Datasets:

Yusuf5

/

OpenCaselist

like 15

Legalization of organ sales means regulation

Diamond ‘13

Diamond ‘13

A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold

proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the U S The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold

(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/) ***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 Enter David Diamond and his proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs by making the sale of human organs legal in the United States. The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed. The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.

<h4><strong>Legalization of organ sales means regulation</h4><p>Diamond ‘13 </p><p></strong>(A TV and radio commercial spokesman, an actor, a freelance broadcast sports producer, and a marketing and public relations consultant. Following four years of service (1953-1957) as a Russian language technician in the U.S. Air Force, Diamond studied foreign affairs at George Washington University in the late 1950’s. He then accepted a number of assignments working for Maryland state senator Newton I. Steers, Jr: as congressional and state senatorial campaign manager; as executive assistant and deputy commissioner in the Maryland Insurance Department; and as legislative assistant in the state capitol in Annapolis. David F., as quoted in “<u><strong>A Proposal to Legalize the Sale of Human Organs</u></strong>,” August 31, http://bobsnewheart.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/a-proposal-to-sell-human-organs/)</p><p>***NOTE -- The “Federal Organ Transplant Law refers to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 </p><p>Enter David Diamond and his <u><strong><mark>proposal for legalizing the sale of human organs</u></strong></mark>. I met David on the internet. We share backgrounds in politics and broadcasting and in trying to save lives through organ transplantation. The David Diamond Plan to increase the supply of transplantable organs <u><strong><mark>by making the sale of human organs legal in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The Federal Organ Transplant law needs to be changed.</mark> </u></strong>The Federal Organ Transplant Law enacted in 1984 provides that only donated organs may be used. The following plan to increase the supply of organs for transplant was developed in subsequent years by David F. Diamond of Memphis, Tennessee. ======0====== The shortage of organs is taking the lives of almost 7,000 people unnecessarily each year. Donation is good. It is the highest altruistic step that a person can contemplate. However, for a number of reasons, many people are not willing to donate. <u><strong><mark>The solution is to provide a regulated system allowing the organs of cadavers to be sold</u></strong></mark> as follows: A. A contract can provide that when a person has decided, for whatever reasons, not to donate organs, he or she (hereafter: the provider) can commit to a plan to have the organs sold if and when the provider is brain dead. This contract will also be signed by the next of kin, spouse or nearest living relative so that that party understands the purpose of the contract and agrees that they will not oppose its implementation when the provider dies. A provider’s option to cancel the contract at any time prior to the provider’s death will be included in the contract. The use of this contract will allow the provider to leave an estate to his heirs or a designated charity. A provider, with few or no assets, might otherwise have none to leave when he or she passed. B. The sale of organs can be conducted by a broker, attorney or individual (hereafter: an agent) designated by the provider. A licensing procedure would establish that the agent would be certified as fiscally responsible and having financial integrity. Upon determination of brain death, the agent selected by the provider, using email, fax or phones, would immediately advise interested buyers of an organ’s availability and condition, etc. Time would be of the essence, of course. Appropriate compensation to the agent, such as a commission for services provided, would be set forth in the contract. Buyers whose bids were accepted would send payment by wire transfer, cashier’s check or other means approved in the law. C. The party designated by the provider must maintain a public record (like a broadcaster’s log which is available for public viewing) specifying the individual who gets the organs, how much is being paid and the identification of the provider. The purpose of this transparency is to eliminate the need for a black market, and to stimulate public awareness. If there is a public record, as soon as organ sales begin, the news media will undoubtedly write about it pointing out how much money was involved in the transactions and stressing how much money goes to the heirs. This will persuade a lot of additional people to agree to such a contract, thus increasing supply exponentially. Through the action of the law of supply and demand, the increased supply will cause prices to decrease to a level most people will consider reasonable. Unless you allow prices to be set by the market process you put a limit on the number of organs that might become available. Any fixed price, set by government or a special agency, would diminish the supply which would defeat the goal of making the most organs available. That would cause some individuals to decide not to participate. But if they knew that the organs they might provide are going to bring whatever the market process allows, they’ll have every incentive to take part. D. The organs would have to be sold only for transplant to U. S. citizens in order to avoid foreigners from bidding up the price and reducing the supply to Americans. Of course, if other countries should adopt model legislation such as ours then we could reciprocate and become partners with them since their organ supply could be shared with ours. E. The poor will not be discriminated against. They will have access to organs because the law will provide that, just as in Medicare or Medicaid presently, the government will pay for any medical procedure or supplies that the patient needs, upon a doctor’s certification that it is medically necessary. The government would buy organs on the market for those with Medicare or Medicaid unless donated organs were available. The same principle will apply for those with health insurance. And the wealthy, who may choose to be self insured, would be free to arrange for organs in the same market. Of course, people would still be free to donate organs. And participation by providers in the futures contracts would be entirely voluntary. F. Presently those uninsured or poor, not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, have to raise tens of thousands of dollars before hospitals or transplant surgeons will help them. The added cost of an organ can also be raised in the same way, or the law can require our government to cover that cost, since it will be less costly over time than dealing with whatever the patient’s medical expenses would be otherwise. G. The plan will require providers to have their medical records maintained by their doctors beginning at least as soon as a futures contract is signed. It would be made available immediately to any parties potentially buying an organ from that cadaver. The purpose, and the result, would be to assure a better, safer organ supply. This plan does not contemplate any sale of kidneys or parts of livers from a living person. There are risks in having such surgery and for that reason and others, we set that aside and take no position on that question. Sometimes, under current law, it is the right thing to do, depending on the circumstances. But in point of fact, the need for such organs will be adequately supplied with adoption of my plan.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The affirmative must legalize all or nearly all—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs

Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University

Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University (Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)

The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two

The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two

Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence. For example the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two interviews.

<h4>The affirmative must legalize <u>all or nearly all</u><strong>—they legalize ZERO sales of live organs</h4><p>Rodgers and Cooper, 06 – professors of counseling at Strathclyde University </p><p></strong>(Brian and Mick, “Proposed Scoring Scheme for Qualitative Thematic Analysis”, https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/2767391/Proposed_Scoring_Scheme_for_Qualitative_Thematic_Analysis_Mick_Cooper.pdf)</p><p>Drawing on the work of psychotherapy researchers Robert Elliott, Clara Hill and colleagues, the following scheme has been proposed for the write up of qualitative thematic analysis when describing the ‘weighting’ of codes or categories (i.e. the number of interviews that the code/category appeared in). <u><strong><mark>The intention is to use ‘plain English’ terms to describe the frequency of occurrence.</mark> For example</u></strong> the term ‘around half’ is used to describe 50% plus or minus one interview, and ‘<u><strong><mark>nearly all’ is used to describe 100% minus one or two</mark> </u></strong>interviews.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.

<h4>Violation -- the aff is decrim, the plan merely removes the prohibition of organ sales and doesn’t create a regulated market AND it only decrims part of the area.</h4>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all

<h4>Vote negative on predictable ground -- all of the controversy comes from the regulations portion of the debate -- they jack the decrim counterplan, all of our regs disads and all of our positive state action kritik links AND we lose cadaveric only CPs from nearly all</h4>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo

Nwabueze 11

Remigius N. Nwabueze 11, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books

As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues Matthews observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative There, the court held that no property right existed in a kidney Where human tissues are destined for research the courts are more likely to deny the property rights of sources against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona

judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in tissues where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that person had possession the courts have not treated non-renewable organs as property Colavito cases is illustrative the court held no property right existed in a kidney Where tissues are destined for research the courts are likely to deny the rights of sources This is evident in Moore and Greenberg more recent example is Catalona

As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, Matthews (1983) observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative.27 There, the court held that no property right existed in a misdirected, but histo-compatible, kidney.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ Where human tissues are destined for research or employed in the research process, the courts are more likely (probably on policy grounds) to deny the property rights of sources as against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg above. A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).

<h4>Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo</h4><p>Remigius N. <strong>Nwabueze 11</strong>, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books</p><p><u><strong>As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, <mark>judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in </mark>human <mark>tissues</u></strong></mark>. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, <u><strong>Matthews</u></strong> (1983) <u><strong>observed that <mark>where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought </mark>that as with blood, hair and the like</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that person had </mark>the first and best right to <mark>possession</mark>, though presumably one might transfer that right</u></strong>, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). <u><strong>Unfortunately, <mark>the courts have not</mark> generally <mark>treated</mark> kidneys and other <mark>non-renewable organs as property</mark>. The <mark>Colavito </mark>line of <mark>cases is illustrative</u></strong></mark>.27 <u><strong>There, <mark>the court held</mark> that <mark>no property right existed in a</u></strong></mark> misdirected, but histo-compatible, <u><strong><mark>kidney</u></strong></mark>.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ <u><strong><mark>Where </mark>human <mark>tissues are destined for research</u></strong></mark> or employed in the research process, <u><strong><mark>the courts are </mark>more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark> (probably on policy grounds) <u><strong><mark>to deny the </mark>property <mark>rights of sources</u></strong></mark> as <u><strong>against those of the users. <mark>This </mark>judicial inclination <mark>is evident in Moore and Greenberg</mark> </u></strong>above.<u><strong> A <mark>more recent example is</mark> Washington University v. <mark>Catalona</u></strong></mark>,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights

Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis

Laurel R. Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis

Compensation systems people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.

people provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals compensation could only go into effect if NOTA and are repealed or amended This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as law do not prohibit sales.

Compensation systems would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals after death. Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, allowing incentives to donors is a sound idea. This can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.

<h4>The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights</h4><p>Laurel R. <strong>Siegel 2K<u>, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis</p><p>Compensation systems</u></strong> would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that <u><strong><mark>people </mark>may be more willing to <mark>provide organs if they receive compensation</u></strong></mark>. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. <u><strong><mark>Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals</u></strong></mark> after death. <u><strong>Additionally, a <mark>compensation</mark> system <mark>could only go into effect if NOTA and</mark> the 1987 UAGA amendments <mark>are repealed or amended</u></strong></mark>. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. <u><strong>A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death.</u></strong> n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ <u><strong><mark>This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body</u></strong>.</mark> This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, <u><strong><mark>allowing incentives to donors</u></strong></mark> is a sound idea. This <u><strong><mark>can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in </mark>live tissue and <mark>organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as </mark>common law and statutory <mark>law do not prohibit sales.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

That wrecks the biomedical research

Gitter 4

Gitter 4 (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz

Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings researchers would face significant transaction costs in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise

Because biomedical research is financially risky according participants property rights in their tissue will diminish incentives to invest scientists would face significant transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate for genetic material This presents a particular risk in the nonprofit sector researchers would face significant costs in locating and negotiating arrangements negotiations could prove complex bargaining could prove impossible where identities are unknown the problems reach their apex in the holdout who refuses to participate unless she is compensated recognizing the right may imply some right to control research participants may demand licensing further decreasing profits these factors would present significant disincentives to researchers

Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,86 Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings. 87 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs88 in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,89 such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore, bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92 Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example, research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.

<h4>That wrecks the biomedical research</h4><p><strong>Gitter 4</strong> (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Because biomedical research is</mark> a costly and <mark>financially risky</mark> endeavor</u></strong>,86 <u><strong>Congress must consider carefully whether <mark>according</mark> human research <mark>participants property rights in their tissue will diminish </mark>the <mark>incentives to invest</mark> in this industry</u></strong>. Certainly, <u><strong>if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical <mark>scientists would face</mark> a <mark>significant </mark>increase in their <mark>transaction costs</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong><mark>scientists would be obliged to compensate</mark> research participants <mark>for </mark>their <mark>genetic material</mark>, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. <mark>This</mark> obligation to remunerate research participants <mark>presents a particular risk </mark>to scientists <mark>in the nonprofit sector</mark>, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings</u></strong>. 87 Second, <u><strong><mark>researchers would face significant</mark> transaction <mark>costs</u></strong></mark>88 <u><strong><mark>in locating and</mark> then <mark>negotiating</mark> compensation <mark>arrangements </mark>with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide</u></strong>,89 <u><strong>such <mark>negotiations could prove</mark> quite <mark>complex</mark> and protracted</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>bargaining</mark> among scientists and research participants <mark>could prove impossible</mark> in cases <mark>where</mark> the <mark>identities</mark> of these participants <mark>are unknown</u></strong></mark>, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, <u><strong><mark>the problems</mark> of increased financial and transaction costs <mark>reach their apex in the </mark>case of the potential <mark>holdout who refuses to participate </mark>in research <mark>unless she is compensated</mark> at a very high rate</u></strong>.92 Finally, <u><strong><mark>recognizing the</mark> research participant's <mark>right</mark> to share in the revenues <mark>may imply some right to control</mark> the products of that <mark>research</u></strong></mark>; for example, <u><strong>research <mark>participants may demand</mark> widespread and affordable <mark>licensing </mark>of the intellectual property developed from their tissue</u></strong>, <u><strong>thereby</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>further decreasing</mark> the scientists' <mark>profits</u></strong></mark>.93 <u><strong>All of <mark>these factors</mark> combined <mark>would present significant disincentives to researchers</mark>, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise</u></strong>. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Ensures environmental pathogens

Cangelosi 5

Gerard A. Cangelosi 5, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together the environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. If these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other s is their ability to thrive outside the host more research is needed. By grouping together the pathogens," the topic can gain critical mass for progress development of improved techniques is critical for assessment of health risks If these diseases are to be effectively controlled vaccines— require improvement

The key difference between environmental pathogens and other human pathogens is their ability to survive and thrive outside the host. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but a great deal more research is needed. By grouping together phylogenetically diverse organisms under the umbrella of "environmental pathogens," it is hoped that the topic can gain the critical mass needed for sustained progress. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. The development of improved diagnostic techniques is critical for accurate assessment of health risks and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens. ¶ If the impacts of these diseases are to be effectively controlled, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and vaccines— require improvement. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools.

<h4>Ensures environmental pathogens</h4><p>Gerard A. <strong>Cangelosi 5</strong>, Prof of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Adjunct Prof of Epidemiology and of Global Health at the University of Washington, PhD in Microbiology from UC Davis, Nancy E. Freitag, PhD, Prof in the Dept of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Medicine, and Merry R. Buckley, Ph.D. in environmental microbiology at Michigan State University, “From Outside to Inside: Environmental Microorganisms as Human Pathogens,” http://academy.asm.org/index.php/environmental-microbiology-ecology-evolution/553-from-outside-to-inside-environmental-microorganisms-as-human-pathogens</p><p><u><strong><mark>The key difference between environmental pathogens and other</mark> human pathogen<mark>s is their ability to</mark> survive and <mark>thrive outside the host</u></strong></mark>. Their widespread occurrence in the environment makes them difficult to monitor and control. Inroads have been made to understand the persistence of these organisms in the environment, the reservoirs they inhabit, the ways they exchange virulence factors, and their diversity, but <u><strong>a great deal <mark>more research is needed. By grouping together</u></strong></mark> phylogenetically diverse organisms under <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> umbrella of "<u><strong>environmental <mark>pathogens," </mark>it is hoped that <mark>the topic can gain</mark> the <mark>critical mass</mark> needed <mark>for </mark>sustained <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Colloquium participants examined other research needs for the field, including the diagnostic and environmental technologies that will be necessary for taking the next steps. It was agreed that because of the complex nature of studying organisms that can exist in the environment and in human hosts, work in this area is best carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion with coordinated input from medical, molecular, and environmental microbiologists, specialists in host responses, epidemiologists, ecologists, environmental engineers, and public health experts. <u><strong>The <mark>development of improved </mark>diagnostic <mark>techniques is critical for </mark>accurate <mark>assessment of health risks</mark> and potential human or animal population impact associated with environmental pathogens.</u></strong> ¶ <u><strong><mark>If</u></strong></mark> the impacts of <u><strong><mark>these diseases are to be effectively controlled</mark>, the techniques used to monitor and control infections by environmental pathogens—including interventions, exposure controls, drugs, and <mark>vaccines— require improvement</u></strong></mark>. The processes surrounding drug and vaccine development must be tailored to the special problem of environmental pathogens, which often strike small numbers of individuals or individuals in less developed areas of the world and, therefore, offer less potential for drug development profit than more common diseases. A challenge exists, therefore, in meeting the need for targeted, specific interventions, including development of drugs and vaccines for infections by environmental agents, in the face of a lack of financial incentive for development of these tools. </p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Extinction

Casadevall 12

Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full

it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats this writer can identify infectious disease recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for extinction of numerous amphibian species Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that pathogens required their hosts and some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as fungal pathogens. For those it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity

recent decades provide unequivocal evidence for pathogens to cause extinction Although disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by finding a single fungus responsible for extinction of numerous species Previously, the view that diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that pathogens required hosts that does not apply to microbes acquired directly from the environment such as fungal pathogens it is possible to kill off every last member without harm to itself from existential threats environmental microbes pose a much greater threat to humanity

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

<h4>Extinction </h4><p>Arturo <strong>Casadevall 12</strong>, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full</p><p>In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern <u><strong>it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats</u></strong>. At this time <u><strong>this writer can identify </u></strong>at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) <u><strong>infectious disease</u></strong>. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes <u><strong><mark>recent decades</mark> have <mark>provide</mark>d <mark>unequivocal evidence for</mark> the ability of certain <mark>pathogens to cause</mark> the <mark>extinction</mark> of entire species. <mark>Although </mark>infectious <mark>disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by</mark> the <mark>finding</mark> that <mark>a single</mark> chytrid <mark>fungus</mark> was <mark>responsible for</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>extinction of numerous</mark> amphibian <mark>species</u></strong></mark> (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). <u><strong><mark>Previously, the view that</mark> infectious <mark>diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>pathogens required </mark>their <mark>hosts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant</u></strong>. However, <u><strong><mark>that </mark>calculation <mark>does not apply to microbes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>acquired directly from the environment</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and have no need for a host, <mark>such as</u></strong></mark> the majority of <u><strong><mark>fungal pathogens</mark>. For those</u></strong> types of host–microbe interactions <u><strong><mark>it is possible</mark> for the pathogen <mark>to kill off every last member</mark> of a species</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>without harm to itself</mark>, since it would return to its natural habitat</u></strong> upon killing its last host. Hence, <u><strong><mark>from</mark> the viewpoint of <mark>existential threats environmental microbes</mark> could potentially <mark>pose a much greater threat to humanity</u></strong></mark> than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.

<h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t

Thaler 9

Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular many people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination

a market allowing the selling of organs The idea is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell kidneys a legal market for organs is a political nonstarter “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers When you renew your driver’s license you are required to answer Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state has a 60 percent donor signup rate much higher than the national rate of 38 the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination.

<h4>Mandated choice solves the case – the aff is super unpopular – the CP isn’t</h4><p><strong>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></strong></mark>. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, <u><strong>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u><strong>this system has been in use since 2006 and <mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</mark>.</u></strong> Here is how it works: <u><strong><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a 60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u><strong>That is <mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. <u><strong>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u></strong>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><strong><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></strong></mark>, which created this system, <u><strong><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>mandated choice may achieve a higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</mark> for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers

Trumball 10/3 (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS

Trumball 10/3 <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? (+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS

A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a lift to Democrats the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment or significant improvement In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas

better-than-expected report on the US job market could give a lift to Democrats such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is helping them to stay in the game. Obama is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. incumbents like Shaheen and Hagan would probably be having a tougher time In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The dynamics may keep hopes alive in places like Arkansas,

WASHINGTON — A better-than-expected report on the US job market Friday could give a modest to lift to struggling Democrats, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House. But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market is simply helping them to stay in the election game. Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President Obama, seeking to help his party, is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement. “When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic incumbents like Sen. Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire and Sen. Kay Hagan in North Carolina would probably be having a tougher time if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) or significant improvement (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls. The same dynamics also may be supporting Democrats who are behind in the polls – helping to keep their hopes alive in places like Arkansas, even though the political terrain favors Republicans.

<h4>Democrats will win now – new unemployment numbers</h4><p><strong>Trumball 10/3</strong> <Mark, CSM, Unemployment drops below 6 percent: Can it help Democrats? <u><strong>(+video), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/1003/Unemployment-drops-below-6-percent-Can-it-help-Democrats-video>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON — <u><strong>A <mark>better-than-expected report on the US job market</mark> Friday <mark>could give a</mark> </u></strong>modest to<u><strong> <mark>lift to</mark> </u></strong>struggling <u><strong><mark>Democrats</u></strong></mark>, one month before an election that could flip control of the Senate to Republicans. The economy created a robust 248,000 jobs in September and <u><strong>the official unemployment rate fell to 5.9 percent</u></strong> from 6.1 percent the month before, the Labor Department reported. <u><strong>That’s welcome news for US workers, and in political terms, <mark>such signs of economic improvement tend to buoy the party that controls the White House.</mark> </u></strong>But despite a string of solid job reports in recent months, the state of the economy is, at best, providing modest support to Democrats in key races. <u><strong><mark>Far from assuring that Democrats can retain their narrow control of the Senate, the improving job market</mark> <mark>is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>helping them to stay in the</u></strong></mark> election <u><strong><mark>game.</mark> </u></strong>Republicans need a net gain of six Senate seats to take charge. President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark>, seeking to help his party, <u><strong><mark>is doing his best to capitalize on the job market’s improvement.</mark> </u></strong>“When I took office, businesses were laying off 800,000 Americans a month. Today, our businesses are hiring 200,000 Americans a month,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, in a speech at Northwestern University near Chicago. A political challenge, however, is that the economy still isn’t nearly as strong as Americans would like – and the president’s popularity is also suffering from other factors – like handling of foreign policy – that have nothing to do with the economy. Although unemployment has fallen sharply from its post-recession high of about 10 percent, the total share of Americans who have jobs has recovered only modestly – to 59 percent of adults, down from about 63 percent just before the recession. Part of that reflects the demographics of the baby boom, as more Americans are hitting retirement age. But it also reflects an economy where many potential workers aren’t optimistic enough to even look for work. Those on the sidelines aren’t counted in the official unemployment rate. Wage growth has also been disappointing, barely keeping pace with inflation. The president acknowledged the challenge in his speech. He said it’s “indisputable that millions of Americans don’t yet feel enough of the benefits of a growing economy where it matters most – and that's in their own lives.” And the positive tone of the September jobs report (many economists didn’t expect the unemployment rate to drop below 6 percent), doesn’t mean the economy is about to shift into high gear. Members of the National Association for Business Economics, in a new survey, expect the annualized pace of economic growth to come in at 3 percent for the remainder of 2014 and 2.9 percent for 2015, after notching 3.1 percent last year. All that hints at why it’s hard for Democrats to run as the party of economic recovery. That doesn’t mean gains in the job market are meaningless for the election, though. Democratic <u><strong><mark>incumbents</u></strong> <u><strong>like</u></strong></mark> Sen. Jeanne <u><strong><mark>Shaheen</u></strong></mark> in New Hampshire <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> Sen. Kay <u><strong><mark>Hagan</u></strong></mark> in North Carolina <u><strong><mark>would probably be having a tougher time</mark> if it weren’t for lower-than-average unemployment</u></strong> (4.4 percent in New Hampshire as of August) <u><strong>or significant improvement</u></strong> (unemployment has fallen in North Carolina from 8.8 percent at the start of 2013 to 6.8 percent in August). <u><strong><mark>In both those states, the Democrats have an edge in recent polls.</mark> <mark>The</mark> same <mark>dynamics</mark> also <mark>may </mark>be supporting Democrats</u></strong> who are behind in the polls – <u><strong>helping to <mark>keep</mark> their <mark>hopes alive in places like Arkansas</u></strong>,</mark> even though the political terrain favors Republicans.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Plan is repugnant to the electorate

Thaler 9

Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter

allowing the buying and selling of organs is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. it’s a political nonstarter

Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.

<h4><strong>Plan is repugnant to the electorate</h4><p>Thaler 9</strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u><strong>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market <mark>allowing the buying and selling of organs</u></strong></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. <u><strong>The idea may have some merit, but it <mark>is spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many <u><strong><mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><strong><mark>they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></strong></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><strong><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys</u></strong>.</mark> These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, <u><strong>whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <mark>it’s a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Democrats get blamed

Cook ’10 , 6/28

Cook ’10 Political Reporter (Charlie, Democratic Buckaroos Trying To Hold On, National Journal, 4/24/14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/democratic-buckaroos-trying-to-hold-on-20100424, 6/28

The report depicts an American electorate that is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and Congress. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power. Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.

The American electorate is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and Congress this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.

The report, based on four recent Pew national surveys, depicts an American electorate that is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful. Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country; 47 percent say that government threatens their personal rights and freedoms; and only 43 percent say they would like to see their member of Congress re-elected this fall, a record low. Voters were happy to dislodge Republicans from their congressional majorities in 2006 and from the White House in 2008. And this same electorate is threatening to throw out the House's Democratic majority this year. A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. Deeper in the report is a table comparing current attitudes, captured in Pew's survey of 1,001 Americans taken April 1-5, with those found in Pew polls taken in July 1994 and October 2006, the last years that election "waves" remade the national political landscape. In July 1994, a little more than three months before Democrats lost both the House and Senate, Congress had an overall job-approval rating of 53 percent. In October 2006, the month before Republicans lost both chambers, just 41 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Congress. Earlier this month, Congress's favorable rating was an abysmal 25 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP scored a favorable rating of just 37 percent in the recent Pew survey. Some Democrats find considerable solace in the fact that voters don't like Republicans much. Yet their own party's favorable rating was just 38 percent, a mere point higher. (In a recent Gallup Poll, Democrats had a 41 percent favorable rating, putting them 1 point lower than Republicans.) The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. First, it took Republicans six or eight years to destroy their party's brand; it took Democrats less than 18 months to trash theirs. More important, we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and both chambers of Congress. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them. The GOP will have to deal with its problems by 2012. But this year? Not so much. A larger Pew survey of 2,070 registered voters conducted March 11-21 found the parties tied at 44 percent in the generic congressional ballot test, in which voters were asked whether they intend to vote for the Republican or Democratic House candidate in their district. During those same two weeks, Gallup's tracking poll of registered voters found Democrats ahead by 2 or 3 percentage points -- 47 percent to 45 or 44 percent. The past three weeks of Gallup tracking produced similarly close numbers in response to the generic ballot question. However, Democrats should be extremely worried about the fact that midterm electorates are almost always older and whiter -- meaning, more Republican -- than the electorates in presidential contests. And this year, Republicans are showing much greater intensity and enthusiasm than Democrats. So, even if the parties are running neck and neck among registered voters on Election Day, Republicans would come out ahead in the popular vote and very likely the House seat count. Simply put, this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power. Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.

<h4>Democrats get blamed </h4><p><strong>Cook ’10</strong> Political Reporter (Charlie, Democratic Buckaroos Trying To Hold On, National Journal, 4/24/14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/democratic-buckaroos-trying-to-hold-on-20100424<u><strong>, 6/28</p><p><mark>The</mark> report</u></strong>, based on four recent Pew national surveys, <u><strong>depicts an <mark>American electorate</mark> that <mark>is angry and suspicious, fearful and vengeful.</mark> <mark>Sixty-five percent of respondents say that Congress is having a negative effect on the country</u></strong></mark>; 47 percent say that government threatens their personal rights and freedoms; and only 43 percent say they would like to see their member of Congress re-elected this fall, a record low. Voters were happy to dislodge Republicans from their congressional majorities in 2006 and from the White House in 2008. And this same electorate is threatening to throw out the House's Democratic majority this year. <u><strong>A party in power these days seems like a rodeo cowboy riding a bucking bronco -- just trying to hang on. </u></strong>Deeper in the report is a table comparing current attitudes, captured in Pew's survey of 1,001 Americans taken April 1-5, with those found in Pew polls taken in July 1994 and October 2006, the last years that election "waves" remade the national political landscape. In July 1994, a little more than three months before Democrats lost both the House and Senate, Congress had an overall job-approval rating of 53 percent. In October 2006, the month before Republicans lost both chambers, just 41 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Congress. Earlier this month, Congress's favorable rating was an abysmal 25 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP scored a favorable rating of just 37 percent in the recent Pew survey. Some Democrats find considerable solace in the fact that voters don't like Republicans much. Yet their own party's favorable rating was just 38 percent, a mere point higher. (In a recent Gallup Poll, Democrats had a 41 percent favorable rating, putting them 1 point lower than Republicans.) <u><strong>The fact that the two parties are seen as equally unattractive also might comfort some Democrats, but only if they ignore two realities. </u></strong>First, it took Republicans six or eight years to destroy their party's brand; it took Democrats less than 18 months to trash theirs. More important, <u><strong><mark>we have never seen a midterm election turn into a referendum on a party that had no power. Midterm elections are all about the party in power, particularly when that party controls the White House and</u></strong></mark> both chambers of<u><strong> <mark>Congress</mark>. The Republican Party has a plethora of problems, but this election will not be about them</u></strong>. The GOP will have to deal with its problems by 2012. But this year? Not so much. A larger Pew survey of 2,070 registered voters conducted March 11-21 found the parties tied at 44 percent in the generic congressional ballot test, in which voters were asked whether they intend to vote for the Republican or Democratic House candidate in their district. During those same two weeks, Gallup's tracking poll of registered voters found Democrats ahead by 2 or 3 percentage points -- 47 percent to 45 or 44 percent. The past three weeks of Gallup tracking produced similarly close numbers in response to the generic ballot question. However, Democrats should be extremely worried about the fact that midterm electorates are almost always older and whiter -- meaning, more Republican -- than the electorates in presidential contests. And this year, Republicans are showing much greater intensity and enthusiasm than Democrats. So, even if the parties are running neck and neck among registered voters on Election Day, Republicans would come out ahead in the popular vote and very likely the House seat count. Simply put, <u><strong><mark>this is a lousy time to be the party holding all the power</mark>. <mark>Democrats can expect that voters will make them bear the brunt of the blame for everything that the people think is wrong with the country.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs

The Hill, 9/6

The Hill, 9/6

Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan blamed Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources , vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands. That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year

Sullivan blamed Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix He added that the E P A are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands That could all change if voters put Republicans in charge If Republicans win the Senate he GOP will make energy a priority Republicans will block the administration's carbon pollution proposal and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize

[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE] Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan (Alaska) blamed President Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources in the party's weekly address, vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands." That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. "A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," Sullivan said. “We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine," he added. Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.

<h4><strong>GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs</h4><p>The Hill, 9/6</p><p></strong>[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE]</p><p><u><strong>Republican Senate candidate Dan <mark>Sullivan</u></strong></mark> (Alaska) <u><strong><mark>blamed</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources</u></strong></mark> in the party's weekly address<u><strong>, <mark>vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix</u></strong></mark>. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "<u><strong>The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law</u></strong>," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. <u><strong><mark>He added that the E</mark>nvironmental <mark>P</mark>rotection <mark>A</mark>gency, and Washington, D.C., <mark>are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands</mark>.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>That could all change</mark>, he explains, <mark>if voters put</mark> him, and fellow <mark>Republicans in charge</u></strong></mark>. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." <u><strong><mark>If Republicans win the Senate</mark> in November, Sullivan says t<mark>he GOP will make energy a priority</mark>. </u></strong>"<u><strong>A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally,"</u></strong> Sullivan said. “<u><strong>We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine</u></strong>," he added. <u><strong><mark>Republicans</mark> won't stop there, they <mark>will</mark> also work to <mark>block the administration's carbon pollution proposal</mark> for existing power plants, <mark>and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize</mark> by next year</u></strong>. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

EPA regs curb warming and motivate other countries

Washington Post, 8/26

Washington Post, 8/26 [Washington Post Editorial Board, “A climate for change: The EPA’s limits on emissions are important but not enough” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-climate-for-change-the-epas-limits-on-emissions-are-important-but-not-enough/2014/08/26/f47fa828-2a4b-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html, CBE]

President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb greenhouse-gas emissions from cars, trucks and — most controversially — power plants, the biggest national emitters McConnell has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces. EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit the EPA proposed in June a rule that would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 2030 The central criticism is that these rules , will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures But critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over Even if the EPA’s reckoning is significantly off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without even considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.

President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb g h -g emissions from cars, trucks and power plants McConnell has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate. the EPA proposed a rule would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 203 critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over Even if the EPA’s reckoning is off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.

THE COUNTRY is about to see its fiercest climate-change battle. After years of congressional inaction, President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb greenhouse-gas emissions from cars, trucks and — most controversially — power plants, the biggest national emitters. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate. Mr. Obama’s executive actions will be an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. The EPA has drawn up the best possible policy framework under current law, and it is much better than nothing. Congress should not weaken the rules. But lawmakers could significantly improve on them. The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces. First, the EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos, in the process cutting their carbon emissions in half. Second, the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit, virtually guaranteeing that no more conventional coal-fired plants will be built in the United States. Third, the EPA proposed in June a rule that would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 2030. The central criticism is that these rules, particularly the third, will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures. But critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions, and the EPA figures that its power plant rule, which gives utilities many years to comply, will peak at about $9 billion per year in 2011 dollars. That’s a relative pittance in an economy that’s nearly $17 trillion and growing. In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over. Even if the EPA’s reckoning is significantly off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without even considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.

<h4><strong>EPA regs curb warming and motivate other countries</h4><p>Washington Post, 8/26</p><p></strong>[Washington Post Editorial Board, “A climate for change: The EPA’s limits on emissions are important but not enough” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-climate-for-change-the-epas-limits-on-emissions-are-important-but-not-enough/2014/08/26/f47fa828-2a4b-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html<u><strong>, CBE]</p><p></u></strong>THE COUNTRY is about to see its fiercest climate-change battle. After years of congressional inaction, <u><strong><mark>President Obama’s Environmental Protection Agency is applying new rules to curb g</mark>reen<mark>h</mark>ouse<mark>-g</mark>as<mark> emissions from cars, trucks and</mark> — most controversially — <mark>power plants</mark>, the biggest national emitters</u></strong>. Senate Minority Leader Mitch <u><strong><mark>McConnell</u></strong></mark> (R-Ky.) <u><strong><mark>has said he will try to restrict the EPA if Republicans take over the Senate</u></strong>.</mark> Mr. Obama’s executive actions will be an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. The EPA has drawn up the best possible policy framework under current law, and it is much better than nothing. Congress should not weaken the rules. But lawmakers could significantly improve on them. <u><strong>The Obama administration’s plan has three pieces.</u></strong> First, the <u><strong>EPA has persuaded carmakers to nearly double the fuel efficiency of U.S. autos</u></strong>, in the process cutting their carbon emissions in half. Second, <u><strong>the EPA placed limits on the carbon dioxide that new power plants can emit</u></strong>, virtually guaranteeing that no more conventional coal-fired plants will be built in the United States. Third, <u><strong><mark>the EPA proposed</mark> in June <mark>a rule</mark> that <mark>would restrict the emissions of existing power plants, cutting their carbon emissions by 30 percent by 203</mark>0</u></strong>. <u><strong>The central criticism is that these rules</u></strong>, particularly the third<u><strong>, will exact extreme costs on the economy without reversing the rise in global temperatures</u></strong>. <u><strong>But <mark>critics have been citing high-cost estimates based on faulty assumptions</u></strong></mark>, and the EPA figures that its power plant rule, which gives utilities many years to comply, will peak at about $9 billion per year in 2011 dollars. That’s a relative pittance in an economy that’s nearly $17 trillion and growing. <u><strong><mark>In return, the EPA projects health and climate benefits outstripping costs many times over</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even if the EPA’s reckoning is </mark>significantly <mark>off, the regulations will do more good than harm — without </mark>even <mark>considering their importance in motivating other countries to act.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Causes extinction

Speth 2008

Speth 2008

the Edge of the World, pg. 26] The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to positive" feedback effects Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could be reduced Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet warms and changes. Finally, the earth's albedo, the reflectivity of the earth's surface, is slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect Our home planet is now dangerously near a 'tipping point.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet.

The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to positive" feedback effects , the land's ability to store carbon could weaken , carbon sinks in the oceans could be reduced , methane could be released from bogs, wetlands, and permafrost as the planet warms , the earth's albedo, is reduced as large areas covered by ice diminish these effects make warming self-reinforcing, Our planet is dangerously near a 'tipping point If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet

[James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @ the Edge of the World, pg. 26] The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"positive" feedback effects where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could also be reduced due to ocean warming and other factors. Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet warms and changes. Finally, the earth's albedo, the reflectivity of the earth's surface, is slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "Our home planet is now dangerously near a 'tipping point.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet.

<h4><strong>Causes extinction</h4><p>Speth 2008 </p><p></strong>[James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @<u><strong> the Edge of the World, pg. 26]</p><p><mark>The possibility of</mark> <mark>abrupt climate change is linked to</u></strong></mark> what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"<u><strong><mark>positive" feedback effects</u></strong></mark> where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. <u><strong>Several of these feedbacks are possible. First<mark>, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken</u></strong></mark>. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. <u><strong>Second<mark>, carbon sinks in the oceans could</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>be reduced</u></strong></mark> due to ocean warming and other factors. <u><strong>Third<mark>,</mark> the potent greenhouse gas <mark>methane could be released from </mark>peat <mark>bogs, wetlands, and </mark>thawing <mark>permafrost</mark>, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, <mark>as the planet warms </mark>and changes. Finally<mark>, the earth's albedo,</mark> the reflectivity of the earth's surface, <mark>is </mark>slated to be <mark>reduced as large areas </mark>now <mark>covered by ice </mark>and snow <mark>diminish</mark> or are covered by meltwater. All <mark>these effects </mark>would tend to <mark>make warming self-reinforcing,</mark> possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect</u></strong>. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "<u><strong><mark>Our </mark>home <mark>planet is </mark>now <mark>dangerously near a 'tipping point</mark>.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet</u></strong>, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "<u><strong>This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” <mark>If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet</mark>,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, <mark>and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely

Dillard-Wright 12

Dillard-Wright 12

, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries the Journal of the American Medical Association JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants had sold a kidney to pay off debts The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization At an average elapsed time most families reported worsened economic conditions with annual incomes dropping pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and infectious disease As the use of live kidney donors has moved to areas of high risk in the developing world surgeons have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people Such motives instrumentalize the poor turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering” misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects If the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views all conditions as treatable classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation including those over 70 years This new category of patients does not stand to benefit from transplantation because their conditions make rejection likely As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and labor are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore realities faced by sellers kidney face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and disease surgeons become complicit in suffering of a hidden population Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an exacerbation of already unjust global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs for first-world people motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans subjects the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views all conditions as treatable the world’s most vulnerable are asked to surrender their bodies so the elite can have longer, more comfortable lives

David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

<h4>Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely <strong> </h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p>Very few studies have been made in</u></strong> order <u><strong>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u></strong>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u><strong>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u></strong> (<u><strong>JAMA</u></strong>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u><strong>study found that nearly all of the study participants</u></strong> (96%) <u><strong>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u></strong> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u><strong>At an average elapsed time</u></strong> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u><strong>most families reported worsened economic conditions </u></strong>since the surgery, <u><strong>with annual incomes dropping</u></strong> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u><strong>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u></strong> <u><strong>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u><strong>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u></strong>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances,<u><strong> to areas of high risk in the developing world</u></strong>, transplant <u><strong><mark>surgeons</u></strong></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u><strong>have <mark>become complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><strong><mark>Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>arising from </mark>the <mark>ulterior motive of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such <mark>motives instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportunity</u></strong></mark>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u><strong>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></strong></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><strong><mark>the recipient side</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>towards medicine</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>that views</u></strong></mark> any and<u><strong> <mark>all conditions as treatable</u></strong></mark>, and now new <u><strong>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong> “<u><strong>those over 70 years</u></strong>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u><strong>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u></strong> much <u><strong>from transplantation</u></strong> <u><strong>because</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> ages and medical <u><strong>conditions make rejection likely</u></strong>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. <u><strong>As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>labor</u></strong> and environmental standards <u><strong>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u></strong>n, <u><strong><mark>the world’s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world’s <mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer, more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u><strong>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u></strong>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare

Robinson 12

Andrew Robinson 12, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2

Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism Regimes based on symbolic exchange are replaced by regimes based on equivalence Ceremony gives way to spectacle Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. What is fatal to it is reversibility Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’ . Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system This is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed Death plays a central role what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms , but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value which returns things to a state of indeterminacy Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies” This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, It creates a split between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us Symbolic exchange is based on a game, When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination

Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. symbolic exchange are replaced by equivalence It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. this is bound to fail. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with radical difference. Gift-exchange is radically subversive because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to the dominant system we have lost the ability to engage in exchanges with death Death should not be seen in purely literal terms. but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and value metamorphosis, reversibility as well as physical death biological death is an idealist illusion the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women The original exclusion was of the dead This first split and exclusion forms the basis for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. This requires an idea of death as an end counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. The internalisation of the idea of the subject alienates us It individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. we still ‘exchange’ with the dead We no longer have living relationships with objects They are reduced to the instrumental “We all” become dead The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. death becomes unintelligible This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. People are killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant

Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination.

<h4>This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare </h4><p>Andrew <strong>Robinson 12</strong>, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2</p><p><u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange</mark> </u></strong>– or rather, its <u><strong><mark>suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism</u></strong>.</mark> Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. <u><strong>Regimes based on <mark>symbolic exchange</u></strong></mark> (differences are exchangeable and related) <u><strong><mark>are replaced by</mark> regimes based on <mark>equivalence</u></strong></mark> (everything is, or means, the same). <u><strong>Ceremony gives way to spectacle</u></strong>, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. <u><strong>Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. <mark>It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same.</mark> Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.</u></strong> <u><strong>To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value.</u></strong> This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death.</mark> Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation</u></strong>. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). <u><strong>But <mark>this is bound to fail.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death.</mark> Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly</u></strong>. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. <u><strong>And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity</u></strong> – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes <u><strong>desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic.</u></strong> Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. <u><strong>What is fatal to it is</u></strong>, rather, <u><strong>reversibility</u></strong>. <u><strong>Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed</u></strong>. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. <u><strong>The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead</u></strong>. <u><strong>Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’</u></strong>, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder<u><strong>. <mark>Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with</mark> monstrosity, with <mark>radical difference. </mark>The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups</u></strong>. But for Baudrillard, <u><strong>it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange</u></strong>. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. <u><strong><mark>Gift-exchange is radically subversive</mark> of the system</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is</u></strong> not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is <u><strong><mark>because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to</mark> that of <mark>the dominant system</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at</u></strong> <u><strong>bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed</u></strong>, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death <u><strong>Death plays a central role</u></strong> in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>what <mark>we have lost </mark>above all in the transition to alienated society is <mark>the ability to engage in exchanges with death</mark>. <mark>Death should not be seen</mark> here <mark>in purely literal terms</u>.</strong></mark> Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body<u><strong>, <mark>but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and</mark> of <mark>value</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>which returns things to a state of indeterminacy</u></strong>. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. <u><strong>Death refers to <mark>metamorphosis, reversibility</mark>, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, <mark>as well as physical death</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify.</u></strong> Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the west’s idea of a <mark>biological</mark>, material <mark>death is</mark> actually <mark>an idealist illusion</mark>, ignoring the sociality of death.</u></strong> Poststructuralists generally maintain that <u><strong><mark>the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions</u></strong></mark>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, </mark>confining particular groups – <mark>the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women </mark>and so on – to particular segregated situations</u></strong>. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. <u><strong><mark>The original exclusion was of the dead</mark> – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This first split and exclusion forms the basis</mark>, or archetype, <mark>for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This <mark>discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death</mark>. </u></strong>Baudrillard suggests that <u><strong><mark>death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine</u></strong> which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. <u><strong>The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity</u></strong>. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. <u><strong><mark>This requires an idea of death as an end</mark>. It is <mark>counterposed to the immortality of social institutions.</u></strong></mark> In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. <u><strong>Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. <mark>The internalisation of the idea of the subject</mark> or the soul <mark>alienates us</mark> from our bodies,</u></strong> voices and so on. <u><strong>It creates a split</u></strong>, as Stirner would say, <u><strong>between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others</mark>.</u></strong> The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. <u><strong>The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In the case of death, <mark>we still ‘exchange’ with the dead</mark> through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. <mark>We no longer have living</mark>, mortal <mark>relationships with objects </mark>either. <mark>They are reduced to the instrumental</mark>. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us</u></strong>. <u><strong>Symbolic exchange is based on a game,</u></strong> with game-like rules. <u><strong>When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc</u></strong>e. <u><strong>Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development</u></strong>. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. <mark>“We all” become dead</mark>, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. <mark>The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.</mark> <mark>Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited</mark>. <mark>The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life</mark>. <mark>People are compelled to survive so as to become useful.</u></strong></mark> For Baudrillard, <u><strong>capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production</u></strong>, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. <u><strong>In modern societies, <mark>death </mark>is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society.</u></strong> For example, elderly people are excluded from society. <u><strong>People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it <mark>becomes unintelligible</u></strong></mark>. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. <u><strong>Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. <mark>This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. </mark>The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it.</u></strong> Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, <u><strong>murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.</u></strong> Baudrillard sees <u><strong>this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies</u></strong>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>there is not a social improvement here. <mark>People are </mark>effectively being<mark> killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, <u><strong>even when <mark>capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant</mark>, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette</u></strong>. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. <u><strong>The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination</u></strong>.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Our alternative is a refusal to affirm the 1AC -- The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive life which is the underlying cause of violence

Meilaender 6

Gilbert Meilaender 6, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)

Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us each person’s life as irreplaceable These feelings fuel the belief that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant the feelings of urgency and desperation make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling or we could ease the general demand for oil We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline altering our lives there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but would entail accepting certain limits on how we live when the subject is organ transplantation we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs We look for “opportunities for action.” If we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine we might be less pressured to think of an organ shortage Alongside our desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human Each of us is unique and irreplaceable But each of us shares in the limits of our finite condition we are mortals The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying We should not deny the existential anguish we should not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism To refuse to acknowledge that truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment recognition of our mortality ought to elicit caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease as long as one irreplaceable person dies there will always be an organ shortage that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade we make death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs we may be able to think again of the price we would pay to increase the supply of organs If our problem is fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem But there are deeper reasons at work we pay a considerable price if we seize upon means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by Forget the issue that arises whether some kind of market could be morally acceptable For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person simply as the sum total of these parts 8+

These feelings fuel the belief it is imperative to make organs available the feelings of urgency and desperation make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline In the face of shortage, we could permit drilling or modify our desires in a way that we no longer think of a shortage accepting certain limits on how we live we only search for ways to procure organs We look for action Alongside our desperation at impending death our tendency to see death as an evil to be combated we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human each of us shares in the limits of our finite condition we are mortals The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying We should not deny existential anguish we should not deny the each of our names will find its place in the syllogism To refuse to acknowledge that would turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued by a “shortage” of cures for a deadly ailment The survival of society is not threatened there will always be an organ shortage that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured we undermine wisdom and care if we think of death as only a problem which it is imperative we solve Freed of the imperative to secure organs we may be able to think again

Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure, and if his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us to honor each person’s life as unique and irreplaceable (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. These quite natural feelings fuel the belief, widely shared in our society, that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant; however, the same feelings of urgency and desperation also make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general. To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling in heretofore protected lands or we could ease the general demand for oil by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline, altering the pattern of our lives. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in such a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but they would entail accepting certain limits on how we live. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, when the subject is organ transplantation, we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs. We look, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, for “opportunities for action.” If, however, we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine, we might be less pressured to think in terms of an organ shortage. Alongside our natural desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced, alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated, we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human. Each of us is unique and irreplaceable; that is true. But each of us also shares in the limits of our finite condition; we are mortals. “The receiving of an organ does not,” as William F. May once put it, “rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. We should not deny the existential anguish; we should also not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism. To refuse to acknowledge that second truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and recognition of our mortality ought to elicit similar caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, as long as one irreplaceable person dies whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, there will always be an organ shortage. From another angle, that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make of death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only or primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Recovering the Meaning of the Body Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs, we may be able to think again of the price we would pay — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — to increase the supply of organs for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. If our problem is thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem. But if there are deeper reasons at work, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, we pay a considerable price if we seize upon certain means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. Perhaps, then, we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by. Forget the issue that arises farther along the way, whether some kind of market in bodily organs could be morally acceptable. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person (from below) simply as the sum total of these parts. 8+. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.

<h4><strong>Our alternative is a refusal to affirm the 1AC -- The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive life which is the underlying cause of violence </h4><p></strong>Gilbert <strong>Meilaender 6</strong>, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)</p><p><u><strong>Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure</u></strong>, and if <u><strong>his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney</u></strong> but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. <u><strong>We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us</u></strong> to honor <u><strong>each person’s life as</u></strong> unique and <u><strong>irreplaceable</u></strong> (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. <u><strong><mark>These</u></strong></mark> quite natural<u><strong> <mark>feelings</mark> <mark>fuel the belief</u></strong></mark>, widely shared in our society, <u><strong>that <mark>it is imperative to make</mark> more <mark>organs available</mark> for transplant</u></strong>; however, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> same <u><strong><mark>feelings of urgency and desperation</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system</mark> in general</u></strong>. <u><strong>To take a very different example, <mark>we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline</u></strong></mark> in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. <u><strong><mark>In the face of</mark> such a <mark>shortage, we could permit drilling</u></strong></mark> in heretofore protected lands <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>we could ease the general demand for oil</u></strong> by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. <u><strong>We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline</u></strong>, <u><strong>altering</u></strong> the pattern of <u><strong>our lives</u></strong>. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And <u><strong>there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to <mark>modify our desires</u></strong> <u><strong>in</u></strong></mark> such <u><strong><mark>a way that we no longer</mark> <mark>think</mark> in terms <mark>of a shortage</mark>, but</u></strong> they <u><strong>would</u></strong> <u><strong>entail <mark>accepting certain limits on how we live</u></strong></mark>. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, <u><strong>when the subject is organ transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>attend <mark>only</mark> to the <mark>search for</mark> new <mark>ways to procure organs</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>We look</u></strong></mark>, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, <u><strong><mark>for</mark> “opportunities for <mark>action</mark>.”</u> <u>If</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine</u></strong>, <u><strong>we might be less pressured</u></strong> <u><strong>to think</u></strong> in terms <u><strong>of an organ shortage</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Alongside our</u></strong></mark> natural <u><strong><mark>desperation at</mark> the <mark>impending death</mark> of one who cannot be replaced</u></strong>, <u><strong>alongside <mark>our</mark> natural <mark>tendency to see death as an evil to be combated</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Each of us is unique and irreplaceable</u></strong>; that is true. <u><strong>But <mark>each of us</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>shares in the limits of our finite condition</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we are mortals</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>The</u></strong> <u><strong>receiving of an organ does not</u></strong></mark>,” as William F. May once put it, “<u><strong><mark>rescue the living from the need to die</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying</u></strong></mark>.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. <u><strong><mark>We should not deny</mark> the <mark>existential anguish</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we should</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>not deny the</mark> homely truth that <mark>each of our names</mark> can and <mark>will find its place in the syllogism</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>To refuse to acknowledge that</u></strong></mark> second <u><strong>truth <mark>would turn medicine into</mark> nothing more than <mark>a crusade against death</u></strong>, <u><strong>plagued</mark> constantly <mark>by a “shortage” of cures for</mark> one or <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>deadly ailment</u></strong></mark>. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and <u><strong>recognition of our mortality ought to elicit</u></strong> similar <u><strong>caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant</u></strong>. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. <u><strong><mark>The survival of society is not threatened</mark> when we do not conquer disease</u></strong>, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, <u><strong>as long as one irreplaceable person dies</u></strong> whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, <u><strong><mark>there will always be an organ shortage</u></strong></mark>. From another angle, <u><strong><mark>that is just the truth of the human condition.</u></strong> <u><strong>If we turn organ procurement into a crusade</u></strong>, <u><strong>we make</u></strong></mark> of <u><strong><mark>death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured</u></strong></mark> as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> will <mark>undermine</mark> the needed <mark>wisdom and care</mark> <mark>if we think of</mark> this person’s <mark>death as</u></strong> <u><strong>only</u></strong></mark> or <u><strong>primarily <mark>a problem which it is imperative</mark> that <mark>we solve</mark>. </u></strong>Recovering the Meaning of the Body <u><strong><mark>Freed of the</mark> sense that we are under some <mark>imperative to secure</mark> more <mark>organs</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we</mark> <mark>may be able to think again</mark> of the price we would pay</u></strong> — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — <u><strong>to increase the supply of organs</u></strong> for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. <u><strong>If our problem is</u></strong> thoughtlessness, selfishness, <u><strong>fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem</u></strong>. <u><strong>But</u></strong> if <u><strong>there are deeper reasons at work</u></strong>, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, <u><strong>we pay a considerable price if we seize upon</u></strong> certain <u><strong>means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. </u></strong>Perhaps, then, <u><strong>we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by</u></strong>. <u><strong>Forget the issue that arises</u></strong> farther along the way, <u><strong>whether some kind of market</u></strong> in bodily organs <u><strong>could be morally acceptable</u></strong>. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. <u><strong>For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person</u></strong> (from below) <u><strong>simply as the sum total of these parts</u></strong>. <u><strong>8+</u></strong>. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.</p>

1NC

1NC OFF CASE

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Organ shortage is exaggerated

McArdle 88

McArdle 88 (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz

Proponents would have the general public believe that there is a severe and growing shortage of human organs for clinical use. Available statistics, however, suggest a different situation. the actual picture is more complex. From 2 to 5 percent of the waiting list numbers are multiple listings for the same individuals The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list the primary concern is for the approximately 4,000 individuals who died without receiving a suitable organ. This is a more manageable number. relatively minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs from existing donors could easily solve this aspect of the problem

Proponents would have the public believe there is a shortage of organs Available statistics suggest a different situation the actual picture is more complex 5 percent are multiple listings for the same individuals The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list 4,000 individuals died without receiving a organ. This is a more manageable number minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs solve the problem

Proponents of xenotransplantation would have the general public believe that there is a severe and growing shortage of human organs for clinical use. Available statistics, however, suggest a different situation. Although routinely citing the total number of people on the U.S. organ waiting list (more than 50,000) and the number that died waiting (4,022 in 1996), the actual picture is more complex. From 2 to 5 percent of the waiting list numbers are multiple listings for the same individuals, with 69 percent (down from 87 percent in 1988) of those remaining needing new kidneys. Any significant increase in numbers of organ donors should easily accommodate all of the non-kidney transplant patients and eventually everyone. The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list, although its sheer size is often used to create a sense of urgency among supporters of xenotransplantation. As a nation, the primary concern is for the approximately 4,000 individuals who died without receiving a suitable organ. This is a more manageable number. In fact, relatively minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs from existing donors could easily solve this aspect of the problem.

<h4>Organ shortage is exaggerated</h4><p><strong>McArdle 88</strong> (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Proponents</u></strong></mark> of xenotransplantation <u><strong><mark>would have the</mark> general <mark>public believe</mark> that <mark>there is a</mark> severe and growing <mark>shortage of</mark> human <mark>organs</mark> for clinical use. <mark>Available statistics</mark>, however, <mark>suggest a different situation</mark>. </u></strong>Although routinely citing the total number of people on the U.S. organ waiting list (more than 50,000) and the number that died waiting (4,022 in 1996), <u><strong><mark>the actual picture is more complex</mark>. From 2 to <mark>5 percent </mark>of the waiting list numbers <mark>are multiple listings for the same individuals</u></strong></mark>, with 69 percent (down from 87 percent in 1988) of those remaining needing new kidneys. Any significant increase in numbers of organ donors should easily accommodate all of the non-kidney transplant patients and eventually everyone. <u><strong><mark>The real problem is not all of the people on the waiting list</u></strong></mark>, although its sheer size is often used to create a sense of urgency among supporters of xenotransplantation. As a nation, <u><strong>the primary concern is for the approximately <mark>4,000 individuals</mark> who <mark>died without receiving a</mark> suitable <mark>organ. This is a more manageable number</mark>. </u></strong>In fact, <u><strong>relatively <mark>minor increases in donations and better recovery of organs</mark> from existing donors could easily <mark>solve</mark> this aspect of <mark>the problem</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC

1NC CASE

1NC Case -- Scarcity

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Status quo solves scarcity

Griggs 14

Griggs 14 (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz

3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs 3-D printers because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models. 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants The process already is seeing some success a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue

3-D printers may be spitting out human organs printers can reproduce the vascular systems printed organs could be used for drug testing, freeing researchers from tests on animals printers could produce organs for transplants a 2-year-old received a windpipe built with her stem cells a foundation announced a prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver Organovo has built models of kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue

The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food. Soon, however, 3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs. For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult. Enter 3-D printers, which because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing. "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long." The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models. Then there's the hope that 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis." An 'exciting new area of medicine' Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues. The process already is seeing some success. Last year a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness. "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee. "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen." To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver. One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days. Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue, he said. "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."

<h4>Status quo solves scarcity </h4><p><strong>Griggs 14</strong> (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz</p><p>The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food. Soon, however, <u><strong><mark>3-D printers may be spitting out</mark> something far more complex, and controversial: <mark>human organs</u></strong></mark>. For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult. Enter <u><strong>3-D <mark>printers</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong>because of their precise process <mark>can reproduce the vascular systems</mark> required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue</u></strong>. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing. "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long." The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, <u><strong>bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic <mark>printed organs could be used for drug </mark>or vaccine <mark>testing, freeing researchers from</mark> less accurate methods such as <mark>tests on animals</mark> or on synthetic models. </u></strong>Then there's the hope that <u><strong>3-D <mark>printers could</mark> someday <mark>produce</mark> much-needed <mark>organs for transplants</u></strong></mark>. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis." An 'exciting new area of medicine' Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues. <u><strong>The process already is seeing some success</u></strong>. Last year <u><strong><mark>a 2-year-old</mark> girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, <mark>received a windpipe built with her</mark> own <mark>stem cells</mark>.</u></strong> The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness. "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee. "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen." To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, <u><strong><mark>a </mark>Virginia <mark>foundation</mark> that supports regenerative medicine research <mark>announced</mark> in December it will award <mark>a </mark>$1 million <mark>prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver</u></strong></mark>. One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, <u><strong>Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. </u></strong>The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days. <u><strong><mark>Organovo has</mark> also <mark>built models of</mark> human <mark>kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue</u></strong></mark>, he said. "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."</p>

1NC

1NC CASE

1NC Case -- Scarcity

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Tyranny of the gift is a simplistic view of ethics which justifies violence – prefer psychological studies

Hippen and Taylor 7

Hippen and Taylor 7 (Benjamin E Hipper, clinical associate professor of medicine at UNC Chapel Hill, JS Taylor, 2007, “In Defense of Transplantation: A Reply to Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” American Journal of Transplantation Volume 7 Issue 7)

Scheper-Hughes she has argued that the lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is a political act of considered resistance' against the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals. This is incompatible with empirical evidence which shows that the most important variable predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families is a lack of foreknowledge regarding the decedent's wishes and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[ Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage' given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships. it is unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in giving the 'gift of life' is only imbued with psychological indenture ////and resentment an approach more receptive to the complexity and ambiguity of the moral lives paints a picture of relationships slightly more diverse and textured than one of master and slave the scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity and more than fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them

Scheper-Hughes argued lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is resistance' This is incompatible with empirical evidence which shows the most important variable is a lack of foreknowledge Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships it is unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in the 'gift of life' is only indenture an approach more complex paints a picture more diverse than master and slave fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them

A conspicuous feature of Scheper-Hughes's criticisms is an indifference to countervailing arguments and evidence. For example, she has elsewhere argued that the lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is best explained as '...a political act of considered resistance',[3] (p. 66), against what she believes they see as the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals. This is incompatible with the empirical evidence that has been collected on the issue, which shows that the most important variable predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families is a lack of foreknowledge regarding the decedent's wishes[5,6] and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[7] Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage',[1] (p. 508), given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members',[1] (p. 508, italics ours), Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships. Moreover, it is simply unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in giving the 'gift of life' is only (or even often) imbued with psychological indenture ////and resentment. Instead, an approach more receptive to the raw complexity and ambiguity of the moral lives of thoughtful human beings paints a picture of relationships slightly more diverse and textured than one of master and slave.[8] In fact, the anthropologist and social scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity,[9] (p. 40), and more than fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them.[10]

<h4>Tyranny of the gift is a simplistic view of ethics which justifies violence – prefer psychological studies</h4><p><strong>Hippen and Taylor 7</strong> (Benjamin E Hipper, clinical associate professor of medicine at UNC Chapel Hill, JS Taylor, 2007, “In Defense of Transplantation: A Reply to Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” American Journal of Transplantation Volume 7 Issue 7)</p><p>A conspicuous feature of <u><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes</u></strong></mark>'s criticisms is an indifference to countervailing arguments and evidence. For example, <u><strong>she has</u></strong> elsewhere <u><strong><mark>argued</mark> that the <mark>lower rate of consent for deceased donation among Black and Hispanic families is</mark> </u></strong>best explained as '...<u><strong>a political act of considered <mark>resistance'</u></strong></mark>,[3] (p. 66), <u><strong>against</u></strong> what she believes they see as <u><strong>the oppressive hegemony of transplant professionals.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This is incompatible with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>empirical evidence</u></strong></mark> that has been collected on the issue, <u><strong><mark>which shows</mark> that <mark>the most important variable</mark> predicting a lack of consent for donation from Black and Hispanic families <mark>is a lack of foreknowledge</mark> regarding the decedent's wishes</u></strong>[5,6] <u><strong>and misconceptions regarding the financial burdens of consenting to deceased donation and the concept of brain-death.[</u></strong>7] <u><strong>Though she denies any meaningful moral difference between family bonds and 'family bondage'</u></strong>,[1] (p. 508), <u><strong>given that '...Families are often violent and predatory, as inclined to abuse and exploit as to protect and nurture their members</u></strong>',[1] (p. 508, italics ours), <u><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes offers no reason to accept this bleak view of human relationships</mark>.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>it is</u></strong></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>unjustified to hold that the inherent moral asymmetry involved in</mark> giving <mark>the 'gift of life' is only</u></strong></mark> (or even often) <u><strong>imbued with psychological <mark>indenture</mark> ////and resentment</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong><mark>an approach more</mark> receptive to the</u></strong> raw <u><strong><mark>complex</mark>ity and ambiguity of the moral lives</u></strong> of thoughtful human beings <u><strong><mark>paints a picture</mark> of relationships slightly <mark>more diverse</mark> and textured <mark>than</mark> one of <mark>master and slave</u></strong></mark>.[8] In fact, <u><strong>the</u></strong> anthropologist and social <u><strong>scientist who coined the term 'Tyranny of the Gift', emphasized and elucidated this diversity</u></strong>,[9] (p. 40), <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>more than <mark>fifty studies of psychosocial outcomes of living donors demonstrated either no change or a positive improvement in the psychological health of the vast majority of them</u></strong></mark>.[10]</p>

1NC

1NC CASE

1NC Case -- Tyranny of the Gift

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Only simulations of the acceptance of death result in any meaningful life affirmation

Razinsky 9

Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)

The sacrificer both destroys and survives. sacrifice is not subterfuge. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. There is no sacrifice,” “unless the one performing it identifies, , with the victim” otherness that is partly sameness, , meeting death is a need, and we must remain as spectators. , critical revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, to use Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. . We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every limited meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts, the mediation of the intellect , and life is felt at its fullest. intimacy: moments of excess and fusion of beings Survival, , has a price. It limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. not so much a negation of life, as an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things rejected. the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life The need for duration,” “conceals life from us to meet death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human.

The sacrificer both destroys and survives. . Sacrifice burns like a sun, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. , meeting death we remain as spectators. revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice brings together life in its fullness and annihilation “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts life is felt at its fullest. Survival limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life to meet death is necessary if life is to have value, and is what makes us human.

Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.

<h4>Only simulations of the acceptance of death result in any meaningful life affirmation </h4><p><strong>Razinsky 9</strong> (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)</p><p>Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). <u><strong><mark>The sacrificer both destroys and survives. </u></strong></mark>Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that <u><strong>sacrifice is not</u></strong> a simulacrum, not a mere <u><strong>subterfuge. </u></strong>In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators<mark>.<u><strong> Sacrifice burns like a sun, </mark>spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, </u></strong>and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). <u><strong><mark>We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. </u></strong></mark>Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “<u><strong>There is no sacrifice,” </u></strong>writes Denis Hollier,<u><strong> “unless the one performing it identifies, </u></strong>in the end<u><strong>, with the victim”</u></strong> (166). Thus it is through identification, through <u><strong>otherness that is partly sameness, </u></strong>that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly<u><strong><mark>, meeting death </mark>is a need, </u></strong>not uncalled-for. We must meet death,<u><strong> and <mark>we </mark>must <mark>remain as spectators. </u></strong></mark>Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved<u><strong>,</u></strong> accompanied by the <u><strong>critical <mark>revaluation of values</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.”</u></strong></mark> Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social.<u><strong> </u></strong>Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. <u><strong><mark>Death </u></strong></mark>perhaps <u><strong><mark>cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped</u></strong></mark> sideways, indirectly, vicariously <u><strong><mark>through a mirror, </mark>to use <mark>Perseus’s </u></strong></mark>ancient <u><strong><mark>trick against Medusa. </u></strong></mark>The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. <u><strong><mark>The safety that theater provides, </u></strong></mark>of essentially <u><strong><mark>knowing that we will remain alive, </u></strong></mark>emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically<u><strong><mark> enables us to </u></strong></mark>really <u><strong><mark>get a taste of death</u></strong></mark>. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. <u><strong><mark>Life </u></strong></mark>is impoverished, it <u><strong><mark>loses in interest, when the highest stake </u></strong></mark>in the game of living, life itself, <u><strong><mark>may not be risked. </u></strong></mark>It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us<u><strong>. <mark>We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong><mark>indispensable, </u></strong></mark>such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are <u><strong><mark>paralyzed by the thought of </u></strong></mark>who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a <u><strong><mark>disaster </u></strong></mark>should occur. Thus <u><strong><mark>the tendency to exclude death from</u></strong></mark> our calculations in <u><strong><mark>life brings </u></strong></mark>in its train <u><strong><mark>many other renunciations and exclusions. </u></strong></mark>Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. <u><strong><mark>Sacrifice</mark>, </u></strong>Bataille says, <u><strong><mark>brings together life in its fullness and </mark>the <mark>annihilation </mark>of life. We are not mere spectators </u></strong>in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. <u><strong><mark>“The sacred horror</u></strong></mark>,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It <u><strong><mark>“opens </u></strong></mark>itself<u><strong><mark>, like a theater curtain, </u></strong></mark>on to a realm beyond this world” <u><strong><mark>and every </mark>limited <mark>meaning is transfigured</u></strong></mark> in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.<u><strong> <mark>The presence of death, </u></strong></mark>which he interprets in a more earthly manner,<u><strong> <mark>is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and </u></strong></mark>other related elements <u><strong><mark>(violence) </u></strong></mark>bring life closer to a state where individuality <u><strong><mark>melts</mark>, the mediation of the intellect </u></strong>between us and the world lessens<u><strong>, and <mark>life is felt at its fullest. </u></strong></mark>Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or<u><strong> intimacy: </u></strong>“immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are <u><strong>moments of excess and </u></strong>of <u><strong>fusion of beings</u></strong> (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. <u><strong><mark>Survival</mark>, </u></strong>he tells us<u><strong>, has a price. It <mark>limits our life.</u></strong></mark> As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for <u><strong><mark>the threat of death: it</u></strong> <u><strong>ruins value where value is only assured through duration.</u></strong></mark> It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). <u><strong><mark>Sacrifice is</mark> the opposite of production</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>accumulation. </u></strong>Death is <u><strong>not</u></strong> <u><strong>so much</u></strong> <u><strong>a negation of life, as </u></strong>it is <u><strong><mark>an affirmation of the intimate </u></strong></mark>order of life, which is <u><strong><mark>opposed to the normal order of things</u></strong></mark> and is therefore <u><strong>rejected. </u></strong>“The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely <u><strong><mark>the economy of value and future-oriented calculations </u></strong></mark>that <u><strong><mark>stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life</u></strong></mark>. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “<u><strong>The need for duration,” </u></strong>in the words of Bataille, <u><strong>“conceals life from us</u></strong>” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity <u><strong><mark>to meet death</u></strong></mark> is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death <u><strong><mark>is necessary if life is to have </mark>its full <mark>value, and is </mark>part of <mark>what makes us human.</u></strong></mark> But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. </p>

2NC

1NC CASE

AT: Framework [Long]

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny

Antonio 95

Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)

the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so Nietzsche considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming Social selves are fodder for the masses the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment and ultimate justification for slave morality "separates strength from expressions of strength Nietzsche considered "roles" as "external phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors Integrity spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about causes and consequences of acts Nervous rotation of appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment this principle is a string to throttle all culture these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin paves the way for a new type of tyrant

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

<h4><u><strong><mark>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u></mark>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, <u><strong><mark>the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment</mark>, master reification, <mark>and ultimate justification for slave morality</mark> and mass discipline <mark>"separates strength from expressions of strength</mark>, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so</u></strong>. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><strong><mark>Nietzsche</u></strong></mark> said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He<u><strong> <mark>considered "roles" as "external</mark>," "surface," or "foreground" <mark>phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement.</u></strong></mark> While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><strong><mark>persons</u></strong></mark> (especially male professionals) <u><strong><mark>in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions</u></strong></mark> and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><strong><mark>They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors</mark> – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." <mark>Integrity</mark>, decisiveness, <mark>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about</mark> possible <mark>causes</mark>, meanings, <mark>and consequences of acts</mark> and unending internal dialogue</u></strong> about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). <u><strong><mark>Nervous rotation of</mark> socially <mark>appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows</mark>," "abstracts," or simulacra. <mark>One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially</mark>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."</u></strong> Nietzsche asked, <u><strong>"Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? </u></strong>. . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; <u><strong>social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"</u></strong> (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). <u><strong><mark>Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment</mark> to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence</u></strong>; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><strong>Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape</u></strong>. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. <u><strong>“Rather do anything than nothing,” <mark>this principle</mark>, too, <mark>is</mark> merely <mark>a string to throttle all culture</u></strong></mark>. . . . <u><strong>Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others</u></strong>." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, <u><strong><mark>these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming</u></strong></mark>, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " <u><strong>Social selves are fodder for the</u></strong> "great man [person] of the <u><strong>masses</u></strong>." Nietzsche held that "<u><strong>the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely</u></strong>- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><strong><mark>The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin</mark>g and untrammeled ressentiment <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</u></strong></mark> (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p>

2NC

1NC CASE

AT: Framework [Long]

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject

Baudrillard ’76

Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order Death is not a due payment it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death our modern idea of death is controlled by representations of the machine and the function A machine either works or it does not the biological machine is either dead or alive The symbolic order is ignorant of this And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself There is no longer any objective progress here: the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is no possible definition of death. We are living within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics The subject's identity is continually falling apart But this death is not at all biological. At the symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying It is according to the mind that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics but it no longer declares this it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture. Every other culture says death begins before death life goes on after we must try to see the radical indeterminacy Death is a nuance of life our modern idea is controlled by representations death articulates life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death life nor death can be assigned a given end there is no definition of death We are living within evolutionist thought this is the illusion of the subject Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual subject does death take on irreversible meaning. death is not an event, but a myth The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution an end­less cycle impelled by death This death must be conjured up and localised in a precise point death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. death objectifies the body as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying Biology has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and world

The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'

<h4><u><strong>This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject </h4><p></u>Baudrillard ’76</strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></strong></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><strong><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></strong></mark>. It is <u><strong><mark>specific to our culture</u></strong>. <u><strong>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u></strong>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><strong><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u></strong> [echeance], <u><strong>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></strong></mark> a very different system of <u><strong><mark>representations</u></strong></mark>: that <u><strong>of the machine and the function</u></strong>. <u><strong>A machine either works or it does not</u></strong>. Thus <u><strong>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u></strong>. <u><strong>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u></strong> digital abstraction. <u><strong>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u></strong>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u><strong>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u></strong>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u><strong>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u></strong>something of <u><strong>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u></strong>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u></strong>: for then <u><strong><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <mark>life nor death can</mark> any longer <mark>be assigned a given end</mark>: <mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> punctuality nor any <u><strong>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are living</u></strong></mark> entirely <u><strong><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u></strong> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u><strong>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u></strong>, falling into God's forgetting. <u><strong>But this death is not at all biological.</u></strong> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u><strong>At the</u></strong> other, <u><strong>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form its identity.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In reality, <mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</mark>, <mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be conjured up and localised in a precise point</mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u></strong>. <u><strong>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u></strong> In a certain sense, <u><strong>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u><strong>It is according to the mind</u></strong>, this imaginary schizz, <u><strong>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u></strong>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><strong><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u></strong>, <u><strong>but it no longer declares this</u></strong>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u><strong>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u></strong>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p>

2NC

1NC CASE

2NC Link -- EXT

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

C.) Politics of Death -- the 1AC models a technoscientific insistence on the extension of life -- our Meilaender evidence indicates that the selling of organs is justified based on the assumption that biological death is an evil that must be combated at all costs -- The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying -- they turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment and constructs death as a “problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured” -- this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life

McGowan 13

McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)

What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. The fact that life has an end means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite it depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. This is why Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life. Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist. The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. The limit of this project is its own infinitude. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. the space for the creation of value disappears. But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

We must imagine there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. Without the value that death provides, neither love ice cream friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have worth Having infinite time we have no incentive to opt for these experiences We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. experience depends on the limits of finitude The struggle to assert the importance of death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself They privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation death provides life becomes bereft of value The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from not from scarcity or death. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object We seek satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the structure this infinite universe is established through repression Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.
 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

<h4>C.) <u>Politics of Death<strong> -- the 1AC models a technoscientific insistence on the extension of life -- our Meilaender evidence indicates that the selling of organs is justified based on the assumption that biological death is an evil that must be combated at all costs -- The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying -- they turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment and constructs death as a “problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured” -- this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life </h4><p></u>McGowan 13</strong> (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)</p><p>On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. <u><strong>What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.</u></strong>3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. <u><strong>Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims</u></strong> of imperialist power.
 4 <u><strong><mark>We must imagine</mark> that for subjects such as these <mark>there is an appeal in death itself.</mark> </u></strong>Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because <u><strong><mark>death is the source of value.</u></strong></mark>5 <u><strong>The fact that life has an end</u></strong>, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, <u><strong>means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. <mark>Without the value that death provides, neither love</mark> nor <mark>ice cream</mark> nor <mark>friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have</mark> any special <mark>worth</u></strong></mark> whatsoever. <u><strong><mark>Having</mark> an <mark>infinite</mark> amount of <mark>time</mark>, <mark>we</mark> would <mark>have no incentive to opt for these experiences</mark> rather than other ones. <mark>We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living.</mark> Even though enjoyment itself is an <mark>experience</mark> of the infinite</u></strong>, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, <u><strong>it</u></strong> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>depends on the limits of finitude</mark>. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject</u></strong>, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. <u><strong><mark>The struggle to assert the importance of death</mark> – the act of being in love with death</u></strong>, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – <u><strong><mark>is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.</u></strong></mark>6 <u><strong>This is</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>why</u></strong> Martin <u><strong>Heidegger</u></strong> attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger <u><strong>sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us.</u></strong> As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. <u><strong><mark>By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters</mark> to us. But of course the <mark>partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself</mark>. <mark>They</mark> simply <mark>privilege life over death</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and see the world in terms of life</mark> <mark>rather than death</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. <mark>But this is not what happens.</mark> <mark>By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world.</mark> <mark>Without the mediation</mark> that <mark>death provides</mark>, the system of pure <mark>life becomes</mark> a system utterly <mark>bereft of value</mark>.</u></strong>8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. <u><strong>Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.</u></strong>9 <u><strong>Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion.</u></strong> The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. <u><strong>After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.</u></strong>10 <u><strong>The same dynamic is visible with capitalism.</u></strong> As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 <u><strong>Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much.</u></strong> The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. <u><strong><mark>The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from</mark> excess, <mark>not from scarcity or death.</u></strong></mark> Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. <u><strong>The limit of this project is</u></strong>, paradoxically, <u><strong>its own infinitude.</u></strong> It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. <u><strong><mark>We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object</mark> and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite</u></strong> -the infinite of modernity- <u><strong>depends on a fundamental misrecognition.</u></strong> We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. <u><strong><mark>We seek</mark> the commodity that would finally bring us complete <mark>satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the</mark> commodity <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, <u><strong>scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory</u></strong>, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, <u><strong>the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies</u></strong>; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. <u><strong>The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death.</u></strong> As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, <u><strong>the space for the creation of value disappears.</u></strong> Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 <u><strong>But <mark>this infinite universe is established through</mark> the <mark>repression</mark> of finitude. <mark>Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.</u></strong></mark> As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 <u><strong>Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.</u></strong> </p>

2NC

1NC CASE

2NC Link -- EXT

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Their “changing the world” attitude through the political sphere is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout

Baudrillard 5

Baudrillard 5 [Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]

death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for bette A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species' From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it forgotten discrimination We need evil from which there is no redemption There is nothing immoral in this. nothing immoral in some losing and What would be immoral would be for everyone to win the imperative of salvation will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed which retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice Individuals carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance Summoned to greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves human beings are at odds; and their existences dislocated An existence realized but denied, thwarted, disowned

death has to be redeemed by a effort to transform the world. One has to ensure salvation at all costs by realizing the world better A performance of transforming it is no longer a question of glory; it is a question of death The point is to make the world transparent by extirpating any evil force under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and no hell no damnation Everything becomes susceptible of redemption From this point good and evil, which were still opposing are dissociated for the realization of the world under the banner of happiness It is to manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment show signs of happiness the future will be modified to" attain perfection of the species' From the point when everyone is saved, no one is Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons democratic enterprise it forgot discrimination We need evil from which there is no redemption There is nothing immoral in this. nothing immoral in some losing What would be immoral would be for everyone to win the imperative of salvation will always be thwarted by challenge elsewhere and personal beatitude sacrificed which retains the fateful quality that in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears misfortune in the form of disavowal and secret disillusionment performance is collective form of human sacrifice, Individuals carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world irrelevant even in their own eyes they do what they do for no other possibility No authority to appeal to They have sacrificed their lives to functional existences They are one with calculation of performance Summoned to efficiency human beings are at odds existences dislocated realized but denied, thwarted, disowned

'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for better or for worse. A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent and operational by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and, at the same time, going from bad to worse: no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. It is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species'; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it is stifled at birth for having forgotten the necessary discrimination, for the omission of evil. We need, then, an irrevocable presence of evil, an evil from which there is no possible redemption, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. There is nothing immoral in this. According to the rules of the game, there is nothing immoral in some losing and others winning, or even in everyone losing. What would be immoral would be for everyone to win. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since the imperative of salvation, of the individual state of grace, will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but which, in any event, retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice, but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. Individuals, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to. They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences. They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance. Summoned to get the greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves, human beings are suddenly at odds; and their existences dislocated. An existence realized, then, but at the same time denied, thwarted, disowned. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement.

<h4>Their “changing the world” attitude through the political sphere is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 5 </strong>[Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]</p><p>'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That <u><strong><mark>death has to be redeemed by a</mark> com- pulsive <mark>effort to transform the world. One has to ensure</mark> one's <mark>salvation at all costs by realizing the world</mark> for <mark>bette</u></strong>r</mark> or for worse. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> <mark>performance</mark> that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that <mark>of transforming</u></strong></mark> the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But <u><strong><mark>it is no longer a question</mark> now <mark>of</mark> his <mark>glory; it is a</mark> <mark>question of</mark> his <mark>death</mark> and of exorcizing it. <mark>The point is to make the world transparent</u></strong></mark> and operational <u><strong><mark>by extirpating</mark> from it any illusion and <mark>any evil force</mark>. And so, <mark>under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and</u></strong></mark>, at the same time, going from bad to worse: <u><strong><mark>no hell</mark> any more, and <mark>no</mark> <mark>damnation</mark>. <mark>Everything becomes susceptible of redemption</mark>. <mark>From this point </mark>on, <mark>good and evil, which were still opposing</mark> powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, <mark>are</mark> to be <mark>dissociated for the</mark> purposes of a definitive <mark>realization of the world under the banner of happiness</u></strong></mark>. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. <mark>It <u><strong>is to</mark> such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the <mark>manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment</mark> Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and <mark>show</mark> all the <mark>signs of happiness</u></strong></mark>!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for <u><strong><mark>the future</mark>, it is better and worse yet: everything <mark>will be</mark> genetically <mark>modified to" attain</mark> the biological and democratic <mark>perfection of the species'</u></strong></mark>; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. <u><strong><mark>From the point when everyone is</mark> potentially <mark>saved, no one is</mark>. <mark>Salvation</mark> <mark>no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons</mark> for our <mark>democratic enterprise</mark>: <mark>it</u></strong></mark> is stifled at birth for having <u><strong><mark>forgot</mark>ten</u></strong> the necessary <u><strong><mark>discrimination</u></strong></mark>, for the omission of evil. <u><strong><mark>We need</u></strong></mark>, then, an irrevocable presence of <u><strong><mark>evil</u></strong></mark>, an evil <u><strong><mark>from which there is no</u></strong></mark> possible <u><strong><mark>redemption</u></strong></mark>, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. <u><strong><mark>There is nothing immoral in this.</mark> </u></strong>According to the rules of the game, there is <u><strong><mark>nothing immoral in some losing </mark>and</u></strong> others winning, or even in everyone losing. <u><strong><mark>What would be immoral would be for everyone to win</u></strong></mark>. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since <u><strong><mark>the imperative of salvation</u></strong></mark>, of the individual state of grace, <u><strong><mark>will always be thwarted by</mark> some <mark>challenge</mark> or passion from <mark>elsewhere</mark>, <mark>and</mark> any form of <mark>personal</mark> <mark>beatitude</mark> may be <mark>sacrificed</u></strong></mark> to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark>, in any event, <u><strong><mark>retains the fateful quality</mark> of <mark>that</mark> which, <mark>in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass.</mark> <mark>Behind</mark> its <mark>euphoric exaltation, this</mark> <mark>imperative of maximum performance</mark> <mark>bears</mark> within it evil and <mark>misfortune in the form of</mark> a deep <mark>disavowal</mark> <mark>and</mark> a <mark>secret disillusionment</mark>. Perhaps <mark>performance</mark> <mark>is</mark> merely a <mark>collective form of human sacrifice</u></strong>, </mark>but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. <u><strong><mark>Individuals</u></strong></mark>, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they <u><strong><mark>carry on their lives like a useless function in</mark> <mark>the eyes of another world</mark>, <mark>irrelevant even in their own eyes</mark>. And <mark>they do what they do</mark> all the better <mark>for</mark> the fact that there is <mark>no other possibility</mark>. <mark>No authority to appeal to</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They have sacrificed their lives to</mark> their <mark>functional existences</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are one with</mark> the exact numerical <mark>calculation</mark> <mark>of</mark> their lives and their <mark>performance</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Summoned to</u></strong></mark> get the <u><strong>greatest <mark>efficiency</mark> and pleasure out of themselves</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>human beings are</u></strong></mark> suddenly <u><strong><mark>at odds</mark>; and their <mark>existences dislocated</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>An existence <mark>realized</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> at the same time <u><strong><mark>denied, thwarted, disowned</u></strong></mark>. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement. </p>

2NC

1NC CASE

AT: Pragmatism Good

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Cadaver link

Scheper-Hughes 03

Scheper-Hughes 03

The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts is driven, by the medical discourse on scarcity The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' only virtual lists with little material basis in reality motivated questionable practices of organ harvesting with 'compensated gifting' doctors acting as brokers the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is an artificially created need invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' as a natural medical phenomenon. In this 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics the ethics of transplantation is modeled after 'lifeboat' ethics There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations In the United States where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor The poor and minorities are over-represented in ICUs due to their over-exposure to urban violence higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The irony is that those lacking public insurance also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited These alternative bioethical positions are expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of moral panics of body theft To those living on the fringes of the new global disorder the scramble for 'fresh' organs increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts While popular resistance led to revoking new laws of presumed consent Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists

The 'demand' for organs is driven by the medical discourse on scarcity The specter of virtual lists with little material basis in reality motivated questionable practices of harvesting with 'compensated gifting' doctors acting as brokers, the idea of 'scarcity' is an artificially created need invented by technicians dangled before the eyes of a dying population The artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' In cadaver transplant the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor minorities are over-represented in ICUs due to their over-exposure to urban violence higher rates of homicide as well as societal and medical neglect those lacking insurance comprise the greatest number of those whose family are asked to altruistically donate organs They are being asked to support a social and medical system that excludes them Those who sell a kidney are from economic strata where access to care are lacking To those living on the fringes of global disorder the scramble for 'fresh' organs increases ontological insecurity in a world that values bodies as a reservoir of spare parts the voice of anthropology has been muted while debates have been waged among bioethicists, legal scholars and economists

Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — is driven, above all, by the medical discourse on scarcity. The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' — sometimes only virtual lists with little material basis in reality I — has motivated and driven questionable practices of organ harvesting with blatant sales alongside 'compensated gifting', doctors acting as brokers, and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is what Ivan Illich (1970) would call an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population. The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' (Bourdieu 1977) as a natural medical phenomenon. In this environment of 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics, the ethics of transplantation is modeled after classical 'lifeboat' ethics (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations, both living and brain dead. In the United States, for example, where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation (if not so, increasingly, in practice), the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. The poor and minorities are over-represented in the intensive care centers (ICUs) of large urban hospitals, due to their over-exposure to urban violence, higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The great irony is that those lacking public insurance (44 million citizens) also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking. But to date the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from far afield and are generally expressed in unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited. These alternative bioethical positions are often expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of rumors and moral panics of body theft and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. To a great many of those living on the fringes of the new global disorder, the scramble for 'fresh' organs and tissues increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts (Scheper-Hughes 1996). While popular resistance in Mexico and Brazil led to revoking new and progressivist laws of presumed consent for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today?

<h4><strong>Cadaver link</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes 03</p><p></strong>Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The 'demand' for</mark> human <mark>organs</mark>, tissues, and body parts</u></strong> — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — <u><strong><mark>is driven</mark>,</u></strong> above all, <u><strong><mark>by the medical discourse on scarcity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The specter of</mark> long transplant 'waiting lists'</u></strong> — sometimes <u><strong>only <mark>virtual lists with little material basis in reality</u></strong></mark> I — has <u><strong><mark>motivated</u></strong></mark> and driven <u><strong><mark>questionable practices</mark> <mark>of</mark> organ <mark>harvesting</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> blatant sales alongside <u><strong><mark>'compensated gifting'</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>doctors acting as brokers</u></strong>,</mark> and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But <u><strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>idea of</mark> organ <mark>'scarcity' is</u></strong></mark> what Ivan Illich (1970) would call <u><strong><mark>an artificially created need</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>invented by</mark> transplant <mark>technicians</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and <mark>dangled before the eyes of</mark> <mark>a</mark>n ever- expanding sick, aging and <mark>dying population</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> resulting <mark>artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized'</u></strong></mark> (Bourdieu 1977) <u><strong>as a natural medical phenomenon. In this</u></strong> environment of <u><strong>'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics</u></strong>, <u><strong>the ethics of transplantation is modeled after</u></strong> classical <u><strong>'lifeboat' ethics</u></strong> (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? <u><strong>There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations</u></strong>, both living and brain dead. <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the United States</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong>where <mark>cadaver</mark> <mark>transplant</mark> continues to be supported as the norm for donation </u></strong>(if not so, increasingly, in practice), <u><strong><mark>the brain</mark> <mark>dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor</u></strong></mark> — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. <u><strong>The poor and <mark>minorities</mark> <mark>are over-represented</mark> <mark>in</u></strong></mark> the intensive care centers (<u><strong><mark>ICUs</u></strong></mark>) of large urban hospitals, <u><strong><mark>due to their over-exposure to urban violence</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>higher rates of homicide</mark>, suicide and vehicular death, <mark>as well</mark> <mark>as</mark> the cumulative effects of <mark>societal and medical</mark> <mark>neglect</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The</u></strong> great <u><strong>irony is that <mark>those lacking</mark> public <mark>insurance</mark> </u></strong>(44 million citizens)<u><strong> also <mark>comprise</mark> <mark>the greatest number of those whose family</mark> members <mark>are asked</mark> <mark>to</mark> behave <mark>altruistically</mark> and to <mark>donate</mark> the <mark>organs</mark> and tissues of loved ones</u></strong>. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. <u><strong><mark>They are being asked to support</mark> with the bodies of their loved ones <mark>a social and medical system that excludes them</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise</u></strong>. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. <u><strong>The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance</u></strong>. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. <u><strong><mark>Those who sell a kidney</mark> <mark>are</mark> normally <mark>from</mark> social and <mark>economic</mark> <mark>strata where access to</mark> basic medical <mark>care</mark> and necessary aftercare <mark>are</mark> most often <mark>lacking</u></strong></mark>. But to date <u><strong>the only dissident voices raised against</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come</u></strong> <u><strong>from</u></strong> far afield and are generally expressed in <u><strong>unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited</u></strong>. <u><strong>These alternative</u></strong> <u><strong>bioethical positions are</u></strong> often <u><strong>expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of</u></strong> rumors and <u><strong>moral panics of body theft</u></strong> and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. <u><strong><mark>To</u></strong></mark> a great many of <u><strong><mark>those</mark> <mark>living on the fringes of</mark> the new <mark>global disorder</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the scramble for 'fresh' organs</u></strong></mark> and tissues <u><strong><mark>increases</mark> their profound sense of <mark>ontological insecurity in a world that values</mark> their <mark>bodies as a reservoir of spare parts</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes 1996). <u><strong>While popular resistance</u></strong> in Mexico and Brazil <u><strong>led to revoking new</u></strong> and progressivist <u><strong>laws of presumed consent</u></strong> for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. <u><strong>Throughout these radical transformations, <mark>the voice of anthropology has been</mark> <mark>muted</u></strong> <u><strong>while</mark> the high-stake <mark>debates have been waged among</mark> transplant professionals, <mark>bioethicists, legal scholars and economists</u></strong></mark>. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today? </p>

2NC

1NC CASE

2NC Link -- Cadaver

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Systematic oppression of capitalism cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales -- their attempt at curbing violence through market based solutions ensures serial policy failure

Dillard-Wright 12

Dillard-Wright 12

, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries the Journal of the American Medical Association JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants had sold a kidney to pay off debts The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization At an average elapsed time most families reported worsened economic conditions with annual incomes dropping pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and infectious disease As the use of live kidney donors has moved , to areas of high risk in the developing world surgeons have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people Such motives instrumentalize the poor turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering” misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects If the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude that views all conditions as treatable classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation including those over 70 years This new category of patients does not stand to benefit from transplantation because their conditions make rejection likely As transplant technology advances this demand will likely increase along lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them it make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and labor are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio the world‟s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world‟s elite can have longer more comfortable lives such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore realities faced by sellers kidney face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and disease surgeons become complicit in suffering of a hidden population Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an exacerbation of already unjust global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs for first-world people motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportuni The “quantification of suffering misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans subjects the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by technoscientific insistence on the extension of artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude the world‟s most vulnerable are asked to surrender their bodies so the elite can have longer, more comfortable lives

David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world‟s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world‟s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.

<h4><strong>Systematic oppression of capitalism cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales -- their attempt at curbing violence through market based solutions ensures serial policy failure</h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p>Very few studies have been made in</u></strong> order <u><strong>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u></strong>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u><strong>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u></strong> (<u><strong>JAMA</u></strong>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u><strong>study found that nearly all of the study participants</u></strong> (96%) <u><strong>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u></strong> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u><strong>At an average elapsed time</u></strong> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u><strong>most families reported worsened economic conditions </u></strong>since the surgery, <u><strong>with annual incomes dropping</u></strong> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u><strong>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u><strong>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u></strong>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances<u><strong>, to areas of high risk in the developing world</u></strong>, transplant <u><strong><mark>surgeons</u></strong></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u><strong>have <mark>become</mark> <mark>complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</mark> </u></strong>(Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><strong><mark>Asking the world‟s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>arising from </mark>the <mark>ulterior</mark> <mark>motive of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such <mark>motives instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportuni</mark>ty</u></strong>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u><strong>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></strong></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><strong><mark>the recipient</mark> <mark>side</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been</mark> <mark>manipulated</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <mark>technoscientific insistence on the extension of</mark> life</u></strong>. <u><strong>Transplant lists</u></strong> <u><strong>have been <mark>artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> towards medicine <u><strong>that views</u></strong> any and<u><strong> all conditions as treatable</u></strong>, and now new <u><strong>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u></strong>, <u><strong>including</u></strong> “<u><strong>those over 70 years</u></strong>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u><strong>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u></strong> much <u><strong>from transplantation</u></strong> <u><strong>because</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> ages and medical <u><strong>conditions make rejection likely</u></strong>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. <u><strong>As transplant technology advances</u></strong>, <u><strong>this demand</u></strong> from a broadened patient pool <u><strong>will likely increase</u></strong>, <u><strong>along</u></strong> with the persistent <u><strong>lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries</u></strong>. Meanwhile, <u><strong>viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist</u></strong> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). <u><strong>Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs</u></strong>, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that <u><strong>many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them</u></strong> (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, <u><strong>it</u></strong> does <u><strong>make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world‟s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism</u></strong>. <u><strong>As if it weren‟t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong>labor</u></strong> and environmental standards <u><strong>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u></strong>n, <u><strong><mark>the world‟s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world‟s <mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer</u></strong>, <u><strong>more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u><strong>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u></strong>

2NC

1NC CASE

2NC Link -- Cadaver

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Legalization means regulation

Wilkinson ‘11

Wilkinson ‘11

, TSW) when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it This style of argument is familiar from other contexts notably debates about the legalization of drugs, and prostitution.

when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it This style of argument is familiar from other contexts notably debates about the legalization of drugs, and prostitution.

(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW) 3. Harm and Risk The first, and most straightforward, objection to organ sale is that it is excessively harmful or dangerous for paid organ donors. Present-day organ trafficking certainly does often involve excessive and unacceptable levels of harm. But, as mentioned earlier, when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system. Once this is borne in mind, the harm argument against organ sale appears vulnerable to a number of objections. The first (an empirical point) is simply that the most widely discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions. The UK body NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), for example, informs us that the risk of postoperative death (to the donor) is about one in 3,000. There is also a small risk (less than 1%) of minor complications (such as chest, wound, or urine infections). As regards long-term health risks, NHSBT claims that there is there is no long-term effect on the health of the donor or on his/her remaining kidney, and that donors are at no greater risk of developing kidney failure after donating than anyone in the general population. So, while there are some not completely insignificant risks to consider, arguably these are tolerable compared to both the risks to the prospective recipient of not receiving the kidney, and the financial benefit to the donor, provided that the level of reward is set at a suitably high level. The second objection says that, if our concern is exposing the organ vendor to risk, then the last thing we should be doing is banning sale since, as Cameron and Hoffenberg put it: It is the marginalization of paid organ donation that leads to its performance in less than ideal circumstances. Paid organ donations need be no more risky than unpaid. In other words, the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it. This style of argument is familiar from other contexts: notably debates about the legalization of abortion, drugs, and prostitution.

<h4><strong>Legalization means regulation</h4><p>Wilkinson ‘11</p><p></strong>(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011<strong> </strong>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/<u><strong>, TSW)</p><p></u></strong>3. Harm and Risk The first, and most straightforward, objection to organ sale is that it is excessively harmful or dangerous for paid organ donors. Present-day organ trafficking certainly does often involve excessive and unacceptable levels of harm. But, as mentioned earlier, <u><strong><mark>when considering the moral permissibility of organ sale, it is advisable to focus not on the worst case, but rather on the likely level of harm that would occur within a properly regulated system.</u></strong></mark> Once this is borne in mind, the harm argument against organ sale appears vulnerable to a number of objections. The first (an empirical point) is simply that the most widely discussed form of organ sale, kidney sale, is not terribly dangerous if performed in good conditions. The UK body NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), for example, informs us that the risk of postoperative death (to the donor) is about one in 3,000. There is also a small risk (less than 1%) of minor complications (such as chest, wound, or urine infections). As regards long-term health risks, NHSBT claims that there is there is no long-term effect on the health of the donor or on his/her remaining kidney, and that donors are at no greater risk of developing kidney failure after donating than anyone in the general population. So, while there are some not completely insignificant risks to consider, arguably these are tolerable compared to both the risks to the prospective recipient of not receiving the kidney, and the financial benefit to the donor, provided that the level of reward is set at a suitably high level. The second objection says that, if our concern is exposing the organ vendor to risk, then the last thing we should be doing is banning sale since, as Cameron and Hoffenberg put it: It is the marginalization of paid organ donation that leads to its performance in less than ideal circumstances. Paid organ donations need be no more risky than unpaid. In other words, <u><strong><mark>the best way of avoiding harm to organ vendors is not to criminalize and drive sale underground but rather to accept and regulate it</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This style of argument is familiar from other contexts</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>notably debates about the legalization of</u></strong></mark> abortion, <u><strong><mark>drugs,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and prostitution.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NR

1NC CASE

2NC Link -- Cadaver

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The lit is about regulations and discussions of the extent of regulations is key

Wilkinson 11

Wilkinson 11

The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices An important preliminary point all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale would look like it should be assumed doctors nurses and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the W H O

The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices An important preliminary point all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale would look like it should be assumed doctors nurses and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the W H O

(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW) 1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. An important preliminary point is that almost all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one. Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required, but most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market. Features (1) and (2) combined are supposed to rule out exploitative organ trafficking from poorer countries, while the ban on direct sales and allocation by a central agency ensure that the organs go not to those most able to pay, but to those in most need. In common with many other defenders of organ sale, Erin and Harris also propose building in practical protections for donors and recipients (e.g., adequate medical care and thorough health checkups before donation takes place). When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices (since that is not what any serious ethicist is defending or proposing) but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale, controlled by some combination of the medical profession and state regulators, would look like. More specifically, it should be assumed (as it is in what follows) that the doctors, nurses, and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by The Transplantation Society and the World Health Organisation (leaving aside of course those bodies' opposition to organ sale itself) (see Other Internet Resources section below).

<h4><strong>The lit is about regulations and discussions of the extent of regulations is key</h4><p>Wilkinson 11 </p><p></strong>(Stephen Professor of Bioethics at Lancaster University, "The Sale of Human Organs", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Mon Oct 17, 2011 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/organs-sale/, TSW)</p><p>1. Different Kinds of Organ Sale System <u><strong><mark>The expression ‘organ sale’ covers a wide range of different practices</u></strong></mark>. People most readily associate it with the case in which one individual (who needs or wants money) sells his or her kidney to another (who needs a kidney). But there are other possibilities too. One (in countries where the prior consent of the deceased is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay people living now for rights over their body after death. Another (in countries where the consent of relatives is required for cadaveric organ donation) is to pay relatives for transplant rights over their recently deceased loved ones' bodies. Since the kidney is the most commonly transplanted organ and since the ethics literature on organ sale is mainly about kidney sale from live donors, that is the practice on which this entry will focus. ‘Organ sale’ as the term is used here does not include the sale of body products (a category which includes blood, eggs, hair, and sperm) since this is different in some important respects. For example, the risk of permanent harm is generally much less in the case of blood and hair donation; while, the donation of eggs and sperm raises additional issues relating to the creation and parenting of additional future people. That said, many of the fundamental issues are similar and the very same concerns about (for example) exploitation and consent arise in both cases. <u><strong><mark>An important preliminary point</u></strong></mark> is that almost <u><strong><mark>all serious advocates of allowing payment for human organs argue not for an unfettered ‘free market’ but for a regulated one.</u></strong></mark> Radcliffe Richards et al. (1998, 1950) for example, in their paper “The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales” say: It must be stressed that we are not arguing for the positive conclusion that organ sales must always be acceptable, let alone that there should be an unfettered market. While Wilkinson (2003, 132) is typical of organ sale defenders in wishing to distance himself from today's (largely ‘underground’) organ trade: … far from being a reason to continue the ban on sale, the dreadfulness of present practice may be a reason to discontinue prohibition, so that the organ trade can be brought ‘overground’ and properly regulated. <u><strong><mark>Different scholars have different views about the precise scope and extent of the regulation required</u></strong></mark>, but <u><strong>most support the requirements that organ sellers give valid consent, are paid a reasonable fee, and are provided with adequate medical care</u></strong>. Taylor (2005, 110) for example, says that: At minimum … a market should require that vendors give their informed consent to the sale of their kidneys, that they not be coerced into selling their kidneys by a third party and that they receive adequate post-operative care. One noteworthy policy proposal comes from Erin and Harris (1994; 2003) who suggest that a market in human organs should have the following features: It is limited to a particular geopolitical area, such as a state or the European Union, with only citizens or residents of that area being allowed to sell or to receive organs. There is a central public body responsible for making (and funding) all purchases and for allocating organs fairly in accordance with clinical criteria. Direct sales are banned. Prices are set at a reasonably generous level to attract people voluntarily into the market. Features (1) and (2) combined are supposed to rule out exploitative organ trafficking from poorer countries, while the ban on direct sales and allocation by a central agency ensure that the organs go not to those most able to pay, but to those in most need. In common with many other defenders of organ sale, Erin and Harris also propose building in practical protections for donors and recipients (e.g., adequate medical care and thorough health checkups before donation takes place). <u><strong><mark>When ethically evaluating organ sale therefore it is best to focus not on the worst aspects of today's organ trafficking practices</u></strong></mark> (since that is not what any serious ethicist is defending or proposing) <u><strong><mark>but rather on what a reasonably well-regulated system of organ sale</u></strong></mark>, controlled by some combination of the medical profession and state regulators, <u><strong><mark>would look like</u></strong></mark>. More specifically, <u><strong><mark>it should be assumed</u></strong></mark> (as it is in what follows) that the <u><strong><mark>doctors</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>nurses</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and transplant coordinators implementing an organ sale system should at least adhere to the standards around consent and clinical care advocated by</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>The Transplantation Society and the W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>H</u></strong></mark>ealth <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganisation (leaving aside of course those bodies' opposition to organ sale itself) (see Other Internet Resources section below).</p>

1NR

1NC CASE

AT: Lit Checks

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Aff has to defend regulation as part of legalization—any other interp is invented and doesn’t reflect the topic literature

O’Gorman ’14

O’Gorman ’14

- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales or physician assisted suicide be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs - certainly existing regulations would apply everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol. legalize is the best stem across the board -- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize

- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize

(Assistant State's Attorney, Prince George's County, Maryland, JD, Baylor Thomas “ ”http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5907.105.html) Briefly because have to go back to the prosecution side of this in 30 minutes, but -- We have to allow some mechanism for the Aff to embrace/make some regulations - there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales or physician assisted suicide be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards. Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs -- certainly existing labor regulations would apply, most everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol. I think legalize is still the best stem across the board (however you end up phrasing it) -- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only and maybe maybe growing a very small number of plants for personal use (Alaska allows you I think 4?) Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize (as distinct from legalize) sale of narcotics. Decrim for drugs then is going to end up being very weak as the Feds by and large don't prosecute possession, as opposed to distribution or manufacturing for distribution, and something like 17 states have already decriminalized small possession. Decriminalization of possession only is going to be very small affs. Also decrim/legalize doesn't get you out of the regulation query - a number of decrim regimes either involve a number of civil penalties which are essentially regulations (see Portugal) or are specific into the circumstances for which they decriminalize which gets you the same problems (see the Netherlands; only coffee houses, only to club members, only up to a certain THC content).Still think the best option is legalize across the board with the neg getting decrim cp ground against drugs and prostitution.Think enough people want a USFG option that we should have one. USFG solves fine for Organs, Gambling on its own. Can probably win solvency for drugs without getting into the preemption issue just by changing federal laws. Can overturn a court case for PAS (not sure how having to defend a constitutional right vs. the states cp is going to play out - but advantages to PAS are probably philosophical enough in nature that it will be ok). Prostitution is going to be odd on a Fed only topic - but not in a way that hurts the neg - so if there aren't too many affs thats ok. Are there any other Fed only crimes that people are considering other than broader drugs instead of just MJ.?

<h4><strong>Aff has to defend regulation as part of legalization—any other interp is invented and doesn’t reflect the topic literature</h4><p>O’Gorman ’14 </p><p></strong>(Assistant State's Attorney, Prince George's County, Maryland, JD, Baylor Thomas “ ”http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5907.105.html)</p><p>Briefly because have to go back to the prosecution side of this in 30 minutes, but -- We have to allow some mechanism for the Aff to embrace/make some regulations <u><strong><mark>- there are not sufficient solvency advocates for the proposition that organ sales </mark>or physician assisted suicide <mark>be completely unregulated - informed consent is a huge bio-ethics issue and surely there are going to be some standards.</mark> Further there aren't solvency advocates for a completely unregulated legalized market in either prostitution or drugs -</u></strong>- <u><strong>certainly</u></strong> <u><strong>existing</u></strong> labor <u><strong>regulations would apply</u></strong>, most <u><strong>everyone assumes that legalized drugs would be regulated to some extent like alcohol.</u></strong> I think <u><strong>legalize</u></strong> <u><strong>is</u></strong> still <u><strong>the best stem across the board</u></strong> (however you end up phrasing it) <u><strong>-- Decriminalization for MJ is going to end up pretty weak because decriminalization advocates assume possession only</u></strong> and maybe maybe growing a very small number of plants for personal use (Alaska allows you I think 4?) <u><strong><mark>Its really not considered in the literature to decriminalize</u></strong></mark> (as distinct from legalize) sale of narcotics. Decrim for drugs then is going to end up being very weak as the Feds by and large don't prosecute possession, as opposed to distribution or manufacturing for distribution, and something like 17 states have already decriminalized small possession. Decriminalization of possession only is going to be very small affs. Also decrim/legalize doesn't get you out of the regulation query - a number of decrim regimes either involve a number of civil penalties which are essentially regulations (see Portugal) or are specific into the circumstances for which they decriminalize which gets you the same problems (see the Netherlands; only coffee houses, only to club members, only up to a certain THC content).Still think the best option is legalize across the board with the neg getting decrim cp ground against drugs and prostitution.Think enough people want a USFG option that we should have one. USFG solves fine for Organs, Gambling on its own. Can probably win solvency for drugs without getting into the preemption issue just by changing federal laws. Can overturn a court case for PAS (not sure how having to defend a constitutional right vs. the states cp is going to play out - but advantages to PAS are probably philosophical enough in nature that it will be ok). Prostitution is going to be odd on a Fed only topic - but not in a way that hurts the neg - so if there aren't too many affs thats ok. Are there any other Fed only crimes that people are considering other than broader drugs instead of just MJ.?</p>

1NR

1NC CASE

AT: Lit Checks

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research

Resnick 1

Resnick 1 Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk exacerbating misperceptions Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research

a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an ad hoc fashion risk misperceptions Scholars undercut valuable research

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

<h4><strong>3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research</h4><p>Resnick 1</p><p></strong>Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2</p><p>In matters of national security, establishing <u><strong><mark>a clear definition of terms is a precondition</u></strong></mark> for effective policymaking. <u><strong><mark>Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an</mark> erratic, <mark>ad hoc fashion risk</u></strong></mark> alienating their constituencies. They also risk <u><strong>exacerbating <mark>misperceptions</u></strong></mark> and hostility among those the policies target. <u><strong><mark>Scholars</mark> who commit the same error <mark>undercut</mark> their ability to conduct <mark>valuable</mark> empirical <mark>research</u></strong></mark>. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.</p>

1NR

1NC CASE

AT Reasonability

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

N

Kentucky

1

GSU NS

Stout, Kristen

1AC - Organ Sales Scarcity Tyranny of the Gift 1NC - T-Regs Bio-Medical DA Mandated Choice CP Midterms DA (Dems Good - EPA Regs) Death K 2NC - Death K 1NR - T-Regs 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx