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Trump’s tax reform is coming together, he is pushing, and it is key to economic growth

Mason 2/2

Mason 2/2 (John M. Mason, 2-2-2017, Tax Reform On The Way: The Hope Of The New Administration," Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/4042088-tax-reform-way-hope-new-administration, Accessed: 2-3-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)

Trump is trying to deliver on the promises he made while campaigning and tax reform is a major issue he promised to address It seems as if the political forces are forming to achieve this tax reform as House Speaker Paul Ryan and Trump advisor Jared Kushner meet for dinner. Investors remain optimistic that tax reform will be achieved in the near term There continues to be optimism that the Trump administration will pull off some kind of economic package that will be able to spur the US economy on to faster rates of growth Trump has pegged Ryan as a tireless legislator Together, they might make a potent pair: someone who understands legislating, and the favored son in law who has the president's ear -- and trust Currently, this optimism over what economic policies might be putting together seems to be offsetting some of the uncertainty created by the Trump way of doing business House speaker Ryan has been a substantial advocate of tax reform, so in this respect he is well prepared to move ahead on crafting a plan, one that will not require an extended period of time to put together. As far as tax cuts, the publicity effort is well on the way as Trump advisors Larry Kudlow and Stephen Moore have argued in the Wall Street Journal Trump is following up movement is underway Writing bills take longer than just pushing out executive orders. And, this movement continues to underwrite the optimism that many feel about future economic growth.

Trump is trying to deliver on tax reform political forces are forming to achieve reform Investors remain optimistic tax reform will be achieved in the near term Trump will be able to spur the US economy on to faster rates of growth optimism seems to be offsetting uncertainty created Trump Ryan will not require an extended period of time movement is underway this continues to underwrite optimism that many feel about economic growth

Summary As in other areas, President Trump is trying to deliver on the promises he made while campaigning and tax reform is a major issue he promised to address. It seems as if the political forces are forming to achieve this tax reform as House Speaker Paul Ryan and Trump advisor Jared Kushner meet for dinner. Investors remain optimistic that tax reform and other policies changes will be achieved in the near term although the particular outcomes of such policy shifts are highly uncertain. There continues to be optimism that the Trump administration will pull off some kind of economic package that will be able to spur the US economy on to faster rates of growth. Capturing the lead story in Politico Playbook is the recent dinner in Washington, D. C. between House Speaker Paul Ryan and Trump son-in-law, Jared Kushner. "Trump has pegged Ryan as a tireless legislator, and has positioned Kushner as a dealmaker…." Washington insiders believe that "Together, they might make a potent pair: someone who understands legislating, and the favored son in law who has the president's ear -- and trust." Tax reform has been one of Trump's promises from the very beginning. And, tax reform is just one part of the economic package, along with a rollback of regulations, especially on the financial industry, and a program of infrastructure spending. Currently, this optimism over what economic policies might be putting together seems to be offsetting some of the uncertainty created by the Trump way of doing business. After the big stock market "take off" that immediately followed the election in early November, the stock market has paused to reassess any change in risk associated with the immediate future. House speaker Ryan has been a substantial advocate of tax reform, so in this respect he is well prepared to move ahead on crafting a plan, one that will not require an extended period of time to put together. Jared Kushner is, of course, getting lots and lots of attention in terms of the role he is now playing in White House deliberations. He really seems to have the President's ear and his trust. As far as tax cuts, the publicity effort is well on the way as Trump advisors Larry Kudlow and Stephen Moore have argued in the Wall Street Journal. Further attention is being given to revoking or revising the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as opponents to the Act start to get their "ducks in line." So, President Trump is following up, in one way or another, on the economic platform he presented on the campaign trail. We still don't have a lot of specifics yet, but movement is underway. Writing bills take longer than just pushing out executive orders. And, this movement continues to underwrite the optimism that many feel about future economic growth.

<h4>Trump’s tax reform is coming together, he is pushing, and it is key to economic growth</h4><p><strong>Mason 2/2</strong> (John M. Mason, 2-2-2017, Tax Reform On The Way: The Hope Of The New Administration," Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/4042088-tax-reform-way-hope-new-administration, Accessed: 2-3-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>Summary As in other areas, President <u><strong><mark>Trump is trying to deliver on</mark> the promises he made while</u></strong> <u><strong>campaigning and <mark>tax reform</mark> is a major issue he promised to address</u></strong>. <u><strong>It seems as if the <mark>political forces</mark> <mark>are forming to achieve </mark>this tax <mark>reform</mark> as House Speaker Paul Ryan and Trump advisor Jared Kushner meet for dinner.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Investors remain optimistic</mark> that <mark>tax reform</u></strong></mark> and other policies changes <u><strong><mark>will be achieved in the near term</u></strong></mark> although the particular outcomes of such policy shifts are highly uncertain. <u><strong>There continues to be optimism that the <mark>Trump</mark> administration will pull off some kind of economic package that <mark>will be able to spur</mark> <mark>the US economy on to faster rates of growth</u></strong></mark>. Capturing the lead story in Politico Playbook is the recent dinner in Washington, D. C. between House Speaker Paul Ryan and Trump son-in-law, Jared Kushner. "<u><strong>Trump has pegged Ryan as a tireless legislator</u></strong>, and has positioned Kushner as a dealmaker…." Washington insiders believe that "<u><strong>Together, they might make a potent pair: someone who understands legislating, and the favored son in law who has the president's ear -- and trust</u></strong>." Tax reform has been one of Trump's promises from the very beginning. And, tax reform is just one part of the economic package, along with a rollback of regulations, especially on the financial industry, and a program of infrastructure spending. <u><strong>Currently, this <mark>optimism</mark> over what economic policies might be putting together <mark>seems to be offsetting</mark> some of the <mark>uncertainty</mark> <mark>created</mark> by the <mark>Trump</mark> way of doing business</u></strong>. After the big stock market "take off" that immediately followed the election in early November, the stock market has paused to reassess any change in risk associated with the immediate future. <u><strong>House speaker <mark>Ryan</mark> has been a substantial advocate of tax reform, so in this respect he is well prepared to move ahead on crafting a plan, one that <mark>will not require an</mark> <mark>extended period of time</mark> to put together.</u></strong> Jared Kushner is, of course, getting lots and lots of attention in terms of the role he is now playing in White House deliberations. He really seems to have the President's ear and his trust. <u><strong>As far as tax cuts, the publicity effort is well on the way as Trump advisors Larry Kudlow and Stephen Moore have argued in the Wall Street Journal</u></strong>. Further attention is being given to revoking or revising the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as opponents to the Act start to get their "ducks in line." So, President <u><strong>Trump is following up</u></strong>, in one way or another, on the economic platform he presented on the campaign trail. We still don't have a lot of specifics yet, but <u><strong><mark>movement is underway</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Writing bills take longer than just pushing out executive orders. And, <mark>this</mark> movement <mark>continues to underwrite</mark> the <mark>optimism</mark> <mark>that many feel</mark> <mark>about</mark> future <mark>economic growth</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1NC

DA

1NC Tax Reform

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Golden Desert

6

Damien MP

Joel Lemuel

1AC - AIIB 1NC - Xi Politics DA Agenda Politics DA Commission CP T QPQ Dollar Heg Turn On Case Appeasement Turn On Case 2NC - T QPQ Politics DA 1NR - Commission CP 2NR Commission CP Politics DA

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Next – is our long Chandler card, it:

<h4>Next – is our long Chandler card, it:</h4>

K – Legal Reformism

1NC

./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx

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Berkeley

5

McDonogh JN

Anastasia Kazteridis

1AC - Fugitivity 1NC - Framework Legalism K 2NC - Framework 1NR - Legalism 2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt

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Warming causes extinction

Mccoy 14

Mccoy 14 (Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510)

the IPCC’s new report should leave no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the climate system and it is “extremely likely that more than half of the increase in temperature is anthropogenic Its report outlines the threats of warming: increased scarcity of food and water; extreme weather rise in sea level loss of biodiversity areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass migration, conflict and violence. the well being of all nations [is] at risk climate change is “the greatest threat to human health Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations The IPCC warns of “tipping points which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts

the IPCC’s new report should leave no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival it is “virtually certain that increase in temperature is anthropogenic the threats of warming scarcity of food and water rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity and mass migration, conflict and violence The IPCC warns of “tipping points which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of systems

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]

<h4>Warming causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Mccoy 14 </strong>(Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510)</p><p>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], <u><mark>the IPCC’s new report</mark> <mark>should leave</u></mark> the world in <u><strong><mark>no doubt</strong> about</mark> <mark>the <strong>scale</strong> and <strong>immediacy</strong> of the threat to <strong>human survival</strong></mark>,</u> health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that <u><mark>it is “<strong>virtually certain</strong></mark> <mark>that</mark> human influence has warmed the</u> global <u>climate system</u>” <u>and</u> that <u>it is “<strong>extremely likely</strong> that more than half of the</u> observed <u><mark>increase</mark> <mark>in</u> </mark>global average surface <u><mark>temperature</u></mark> from 1951 to 2010” <u><mark>is anthropogenic</u></mark> [1]. <u>Its</u> new <u>report outlines <mark>the</u></mark> future <u><mark>threats</mark> <mark>of</mark> </u>further global <u><mark>warming</mark>: increased <mark>scarcity of food and</mark> </u>fresh <u><mark>water</mark>; extreme weather</u> events; <u><mark>rise in sea level</u>; <u>loss of biodiversity</u></mark>; <u>areas becoming <strong>uninhabitable;</strong> <mark>and mass</u></mark> human <u><mark>migration, conflict and violence</mark>.</u> Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “<u>the well being of</u> people of <u>all nations [is] at risk</u>.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that <u>climate change is “the <strong>greatest threat</strong> to human health</u> of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. <u>Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet</u>. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “<u><strong>Business as usual</strong>” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations</u> from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. <u><mark>The IPCC warns of “<strong>tipping points</u></strong></mark>” in the Earth’s system, <u><mark>which, if crossed, could lead to a <strong>catastrophic collapse</strong> of</mark> interlinked human and natural <mark>systems</u></mark>. The AAAS concludes that <u>there is now a “real chance of <strong>abrupt,</strong> <strong>unpredictable</strong> and potentially <strong>irreversible</strong> changes with <strong>highly damaging</strong> impacts</u> on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6] </p>

1AC

Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order

./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx

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Golden Desert

4

Notre Dame MP

Jack Lassiter

1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out) 1NC - Security K T-Reznick 2NR - K

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Defensive realism is true and shapes China’s rise – resolving the security dilemma makes China feel secure and satisfied

The security dilemma proves – this only occurs between defensive realist states – since its aggression due to violations of security

China has shifted from an offensive realist to defensive realist state – Raditio cites that after Mischief Reef China China sought to adopt the strategy of engagement in the SCS Second, China doesn’t mean Raditio 14 (Klaus Heinrich, PhD student at the Department of Government and International Relations of the University of Sydney; Junior Policy Associate at China Studies Centre of the University of Sydney, “China and the Tension in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective,” University of Sydney, 2014, https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Klaus%20Raditio.pdf, KentDenver-NK)

<h4>Defensive realism is true and shapes China’s rise – resolving the security dilemma makes China feel secure and satisfied</h4><p>The security dilemma proves – this only occurs between defensive realist states – since its aggression due to violations of security </p><p>China has shifted from an offensive realist to defensive realist state – Raditio cites that after Mischief Reef China China sought to adopt the strategy of engagement in the SCS</p><p><strong>Second, China doesn’t mean </p><p>Raditio 14 (Klaus Heinrich, PhD student at the Department of Government and International Relations of the University of Sydney; Junior Policy Associate at China Studies Centre of the University of Sydney, “China and the Tension in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective,” University of Sydney, 2014, https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Klaus%20Raditio.pdf, KentDenver-NK)</p></strong>

1AC

1AC

Solvency

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Berkeley

2

Classical TS

Anastasia Kazteridis

1AC-Taiwan Adv 1-Taiwan Adv 2-Relations Solvency

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2. Ends the security dilemma, squo is trapped in cycle of expansion of military posture that is inescapable

<h4><strong>2. Ends the security dilemma, squo is trapped in cycle of expansion of military posture that is inescapable </h4></strong>

2AC/1AR (LD)

Flashpoints/Taiwan

2AC Solvency

./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx

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UC Berkeley Invitational

5

Davis WK

Hanna Wilson

1AC - FlashpointsTaiwan - Relations - Grand Bargain Solvency 1NC - Topicality (Military) - Discussion Counter Plan - Japan DA - Taiwan - Relations

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All feminist epistemologists have criticized traditional Western epistemology, by which is meant Cartesian Epistemology, or the Enlightenment or modernist epistemology that has been dominant in modern and contemporary science. Traditional Western epistemology focuses on the individual epistemic agent and holds that the epistemic agent is autonomous and can be completely impartial. It holds that knowledge claims are universal and absolute, not perspective. In other words, according to this epistemology, knowledge claims are made from no particular time, location, circumstance, and perspective, and therefore they are true in all situations and from all perspectives. In short, knowledge claims are made from nowhere and are universally valid. Such an epistemology clearly denies that knowledge is socially and historically constructed. It dichotomizes subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity, and nature and culture in an absolute manner. It values rationality and abstraction and devalues emotion and the concrete. Since the Enlightenment, it has been the dominant epistemology in Western philosophy and science. In the West, it was almost equivalent to epistemology before feminist epistemology emerged. For feminist epistemologists, traditional Western epistemology is androcentric and male-biased. It fails to take women's experience and perspectives into account. Due to the existence of male domination, male norms have become dominant norms and been regarded as objective and universal standards for all. Accordingly, women's ways of thinking and knowing have been considered something inferior and invalid. According to feminist epistemologists, such male-bias has severely hindered the advance of philosophy and science. For example, due to devaluing femininity, the knowledge that mothers have of children is not greatly appreciated (Anderson 1995, 50). In general, the more a kind of knowledge is associated with femininity, the less value it will be assigned by traditional Western epistemology. At the most general level, impersonal knowledge is coded “masculine” while personal knowledge is coded “feminine.” The former enjoys higher prestige than the latter. As far as specific subject matters and methods within theoretical knowledge are concerned, the natural sciences are “harder” and hence more prestigious than social sciences, which are supposed to be awash in feminine emotionality and subjectivity. Mathematics is the most masculine and therefore the most prestigious (see ibid. 64). At the personal level, research done by females is usually taken less seriously than that done by males. “Laboratory, field, and natural experiments alike show that the perceived gender of the author influences people’s judgments of the quality of research, independent of its content” (ibid, 59). Psychologists M. A. Paludi and W.D. Bauer in their survey found that the same paper was evaluated very differently when its author was perceived as male, female, or of uncertain gender. The same paper was sent to three groups of evaluators to rank its quality under three different author names. The paper was assigned a much higher average ranking by its evaluators when it was under the name “John T. McKay” than when it was under “Joan T. McKay.” The paper’s ranking was between the evaluations given by the above two groups when it was under “J. T. McKay,” a name that does not clearly identify the author’s gender (see Paludi and Bauer 1983, 287-390, and quoted in Anderson 1995, 59). Academics are no less disposed than others to devalue women’s work. For example, before the Modern Language Association instituted blind name review for papers submitted for their meetings, men’s submissions were accepted at significantly higher rates than women’s. After the association adopted blind name review, women’s acceptance rates rose to equality with men’s (Lefkowits 1979, 56, and quoted in Anderson 1995, 59). When a scientific discovery is made by a woman, it may not be taken as seriously as one made by a man. The case of Barbara McClintock is a good example of that. It took more than three decades for biology academics to recognize the significance of her discovery of genetic transposition (Anderson 1995, 60). Such cases show how male bias in the dominant epistemology underlying scientific research has slowed the progress of knowledge. Although among feminist epistemologists there are disagreements on whether there are uniform women's ways of knowing in the global sphere, to what extent traditional Western epistemology is male-biased, and whether some ways of knowing are shared by both genders, all feminist epistemologists agree that traditional Western epistemology is gender-biased and that feminist criticisms of it will significantly contribute to the improvement of theories of knowledge.

<h4><u><strong><mark>All feminist epistemologists have criticized traditional Western epistemology</u></strong></mark>, by which is meant Cartesian Epistemology, or the Enlightenment or modernist epistemology <u><strong>that has been dominant in modern and contemporary science. Traditional Western epistemology focuses on the individual epistemic agent and holds that the epistemic agent is autonomous and can be completely impartial. It holds that knowledge claims are universal and absolute, not perspective</u></strong>. In other words, according to this epistemology, <u><strong>knowledge claims are made from no particular time, location, circumstance, and perspective, and therefore they are true in all situations and from all perspectives.</u></strong> In short<u><strong>, knowledge claims are made from nowhere and are universally valid. <mark>Such an epistemology clearly denies that knowledge is socially and historically constructed. It dichotomizes subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity, and nature and culture in an absolute manner. It values rationality and abstraction and devalues emotion and the concrete</u></strong></mark>. Since the Enlightenment, it has been the dominant epistemology in Western philosophy and science. <u><strong>In the West, it was almost equivalent to epistemology before feminist epistemology emerged. For feminist epistemologists, traditional Western epistemology is androcentric and male-biased. It fails to take women's experience and perspectives into account. Due to the existence of male domination, male norms have become dominant norms and been regarded as objective and universal standards for all. Accordingly, women's ways of thinking and knowing have been considered something inferior and invalid. </u></strong>According to feminist epistemologists, <u><strong>such male-bias has severely hindered the advance of philosophy and science.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong>due to devaluing femininity, the knowledge that mothers have of children is not greatly appreciated</u></strong> (Anderson 1995, 50). In general, <u><strong>the more a kind of knowledge is associated with femininity, the less value it will be assigned by traditional Western epistemology</u></strong>. At the most general level, <u><strong><mark>impersonal knowledge is coded “masculine” while personal knowledge is coded “feminine</u></strong></mark>.” The former enjoys higher prestige than the latter. As far as specific subject matters and methods within theoretical knowledge are concerned, <u><strong>the natural sciences are “harder” and hence more prestigious than social sciences, which are supposed to be awash in feminine emotionality and subjectivity. Mathematics is the most masculine and therefore the most prestigious </u></strong>(see ibid. 64). At the personal level, <u><strong><mark>research done by females is usually taken less seriously than that done by males</u></strong></mark>. “Laboratory, field, and natural experiments alike show that <u><strong>the perceived gender of the author influences people’s judgments of the quality of research, independent of its content</u></strong>” (ibid, 59). Psychologists M. A. Paludi and W.D. Bauer in their survey found that <u><strong>the same paper was evaluated very differently when its author was perceived as male, female, or of uncertain gender</u></strong>. The same paper was sent to three groups of evaluators to rank its quality under three different author names. The paper was assigned a much higher average ranking by its evaluators when it was under the name “John T. McKay” than when it was under “Joan T. McKay.” The paper’s ranking was between the evaluations given by the above two groups when it was under “J. T. McKay,” a name that does not clearly identify the author’s gender (see Paludi and Bauer 1983, 287-390, and quoted in Anderson 1995, 59). <u><strong> Academics are no less disposed than others to devalue women’s work.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong>before the Modern Language Association</u></strong> instituted blind name review for papers submitted for their meetings<u><strong>, men’s submissions were accepted at significantly higher rates than women’s</u></strong>. After the association adopted blind name review, women’s acceptance rates rose to equality with men’s (Lefkowits 1979, 56, and quoted in Anderson 1995, 59). <u><strong><mark>When a scientific discovery is made by a woman, it may not be taken as seriously as one made by a man</mark>.</u></strong> The case of Barbara McClintock is a good example of that. It took more than three decades for biology academics to recognize the significance of her discovery of genetic transposition (Anderson 1995, 60). S<u><strong>uch cases show how male bias in the dominant epistemology underlying scientific research has slowed the progress of knowledge.</u></strong> Although among feminist epistemologists there are disagreements on whether there are uniform women's ways of knowing in the global sphere, to what extent traditional Western epistemology is male-biased, and whether some ways of knowing are shared by both genders, <u><strong><mark>all feminist epistemologists agree that traditional Western epistemology is gender-biased and that feminist criticisms of it will significantly contribute to the improvement of theories of knowledge.</mark> </h4></u></strong>

2NC/NR

1 K

Framework

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A

Mile High Classic

6

Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk

John Mckiernan

Taiwan Aff - Taiwan - Relations - Solvency 1NC - T - Fem K - Solvency (On Case) 2NC - K - FWK - Perm 1NR - Solvency 2NR Choice - Weigh K and case using Framework o Solvency

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The AIIB is a lightning rod – republicans hate the economic costs

Zhang 15

Zhang 15 (Xunchao Zhang, University of Chicago, Committee on International Relations Department, 9-21-2015, "AIIB: a Test of Sino-US Relations," Australian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/aiib-a-test-of-sino-us-relations/, Accessed: 2-1-2017 /Kent Denver-NK)

why did Washington not join the AIIB answer lies in US domestic politics Such an option was constrained by Republican control over Congress. r the US to join the AIIB, it has to make billions of dollars of capital contribution; such funding would never be approved by the Republican-dominated Congress there was less political capital to spare for the AIIB. S domestic politics on China is increasely security-centric and confrontational The general deterioration of the public perception makes it difficult for the two nations to cooperate on economic issues.

why did Washington not join the AIIB answer lies in US domestic politics constrained by Republican control over Congress For the US to join the AIIB, it has to make billions of dollars of capital contribution would never be approved by the Republican-dominated Congress there was less political capital to spare for the AIIB politics is increasely security-centric and confrontational deterioration of the public perception makes it difficult for the nations to cooperate on economic issues

But why did Washington not join the AIIB after all? The answer lies in US domestic politics. Such an option was constrained by Republican control over Congress. For the US to join the AIIB, it has to make billions of dollars of capital contribution; such funding would never be approved by the Republican-dominated Congress. Given President Obama’s fights with Republicans on several foreign policy issues, such as the recent approval of the nuclear agreement, there was less political capital to spare for the AIIB. In addition, US domestic politics on China is increasely security-centric and confrontational, for example on issues such as cyber-security. The general deterioration of the public perception of Sino-US security relations makes it difficult for the two nations to cooperate on economic issues.

<h4>The AIIB is a lightning rod – republicans hate the economic costs</h4><p><strong>Zhang 15</strong> (Xunchao Zhang, University of Chicago, Committee on International Relations Department, 9-21-2015, "AIIB: a Test of Sino-US Relations," Australian Institute of International Affairs, <u>http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/aiib-a-test-of-sino-us-relations/, Accessed: 2-1-2017 /Kent Denver-NK)</p><p></u>But <u><strong><mark>why did Washington not join the AIIB</u></strong></mark> after all? The <u><strong><mark>answer lies in US domestic politics</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Such an option was <mark>constrained by</mark> <mark>Republican control over Congress</mark>.</u></strong> <mark>Fo<u><strong>r the US to join the AIIB, it has to make billions of dollars of capital contribution</mark>; such funding <mark>would never be approved by the Republican-dominated Congress</u></strong></mark>. Given President Obama’s fights with Republicans on several foreign policy issues, such as the recent approval of the nuclear agreement, <u><strong><mark>there was less political capital to spare for the AIIB</mark>.</u></strong> In addition, U<u><strong>S domestic <mark>politics</mark> on China <mark>is increasely security-centric and confrontational</u></strong></mark>, for example on issues such as cyber-security. <u><strong>The general <mark>deterioration of the public perception</u></strong></mark> of Sino-US security relations <u><strong><mark>makes it difficult for the</mark> two <mark>nations to</mark> <mark>cooperate on economic issues</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1NC

DA

1NC Tax Reform

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Damien MP

Joel Lemuel

1AC - AIIB 1NC - Xi Politics DA Agenda Politics DA Commission CP T QPQ Dollar Heg Turn On Case Appeasement Turn On Case 2NC - T QPQ Politics DA 1NR - Commission CP 2NR Commission CP Politics DA

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Cyber attacks go nuclear

The Guardian 2009

The Guardian 2009 [The Guardian, 7-28-2009, “New Study: Hacking terrorists could trigger Armageddon” http://dvice.com/archives/2009/07/new-study-hacki.php]

If terrorists can get in touch with the right hackers, they could start a gigantic nuclear war, and the chances of this happening are growing ICNND) asserts in its latest research, saying that if terrorists could just break into some key computer systems, worldwide nuclear conflagration could result. But this is not some fantasy battle. It's real. Think about this for a second: If you were a terrorist, which would you rather do — design and build your own nuclear weapon, or learn how to hack into a system controlling thousands of nuclear warheads? Launch a missile here and there, and suddenly ICBMs are flying all around the world.

If terrorists can get in touch with hackers they could start a gigantic nuclear war if terrorists could just break into key systems nuclear conflagration could result suddenly ICBMs are flying around the world

If terrorists can get in touch with the right hackers, they could start a gigantic nuclear war, and the chances of this happening are growing more likely every day. At least that's what the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) asserts in its latest research, saying that if terrorists could just break into some key computer systems, worldwide nuclear conflagration could result. Yeah, right. Combine the words "hacker," "nuclear," and "the Internet," a you have a recipe for ginning up world-class fear. But this is not some fantasy battle. It's real. Think about this for a second: If you were a terrorist, which would you rather do — design and build your own nuclear weapon, or learn how to hack into a system controlling thousands of nuclear warheads? Launch a missile here and there, and suddenly ICBMs are flying all around the world.

<h4><strong>Cyber attacks go nuclear</h4><p>The Guardian 2009</p><p><u>[The Guardian, 7-28-2009, “New Study: Hacking terrorists could trigger Armageddon” http://dvice.com/archives/2009/07/new-study-hacki.php]</p><p><mark>If terrorists can get in touch</mark> <mark>with</mark> the right <mark>hackers</mark>, <mark>they could</mark> <mark>start a gigantic nuclear war</mark>, and the chances of this happening are growing </u></strong>more likely every day. At least that's what the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (<u><strong>ICNND) asserts in its latest research, saying that <mark>if terrorists could just break into</mark> some <mark>key</mark> computer <mark>systems</mark>, worldwide <mark>nuclear conflagration could result</mark>. </u></strong>Yeah, right. Combine the words "hacker," "nuclear," and "the Internet," a you have a recipe for ginning up world-class fear. <u><strong>But this is not some fantasy battle. It's real. Think about this for a second: If you were a terrorist, which would you rather do — design and build your own nuclear weapon, or learn how to hack into a system controlling thousands of nuclear warheads? Launch a missile here and there, and <mark>suddenly ICBMs are flying</mark> all <mark>around the world</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1AC

Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order

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Notre Dame MP

Jack Lassiter

1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out) 1NC - Security K T-Reznick 2NR - K

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Proves trade-offs between forms of “politics”

<h4>Proves trade-offs between forms of “politics”</h4>

K – Legal Reformism

1NC

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Berkeley

5

McDonogh JN

Anastasia Kazteridis

1AC - Fugitivity 1NC - Framework Legalism K 2NC - Framework 1NR - Legalism 2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt

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3. Signals restraint and moderates China, both know each other’s intentions

<h4><strong>3. Signals restraint and moderates China, both know each other’s intentions</h4></strong>

2AC/1AR (LD)

Flashpoints/Taiwan

2AC Solvency

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Davis WK

Hanna Wilson

1AC - FlashpointsTaiwan - Relations - Grand Bargain Solvency 1NC - Topicality (Military) - Discussion Counter Plan - Japan DA - Taiwan - Relations

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Feminism provides a space to deal with issues that affect all people, not just men.

<h4><u>Feminism provides a space to deal with issues that affect all people, not just men.</h4></u>

2NC/NR

1 K

Framework

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Mile High Classic

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Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk

John Mckiernan

Taiwan Aff - Taiwan - Relations - Solvency 1NC - T - Fem K - Solvency (On Case) 2NC - K - FWK - Perm 1NR - Solvency 2NR Choice - Weigh K and case using Framework o Solvency

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China is a defensive realist state It is necessary to identify the nature of the states involved to discover whether a security dilemma applies in the SCS, because security dilemmas only take place between defensive realist states. Although Tang mentions security dilemmas between two states, this paper argues that it can apply between two or more states. In this context, this paper aims to elaborate the situation in the SCS among its claimants, especially between China on the one side, and other SCS claimants, i.e. Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, on the other side. Unlike an offensive realist state, which seeks security by power maximisation even if it violates other states’ security, a defensive realist state does not pursue security by offending others, unless it has very exceptional reasons.'? In fact, a defensive realist state is very reluctant to launch attacks, and prefers a resistance behaviour when facing an imminent threat. Is In addition, a defensive realist state pursues security instead of expansion and considers cooperation a feasible means of self-defence." A defensive realist state also voluntarily restrains itself and accepts other countries' constraints." The main military strategy of a defensive realist state is self-defence and deterrence, not expansion. It favours a strategy between engagement and passive containment, and rejects active containment, let alone preventive war.2' From the above-mentioned criteria for a defensive realist state, one can be assured that China is a defensive realist state, as well as other claimants in the SCS, mainly Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. These countries do not have ambitions to expand, and seek security in terms of self-help instead of pursuing hegemonic power. The debate on China's nature will be much more intensive and vigorous compared with other claimants in the SCS. This is because China has been accused of being assertive, aggressive and abrasive in the SCS, whereas other claimants have seldom been accused of such things. I argue that the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia can be categorised as defensive realist states, because of their non-expansionary behaviour and their attitude towards cooperation. Regarding China, Tang argues that, since 1978, the country has shifted from being an offensive realist state to a defensive realist state. Furthermore, Tang attributes China's success in the past three decades to this shift in its strategy.22 Ralf Emmers also suggested that in the more specific period after 1995, relations between China and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations) members bilaterally and multilaterally reached a golden age.23 China and the ASEAN cooperated in various fields, which resulted in truly significant achievements, such as the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS in 2002, and China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003. One may argue that China's attitude resembled a defensive realist state only in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, and since then its attitude has shifted to a more aggressive stance. However, I would contend for several reasons that, although there is a shift in China's SCS strategy towards aggressiveness, it is still a defensive realist state. First, during the period of de-escalation after the Mischief Reef Incident (the late 1990s to the mid-2000s), China adopted the strategy of engagement towards other claimants, with the aim of buying time to consolidate its claims in the SCS—particularly to jurisdiction over the disputed waters and maritime rights—and deter other claimants from enhancing their claims at China's expense, such as excluding China from resource exploration projects? China also aimed to reduce the influence that external powers, especially the US, had over other claimants to avoid complicating its efforts to consolidate its claim in the SCS. The adoption of engagement strategy shows that China is a defensive realist state. Second, China has never meant to be expansionist. Regardless of how other states perceive China, its claim over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands is not something contemporary. China has a well-established stance that did not appear unexpectedly nor recently. As the country becomes more developed and powerful, it adjusts its strategy to protect its interests. The importance of the SCS to China and its growing capability have made it determined to assert its interests more vigorously, yet military conflict is not a viable option for China at the moment. Third, China itself regards its attitude as self-defence. It is surrounded by the hostile attitudes of its neighbours. The strong presence of the US in the region also adds to its uneasiness. The enhanced security alliance between other claimants and external powers, especially the US, could have been China's reason for adopting a more strident approach.25 China is neither an offensive realist state nor a pacifist state. Its proactive behaviour in exercising what it perceives to be its rights to some extent is not beyond acceptable limits. Fourth, China never dismisses cooperation as a means to avoid conflict. In fact, the idea of cooperation in the SCS, known as Deng Xiaoping's "shelving disputes and seeking joint development," was initiated by China. The country still formally upholds this policy and has never ruled out the possibility of de-escalating the tension by reassurance and cooperation. China’s leaders will say “Yes” — it’s a good deal and it’s good politics.

Glaser 16

Glaser 16 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the U S as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and a large reduction in the security threat posed by the U S The grand bargain therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might

the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at little cost. Chinese nationalist claims have blown disputes out of proportion China’s leaders might be able to deflate nationalist claims the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, and a reduction in the security threat posed by the U S therefore, could be appealing to a leadership that faces domestic challenges and regional opposition

The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless, the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the United States as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and, closely related, a large reduction in the security threat posed by the United States. The grand bargain, therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.

<h4><u><mark>China is</mark> <strong>a <mark>defensive realist</mark> state</strong> It is necessary to identify the nature of the states involved to discover whether a security dilemma applies</u> in the SCS, <u>because <strong><mark>security dilemmas only take place between defensive realist states</u></strong></mark>. Although Tang mentions security dilemmas between two states, this paper argues that it can apply between two or more states. In this context, this paper aims to elaborate the situation in the SCS among its claimants, especially between China on the one side, and other SCS claimants, i.e. Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, on the other side. <u><mark>Unlike</mark> an <mark>offensive realist</mark> state, which seeks security by power maximisation even if it violates other states’ security, <mark>a defensive realist</mark> state <mark>does not pursue </mark>security by <mark>offending others, unless <strong>it has</mark> very <mark>exceptional reasons</u></strong></mark>.'? In fact, a defensive realist state is very reluctant to launch attacks, and prefers a resistance behaviour when facing an imminent threat. Is In addition<u>, a defensive realist state <strong><mark>pursues security instead of expansion</strong></mark> and considers cooperation a feasible means of self-defence</u>." <u>A defensive realist state <mark>also voluntarily restrains itself and accepts</mark> other countries' <mark>constraints</mark>."</u> <u><mark>The main</mark> military <mark>strategy</mark> of a defensive realist state <mark>is <strong>self-defence </mark>and deterrence<mark>, not expansion</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>It</mark> favours a strategy between engagement and passive containment, and <mark>rejects</mark> active <mark>containment</mark>, let alone preventive war.2'</u> From the above-mentioned criteria for a defensive realist state, <u>one can be assured that China is a defensive realist state, as well as other claimants in the SCS, mainly Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. These <mark>countries do not have ambitions to</mark> <mark>expand, and seek security</mark> in terms of self-help <strong><mark>instead of</mark> pursuing <mark>heg</mark>emonic power</u></strong>. The debate on China's nature will be much more intensive and vigorous compared with other claimants in the SCS. This is because China has been accused of being assertive, aggressive and abrasive in the SCS, whereas other claimants have seldom been accused of such things. I argue that the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia can be categorised as defensive realist states, because of their non-expansionary behaviour and their attitude towards cooperation. <u>Regarding <mark>China</mark>, Tang argues that, since 1978, the country has <strong><mark>shifted from being an offensive realist state</strong> to a defensive realist</mark> state. Furthermore, Tang attributes China's success in the past three decades to this shift in its strategy.</u>22 Ralf Emmers also suggested that in the more specific period after 1995, relations between China and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations) members bilaterally and multilaterally reached a golden age.23 China and the ASEAN cooperated in various fields, which resulted in truly significant achievements, such as the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS in 2002, and China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003. One may argue that China's attitude resembled a defensive realist state only in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, and since then its attitude has shifted to a more aggressive stance. However, <u>I would contend for several reasons that, although there is a shift in China's SCS strategy towards aggressiveness, it is still a defensive realist state. <mark>First</mark>, during the period of de-escalation <mark>after</mark> the <mark>Mischief Reef</mark> Incident</u> (the late 1990s to the mid-2000s), <u><strong><mark>China adopted </mark>the strategy of <mark>engagement</strong></mark> towards other claimants, with the aim of buying time to consolidate its claims in the SCS</u>—particularly to jurisdiction over the disputed waters and maritime rights—and deter other claimants from enhancing their claims at China's expense, such as excluding China from resource exploration projects? <u><mark>China</mark> also <mark>aimed to reduce the influence that</mark> external powers, especially <mark>the US, had over other claimants</mark> to avoid complicating its efforts to consolidate its claim in the SCS. <mark>The adoption <strong>of engagement</mark> strategy <mark>shows</mark> that <mark>China is a defensive realist</strong></mark> state</u>. <u><mark>Second, China has <strong>never</mark> <mark>meant to be expansionist</strong></mark>. Regardless of how other states perceive China, its claim over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands is not something contemporary. China has a well-established stance that did not appear unexpectedly nor recently</u>. <u>As the country becomes more developed and powerful, it adjusts its strategy to protect its interests. </u>The importance of the SCS to China and its growing capability have made it determined to assert its interests more vigorously, yet military conflict is not a viable option for China at the moment. Third, <u><strong><mark>China itself regards its attitude</strong> as self-defence</mark>. It is <mark>surrounded b</mark>y the <mark>hostile attitudes of its neighbours</mark>. <mark>The</mark> strong <mark>presence of the US</mark> in the region also <mark>adds</mark> <mark>to its uneasiness</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>enhanced</mark> security alliance between other claimants and external <mark>powers</mark>, especially the US, <mark>could have been China's reason for adopting a more strident</mark> <mark>approach</u></mark>.25 <u><mark>China is <strong>neither an offensive realist</strong></mark> state <mark>nor a pacifist</mark> state</u>. Its proactive behaviour in exercising what it perceives to be its rights to some extent is not beyond acceptable limits. Fourth, <u><strong><mark>China never dismisses cooperation</strong> as a means to avoid conflict</u></mark>. In fact, the idea of cooperation in the SCS, known <u>as Deng Xiaoping's "shelving disputes and seeking joint development," was initiated by China. The country still formally upholds this policy and has <strong>never ruled out the possibility o</strong>f de-escalating the tension by reassurance and cooperation. </u>China’s leaders will say “<u>Yes</u>” — it’s <u>a good deal</u> and it’s <u>good politics</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 16</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p><u>The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty</u>. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless, <u><mark>the grand bargain would provide China with a <strong>major achievement</strong> at </mark>arguably <strong><mark>little cost</strong>. </mark>Current <mark>Chinese nationalist claims have blown </mark>the importance of the maritime and sovereignty <mark>disputes </mark>in the South China and East China Seas <strong>far <mark>out of proportion</strong></mark> to their material value. If <mark>China’s leaders</mark> decide to prioritize other goals, they <mark>might be able to <strong>deflate </mark>these <mark>nationalist claims</strong></mark>, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that <mark>the grand bargain would provide <strong>large benefits to China</strong>, </mark>including elimination of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control <mark>and</u></mark>, closely related, <u><strong><mark>a </mark>large <mark>reduction in the security threat</strong> posed by the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u>The grand bargain</u>, <u><mark>therefore, could be <strong>appealing to a </mark>Chinese <mark>leadership</strong> that faces <strong></mark>daunting <mark>domestic challenges</strong> and <strong></mark>intensifying <mark>regional opposition</strong> </mark>to its assertive policies and growing military might</u>. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.</p>

1AC

1AC

Solvency

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Berkeley

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Classical TS

Anastasia Kazteridis

1AC-Taiwan Adv 1-Taiwan Adv 2-Relations Solvency

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The United States federal government should condition cooperating with the People’s Republic of China over China’s nuclear energy on tangible improvements on human rights in the People’s Republic of China.

<h4>The United States federal government should condition cooperating with the People’s Republic of China over China’s nuclear energy on tangible improvements on human rights in the People’s Republic of China.</h4>

1NC

1

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St Marks

3

Harker JW

Viveth K

1AC Nuclear cooperation 1NC Inherency Green Tech Bubble DA T-Engagement HR Condition CP 2NR Inherency

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The plan poisons the well for Tax reform – causes Republican overreach

Sherman and Bresnahan 1/3

Sherman and Bresnahan 1/3 (JAKE SHERMAN and JOHN BRESNAHAN, 1-3-2017, What we’ve learned from the GOP’s ethics fiasco," POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/gop-ethics-office-takeaways-233127, Accessed: 1-5-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)

Republicans aren’t immune to overreach when Republicans lost power in 2006, it was because they abused their authority by overreaching Big pricey bills. Ethics and earmark scandals. Political tin ear One of the biggest fears at the highest rungs of GOP leadership is that the party will misread its mandate and try to do too much too quickly. Republicans need to maintain their political capital They want to quickly complete a massive rewrite of the tax code, boost infrastructure spending and repeal Obamacare Eye poking, top Republicans warn, will only engender sour feelings in the Capitol

Republicans aren’t immune to overreach Republicans lost power because they abused their authority by overreaching One of the biggest fears is that the party will misread its mandate and try to do too much too quickly Republicans need to maintain their political capital They want to quickly complete a massive rewrite of the tax code Eye poking, top Republicans warn, will only engender sour feelings in the Capitol

Republicans aren’t immune to overreach When Republicans took the majority in 2010, then Speaker John Boehner made pretty clear that he was aware that, when Republicans lost power in 2006, it was because they abused their authority by overreaching. Big pricey bills. Ethics and earmark scandals. Political tin ear. One of the biggest fears at the highest rungs of GOP leadership is that the party will misread its mandate and try to do too much too quickly. Republicans need to maintain their political capital. They want to quickly complete a massive rewrite of the tax code, boost infrastructure spending and repeal Obamacare. Eye poking, top Republicans warn, will only engender sour feelings in the Capitol.

<h4>The plan poisons the well for Tax reform – causes Republican overreach</h4><p><strong>Sherman and Bresnahan 1/3</strong> (JAKE SHERMAN and JOHN BRESNAHAN, 1-3-2017, What we’ve learned from the GOP’s ethics fiasco," POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/gop-ethics-office-takeaways-233127, Accessed: 1-5-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Republicans aren’t immune to overreach</u></strong></mark> When Republicans took the majority in 2010, then Speaker John Boehner made pretty clear that he was aware that, <u><strong>when <mark>Republicans lost power</mark> in 2006, it was <mark>because they abused their authority by overreaching</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Big pricey bills. Ethics and earmark scandals. Political tin ear</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>One of the biggest fears</mark> at the highest rungs of GOP leadership <mark>is that the party will misread</mark> <mark>its mandate and try to do too much too quickly</mark>. <mark>Republicans need to maintain their political capital</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They want to quickly complete a massive</mark> <mark>rewrite of the tax</mark> <mark>code</mark>, boost infrastructure spending and repeal Obamacare</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Eye poking, top Republicans warn, will only engender sour feelings in the Capitol</u></strong></mark>.</p>

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The United States federal government should negotiate a phased grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end the commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan in exchange for a commitment by the People’s Republic of China to peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and to officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

<h4><u><strong>The United States federal government should negotiate a phased grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end the commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan in exchange for a commitment by the People’s Republic of China to peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and to officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia. </h4></u></strong>

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<h4>Makes Epistemology K of their authors</h4>

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Taiwan is critical, and the grand bargain deals with the other issues as well

Glaser 2015

Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB

A second counterargument is that Taiwan is no longer the key issue China’s disputes with its neighbors in the South China and East China Seas have become more intense, and increasingly define day-to-day tensions in the region. Possibly most worrisome Two rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective , the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the immediate possibility of the United States fighting China to protect Taiwan and, therefore, are not adequately captured by focusing solely on the cross-strait relationship. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the key factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term. a grand bargain would deal fully with this counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes

commitment to Taiwan is among the key factors fueling doubts about U.S. motives and Chinese worries about a war make control of the SLOCs important These contribute to competition and strained relations increasing conflict , a grand bargain would deal with resolution of other disputes

A second counterargument is that Taiwan is no longer the key issue straining U.S.-China relations. Consequently, focusing on Taiwan is misguided. As dis- cussed earlier, cross-strait relations have been improving for many years. At the same time, China’s disputes with its neighbors in the South China and East China Seas have become more intense, and increasingly define day-to-day tensions in the region. Possibly most worrisome, Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly strained in the past few years, taking the spotlight off Taiwan. Two rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective. As I have already argued, the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the immediate possibility of the United States fighting China to protect Taiwan and, therefore, are not adequately captured by focusing solely on the cross-strait relationship. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the key factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term. Second, a grand bargain would deal fully with this counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes.

<h4>Taiwan is critical, and the grand bargain deals with the other issues as well</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser</strong> is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring <strong>2015</strong>), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB </p><p><u>A second counterargument is that Taiwan is no longer the key issue</u> straining U.S.-China relations. Consequently, focusing on Taiwan is misguided. As dis- cussed earlier, cross-strait relations have been improving for many years. At the same time, <u>China’s disputes with its neighbors in the South China and East China Seas have become more intense, and increasingly define day-to-day tensions in the region. Possibly most worrisome</u>, Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly strained in the past few years, taking the spotlight off Taiwan. <u>Two rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective</u>. As I have already argued<u>, the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the immediate possibility of the United States fighting China to protect Taiwan and, therefore, are not adequately captured by focusing solely on the cross-strait relationship.</u> <u><strong>The U.S. <mark>commitment to Taiwan</mark> <mark>is among the key factors fueling </mark>Chinese <mark>doubts about U.S. motives </mark>in the region <mark>and Chinese worries about a war</mark> over Taiwan <mark>make control of the</mark> Northeast Asian <mark>SLOCs</mark> far more <mark>important</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>These</mark> worries <mark>contribute to <strong></mark>military <mark>competition</strong> and <strong>strained </mark>political <mark>relations</strong></mark>, thereby <mark>increasing</mark> the probability of<mark> conflict</mark> over the longer term. </u>Second<mark>, <u><strong>a grand bargain would deal </mark>fully <mark>with</mark> this counterargument by requiring <mark>resolution of </mark>these <mark>other disputes</u></strong></mark>.</p>

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4. it bolsters US-China relations—solve conflict

<h4><u><strong>4. it bolsters US-China relations—solve conflict</h4></u></strong>

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Unconditional engagement solves =)

their author Gomez 16 — Eric Gomez, 9-28-2016 ("A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship," Cato Institute, 9-28-2016, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship) hk

their author Gomez 16 — Eric Gomez, 9-28-2016 ("A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship," Cato Institute, 9-28-2016, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship) hk

If China proved unwilling to make any concessions the United States could still unilaterally withdraw from its military commitment to Taiwan. No demands or conditions would be placed on Chinese behavior Unilateral withdrawal would reduce the likelihood of U.S.-Chinese armed conflict The United States would retain the ability to punish China in other ways should it attack Taiwan. U.S. arms sales are separate from the implicit commitment to defend Taiwan and could continue, albeit in some reduced or modified form. Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan while stepping down from the implicit commitment to use military force to defend the island allows the United States to demonstrate support for

If China proved unwilling to make any concessions the United States could unilaterally withdraw from its military commitment to Taiwan. No demands or conditions would be placed on Chinese behavior Unilateral withdrawal would reduce the likelihood of U.S.-Chinese armed conflict The United States would retain the ability to punish China in other ways should it attack Taiwan. Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan while stepping down from the implicit commitment allows the United States to support

If China proved unwilling to make any concessions, either in other territorial disputes or in cross-strait relations, the United States could still unilaterally withdraw from its military commitment to Taiwan. No demands or conditions would be placed on Chinese behavior. American policymakers are unlikely to accept such a course of action given recent shows of Chinese assertiveness. Charles Glaser explains, “China appears too likely to misinterpret [unilaterally ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan], which could fuel Chinese overconfidence and intensify challenges to U.S. interests.”103 Unilateral withdrawal would reduce the likelihood of U.S.-Chinese armed conflict, but the dearth of other benefits would make the policy difficult for policymakers to implement. Extracting some kind of concession from China, either in cross-strait relations or in other territorial disputes, should be a priority.¶ Finally, stepping down from the commitment to defend Taiwan with military force does not remove America’s interest in keeping the Taiwan Strait free of armed conflict. The United States would retain the ability to punish China in other ways should it attack Taiwan. Diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions may not inflict the same kinds of costs on Beijing as military force, but they are additional costs that would have to be absorbed.104 Additionally, U.S. arms sales are separate from the implicit commitment to defend Taiwan and could continue, albeit in some reduced or modified form.105 Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan while stepping down from the implicit commitment to use military force to defend the island allows the United States to demonstrate support for Taiwan’s defense without taking on the risks associated with direct intervention.106

<h4>Unconditional engagement solves =) </h4><p><strong>their author Gomez 16<u><mark> — Eric Gomez, 9-28-2016 ("A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship," Cato Institute, 9-28-2016, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship) hk </p><p>If China proved unwilling to make any concessions</u></strong></mark>, either in other territorial disputes or in cross-strait relations, <u><strong><mark>the United States could</mark> still <mark>unilaterally withdraw from its military commitment to Taiwan. No demands or conditions would be placed on Chinese behavior</u></strong></mark>. American policymakers are unlikely to accept such a course of action given recent shows of Chinese assertiveness. Charles Glaser explains, “China appears too likely to misinterpret [unilaterally ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan], which could fuel Chinese overconfidence and intensify challenges to U.S. interests.”103 <u><strong><mark>Unilateral withdrawal would reduce the likelihood of U.S.-Chinese armed conflict</u></strong></mark>, but the dearth of other benefits would make the policy difficult for policymakers to implement. Extracting some kind of concession from China, either in cross-strait relations or in other territorial disputes, should be a priority.¶ Finally, stepping down from the commitment to defend Taiwan with military force does not remove America’s interest in keeping the Taiwan Strait free of armed conflict. <u><strong><mark>The United States would retain the ability to punish China in other ways should it attack Taiwan.</u></strong></mark> Diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions may not inflict the same kinds of costs on Beijing as military force, but they are additional costs that would have to be absorbed.104 Additionally, <u><strong>U.S. arms sales are separate from the implicit commitment to defend Taiwan and could continue, albeit in some reduced or modified form.</u></strong>105 <u><strong><mark>Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan while stepping down from the implicit commitment</mark> to use military force to defend the island <mark>allows the United States to </mark>demonstrate<mark> support </mark>for </u>Taiwan’s defense without taking on the risks associated with direct intervention.106 </p></strong>

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IR affairs are dealt between males – feminism is key to providing multiple perspectives and ending the male-dominated political hierarchy

IR Online 16

IR Online 16 (International Relations Online, 2016, International Relations Online is owned and operated by 2U Inc. Founded in 2008 by a team of education and technology veterans, 2U enables leading colleges and universities to deliver their high-quality degree programs online to qualified students anywhere. “International Relations Feminism” https://internationalrelationsonline.com/feminist-international-relations/)

If you look at the political arena, you will notice that a vast majority of politicians are male. This shapes the way politics and international relations works as many international affairs are dealt between males. Feminism addresses international relations from a female perspective, encouraging gender equality feminists in the international relations field look at who is shaping politics in the world today, whether women are involved in the decision-making process, and how females can change foreign policy and other aspects of international relations. They critique the present social norms and question the patriarchal hierarchy in the military and economy, among other fields. Feminists in international relations also raise their concern that women are a “disadvantaged group” that “own one percent of the world’s property and resources and perform 60 percent of the [world’s] labor, Gender studies impacts international relations in more ways than one. women and men often shared similar attitudes toward conflict between nations and that a person of either gender who included women’s issues among their concerns and advocated for gender equality, was more likely to encourage diplomacy in resolving conflicts. The theory of feminism in international relations is important to take note of in a world where gender equality is seeing rapid growth. Bringing women to the forefront of political and international issues and relations instead of continuing with the socially accepted norm of a male-dominated political hierarchy, can encourage creative thinking, leading to improved solutions for future conflicts.

If you look at the political arena, you will notice that a vast majority of politicians are male. feminists in the international relations field critique the present social norms and question the patriarchal hierarchy in the military and economy, among other fields. women and men often shared similar attitudes toward conflict between nations and that a person of either gender who included women’s issues among their concerns and advocated for gender equality, was more likely to encourage diplomacy in resolving conflicts.

If you look at the political arena, you will notice that a vast majority of politicians are male. This shapes the way politics and international relations works as many international affairs are dealt between males. Feminism, however, addresses international relations from a female perspective, encouraging gender equality. In essence, feminists in the international relations field look at who is shaping politics in the world today, whether women are involved in the decision-making process, and how females can change foreign policy and other aspects of international relations. They critique the present social norms and question the patriarchal hierarchy in the military and economy, among other fields. Feminists in international relations also raise their concern that women are a “disadvantaged group” that “own one percent of the world’s property and resources and perform 60 percent of the [world’s] labor,” as reported by gender and international relations specialist Jacqui True. Gender studies impacts international relations in more ways than one. For example, Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner conducted a study of four very different Middle Eastern countries—Kuwait, Palestine, Egypt, and Israel—and found that women and men often shared similar attitudes toward conflict between nations and that a person of either gender who included women’s issues among their concerns and advocated for gender equality, was more likely to encourage diplomacy in resolving conflicts. The theory of feminism in international relations is important to take note of in a world where gender equality is seeing rapid growth. Bringing women to the forefront of political and international issues and relations instead of continuing with the socially accepted norm of a male-dominated political hierarchy, can encourage creative thinking, leading to improved solutions for future conflicts.

<h4>IR affairs are dealt between males – feminism is key to providing multiple perspectives and ending the male-dominated political hierarchy </h4><p><strong>IR Online 16<u></strong> (International Relations Online, 2016, International Relations Online is owned and operated by 2U Inc. Founded in 2008 by a team of education and technology veterans, 2U enables leading colleges and universities to deliver their high-quality degree programs online to qualified students anywhere. “International Relations Feminism” https://internationalrelationsonline.com/feminist-international-relations/)</p><p><strong><mark>If you look at the political arena, you will notice that a vast majority of politicians are male.</mark> This shapes the way politics and international relations works as many international affairs are dealt between males. Feminism</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>addresses international relations from a female perspective, encouraging gender equality</u></strong>. In essence, <u><strong><mark>feminists in the international relations field</mark> look at who is shaping politics in the world today, whether women are involved in the decision-making process, and how females can change foreign policy and other aspects of international relations. They <mark>critique the present social norms and question the patriarchal hierarchy in the military and economy, among other fields.</mark> Feminists in international relations also raise their concern that women are a “disadvantaged group” that “own one percent of the world’s property and resources and perform 60 percent of the [world’s] labor,</u></strong>” as reported by gender and international relations specialist Jacqui True. <u><strong>Gender studies impacts international relations in more ways than one.</u></strong> For example, Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner conducted a study of four very different Middle Eastern countries—Kuwait, Palestine, Egypt, and Israel—and found that <u><strong><mark>women and men often shared similar attitudes toward conflict between nations and that a person of either gender who included women’s issues among their concerns and advocated for gender equality, was more likely to encourage diplomacy in resolving conflicts.</mark> The theory of feminism in international relations is important to take note of in a world where gender equality is seeing rapid growth. Bringing women to the forefront of political and international issues and relations instead of continuing with the socially accepted norm of a male-dominated political hierarchy, can encourage creative thinking, leading to improved solutions for future conflicts.</p></u></strong>

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Unconditional engagement triggers human rights violations---explicit conditions solve---even if China doesn’t say yes, pressure creates political space needed for dissident gains

Roth 11

Roth 11 - executive director at the Human Rights Watch, served as a federal prosecutor in New York and for the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, DC, graduate of Yale Law School and Brown University, has conducted numerous human rights investigations and missions around the world, has written extensively on a wide range of human rights abuses, devoting special attention to issues of international justice, counterterrorism, the foreign policies of the major powers, and the work of the United Nations (Kenneth, “World Report 2011: A Facade of Action,” http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/world-report-2011-facade-action)//BB

There is often a degree of rationality in a government's decision to violate human rights. The government might fear freedom would encourage discontent and thus jeopardize power International pressure can change that calculus conditioning aid or support on ending them abuse raises the cost of violating human rights. It discourages further oppression, signaling that violations cannot continue cost-free governments have a duty to exert such pressure. A commitment to human rights requires using available and appropriate tools to convince other governments to respect them as well. No repressive government likes facing such pressure What is disappointing is governments abandoning public pressure. With disturbing frequency, governments that might have been counted on to generate pressure are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments and giving up. In place of a commitment to exerting public pressure for human rights, they profess a preference for dialogue" and "cooperation There when the problem is a lack of political will to respect rights, public pressure is needed to change the cost-benefit analysis that leads to the choice of repression over rights the quest for dialogue and cooperation becomes a charade designed more to appease critics of complacency than to secure change, a calculated diversion from the fact that nothing of consequence is being done the refusal to use pressure makes dialogue and cooperation less effective because governments know there is nothing to fear from simply feigning serious participation this misguided approach include near-universal cowardice in confronting China's deepening crackdown on basic liberties. governments, by abandoning public pressure, effectively close their eyes to repression. in too many cases, governments these days are disappointingly disinclined to use public pressure to alter the calculus of repression. When governments stop exerting public pressure to address human rights violations, they leave domestic advocates-rights activists, sympathetic parliamentarians, concerned journalists-without crucial support. Pressure from abroad can help create the political space for local actors to push their government to respect rights. It also can let domestic advocates know that they are not alone, that others stand with them. But when there is no such pressure, repressive governments have a freer hand to restrict domestic advocates because dialogue and cooperation look too much like acquiescence and acceptance, domestic advocates sense indifference rather than solidarity

government's fear freedom would encourage discontent and jeopardize power. conditioning support on ending abuse raises the cost of violating h r There is a lack of political will pressure is needed to change cost-benefit analysis dialogue becomes a charade to appease critics than to secure change When governments stop pressure they leave domestic activists without support. Pressure can create political space for actors to push government to respect rights because dialogue look like acceptance, advocates sense indifference

There is often a degree of rationality in a government's decision to violate human rights. The government might fear that permitting greater freedom would encourage people to join together in voicing discontent and thus jeopardize its grip on power. Or abusive leaders might worry that devoting resources to the impoverished would compromise their ability to enrich themselves and their cronies. International pressure can change that calculus. Whether exposing or condemning abuses, conditioning access to military aid or budgetary support on ending them, imposing targeted sanctions on individual abusers, or even calling for prosecution and punishment of those responsible, public pressure raises the cost of violating human rights. It discourages further oppression, signaling that violations cannot continue cost-free. All governments have a duty to exert such pressure. A commitment to human rights requires not only upholding them at home but also using available and appropriate tools to convince other governments to respect them as well. No repressive government likes facing such pressure. Today many are fighting back, hoping to dissuade others from adopting or continuing such measures. That reaction is hardly surprising. What is disappointing is the number of governments that, in the face of that reaction, are abandoning public pressure. With disturbing frequency, governments that might have been counted on to generate such pressure for human rights are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments and giving up. In place of a commitment to exerting public pressure for human rights, they profess a preference for softer approaches such as private "dialogue" and "cooperation." There is nothing inherently wrong with dialogue and cooperation to promote human rights. Persuading a government through dialogue to genuinely cooperate with efforts to improve its human rights record is a key goal of human rights advocacy. A cooperative approach makes sense for a government that demonstrably wants to respect human rights but lacks the resources or technical know-how to implement its commitment. It can also be useful for face-saving reasons-if a government is willing to end violations but wants to appear to act on its own initiative. Indeed, Human Rights Watch often engages quietly with governments for such reasons. But when the problem is a lack of political will to respect rights, public pressure is needed to change the cost-benefit analysis that leads to the choice of repression over rights. In such cases, the quest for dialogue and cooperation becomes a charade designed more to appease critics of complacency than to secure change, a calculated diversion from the fact that nothing of consequence is being done. Moreover, the refusal to use pressure makes dialogue and cooperation less effective because governments know there is nothing to fear from simply feigning serious participation. Recent illustrations of this misguided approach include ASEAN's tepid response to Burmese repression, the United Nations' deferential attitude toward Sri Lankan atrocities, the European Union's obsequious approach to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the soft Western reaction to certain favored repressive African leaders such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, the weak United States policy toward Saudi Arabia, India's pliant posture toward Burma and Sri Lanka, and the near-universal cowardice in confronting China's deepening crackdown on basic liberties. In all of these cases, governments, by abandoning public pressure, effectively close their eyes to repression. Even those that shy away from using pressure in most cases are sometimes willing to apply it toward pariah governments, such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, whose behavior, whether on human rights or other matters, is so outrageous that it overshadows other interests. But in too many cases, governments these days are disappointingly disinclined to use public pressure to alter the calculus of repression. When governments stop exerting public pressure to address human rights violations, they leave domestic advocates-rights activists, sympathetic parliamentarians, concerned journalists-without crucial support. Pressure from abroad can help create the political space for local actors to push their government to respect rights. It also can let domestic advocates know that they are not alone, that others stand with them. But when there is little or no such pressure, repressive governments have a freer hand to restrict domestic advocates, as has occurred in recent years in Russia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And because dialogue and cooperation look too much like acquiescence and acceptance, domestic advocates sense indifference rather than solidarity.

<h4>Unconditional engagement triggers human rights violations---<u>explicit conditions</u> solve---even if China doesn’t say yes, pressure creates political space needed for dissident gains</h4><p><strong>Roth 11</strong> - executive director at the Human Rights Watch, served as a federal prosecutor in New York and for the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, DC, graduate of Yale Law School and Brown University, has conducted numerous human rights investigations and missions around the world, has written extensively on a wide range of human rights abuses, devoting special attention to issues of international justice, counterterrorism, the foreign policies of the major powers, and the work of the United Nations (Kenneth, “World Report 2011: A Facade of Action,” http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/world-report-2011-facade-action)//BB</p><p><u><strong>There is often a degree of rationality in a <mark>government's</mark> decision to violate human rights. The government might <mark>fear</u></strong></mark> that permitting greater <u><strong><mark>freedom would encourage</u></strong></mark> people to join together in voicing <u><strong><mark>discontent and</mark> thus <mark>jeopardize</u></strong></mark> its grip on <u><strong><mark>power</u></strong>.</mark> Or abusive leaders might worry that devoting resources to the impoverished would compromise their ability to enrich themselves and their cronies. <u><strong>International pressure can change that calculus</u></strong>. Whether exposing or condemning abuses, <u><strong><mark>conditioning</u></strong></mark> access to military <u><strong>aid or</u></strong> budgetary <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong> <u><strong>on ending</mark> them</u></strong>, imposing targeted sanctions on individual <u><strong><mark>abuse</u></strong></mark>rs, or even calling for prosecution and punishment of those responsible, public pressure<u><strong> <mark>raises the cost of violating h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights. It discourages further oppression, signaling that violations cannot continue cost-free</u></strong>. All <u><strong>governments have a duty to exert such pressure. A commitment to human rights requires</u></strong> not only upholding them at home but also <u><strong>using</u></strong> <u><strong>available and appropriate tools to convince other governments to respect them as well. No repressive government likes facing such pressure</u></strong>. Today many are fighting back, hoping to dissuade others from adopting or continuing such measures. That reaction is hardly surprising. <u><strong>What is disappointing is</u></strong> the number of <u><strong>governments</u></strong> that, in the face of that reaction, are <u><strong>abandoning public pressure. With disturbing frequency, governments that might have been counted on to generate </u></strong>such <u><strong>pressure</u></strong> for human rights <u><strong>are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments and giving up. In place of a commitment to exerting public pressure for human rights, they profess a preference for</u></strong> softer approaches such as private "<u><strong>dialogue" and "cooperation</u></strong>." <u><strong><mark>There</u></strong></mark> is nothing inherently wrong with dialogue and cooperation to promote human rights. Persuading a government through dialogue to genuinely cooperate with efforts to improve its human rights record is a key goal of human rights advocacy. A cooperative approach makes sense for a government that demonstrably wants to respect human rights but lacks the resources or technical know-how to implement its commitment. It can also be useful for face-saving reasons-if a government is willing to end violations but wants to appear to act on its own initiative. Indeed, Human Rights Watch often engages quietly with governments for such reasons. But <u><strong>when the problem <mark>is a lack of political will</mark> to respect rights, public <mark>pressure is needed to change</mark> the <mark>cost-benefit analysis</mark> that leads to the choice of repression over rights</u></strong>. In such cases, <u><strong>the quest for <mark>dialogue</mark> and cooperation <mark>becomes a charade</mark> designed more <mark>to appease critics</mark> of complacency <mark>than to secure change</mark>, a calculated diversion from the fact that nothing of consequence is being done</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>the refusal to use pressure makes dialogue and cooperation less effective because governments know there is nothing to fear from simply feigning serious participation</u></strong>. Recent illustrations of <u><strong>this misguided approach include </u></strong>ASEAN's tepid response to Burmese repression, the United Nations' deferential attitude toward Sri Lankan atrocities, the European Union's obsequious approach to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the soft Western reaction to certain favored repressive African leaders such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, the weak United States policy toward Saudi Arabia, India's pliant posture toward Burma and Sri Lanka, and the <u><strong>near-universal cowardice in confronting China's deepening crackdown on basic liberties.</u></strong> In all of these cases, <u><strong>governments, by abandoning public pressure, effectively close their eyes to repression.</u></strong> Even those that shy away from using pressure in most cases are sometimes willing to apply it toward pariah governments, such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, whose behavior, whether on human rights or other matters, is so outrageous that it overshadows other interests. But <u><strong>in too many cases, governments these days are disappointingly disinclined to use public pressure to alter the calculus of repression. <mark>When governments stop</mark> exerting public <mark>pressure</mark> to address human rights violations, <mark>they</mark> <mark>leave domestic</mark> advocates-rights <mark>activists</mark>, sympathetic parliamentarians, concerned journalists-<mark>without </mark>crucial <mark>support. Pressure</mark> from abroad <mark>can</mark> help <mark>create</mark> the <mark>political space for</mark> local <mark>actors to push</mark> their <mark>government</mark> <mark>to respect rights</mark>. It also can let domestic advocates know that they are not alone, that others stand with them. But when there is</u></strong> little or <u><strong>no such pressure, repressive governments have a freer hand to restrict domestic advocates</u></strong>, as has occurred in recent years in Russia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And <u><strong><mark>because dialogue</mark> and cooperation <mark>look</mark> too much <mark>like</mark> acquiescence and <mark>acceptance,</mark> domestic <mark>advocates sense indifference</mark> rather than solidarity</u></strong>.</p>

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The attempt to condition china’s on a particular course of actions is the ethics of pure war in which all relations to being become impossible and humanity is reduced to a standing reserve

Introna 2010

Introna 2010 (Lucas, Professor of Organization, Technology and Ethics at Lancaster University, “The ‘Measure of a Man’ and the Ethos of Hospitality: Towards an Ethical Dwelling with Technology”, AI and Society Vol 25 no 1, pg 93-102, dml)

The urgency of justice is an urgency born out of the radical irreducible asymmetry of every ethical relation with the Other. Without such a radical asymmetry, the claim of the Other can always in principle become determined and codified into a calculation justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest. We can welcome the guest unconditionally but we must simultaneously assert that the host (and all other possible guests) are also, and need also be taken as, radically singular Others. Without this impossible possibility ethics and justice will not have the urgency of an ethics that really matters One may respond by claiming that an ethics of hospitality leaves us in a dead-end with nowhere to go It is when we believe that we have ‘sorted’ ethics out that violence is already present. Conversely, it is when we become unsure and we need to think afresh, that it becomes possible for us to be open to the questioning appeal of the otherness of the Other, to be truly hospitable an ethics of hospitality could be based on Undecidability and impossibility it is only when we suspend the law unconditionally to make a ‘fresh’ judgement, that hospitality becomes possible If the possibility of becoming unsettled by the otherness of the Other becomes circumvented by the self-evidence of the code then the law becomes a law onto itself pure violence The right of the humans to decide did not come up for consideration Without radically unsettling the implicit judgements about ‘‘the measure’’ to be considered ethics did not happen our human tendency to treat the inanimate, the artificial, as our instruments needs to be suspended unconditionally. Without such as step the possibility of an ethics of hospitality towards all beings is not possible.

Without this impossible possibility ethics will not have urgency it is only when we suspend the law unconditionally ( that hospitality becomes possible. If the possibility of becoming unsettled becomes circumvented then the law becomes pure violence Without radically unsettling the implicit judgements about ‘‘the measure’’ ethics did not happen our human tendency to treat the artificial, as our instruments needs to be suspended unconditionally. Without such as step the possibility of an ethics towards all beings is not possible

It is exactly this simultaneous presence of the Other and all other Others that gives birth to the question of justice. The urgency of justice is an urgency born out of the radical irreducible asymmetry of every ethical relation with the Other. Without such a radical asymmetry, the claim of the Other can always in principle become determined and codified into a calculation, justice as a calculation and distribution. Thus, justice has its standard, its force, in the ethical proximity of the singular Other. As Levinas (1991[1974], 159) asserts: ‘‘justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest. The equality of all is born by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting of self moves justice’’ (emphasis added). This formulation of the aporia between ethics and justice by Levinas highlights the tension, one may say the profound ‘paradox’ of hospitality in the relation between the quest and the host. We can welcome the guest (the wholly Other) unconditionally but we must simultaneously assert that the host (and all other possible guests) are also, and need also be taken as, radically singular Others. Without this impossible possibility ethics and justice (or rather hospitality) will not have the urgency of an ethics that really matters. Buts what does this mean for Data and all other artificial beings? 6 Responding to the wholly Other One may respond by claiming that an ethics of hospitality leaves us in a dead-end with nowhere to go. Yes, it does leave one in an impossible possibility but that is exactly its strength. It is when we believe that we have ‘sorted’ ethics out that violence is already present. Conversely, it is when we become unsure, when we are full of questions, when our categories fails us, and we need to think afresh, start all over again, that it becomes possible for us to be open to the questioning appeal of the otherness of the Other, to be truly hospitable. Where does this leave us? What do we concretely do? I will suggest—in following Derrida and Levinas—that an ethics of hospitality could be based on, but not limited to, the following aporia: • The suspension of the law (unconditionally) • Letting the Other speak • Undecidability and impossibility • Justice for all Others (for every third whatsoever) 6.1 The suspension of the law (unconditionally) Derrida (1992) suggests, as was argued above, that it is only when we suspend the law unconditionally (categories, codes, values, etc.) to make a ‘fresh’ judgement, that hospitality becomes possible. If the possibility of becoming unsettled by the otherness of the Other becomes circumvented by the self-evidence of the category, code, reasons, etc., then the law becomes a law onto itself—pure violence. Hospitality demands that we interrogate again and again the implicit judgements—inclusions and exclusions— already implied in the law. In the case of Data, the categories and judgements remained in tact in many interacting ways. It was Data that was on trial, not the humans. It was evident to everybody that he was the ‘lesser’ machine and that they had the right to decide his fate. The right of the humans to decide did not come up for consideration. Furthermore, once the court case started his friends ironically believed that his moral worth was in being ‘like them’. They did not suspend their categories of ‘machine’, ‘person’ and ‘sentience’ and asked the question ‘‘what is it about Data, as Data, that is significant’’. One can most certainly question whether Data really did find ‘justice’ in being spared because he was almost like them? Without radically unsettling the implicit judgements about ‘‘the measure’’ to be considered ethics did not happen. More generally, our human tendency to treat the inanimate, the artificial, as our instruments, as being in our service, for our purposes, needs to be suspended unconditionally. Without such as step the possibility of an ethics of hospitality towards all beings is not possible.

<h4><strong>The attempt to condition china’s on a particular course of actions is the ethics of pure war in which all relations to being become impossible and humanity is reduced to a standing reserve</h4><p>Introna 2010</strong> (Lucas, Professor of Organization, Technology and Ethics at Lancaster University, “The ‘Measure of a Man’ and the Ethos of Hospitality: Towards an Ethical Dwelling with Technology”, AI and Society Vol 25 no 1, pg 93-102, dml)</p><p>It is exactly this simultaneous presence of the Other and all other Others that gives birth to the question of justice. <u>The urgency of justice is an urgency born out of the radical irreducible asymmetry of every ethical relation with the Other. Without such a radical asymmetry, the claim of the Other can always in principle become determined and codified into a calculation</u>, justice as a calculation and distribution. Thus, justice has its standard, its force, in the ethical proximity of the singular Other. As Levinas (1991[1974], 159) asserts: ‘‘<u>justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest.</u> The equality of all is born by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting of self moves justice’’ (emphasis added). This formulation of the aporia between ethics and justice by Levinas highlights the tension, one may say the profound ‘paradox’ of hospitality in the relation between the quest and the host. <u>We can welcome the guest</u> (the wholly Other) <u>unconditionally but we must simultaneously assert that the host (and all other possible guests) are also, and need also be taken as, radically singular Others. <mark>Without this impossible possibility ethics</mark> and justice</u> (or rather hospitality) <u><mark>will not have</mark> the <mark>urgency</mark> of an ethics that really matters</u>. Buts what does this mean for Data and all other artificial beings? 6 Responding to the wholly Other <u>One may respond by claiming that an ethics of hospitality leaves us in a dead-end with nowhere to go</u>. Yes, it does leave one in an impossible possibility but that is exactly its strength. <u>It is when we believe that we have ‘sorted’ ethics out that violence is already present. Conversely, it is when we become unsure</u>, when we are full of questions, when our categories fails us, <u>and we need to think afresh,</u> start all over again, <u>that it becomes possible for us to be open to the questioning appeal of the otherness of the Other, to be truly hospitable</u>. Where does this leave us? What do we concretely do? I will suggest—in following Derrida and Levinas—that <u>an ethics of hospitality could be based on</u>, but not limited to, the following aporia: • The suspension of the law (unconditionally) • Letting the Other speak • <u>Undecidability and impossibility</u> • Justice for all Others (for every third whatsoever) 6.1 The suspension of the law (unconditionally) Derrida (1992) suggests, as was argued above, that <u><mark>it is only when we suspend the law unconditionally</u> (</mark>categories, codes, values, etc.) <u>to make a ‘fresh’ judgement, <mark>that hospitality becomes possible</u>. <u>If the possibility of becoming unsettled</mark> by the otherness of the Other <mark>becomes circumvented</mark> by the self-evidence of the </u>category, <u>code</u>, reasons, etc., <u><mark>then the law becomes</mark> a law onto itself</u>—<u><mark>pure violence</u></mark>. Hospitality demands that we interrogate again and again the implicit judgements—inclusions and exclusions— already implied in the law. In the case of Data, the categories and judgements remained in tact in many interacting ways. It was Data that was on trial, not the humans. It was evident to everybody that he was the ‘lesser’ machine and that they had the right to decide his fate. <u>The right of the humans to decide did not come up for consideration</u>. Furthermore, once the court case started his friends ironically believed that his moral worth was in being ‘like them’. They did not suspend their categories of ‘machine’, ‘person’ and ‘sentience’ and asked the question ‘‘what is it about Data, as Data, that is significant’’. One can most certainly question whether Data really did find ‘justice’ in being spared because he was almost like them? <u><mark>Without radically unsettling the implicit judgements about ‘‘the measure’’</mark> to be considered <mark>ethics did not happen</u></mark>. More generally, <u><mark>our human tendency to treat the</mark> inanimate, the <mark>artificial, as our instruments</u></mark>, as being in our service, for our purposes, <u><mark>needs to be suspended unconditionally. Without such as step the possibility of an ethics</mark> of hospitality <mark>towards all beings is not possible</mark>. </p></u>

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Political capital is key to tax reform

Thorndike 2/3

Thorndike 2/3 (Joseph Thorndike, director of Tax Analysts’ Tax History Project. I’m an historian, a regular columnist for Tax Analysts’ publications including Tax Notes magazine, and a writer for the Tax Analysts blog, Presidential Leadership Will Be Needed To Make Tax Reform A Reality," 2/3/2017, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2017/02/03/presidential-leadership-will-be-needed-to-make-tax-reform-a-reality/2/#7319530056d3, Accessed: 2-3-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)

The border adjustable tax is a particularly heavy lift given the opposition of key stakeholders and business constituents Tax reform creates winners and losers. The only way to make tax reform happen – even when the political winds are at the back of would-be reformers – is to fight hard for it. House leaders, including Speaker Paul Ryan, seem ready to go to the mat it will take more presidential leadership, too Without Reagan, tax reform wouldn’t have happened This year, it’s going to take another big dose of presidential leadership to make tax reform a reality – especially if the border adjustable tax is going to be a part of it. But Washington is full of good tax ideas that went nowhere, thanks to policy inertia and active resistance from potential “losers” in the reform process. If this year’s drive for reform is going to survive, President Trump will have to get busy It’s going to take real leadership

tax is a heavy lift, The only way to make tax reform happen is to fight hard for it it will take presidential leadership Without Reagan, tax reform wouldn’t have happened This year, it’s going to take another big dose of presidential leadership to make tax reform a reality Washington is full of policy inertia and active resistance If reform is going to survive Trump will have to get busy

The border adjustable tax is a particularly heavy lift, given the opposition of key stakeholders and business constituents (including major retailers and the Koch brothers). It’s a tired refrain in the tax community but it’s still true: Tax reform creates winners and losers. That makes it hard. And unlikely. The only way to make tax reform happen – even when the political winds are at the back of would-be reformers – is to fight hard for it. House leaders, including Speaker Paul Ryan, seem ready to go to the mat. But if the past is any guide, it will take more presidential leadership, too. In an article for Tax Notes this week, my colleague Mindy Herzfeld looks back to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and emphasizes the vital role Ronald Reagan played in getting the law passed. Without Reagan, tax reform wouldn’t have happened. This year, it’s going to take another big dose of presidential leadership to make tax reform a reality – especially if the border adjustable tax is going to be a part of it. There is much to like about the House proposal for replacing our dysfunctional tax (Bill Gale of the Brookings Institution laid out some of the proposal’s most appealing qualities in a recent op-ed). But Washington is full of good tax ideas that went nowhere, thanks to policy inertia and active resistance from potential “losers” in the reform process. If this year’s drive for reform is going to survive, President Trump will have to get busy. It’s going to take more than tortured interpretations of stray presidential comments to get tax reform written into law. It’s going to take real leadership.

<h4>Political capital is key to tax reform</h4><p><strong>Thorndike 2/3</strong> (Joseph Thorndike, director of Tax Analysts’ Tax History Project. I’m an historian, a regular columnist for Tax Analysts’ publications including Tax Notes magazine, and a writer for the Tax Analysts blog, Presidential Leadership Will Be Needed To Make Tax Reform A Reality," 2/3/2017, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2017/02/03/presidential-leadership-will-be-needed-to-make-tax-reform-a-reality/2/#7319530056d3, Accessed: 2-3-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p><u><strong>The border adjustable <mark>tax</mark> <mark>is a</mark> particularly <mark>heavy lift</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong>given the opposition of key stakeholders and business constituents</u></strong> (including major retailers and the Koch brothers). It’s a tired refrain in the tax community but it’s still true: <u><strong>Tax reform creates winners and losers.</u></strong> That makes it hard. And unlikely. <u><strong><mark>The only way to make tax reform happen</mark> – even when the political winds are at the back of would-be reformers – <mark>is to fight hard for it</mark>. House leaders, including Speaker Paul Ryan, seem ready to go to the mat</u></strong>. But if the past is any guide, <u><strong><mark>it will take</mark> more <mark>presidential leadership</mark>, too</u></strong>. In an article for Tax Notes this week, my colleague Mindy Herzfeld looks back to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and emphasizes the vital role Ronald Reagan played in getting the law passed. <u><strong><mark>Without Reagan, tax reform wouldn’t</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>have happened</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This year, it’s going to take another big dose of presidential leadership to make tax</mark> <mark>reform a reality</mark> – especially if the border adjustable tax is going to be a part of it.</u></strong> There is much to like about the House proposal for replacing our dysfunctional tax (Bill Gale of the Brookings Institution laid out some of the proposal’s most appealing qualities in a recent op-ed). <u><strong>But <mark>Washington is full of</mark> good tax ideas that went nowhere, thanks to <mark>policy inertia and active resistance</mark> from potential “losers” in the reform process.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>If</mark> this year’s drive for <mark>reform</mark> <mark>is going to survive</mark>, President <mark>Trump</mark> <mark>will</mark> <mark>have to get busy</u></strong></mark>. It’s going to take more than tortured interpretations of stray presidential comments to get tax reform written into law. <u><strong>It’s going to take real leadership</u></strong>.</p>

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China’s leaders will say “Yes” — it’s a good deal and good politics.

Glaser 16

Glaser 16 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the U S as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and a large reduction in the security threat posed by the U S The grand bargain therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might

the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at little cost. Chinese nationalist claims have blown disputes out of proportion China’s leaders might be able to deflate nationalist claims the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, and a reduction in the security threat posed by the U S therefore, could be appealing to a leadership that faces domestic challenges and regional opposition

The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless, the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the United States as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and, closely related, a large reduction in the security threat posed by the United States. The grand bargain, therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.

<h4>China’s leaders will say “<u>Yes</u>” — it’s <u>a good deal</u> and <u>good politics</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 16</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)</p><p><u>The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty</u>. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless, <u><mark>the grand bargain would provide China with a <strong>major achievement</strong> at </mark>arguably <strong><mark>little cost</strong>. </mark>Current <mark>Chinese nationalist claims have blown </mark>the importance of the maritime and sovereignty <mark>disputes </mark>in the South China and East China Seas <strong>far <mark>out of proportion</strong></mark> to their material value. If <mark>China’s leaders</mark> decide to prioritize other goals, they <mark>might be able to <strong>deflate </mark>these <mark>nationalist claims</strong></mark>, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that <mark>the grand bargain would provide <strong>large benefits to China</strong>, </mark>including elimination of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control <mark>and</u></mark>, closely related, <u><strong><mark>a </mark>large <mark>reduction in the security threat</strong> posed by the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u>The grand bargain</u>, <u><mark>therefore, could be <strong>appealing to a </mark>Chinese <mark>leadership</strong> that faces <strong></mark>daunting <mark>domestic challenges</strong> and <strong></mark>intensifying <mark>regional opposition</strong> </mark>to its assertive policies and growing military might</u>. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.</p>

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US-China war over Taiwan causes extinction.

<h4><strong>US-China war over Taiwan causes extinction. </h4></strong>

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Hanna Wilson

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Grand bargain solves the benefits of accommodation while preserving credibility in the region—solves aff disads

Glaser, 2015

Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB

The United States’ choice of whether to end its commitment to defend Taiwan is complicated further by uncertainty about the nature and extent of China’s goals If China places relatively little value on expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan, then even if U.S. accommodation generated doubts about U.S. resolve, they would be of little consequence if China’s aims are both limited and stable, then U.S. accommodation would not risk creating a more dangerous China the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitment to its allies

even if accommodation generated doubts about resolve, they would be of little consequence. accommodation would not risk a more dangerous China policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving benefits of accommodation concessions by China in a grand bargain could achieve this goal to make its commitment contingent on China making concessions the U S should design such a grand bargain to gain information about China’s motives demonstrate resolve and preserve the credibility of commitment to allies

The United States’ choice of whether to end its commitment to defend Taiwan is complicated further by uncertainty about the nature and extent of China’s goals. If China places relatively little value on expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan, then even if U.S. accommodation generated doubts about U.S. resolve, they would be of little consequence. In contrast, if China highly values winning all of its maritime disputes and pushing the United States out of Northeast Asia, then reductions in U.S. credibility would be more costly. Similarly, if China’s aims are both limited and stable, then U.S. accommodation would not risk creating a more dangerous China. In contrast, if China’s goals are still evolving and if U.S. accommodation would empower domestic hard-liners, then U.S. security would be reduced. Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies.

<h4>Grand bargain solves the benefits of accommodation while preserving credibility in the region—solves aff disads</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p><u>The United States’ choice of whether to end its commitment to defend Taiwan is complicated further by uncertainty about the nature and extent of China’s goals</u>. <u>If China places relatively little value on expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan, then <mark>even if </mark>U.S. <mark>accommodation generated doubts about</mark> U.S. <mark>resolve, they would be of little consequence</u>.</mark> In contrast, if China highly values winning all of its maritime disputes and pushing the United States out of Northeast Asia, then reductions in U.S. credibility would be more costly. Similarly, <u><strong>if China’s aims are both limited and stable, then U.S. <mark>accommodation would not risk </mark>creating<mark> a more dangerous China</u></strong></mark>. In contrast, if China’s goals are still evolving and if U.S. accommodation would empower domestic hard-liners, then U.S. security would be reduced. Therefore, <u>the question arises whether <strong><mark>policies exist that would reduce the risks</mark> <mark>while preserving </mark>the <mark>benefits of</mark> U.S. <mark>accommodation </mark>on Taiwan</u></strong>. <u>If combining certain <mark>concessions by China in</mark> an overall package—<strong><mark>a grand bargain</strong></mark>, for lack of a better term—<mark>could achieve this goal</mark>, then the United States’ best option might be <mark>to make</mark> ending <mark>its commitment</mark> to Taiwan <strong><mark>contingent</strong> on China making concessions </mark>of its own.</u> The preceding analysis suggests that <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should design such a grand bargain</mark> with a variety of purposes in mind: <mark>to gain information</mark> <mark>about </mark>the nature and extent of <mark>China’s</mark> <mark>motives</mark>; <strong>to <mark>demonstrate </mark>its <mark>resolve</strong></mark> to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; <mark>and</mark>, related, <strong>to <mark>preserve the credibility of </mark>its <mark>commitment</u></strong></mark>s<u><mark> to </mark>its <mark>allies</u></mark>.</p>

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Beats “link of omission” – silence on “formality” breeds passivity

Chandler ‘7

Chandler ‘7 (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster –

politics is no less important to many of us today. Politics still gives us a sense of social connection and social rootedness and gives meaning to many of our lives. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. We are less likely to engage in the formal politics of representation - of elections and governments - but in post-territorial politics, a This type of politics is on the one hand ‘global’ but, on the other, highly individualised ‘politics’ nowadays it is less the ‘old’ politics, of self-interest, political parties, and concern for governmental power, than the ‘new’ politics of global ethical concerns the practice of global politics tends to be non-instrumental, we do not subordinate ourselves to collective associations or parties and are more likely to give value to our aspirations, acts, or the fact of our awareness of an issue, as an end in-itself The practice of ‘doing politics’ as a form of religiosity is a highly conservative one. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ - this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine social engagement and transformation. I want to argue that global ethical politics reflects and institutionalises our sense of disconnection and social atomisation and results in irrational and unaccountable government policy making. People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests . I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creation of a sense of community through differences than with any political agreement Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brain-washed Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research. The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity – the awareness of our own ethics and values – than with engaging with the world when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world. have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God. Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our ‘political’ acts. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and organisation.

, politics is important We are less likely to engage in formal politics of governments but in post-territorial politics This type is global’ but individualised ‘politics’ nowadays is less ‘old’ politics, of government than of global ethical concern the practice tends to give value to aspiration as an end in-itself. The practice is highly conservative this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine engagement and transformation global ethical politics institutionalises disconnection and atomisation and results in unaccountable government policy making People argue there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political protests, I disagree these are individualised rather than attempts to engage politically people are concerned with sense of community Rather than political engagement radical political activism is a form of disengagement the most dangerous trends are frameworks which argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem while the task is to focus on alternative forms of living or thinking about the world Critical thought becomes wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, clarifying own ethical frameworks and biases before thinking about world affairs. This becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research The inward-looking narcissistic trends in academia where we are more concerned with our reflectivity than about how theory might be used to engage with the world Politics has become a religious activity less and less based on engagement and debate politics bring people into a one-to-one relationship in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God when we look for meaning inside ourselves rather than in consequences of our ‘political’ acts The more we engage in the new politics the less we engage with the outside world our peers and intellectual debate

“The Attraction of Post-Territorial Politics: Ethics and Activism in the International Sphere” – Inaugural Lecture – May – available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/short_articles/Inaugural%20lecture.pdf) However, politics is no less important to many of us today. Politics still gives us a sense of social connection and social rootedness and gives meaning to many of our lives. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. We are less likely to engage in the formal politics of representation - of elections and governments - but in post-territorial politics, a politics where there is much less division between the private sphere and the public one and much less division between national, territorial, concerns and global ones. This type of politics is on the one hand ‘global’ but, on the other, highly individualised: it is very much the politics of our everyday lives – the sense of meaning we get from thinking about global warming when we turn off the taps when we brush our teeth, take our rubbish out for recycling or cut back on our car use - we might also do global politics in deriving meaning from the ethical or social value of our work, or in our subscription or support for good causes from Oxfam to Greenpeace and Christian Aid. I want to suggest that when we do ‘politics’ nowadays it is less the ‘old’ politics, of self-interest, political parties, and concern for governmental power, than the ‘new’ politics of global ethical concerns. I further want to suggest that the forms and content of this new global approach to the political are more akin to religious beliefs and practices than to the forms of our social political engagement in the past. Global politics is similar to religious approaches in three vital respects: 1) global post-territorial politics are no longer concerned with power, its’ concerns are free-floating and in many ways, existential, about how we live our lives; 2) global politics revolve around practices with are private and individualised, they are about us as individuals and our ethical choices; 3) the practice of global politics tends to be non-instrumental, we do not subordinate ourselves to collective associations or parties and are more likely to give value to our aspirations, acts, or the fact of our awareness of an issue, as an end in-itself. It is as if we are upholding our goodness or ethicality in the face of an increasingly confusing, problematic and alienating world – our politics in this sense are an expression or voice, in Marx’s words, of ‘the heart in a heartless world’ or ‘the soul of a soulless condition’. The practice of ‘doing politics’ as a form of religiosity is a highly conservative one. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ - this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine social engagement and transformation. I want to argue that global ethical politics reflects and institutionalises our sense of disconnection and social atomisation and results in irrational and unaccountable government policy making. I want to illustrate my points by briefly looking at the practices of global ethics in three spheres, those of radical political activism, government policy making and academia. Radical activism People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones - there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creation of a sense of community through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, that political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions, it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brain-washed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever increasing awareness of themselves and by giving ‘political’ meaning to every personal action. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement or organisation. Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that ‘foreign policy is no longer foreign policy’ (Timothy Garten Ash, ‘Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for’, 26 April 2007), this is certainly true. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing ‘identity’. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the ‘value-based’ interventions from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blair’s recent Foreign Affairs article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, 86:1 (2007), pp.79–90). Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political agenda for - the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere – the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making based on a clear political programme to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict etc – of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the US or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the ‘civilised world’, NATO or the EU are on the line in ‘wars of choice’ from the war on terror to the war on global warming lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of Realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or cohere political programmes. As Baudrillard suggests, without a connection to the ‘represented’ masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’ (In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, for example). It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. As Donald Rumsfeld stated about the war on terror, ‘there are no metrics’ to help assess whether the war is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber once counterposed this type of politics – the ‘ethics of conviction’ – to the ‘ethics of responsibility’ in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues from war crimes to EU membership requirements. Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism’s ontological focus. It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with ‘what is’ as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull’s (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead. The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity – the awareness of our own ethics and values – than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world. Conclusion I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy. Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God. Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our ‘political’ acts. What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory – the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and organisation.

<h4><strong>Beats “link of omission” – silence on “formality” breeds passivity</h4><p>Chandler ‘7</p><p></strong>(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – </p><p>“The Attraction of Post-Territorial Politics: Ethics and Activism in the International Sphere” – Inaugural Lecture – May – available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/short_articles/Inaugural%20lecture.pdf) </p><p>However<mark>, <u><strong>politics is</mark> no less <mark>important</mark> to many of us today. Politics still gives us a sense of social connection and social rootedness and gives meaning to many of our lives. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. <mark>We are less likely to engage in</mark> the <mark>formal politics</mark> of representation - <mark>of </mark>elections and<mark> governments</mark> - <mark>but in post-territorial politics</mark>, a </u></strong>politics where there is much less division between the private sphere and the public one and much less division between national, territorial, concerns and global ones. <u><strong><mark>This type </mark>of politics<mark> is</mark> on the one hand ‘<mark>global’ but</mark>, on the other, highly <mark>individualised</u></strong></mark>: it is very much the politics of our everyday lives – the sense of meaning we get from thinking about global warming when we turn off the taps when we brush our teeth, take our rubbish out for recycling or cut back on our car use - we might also do global politics in deriving meaning from the ethical or social value of our work, or in our subscription or support for good causes from Oxfam to Greenpeace and Christian Aid. I want to suggest that when we do<u> <mark>‘<strong>politics’ nowadays</mark> it <mark>is less </mark>the<mark> ‘old’ politics, of</mark> self-interest, political parties, and concern for <mark>government</mark>al power, <mark>than</mark> the ‘new’ politics<mark> of global ethical concern</mark>s</u></strong>. I further want to suggest that the forms and content of this new global approach to the political are more akin to religious beliefs and practices than to the forms of our social political engagement in the past. Global politics is similar to religious approaches in three vital respects: 1) global post-territorial politics are no longer concerned with power, its’ concerns are free-floating and in many ways, existential, about how we live our lives; 2) global politics revolve around practices with are private and individualised, they are about us as individuals and our ethical choices; 3) <u><strong><mark>the practice</mark> of global politics <mark>tends to</mark> be non-instrumental, we do not subordinate ourselves to collective associations or parties and are more likely to <mark>give value to</mark> our <mark>aspiration</mark>s, acts, or the fact of our awareness of an issue, <mark>as an end in-itself</u></strong>.</mark> It is as if we are upholding our goodness or ethicality in the face of an increasingly confusing, problematic and alienating world – our politics in this sense are an expression or voice, in Marx’s words, of ‘the heart in a heartless world’ or ‘the soul of a soulless condition’. <u><strong><mark>The practice</mark> of ‘doing politics’ as a form of religiosity <mark>is </mark>a<mark> highly conservative </mark>one. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ - <mark>this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine</mark> social <mark>engagement and transformation</mark>. I want to argue that <mark>global ethical politics</mark> reflects and <mark>institutionalises</mark> our sense of <mark>disconnection and</mark> social <mark>atomisation and results in</mark> irrational and <mark>unaccountable government policy making</strong></mark>.</u> I want to illustrate my points by briefly looking at the practices of global ethics in three spheres, those of radical political activism, government policy making and academia. Radical activism <u><strong><mark>People </mark>often<mark> argue </mark>that<mark> there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political</mark> activist <mark>protests</u></strong>,</mark> such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda<u><strong>. <mark>I disagree</mark>; <mark>these</mark> new forms of protest <mark>are</mark> highly <mark>individualised</u></strong></mark> and personal ones - there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, <u><strong><mark>rather than attempts to engage politically</mark> with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if <mark>people are</mark> more <mark>concerned with</mark> the creation of a <mark>sense of community</mark> through differences than with any political</strong> </u>debate, shared <u>agreement</u> or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, that political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions, it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. <u><strong><mark>Rather than</mark> a <mark>political engagement</mark> with the world, it seems that <mark>radical political activism</mark> today <mark>is a form of</mark> social <mark>disengagement</mark> – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brain-washed</strong> </u>by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever increasing awareness of themselves and by giving ‘political’ meaning to every personal action. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement or organisation. Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that ‘foreign policy is no longer foreign policy’ (Timothy Garten Ash, ‘Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for’, 26 April 2007), this is certainly true. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing ‘identity’. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the ‘value-based’ interventions from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blair’s recent Foreign Affairs article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, 86:1 (2007), pp.79–90). Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political agenda for - the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere – the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making based on a clear political programme to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict etc – of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the US or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the ‘civilised world’, NATO or the EU are on the line in ‘wars of choice’ from the war on terror to the war on global warming lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of Realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or cohere political programmes. As Baudrillard suggests, without a connection to the ‘represented’ masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’ (In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, for example). It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. As Donald Rumsfeld stated about the war on terror, ‘there are no metrics’ to help assess whether the war is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber once counterposed this type of politics – the ‘ethics of conviction’ – to the ‘ethics of responsibility’ in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues from war crimes to EU membership requirements. <u><strong>Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work</u></strong>. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. <u><strong>The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic.</u></strong> However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism’s ontological focus. It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with ‘what is’ as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But <u><strong><mark>the most dangerous trends</mark> in the discipline today <mark>are</mark> those <mark>frameworks which</mark> have taken up Critical Theory and <mark>argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem</mark>-solving <mark>while</mark> <mark>the task</mark> for critical theorists <mark>is to focus on</mark> emancipatory <mark>alternative forms of living</mark> <mark>or</mark> of <mark>thinking about the world</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Critical thought</mark> then <mark>becomes</mark> a process of <mark>wishful thinking</mark> <mark>rather than one of engagement,</mark> with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on <mark>clarifying</mark> our <mark>own ethical frameworks and biases</mark> and positionality, <mark>before thinking about</mark> or teaching on <mark>world affairs. This becomes ‘me-search’ rather than research</mark>.</u></strong> We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull’s (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead. <u><strong><mark>The inward-looking</mark> and <mark>narcissistic</mark> <mark>trends in academia</mark>, <mark>where we are more concerned</mark> <mark>with our</mark> <mark>reflectivity</mark> – the awareness of our own ethics and values – than with engaging with the world</u></strong>, was brought home to me <u><strong>when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, <mark>than</mark> <mark>about</mark> <mark>how theory might be used to</mark> understand and <mark>engage with the world</mark>.</u></strong> Conclusion I <u><strong>have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. <mark>Politics has become a religious</mark> <mark>activity</mark>, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is <mark>less and less</mark> an activity <mark>based</mark> <mark>on</mark> social <mark>engagement and</mark> the testing of ideas in public <mark>debate</mark> or in the academy</u></strong>. <u><strong>Doing <mark>politics</mark> today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to <mark>bring people into a one-to-one</mark> <mark>relationship</mark> with global issues <mark>in the same way religious</mark> <mark>people have a one-to-one relationship with their God</mark>. Politics is increasingly like religion because <mark>when we look for meaning</mark> we find it <mark>inside ourselves rather than in</mark> the external <mark>consequences of our ‘political’ acts</mark>. </u></strong>What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory – the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. <u><strong><mark>The more we engage in the new politics</mark> where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, <mark>the less we engage</mark> instrumentally <mark>with the outside world</mark>, and the less we engage with <mark>our peers</mark> <mark>and</mark> colleagues at the level of political or <mark>intellectual debate</mark> and organisation.</u></strong> </p>

K – Legal Reformism

1NC

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N

Berkeley

5

McDonogh JN

Anastasia Kazteridis

1AC - Fugitivity 1NC - Framework Legalism K 2NC - Framework 1NR - Legalism 2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt

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Policy making stifles change because of gender constraints

Schofield and Goodwin 10 )

Schofield and Goodwin 10 (Tom and Susan, 2010, "," No Publication,  HYPERLINK "http://www.engagingmen.net/files/resources/2010/emmafulu/Public_policy-SchofieldGoodwin_2006.pdf" \t "_blank" http://www.engagingmen.net/files/resources/2010/emmafulu/Public_policy-SchofieldGoodwin_2006.pdf)

The specificity of our approach to studying gender politics and gender equality in public policy and institutions is well illustrated by comparison with the predominant approach. It does so by examining correlations of policy outcomes and actions among a range of players, including government and stakeholder officials Louise Chappell’s (2002) study of gender politics in Australian and Canadian political institutions is also informed by the methods and theories of political science. According to Chappell, it is the “gendering” of this interplay that creates opportunities for or constraints on feminist action. Chappell argues that this derives from the operation of “gender norms” A second reason is the absence of systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between “norms” and the political action discussed. As a result, “gender norms” and political action are connected as a correlation that implies a particular institutional gender dynamic (or dynamics) by which the correlation is produced. Yet the dynamic (dynamics) itself is not explored to explain exactly how and why particular “gender norms” and political actions are linked and produced within institutions.

The specificity of our approach to studying gender politics and gender equality in public policy and institutions is well illustrated by comparison with the predominant approach it is the “gendering” of this interplay that creates opportunities for or constraints on feminist action. this derives from the operation of “gender norms”

The specificity of our approach to studying gender politics and gender equality in public policy and institutions is well illustrated by comparison with the predominant approach. The latter is informed by theories and methods developed mainly by political science, especially those used in international comparative analysis of the policies and politics of nation states. The ongoing and large-scale study, established in 1995 by a transatlantic network of scholars (Research Network on Gender Politics and the State) to explore “routes to feminist policy formation” in political institutions (Mazur 2002), exemplifies this approach. Its main purpose is to explore whether, how and under what conditions women’s policy machinery and women’s movement activism in policy making in Europe and North America are associated with achieving “positive policy outcomes”1.. It does so by examining correlations of policy outcomes and actions among a range of players, including government and stakeholder officials (Research Network on Gender Politics and Gender Politics and Public Policy Making - 3 the State – RNGPS 2005). On the basis of these findings the RNGS researchers suggest a kind of taxonomy of the types of political alliances among women’s movement actors, women’s policy agencies and other government players that can achieve “positive policy outcomes”. However, the study’s methodology does not permit the researchers to explain why and how successful alliances develop to advance “positive policy outcomes”, and why and how they may not. Louise Chappell’s (2002) study of gender politics in Australian and Canadian political institutions is also informed by the methods and theories of political science. She draws strongly on neo-institutionalist approaches to the state, examining the interplay of a number of state institutions over time and between two polities, to determine how they influence feminist political action (Chappell 2002, 4-9). According to Chappell, it is the “gendering” of this interplay that creates opportunities for or constraints on feminist action. Chappell argues that this derives from the operation of “gender norms”. But it is not clear exactly how these influence political behaviour. One reason is that the meaning of “gender norms” is not fully elaborated in theoretical terms. Sylvia Walby (2004, 8) has suggested that the lack of theoretical explanation is an inherent characteristic of the “gender norms” approach generally. A second reason is the absence of systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between “norms” and the political action discussed. As a result, “gender norms” and political action are connected as a correlation that implies a particular institutional gender dynamic (or dynamics) by which the correlation is produced. Yet the dynamic (dynamics) itself is not explored to explain exactly how and why particular “gender norms” and political actions are linked and produced within institutions.

<h4>Policy making stifles change because of gender constraints</h4><p><strong>Schofield and Goodwin 10</strong> (Tom and Susan, 2010, "," No Publication,  HYPERLINK "http://www.engagingmen.net/files/resources/2010/emmafulu/Public_policy-SchofieldGoodwin_2006.pdf" \t "_blank" http://www.engagingmen.net/files/resources/2010/emmafulu/Public_policy-SchofieldGoodwin_2006.pdf<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>The specificity of our approach to studying gender politics and gender equality in public policy and institutions is well illustrated by comparison with the predominant approach</mark>.</u></strong> The latter is informed by theories and methods developed mainly by political science, especially those used in international comparative analysis of the policies and politics of nation states. The ongoing and large-scale study, established in 1995 by a transatlantic network of scholars (Research Network on Gender Politics and the State) to explore “routes to feminist policy formation” in political institutions (Mazur 2002), exemplifies this approach. Its main purpose is to explore whether, how and under what conditions women’s policy machinery and women’s movement activism in policy making in Europe and North America are associated with achieving “positive policy outcomes”1.. <u><strong>It does so by examining correlations of policy outcomes and actions among a range of players, including government and stakeholder officials </u></strong>(Research Network on Gender Politics and Gender Politics and Public Policy Making - 3 the State – RNGPS 2005). On the basis of these findings the RNGS researchers suggest a kind of taxonomy of the types of political alliances among women’s movement actors, women’s policy agencies and other government players that can achieve “positive policy outcomes”. However, the study’s methodology does not permit the researchers to explain why and how successful alliances develop to advance “positive policy outcomes”, and why and how they may not. <u><strong>Louise Chappell’s (2002) study of gender politics in Australian and Canadian political institutions is also informed by the methods and theories of political science.</u></strong> She draws strongly on neo-institutionalist approaches to the state, examining the interplay of a number of state institutions over time and between two polities, to determine how they influence feminist political action (Chappell 2002, 4-9). <u><strong>According to Chappell, <mark>it is the “gendering” of this interplay that creates opportunities for or constraints on feminist action.</mark> Chappell argues that <mark>this derives from the operation of “gender norms”</u></strong></mark>. But it is not clear exactly how these influence political behaviour. One reason is that the meaning of “gender norms” is not fully elaborated in theoretical terms. Sylvia Walby (2004, 8) has suggested that the lack of theoretical explanation is an inherent characteristic of the “gender norms” approach generally. <u><strong>A second reason is the absence of systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between “norms” and the political action discussed. As a result, “gender norms” and political action are connected as a correlation that implies a particular institutional gender dynamic (or dynamics) by which the correlation is produced. Yet the dynamic (dynamics) itself is not explored to explain exactly how and why particular “gender norms” and political actions are linked and produced within institutions.</p></u></strong>

2NC/NR

1 K

Framework

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Mile High Classic

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Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk

John Mckiernan

Taiwan Aff - Taiwan - Relations - Solvency 1NC - T - Fem K - Solvency (On Case) 2NC - K - FWK - Perm 1NR - Solvency 2NR Choice - Weigh K and case using Framework o Solvency

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Chinese respect for human rights is modeled globally---solves conflict and democratic peace

Schulz 9

Schulz 9 - Senior Fellow in human rights policy at the Center for American Progress, served as Executive Director of Amnesty International USA from 1994 to 2006 (William F., January 2009, Strategic Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China, Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/china_human_rights.pdf)//BB

The decision to de-link human rights and trade, made early in the Clinton administration, removed one vehicle for exerting pressure on China without offering up an alternative Bush further softened policy on China’s human rights record, subordinating the issue to economic priorities the Bush administration chose, ironically enough, to drop China from the State Department’s list of worst human rights violators three days before China’s crackdown on Tibet in March 2008 Yet the state of human rights in China is critically important both in terms of international human rights norms and American interests measured by the sheer numbers of people being affected by abuse of their rights, China may be the premier violator of civil and political rights in the world Furthermore, because of China’s very size and reach, its posture toward human rights has a profound influence on how human rights norms and practices are perceived at the United Nations, in developing countries where China is expanding its engagement at a rapid rate and throughout Asia Human rights standards have evolved standards can devolve if powerful nations seek regressive changes casting the entire human rights regimen into jeopardy significant improvement in China’s human rights policies would reverberate widely around the world removing a model of authoritarianism for others to mimic or hide behind Improving China’s human rights record will pay enormous dividends for the United States as well states that allow themselves to be held to account by their own citizens and respect the rule of law tend to be more reliable partners in their relations with other states. Any authoritarian country is inherently brittle, caught up in needless preoccupation with controlling its own population and warding off dissent A fickle approach to the rule of law jeopardizes everything from business contracts for American corporations to enforcement of trade and environmental agreements if we accept the commonly agreed proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, launch wars against other democracies, then a more democratic China is likely to be a less belligerent China were China to place a higher value on human rights, it might well be willing to bear a greater portion of the burden for such things as U.N. human rights mechanisms and the resolution of international crises stemming from injustice

The decision to de-link h r and trade removed one vehicle for exerting pressure on China the state of h r in China is critically important in international h r norms standards can devolve casting the entire h r regimen into jeopardy significant improvement in China’s h r would reverberate widely if we accept that democracies rarely launch wars against other democracies, a more democratic China is likely to be a less belligerent China

The decision to de-link human rights and trade, made early in the Clinton administration, removed one vehicle for exerting pressure on China—albeit a vehicle that had yielded limited results—without offering up an alternative. The Bush administration further softened policy on China’s human rights record, subordinating the issue to economic priorities and strategic concerns about North Korea. Though it maintained pressure on China to improve its record on religious rights in the country, the Bush administration chose, ironically enough, to drop China from the State Department’s list of worst human rights violators three days before China’s crackdown on Tibet in March 2008. Yet the state of human rights in China is critically important both in terms of international human rights norms and American interests. To be sure, there are no mass killings going on in China, as there are in Darfur, and while Beijing is highly repressive, its authoritarian leaders are more open to outside influence than the generals who rule in Myanmar. But measured by the sheer numbers of people being affected by abuse of their rights, China may be the premier violator of civil and political rights in the world. Furthermore, because of China’s very size and reach, its posture toward human rights has a profound influence on how human rights norms and practices are perceived at the United Nations, in developing countries where China is expanding its engagement at a rapid rate,10 and throughout Asia. Human rights standards (and the legal regimens that codify them) have evolved over the last two centuries; what had been accepted as normative, such as slavery, is regarded today as abhorrent and a violation of international law. But those standards can devolve as well, especially if powerful nations seek regressive changes or instigate regressive norms—casting the entire human rights regimen into jeopardy. Conversely, significant improvement in China’s human rights policies would reverberate widely around the world, removing a model of authoritarianism for others to mimic or hide behind. Improving China’s human rights record will pay enormous dividends for the United States as well. Americans have been far too easily swayed by the notion that China’s economic advances have by necessity come at the expense of a sacrifice of civil and political rights. Businesses especially have been persuaded that economic growth will be sufficient to usher in political change…eventually.11 And many Americans are wary of the security issues implicated in competition with China, asking whether we should alienate such an important emerging power over issues like democracy or religious freedom. But states that allow themselves to be held to account by their own citizens and respect the rule of law tend to be more reliable partners in their relations with other states. Any authoritarian country is inherently brittle, caught up in needless preoccupation with controlling its own population and warding off dissent. That makes for suspicion and resentment of outsiders. The absence of a viable opposition or fully independent press makes a ruling party less wary of abrogating international agreements or alienating other nations for no good reason. A fickle approach to the rule of law jeopardizes everything from business contracts for American corporations to enforcement of trade and environmental agreements. Cheap Chinese labor undercuts American jobs; the higher the labor standards in a country, the slower the U.S. trade deficit grows.12 Moreover, if we accept the commonly agreed proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, launch wars against other democracies, then a more democratic China is likely to be a less belligerent China—at least in the long run. Finally, were China to place a higher value on human rights, it might well be willing to bear a greater portion of the burden for such things as U.N. human rights mechanisms and the resolution of international crises stemming from injustice.

<h4>Chinese respect for human rights is modeled globally---solves <u>conflict</u> and <u>democratic peace</h4><p></u><strong>Schulz 9</strong> - Senior Fellow in human rights policy at the Center for American Progress, served as Executive Director of Amnesty International USA from 1994 to 2006 (William F., January 2009, Strategic Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China, Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/china_human_rights.pdf)//BB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The decision to de-link h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>and trade</mark>, made early in the Clinton administration, <mark>removed one vehicle for exerting pressure on China</u></strong></mark>—albeit a vehicle that had yielded limited results—<u><strong>without offering up an alternative</u></strong>. The <u><strong>Bush</u></strong> administration <u><strong>further softened policy on China’s human rights record, subordinating the issue to economic priorities</u></strong> and strategic concerns about North Korea. Though it maintained pressure on China to improve its record on religious rights in the country, <u><strong>the Bush administration chose, ironically enough, to drop China from the State Department’s list of worst human rights violators three days before China’s crackdown on Tibet in March 2008</u></strong>. <u><strong>Yet <mark>the state of h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>in China is critically important</mark> both <mark>in</mark> terms of <mark>international h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>norms</mark> and American interests</u></strong>. To be sure, there are no mass killings going on in China, as there are in Darfur, and while Beijing is highly repressive, its authoritarian leaders are more open to outside influence than the generals who rule in Myanmar. But <u><strong>measured by the sheer numbers of people being affected by abuse of their rights, China may be the premier violator of civil and political rights in the world</u></strong>. <u><strong>Furthermore, because of China’s very size and reach, its posture toward human rights has a profound influence on how human rights norms and practices are perceived at the United Nations, in developing countries where China is expanding its engagement at a rapid rate</u></strong>,10 <u><strong>and throughout Asia</u></strong>. <u><strong>Human rights standards</u></strong> (and the legal regimens that codify them) <u><strong>have evolved</u></strong> over the last two centuries; what had been accepted as normative, such as slavery, is regarded today as abhorrent and a violation of international law. But those <u><strong><mark>standards can devolve</u></strong></mark> as well, especially <u><strong>if powerful nations seek regressive changes</u></strong> or instigate regressive norms—<u><strong><mark>casting the entire h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>regimen into jeopardy</u></strong></mark>. Conversely, <u><strong><mark>significant improvement in China’s h</mark>uman <mark>r</mark>ights policies <mark>would reverberate widely</mark> around the world</u></strong>, <u><strong>removing a model of authoritarianism for others to mimic or hide behind</u></strong>. <u><strong>Improving China’s human rights record will pay enormous dividends for the United States as well</u></strong>. Americans have been far too easily swayed by the notion that China’s economic advances have by necessity come at the expense of a sacrifice of civil and political rights. Businesses especially have been persuaded that economic growth will be sufficient to usher in political change…eventually.11 And many Americans are wary of the security issues implicated in competition with China, asking whether we should alienate such an important emerging power over issues like democracy or religious freedom. But <u><strong>states that allow themselves to be held to account by their own citizens and respect the rule of law tend to be more reliable partners in their relations with other states. Any authoritarian country is inherently brittle, caught up in needless preoccupation with controlling its own population and warding off dissent</u></strong>. That makes for suspicion and resentment of outsiders. The absence of a viable opposition or fully independent press makes a ruling party less wary of abrogating international agreements or alienating other nations for no good reason. <u><strong>A fickle approach to the rule of law jeopardizes everything from business contracts for American corporations to enforcement of trade and environmental agreements</u></strong>. Cheap Chinese labor undercuts American jobs; the higher the labor standards in a country, the slower the U.S. trade deficit grows.12 Moreover, <u><strong><mark>if we accept</mark> the commonly agreed proposition <mark>that democracies rarely</mark>, if ever, <mark>launch</mark> <mark>wars against other democracies,</mark> then <mark>a more democratic China is likely to be a less belligerent China</u></strong></mark>—at least in the long run. Finally, <u><strong>were China to place a higher value on human rights, it might well be willing to bear a greater portion of the burden for such things as U.N. human rights mechanisms and the resolution of international crises stemming from injustice</u></strong>. </p>

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Harker JW

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1AC Nuclear cooperation 1NC Inherency Green Tech Bubble DA T-Engagement HR Condition CP 2NR Inherency

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Engagement is the attempt to influence Chinese policy change through enhancing political contacts – economic and diplomatic contacts are distinct from military and cultural

Resnick, 1

Resnick, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

I define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural a list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS diplomatic recognition Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions Summit meetings MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges . Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the policy behavior of the target state This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends

define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a state through establishment of contacts with that state .e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS diplomatic recognitio Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions Summit meetings MILITARY CONTACTS Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures .

* A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

<h4>Engagement is the attempt to influence Chinese policy change through enhancing political contacts – economic and diplomatic contacts are distinct from military and cultural</h4><p><strong>Resnick, 1 </strong>– Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)</p><p>* A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, <u><strong>I</u></strong> propose that we<u><strong> <mark>define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a</mark> target <mark>state through</mark> the</u></strong> comprehensive <u><strong><mark>establishment</mark> and enhancement <mark>of contacts with that state</mark> across multiple issue-areas (i<mark>.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural</u></strong>).</mark> The following is <u><strong>a</u></strong> brief <u><strong>list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: <mark>DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS</mark> </u></strong>Extension of <u><strong><mark>diplomatic recognitio</mark>n</u></strong>; normalization of diplomatic relations <u><strong><mark>Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions</u></strong></mark> and regimes <u><strong><mark>Summit meetings</u></strong></mark> and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa <u><strong><mark>MILITARY CONTACTS</mark> Visits of senior military officials</u></strong> of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa <u><strong><mark>Arms transfers</mark> <mark>Military aid</u></strong> <u><strong>and cooperation</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Military exchange and training programs</mark> <mark>Confidence and security-building measures</mark> Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants</u></strong> <u><strong>CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges</u></strong>(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains<u><strong>. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the</u></strong> domestic and/or foreign <u><strong>policy behavior of the target state</u></strong>. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. <u><strong>This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement<mark>. </mark>It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends</u></strong>, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.</p>

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Edina RW

Ben Zeppos

1AC Arms Sales 1NC Psychoanalysis T Military Unconditional Engagement CP and Asian Prolif DA 2NR Pyschoanalysis

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Economic decline leads to nuclear war

Tønnesson 15

Tønnesson 15 (Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311)

recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so Deterrence could lose its credibility great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional war

Interdependence raises the cost of conflict If leaders seriously anticipate their nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate force , and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms a shift could happen abruptly The greatest risk is changes in the world economy alter circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace precarious This could have consequences with nuclear deterrence the only factor to protect from Armageddon, . Deterrence could lose credibility great powers might gamble in a cyber or conventional war

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

<h4>Economic decline leads to nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Tønnesson 15</strong> (Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311)</p><p>Several <u><strong>recent works</u></strong> on China and Sino–US relations <u><strong>have made</u></strong> substantial <u><strong>contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances</u></strong> a combination of <u><strong>nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers</u></strong>. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that <u><strong>interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict</u></strong> are right. <u><strong><mark>Interdependence raises the cost of conflict</u></strong></mark> for all sides <u><strong>but</u></strong> <u><strong>asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations</u></strong> may <u><strong>generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that</u></strong> in turn <u><strong>increase the risk of military conflict</u></strong> (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, <u><strong>decisions for war</u></strong> and peace <u><strong>are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations</u></strong>. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. <u><strong><mark>If leaders</u></strong></mark> on either side of the Atlantic <u><strong>begin to <mark>seriously</mark> fear or <mark>anticipate their</mark> own <mark>nation’s decline</u></strong></mark> then <u><strong><mark>they may blame</u></strong></mark> this on <u><strong><mark>external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate</mark> the use of <mark>force</mark> to gain</u></strong> respect or <u><strong>credibility, adopt protectionist policies<mark>, and</u></strong></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>refuse to be deterred by</u></strong></mark> either <u><strong><mark>nuclear arms</mark> or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such <mark>a</mark> dangerous <mark>shift could happen abruptly</u></strong></mark>, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions <u><strong>in East Asia</u></strong> are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. <u><strong><mark>The greatest risk is</mark> not</u></strong> that <u><strong>a territorial dispute</u></strong> leads to war under present circumstances <u><strong>but that <mark>changes in the world economy alter</mark> those <mark>circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace</mark> more <mark>precarious</u></strong></mark>. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. <u><strong><mark>This could have</mark> unforeseen <mark>consequences</mark> in the field of security, <mark>with nuclear deterrence</mark> remaining <mark>the only factor to protect</mark> the world <mark>from Armageddon, </mark>and unreliably so</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>Deterrence could lose</mark> its <mark>credibility</u></strong></mark>: one of the two <u><strong><mark>great powers might gamble</mark> that the other yield <mark>in a cyber</mark>-war <mark>or conventional</u></strong></mark> limited <u><strong><mark>war</u></strong></mark>, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene. </p>

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Damien MP

Joel Lemuel

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Plan demonstrates resolve – avoids their appeasement and allies disads – even if they say no – the plan communicates valuable information about China’s intentions—only a qpq bargain solves

Glaser, 2015

Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China

Insisting concessions would demonstrate resolve the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests if China were uncompromising. the key issue comes back to information if China is likely to have unlimited aims the risks are larger China’s refusal would indicate more ambitious aims compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a deal that included resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase security by eliminating disputes that via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.

<h4>Plan demonstrates resolve – avoids their appeasement and allies disads – even if they say no – the plan communicates valuable information about China’s intentions—only a qpq bargain solves</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p><u><mark>Insisting </mark>on Chinese <mark>concessions</mark> <mark>would</mark> also <strong><mark>demonstrate </mark>U.S. <mark>resolve</strong></mark> to protect American interests</u>. <u>By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, <strong><mark>the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests</strong></mark> in the South China and East China Seas,</u> <u><mark>if China were uncompromising.</mark> </u>Once again, <u><strong><mark>the key issue</strong></mark> from the U.S. perspective <strong><mark>comes back to information</strong></mark>—<mark>if China is</mark> more <mark>likely to have unlimited aims</mark>, then <mark>the</mark> <mark>risks</mark> of U.S. accommodation <mark>are larger</mark> and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. </u>As argued above, <u><mark>China’s refusal</mark> to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests</u> (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), <u><mark>would indicate more ambitious</mark> Chinese <mark>aims</mark>.</u> Thus, <u><strong><mark>compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a</mark> package <mark>deal</mark> <mark>that included</mark> Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve</strong>. In addition, <mark>resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase</mark> U.S. <mark>security</mark> <mark>by eliminating disputes</mark> <mark>that</mark>, <mark>via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises</mark> with China</u>.</p>

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Notre Dame MP

Jack Lassiter

1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out) 1NC - Security K T-Reznick 2NR - K

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The impact is global existential crises driven by the worst excesses of neoliberal exploitation

Srnicek and Williams 15

Srnicek and Williams 15 – *PhD in IR @ LSE, **PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis entitled Hegemony and Complexity (Nick and Alex, “Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work,” Kindle Book)

localism extends far beyond the left, inflecting the politics of pro-capitalists, anti-capitalists, radicals and mainstream culture alike, as a new kind of political common sense. Shared between all of these is a belief that abstraction is at the root of our present political, ecological and economic problems, and that the solution therefore lies in adopting a small approach Small-scale actions immediate communities, face-to-face interaction characterise the localist worldview localism has a seductive logic to it contemporary anarchist practice, offers to do something concrete enabling political action with immediately noticeable effects But this sense of empowerment can be misleading The problem with localism is that, in attempting to reduce large-scale systemic problems to the more manageable sphere of the local community, it denies the systemically interconnected nature of today’s world. Problems such as global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, and the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract complex and non-localised. Though they touch upon every locality, they are never fully manifested in any particular region these are systemic and abstract problems, requiring systemic and abstract responses Though undoubtedly well-meaning, both the radical and mainstream left partake in localist politics and economics to their detriment

localism is a belief abstraction is at the root of our ecological and economic problems and the solution therefore lies in a ‘small approach this sense of empowerment can be misleading attempting to reduce large-scale systemic problems to the manageable sphere of the local denies the interconnected world global exploitation climate change populations are abstract complex and non-localised the radical left partake in localist politics to their detriment

Less politically radical than horizontalism, though no less ubiquitous, is localism. As an ideology, localism extends far beyond the left, inflecting the politics of pro-capitalists, anti-capitalists, radicals and mainstream culture alike, as a new kind of political common sense. Shared between all of these is a belief that the abstraction and sheer scale of the modern world is at the root of our present political, ecological and economic problems, and that the solution therefore lies in adopting a ‘small is beautiful’ approach to the world. 69 Small-scale actions, local economies, immediate communities, face-to-face interaction – all of these responses characterise the localist worldview. In a time when most of the political strategies and tactics developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear blunted and ineffectual, localism has a seductive logic to it. In all its diverse variants, from centre-right communitarianism70 to ethical consumerism, 71 developmental microloans, and contemporary anarchist practice, 72 the promise it offers to do something concrete, enabling political action with immediately noticeable effects, is empowering on an individual level. But this sense of empowerment can be misleading. The problem with localism is that, in attempting to reduce large-scale systemic problems to the more manageable sphere of the local community, it effectively denies the systemically interconnected nature of today’s world. Problems such as global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, and the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, and non-localised. Though they touch upon every locality, they are never fully manifested in any particular region. Fundamentally, these are systemic and abstract problems, requiring systemic and abstract responses. While much of the populist localism on the right can easily be dismissed as regressive macho fantasy (for example, secessionist libertarianism), sinister ideological cover for austerity economics (the UK Conservative Party’s ‘Big Society’) or downright racist (the nationalist or fascist blaming of immigrants for structural economic problems), the localism of the left has been less thoroughly scrutinised. Though undoubtedly well-meaning, both the radical and mainstream left partake in localist politics and economics to their detriment. In what follows we will critically examine two of the more popular variants – local food and economic localism – which in very different areas exemplify the problematic dynamics of localism in general.

<h4>The impact is global existential crises driven by the worst excesses of neoliberal exploitation</h4><p><strong>Srnicek and Williams 15</strong> – *PhD in IR @ LSE, **PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis entitled Hegemony and Complexity </p><p>(Nick and Alex, “Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work,” Kindle Book)</p><p>Less politically radical than horizontalism, though no less ubiquitous, is localism. As an ideology, <u><strong><mark>localism</mark> extends far beyond the left, inflecting the politics of pro-capitalists, anti-capitalists, radicals and mainstream culture alike, as a new kind of political common sense. Shared between all of these <mark>is a belief</mark> that</u></strong> the <u><strong><mark>abstraction</u></strong></mark> and sheer scale of the modern world <u><strong><mark>is at the root of our</mark> present political, <mark>ecological and economic problems</mark>, <mark>and</mark> that <mark>the solution therefore lies in</mark> adopting <mark>a</u></strong> ‘<u><strong>small</u></strong></mark> is beautiful’ <u><strong><mark>approach</u></strong></mark> to the world. 69 <u><strong>Small-scale actions</u></strong>, local economies, <u><strong>immediate communities, face-to-face interaction</u></strong> – all of these responses <u><strong>characterise the localist worldview</u></strong>. In a time when most of the political strategies and tactics developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear blunted and ineffectual, <u><strong>localism has a seductive logic to it</u></strong>. In all its diverse variants, from centre-right communitarianism70 to ethical consumerism, 71 developmental microloans, and <u><strong>contemporary anarchist practice, </u></strong>72 the promise it <u><strong>offers to do something concrete</u></strong>, <u><strong>enabling political action with immediately noticeable effects</u></strong>, is empowering on an individual level. <u><strong>But <mark>this sense of empowerment</mark> <mark>can be misleading</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The problem with localism is that, in <mark>attempting to reduce large-scale systemic problems to the</mark> more <mark>manageable sphere of the local</mark> community, it</u></strong> effectively <u><strong><mark>denies the</mark> systemically <mark>interconnected</mark> nature of today’s <mark>world</mark>. Problems such as <mark>global exploitation</mark>, planetary <mark>climate change</mark>, rising surplus <mark>populations</mark>, and the repeated crises of capitalism <mark>are abstract</u></strong></mark> in appearance, <u><strong><mark>complex</u></strong></mark> in structure, <u><strong><mark>and non-localised</mark>. Though they touch upon every locality, they are never fully manifested in any particular region</u></strong>. Fundamentally, <u><strong>these are systemic and abstract problems, requiring systemic and abstract responses</u></strong>. While much of the populist localism on the right can easily be dismissed as regressive macho fantasy (for example, secessionist libertarianism), sinister ideological cover for austerity economics (the UK Conservative Party’s ‘Big Society’) or downright racist (the nationalist or fascist blaming of immigrants for structural economic problems), the localism of the left has been less thoroughly scrutinised. <u><strong>Though undoubtedly well-meaning, both <mark>the radical</mark> and mainstream <mark>left partake in localist politics</mark> and economics <mark>to their detriment</u></strong></mark>. In what follows we will critically examine two of the more popular variants – local food and economic localism – which in very different areas exemplify the problematic dynamics of localism in general.</p>

K – Legal Reformism

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McDonogh JN

Anastasia Kazteridis

1AC - Fugitivity 1NC - Framework Legalism K 2NC - Framework 1NR - Legalism 2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt

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Plan demonstrates resolve and avoids their appeasement and allies disads, even if they say no, the plan communicates valuable information about China’s intentions—only a qpq bargain solves

Glaser, 2015

Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China

Insisting concessions would demonstrate resolve the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests if China were uncompromising. the key issue comes back to information if China is likely to have unlimited aims the risks are larger China’s refusal would indicate more ambitious aims compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a deal that included resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase security by eliminating disputes that via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.

<h4>Plan demonstrates resolve and avoids their appeasement and allies disads, even if they say no, the plan communicates valuable information about China’s intentions—only a qpq bargain solves</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p><u><mark>Insisting </mark>on Chinese <mark>concessions</mark> <mark>would</mark> also <strong><mark>demonstrate </mark>U.S. <mark>resolve</strong></mark> to protect American interests</u>. <u>By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, <strong><mark>the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests</strong></mark> in the South China and East China Seas,</u> <u><mark>if China were uncompromising.</mark> </u>Once again, <u><strong><mark>the key issue</strong></mark> from the U.S. perspective <strong><mark>comes back to information</strong></mark>—<mark>if China is</mark> more <mark>likely to have unlimited aims</mark>, then <mark>the</mark> <mark>risks</mark> of U.S. accommodation <mark>are larger</mark> and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. </u>As argued above, <u><mark>China’s refusal</mark> to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests</u> (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), <u><mark>would indicate more ambitious</mark> Chinese <mark>aims</mark>.</u> Thus, <u><strong><mark>compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a</mark> package <mark>deal</mark> <mark>that included</mark> Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve</strong>. In addition, <mark>resolution of the maritime disputes</mark> <mark>would directly increase</mark> U.S. <mark>security</mark> <mark>by eliminating disputes</mark> <mark>that</mark>, <mark>via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises</mark> with China</u>.</p>

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1AC-Taiwan Adv 1-Taiwan Adv 2-Relations Solvency

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A. Magnitude—immediate death toll is billions, weapons would blot out the sun, and cause nuclear winter—ends life—Ag collapse alone would kill billions that’s Wittner and Helfand,

<h4><strong>A. Magnitude—immediate death toll is billions, weapons would blot out the sun, and cause nuclear winter—ends life—Ag collapse alone would kill billions that’s Wittner and Helfand, </h4></strong>

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UC Berkeley Invitational

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Davis WK

Hanna Wilson

1AC - FlashpointsTaiwan - Relations - Grand Bargain Solvency 1NC - Topicality (Military) - Discussion Counter Plan - Japan DA - Taiwan - Relations

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Silencing DA: They are working to silence feminism by the way that it has been done for years. Saying that “it’s not needed, we’re not anti women” is just what the state wants you to believe

<h4>Silencing DA: They are working to silence feminism by the way that it has been done for years. Saying that “it’s not needed, we’re not anti women” is just what the state wants you to believe</h4>

2NC/NR

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Mile High Classic

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Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk

John Mckiernan

Taiwan Aff - Taiwan - Relations - Solvency 1NC - T - Fem K - Solvency (On Case) 2NC - K - FWK - Perm 1NR - Solvency 2NR Choice - Weigh K and case using Framework o Solvency

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