become a principle of elaboration”? what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable. It can’t be repaired. The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new The undercommons do not come to pay their debts, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone. If you want to know what the undercommons wants, what black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people want it is this – we cannot be satisfied with the recognition and acknowledgement generated by the very system that denies a) that anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to be the broken part; so we refuse to ask for recognition and instead we want to take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls. We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with yet, because once we have torn shit down, we will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of wanting and being and becoming In the melancholic and visionary 2009 film version of Maurice Sandak’s Where The Wild Things Are Max’s power is that he is small while they are big; he promises the beasts that he has no plans to eat them and this is more than anyone has ever promised them. He promises that he will find ways through and around and will “slip through cracks” and re-crack the cracks if they fill up That Max fails to make the wild things happy or to save them or to make a world with them is less important than the fact that he found them and he recognized in them the end of something and potentially the path to an alternative to his world The wild things were not the utopian creatures of fairy tales, they were the rejected and lost subjects of the world he sees what is included and what is left out and he is now able to set sail for another place, a place that is neither the home he left nor the home to which he wants to return Moten and Harney want to gesture to another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is ongoing and exists in the present and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. What’s more, the call is always a call to dis-order and this disorder or wildness shows up in many places: in jazz, in improvisation, in noise Listening to cacophony and noise tells us that there is a wild beyond to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us when we are called to this other place, the wild beyond, “beyond the beyond we have to give ourselves over to a certain kind of craziness even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy Fanon knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he knew that it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild Fanon wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order to bring colonialism to an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism blackness is the willingness to be in the space that has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule, by order he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with the right to refuse what has been refused to you it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals the refusal of the choices as offered when you arrive at the ballot box, pen in hand, you only get to check “yes” or “no” And so, you must refuse the choice as offered. Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to refuse what they term “the call to order.” to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation and the reinstantiation of the law. When we refuse we create dissonance and more importantly, we allow dissonance to continue – when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue, dissonant study perhaps, disorganized study, but study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left the room we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument when we refuse the call to order – the teacher picking up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth. the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.”

we do not seek to fix what has been broken we resolve to live with brokenness what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new.” The undercommons do not come to pay their debts black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people cannot be satisfied with recognition generated by the very system that denies that anything was ever broken and that we deserved to be broken we refuse to ask for recognition We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with because once we have torn shit down, we will see more and feel a new sense of becoming In Where The Wild Things Are That Max fails to make the wild things happy or save them is less important than that he recognized in them the end of something they were the rejected and lost subjects of the world he is able to set sail for another place Moten and Harney want to gesture to a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness a call to dis-order in jazz, in improvisation, in noise when we are called to this beyond the beyond we have to give ourselves to a certain craziness Fanon knew it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild to bring colonialism to an end one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other who has been rendered a nonentity blackness is to be in the space abandoned by colonialism The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal at the ballot box you only get to check “yes” or “no you must refuse the choice as offered to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation we allow dissonance to continue when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique The undercommons is always here. Our goal is not to end the troubles but to end the world refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, refuse to shape noise into “music.”

If we do not seek to fix what has been broken, then what? How do we resolve to live with brokenness, with being broke, which is also what Moten and Harney call “debt.” Well, given that debt is sometimes a history of giving, at other times a history of taking, at all times a history of capitalism and given that debt also signifies a promise of ownership but never delivers on that promise, we have to understand that debt is something that cannot be paid off. Debt, as Harney puts it, presumes a kind of individualized relation to a naturalized economy that is predicated upon exploitation. Can we have, he asks, another sense of what is owed that does not presume a nexus of activities like recognition and acknowledgement, payment and gratitude. Can debt “become a principle of elaboration”? Moten links economic debt to the brokenness of being in the interview with Stevphen Shukaitis; he acknowledges that some debts should be paid, and that much is owed especially to black people by white people, and yet, he says: “I also know that what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable. It can’t be repaired. The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new.” The undercommons do not come to pay their debts, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone. If you want to know what the undercommons wants, what Moten and Harney want, what black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people want, what we (the “we” who cohabit in the space of the undercommons) want, it is this – we cannot be satisfied with the recognition and acknowledgement generated by the very system that denies a) that anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to be the broken part; so we refuse to ask for recognition and instead we want to take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls. We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with yet, because once we have torn shit down, we will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of wanting and being and becoming. What we want after “the break” will be different from what we think we want before the break and both are necessarily different from the desire that issues from being in the break. Let’s come at this by another path. In the melancholic and visionary 2009 film version of Maurice Sandak’s Where The Wild Things Are (1963), Max, the small seeker who leaves his room, his home, his family to find the wild beyond, finds a world of lost and lonely beasts and they promptly make him their king. Max is the first king the wild things have had whom they did not eat and who did not, in turn, try to eat them; and the beasts are the first grown things that Max has met who want his opinion, his judgment, his rule. Max’s power is that he is small while they are big; he promises the beasts that he has no plans to eat them and this is more than anyone has ever promised them. He promises that he will find ways through and around and will “slip through cracks” and re-crack the cracks if they fill up. He promises to keep sadness at bay and to make a world with the wild creatures that “roared their terrible roars and gnashed their terrible teeth and rolled their terrible eyes and showed their terrible claws.” That Max fails to make the wild things happy or to save them or to make a world with them is less important than the fact that he found them and he recognized in them the end of something and potentially the path to an alternative to his world. The wild things were not the utopian creatures of fairy tales, they were the rejected and lost subjects of the world Max had left behind and, because he shuttles between the Oedipal land where his mother rules and the ruined world of the wild, he knows the parameters of the real – he sees what is included and what is left out and he is now able to set sail for another place, a place that is neither the home he left nor the home to which he wants to return. Moten and Harney want to gesture to another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness. The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is ongoing and exists in the present and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself.” While describing the London Riots of 2011, Harney suggests that the riots and insurrections do not separate out “the request, the demand and the call” – rather, they enact the one in the other: “I think the call, in the way I would understand it, the call, as in the call and response, the response is already there before the call goes out. You’re already in something.” You are already in it. For Moten too, you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. What’s more, the call is always a call to dis-order and this disorder or wildness shows up in many places: in jazz, in improvisation, in noise. The disordered sounds that we refer to as cacophony will always be cast as “extra-musical,” as Moten puts it, precisely because we hear something in them that reminds us that our desire for harmony is arbitrary and in another world, harmony would sound incomprehensible. Listening to cacophony and noise tells us that there is a wild beyond to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us. And when we are called to this other place, the wild beyond, “beyond the beyond” in Moten and Harney’s apt terminology, we have to give ourselves over to a certain kind of craziness. MARKED Moten reminds us that even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy” but, Fanon, as a psychiatrist, also knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he knew that it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild. Fanon, according to Moten, wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order to bring colonialism to an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism. Indeed, blackness, for Moten and Harney by way of Fanon, is the willingness to be in the space that has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule, by order. Moten takes us there, saying of Fanon finally: “Eventually, I believe, he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not (as John Donne would say).” The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal. In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with the right to refuse what has been refused to you. Citing Gayatri Spivak, Moten and Harney call this refusal the “first right” and it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals the refusal of the choices as offered. We can understand this refusal in terms that Chandan Reddy lays out in Freedom With Violence (2011) – for Reddy, gay marriage is the option that cannot be opposed in the ballot box. While we can circulate multiple critiques of gay marriage in terms of its institutionalization of intimacy, when you arrive at the ballot box, pen in hand, you only get to check “yes” or “no” and the no, in this case, could be more damning than the yes. And so, you must refuse the choice as offered. Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to refuse what they term “the call to order.” And what would it mean, furthermore, to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation and the reinstantiation of the law. When we refuse, Moten and Harney suggest, we create dissonance and more importantly, we allow dissonance to continue – when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue, dissonant study perhaps, disorganized study, but study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left the room. Or, when we listen to music, we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument; music is also the anticipation of the performance and the noises of appreciation it generates and the speaking that happens through and around it, making it and loving it, being in it while listening. And so, when we refuse the call to order – the teacher picking up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth. These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.”

<h4>brokenness</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 13</u></strong> (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study,” pp 5-9) gz</p><p><u>If <mark>we <strong>do not seek to fix what has been broken</strong></mark>, then what? How do <mark>we resolve to <strong>live with brokenness</strong></mark>, with being broke, which is also what Moten and Harney call “debt</u>.” Well, given that debt is sometimes a history of giving, at other times a history of taking, at all times a history of capitalism and given that debt also signifies a promise of ownership but never delivers on that promise, we have to understand that debt is something that cannot be paid off. Debt, as Harney puts it, presumes a kind of individualized relation to a naturalized economy that is predicated upon exploitation. Can we have, he asks, another sense of what is owed that does not presume a nexus of activities like recognition and acknowledgement, payment and gratitude. <u>Can debt “become a principle of elaboration”?</p><p></u>Moten links economic debt to the brokenness of being in the interview with Stevphen Shukaitis; he acknowledges that some debts should be paid, and that much is owed especially to black people by white people, and yet, he says: “I also know that <u><mark>what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable</mark>. <strong>It can’t be repaired</strong>. <mark>The only thing we can do is <strong>tear this shit down completely and build something new</u></strong>.” <u>The undercommons do <strong>not come to pay their debts</mark>, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone</strong>.</p><p>If you want to know what the undercommons wants, what</u> Moten and Harney want, what <u><mark>black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people</mark> want</u>, what we (the “we” who cohabit in the space of the undercommons) want, <u>it is this – we <strong><mark>cannot be satisfied with</mark> the <mark>recognition</mark> and acknowledgement <mark>generated by the very system</strong> that denies</mark> a) <mark>that anything was ever broken and</mark> b) <mark>that we deserved to be</mark> the <mark>broken</mark> part; so <mark>we <strong>refuse to ask for recognition</strong></mark> and instead we want to <strong>take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure</strong> that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls. <strong><mark>We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with</strong></mark> yet, <mark>because once we have torn shit down, we will</mark> inevitably <strong><mark>see more and </mark>see differently</strong> and <mark>feel a new sense of</mark> wanting and being and <mark>becoming</u></mark>. What we want after “the break” will be different from what we think we want before the break and both are necessarily different from the desire that issues from being in the break.</p><p>Let’s come at this by another path. <u><mark>In</mark> the melancholic and visionary 2009 film version of Maurice Sandak’s <mark>Where The Wild Things Are</u></mark> (1963), Max, the small seeker who leaves his room, his home, his family to find the wild beyond, finds a world of lost and lonely beasts and they promptly make him their king. Max is the first king the wild things have had whom they did not eat and who did not, in turn, try to eat them; and the beasts are the first grown things that Max has met who want his opinion, his judgment, his rule. <u>Max’s power is that he is small while they are big; he promises the beasts that he has no plans to eat them and this is more than anyone has ever promised them. He promises that he will find ways through and around and will “slip through cracks” and re-crack the cracks if they fill up</u>. He promises to keep sadness at bay and to make a world with the wild creatures that “roared their terrible roars and gnashed their terrible teeth and rolled their terrible eyes and showed their terrible claws.” <u><mark>That Max fails to make the wild things happy or</mark> to <mark>save them</mark> or to make a world with them <strong><mark>is less important</strong> than</mark> the fact <mark>that</mark> <strong>he found them and <mark>he recognized in them the end of something</mark> and potentially the path to an alternative to his world</u></strong>. <u>The wild things were not the utopian creatures of fairy tales, <mark>they were the <strong>rejected and lost subjects of the world</u></strong></mark> Max had left behind and, because he shuttles between the Oedipal land where his mother rules and the ruined world of the wild, he knows the parameters of the real – <u>he sees what is included and what is left out and <mark>he is</mark> now <mark>able to <strong>set sail for another place</strong></mark>, a place that is neither the home he left nor the home to which he wants to return</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Moten and Harney want to gesture to</mark> another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is <strong><mark>a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness</u></strong></mark>. <u>The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is <strong>ongoing and exists in the present</strong> and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of <strong>demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself</u></strong>.” While describing the London Riots of 2011, Harney suggests that the riots and insurrections do not separate out “the request, the demand and the call” – rather, they enact the one in the other: “I think the call, in the way I would understand it, the call, as in the call and response, the response is already there before the call goes out. You’re already in something.” You are already in it. For Moten too, <u>you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. What’s more, the call is always <strong><mark>a call to dis-order</strong></mark> and this disorder or wildness shows up in many places: <strong><mark>in jazz, in improvisation, in noise</u></strong></mark>. The disordered sounds that we refer to as cacophony will always be cast as “extra-musical,” as Moten puts it, precisely because we hear something in them that reminds us that our desire for harmony is arbitrary and in another world, harmony would sound incomprehensible. <u>Listening to cacophony and noise tells us that <strong>there is a wild beyond</strong> to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us</u>.</p><p>And <u><mark>when we are called to this</mark> other place, <strong>the wild beyond, “<mark>beyond the beyond</u></strong></mark>” in Moten and Harney’s apt terminology, <u><mark>we have to give ourselves</mark> over <mark>to a <strong>certain</mark> kind of <mark>craziness</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>MARKED</p><p>Moten reminds us that <u>even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy</u>” but, <u><mark>Fanon</u></mark>, as a psychiatrist, also <u>knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he <mark>knew</mark> that <mark>it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had <strong>assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild</u></strong></mark>. <u>Fanon</u>, according to Moten, <u>wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order <mark>to bring colonialism to an end</mark> then, <mark>one <strong>does not speak truth to power</strong>, <strong>one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other</strong></mark>, the other <mark>who has been <strong>rendered a nonentity</mark> by colonialism</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><mark>blackness</u></mark>, for Moten and Harney by way of Fanon, <u><mark>is</mark> the willingness <mark>to be in the space</mark> <strong>that has been <mark>abandoned by colonialism</mark>, by rule, by order</u></strong>. Moten takes us there, saying of Fanon finally: “Eventually, I believe, <u>he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not</u> (as John Donne would say).”</p><p><u><mark>The path to the wild beyond is <strong>paved with refusal</u></strong></mark>. <u>In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with <strong>the right to refuse what has been refused to you</u></strong>. Citing Gayatri Spivak, Moten and Harney call this refusal the “first right” and <u>it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals <strong>the refusal of the choices as offered</u></strong>. We can understand this refusal in terms that Chandan Reddy lays out in Freedom With Violence (2011) – for Reddy, gay marriage is the option that cannot be opposed in the ballot box. While we can circulate multiple critiques of gay marriage in terms of its institutionalization of intimacy, <u>when you arrive <mark>at the ballot box</mark>, pen in hand, <mark>you only get to check “yes” or “no</mark>”</u> and the no, in this case, could be more damning than the yes. <u>And so, <strong><mark>you must refuse the choice as offered</mark>.</p><p></strong>Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to <strong>refuse what they term “the call to order.”</u></strong> And what would it mean, furthermore, <u><strong><mark>to refuse to call others to order</strong>, to <strong>refuse interpellation</strong></mark> and the reinstantiation of the law. When we refuse</u>, Moten and Harney suggest, <u>we create dissonance and more importantly, <strong><mark>we allow dissonance to continue</strong></mark> – <mark>when we <strong>enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order</strong>, we are <strong>allowing study to continue</strong></mark>, dissonant study perhaps, disorganized study, but <mark>study that precedes our call and <strong>will continue after we have left</mark> the room</u></strong>. Or, when we listen to music, <u>we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument</u>; music is also the anticipation of the performance and the noises of appreciation it generates and the speaking that happens through and around it, making it and loving it, being in it while listening. And so, <u>when we refuse the call to order – the teacher picking up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – <strong>we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth.</p><p></u></strong>These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – <u><mark>the undercommons is <strong>not a realm where we rebel and we create critique</strong></mark>; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” <mark>The undercommons is</mark> a space and time which is <strong><mark>always here</u></strong>. <u>Our goal</mark> – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – <mark>is not to end the troubles but to <strong>end the world</mark> that created those particular troubles</strong> as the ones that must be opposed</u>. Moten and Harney <u><strong><mark>refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity,</strong></mark> as the <strong>absence of a plan</strong> and as a mode of stalling real politics</u>. Moten and Harney tell us to <u>listen to the noise we make and to <strong><mark>refuse</mark> the offers we receive <mark>to shape </mark>that <mark>noise into “music.”</p></u></strong></mark>

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The term “marihuana” is historically racist – CP solves

Leafly 14

Leafly 14

The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture Many organizations publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of cannabis why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used in Between the years of 1910 and 1920 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression hit the United States, Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants in the South Americans began to treat cannabis and the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger testified Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon

The word “marijuana” gained publicity as a racist term Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist cannabis” was used 1920 Mexicans immigrated After The Depression Americans were searching for someone to blame Americans began to treat cannabis and Blacks and immigrants who consumed it as a foreign substance used to corrupt individuals Anslinger used the term “marijuana adding to the herb’s new “foreign” identity Though the word marijuana is common its history is deeply steeped in race the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction

http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon.

<h4>The term “marihuana” <u><strong>is historically racist – CP solves</h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></u></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><mark>The word “marijuana” </mark>plays a controversial role in cannabis culture</u>. <u>Many</u> well-known <u>organizations</u> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u>publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of</u> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u>cannabis</u>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u>why has the word <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word in American culture. Rather, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u>in</u> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u>Between the years of 1910 and <mark>1920</u></mark>, over <u>890,000 <mark>Mexicans</mark> legally <mark>immigrated </mark>into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war.</u> <u>Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption</u>. <u>The idea of smoking cannabis entered</u> <u>mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. </u>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><mark>After</mark>math</u> <u>1930s: <mark>The </mark>Great <mark>Depression</u></mark> had just <u>hit the United States,</u> and <u><mark>Americans were <strong>searching for someone to blame</strong></mark>. Due to the influx of immigrants</u> (particularly <u>in the South</u>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><mark>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></mark> (<u><mark>and</u></mark>, arguably, <u><strong>the <mark>Blacks and </mark>Mexican <mark>immigrants who consumed it</mark>) <mark>as a foreign substance used to corrupt</mark> the minds and bodies of low-class <mark>individuals</mark>. </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u>Anslinger</u> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u>. In one documented incident, <u>Anslinger</u> <u>testified</u> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u>In another statement, <u>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the <strong>term “marijuana</mark>”</strong> when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <strong><mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</strong></mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p>

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Kentucky

2

Mary Washington SY

Rebecca Steiner

1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

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Deferral disad – the perm relies on a politics of hope which beholds the possibility of security’s affective recuperation – refuse this politics in favor of one governed by pause

Massumi ‘14

Massumi ‘14 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, “The Remains of the Day,” On Violence, Vol 1 2013-14)

the tendency I am diagnosing is self-operating. It operates independently of the personal qualities of those in power. As a person, I find Obama honorable and reasonable to a fault And yet … he has been swept up. His return to the deliberative reason of traditional liberal democratic process has been a tragi-comic failure But the way in which Obama has at the same time made the exception to the rules the rule, in the name of national security – that definitely works. It's likely to prove indefinitely effective. It is likely to be Obama's most lasting "contribution". It is what makes the "everything has changed" of 9-11 just "more of the same." For the unforeseable future. Because the unforeseeable future is threat, and that puts us right back in the loop. Please don't misunderstand this as appeal to a more effective return to the liberal-deliberative model. This path has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired ever. The circularity of the future cause at the heart of preemption as a positive and productive power, as a force of history in its own right, has seen to that. All signs indicate that political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing, as permanently and unrefusably as the spectrum of politics has moved onto a war footing. A logic of war has become the logic of politics. There is likely no going back. If resistance is possible, it must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace that has become the space of life. This means engaging the operative logic of preemption on its own terrains. This in turn means, in the most literal sense, a struggle for the future (perhaps through practices of slowness, against the preemptive addiction to rapid response?). It also means engaging it on the level of affect: reclaiming legitimation in a different affective key. Not the key of hope. Hope is more of a deferral of the present to the future than it is a way of bringing the future into the present according to a different operative logic. To hope is to look dreamy-eyed toward the future – cringingg with the halfacknowledged certainty that when the future comes, in this broken world, it will be enough to make you cry. The only way to keep up the spirit is to defer to the future again, eyes wet with hope all over again.

Obama has made the exception to the rules the rule Because the unforeseeable future is threat, that puts us right back in the loop don't misunderstand this as appeal to the liberal-deliberative model. This has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing permanently war has become politics. resistance must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace This means engaging preemption on its own terrains. a struggle for the future through practices of slowness Hope is a deferral to the future

It is important to emphasize this: the tendency I am diagnosing is self-operating. It operates independently of the personal qualities of those in power. As a person, I find Obama honorable and reasonable to a fault. No one is more sincerely deliberative. No president in recent memory has shown such infinite patience for working out differences and reaching compromise. Rarely has the United States seen such dedication in a president to the civil sphere as the seat of deliberative representative democracy, to the point that he has even tried to play down that old standard, the politics of fear. And yet … he has been swept up. His return to the deliberative reason of traditional liberal democratic process has been a tragi-comic failure. Rarely has a president proven so painfully ineffectual. Rarely has the power of reason of State seemed so faint. But the way in which Obama has at the same time made the exception to the rules the rule, in the name of national security – that definitely works. It's likely to prove indefinitely effective. It is likely to be Obama's most lasting "contribution". It is what makes the "everything has changed" of 9-11 just "more of the same." For the unforeseable future. Because the unforeseeable future is threat, and that puts us right back in the loop. Please don't misunderstand this as appeal to a more effective return to the liberal-deliberative model. This path has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired anytime soon, if ever. The circularity of the future cause at the heart of preemption as a positive and productive power, as a force of history in its own right, has seen to that. All signs indicate that political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing, as permanently and unrefusably as the spectrum of politics has moved onto a war footing. A logic of war has become the logic of politics. In the 19th century Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Now politics is the continuation of war by the same means. There is likely no going back. If resistance is possible, it must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace that has become the space of life. This means engaging the operative logic of preemption on its own terrains. This in turn means, in the most literal sense, a struggle for the future (perhaps through practices of slowness, against the preemptive addiction to rapid response?). It also means engaging it on the level of affect: reclaiming legitimation in a different affective key. Not the key of hope. Hope is more of a deferral of the present to the future than it is a way of bringing the future into the present according to a different operative logic. To hope is to look dreamy-eyed toward the future – cringingg with the halfacknowledged certainty that when the future comes, in this broken world, it will be enough to make you cry. The only way to keep up the spirit is to defer to the future again, eyes wet with hope all over again.

<h4><u>Deferral disad</u> – the perm relies on a politics of hope which beholds the possibility of security’s affective recuperation – refuse this politics in favor of one <u>governed by pause</h4><p><strong>Massumi ‘14</u> </strong>(Brian, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, “The Remains of the Day,” On Violence, Vol<u> 1 2013-14)</p><p></u>It is important to emphasize this: <u>the tendency I am diagnosing is self-operating. It operates independently of the personal qualities of those in power. As a person, I find Obama honorable and reasonable to a fault</u>. No one is more sincerely deliberative. No president in recent memory has shown such infinite patience for working out differences and reaching compromise. Rarely has the United States seen such dedication in a president to the civil sphere as the seat of deliberative representative democracy, to the point that he has even tried to play down that old standard, the politics of fear. <u>And yet … he has been swept up. His return to the deliberative reason of traditional liberal democratic process has been a tragi-comic failure</u>. Rarely has a president proven so painfully ineffectual. Rarely has the power of reason of State seemed so faint. <u>But the way in which <mark>Obama has</mark> at the same time <mark>made the exception to the rules the rule</mark>, in the name of national security – that definitely works. It's likely to prove indefinitely effective. It is likely to be Obama's most lasting "contribution". It is what makes the "everything has changed" of 9-11 just "more of the same." For the unforeseable future. <mark>Because the unforeseeable future is threat, </mark>and <mark>that puts us right back in the loop</mark>.</p><p>Please <mark>don't misunderstand this as appeal to </mark>a more effective return to <mark>the liberal-deliberative model. This</mark> path <mark>has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired</u></mark> anytime soon, if <u>ever. The circularity of the future cause at the heart of preemption as a positive and productive power, as a force of history in its own right, has seen to that. All signs indicate that <mark>political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing</mark>, as <mark>permanently</mark> and unrefusably as the spectrum of politics has moved onto a war footing. A logic of <mark>war has become </mark>the logic of <mark>politics.</u></mark> In the 19th century Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Now politics is the continuation of war by the same means. <u>There is likely no going back<strong>. </p><p></strong>If <mark>resistance</mark> is possible, it <mark>must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace</mark> that has become the space of life. <mark>This means engaging </mark>the operative logic of <mark>preemption on its own terrains.</mark> This in turn means, in the most literal sense, <mark>a struggle for the future</mark> (perhaps <mark>through practices of slowness</mark>,</u> <u>against the preemptive addiction to rapid response?). It also means engaging it on the level of affect: reclaiming legitimation in a different affective key.</p><p>Not the key of hope. <mark>Hope is</mark> more of <mark>a deferral</mark> of the present <mark>to the future</mark> than it is a way of bringing the future into the present according to a different operative logic. To hope is to look dreamy-eyed toward the future – cringingg with the halfacknowledged certainty that when the future comes, in this broken world, it will be enough to make you cry. The only way to keep up the spirit is to defer to the future again, eyes wet with hope all over again.</p></u>

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Michigan AP

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Causes extinction through global civil war

Duffield 8

Duffield 8 (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies Volume 21 Issue 2)

you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics

you cannot have development without containing underdeveloped life this nexus can be traced to the division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant security interconnects containment of migration with measures to integrate migrant communities within consumer society to improve the self-reliance of underdeveloped life in situ It marks a terrain of a global civil war fought on and between the modalities of life itself global civil war connects livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats in the North the need for social cohesion at home while urging intervention abroad this disastrous formula will be defended to the death we are all involved in this war since it mobilizes societies as a whole

This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.

<h4>Causes extinction through global civil war</h4><p><u><strong>Duffield 8</u></strong> (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies<u> Volume 21 Issue 2)</p><p></u>This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that <u><mark>you cannot have development </mark>or security <mark>without containing</mark> the <strong>circulation of <mark>underdeveloped life</u></strong></mark>. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, <u>the origins of <mark>this nexus can be traced to </mark>decolonization</u>. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, <u>decolonization publicly signalled <mark>the</mark> generic <mark>division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life</mark>, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, <mark>with an <strong>underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant</u></strong></mark>. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, <u>decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally</u>. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, <u>containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration</u>. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. <u>Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.</p><p>The international <mark>security </mark>architecture that emerged with decolonization <mark>interconnects</mark> the <mark>containment of </mark>irregular <mark>migration with measures to integrate migrant communities</mark> already settled <mark>within consumer society</mark> and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives <mark>to improve the self-reliance</mark> and stasis <mark>of underdeveloped life in situ</mark>. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. <mark>It marks</mark> out <mark>a terrain of a <strong>global civil war</strong></mark>, or rather tableau of wars, which is being <strong><mark>fought on and between the modalities of life itself</u></strong></mark>. <u>Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—<strong><mark>global civil war connects </mark>the <mark>livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats</mark> to critical infrastructure <mark>in the North</u></strong></mark>. Since the end of the Cold War, <u>the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on <mark>the need for social cohesion at home while</mark>, at the same time, <mark>urging</mark> a <strong>fresh wave of <mark>intervention abroad</strong></mark> to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means</u>. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, <u>there is a real possibility that <strong><mark>this disastrous formula</mark> for sharing the world with others <mark>will be defended to the death</u></strong></mark>. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. <u>Reflected within the <strong>globalization of containment</strong>, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become <strong>increasingly violent and coercive</strong>.</u> In one way or another, <u><strong><mark>we are all involved in this war</strong></mark>; it cannot be escaped <mark>since it mobilizes societies as a whole</mark>, including policy makers and academics</u>. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.</p>

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Kristen Stout

1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

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We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must abuse the university’s openness to give power back to the undercommons Moten and Harney 04. Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons, SEVEN THESES Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press“To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching.

Moten and Harney 04. To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal sneak into the university steal what one can To abuse its hospitality Call out to it as it calls to you subversive intellectual came under false pretenses bad documents out of love Teaching profession an operation the /auto-encyclopedic erased by it beyond of teaching they will not be subjects they want to think as objects minority who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment regarded as theft criminal act the only possible act inhabit the ruptural the criminal matricidal queer on the stroll of the stolen life stolen back allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others

<h4>We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must abuse the university’s openness to give power back to the undercommons</h4><p><u><strong>Moten and Harney 04.</u></strong> Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons, SEVEN THESES Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press“<u><strong><mark>To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal</u></strong></mark>,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. <u>This is the only possible relationship to the American university today.</u> This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: <u>it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment</u>. In the face of these conditions <u><mark>one can only <strong>sneak into the university</strong> and <strong>steal what one can</u></strong>. <u><strong>To abuse its hospitality</strong></mark>, to <mark>spite its mission</mark>, to <mark>join its refugee colony</mark>, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university</u>. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. <u><strong>Call out to it as it calls to you</u></strong>. <u>But for the <strong>subversive intellectual</strong>, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men</u>. After all, <u><mark>the subversive intellectual <strong>came under false pretenses</strong>, with <strong>bad documents</strong>, <strong>out of love</u></strong></mark>. <u>Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome</u>. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. <u><mark>She disappears into the underground</mark>, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, <mark>into the Undercommons</mark> of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong</u>. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say <u>teaching</u>, one <u>would be performing the work of the university</u>. <u><strong><mark>Teaching</strong> is</mark> merely <mark>a <strong>profession</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>an operation</strong></mark> of <mark>what</mark> Jacques <mark>Derrida calls <strong>the</mark> </strong>onto-<strong>/<mark>auto-encyclopedic</strong> circle of the Universitas</u></mark>. But <u>it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters</u>. <u>The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby <strong>erased by it</u></strong>. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But <u><mark>it is teaching that brings us in</u></mark>. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. <u>The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food</u>. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But <u>if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university</u>. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” <u>But <mark>what would it mean if</u></mark> teaching or rather what we might call “<u><mark>the <strong>beyond of teaching</strong>” is</mark> precisely <mark>what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance</u></mark>? <u><mark>And what of those minorities who refuse</mark>, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), <mark>as if <strong>they will not be subjects</strong>, as if <strong>they want to think as objects</strong>, as <strong>minority</u></strong></mark>? Certainly, <u>the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste</u>. But <u><mark>their collective labor will always call into question <strong>who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment</u></strong></mark>. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps <u>the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must</u>. But <u>even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional</u>. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But <u><mark>if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes</mark> with hands full into the underground of the university, <mark>into the Undercommons</mark>—<mark>this will be <strong>regarded as theft</strong>, as a <strong>criminal act</u></strong></mark>. And <u><mark>it is</mark> at the same time, <strong><mark>the only possible act</u></strong></mark>. <u>In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. <mark>To enter this space is to <strong>inhabit the ruptural</strong></mark> and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, <strong><mark>the criminal</strong>, <strong>matricidal</strong>, <strong>queer</strong></mark>, in the cistern, <strong><mark>on the stroll of the stolen life</strong></mark>, <mark>the life stolen by enlightenment</mark> and <strong><mark>stolen back</strong></mark>, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons</u>. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; <u><mark>it’s about <strong>allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others</strong></mark>, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching</u>.</p>

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Brian Lain

1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx

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The 1AC finds its value in futurity – a political position in structural and ontological opposition to the queer. Attempts at political assimilation merely displace queerness onto others. The alternative is queer negativity – only this oppositional resistance to the enslavement of the future can contest infinite anti-queer violence

Edelman 4

Edelman 4 (Lee Edelman, a professor of English at Tufts University, “NO FUTURE: Queer Theory and the Death Drive” Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004, KB)

By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive and hence our disidentification from the promise of futurity, those of us inhabiting¶ the, place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness and enter the properly political sphere but only by shifting the figural burden of queerness to someone else. The structural position of queerness and the need to fill it remain By choosing to accept that position we might¶ undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification which can only return us to the politics of¶ reproduction. For the liberal's view of society, which seems to accord the¶ queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right's the queerness¶ of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. While¶ the right wing imagines the elimination of queers the left would eliminate queerness by shining the¶ cool light of reason upon it, hoping to expose it as merely a mode¶ of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining¶ fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem to portend, and not¶ for the right alone, the undoing of the social order and its cynosure, the¶ Child. Queerness comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing¶ the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the¶ left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.¶ But this is where reason must fail. Sexuality refuses demystification¶ as the Symbolic refuses the queer the demystification of queerness¶ and of sexuality the demystification inherent¶ in the position of liberal rationality, could achieve its realization only by¶ traversing the collective fantasy that invests the social order with meaning by way of reproductive futurism. The sacralization of the Child necessitates the sacrifice of the queer.¶ Bernard Law denounced legislation¶ giving health care benefits to Same-sex partners of municipal employ-¶ ees. He did so by proclaiming that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish¶ the marital bond. "Society," "has a special interest in the¶ protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains¶ the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and¶ socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage." after Law had resigned for his failure to protect¶ Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John¶ Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state􀄬recognized same-sex¶ unions as parodic versions of authentic families, "based on individual¶ egoism" rather than genuine love. "Such a 'caricature' has no future and cannot give future to any¶ society. Queers must respond to the violent force by insisting on our equal right to the social order's¶ prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's¶ coherence and integrity, but by saying explicitly what Law and the¶ Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway¶ in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality:¶ Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.¶ We might like to believe that with patience work contributions to lobbying groups or participation in activist¶ groups doses of legal savvy sophistication the¶ future will hold a place for us a place at the political table that won't¶ have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed bar or baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no¶ future at all,: that the future is "always/ A day/ Away." we're¶ held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to¶ pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one. That future¶ is nothing but kid stuff, reborn to screen out the grave ensnaring us in, reality's gossamer web. Those queered by the social order that projects its death¶ drive onto them are positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy¶ that so defines them. But they're positioned to recognize the¶ irredudbility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to¶ the logic of social organization Acceding to this figural identification might be politically self-destructive." But politics and the self are what queerness necessarily destroys insofar as this "self" is the agent of reproductive¶ futurism and this "politics" the means of its promulgation¶ as the order of social reality. But political self-destruction inheres in the¶ only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future, in the name of having a life. If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of¶ futurity the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever¶ lead would depend on our taking the place of the death drive we're called on to figure against the cult of the Child and¶ the political order it enforces, that we are "not the signifier of what might become a new form of 'social organisation,'¶ that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter¶ tomorrow, since these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose not to choose¶ the Child The queerness we¶ propose knows nothing about¶ 'sacrifice now for the sake of future generations' [it] knows that¶ civilisation is mortal it delights in that mortality¶ as the negation of everything that would define itself as¶ pro-life the Child as futurity’s emblem must die the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a¶ Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on¶ the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the¶ negativity that pierces the fantasy Screen of futurity, shattering narrative¶ temporality what is queerest is this willingness to insist that the future stop here.

By denying our identification with negativity the queer may enter the political sphere, but only by shifting the burden of queerness to someone else. By choosing to accept that position we might¶ undertake imagining an oppositional stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification which can only return us to the politics of¶ reproduction While¶ the right imagines the elimination of queers the left would eliminate queerness by shining reason upon it to portend the undoing of the social order Queerness comes to mean nothing the demystification of queerness could achieve its realization only by¶ traversing the fantasy that invests the social order with meaning by reproductive futurism The sacralization of the Child necessitates the sacrifice¶ of the queer Queers must respond Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're ¶ terrorized fuck the network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as¶ its prop We might like to believe that with patience or activist¶ groups the¶ future will hold a place for us But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers we're¶ held in thrall by a future continually deferred That future¶ is reborn to screen out the grave ensnaring us in, reality's web. political self-destruction inheres in the¶ only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future,¶ in the name of having a life.¶ the only oppositional status would depend on our taking the place of the death drive¶ ',we're called on to figure we are "not the signifier a new politics, a better society, a brighter¶ tomorrow these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement,¶ in the form of the future. The queerness we¶ propose knows nothing about¶ 'sacrifice now for future generations' the Child as futurity’s emblem must die

By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive, and¶ hence our disidentification from the promise of futurity, those of us inhabiting¶ the, place of the queer may be able to cast off that queerness and enter the properly political sphere, but only by shifting the figural¶ burden of queerness to someone else. The structural position of queerness,¶ after all, and the need to fill it remain. By choosing to accept that position,¶ however, by assuming the " truth" of our queer capacity to figure the¶ undoing of the Symbolic, and of the Symbolic subject as well, we might¶ undertake the impossible project of imagining an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification (the politics aimed at closing the gap opened up by the signifier itself), which can only return us, by way of the Child, to the politics of¶ reproduction. For the liberal's view of society, which seems to accord the¶ queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right's the queerness¶ of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. While¶ the right wing imagines the elimination of queers (or of the need to confront¶ their existence), the left would eliminate queerness by shining the¶ cool light of reason upon it, hoping thereby to expose it as merely a mode¶ of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining¶ fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem to portend, and not¶ for the right alone, the undoing of the social order and its cynosure, the¶ Child. Queerness thus comes to mean nothing for both: for the right wing¶ the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the¶ left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.¶ But this is where reason must fail. Sexuality refuses demystification¶ as the Symbolic refuses the queer; for sexuality and the Symbolic become¶ what they are by virtue of such refusals. Ironically - but irony, as I've argued,¶ always characterizes queer theory-the demystification of queerness¶ and so, by extension, of sexuality itself, the demystification inherent¶ in the position of liberal rationality, could achieve its realization only by¶ traversing the collective fantasy that invests the social order with meaning by way of reproductive futurism. Taken at its word, that is, liberalism's¶ abstract reason, rescuing queerness for sociality, dissolves, like¶ queerness, the very investments on which sociality rests by doing away¶ with its underlying and sustaining libidinal fantasies. Beyond the resonance¶ of fantasy, after all, lies neither law nor reason. In the beyond of demystification,¶ in that neutral, democratic literality that marks the futurism¶ of the left, one could only encounter a queer dismantling of futurism¶ itself as fantasy and a derealization of the order of meaning that futurism¶ reproduces. Intent on the end, not the ends, of the social, queerness¶ insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to¶ imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social¶ order itself. The sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the sacrifice¶ of the queer.¶ Bernard Law, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe¶ understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by¶ the signifier of his patronymic, denounced in 1996 proposed legislation¶ giving health care benefits to Same-sex partners of municipal employ-¶ ees. He did so by proclaiming, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the¶ sky, that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish¶ the marital bond. "Society," he opined, "has a special interest in the¶ protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains¶ the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and¶ socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage." 31¶ With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure¶ of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults¶ that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra¶ of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child¶ at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer.¶ Some seven years later, after Law had resigned for his failure to protect¶ Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John¶ Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state􀄬recognized same-sex¶ unions as parodic versions of authentic families, "based on individual¶ egoism" rather than genuine love. Justifying that condemnation, he observed,¶ "Such a 'caricature' has no future and cannot give future to any¶ society." 32 Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant¶ provocations not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order's¶ prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's¶ coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the¶ Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway¶ in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality:¶ Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively¶ terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent¶ kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital Is and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as¶ its prop.¶ We might like to believe that with patience, with work, with generous¶ contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation in activist¶ groups or generous doses of legal savvy and electoral sophistication, the¶ future will hold a place for us - a place at the political table that won't¶ have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed or the bar or the¶ baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no¶ future at all,: that the future, as Annie's hymn to the hope of "Tomorrow"¶ understands, is "always/ A day/ Away." Like the lovers on Keats's Grecian¶ urn, forever "near the goal" of a union they'll never in fact achieve, we're¶ held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to¶ pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one. That future¶ is nothing but kid stuff, reborn each day to screen out the grave that gapes¶ from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, ensnaring us in, reality's gossamer web. Those queered by the social order that projects its death¶ drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy¶ that so defines them. But they're positioned as well to recognize the¶ irredudbility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to¶ the logic of social organization as such. Acceding to this figural identification¶ with the undoing of identity, which is also to say with the disarticulation¶ of social and Symbolic form, might well be described, in John¶ Brenkman's words, as "politically self-destructive." But politics (as the¶ social elaboration of reality) and the self (as mere prosthesis maintain- ;¶ ing the future for the figural Child), are what queerness, again as figure, "¶ necessarily destroys -necessarily insofar as this "self" is the agent of reproductive¶ futurism and this "politics" the means of its promulgation¶ as the order of social reality. But perhaps, as Lacan's engagement with¶ Antigone in Seminar 7 suggests, political self-destruction inheres in the¶ only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future,¶ in the name of having a life.¶ If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of¶ futurity, if the jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer¶ (non)identity annihilates the fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate¶ identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction,¶ then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever¶ lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive¶ ',we're called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and¶ the political order it enforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made dear,¶ are "not the signifier of what might become a new form of 'social organisation,'¶ " that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter¶ tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement,¶ in the form of the future. We choose, instead, not to choose¶ the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective¶ identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we¶ propose, in Hocquenghem's words, 14 is unaware of the passing of generations¶ as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about¶ 'sacrifice now for the sake of future generations' . . . [it] knows that¶ civilisation alone is mortal." 34 Even more: it delights in that mortality¶ as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as¶ pro-life. It is we "who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of¶ the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we're condemned¶ should we speak them or not: that we are the advocates of abortion; that¶ the Child as futurity’s emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition¶ and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a¶ Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on¶ the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the¶ negativity that pierces the fantasy Screen of futurity, shattering narrative¶ temporality with irony's always explosive force. And so what is queerest¶ about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness¶ to insist intransitively-to insist that the future stop here.

<h4><u><strong>The 1AC finds its value in futurity – a political position in structural and ontological opposition to the queer. Attempts at political assimilation merely displace queerness onto others. The alternative is queer negativity – only this oppositional resistance to the enslavement of the future can contest infinite anti-queer violence</h4><p>Edelman 4</p><p></u></strong>(Lee Edelman<u>, a professor of English at Tufts University, “NO FUTURE: Queer Theory and the Death Drive” Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004, KB)</p><p><mark>By denying our identification with </mark>the <mark>negativity</mark> of this drive</u>, <u>and</u>¶ <u>hence our disidentification from</u> <u>the promise of futurity, those of us inhabiting¶ the, place of <mark>the queer may </mark>be able to cast off that queerness and <mark>enter the</mark> properly <mark>political sphere</u>, <u><strong>but only by shifting the</mark> figural</u></strong>¶<u><strong> <mark>burden of queerness to someone else.</u></strong></mark> <u>The structural position of queerness</u>,¶ after all, <u>and the need to fill it remain</u>. <u><mark>By choosing to accept that position</u></mark>,¶ however, by assuming the " truth" of our queer capacity to figure the¶ undoing of the Symbolic, and of the Symbolic subject as well, <u><mark>we might¶ undertake </mark>the impossible project of <mark>imagining an oppositional </mark>political <mark>stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the politics of signification</u></mark> (the politics aimed at closing the gap opened up by the signifier itself), <u><mark>which can only return us</u></mark>, by way of the Child, <u><mark>to the politics of¶ reproduction</mark>. For the liberal's view of society, which seems to accord the¶ queer a place, endorses no more than the conservative right's the queerness¶ of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer. <mark>While¶ the right</mark> wing <mark>imagines the elimination of queers</u></mark> (or of the need to confront¶ their existence), <u><mark>the left would eliminate queerness by shining</mark> the¶ cool light of <mark>reason upon it</mark>, hoping</u> thereby <u>to expose it as merely a mode¶ of sexual expression free of the all-pervasive coloring, the determining¶ fantasy formation, by means of which it can seem <mark>to portend</mark>, and not¶ for the right alone, <mark>the undoing of the social order</mark> and its cynosure, the¶ Child.</u> <u><strong><mark>Queerness</u></strong></mark> thus <u><strong><mark>comes to mean nothing</strong></mark> for both: for the right wing¶ the nothingness always at war with the positivity of civil society; for the¶ left, nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.¶ <strong>But this is where reason must fail.</u></strong> <u>Sexuality refuses demystification¶ as the Symbolic refuses the queer</u>; for sexuality and the Symbolic become¶ what they are by virtue of such refusals. Ironically - but irony, as I've argued,¶ always characterizes queer theory-<u><mark>the demystification of queerness</mark>¶ and</u> so, by extension, <u>of</u> <u>sexuality</u> itself, <u>the demystification inherent¶ in the position of liberal rationality, <mark>could achieve its realization only by¶ traversing the</mark> collective <mark>fantasy that invests the social order with meaning by</mark> way of <mark>reproductive futurism</mark>.</u> Taken at its word, that is, liberalism's¶ abstract reason, rescuing queerness for sociality, dissolves, like¶ queerness, the very investments on which sociality rests by doing away¶ with its underlying and sustaining libidinal fantasies. Beyond the resonance¶ of fantasy, after all, lies neither law nor reason. In the beyond of demystification,¶ in that neutral, democratic literality that marks the futurism¶ of the left, one could only encounter a queer dismantling of futurism¶ itself as fantasy and a derealization of the order of meaning that futurism¶ reproduces. Intent on the end, not the ends, of the social, queerness¶ insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to¶ imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social¶ order itself. <u><strong><mark>The sacralization of the Child</u></strong></mark> thus <u><strong><mark>necessitates the sacrifice</u></strong>¶<u><strong> of the queer</strong></mark>.¶</u> <u>Bernard Law</u>, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe¶ understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by¶ the signifier of his patronymic, <u>denounced</u> in 1996 proposed <u>legislation¶ giving health care benefits to Same-sex partners of municipal employ-¶ ees. He did so by proclaiming</u>, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the¶ sky, <u>that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish¶ the marital bond. "Society,"</u> he opined, <u>"has a special interest in the¶ protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains¶ the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and¶ socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage."</u> 31¶ With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure¶ of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults¶ that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra¶ of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child¶ at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer.¶ Some seven years later, <u>after Law had resigned for his failure to protect¶ Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John¶ Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state􀄬recognized same-sex¶ unions as parodic versions of authentic families, "based on individual¶ egoism" rather than genuine love.</u> Justifying that condemnation, he observed,¶ <u>"Such a 'caricature' has no future and cannot give future to any¶ society.</u>" 32 <u><mark>Queers must respond</mark> to the violent force</u> of such constant¶ provocations not only <u>by insisting on our equal right to the social order's¶ prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's¶ coherence and integrity, but</u> also <u>by saying explicitly what Law and the¶ Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway¶ in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality:¶ <strong><mark>Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're </mark>collectively</u></strong><mark>¶<u><strong> terrorized</u></strong></mark>; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent¶ kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital Is and with small; <u><strong><mark>fuck</u></strong> <u><strong>the</mark> whole <mark>network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as</u></strong>¶<u><strong> its prop</mark>.</strong>¶</u> <u><mark>We might like to believe that with patience</u></mark>, with <u>work</u>, with generous¶ <u>contributions to lobbying groups <mark>or</u></mark> generous <u>participation in <mark>activist¶ groups</u></mark> or generous <u>doses of legal savvy</u> and electoral <u>sophistication</u>, <u><mark>the¶ future will hold a place for</mark> <mark>us</mark> </u>- <u>a place at the political table that won't¶ have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed</u> or the <u>bar</u> <u>or</u> the¶ <u>baths. <strong><mark>But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers</strong></mark>, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no¶ future at all,: that the future</u>, as Annie's hymn to the hope of "Tomorrow"¶ understands, <u>is "always/ A day/ Away."</u> Like the lovers on Keats's Grecian¶ urn, forever "near the goal" of a union they'll never in fact achieve, <u><mark>we're¶ held in thrall by a future continually deferred</mark> by time itself, constrained to¶ pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one.</u> <u><mark>That future¶ is</mark> nothing but kid stuff, <mark>reborn</u></mark> each day <u><mark>to screen out the grave</u></mark> that gapes¶ from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, <u><mark>ensnaring us in, reality's </mark>gossamer <mark>web.</mark> Those queered by the social order that projects its death¶ drive onto them are</u> no doubt <u>positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy¶ that so defines them. But they're positioned</u> as well <u>to recognize the¶ irredudbility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to¶ the logic of social organization</u> as such. <u>Acceding to this figural identification</u>¶ with the undoing of identity, which is also to say with the disarticulation¶ of social and Symbolic form, <u>might </u>well <u>be</u> described, in John¶ Brenkman's words, as "<u>politically self-destructive." But politics</u> (as the¶ social elaboration of reality) <u>and the self</u> (as mere prosthesis maintain- ;¶ ing the future for the figural Child), <u>are what queerness</u>, again as figure, "¶ <u>necessarily destroys</u> -necessarily <u>insofar as this "self" is the agent of reproductive¶ futurism and this "politics" the means of its promulgation¶ as the order of social reality. But</u> perhaps, as Lacan's engagement with¶ Antigone in Seminar 7 suggests, <u><mark>political self-destruction inheres in the¶ only act that counts as one: <strong>the act of resisting enslavement to the future,</u></strong>¶<u><strong> in the name of having a life.</u></strong>¶</mark> <u>If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of¶ futurity</u>, if the jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer¶ (non)identity annihilates the fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate¶ identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction,¶ then <u><mark>the only oppositional status </mark>to which our queerness could ever¶ lead <mark>would depend on our taking</u></mark> seriously <u><mark>the place of the death drive</u>¶ ',<u>we're called on to figure</u></mark> and insisting, <u>against the cult of the Child and¶ the political order it enforces, that <strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark>, as Guy Hocquenghem made dear,¶ <u><strong><mark>are "not the signifier</strong></mark> of what might become a new form of 'social organisation,'¶ </u>" <u>that we do not intend <mark>a new politics, a better society, a brighter¶ tomorrow</mark>, since</u> all of <u><strong><mark>these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement,</u></strong>¶<u><strong> in the form of the future.</strong></mark> We choose</u>, instead, <u>not to choose¶ the Child</u>, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective¶ identification with an always impossible future. <u><mark>The queerness we¶ propose</u></mark>, in Hocquenghem's words, 14 is unaware of the passing of generations¶ as stages on the road to better living. It<u> <mark>knows nothing about¶ 'sacrifice now for </mark>the sake of <mark>future generations'</u></mark> . . . <u>[it] knows that¶ civilisation</u> alone <u>is mortal</u>." 34 Even more: <u>it delights in that mortality¶ as the negation of everything that would define itself</u>, moralistically, <u>as¶ pro-life</u>. It is we "who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of¶ the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we're condemned¶ should we speak them or not: that we are the advocates of abortion; that¶ <u><mark>the Child as futurity’s emblem must die</u></mark>; that <u><strong>the future is mere repetition</u></strong>¶<u><strong> and just as lethal as the past.</u></strong> <u>Our queerness has nothing to offer a¶ Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on¶ the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the¶ negativity that pierces the fantasy Screen of futurity, shattering narrative¶ temporality</u> with irony's always explosive force. And so <u>what is queerest</u>¶ about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us <u>is this willingness</u>¶ to insist intransitively-<u>to insist that the future stop here.</p></u>

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Footnoting disad – failure to reject increases violence

Der Derian 95

Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes

A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the contested' nature of realism with a footnote and then business as usual This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to commit worse epistemological crimes

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

<h4>Footnoting disad – failure to reject increases violence</h4><p><u><strong>Der Derian 95</u></strong> (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)</p><p>But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? <u><mark>A stop-gap solution is to supplement the</u></mark> definitional <u><mark>gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist</u></mark>, mindful of a creeping pluralism, <u><mark>will note the</mark> 'essentially <mark>contested' nature of realism</mark> - duly backed up <mark>with a footnote</u></mark> to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - <u><mark>and then</mark> get down to <mark>business as usual</u></mark>, that is, <u>using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. <mark>This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere</mark>: in exchange for not contesting</u> the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, <u><mark>the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to</mark> then turn around and <mark>commit worse epistemological crimes</u></mark>. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.</p>

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GOP is in the lead, but the election could tilt

Liasson 10/3 >#SPS

Liasson 10/3 <Mara, NPR national political correspondent, “NPR Poll: Senate Battleground Tilts Republican, But Still Anybody's Game,” http://www.npr.org/2014/10/03/353315549/npr-poll-senate-battleground-tilts-republican-but-still-anybodys-game>#SPS

the political landscape continues to be tilted against Obama and his party. The battle for control of the Senate the biggest prize this year remains close and could tip either way. The president, the Republicans and the Democrats were viewed with equal disgust — their favorability ratings all in the low 40s. "The direction of the country is overwhelmingly perceived to be in the wrong direction. Obama is exceedingly unpopular in the Senate battlegrounds," "The generic party preference for a Senate candidate favors the Republicans by three points. the playing field still tilts to Republicans in these 12 battleground states."

the political landscape continues to be tilted against Obama The battle for control of the Senate could tip either way. Obama is exceedingly unpopular in the Senate battlegrounds The generic party preference favors the Republicans by three points the playing field still tilts to Republicans

With fewer than five weeks until election day, the political landscape continues to be tilted against President Obama and his party. The battle for control of the Senate — the biggest prize this year — remains close and could tip either way. Those are the findings of NPR's latest bipartisan poll of likely voters, conducted by Republican Whit Ayres of Resurgent Republic and Democrat Stan Greenberg of Democracy Corps. The poll concentrated on the Senate battleground — the 12 states that will determine control of the Senate next year. It found an electorate where nobody likes anybody. The president, the Republicans and the Democrats were viewed with equal disgust — their favorability ratings all in the low 40s. This is a disgruntled group of voters, says Ayres, which this year happens to be good news for his party. "The direction of the country is overwhelmingly perceived to be in the wrong direction. Barack Obama is exceedingly unpopular in the Senate battlegrounds," he says. "The generic party preference for a Senate candidate favors the Republicans by three points. So the playing field still tilts strongly to Republicans in these 12 battleground states."

<h4>GOP is in the lead, but the election could tilt </h4><p><u><strong>Liasson 10/3</u></strong> <Mara, NPR national political correspondent, “NPR Poll: Senate Battleground Tilts Republican, But Still Anybody's Game,” http://www.npr.org/2014/10/03/353315549/npr-poll-senate-battleground-tilts-republican-but-still-anybodys-game<u><strong>>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>With fewer than five weeks until election day, <u><mark>the political landscape continues to be tilted against</u></mark> President <u><mark>Obama</mark> and his party.</u> <u><mark>The battle for control of the Senate</u></mark> — <u>the biggest prize this year</u> — <u>remains close and <strong><mark>could tip either way</strong>.</mark> </u>Those are the findings of NPR's latest bipartisan poll of likely voters, conducted by Republican Whit Ayres of Resurgent Republic and Democrat Stan Greenberg of Democracy Corps. The poll concentrated on the Senate battleground — the 12 states that will determine control of the Senate next year. It found an electorate where nobody likes anybody. <u>The president, the Republicans and the Democrats were viewed with equal disgust — their favorability ratings all in the low 40s.</u> This is a disgruntled group of voters, says Ayres, which this year happens to be good news for his party. <u>"The direction of the country is overwhelmingly perceived to be in the wrong direction.</u> Barack <u><mark>Obama is exceedingly unpopular in the Senate battlegrounds</mark>,"</u> he says. <u>"<mark>The generic party preference</mark> for a Senate candidate <mark>favors the Republicans by three points</mark>.</u> So <u><mark>the playing field still tilts</u></mark> strongly <u><mark>to Republicans</mark> in these 12 battleground states." </p></u>

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Uncomfort

Halberstam 11.

Halberstam 11. J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 2

success in a heteronormative, capitalist society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation If the boom and bust years of the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first have taught us anything, we should at least have a healthy critique of static models of success and failure The Queer Art of Failure dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world Failing is something queers do and have always done exceptionally well; for queers failure can be a style or a way of life it can stand in contrast to the grim scenarios of success that depend upon “trying and trying again. if success requires so much effort, then maybe failure is easier in the long run and offers different rewards failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life positive thinking is a North American affliction, “a mass delusion” that emerges out of a combination of American exceptionalism and a desire to believe that success happens to good people and failure is just a consequence of a bad attitude rather than structural conditions believing that success depends upon one’s attitude is far preferable to Americans than recognizing that their success is the outcome of the tilted scales of race, class, and gender the flip side of positivity is thus a harsh insistence on personal responsibility,” meaning that while capitalism produces some people’s success through other people’s failures, the ideology of positive thinking insists that success depends only upon working hard and failure is always of your own doing Ehrenreich uses the example of American women’s application of positive thinking to breast cancer to demonstrate how dangerous the belief in optimism can be and how deeply Americans want to believe that health is a matter of attitude rather than environmental degradation and that wealth is a matter of visualizing success rather than having the cards stacked in your favor For the nonbelievers outside the cult of positive thinking, the failures and losers, the grouchy, irritable whiners who do not want to “have a nice day” and who do not believe that getting cancer has made them better people, politics offers a better explanatory framework than personal disposition there are definite advantages to failing Relieved of the obligation to keep smiling through chemotherapy or bankruptcy, the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life in the United States. From the perspective of feminism, failure has often been a better bet than success Where feminine success is always measured by male standards, and gender failure often means being relieved of the pressure to measure up to patriarchal ideals, not succeeding at womanhood can offer unexpected pleasures if womanhood depends upon a heterosexual framework, then lesbians are not “women,” and if lesbians are not “women,” then they fall outside of patriarchal norms and can re-create some of the meaning of their genders these kinds of shadow feminisms have long haunted the more acceptable forms of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than negativity, rejection, and transformation Shadow feminisms take the form not of becoming, being, and doing but of shady, murky modes of undoing, un- becoming, and violating

success in a heteronormative society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity The Queer Art of Failure dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may creative cooperative surprising ways of being Failing is something queers do and have always done exceptionally well; for queers failure can be a style it can stand in contrast to the grim scenarios of success that depend upon “trying and trying again. failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development delivering us from unruly childhoods to predictable adulthoods it provides the opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life positive thinking is a North American affliction, “a mass delusion emerges out of American exceptionalism the flip side of positivity is thus a harsh insistence on personal responsibility Americans want to believe that health is a matter of attitude rather than environmental degradation the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life in the U S feminine success is always measured by male standards gender failure means being relieved of the pressure to measure up to patriarchal ideals not succeeding can offer unexpected pleasures if womanhood depends upon a heterosexual framework lesbians are not “women shadow feminisms have long haunted the more acceptable forms of feminism

In this book I range from children’s animation to avant-garde per- formance and queer art to think about ways of being and knowing that stand outside of conventional understandings of success. I argue that success in a heteronormative, capitalist society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation. But these measures of success have come under serious pressure recently, with the collapse of financial markets on the one hand and the epic rise in divorce rates on the other. If the boom and bust years of the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first have taught us anything, we should at least have a healthy critique of static models of success and failure. Rather than just arguing for a reevaluation of these standards of passing and failing, The Queer Art of Failure dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live. Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world. Failing is something queers do and have always done exceptionally well; for queers failure can be a style, to cite Quentin Crisp, or a way of life, to cite Foucault, and it can stand in contrast to the grim scenarios of success that depend upon “trying and trying again.” MARKED In fact if success requires so much effort, then maybe failure is easier in the long run and offers different rewards. What kinds of reward can failure offer us? Perhaps most obviously, failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods. Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers. And while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life. As Barbara Ehrenreich reminds us in Bright- sided, positive thinking is a North American affliction, “a mass delusion” that emerges out of a combination of American exceptionalism and a desire to believe that success happens to good people and failure is just a consequence of a bad attitude rather than structural conditions (2009: 13). Positive thinking is offered up in the U.S. as a cure for cancer, a path to untold riches, and a surefire way to engineer your own success. Indeed believing that success depends upon one’s attitude is far preferable to Americans than recognizing that their success is the outcome of the tilted scales of race, class, and gender. As Ehrenreich puts it, “If optimism is the key to material success, and if you can achieve an optimistic outlook through the discipline of positive thinking, then there is no excuse for failure.” But, she continues, “the flip side of positivity is thus a harsh insistence on personal responsibility,” meaning that while capitalism produces some people’s success through other people’s failures, the ideology of positive thinking insists that success depends only upon working hard and failure is always of your own doing (8). We know better of course in an age when the banks that ripped off ordinary people have been deemed “too big to fail” and the people who bought bad mortgages are simply too little to care about. In Bright-sided Ehrenreich uses the example of American women’s application of positive thinking to breast cancer to demonstrate how dangerous the belief in optimism can be and how deeply Americans want to believe that health is a matter of attitude rather than environmental degradation and that wealth is a matter of visualizing success rather than having the cards stacked in your favor. For the nonbelievers outside the cult of positive thinking, however, the failures and losers, the grouchy, irritable whiners who do not want to “have a nice day” and who do not believe that getting cancer has made them better people, politics offers a better explanatory framework than personal disposition. For these negative thinkers, there are definite advantages to failing. Relieved of the obligation to keep smiling through chemotherapy or bankruptcy, the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life in the United States. From the perspective of feminism, failure has often been a better bet than success. Where feminine success is always measured by male standards, and gender failure often means being relieved of the pressure to measure up to patriarchal ideals, not succeeding at womanhood can offer unexpected pleasures. In many ways this has been the message of many renegade feminists in the past. Monique Wittig (1992) argued in the 1970s that if womanhood depends upon a heterosexual framework, then lesbians are not “women,” and if lesbians are not “women,” then they fall outside of patriarchal norms and can re-create some of the meaning of their genders. Also in the 1970s Valerie Solanas suggested that if “woman” takes on meaning only in relation to “man,” then we need to “cut up men” (2004: 72). Perhaps that is a little drastic, but at any rate these kinds of feminisms, what I call shadow feminisms in chapter 5, have long haunted the more acceptable forms of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than negativity, rejection, and transformation. Shadow feminisms take the form not of becoming, being, and doing but of shady, murky modes of undoing, un- becoming, and violating.

<h4>Uncomfort</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 11.</u></strong> J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 2</p><p>In this book I range from children’s animation to avant-garde per- formance and queer art to think about ways of being and knowing that stand outside of conventional understandings of success. I argue that <u><strong><mark>success</strong> in a <strong>heteronormative</mark>, capitalist <mark>society</strong> equates too easily to specific forms of <strong>reproductive maturity</strong></mark> combined with wealth accumulation</u>. But these measures of success have come under serious pressure recently, with the collapse of financial markets on the one hand and the epic rise in divorce rates on the other. <u>If the boom and bust years of the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first have taught us anything, we should at least have a <strong>healthy critique</strong> of <strong>static models</strong> of <strong>success and failure</u></strong>.</p><p>Rather than just arguing for a reevaluation of these standards of passing and failing, <u><mark>The Queer Art of Failure <strong>dismantles the logics</strong> of <strong>success and failure</strong> with which we currently live</u></mark>. Under certain circumstances <u><strong><mark>failing</strong>, <strong>losing</strong>, <strong>forgetting</strong>, <strong>unmaking</strong>, <strong>undoing</strong>, <strong>unbecoming</strong>, not knowing may</mark> in fact offer more <strong><mark>creative</strong></mark>, more <strong><mark>cooperative</strong></mark>, more <strong><mark>surprising ways</strong> of <strong>being</strong></mark> in the <strong>world</u></strong>. <u><mark>Failing is something <strong>queers do</strong> and have <strong>always done exceptionally well</strong>; for queers failure can be a <strong>style</u></strong></mark>, to cite Quentin Crisp, <u>or a <strong>way of life</u></strong>, to cite Foucault, and <u><mark>it can stand <strong>in contrast</strong> to the <strong>grim scenarios of success</strong> that depend upon “<strong>trying</strong> and <strong>trying again.</u></strong></mark>” </p><p>MARKED</p><p>In fact <u>if success <strong>requires so much effort</strong>, then <strong>maybe failure is easier</strong> in the long run and <strong>offers different rewards</u></strong>.</p><p>What kinds of reward can failure offer us? Perhaps most obviously, <u><mark>failure allows us to <strong>escape</strong> the <strong>punishing norms</strong> that <strong>discipline behavior</strong> and <strong>manage human development</strong></mark> with the goal of <strong><mark>delivering</strong> us from <strong>unruly childhoods</strong> to</mark> <strong>orderly</strong> and <strong><mark>predictable adulthoods</u></strong></mark>. <u>Failure <strong>preserves</strong> some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers</u>. And <u>while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, <mark>it</mark> also <strong><mark>provides the opportunity</strong> to <strong>use these negative affects</strong> to <strong>poke holes</strong> in the <strong>toxic positivity</strong> of <strong>contemporary life</u></strong></mark>. As Barbara Ehrenreich reminds us in Bright- sided, <u><strong><mark>positive thinking</strong> is a <strong>North American affliction</strong>, “a <strong>mass delusion</strong></mark>” that <mark>emerges out of</mark> a combination of <strong><mark>American exceptionalism</strong></mark> and a desire to believe that <strong>success happens</strong> to <strong>good people</strong> and <strong>failure</strong> is just a consequence of a <strong>bad attitude</strong> rather than structural <strong>conditions</u></strong> (2009: 13). Positive thinking is offered up in the U.S. as a cure for cancer, a path to untold riches, and a surefire way to engineer your own success. Indeed <u>believing that success depends upon one’s attitude is far preferable to Americans than recognizing that their success is the outcome of the tilted scales of race, class, and gender</u>. As Ehrenreich puts it, “If optimism is the key to material success, and if you can achieve an optimistic outlook through the discipline of positive thinking, then there is no excuse for failure.” But, she continues, “<u><mark>the flip side of positivity is thus a <strong>harsh insistence</strong> on <strong>personal responsibility</strong></mark>,” meaning that while capitalism produces some people’s success through other people’s failures, the ideology of positive thinking insists that success depends only upon working hard and failure is always of your own doing</u> (8). We know better of course in an age when the banks that ripped off ordinary people have been deemed “too big to fail” and the people who bought bad mortgages are simply too little to care about.</p><p>In Bright-sided <u>Ehrenreich uses the example of American women’s application of positive thinking to breast cancer to demonstrate <strong>how dangerous</strong> the belief in optimism can be and how deeply <mark>Americans want to believe that <strong>health is a matter of attitude</strong> rather than <strong>environmental degradation</strong></mark> and that wealth is a matter of <strong>visualizing success</strong> rather than having the cards <strong>stacked in your favor</u></strong>. <u>For the nonbelievers outside the cult of positive thinking,</u> however, <u>the failures and losers, the grouchy, irritable whiners who do not want to “have a nice day” and who do not believe that getting cancer has made them better people, politics offers a better <strong>explanatory framework</strong> than <strong>personal disposition</u></strong>. For these negative thinkers, <u>there are <strong>definite advantages</strong> to failing</u>. <u><strong>Relieved</strong> of the obligation to <strong>keep smiling</strong> through chemotherapy or bankruptcy, <mark>the negative thinker can use the <strong>experience of failure</strong> to confront the <strong>gross inequalities</strong> of <strong>everyday life in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</strong>.</p><p>From the perspective of <strong>feminism</strong>, failure has often been <strong>a better bet than success</u></strong>. <u>Where <mark>feminine success is always <strong>measured by male standards</strong></mark>, and <strong><mark>gender failure</strong></mark> often <mark>means <strong>being relieved</strong> of the pressure to <strong>measure up to patriarchal ideals</strong></mark>, <mark>not succeeding</mark> at womanhood <mark>can offer <strong>unexpected pleasures</u></strong></mark>. In many ways this has been the message of many renegade feminists in the past. Monique Wittig (1992) argued in the 1970s that <u><mark>if womanhood <strong>depends upon a heterosexual framework</strong></mark>, then <strong><mark>lesbians are not “women</strong></mark>,” and if lesbians <strong>are not “women</strong>,” then they <strong>fall outside of patriarchal norms</strong> and can re-create some of the <strong>meaning of their genders</u></strong>. Also in the 1970s Valerie Solanas suggested that if “woman” takes on meaning only in relation to “man,” then we need to “cut up men” (2004: 72). Perhaps that is a little drastic, but at any rate <u>these kinds of</u> feminisms, what I call <u><mark>shadow feminisms</u></mark> in chapter 5, <u><mark>have <strong>long haunted</strong> the more <strong>acceptable forms of feminism</strong></mark> that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than negativity, rejection, and transformation</u>. <u>Shadow feminisms take the form not of becoming, being, and doing but of shady, murky modes of undoing, un- becoming, and violating</u>.</p>

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University

Comfort

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Fullerton

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JV Reed

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ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round2.docx