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Nuclear war---unique because of failing modernization now

Rovner 15

Joshua Rovner 15, the John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University and Director of the Security and Strategy Program, 8/26/15, “How Vladimir Putin's paranoia could lead to nuclear war,” http://theweek.com/articles/572575/how-vladimir-putins-paranoia-could-lead-nuclear-war

self-defeating strategies are reducing Russian power and leaving it isolated The U S does not need bold action to shore up its gigantic advantages relative to Russia. It only needs to allow Putin to keep on blundering given doubts that Russia can live up to its own military modernization targets But Putin's incompetence also creates new risks He might begin overt conventional maneuvers Russia could quickly establish a foothold on some slice of Baltic territory NATO would have to fight very hard beyond the costs of conventional fighting, they would face the risk of a nuclear exchange there are psychological, political, and military pathways to nuclear escalation wartime psychological stress might cause leaders to misinterpret signals of restraint and become risk-acceptant paranoid leaders might believe the price of losing is regime change they might be willing to gamble for resurrection by crossing the nuclear threshold leaders may opt to use nuclear weapons through inadvertent escalation Putin's strategic myopia exacerbates the psychological and political pathways to escalation

self-defeating strategies are reducing Russian power The U S only needs to allow Putin to keep on blundering given doubts that Russia can live up to its own modernization targets But Putin might begin overt conventional maneuvers Russia could quickly establish a foothold on Baltic territory NATO would have to fight very hard they would face the risk of nuclear exchange there are psychological, political, and military pathways to nuclear escalation stress might cause leaders to misinterpret signals and become risk-acceptant leaders might believe losing is regime change they might gamble crossing the nuclear threshold leaders may use nuclear weapons through inadvertent escalation Putin's strategic myopia exacerbates pathways to escalation

In one sense, the fact that Putin is a bad strategist is good news for the United States. His self-defeating strategies are reducing Russian power and leaving it isolated. This will make it easier for Washington to focus on other parts of the world. The United States does not need bold action to shore up its gigantic advantages relative to Russia. It only needs to allow Putin to keep on blundering. It also does not need to engage in a costly arms race, given doubts that Russia can live up to its own military modernization targets. But Putin's incompetence also creates new risks. His inability to learn from Ukraine, for instance, suggests that he might be willing to try the same gambit in the Baltics on the pretext of defending ethnic Russians. Putin may believe that he can attempt a similar sort of covert coup using special operators and supporting separatists while publicly denying any involvement. He might also begin overt conventional maneuvers near the Estonian or Latvian border to send a tacit threat of Russian intervention. Making good on that threat, however, would risk a conflict with the United States, which would be obligated to come to the defense of its NATO allies. What would happen if NATO sent conventional forces to contest Russian moves in the Baltics? Some analysts correctly note that while NATO possesses overwhelming advantages in the aggregate, it would be outnumbered locally. This means that Russia could quickly establish a foothold on some slice of Baltic territory before the United States could organize a response. NATO would need some time to arrive in theater with the strength needed to confront Russian forces, and it would have to fight very hard to eject them. And beyond the costs of conventional fighting, they would also face the risk of a nuclear exchange. While escalation is not inevitable, Putin's strategic ineptitude makes it more likely. In the abstract, there are psychological, political, and military pathways to nuclear escalation. First, intense wartime psychological stress might cause leaders to misinterpret signals of restraint, exaggerate the costs and danger of fighting, and become risk-acceptant. Second, paranoid leaders might believe the price of losing is regime change. If they are convinced that staying in power requires decisive victory, even against a vastly superior conventional enemy, they might be willing to gamble for resurrection by crossing the nuclear threshold. Third, leaders may opt to use nuclear weapons through a process of inadvertent escalation. They may reasonably construe attacks on their command and control systems, for instance, as part of a campaign to disable their deterrent force. Under these circumstances they might act on a terrible "use it or lose it" impulse, even if their adversary had no intention of destroying their nuclear capabilities. While all three of these scenarios could occur during a NATO–Russia conventional conflict, Putin's strategic myopia is particularly troubling because it exacerbates the psychological and political pathways to escalation. The inability to recognize failure might give him false confidence about Russia's prospect against NATO forces, especially because Russia would enjoy initially superior numbers in a hypothetical war. This lead might not last long. In the last 30 years the United States has demonstrated extraordinary abilities to overcome enemy defenses through a combination of rapid maneuver, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, and brute force. A successful counter-attack against Russian forces, especially including strikes on Russian air defense installations, would come as a terrifying shock to Russian leaders. In this case a host of familiar psychological pathologies could take hold, making it possible for Putin to lash out in anger and frustration rather than seeking some way of limiting the damage.

<h4>Nuclear war---unique because of failing modernization now </h4><p>Joshua <strong>Rovner 15</strong>, the John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University and Director of the Security and Strategy Program, 8/26/15, “How Vladimir Putin's paranoia could lead to nuclear war,” http://theweek.com/articles/572575/how-vladimir-putins-paranoia-could-lead-nuclear-war</p><p>In one sense, the fact that Putin is a bad strategist is good news for the United States. His <u><strong><mark>self-defeating strategies</strong> are <strong>reducing Russian power</strong></mark> and leaving it isolated</u>. This will make it easier for Washington to focus on other parts of the world. <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>does not need bold action to shore up its gigantic advantages relative to Russia. It <strong><mark>only needs to allow Putin to keep on blundering</u></strong></mark>. It also does not need to engage in a costly arms race, <u><mark>given <strong>doubts that Russia can live up to its own </mark>military <mark>modernization</mark> <mark>targets</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>But Putin</mark>'s incompetence also creates new risks</u>. His inability to learn from Ukraine, for instance, suggests that he might be willing to try the same gambit in the Baltics on the pretext of defending ethnic Russians. Putin may believe that he can attempt a similar sort of covert coup using special operators and supporting separatists while publicly denying any involvement. <u>He <mark>might</u></mark> also <u><mark>begin overt conventional maneuvers</u></mark> near the Estonian or Latvian border to send a tacit threat of Russian intervention. Making good on that threat, however, would risk a conflict with the United States, which would be obligated to come to the defense of its NATO allies.</p><p>What would happen if NATO sent conventional forces to contest Russian moves in the Baltics? Some analysts correctly note that while NATO possesses overwhelming advantages in the aggregate, it would be outnumbered locally. This means that <u><mark>Russia could quickly establish a foothold on</mark> some slice of <mark>Baltic territory</u></mark> before the United States could organize a response. <u><mark>NATO would</u></mark> need some time to arrive in theater with the strength needed to confront Russian forces, and it would <u><mark>have to fight very hard</u></mark> to eject them. And <u>beyond the costs of conventional fighting, <mark>they would</u></mark> also <u><mark>face the <strong>risk of</mark> a <mark>nuclear exchange</u></strong></mark>. While escalation is not inevitable, Putin's strategic ineptitude makes it more likely.</p><p>In the abstract, <u><mark>there are <strong>psychological, political, and military pathways to nuclear escalation</u></strong></mark>. First, intense <u>wartime psychological <mark>stress might cause leaders to <strong>misinterpret signals</strong></mark> of restraint</u>, exaggerate the costs and danger of fighting, <u><mark>and become <strong>risk-acceptant</u></strong></mark>. Second, <u>paranoid <mark>leaders might believe</mark> the price of <mark>losing is regime change</u></mark>. If they are convinced that staying in power requires decisive victory, even against a vastly superior conventional enemy, <u><mark>they might</mark> be willing to <mark>gamble</mark> for resurrection by <mark>crossing the nuclear threshold</u></mark>. Third, <u><mark>leaders may</mark> opt to <mark>use nuclear weapons through</u></mark> a process of <u><strong><mark>inadvertent escalation</u></strong></mark>. They may reasonably construe attacks on their command and control systems, for instance, as part of a campaign to disable their deterrent force. Under these circumstances they might act on a terrible "use it or lose it" impulse, even if their adversary had no intention of destroying their nuclear capabilities.</p><p>While all three of these scenarios could occur during a NATO–Russia conventional conflict, <u><mark>Putin's strategic myopia</u></mark> is particularly troubling because it <u><strong><mark>exacerbates</strong></mark> the psychological and political <mark>pathways to escalation</u></mark>. The inability to recognize failure might give him false confidence about Russia's prospect against NATO forces, especially because Russia would enjoy initially superior numbers in a hypothetical war. This lead might not last long. In the last 30 years the United States has demonstrated extraordinary abilities to overcome enemy defenses through a combination of rapid maneuver, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, and brute force. A successful counter-attack against Russian forces, especially including strikes on Russian air defense installations, would come as a terrifying shock to Russian leaders. In this case a host of familiar psychological pathologies could take hold, making it possible for Putin to lash out in anger and frustration rather than seeking some way of limiting the damage.</p>

Yuan DA

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round4.docx

N

MBA

4

Greenhill KS

MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round4.docx

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HS Policy 2016-17

cx

hs

Plan is popular – public has consistently seen China as a beneficial trade ally for 10 years

Friedhoff and Smeltz 15

Friedhoff and Smeltz 15 Karl Friedhoff, Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2016, (AMERICANS VIEW RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS IMPORTANT DESPITE SOME MISTRUST, September 22nd, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-view-relations-china-important-despite-some-mistrust, 6.22.16, WP

American public prefers engagement to the containment of China. In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, 67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Three in ten (29%) said that the United States should seek to actively limit China’s growth. This finding has been consistent since the question was first asked in 2006. Americans underscore the importance of ties to China likely because of growing Chinese influence in Asia. Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years, compared to just 31 percent who expect the same from the United States.

the American public prefers engagement to the containment of China 67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. This finding has been consistent since 2006 Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years

Despite suspicions toward China, the American public prefers engagement to the containment of China. In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, 67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Three in ten (29%) said that the United States should seek to actively limit China’s growth. This finding has been consistent since the question was first asked in 2006. Americans underscore the importance of ties to China likely because of growing Chinese influence in Asia. Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years, compared to just 31 percent who expect the same from the United States. [2] Some expectation of China’s influence in the next decade, however, is based on misperception. From 2010 through 2014, Pew Research surveys showed that Americans were either as likely or more likely to name China as to name the United States when asked which country is the world’s leading economic power. In the most recent spring 2015 survey, however, Americans were more likely to say that the United States leads by ten percentage points (46% US, 36% China), perhaps a reflection of China’s economic difficulties over the past several months as well as US economic recovery.

<h4>Plan is popular – public has consistently seen China as a beneficial trade ally for 10 years</h4><p><strong>Friedhoff and Smeltz</strong> <strong>15</strong> Karl Friedhoff, Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2016, (AMERICANS VIEW RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS IMPORTANT DESPITE SOME MISTRUST, September 22nd, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-view-relations-china-important-despite-some-mistrust, 6.22.16, WP</p><p>Despite suspicions toward China, <mark>the <u>American public prefers engagement to the containment of China</mark>. In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey, <mark>67 percent of Americans said the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China.</mark> Three in ten (29%) said that the United States should seek to actively limit China’s growth. <mark>This finding has been consistent since</mark> the question was first asked in <mark>2006</mark>.</u> <u>Americans underscore the importance of ties to China likely because of growing Chinese influence in Asia. <mark>Fifty-two percent expect that China’s influence in Asia will grow in the next ten years</mark>, compared to just 31 percent who expect the same from the United States.</u> [2] Some expectation of China’s influence in the next decade, however, is based on misperception. From 2010 through 2014, Pew Research surveys showed that Americans were either as likely or more likely to name China as to name the United States when asked which country is the world’s leading economic power. In the most recent spring 2015 survey, however, Americans were more likely to say that the United States leads by ten percentage points (46% US, 36% China), perhaps a reflection of China’s economic difficulties over the past several months as well as US economic recovery.</p>

1NR

Case

Case

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GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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The plan is a major distraction that undermines Xi's ability to consolidate power.

Liu 17

Liu 17 — Melinda Liu, Beijing Bureau Chief (since 1998) for Newsweek, Recipient of the Shorenstein Journalism Award for distinguished coverage of Asia, 2017 ("Donald Trump and China's Year of the Hawk," Politico, January 18th, Available Online at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, SCOTT)

Trump’s moves and the response from Chinese hawks are putting enormous pressure on Xi and his team at a particularly delicate political moment Xi expected to try to alter the age and term limits observed by senior communist officials, and perhaps timeworn succession procedures as well Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions Beijing has placed an enormous premium on stability Intense political jockeying is already underway in China, and the economy faces increasingly serious and difficult challenges The last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship or on the Taiwan issue that require him to have to divert considerable time and attention.”

Trump’s moves—and the response from Chinese hawks—are putting enormous pressure on Xi at a particularly delicate political moment Xi expected to alter limits Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions Intense political jockeying is underway last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship or on the Taiwan issue that require him to have to divert considerable time and attention.”

Trump’s moves—and the response from Chinese hawks—are putting enormous pressure on Xi and his team at a particularly delicate political moment. Long before Trump’s election upset, Xi began preparing for the 19th Communist Party Congress, scheduled for late 2017 (the exact date remains secret). The Congress will almost certainly grant Xi a second five-year term as party head. But that’s not what worries Xi. At the Congress, he’s expected to try to alter the age and term limits observed by senior communist officials, and perhaps timeworn succession procedures as well. Such changes won’t be universally popular in a bureaucracy already rattled by Xi’s draconian anti-corruption campaign. That means over the next months, Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions. “Beijing has placed an enormous premium on stability. Intense political jockeying is already underway in China, and the economy faces increasingly serious and difficult challenges,” says Haenle of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center. “The last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship or on the Taiwan issue that require him to have to divert considerable time and attention.”

<h4>The plan is a major distraction that undermines Xi's ability to consolidate power.</h4><p><strong>Liu 17</strong> — Melinda Liu, Beijing Bureau Chief (since 1998) for Newsweek, Recipient of the Shorenstein Journalism Award for distinguished coverage of Asia, 2017 ("Donald Trump and China's Year of the Hawk," Politico, January 18th, Available Online at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656<u>, SCOTT)</p><p><strong><mark>Trump’s moves</u></strong>—<u>and the</u> <u>response from</u> <u><strong>Chinese hawks</u></strong>—<u>are putting</u> <u><strong>enormous pressure on Xi</u></strong></mark> <u>and his team <mark>at a particularly</u> <u><strong>delicate political moment</u></strong></mark>. Long before Trump’s election upset, Xi began preparing for the 19th Communist Party Congress, scheduled for late 2017 (the exact date remains secret). The Congress will almost certainly grant Xi a second five-year term as party head. But that’s not what worries <u><mark>Xi</u></mark>. At the Congress, he’s <u><mark>expected</mark> to try <mark>to alter</mark> the age and term <mark>limits</mark> observed by senior communist officials, and perhaps timeworn succession procedures as well</u>. Such changes won’t be universally popular in a bureaucracy already rattled by Xi’s draconian anti-corruption campaign. That means over the next months, <u><strong><mark>Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions</u></strong></mark>. “<u>Beijing has placed an enormous premium on stability</u>. <u><strong><mark>Intense political jockeying</u></strong> <u>is</mark> already <mark>underway</mark> in China, and the economy faces increasingly serious and difficult challenges</u>,” says Haenle of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center. “<u>The <mark>last thing Xi Jinping wants is</u> <u><strong>big problems in the U.S.-China relationship</u></strong> <u>or on the Taiwan issue that require him to have to <strong>divert considerable time and attention</strong>.”</p></u></mark>

OFFCASE

1NC

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IDCA JV state

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NEW TRIER JM

Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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Voting negative refuses the affirmative in favor of Historical Materialist Pedagogy. International inequality is sutured by the unequal circulation of capital. Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary moment. Only starting from the structural antagonisms produced by wage labor can lead to transformative politics.

Ebert ‘9

Ebert ‘9 [Teresa, Associate Professor of English, State University of New York at Albany, THE TASK OF CULTURAL CRITIQUE, pp. 92-95]

Unlike these rewritings, which reaffirm in a somewhat new language the system of wage AND Instead, the pedagogy of critique is a worldly teaching of the worldly.

<h4>Voting negative refuses the affirmative in favor of Historical Materialist Pedagogy. International inequality is sutured by the unequal circulation of capital. Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary moment. Only starting from the <u>structural antagonisms </u>produced by wage labor can lead to transformative politics. </h4><p><strong>Ebert ‘9</strong> [Teresa, Associate Professor of English, State University of New York at Albany, THE TASK OF CULTURAL CRITIQUE, pp. 92-95]</p><p>Unlike these rewritings, which reaffirm in a somewhat new language the system of wage </p><p>AND</p><p>Instead, the pedagogy of critique is a worldly teaching of the worldly. </p>

1NC Doubles UT

2

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University of Texas

Doubles

Milpitas DT

Alexis Kostun, Roberto Montero, Alec Ramsey

1AC - Techno-Orientalism 1NC - Framework Cap 2NC - Framework 1NR - Cap 2NR - Framework

hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-University%20of%20Texas-Doubles.docx

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Decline doesn’t cause war – empirically denied

-Specifically says nationalism/democracy/game theory/liberal institutionalist norms won’t lead to war if they occur

Columbia, ’11 (Robert, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425) worsening of economic difficulties could produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back beggar-my-neighbor policies it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

economic difficulties could produce nationalism, undermine democracy and bring beggar policies it is hard to believe conflicts could lead to fighting even if trade and liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see leaders and opinion believe countries could prosper by attacking the fact we have such a sharp down-turn without suggesting force shows bad times will not make war thinkable

-Says no diversionary theory because public w/n demand war Jervis, 11 (Professor PolSci Columbia, ’11 (Robert, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425) Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

<h4>Decline doesn’t cause war – empirically denied</h4><p>-Specifically says nationalism/democracy/game theory/liberal institutionalist norms won’t lead to war if they occur</p><p>-Says no diversionary theory because public w/n demand war</p><p><strong>Jervis, 11</strong> (Professor PolSci<u><strong> Columbia, ’11 (Robert, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)</p><p></u></strong>Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a <u>worsening of</u> the current <u><mark>economic difficulties</u></mark>, which <u><mark>could</u></mark> itself <u><mark>produce</mark> greater <mark>nationalism, undermine democracy and</mark> <mark>bring</mark> back</u> old-fashioned <u><mark>beggar</mark>-my-neighbor</u> economic <u><mark>policies</u></mark>. While these dangers are real, <u><mark>it is hard to believe</mark> that the <mark>conflicts could</mark> be great enough to <mark>lead</mark> the members of the community <mark>to</mark> contemplate <mark>fighting</mark> each other</u>. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that <u><mark>even if</mark> the more extreme versions of free <mark>trade and</mark> economic <mark>liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see</mark> how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict <mark>leaders and</mark> mass <mark>opinion</mark> would come to <mark>believe</mark> that their <mark>countries could prosper</mark> <mark>by</mark> impoverishing or even <mark>attacking</mark> others</u>. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that <u><mark>the</mark> very <mark>fact</mark> that <mark>we have</mark> seen <mark>such a sharp</mark> economic <mark>down-turn without</mark> anyone <mark>suggesting</mark> that <mark>force</mark> of arms is the solution <mark>shows</mark> that <strong>even if <mark>bad times</mark> bring about greater economic conflict, it <mark>will not make war thinkable</mark>.</p></u></strong>

A1

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round4.docx

N

MBA

4

Greenhill KS

MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round4.docx

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Their Roh evidence is a solvency deficit - japan isn’t china and you don’t do anything to deconstruct orientalist anxieties surrounding japan. Means there’s no solvency.

Roh ‘16

Roh ‘16 – Assistant Prof of English @ University of Utah, Primary Focus on Asian American Literature and Critical Theory (David S., “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media -- Technologizing Orientalism, An Introduction” Introduction (No Page), Edited by Greta Niu and Betsy Huang, First published online: June 21, 2016) A century has passed since British author Sax Rohmer introduced the character Dr. Fu

AND future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity" (168).

AND future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity" (168).

<h4>Their Roh evidence is a solvency deficit - japan isn’t china and you don’t do anything to deconstruct orientalist anxieties surrounding japan. Means there’s no solvency. </h4><p><strong>Roh ‘16 </strong>– Assistant Prof of English @ University of Utah, Primary Focus on Asian American Literature and Critical Theory (David S., “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media -- Technologizing Orientalism, An Introduction” Introduction (No Page), <u>Edited by Greta Niu and Betsy Huang</u>, First published online: June 21, 2016)</p><p>A century has passed since British author Sax Rohmer introduced the character Dr. Fu </p><p><u><strong>AND</p><p>future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity" (168).  </p></u></strong>

1NC Doubles UT

Case

./documents/hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-University%20of%20Texas-Doubles.docx

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University of Texas

Doubles

Milpitas DT

Alexis Kostun, Roberto Montero, Alec Ramsey

1AC - Techno-Orientalism 1NC - Framework Cap 2NC - Framework 1NR - Cap 2NR - Framework

hspolicy16/KatyTaylor/BaKa/Katy%20Taylor-Bandyopadhyay-Kaculi-Neg-University%20of%20Texas-Doubles.docx

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Xi consolidation key to avert CCP collapse

Kuhn 11/20

Kuhn 11/20 — Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Columnist for China Daily and South China Morning Post, Author of How China's Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China's Past, Current and Future Leaders and The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin—the first biography of a living Chinese leader, holds a Ph.D. in Anatomy and Brain Research from the Brain Research Institute at the University of California-Los Angeles and an M.S. in Management from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016 ("Why China needs Xi Jinping as its core leader," South China Morning Post, November 20th, Available Online at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2047173/why-china-needs-xi-jinping-its-core-leader, SCOTT)

Xi was designated as “core” of the Communist Party’s Central Committee China is now facing multiple challenges domestically slow growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, imbalanced development, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; and, internationally – wars, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and territorial disputes the resistance of entrenched interest groups must be overcome Xi has encountered obstacles necessity of having a leadership core to maintain stability Xi as the core does not end, and even may not diminish, the cardinal principle of democratic centralism bolsters each of the concepts strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadership of the principal levers of power a core is required to manage the party more strictly and thereby give members and the public more confidence Xi’s core status arises through the collective will of the party and the people a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party describing it as significant for upholding the Central Committee’s authority and maintaining the central, unified leadership of the party and for its “staying true to its mission”. Any leading group should have a core; a leadership with no core is unreliable.” China faces threats at home and abroad Donald Trump The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever and thus to strengthen Xi’s authority is a primary reason, I’m told, for designating Xi as core leader Party theorists say China “urgently” requires a political nucleus that is sophisticated and nuanced, attuned to contemporary times. Deng’s admonition rings timelessly true. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the ‘emperor system’ however inapplicable (even inexplicable) in Western political theory core both strengthens cohesion and serves to prevent a personality cult absolute power is rejected combination of concentrated centralism and democratic collective leadership collective leadership system” is reconfirmed Xi as the core does not end the cardinal principle of “democratic centralism” while strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadersh to read these statements as contradictory is to misunderstand what is happening here no one here worries that Xi will become Mao what kind of China do we want? Certainly not one with weak central leadership and fragmented citadels of power China today requires a leader with sufficient strength and prestige to secure social stability, drive economic reform, and guide it in being a responsible world power. Xi as core leader should be good for China and, thus, for the world

Xi designated as “core China is cing multiple challenges: domestically and, internationally resistance must be overcome Xi encountered obstacles a core is required to manage the party through the collective will a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party” significant for upholding authority and maintaining the central, unified leadership of the party a leadership with no core is unreliable The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever China “urgently” requires a political nucleus both strengthens cohesion and serves to prevent a personality cult combination of concentrated centralism and democratic collective leadership collective leadership system” is reconfirmed Xi as the core does not end the cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”. to read these statements as contradictory is to misunderstand China today requires a leader with sufficient strength Xi as core leader should be good for China

When, at a recent party plenum, President Xi Jinping ( 習近平 ) was designated as “core” of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, some Western media were quick to condemn the rise of a new “strongman”. While recognising the significance of Xi as the core was correct, conjuring up visions of an emerging dictator was not. I recalled my meeting with Xi years earlier, when he was still party secretary of Zhejiang (浙江) province. Even then he was criticising “empty talk” and advising, “We should never overestimate our accomplishments or indulge ourselves in our achievements”. I took note of how Xi stressed, “We need to assess ourselves objectively”. Hardly, in retrospect, the ruminations of a gestating dictator. To understand why Xi is now the core, one must appreciate the complex challenges of our times. China is now facing multiple challenges: domestically – slow growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, imbalanced development, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; and, internationally – wars, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and territorial disputes in the South and East China seas. A woman wearing a mask for protection against pollution walks on an overhead bridge in smoggy Beijing. China today faces multiple challenges, at home and abroad. Photo: AP How Xi Jinping can use his new power as ‘core’ of China’s communist party Most critically, because China must deepen its reforms to achieve its oft-promised goal of a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020, the resistance of entrenched interest groups must be overcome. More subtly, there is what some call a pervasive “soft resistance” – local officials who do not do their job and economic elites who migrate. If reform had been progressing smoothly, then why strengthen central authority by investing Xi with the status of core leader? Xi has encountered obstacles; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need for a core leader. I have been speaking to party ­officials and theorists about Xi as core leader. In fact, the necessity of having a leadership core to maintain stability and expedite reform is the first and foremost of what I found to be four factors relating to Xi’s elevation. A second factor is that not only does Xi have the responsibility for China’s transformation, he is also accountable for it. Moreover, he has shown courage in confronting and dismantling a vast, corrupt system of bribery, patronage and illicit wealth accretion. A police officer and candidate from the ruling Communist Party salutes earlier this month as he attends a community meeting organised for candidates to canvass support from voters. Elections kicked off last week for more than 2 million members of the county and district people’s congresses. Photo: AP In ‘core leader’ Xi Jinping’s China, discipline trumps corruption when it comes to reform A third factor is that Xi as the core does not end, and even may not diminish, the cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”. The party bolsters each of the concepts: encouraging the democratic solicitation of input and feedback from members, lower-ranked officials, and the public; and strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadership of the principal levers of power (his positions as party general secretary, head of state, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and head of the “leading groups” on reform, national security and internet security). True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests, not repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear A fourth factor is that a core is required to manage the party more strictly and thereby give members and the public more confidence. Witness Xi’s relentless and unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, which is altering how government officials and industry managers work and even think. Let no one assume that Xi’s battle against corruption has been risk-free. Significantly, these four factors undergirding Xi as the core leader map onto his overarching political framework, his strategic blueprint called “The Four Comprehensives” – a moderately prosperous society, reform, rule of law, party discipline. Xi’s core status arises, we’re told, through the collective will of the party and the people. Becoming party core is not an automatic consequence of being general secretary; a core leader must fit the times and the status must be earned. Speaking at a press conference following the 18th Central Committee’s sixth plenum last month, Huang Kunming (黄坤明), executive vice-minister of the committee’s Publicity Department, said that the “central and local departments as well as the military all expressed their support” for Xi’s position as party core, adding that this decision was “based on the valuable experience of the party and we feel keenly about it”. Huang explained that “a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party”, describing it as significant for upholding the Central Committee’s authority and maintaining the central, unified leadership of the party and for its “staying true to its mission”. Therefore, party theorists explain, Xi as core leader is more a ratification of reality than a shift of fundamentals. Souvenir plates with portraits of former leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as well as current leader Xi Jinping, are displayed in Beijing, on the second day of the party’s sixth plenum last month. It was Deng who introduced the concept of core leader when he designated Jiang as “core of the third generation” of central leaders following Jiang’s appointment as party leader in 1989. Photo: Reuters Why becoming the ‘core’ matters for China’s communist leaders What does Xi as core mean in a historical context? It was Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) who introduced the concept when he designated Jiang Zemin (江澤民) as “core of the third generation” of central leaders, bolstering Jiang’s stature following his unexpected appointment as party leader in 1989. At the time, China was facing the dual impediments of economic stagnation and social uncertainty at home, and economic quarantine and diplomatic isolation abroad. As Deng pointed out: “Any leading group should have a core; a leadership with no core is unreliable.” Xi has encountered obstacles; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need for a core leader Only then did Deng retrospectively apply the novel term to Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and to himself, as core of the first and second generations, respectively. (Of course, Mao was so utterly dominant that calling him core during his lifetime would have seemed a demotion. Deng remained core even when he no longer held any official position.) Today’s world is more complex. China faces threats at home and abroad. Volatility grows and uncertainty abounds – the Middle East and Donald Trump are offered as evidence. The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever, and thus to strengthen Xi’s authority is a primary reason, I’m told, for designating Xi as core leader. Party theorists say China “urgently” requires a political nucleus that is sophisticated and nuanced, attuned to contemporary times. Though conditions now differ from those in 1989, Deng’s admonition rings timelessly true. However, that a core leader is needed now does not mean one will always be needed. When China becomes a fully modernised nation, perhaps by mid-century, conditions may change again. People walk past a poster in Beijing about the PLA, featuring a portrait of President Xi Jinping. That a core leader is needed now does not mean one will always be needed. Photo: Reuters How the West got China wrong I hear frequently of the “painful lessons of China’s century of blood and tears” and that for China not to have a tested and authoritative leadership core would be “unthinkable”. Party inner talk says “Xi Jinping has passed the test of the people” to be China’s political core, leadership core, and a core of the times. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the ‘emperor system’ Chinese scholars argue that “core” is a unique characteristic of Chinese political theory – however inapplicable (even inexplicable) in Western political theory. They call Western concerns that Xi as core leader means that “a new emperor is born” wildly unfounded, even paranoic. In feudal society, the emperor ruled unconditionally with arbitrary imperial power, and in such a “command-obey” system, goes the argument, there is simply no need for a core. Rather, given today’s party political structure, the concept of a core both strengthens cohesion and serves to prevent a personality cult, not to promote one. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the “emperor system” – absolute power is rejected – and that the optimum system, at least for the foreseeable future, is a combination of concentrated centralism and democratic collective leadership. Corroborating this functional balance, in the communiqué issued following the sixth plenum, the “collective leadership system” is reconfirmed. It states: “The implementation of collective leadership and personal division of labour is an important component of democratic centralism and must always be adhered to.” And it stresses: “Any organisation or individual shall, under any circumstance, not be allowed to violate this system for any reason.” The three “any’s” seem no accident. Xi Jinping casts his ballot last week at a voting booth to elect new deputies for the local people’s congress in his district in Beijing. Xi as the core does not end the cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”. The party encourages the democratic solicitation of feedback from members, lower-ranked officials and the public, while strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadership. Photo: Xinhua How did China’s Xi Jinping secure ‘core’ status in just four years? Some analysts see contradictions. On the one hand, the communiqué calls for democracy and constructive criticism internally within the party. On the other, disobeying the central leadership is forbidden, backed by vigilant supervision and tough discipline. Yet to read these statements as contradictory is to misunderstand what is happening here. Xi appreciates the complex and arduous tasks that lie ahead. He told me so a decade ago, and it is obviously truer today than it was then. The state­ments are harmonised, first, by the party’s motivation to seek optimum policies for the country, and second, by keeping most of the divergent views internal. Though there are concerns, no one here worries that Xi will become Mao True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests, not pandering and fawning by repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear. Though there are concerns, no one here worries that Xi will become Mao. China is now the world’s largest trading nation and its second-largest economy. China’s diplomacy is expanding and its military is growing. From its Belt and Road initiative building infrastructure and facilitating trade in over 60 developing countries to its leading role in the UN peacekeeping forces, China, the “Middle Kingdom”, is involved in every meaningful matter of international affairs. So, what kind of China do we want? Certainly not one with weak central leadership and fragmented citadels of power. With its huge and imbalanced population, and its diverse culture and traditions, China today requires a leader with sufficient strength and prestige to secure social stability, drive economic reform, and guide it in being a responsible world power. Xi as core leader should be good for China and, thus, for the world.

<h4>Xi consolidation key to avert CCP collapse</h4><p><strong>Kuhn</strong> <strong>11/20</strong> — Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Columnist for China Daily and South China Morning Post, Author of How China's Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China's Past, Current and Future Leaders and The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin—the first biography of a living Chinese leader, holds a Ph.D. in Anatomy and Brain Research from the Brain Research Institute at the University of California-Los Angeles and an M.S. in Management from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016 ("Why China needs Xi Jinping as its core leader," South China Morning Post, November 20th, Available Online at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2047173/why-china-needs-xi-jinping-its-core-leader, SCOTT)</p><p>When, at a recent party plenum, President <u><mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping ( 習近平 ) <u>was <mark>designated as “<strong>core</strong></mark>” of the Communist Party’s Central Committee</u>, some Western media were quick to condemn the rise of a new “strongman”. While recognising the significance of Xi as the core was correct, conjuring up visions of an emerging dictator was not. I recalled my meeting with Xi years earlier, when he was still party secretary of Zhejiang (浙江) province. Even then he was criticising “empty talk” and advising, “We should never overestimate our accomplishments or indulge ourselves in our achievements”. I took note of how Xi stressed, “We need to assess ourselves objectively”. Hardly, in retrospect, the ruminations of a gestating dictator. To understand why Xi is now the core, one must appreciate the complex challenges of our times. <u><mark>China is</mark> now fa<mark>cing multiple <strong>challenges</u></strong>: <u>domestically</u></mark> – <u>slow growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, imbalanced development, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; <mark>and, internationally</mark> – wars, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and territorial disputes</u> in the South and East China seas. A woman wearing a mask for protection against pollution walks on an overhead bridge in smoggy Beijing. China today faces multiple challenges, at home and abroad. Photo: AP How Xi Jinping can use his new power as ‘core’ of China’s communist party Most critically, because China must deepen its reforms to achieve its oft-promised goal of a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020, <u>the <strong><mark>resistance</strong></mark> of entrenched interest groups <mark>must be overcome</u></mark>. More subtly, there is what some call a pervasive “soft resistance” – local officials who do not do their job and economic elites who migrate. If reform had been progressing smoothly, then why strengthen central authority by investing Xi with the status of core leader? <u><mark>Xi</mark> has <mark>encountered <strong>obstacles</u></strong></mark>; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need for a core leader. I have been speaking to party ­officials and theorists about Xi as core leader. In fact, the <u>necessity of having a leadership core to maintain stability</u> and expedite reform is the first and foremost of what I found to be four factors relating to Xi’s elevation. A second factor is that not only does Xi have the responsibility for China’s transformation, he is also accountable for it. Moreover, he has shown courage in confronting and dismantling a vast, corrupt system of bribery, patronage and illicit wealth accretion. A police officer and candidate from the ruling Communist Party salutes earlier this month as he attends a community meeting organised for candidates to canvass support from voters. Elections kicked off last week for more than 2 million members of the county and district people’s congresses. Photo: AP In ‘core leader’ Xi Jinping’s China, discipline trumps corruption when it comes to reform A third factor is that <u><strong>Xi as the core does not end</strong>, and even may not diminish, the cardinal principle of</u> “<u><strong>democratic centralism</u></strong>”. The party <u><strong>bolsters</strong> each of the concepts</u>: encouraging the democratic solicitation of input and feedback from members, lower-ranked officials, and the public; and <u>strengthening <strong>centralism</strong> through Xi’s leadership of the principal levers of power</u> (his positions as party general secretary, head of state, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and head of the “leading groups” on reform, national security and internet security). True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests, not repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear A fourth factor is that <u><mark>a core is required to <strong>manage the party</strong></mark> more strictly and thereby give members and the public more confidence</u>. Witness Xi’s relentless and unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, which is altering how government officials and industry managers work and even think. Let no one assume that Xi’s battle against corruption has been risk-free. Significantly, these four factors undergirding Xi as the core leader map onto his overarching political framework, his strategic blueprint called “The Four Comprehensives” – a moderately prosperous society, reform, rule of law, party discipline. <u>Xi’s core status arises</u>, we’re told, <u><mark>through the</u> <u><strong>collective</u></strong> <u>will</mark> of the party and the people</u>. Becoming party core is not an automatic consequence of being general secretary; a core leader must fit the times and the status must be earned. Speaking at a press conference following the 18th Central Committee’s sixth plenum last month, Huang Kunming (黄坤明), executive vice-minister of the committee’s Publicity Department, said that the “central and local departments as well as the military all expressed their support” for Xi’s position as party core, adding that this decision was “based on the valuable experience of the party and we feel keenly about it”. Huang explained that “<u><strong><mark>a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party</u></strong>”</mark>, <u>describing it as <mark>significant for upholding</mark> the Central Committee’s <strong><mark>authority</strong> and maintaining the <strong>central, unified leadership</strong> of the party</mark> and for its “staying true to its mission”. </u>Therefore, party theorists explain, Xi as core leader is more a ratification of reality than a shift of fundamentals. Souvenir plates with portraits of former leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as well as current leader Xi Jinping, are displayed in Beijing, on the second day of the party’s sixth plenum last month. It was Deng who introduced the concept of core leader when he designated Jiang as “core of the third generation” of central leaders following Jiang’s appointment as party leader in 1989. Photo: Reuters Why becoming the ‘core’ matters for China’s communist leaders What does Xi as core mean in a historical context? It was Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) who introduced the concept when he designated Jiang Zemin (江澤民) as “core of the third generation” of central leaders, bolstering Jiang’s stature following his unexpected appointment as party leader in 1989. At the time, China was facing the dual impediments of economic stagnation and social uncertainty at home, and economic quarantine and diplomatic isolation abroad. As Deng pointed out: “<u>Any leading group should have a core; <mark>a leadership with no core is <strong>unreliable</strong></mark>.” </u>Xi has encountered obstacles; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need for a core leader Only then did Deng retrospectively apply the novel term to Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and to himself, as core of the first and second generations, respectively. (Of course, Mao was so utterly dominant that calling him core during his lifetime would have seemed a demotion. Deng remained core even when he no longer held any official position.) Today’s world is more complex. <u>China faces <strong>threats</strong> at home and abroad</u>. Volatility grows and uncertainty abounds – the Middle East and <u>Donald Trump</u> are offered as evidence. <u><strong><mark>The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever</u></strong></mark>, <u>and thus to strengthen Xi’s authority is a primary reason, I’m told, for designating Xi as core leader</u>. <u>Party theorists say</u> <u><strong><mark>China “urgently” requires a political nucleus</u></strong></mark> <u>that is sophisticated and nuanced, attuned to contemporary times. </u>Though conditions now differ from those in 1989, <u>Deng’s admonition rings timelessly true. </u>However, that a core leader is needed now does not mean one will always be needed. When China becomes a fully modernised nation, perhaps by mid-century, conditions may change again. People walk past a poster in Beijing about the PLA, featuring a portrait of President Xi Jinping. That a core leader is needed now does not mean one will always be needed. Photo: Reuters How the West got China wrong I hear frequently of the “painful lessons of China’s century of blood and tears” and that for China not to have a tested and authoritative leadership core would be “unthinkable”. Party inner talk says “Xi Jinping has passed the test of the people” to be China’s political core, leadership core, and a core of the times. <u>Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the ‘emperor system’ </u>Chinese scholars argue that “core” is a unique characteristic of Chinese political theory – <u>however inapplicable (even inexplicable) in Western political theory</u>. They call Western concerns that Xi as core leader means that “a new emperor is born” wildly unfounded, even paranoic. In feudal society, the emperor ruled unconditionally with arbitrary imperial power, and in such a “command-obey” system, goes the argument, there is simply no need for a core. Rather, given today’s party political structure, the concept of a <u>core <mark>both strengthens <strong>cohesion</strong> and serves to prevent a personality cult</u></mark>, not to promote one. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the “emperor system” – <u>absolute power is rejected</u> – and that the optimum system, at least for the foreseeable future, is a <u><strong><mark>combination of concentrated centralism and democratic collective leadership</u></strong></mark>. Corroborating this functional balance, in the communiqué issued following the sixth plenum, the “<u><strong><mark>collective leadership system” is reconfirmed</u></strong></mark>. It states: “The implementation of collective leadership and personal division of labour is an important component of democratic centralism and must always be adhered to.” And it stresses: “Any organisation or individual shall, under any circumstance, not be allowed to violate this system for any reason.” The three “any’s” seem no accident. Xi Jinping casts his ballot last week at a voting booth to elect new deputies for the local people’s congress in his district in Beijing. <u><strong><mark>Xi as the core does not end </strong>the cardinal principle of “<strong>democratic centralism</strong>”</u>.</mark> The party encourages the democratic solicitation of feedback from members, lower-ranked officials and the public, <u>while strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadersh</u>ip. Photo: Xinhua How did China’s Xi Jinping secure ‘core’ status in just four years? Some analysts see contradictions. On the one hand, the communiqué calls for democracy and constructive criticism internally within the party. On the other, disobeying the central leadership is forbidden, backed by vigilant supervision and tough discipline. Yet <u><mark>to read these statements as contradictory is to <strong>misunderstand</strong></mark> what is happening here</u>. Xi appreciates the complex and arduous tasks that lie ahead. He told me so a decade ago, and it is obviously truer today than it was then. The state­ments are harmonised, first, by the party’s motivation to seek optimum policies for the country, and second, by keeping most of the divergent views internal. Though there are concerns, <u>no one here worries that Xi will become Mao</u> True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests, not pandering and fawning by repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear. Though there are concerns, no one here worries that Xi will become Mao. China is now the world’s largest trading nation and its second-largest economy. China’s diplomacy is expanding and its military is growing. From its Belt and Road initiative building infrastructure and facilitating trade in over 60 developing countries to its leading role in the UN peacekeeping forces, China, the “Middle Kingdom”, is involved in every meaningful matter of international affairs. So, <u>what kind of China do we want?</u> <u>Certainly not one with weak central leadership and fragmented citadels of power</u>. With its huge and imbalanced population, and its diverse culture and traditions, <u><strong><mark>China today requires a leader with sufficient strength</strong></mark> and prestige to secure social stability, drive economic reform, and guide it in being a responsible world power.</u> <u><mark>Xi as core leader should be <strong>good for China</strong></mark> and, thus, for the world</u>.</p>

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Societal collapse inevitable – resource depletion, economic inequality, historical trends

-Assumes tech solves/increased resource growth

There are widespread concerns trends in population and resource-use are unsustainable Can complex, advanced civilizations really collapse? It Is common to portray history as an inevitable trend toward complexity, political organization, and economic specialization, with technologies supporting ever-growing population sustained by ever-increasing energy, and information. Yet this is not inevitable cases where this trend has been severely disrupted by a precipitous collapse —often lasting centuries— have been quite common examples suggests that the process of rise-and-collapse is recurrent throughout history Roman Empire's dramatic collapse followed by population decline, economic deterioration, intellectual regression, Is well known, but not the first Minoan and Mycenaean reached advanced levels and collapsed completely Mesopotamia presents a series including Sumerians Assyrian. Babylonian and Abbasid Empires Hittite and Harrapan civilizations collapsed so completely their very existence was unknown until modern archeology India and Southeast Asia similarly experienced "multiple and overlapping histories of collapse and regeneration" over 15 centuries Collapses are not restricted to the "Old World As Diamond puts it, it is difficult to ignore ''the disappearance of 99% of the Maya population We know of many other collapses including Mississippian South West cultures Sub-Saharan civilizations and collapses across the Pacific Islands . It is likely other collapses occurred in societies that were not sufficient to produce written records a study of the Neolithic period has shown introduction of agriculture was followed by a boom-and-bust in populations most regions show boom-bust pattern", in population declines "of the order of 60% timing and evidence point to endogenous causes suggesting the possibility of rapid population growth driven to unsustainable levels through wavelet analysis Downey shown length is 500 years despite the impression collapse is fictional the "picture that emerges is of a process recurrent in history, and global As Turchin and Nefedov contend, there is great support for that secular cycles are the rule This brings up the question of whether modern civilization is similarly susceptible the overview demonstrates not only the ubiquity of the phenomenon, but also the extent advanced, complex, and powerful societies are susceptible A large number of explanations have been proposed However, these are specific to particular case of collapse rather than general. even for the specific case where the explanation applies, the society in question usually had already experienced the phenomenon identified as the cause without collapsing Indeed, many societies experience migrations, invasions, and civil wars. Other processes must be involved, and, in fact, the political, economic, ecological, and technological conditions under which civilizations have collapsed have varied widely Individual explanations may seem appropriate in their particular case, but the very universal nature of the phenomenon implies a mechanism that is not specific to a particular time period nor a particular culture, technology, or natural disaster we model collapse mathematically to provide a general framework that allows carrying out "thought experiments" for the phenomenon of collapse and to test changes that would avoid it. HANDY advances beyond existing biological dynamic population models by simultaneously modeling features across societies that have collapsed stretching of resources and economic stratification In historical cases, we have direct evidence of Ecological Strain and Economic Stratification playing a central role in collapse For these empirical reasons, and theoretical ones our model incorporates both of these two features. Although similar to the Brawler and Taylor [1998] model (hereafter referred to as "BT") in that HANDY Is based on the classical predator-prey model, the inclusion of two societal classes introduces a much richer set of dynamical solutions, including cycles of societal and ecological collapse, as well as the possibility of smoothly reaching equilibrium (the ecological carrying capacity). We use Carrying Capacity in its biological definition: the population level that the resources of a particular environment can sustain over the long term [Cation, 1980; Daly and Farley, 2003; Cohen, 1995]. In this paper, we call these environment resources "Nature".

population and resource-use are unsustainable this is not inevitable collapse have been common most show boom-bust suggesting population growth driven unsustainable explanations are specific rather than general Other processes must be involved features across societies stretching resources and economic stratification we have direct evidence

-Ignore their short-term, casual explanations for collapse -Any model that doesn’t include biological and theoretical components is structurally flawed Motesharrei 14 {Safa, Bachelor degrees in Engineering and Physics (Maryland), Masters in Physics and Mathematics (Maryland), Research Assistant at the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, PhD candidate in Applied Mathematics/Public Policy (Maryland), This report was co-written with Eugenia Kalnay (meteorologist and a Distinguished University Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science at Maryland), “Human and Nature Dynamics (HANDY): Modeling Inequality and Use of Resources in the Collapse or Sustainability of Societies,” National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, 3/19, http://www.sesync.org/sites/default/files/resources/motesharrei-rivas-kalnay.pdf#THUR} 1 Introduction: There are widespread concerns that current trends in population and resource-use are unsustainable, but the possibilities of an overshoot and collapse remain unclear and controversial. How real is the possibility of a societal collapse? Can complex, advanced civilizations really collapse? It Is common to portray human history as a relentless and inevitable trend toward greater levels of social complexity, political organization, and economic specialization, with the development of more complex and capable technologies supporting ever-growing population, all sustained by the mobilization of ever-increasing quantities of material, energy, and information. Yet this is not inevitable. In fact, cases where this seemingly near-universal, long-term trend has been severely disrupted by a precipitous collapse —often lasting centuries— have been quite common. A brief review of some examples of collapses suggests that the process of rise-and-collapse is actually a recurrent cycle found throughout history, making it important to establish a general explanation of this process [Tainter, 1988; Yofiee and Cowgill, 1988; Turchin and Nefedov, 2009; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997; Goldstein, 1988; Modelski, 1987; Meadows et al., 1972]. The Roman Empire's dramatic collapse (followed by many centuries of population decline, economic deterioration, intellectual regression, and the disappearance of literacy) Is well known, but it was not the first rise-and-collapse cycle in Europe. Prior to the rise of Classical Greco-Roman civilization, both the Minoan and Mycenaean Civilizations had each risen, reached very advanced levels of civilization, and then collapsed virtually completely [Morris, 2006: Redman, 1999]. The history of Mesopotamia —the very cradle of civilization, agriculture, complex society, and urban life— presents a series of rise-and-declines including the Sumerians, the Akkadian. Assyrian. Babylonian. Achaemenid, Seleucid, Parthian, Sassanid, Umayyad. and Abbasid Empires [Yofiee, 1979: Redman et al.. 2004]. In neighboring Egypt, this cycle also appeared repeatedly. In both Anatolia and in the Indus Valley, the very large and long-lasting Hittite and Harrapan civilizations both collapsed so completely that their very existence was unknown until modern archeology rediscovered them. Similar cycles of rise and collapse occurred repeatedly in India, most notably with the Mauryau and the Gupta Empires [Thapar, 2004; Jansen et al., 1991; Kenoyer, 199S; Edwards et al., 1971, 1973]. Southeast Asia similarly experienced "multiple and overlapping histories of collapse and regeneration" over 15 centuries, culminating in the Khmer Empire based in Angkor, which itself was depopulated and swallowed by the forest during the 15th Century [Stark. 2006]. Chinese history is, very- much like Egypt's, full of repeated cycles of rises and collapses, with each of the Zhou, Han, Tang, and Song Empires followed by a very serious collapse of political authority and socioeconomic progress [Chu and Lee, 1994; Needham and Wang, 1956; Lee, 1931]. Collapses are not restricted to the "Old World". The collapse of Maya Civilization is well-known and evokes widespread fascination, both because of the advanced nature of Mayan society and because of the depth of the collapse [Webster, 2002; Denierest et al., 2004]. As Diamond [2005] puts it, it is difficult to ignore ''the disappearance of between 90 and 99% of the Maya population after A.D. 800 ...and the disappearance of kings, Long Count calendars, and other complex political and cultural institutions." In the nearby central highlands of Mexico, a number of powerful states also rose to high levels of power and prosperity and then rapidly collapsed, Teotihuaean (the sixth largest city in the world in the 7th C) and Monte Alban being just the largest of these to experience dramatic collapse, with their populations declining to about 20-25% of their peak within just a few generations [Tainter, 1988]. We know of many other collapses including Mississippian Cultures such as Cahokia. South West US cultures such as the Pueblo and Hohokani, Andean civilizations such as Tiwanaku. Sub-Saharan civilizations such as Great Zimbabwe, and many collapses across the Pacific Islands, such as Easter Island. It is also likely other collapses have also occurred in societies that were not at a sufficient level of complexity to produce written records or archeological evidence. Indeed, a recent study [Shennan et al.. 2013] of the Neolithic period in Europe has shown that "in contrast to the steady population growth usually assume*!, the introduction of agriculture into Europe was followed by a boom-and-bust pattern in the density of regional populations". Furthermore "most regions show more than one boom-bust pattern", and in most regions, population declines "of the order of the 30-60%" can be found. The authors also argue that, rather than climate change or diseases, the timing and evidence point to endogenous causes for these collapses in 19 out of 23 cases studied, suggesting the possibility of "rapid population growth driven by farming to unsustainable levels". Moreover, through wavelet analysis of the archeological data, S. Downey [personal communication] has shown that the average length of such boom-and-bust cycles is about 300-500 years. In summary, despite the common impression that societal collapse is rare, or even largely fictional, the "picture that emerges is of a process recurrent in history, and global in its distribution" painter, 1988]. See also Yofiee and Cowgill [1988]; Goldstein [1988]; Ibn Khaldun [1958]; Kon-dratieff [1984]; Parsons [1991]. As Turchin and Nefedov [2009] contend, there is a great deal of support for "the hypothesis that secular cycles — demographic-social-political oscillations of a very long period (centuries long) are the rule, rather than an exception in the large agrarian states and empires." This brings up the question of whether modern civilization is similarly susceptible. It may seem reasonable to believe that modern civilization, armed with its greater technological capacity, scientific knowledge, and energy resources, will be able to survive and endure whatever crises historical societies succumbed to. But the brief overview of collapses demonstrates not only the ubiquity of the phenomenon, but also the extent to which advanced, complex, and powerful societies are susceptible to collapse. The fall of the Roman Empire, and the equally (if not more) advanced Han, Mauryau, and Gupta Empires, as well as so many advanced Mesopotaniiau Empires, are all testimony to the fact that advanced, sophisticated, complex, and creative civilizations can be both fragile and impermanent. A large number of explanations have been proposed for each specific case of collapse, including one or more of the following: volcanoes, earthquakes, droughts, floods, changes in the courses of rivers, soil degradation (erosion, exhaustion, salinization. etc), deforestation, climate change, tribal migrations, foreign invasions, changes in technology (such as the introduction of ironworking). changes in the methods or weapons of warfare (such as the introduction of horse cavalry, armored infantry, or long swords), changes in trade patterns, depletion of particular mineral resources (e.g.. silver mines), cultural decline and social decadence, popular uprisings, and civil wars. However, these explanations are specific to each particular case of collapse rather than general. Moreover, even for the specific case where the explanation applies, the society in question usually had already experienced the phenomenon identified as the cause without collapsing. For example, the Minoan society had repeatedly experienced earthquakes that destroyed palaces, and they simply rebuilt them more splendidly than before. Indeed, many societies experience droughts, floods, volcanoes, soil erosion, and deforestation with no major social disruption [Tainter, 1988]. The same applies to migrations, invasions, and civil wars. The Roman. Han. Assyrian, and Mauryau Empires were, for centuries, completely militarily hegemonic, successfully defeating the neighboring "barbarian" peoples who eventually did overrun them. So external military pressure alone hardly constitutes an explanation for their collapses. With both natural disasters and ex¬ternal threats, identifying a specific cause compels one to ask. "yes. but why did this particular instance of this factor produce the collapse?" Other processes must be involved, and, in fact, the political, economic, ecological, and technological conditions under which civilizations have collapsed have varied widely. Individual collapses may have involved an array of specific factors, with particular triggers, but a general explanation remains elusive. Individual explanations may seem appropriate in their particular case, but the very universal nature of the phenomenon implies a mechanism that is not specific to a particular time period of human history, nor a particular culture, technology, or natural disaster [Tainter, 1988; Yofiee and Cowgill, 1988; Turchin, 2003]. In this paper we attempt to model collapse mathematically in a more general way. We propose a simple model, not intended to describe actual individual cases, but rather to provide a general framework that allows carrying out "thought experiments" for the phenomenon of collapse and to test changes that would avoid it. This model (called HANDY, for Human and Nature DYnamics) advances beyond existing biological dynamic population models by simultaneously modeling two separate important features which seem to appear across societies that have collapsed: (1) the stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity [Pouting, 1991; Redman, 1999; Redman et al., 2004; Kamrnen, 1994; Postan, 1966; Ladurie, 19S7; Abel, 1980; Cat ton, 1980; Wood, 1998; Wright, 2004], and (2) the economic stratification of society into Elites and Masses (or "Commoners") [Brenner, 1985; Parsons, 1991; Turchin, 2005, 2006; Turchin and Nefedov, 2009; Diamond, 2005: Goldstone, 1991; Ibn Khaldun, 1958]. In many of these historical cases, we have direct evidence of Ecological Strain and Economic Stratification playing a central role in the character or in the process of the collapse [Diamond, 2005; Goldstone, 1991; Culbert, 1973; Lentz, 2000: Mitchell, 1990]. For these empirical reasons, and the theoretical ones explained in section 3, our model incorporates both of these two features. Although similar to the Brawler and Taylor [1998] model (hereafter referred to as "BT") in that HANDY Is based on the classical predator-prey model, the inclusion of two societal classes introduces a much richer set of dynamical solutions, including cycles of societal and ecological collapse, as well as the possibility of smoothly reaching equilibrium (the ecological carrying capacity). We use Carrying Capacity in its biological definition: the population level that the resources of a particular environment can sustain over the long term [Cation, 1980; Daly and Farley, 2003; Cohen, 1995]. In this paper, we call these environment resources "Nature".

<h4>Societal collapse <u>inevitable</u> – resource depletion, economic inequality, historical trends </h4><p>-Assumes tech solves/increased resource growth</p><p>-Ignore their short-term, casual explanations for collapse </p><p>-Any model that doesn’t include biological and theoretical components is structurally flawed </p><p><strong>Motesharrei 14 </strong>{Safa, Bachelor degrees in Engineering and Physics (Maryland), Masters in Physics and Mathematics (Maryland), Research Assistant at the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, PhD candidate in Applied Mathematics/Public Policy (Maryland), This report was co-written with Eugenia Kalnay (meteorologist and a Distinguished University Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science at Maryland), “Human and Nature Dynamics (HANDY): Modeling Inequality and Use of Resources in the Collapse or Sustainability of Societies,” National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, 3/19, http://www.sesync.org/sites/default/files/resources/motesharrei-rivas-kalnay.pdf#THUR}</p><p>1 Introduction: <u>There are <strong>widespread concerns</strong> </u>that current<u> trends in <mark>population and resource-use are unsustainable</u></mark>, but the possibilities of an overshoot and collapse remain unclear and controversial. How real is the possibility of a societal collapse? <u>Can complex, advanced civilizations really collapse? It Is common to portray</u> human <u>history as</u> a relentless <u>an</u>d <u>inevitable trend toward</u> greater levels of social <u>complexity, political organization, and economic specialization, with</u> the development of more complex and capable <u>technologies supporting ever-growing population</u>, all <u>sustained by</u> the mobilization of <u>ever-increasing</u> quantities of material, <u>energy, and information. <strong>Yet <mark>this is not inevitable</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u>cases where this</u> seemingly near-universal, long-term <u>trend has been severely disrupted by a precipitous <mark>collapse</mark> —often lasting centuries— <mark>have been</mark> <strong>quite <mark>common</u></strong></mark>. A brief review of some <u>examples </u>of collapses<u> suggests that the process of rise-and-collapse is </u>actually a<u> recurrent</u> cycle found<u> throughout history</u>, making it important to establish a general explanation of this process [Tainter, 1988; Yofiee and Cowgill, 1988; Turchin and Nefedov, 2009; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997; Goldstein, 1988; Modelski, 1987; Meadows et al., 1972]. The <u>Roman Empire's dramatic collapse</u> (<u>followed by</u> many centuries of <u>population decline, economic deterioration, intellectual regression, </u>and the disappearance of literacy) <u>Is well known, but</u> it was <u>not the first</u> rise-and-collapse cycle in Europe. Prior to the rise of Classical Greco-Roman civilization, both the <u>Minoan and Mycenaean</u> Civilizations had each risen, <u>reached </u>very<u> advanced levels</u> of civilization, <u>and</u> then <u>collapsed</u> virtually <u><strong>completely</u></strong> [Morris, 2006: Redman, 1999]. The history of <u>Mesopotamia</u> —the very cradle of civilization, agriculture, complex society, and urban life— <u>presents a series</u> of rise-and-declines <u>including</u> the <u>Sumerians</u>, the Akkadian. <u>Assyrian. Babylonian</u>. Achaemenid, Seleucid, Parthian, Sassanid, Umayyad. <u>and Abbasid Empires</u> [Yofiee, 1979: Redman et al.. 2004]. In neighboring Egypt, this cycle also appeared repeatedly. In both Anatolia and in the Indus Valley, the very large and long-lasting <u>Hittite and Harrapan civilizations</u> both <u>collapsed so completely</u> that <u><strong>their very existence was unknown until modern archeology</u></strong> rediscovered them. Similar cycles of rise and collapse occurred repeatedly in <u>India</u>, most notably with the Mauryau <u>and</u> the Gupta Empires [Thapar, 2004; Jansen et al., 1991; Kenoyer, 199S; Edwards et al., 1971, 1973]. <u>Southeast Asia similarly experienced "multiple and overlapping histories of collapse and regeneration<strong>" over 15 centuries</u></strong>, culminating in the Khmer Empire based in Angkor, which itself was depopulated and swallowed by the forest during the 15th Century [Stark. 2006]. Chinese history is, very- much like Egypt's, full of repeated cycles of rises and collapses, with each of the Zhou, Han, Tang, and Song Empires followed by a very serious collapse of political authority and socioeconomic progress [Chu and Lee, 1994; Needham and Wang, 1956; Lee, 1931]. <u>Collapses are not restricted to the "Old World</u>". The collapse of Maya Civilization is well-known and evokes widespread fascination, both because of the advanced nature of Mayan society and because of the depth of the collapse [Webster, 2002; Denierest et al., 2004]. <u>As Diamond</u> [2005] <u>puts it, it is difficult to ignore ''the disappearance of </u>between 90 and<u> <strong>99%</strong> of the Maya population </u>after A.D. 800 ...and the disappearance of kings, Long Count calendars, and other complex political and cultural institutions." In the nearby central highlands of Mexico, a number of powerful states also rose to high levels of power and prosperity and then rapidly collapsed, Teotihuaean (the sixth largest city in the world in the 7th C) and Monte Alban being just the largest of these to experience dramatic collapse, with their populations declining to about 20-25% of their peak within just a few generations [Tainter, 1988]. <u>We know of <strong>many other collapses</u></strong> <u>including Mississippian </u>Cultures such as Cahokia. <u>South West</u> US <u>cultures</u> such as the Pueblo and Hohokani, Andean civilizations such as Tiwanaku. <u>Sub-Saharan</u> <u>civilizations</u> such as Great Zimbabwe, <u>and</u> many <u>collapses across the Pacific Islands</u>, such as Easter Island<u>. It is</u> also <u>likely</u> <u>other collapses</u> have also <u>occurred in societies</u> <u>that were not </u>at a<u> sufficient</u> level of complexity <u>to produce written records</u> or archeological evidence. Indeed, <u>a</u> recent <u>study</u> [Shennan et al.. 2013] <u>of the Neolithic period </u>in Europe <u>has shown</u> that "in contrast to the steady population growth usually assume*!, the <u>introduction of agriculture</u> into Europe <u>was followed by a boom-and-bust </u>pattern<u> in</u> the density of regional <u>populations</u>". Furthermore "<u><mark>most</mark> regions <mark>show</u></mark> more than one <u><mark>boom-bust</mark> pattern",</u> and <u>in</u> most regions, <u>population declines "of the order of</u> the 30-<u>60%</u>" can be found. The authors also argue that, rather than climate change or diseases, the <u><strong>timing and evidence point to endogenous causes</u></strong> for these collapses in 19 out of 23 cases studied, <u><mark>suggesting</mark> the possibility of</u> "<u>rapid <mark>population growth driven</u></mark> by farming <u>to <mark>unsustainable</mark> levels</u>". Moreover, <u>through wavelet analysis </u>of the archeological data, S. <u>Downey</u> [personal communication] has <u>shown</u> that the average <u>length</u> of such boom-and-bust cycles <u>is</u> about 300-<u>500 years</u>. In summary, <u>despite the</u> common <u>impression</u> that societal <u>collapse is</u> rare, or even largely <u>fictional</u>, <u>the "picture that emerges is of a process <strong>recurrent in history, and global</u></strong> in its distribution" painter, 1988]. See also Yofiee and Cowgill [1988]; Goldstein [1988]; Ibn Khaldun [1958]; Kon-dratieff [1984]; Parsons [1991]. <u>As Turchin and Nefedov</u> [2009] <u>contend, there is</u> a <u>great</u> deal of <u>support for</u> "the hypothesis <u>that secular cycles</u> — demographic-social-political oscillations of a very long period (centuries long) <u>are the rule</u>, rather than an exception in the large agrarian states and empires." <u>This brings up the question of whether modern civilization is similarly susceptible</u>. It may seem reasonable to believe that modern civilization, armed with its greater technological capacity, scientific knowledge, and energy resources, will be able to survive and endure whatever crises historical societies succumbed to. But <u>the</u> brief <u>overview</u> of collapses <u>demonstrates not only the <strong>ubiquity of the phenomenon, but also the extent</u></strong> to which <u>advanced, complex, and powerful societies are susceptible</u> to collapse. The fall of the Roman Empire, and the equally (if not more) advanced Han, Mauryau, and Gupta Empires, as well as so many advanced Mesopotaniiau Empires, are all testimony to the fact that advanced, sophisticated, complex, and creative civilizations can be both fragile and impermanent. <u>A large number of <mark>explanations</mark> have been proposed</u> for each specific case of collapse, including one or more of the following: volcanoes, earthquakes, droughts, floods, changes in the courses of rivers, soil degradation (erosion, exhaustion, salinization. etc), deforestation, climate change, tribal migrations, foreign invasions, changes in technology (such as the introduction of ironworking). changes in the methods or weapons of warfare (such as the introduction of horse cavalry, armored infantry, or long swords), changes in trade patterns, depletion of particular mineral resources (e.g.. silver mines), cultural decline and social decadence, popular uprisings, and civil wars. <u>However, these</u> explanations <u><mark>are specific</mark> to</u> each <u>particular case of collapse <strong><mark>rather than general</strong></mark>. </u>Moreover,<u> even for the specific case where the explanation</u> <u>applies, the society in question usually had already experienced the phenomenon identified as the cause without collapsing</u>. For example, the Minoan society had repeatedly experienced earthquakes that destroyed palaces, and they simply rebuilt them more splendidly than before. <u>Indeed, many societies experience</u> droughts, floods, volcanoes, soil erosion, and deforestation with no major social disruption [Tainter, 1988]. The same applies to <u>migrations, invasions, and civil wars. </u>The Roman. Han. Assyrian, and Mauryau Empires were, for centuries, completely militarily hegemonic, successfully defeating the neighboring "barbarian" peoples who eventually did overrun them. So external military pressure alone hardly constitutes an explanation for their collapses. With both natural disasters and ex¬ternal threats, identifying a specific cause compels one to ask. "yes. but why did this particular instance of this factor produce the collapse?" <u><mark>Other processes <strong>must be involved</strong></mark>, and, in fact, the political, economic, ecological, and technological conditions under which civilizations have collapsed have varied widely</u>. Individual collapses may have involved an array of specific factors, with particular triggers, but a general explanation remains elusive. <u>Individual explanations may seem appropriate in their particular case, but the very universal nature of the phenomenon <strong>implies a mechanism that is not specific to a particular time period</u></strong> of human history, <u>nor a particular culture, technology, or natural disaster</u> [Tainter, 1988; Yofiee and Cowgill, 1988; Turchin, 2003]. In this paper <u>we</u> attempt to <u>model collapse mathematically</u> in a more general way. We propose a simple model, not intended to describe actual individual cases, but rather <u>to provide a general framework that allows carrying out "thought experiments" for the phenomenon of collapse</u> <u>and to test changes that would avoid it.</u> This model (called <u>HANDY</u>, for Human and Nature DYnamics) <u><strong>advances beyond existing</u></strong> <u>biological dynamic population models by simultaneously modeling</u> two separate important <u><mark>features</u></mark> which seem to appear <u><mark>across societies</mark> that have collapsed</u>: (1) the <u><mark>stretching</mark> of <mark>resources</u></mark> due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity [Pouting, 1991; Redman, 1999; Redman et al., 2004; Kamrnen, 1994; Postan, 1966; Ladurie, 19S7; Abel, 1980; Cat ton, 1980; Wood, 1998; Wright, 2004], <u><mark>and</u></mark> (2) the <u><mark>economic stratification</u></mark> of society into Elites and Masses (or "Commoners") [Brenner, 1985; Parsons, 1991; Turchin, 2005, 2006; Turchin and Nefedov, 2009; Diamond, 2005: Goldstone, 1991; Ibn Khaldun, 1958]. <u>In</u> many of these <u>historical cases, <mark>we have <strong>direct evidence</mark> of Ecological Strain and Economic Stratification</strong> playing a central role in</u> the character or in the process of the <u>collapse</u> [Diamond, 2005; Goldstone, 1991; Culbert, 1973; Lentz, 2000: Mitchell, 1990]. <u>For these empirical reasons, and </u>the <u>theoretical ones</u> explained in section 3, <u>our model incorporates</u> <u>both of these two features. Although similar to the Brawler and Taylor [1998] model (hereafter referred to as "BT") in that HANDY Is based on the classical predator-prey model, the inclusion of two societal classes introduces a much richer set of dynamical solutions, including cycles of societal and ecological collapse, as well as the possibility of smoothly reaching equilibrium (the ecological carrying capacity). We use Carrying Capacity in its biological definition: the population level that the resources of a particular environment can sustain over the long term [Cation, 1980; Daly and Farley, 2003; Cohen, 1995]. In this paper, we call these environment resources "Nature".</p></u>

A1

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MBA

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Greenhill KS

MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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Bounds and Briggs evidence in the context of an affirmation of the UK looking to incorporate India and China into its global liberal order to take advantage of the “China Rise” – that’s probably orientalist. The 1AC’s form of “cultural diplomacy” inevitably becomes a commodity to be exchanged in the field of IR – “a medium of exchange for finding shared solutions”.

<h4>Bounds and Briggs evidence in the context of an affirmation of the UK looking to incorporate India and China into its global liberal order to take advantage of the “China Rise” – that’s probably orientalist. The 1AC’s form of “cultural diplomacy” inevitably becomes a commodity to be exchanged in the field of IR – “a medium of exchange for finding shared solutions”.</h4>

1NC Doubles UT

Case

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University of Texas

Doubles

Milpitas DT

Alexis Kostun, Roberto Montero, Alec Ramsey

1AC - Techno-Orientalism 1NC - Framework Cap 2NC - Framework 1NR - Cap 2NR - Framework

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East-Asia war — Multiple hotspots

Perkinson 12

Perkinson 12 — Jessica Perkinson, Program Coordinator at the Center for Asian Studies at American University, M.A. Candidate at the School of International Service at American University, holds a B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture from Indiana University, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” M.A. Thesis — American University, Available Online at http://hdl.handle.net/1961/10330, Accessed 10-25-2016, p. 9-10)

Should the CCP undergo collapse the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and instability within the Chinese government could lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the U S the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US It is with this in mind that China scholars should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the U S the potential for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

stability of the CCP play a significant role in peace in Asia China is also relied upon for economic stability China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait instability would be widespread and dramatic CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US. It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof – for [end page 9] reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

<h4>East-Asia war — Multiple hotspots</h4><p><strong>Perkinson 12</strong> — Jessica Perkinson, Program Coordinator at the Center for Asian Studies at American University, M.A. Candidate at the School of International Service at American University, holds a B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture from Indiana University, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” M.A. Thesis — American University, Available Online at http://hdl.handle.net/1961/10330, Accessed 10-25-2016, p. 9-10)</p><p><u>Should the CCP undergo</u> some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete <u>collapse</u>, as some radical China scholars predict2 – <u>the implications for international and US national security are <strong>vast</strong>. Not only does China and the <mark>stability of the CCP play a <strong>significant role in</mark> the maintenance of <mark>peace in</mark> the East <mark>Asia</mark>n region</strong>, but <mark>China is also relied upon</mark> by many members of the international community <mark>for</mark> <strong>foreign direct investment</strong>, <strong><mark>economic stability</strong></mark> and <strong>trade</strong>. <mark>China plays a key role in <strong>maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula</u></strong></mark> as one of North Korea’s only allies, <u><mark>and</u></mark> it is argued that <u>instability within the Chinese government could</u> also <u>lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation <mark>across the <strong>Taiwan Strait</strong></mark>. For the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>the effect of <mark>instability</mark> within the CCP <mark>would be <strong>widespread and dramatic</strong></mark>. As the</u> United States’ <u>largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could <strong>threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation</strong> in the US</u>. In addition, <u>China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US</u>.</p><p><u>It is with this in mind that China scholars</u> within the United States and around the world <u>should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for</u> reform, instability or even <u>collapse of the <mark>CCP is of critical importance to <strong>the stability of the international order as a whole</strong></mark>. For the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates specifically, <u>the potential</u> - or lack thereof – <u>for</u> [end page 9] <u>reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.</p></u>

OFFCASE

1NC

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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HS Policy 2016-17

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Collapse spurs transition – IMMEDIATE change is best – prevents extinction level climate change, resource wars and environmental degradation

-More sustainability evidence: resource depletion, price spikes, unattainable influence and warming

#THUR} Resource scarcity is only part of the concern before we run out of oil 'we're running out of planet Climate change is accelerated by human activities The ability of the climate to assimilate emissions without incurring 'dangerous' change is fast running out The history of climate policy certainly suggests some caution in believing things will be that easy. Kyoto things haven't worked out that well emissions have risen by 40 per cent In the meantime, the science itself has moved on. The IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report argues that a 450 ppm target will be needed if climate change is to be restricted to an average global temperature increase of 2°C." Achieving that could mean reducing emissions by 85 per cent concentrations are already at 435 ppm. And if we want a 75 per cent chance of staying below 2°C, the global economy can only afford to emit a total of 1 thousand billion tonnes between 2000 and 2050. by 2008 we had already used up a third of this budget. Staying within is going to be more demanding even than existing 450 ppm stabilization scenarios suggest The message from all this is a profoundly uncomfortable one. Dangerous climate change is a matter of decades away. And we're using up the climate slack' too quickly. It may take decades to transform . And we have barely started As science improves it becomes clearer that a warming world may pose the gravest threat to survival we face climate may just turn out to be the mother of all limits. This brief sketch does no justice It hasn't even touched deforestation unprecedented biodiversity loss collapse of fish stocks, water scarcity or pollution Nobody seriously disagrees with the assessment of impacts. 60 per cent of ecosystem have been degraded During the global economy has grown 5 times. If it continues to grow at the same rate, it will be 80 times bigger in 2100 This extraordinary ramping up has no historical precedent It's totally at odds with our scientific knowledge of the finite resource base and the fragile ecology on which we depend for survival. A world in which things simply go on as usual is already inconceivable a world in which 9 billion achieve affluence would need to be 15 times the size of today's economy The default assumption is that growth will continue for the richest nations where wealth adds little to happiness and is beginning to threaten the foundations of our well-being. The reasons for this collective blindness are The modern economy structurally reliant on economic growth When growth falters politicians panic. Questioning growth is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists and revolutionaries. But question it we must. the idea of a continually growing economy is an anathema to an ecologist. No subsystem of a finite system can grow indefinitely, in physical terms we have no alternative but to question growth. The myth of growth has failed us. It has failed the billion who live on half the price of a cup of coffee each day. It has failed the fragile ecological systems on which we depend for survival. It has failed, spectacularly to provide economic stability if the current economic crisis does the end of easy growth Prosperity without growth is a very useful trick to have up your sleeve when the economy is faltering. we find ourselves faced with the imminent end of cheap oil, rising prices degradation of air, water and soil, conflicts over land use, resource use, water use, forestry and fishing rights, and the momentous challenge of stabilizing the global climate. we face tasks with an economy that is fundamentally broken, in desperate need of renewal a return to business as usual is not an option economic crisis presents us with a unique opportunity to invest in change To sweep away the short-term thinking that has plagued society for decades. To replace it with considered policy capable of addressing the enormous challenge of delivering a lasting prosperity. prosperity goes beyond material pleasures . It resides in the quality of our lives and in the health and happiness of our families It is present in the strength of community It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the life of society. Prosperity consists in our ability to flourish as human beings — within the ecological limits of a finite planet. The challenge for our society is to create the conditions under which this is possible. It is the most urgent task of our times.

ability of climate to assimilate is running out 450 ppm will be needed if change is restricted that could mean reducing emissions 85 per cent economy can only afford 1 thousand billion tonnes we already used a third As science improves warming pose gravest threat to survival climate may be the mother of all limits. This sketch hasn't touched deforestation unprecedented biod fish stocks, water or pollution Nobody disagrees global economy ramping up has no precedent. It's totally at odds with finite resource base and fragile ecology things as usual is inconceivable The assumption is growth will continue No subsystem can grow indefinitely, in physical terms growth has failed billion the systems we depend for survival. I crisis presents opportunity to change prosperity resides in quality of lives and health The challenge is to create the conditions

-Yes transition: creates political will and signals need -Now key: must be below 450 ppm Jackson 9 {Tim, ecological economist and professor of sustainable development (Surrey), Professorial Fellow to the Economic and Social Research Council, “Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet,” London: Earthscan, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga13/prosperity.pdf#THUR} This third phase of the limits debate is different from the last two. Resource scarcity — the problem of 'sources' in the language of environmental economists — is only part of the concern. The debate is driven even more strongly by the problem of 'sinks' — the capacity of the planet to assimilate' the environmental impacts of economic activity. 'Even before we run out of oil,' explains ecologist Bill McKibben, 'we're running out of planet.'19 Climate change is one of these sink problems. It's brought about by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere — accelerated by human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels. The ability of the climate to assimilate these emissions without incurring 'dangerous' climate change is fast running out. Brought to the world's attention in the late 1980s by climate scientist James Hansen and others, climate change has risen up the political agenda inexorably over the last two decades. Its visibility was given a massive boost by the influential Stern Review published in 2006. A former World Bank economist, Nicholas Stern was asked to lead a review of the economics of climate change for the UK Treasury. The review concluded that a small early hit on GDP (perhaps as low as 1 per cent of GDP) would allow us to avoid a much bigger hit (perhaps as high as 20 per cent of GDP) later on.20 Its telling that it took an economist commissioned by a government treasury to alert the world to things climate scientists — most notably the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — had been saying for years. This is partly a testament to the power of economists in the policy world. But the impact of the Stern report was also due to the seductive nature of its message. Climate change can be fixed, it said, and we'll barely notice the difference. Economic growth can go on more or less as usual. We'll have occasion to look at that message a bit more closely in what follows. The history of climate policy certainly suggests some caution in believing things will be that easy. The Kyoto Protocol committed the advanced economies to greenhouse gas emission reductions equivalent to about 5 per cent over 1990 levels by 2010. But things haven't worked out that well. Globally, emissions have risen by 40 per cent since 1990. In the meantime, the science itself has moved on. The Stern Review took as its target the task of stabilizing carbon emissions in the atmosphere at 550 parts per million (ppm).21 Most scientists — and Stern himself — now accept that that target won't prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change. The IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report argues that a 450 ppm target will be needed if climate change is to be restricted to an average global temperature increase of 2°C." Achieving that target could mean reducing global emissions by up to 85 per cent over 1990 levels by 2050." Two articles published in the journal Nature in April 2009 challenge even that conclusion. The authors argue that what matters is the total greenhouse gas budget we allow ourselves over the period to 2050. Global atmospheric concentrations are already at 435 ppm. And if we want a 75 per cent chance of staying below 2°C, the global economy can only afford to emit a total of 1 thousand billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO.) between the year 2000 and the year 2050. Crucially, they show that by 2008 we had already used up a third of this budget. Staying within the budget is going to be more demanding even than existing 450 ppm stabilization scenarios suggest.24 The message from all this is a profoundly uncomfortable one. Dangerous climate change is a matter of decades away. And we're using up the climate slack' too quickly. It may take decades to transform our energy systems. And we have barely started on that task. As the science improves it becomes clearer that a warming world may pose the gravest threat to survival we face. Though it came late to the party, the climate may just turn out to be the mother of all limits. This brief sketch of ecological limits does no justice at all to the accumulating wealth of understanding about resource scarcity or climate change. It hasn't even touched on questions of rapid deforestation, historically unprecedented biodiversity loss, the collapse of fish stocks, water scarcity or the pollution of soil and water supplies. Interested readers must go elsewhere for detailed discussions of these issues.2* In a sense, the details are not the point. Nobody seriously disagrees with the assessment of impacts. It's now widely acknowledged, for example, that an estimated 60 per cent of the world's ecosystem services have been degraded or over-used since the mid-20th century.26 During the same period of time the global economy has grown more than 5 times. If it continues to grow at the same rate, it will be 80 times bigger in 2100 than it was in 1950.27 This extraordinary ramping up of global economic activity has no historical precedent. It's totally at odds with our scientific knowledge of the finite resource base and the fragile ecology on which we depend for survival. A world in which things simply go on as usual is already inconceivable. But what about a world in which an estimated 9 billion people all achieve the level of affluence expected in the OECD nations?28 Such an economy would need to be 15 times the size of today's economy (75 times what it was in 1950) by 2050 and 40 times bigger than today's economy (200 times bigger than in 1950) by the end of the century." What on earth does such an economy look like? What does it run on? Does it really offer a credible vision for a shared and lasting prosperity? For the most part, we avoid the stark reality of these numbers. The default assumption is that — financial crises aside — growth will continue indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, where a better quality of life is undeniably needed, but even for the richest nations where the cornucopia of material wealth adds little to happiness and is beginning to threaten the foundations of our well-being. The reasons for this collective blindness are (as we shall see in more detail later) easy enough to find. The modern economy is structurally reliant on economic growth for its stability. When growth falters — as it did dramatically during the latter stages of 2008 — politicians panic. Businesses struggle to survive. People lose their jobs and sometimes their homes. A spiral of recession looms. Questioning growth is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists and revolutionaries. But question it we must. The idea of a non-growing economy may be an anathema to an economist. But the idea of a continually growing economy is an anathema to an ecologist. No subsystem of a finite system can grow indefinitely, in physical terms. Economists have to be able to answer the question of how a continually growing economic system can fit within a finite ecological system. The only possible response to this challenge is to suggest — as economists do — that growth in dollars is 'decoupled' from growth in physical throughputs and environmental impacts. But as we shall see more clearly in what follows, this hasn't so far achieved what's needed. There are no prospects for it doing so in the immediate future. And the sheer scale of decoupling required to meet the limits set out here (and to stay within them while the economy keeps on growing in perpetuity) staggers the imagination. In short, we have no alternative but to question growth. The myth of growth has failed us. It has failed the 1 billion people who still attempt to live on half the price of a cup of coffee each day. It has failed the fragile ecological systems on which we depend for survival. It has failed, spectacularly, in its own terms, to provide economic stability and secure peoples livelihoods. Of course, if the current economic crisis really does indicate {as some predict) the end of an era of easy growth, at least for the advanced nations, then the concerns of this book are doubly relevant. Prosperity without growth is a very useful trick to have up your sleeve when the economy is faltering. The uncomfortable reality is that we find ourselves faced with the imminent end of the era of cheap oil, the prospect of steadily rising commodity prices, the degradation of air, water and soil, conflicts over land use, resource use, water use, forestry and fishing rights, and the momentous challenge of stabilizing the global climate. And we face these tasks with an economy that is fundamentally broken, in desperate need of renewal. In these circumstances, a return to business as usual is not an option. Prosperity for the few founded on ecological destruction and persistent social injustice is no foundation for a civilized society. Economic recovery is vital. Protecting peoples jobs — and creating new ones — is absolutely essential. But we also stand in urgent need of a renewed sense of shared prosperity. A deeper commitment to justice in a finite world. Delivering these goals may seem an unfamiliar or even incongruous task to policy in the modern age. The role of government has been framed so narrowly by material aims and hollowed out by a misguided vision of unbounded consumer freedoms. The concept of governance itself stands in urgent need of renewal. But the economic crisis presents us with a unique opportunity to invest in change. To sweep away the short-term thinking that has plagued society for decades. To replace it with considered policy capable of addressing the enormous challenge of delivering a lasting prosperity. For at the end of the day prosperity goes beyond material pleasures. It transcends material concerns. It resides in the quality of our lives and in the health and happiness of our families. It is present in the strength of our relationships and our trust in the community. It is evidenced by our satisfaction at work and our sense of shared meaning and purpose. It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the life of society. Prosperity consists in our ability to flourish as human beings — within the ecological limits of a finite planet. The challenge for our society is to create the conditions under which this is possible. It is the most urgent task of our times.

<h4>Collapse spurs transition – <u>IMMEDIATE</u> change is best – prevents <u>extinction</u> level climate change, resource wars and environmental degradation </h4><p>-More sustainability evidence: resource depletion, price spikes, unattainable influence and warming</p><p>-Yes transition: creates political will and signals need</p><p>-Now key: must be below 450 ppm</p><p><strong>Jackson 9 </strong>{Tim, ecological economist and professor of sustainable development (Surrey), Professorial Fellow to the Economic and Social Research Council, “Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet,” London: Earthscan, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga13/prosperity.pdf<u>#THUR}</p><p></u>This third phase of the limits debate is different from the last two. <u>Resource scarcity</u> — the problem of 'sources' in the language of environmental economists — <u>is only part of the concern</u>. The debate is driven even more strongly by the problem of 'sinks' — the capacity of the planet to assimilate' the environmental impacts of economic activity. 'Even <u>before we run out of oil</u>,' explains ecologist Bill McKibben, <u><strong>'we're running out of planet</u></strong>.'19 <u>Climate change is</u> one of these sink problems. It's brought about by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere — <u>accelerated by human activities</u>, especially the burning of fossil fuels. <u>The <mark>ability of</mark> the <mark>climate to assimilate</u></mark> these <u>emissions without incurring 'dangerous' </u>climate <u>change <mark>is</mark> <strong>fast <mark>running out</u></strong></mark>. Brought to the world's attention in the late 1980s by climate scientist James Hansen and others, climate change has risen up the political agenda inexorably over the last two decades. Its visibility was given a massive boost by the influential Stern Review published in 2006. A former World Bank economist, Nicholas Stern was asked to lead a review of the economics of climate change for the UK Treasury. The review concluded that a small early hit on GDP (perhaps as low as 1 per cent of GDP) would allow us to avoid a much bigger hit (perhaps as high as 20 per cent of GDP) later on.20 Its telling that it took an economist commissioned by a government treasury to alert the world to things climate scientists — most notably the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — had been saying for years. This is partly a testament to the power of economists in the policy world. But the impact of the Stern report was also due to the seductive nature of its message. Climate change can be fixed, it said, and we'll barely notice the difference. Economic growth can go on more or less as usual. We'll have occasion to look at that message a bit more closely in what follows. <u>The history of climate policy certainly suggests some caution in believing things will be that easy.</u> The <u>Kyoto</u> Protocol committed the advanced economies to greenhouse gas emission reductions equivalent to about 5 per cent over 1990 levels by 2010. But <u>things haven't worked out that well</u>. Globally, <u>emissions have risen by 40 per cent</u> since 1990. <u>In the meantime, the science itself has moved on.</u> The Stern Review took as its target the task of stabilizing carbon emissions in the atmosphere at 550 parts per million (ppm).21 Most scientists — and Stern himself — now accept that that target won't prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change. <u>The IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report argues that a <mark>450 ppm</mark> target <mark>will be needed if</mark> climate <mark>change is</mark> to be <mark>restricted</mark> to an average global temperature increase of 2°C."</u> <u>Achieving <mark>that</u></mark> target <u><mark>could mean reducing</u></mark> global <u><mark>emissions</mark> by </u>up to <u><mark>85 per cent</u></mark> over 1990 levels by 2050." Two articles published in the journal Nature in April 2009 challenge even that conclusion. The authors argue that what matters is the total greenhouse gas budget we allow ourselves over the period to 2050. Global atmospheric <u>concentrations are already at 435 ppm. And if we want a 75 per cent chance of staying below 2°C, the global <mark>economy can only afford</mark> to emit a total of <mark>1 thousand billion tonnes</u></mark> of carbon dioxide (CO.) <u>between</u> the year <u>2000 and</u> the year <u>2050.</u> Crucially, they show that <u>by 2008 <strong><mark>we</mark> had <mark>already used</mark> up <mark>a third</mark> of this budget</strong>. Staying within</u> the budget <u>is going to be more demanding even than existing 450 ppm stabilization scenarios suggest</u>.24 <u>The message from all this is a profoundly uncomfortable one. <strong>Dangerous climate change is a matter of decades away</strong>. And we're using up the climate slack' too quickly. It may take decades to transform</u> our energy systems<u>. <strong>And we have barely started</u></strong> on that task. <u><mark>As</u></mark> the <u><mark>science improves</mark> it becomes clearer that a <mark>warming</mark> world may <mark>pose</mark> the <strong><mark>gravest threat to survival</mark> we face</u></strong>. Though it came late to the party, the <u><mark>climate may</mark> just turn out to <mark>be the <strong>mother of all limits.</strong> This</mark> brief <mark>sketch</u></mark> of ecological limits <u><strong>does no justice</u></strong> at all to the accumulating wealth of understanding about resource scarcity or climate change. <u>It <strong><mark>hasn't</mark> even <mark>touched</u></strong></mark> on questions of rapid <u><mark>deforestation</u></mark>, historically <u><strong><mark>unprecedented</strong> biod</mark>iversity loss</u>, the <u>collapse of <mark>fish stocks, water</mark> scarcity <mark>or</u></mark> the <u><mark>pollution</u></mark> of soil and water supplies. Interested readers must go elsewhere for detailed discussions of these issues.2* In a sense, the details are not the point. <u><strong><mark>Nobody</mark> seriously <mark>disagrees</mark> with the assessment of impacts</strong>.</u> It's now widely acknowledged, for example, that an estimated <u>60 per cent of</u> the world's <u>ecosystem</u> services <u>have been degraded</u> or over-used since the mid-20th century.26 <u>During</u> the same period of time <u>the <mark>global economy</mark> has grown </u>more than<u> 5 times. If it continues to grow at the same rate, it will be 80</u> <u>times bigger in 2100</u> than it was in 1950.27 <u>This extraordinary <mark>ramping up</mark> </u>of global economic activity<u> <mark>has no</mark> h<strong>istorical <mark>precedent</u></strong>. <u>It's</mark> <mark>totally at odds with</mark> our scientific knowledge of the <mark>finite resource base and</mark> the <mark>fragile ecology</mark> on which we depend for survival. A</u> <u>world in which <mark>things</mark> simply go on <mark>as usual is</mark> already <strong><mark>inconceivable</u></strong></mark>. But what about <u>a world in which</u> an estimated<u> 9 billion</u> people all <u>achieve</u> the level of <u>affluence</u> expected in the OECD nations?28 Such an economy <u>would need to be 15 times the size of today's economy</u> (75 times what it was in 1950) by 2050 and 40 times bigger than today's economy (200 times bigger than in 1950) by the end of the century." What on earth does such an economy look like? What does it run on? Does it really offer a credible vision for a shared and lasting prosperity? For the most part, we avoid the stark reality of these numbers. <u><mark>The</mark> default <mark>assumption is</mark> that</u> — financial crises aside — <u><mark>growth will continue</u></mark> indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, where a better quality of life is undeniably needed, but even <u>for the richest nations where</u> the cornucopia of material <u>wealth adds little to happiness and is beginning to threaten the foundations of our well-being. The reasons for this collective blindness are</u> (as we shall see in more detail later) easy enough to find. <u>The modern economy</u> is <u>structurally reliant on economic growth</u> for its stability. <u>When growth falters</u> — as it did dramatically during the latter stages of 2008 — <u>politicians panic. </u>Businesses struggle to survive. People lose their jobs and sometimes their homes. A spiral of recession looms. <u>Questioning growth is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists and revolutionaries. But <strong>question it we must.</u></strong> The idea of a non-growing economy may be an anathema to an economist. But <u>the idea of a <strong>continually growing economy is an</strong> <strong>anathema to an ecologist</strong>.</u> <u><mark>No subsystem</mark> of a finite system <mark>can grow indefinitely, in physical terms</u></mark>. Economists have to be able to answer the question of how a continually growing economic system can fit within a finite ecological system. The only possible response to this challenge is to suggest — as economists do — that growth in dollars is 'decoupled' from growth in physical throughputs and environmental impacts. But as we shall see more clearly in what follows, this hasn't so far achieved what's needed. There are no prospects for it doing so in the immediate future. And the sheer scale of decoupling required to meet the limits set out here (and to stay within them while the economy keeps on growing in perpetuity) staggers the imagination. In short, <u><strong>we have no alternative but to question growth.</strong> The myth of <mark>growth has failed</mark> us. It has failed the</u> 1 <u><mark>billion</u></mark> people <u>who</u> still attempt to <u>live on half the price of a cup of coffee each day.</u> <u>It has failed <mark>the</mark> fragile ecological <mark>systems</mark> on which <mark>we depend for survival. I</mark>t has failed, <strong>spectacularly</u></strong>, in its own terms, <u>to provide economic stability</u> and secure peoples livelihoods. Of course,<u> if the current economic crisis </u>really<u> does </u>indicate {as some predict)<u> the end of </u>an era of <u>easy growth</u>, at least for the advanced nations, then the concerns of this book are doubly relevant. <u>Prosperity without growth is a very useful trick to have up your sleeve when the economy is faltering.</u> The uncomfortable reality is that <u><strong>we find ourselves faced with the imminent</strong> end </u>of the era <u>of cheap oil, </u>the prospect of steadily<u> rising </u>commodity<u> prices</u>, the <u>degradation of air, water and soil, <strong>conflicts over land use, resource use, water use, forestry and fishing rights</strong>, and the momentous challenge of stabilizing the global climate.</u> And <u>we face</u> these <u>tasks with an economy that is fundamentally broken, in desperate need of renewal</u>. In these circumstances, <u><strong>a return to business as usual is not an option</u></strong>. Prosperity for the few founded on ecological destruction and persistent social injustice is no foundation for a civilized society. Economic recovery is vital. Protecting peoples jobs — and creating new ones — is absolutely essential. But we also stand in urgent need of a renewed sense of shared prosperity. A deeper commitment to justice in a finite world. Delivering these goals may seem an unfamiliar or even incongruous task to policy in the modern age. The role of government has been framed so narrowly by material aims and hollowed out by a misguided vision of unbounded consumer freedoms. The concept of governance itself stands in urgent need of renewal. But the <u><strong>economic <mark>crisis presents</mark> us with a unique <mark>opportunity to</mark> invest in <mark>change</u></strong></mark>. <u>To sweep away the short-term thinking that has plagued society for decades.</u> <u>To replace it with considered policy capable of addressing the enormous challenge of delivering a lasting prosperity.</u> For at the end of the day <u><mark>prosperity</mark> goes beyond material pleasures</u>. It transcends material concerns<u>. It <mark>resides in</mark> the <mark>quality of</mark> our <mark>lives and</mark> in the <mark>health</mark> and happiness of our families</u>. <u>It is present in the strength of</u> our relationships and our trust in the <u>community</u>. It is evidenced by our satisfaction at work and our sense of shared meaning and purpose. <u>It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the life of society. Prosperity consists in our ability to flourish as human beings — within the ecological limits of a finite planet. <mark>The challenge</mark> for our society <mark>is to create the conditions</mark> under which this is possible. <strong>It is the most urgent task of our times</strong>.</p></u>

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we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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Defense budget is top of the docket – push starts next week

Bertuca 3-11

Bertuca 3-11

Office of Management and Budget will release Trump skinny budget on March 16 Congressional request for supplemental FY-17 defense spending the White House announced plans to boost defense spending by $54 billion in FY-18 above the $549 billion cap The budget would provide the Pentagon with a $573 billion base topline and would amount to a 3 percent increase, or $17 billion above Obama

O M B will release Trump skinny budget on March 16 Congressional request for defense spending the White House boost defense spending by $54 billion above the cap The budget would provide the Pentagon with a 3 percent increase

[Tony. “Trump's budget blueprint to be released March 16” Inside Defense, 3/11/17 ln//GBS-JV] White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said today that Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney will release the Trump administration's "skinny budget" for fiscal year 2018 on March 16. Congressional staffers also expect a request for supplemental FY-17 defense spending, along with funds for President Trump's proposed wall on the southern border with Mexico, to be released March 16. The final FY-18 budget request is due to Congress in May. On Feb. 27, the White House announced plans to boost defense spending by $54 billion in FY-18 above the $549 billion cap mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act. The increase, which would bring total defense spending to $603 billion, would be paid for by steep cuts to domestic agencies. The budget would provide the Pentagon with a $573 billion base topline and would amount to a 3 percent increase, or $17 billion above what the Obama administration had planned.

<h4>Defense budget is top of the docket – push starts <strong>next week</h4><p>Bertuca 3-11</p><p></strong>[Tony. “Trump's budget blueprint to be released March 16” Inside Defense, 3/11/17 ln//GBS-JV]</p><p>White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said today that <u><mark>O</mark>ffice of <mark>M</mark>anagement and <mark>B</mark>udget</u> Director Mick Mulvaney <u><mark>will</mark> <mark>release</u></mark> the <u><mark>Trump</u></mark> administration's "<u><strong><mark>skinny budget</u></strong></mark>" for fiscal year 2018 <u><strong><mark>on March 16</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Congressional</u></mark> staffers also expect a <u><mark>request for</mark> supplemental FY-17 <mark>defense spending</u></mark>, along with funds for President Trump's proposed wall on the southern border with Mexico, to be released March 16. The final FY-18 budget request is due to Congress in May. On Feb. 27, <u><strong><mark>the White House</mark> announced plans to <mark>boost defense spending by $54 billion</mark> in FY-18 <mark>above the</mark> $549 billion <mark>cap</u></strong></mark> mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act. The increase, which would bring total defense spending to $603 billion, would be paid for by steep cuts to domestic agencies. <u><mark>The budget would provide the Pentagon with</mark> a $573 billion base topline and would amount to <mark>a 3 percent increase</mark>, or $17 billion above</u> what the <u>Obama</u> administration had planned.</p>

OFFCASE

Politics

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IDCA JV state

Quarters

NEW TRIER JM

Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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Roberts evidence in the context of music – you are not that. The dynamic and solidarity building aspects of the evidence stem off aspects of musical unity. That’s not what I got after listening to the 1AC. Neg on presumption.

<h4>Roberts evidence in the context of music – you are not that. The dynamic and solidarity building aspects of the evidence stem off aspects of musical unity. That’s not what I got after listening to the 1AC. Neg on presumption.</h4>

1NC Doubles UT

Case

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University of Texas

Doubles

Milpitas DT

Alexis Kostun, Roberto Montero, Alec Ramsey

1AC - Techno-Orientalism 1NC - Framework Cap 2NC - Framework 1NR - Cap 2NR - Framework

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Growth causes war

Trainer 2

Trainer 2 (Ted, Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Arts at the University of New South Wales, “If You Want Affluence, Prepare For War,” Democracy & Nature, Volume 8, Number 2, p. 296-297)

the struggle for wealth is central in the literature on the causes of war warfare appears as a normal form of competition within the capitalist economy world wars occur during economic expansion War is an inevitable result of the struggle for expansion Choucri and North say their most important finding is that growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that results in war The World Wars can be seen as imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain held empire which it fought wars to take! Finite resources in expanding populations and increasing demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the quest for growth ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources expansion is a prime source of conflict long as growth remain unmanaged these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.

struggle for wealth cause of war world wars occur during expansion War is an inevitable result of expansion growth is a strong determinant of expansion that results in war World Wars can be imperial grabbing Finite resources create a situation ripe for international violence. War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth expansion is a prime source of conflict these processes carry major powers into war

Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars [end page 296] regularly occur during a period of economic expansion.’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75

<h4>Growth causes war</h4><p><strong>Trainer 2 </strong>(Ted, Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Arts at the University of New South Wales, “If You Want Affluence, Prepare For<u> War,” Democracy & Nature, Volume 8, Number 2, p. 296-297)</p><p></u>Finally, at the most abstract level, <u>the <mark>struggle for</u> </mark>greater <u><mark>wealth</u></mark> and power <u><strong>is central in the literature</u></strong> <u>on the <mark>cause</mark>s <mark>of war</u></mark>. ‘… <u>warfare appears as a normal</u> and periodic <u>form of competition within the capitalist</u> world <u>economy</u>. … <u><mark>world wars</u></mark> [end page 296] regularly <u><mark>occur during</u></mark> a period of <u><strong>economic <mark>expansion</u></strong></mark>.’71 ‘<u><mark>War is an inevitable result of</mark> the struggle</u> between economies <u>for <mark>expansion</u></mark>.’72 <u>Choucri and North say their <strong>most important finding</u></strong> <u>is that</u> domestic <u><mark>growth is a strong determinant of</mark> national <mark>expansion</mark> and <mark>that</u></mark> this <u><mark>results in</u></mark> competition between nations and <u><mark>war</u></mark>.73 <u>The</u> First and Second <u><mark>World Wars can be</mark> seen as</u> being largely about <u><mark>imperial grabbing</mark>. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain</u> already <u>held</u> much of the world within its <u>empire</u> … <u>which it</u> had previously <u><strong>fought wars to take! </u></strong>‘<u><mark>Finite resources</mark> in</u> a world of <u>expanding populations and increasing</u> per capita <u>demands <mark>create a situation <strong>ripe for international violence</strong>.</mark>’74 Ashley focuses on </u>the significance of<u> the quest for</u> economic <u>growth</u>. <u>‘<mark>War is</u> <u><strong>mainly explicable</u></strong> <u>in terms of differential</mark> <mark>growth</mark> in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources </u>… <u><strong><mark>expansion is a prime source of conflict</u></strong></mark>. So <u>long as</u> the dynamics of differential <u>growth remain unmanaged</u>, it is probable that <u><mark>these</mark> long term <mark>processes</mark> will sooner or later <strong><mark>carry major powers into war</strong></mark>.</u>’75</p>

A1

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MBA

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Greenhill KS

MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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Internal divide over engaging China guarantees opposition

Gries ’14

Gries ’14 – Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and director of the University of Oklahoma's Institute for U.S.-China Issues

(Peter Hays, April 2014, The Politics of American Foreign Policy, date accessed: 6.22.16, pages 209-210, accessible at http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gries.2014.Ch9.pdf)//AP Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are internally divided over China. On the left Democrats concerned about human rights issues, advocate for tougher China policies. congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, has been a frequent critic of Chinese human rights abuses Yet other Democrats on Capitol Hill, many from heavily blue collar districts, join Big Labor in condemning unfair Chinese trade practices and advocating tougher U.S. trade policies towards China. Republicans in Washington are equally divided on China policy Business conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy Military hawks and Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China policies. Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia frequently promotes tougher positions on China. New Jersey congressman Christopher Smith has also advocated a tougher U.S. China policy, but for very different reasons China’s continued repression of religion is among the most despotic in the world,”

Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are internally divided over China concerned about human rights issues, advocate for tougher China policie Republicans in Washington are equally divided on China policy Military hawks and Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China policies

(Peter Hays, April 2014, The Politics of American Foreign Policy, date accessed: 6.22.16, pages 209-210, accessible at http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gries.2014.Ch9.pdf)//AP Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are internally divided over China. On the left, some Democrats argue for a pro-China policy of engagement to better integrate China into the global economic, political, and security orders. Other Democrats, concerned about human rights issues, advocate for tougher China policies. For instance, California congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, quoted above, has been a frequent critic of Chinese human rights abuses. Yet other Democrats on Capitol Hill, many from heavily blue collar districts, join Big Labor in condemning unfair Chinese trade practices and advocating tougher U.S. trade policies towards China. On the right, Republicans in Washington are equally divided on China policy. Business conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy conducive to increased trade, investment, and profits. For instance, the U.S.-China Business Council and AmCham China, which lobby on behalf of U.S. companies doing business with China, have worked closely with many Republicans on the Hill to support pro-China and block anti-China legislation. Military hawks and Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China policies. Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia, quoted in the epigraph, serves on the House Armed Services Committee and cochairs the House’s China Caucus, and frequently promotes tougher positions on China. New Jersey congressman Christopher Smith, who has held dozens of hearings on Capitol Hill to deplore China’s lack of religious freedoms, has also advocated a tougher U.S. China policy, but for very different reasons. “China’s continued repression of religion is among the most despotic in the world,” Smith, a Christian conservative who founded the House Pro-Life Caucus, argues. “Today, numerous underground Roman Catholic priests and bishops and Protestant pastors languish in the infamous concentration camps of China for simply proclaiming the Gospel of Jesus Christ.”

<h4>Internal divide over engaging China <u>guarantees</u> opposition </h4><p><strong>Gries ’14</strong> – Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and director of the University of Oklahoma's Institute for U.S.-China Issues</p><p><u>(Peter Hays, April 2014, The Politics of American Foreign Policy, date accessed: 6.22.16, pages 209-210, accessible at http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gries.2014.Ch9.pdf)//AP</p><p><strong><mark>Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are internally divided over China</mark>.</u></strong> <u>On the left</u>, some Democrats argue for a pro-China policy of engagement to better integrate China into the global economic, political, and security orders. Other <u>Democrats</u>, <u><strong><mark>concerned about human rights issues, advocate for tougher China policie</mark>s.</u></strong> For instance, California <u>congresswoman</u> <u>Nancy Pelosi,</u> quoted above, <u>has been a frequent critic of Chinese human rights abuses</u>. <u>Yet other Democrats on Capitol Hill, many from heavily blue collar districts, join Big Labor in condemning unfair Chinese trade practices and advocating tougher U.S. trade policies towards China.</p><p></u>On the right, <u><strong><mark>Republicans in Washington are equally divided on China policy</u></strong></mark>. <u>Business conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy</u> conducive to increased trade, investment, and profits. For instance, the U.S.-China Business Council and AmCham China, which lobby on behalf of U.S. companies doing business with China, have worked closely with many Republicans on the Hill to support pro-China and block anti-China legislation. <u><strong><mark>Military hawks and Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China policies</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia</u>, quoted in the epigraph, serves on the House Armed Services Committee and cochairs the House’s China Caucus, and <u>frequently promotes tougher positions on China.</u> <u>New Jersey congressman Christopher Smith</u>, who has held dozens of hearings on Capitol Hill to deplore China’s lack of religious freedoms, <u>has also advocated a tougher U.S. China policy, but for very different reasons</u>. “<u>China’s continued repression of religion is among the most despotic in the world,”</u> Smith, a Christian conservative who founded the House Pro-Life Caucus, argues. “Today, numerous underground Roman Catholic priests and bishops and Protestant pastors languish in the infamous concentration camps of China for simply proclaiming the Gospel of Jesus Christ.”</p>

OFFCASE

Politics

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IDCA JV state

Quarters

NEW TRIER JM

Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-IDCA%20JV%20state-Quarters.docx

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Trade disputes don’t escalate – solidified international norms

Ikenson, 12

Ikenson, 12 [March 5th, Daniel, Daniel Ikenson is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,

An emerging narrative is that a proliferation of protectionist Chinese policies is to blame for worsening U.S.-China relations The term "trade war" is no longer taboo it is beyond doubt that certain Chinese policies have been provocative discriminatory protectionist, and, in some cases, violative of the agreed rules of international trade. If the public's passions are going to be inflamed with talk of a trade war, prudence demands that the war's nature be properly characterized and its causes identified and accurately depicted. trade wars are never won It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible

An emerging narrative is that a prolif of protectionist policies is to blame for worsening relations The term "trade war" is no longer taboo trade wars are never won the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible the recent trend reversible

http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war] An emerging narrative in 2012 is that a proliferation of protectionist, treaty-violating, or otherwise illiberal Chinese policies is to blame for worsening U.S.-China relations. China trade experts from across the ideological and political spectra have lent credibility to that story. Business groups that once counseled against U.S. government actions that might be perceived by the Chinese as provocative have changed their tunes. The term "trade war" is no longer taboo.¶ The media have portrayed the United States as a victim of underhanded Chinese practices, including currency manipulation, dumping, subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory "indigenous innovation" policies, export restrictions, industrial espionage, and other ad hoc impediments to U.S. investment and exports. ¶ Indeed, it is beyond doubt that certain Chinese policies have been provocative, discriminatory, protectionist, and, in some cases, violative of the agreed rules of international trade. But there is more to the story than that. U.S. policies, politics, and attitudes have contributed to rising tensions, as have rabble-rousing politicians and a confrontation-thirsty media. If the public's passions are going to be inflamed with talk of a trade war, prudence demands that the war's nature be properly characterized and its causes identified and accurately depicted.¶ Those agitating for tough policy actions should put down their battle bugles and consider that trade wars are never won. Instead, such wars claim victims indiscriminately and leave significant damage in their wake. Even if one concludes that China's list of offenses is collectively more egregious than that of the United States, the most sensible course of action — for the American public (if not campaigning politicians) — is one that avoids mutually destructive actions and finds measures to reduce frictions with China.¶ Nature of the U.S.-China Trade War¶ It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms. Rather, both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade. And that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1

<h4>Trade disputes don’t escalate – solidified international norms </h4><p><strong>Ikenson, 12</strong> [March 5th, Daniel, Daniel Ikenson is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, </p><p> http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war] </p><p><u><mark>An emerging narrative</u></mark> in 2012 <u><mark>is that a prolif</mark>eration <mark>of protectionist</u></mark>, treaty-violating, or otherwise illiberal <u>Chinese <mark>policies is to blame for</mark> <mark>worsening</mark> U.S.-China</u> <u><mark>relations</u></mark>. China trade experts from across the ideological and political spectra have lent credibility to that story. Business groups that once counseled against U.S. government actions that might be perceived by the Chinese as provocative have changed their tunes. <u><mark>The term "<strong>trade war</strong>" is no longer</mark> <mark>taboo</u></mark>.¶ The media have portrayed the United States as a victim of underhanded Chinese practices, including currency manipulation, dumping, subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory "indigenous innovation" policies, export restrictions, industrial espionage, and other ad hoc impediments to U.S. investment and exports. ¶ Indeed, <u>it is beyond doubt that certain Chinese policies have been provocative</u>, <u>discriminatory</u>, <u>protectionist, and, in some cases, violative of the agreed rules of</u> <u>international trade.</u> But there is more to the story than that. U.S. policies, politics, and attitudes have contributed to rising tensions, as have rabble-rousing politicians and a confrontation-thirsty media. <u>If the public's passions are going to be inflamed with talk of a trade war, prudence demands that the war's nature be properly characterized and its causes identified and accurately depicted.</u>¶ Those agitating for tough policy actions should put down their battle bugles and consider that <u><strong><mark>trade wars are never won</u></strong></mark>. Instead, such wars claim victims indiscriminately and leave significant damage in their wake. Even if one concludes that China's list of offenses is collectively more egregious than that of the United States, the most sensible course of action — for the American public (if not campaigning politicians) — is one that avoids mutually destructive actions and finds measures to reduce frictions with China.¶ Nature of the U.S.-China Trade War¶ <u>It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion.</u> But <u><mark>the U.S.-China economic relationship has <strong>not descended</strong> into an <strong>existential call to arms</u></mark>.</strong> Rather, <u><mark>both governments have taken protectionist actions that are <strong>legally defensible</strong></mark> or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade.</u> <u>That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade</u>. And <u>that suggests that the <strong>kerfuffle is containable</u></strong> <u>and <strong><mark>the recent trend</mark> <mark>reversible</u></strong></mark>.1</p>

A1

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MBA

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Greenhill KS

MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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Political capital’s key – and a robust defense budget solves ISIS and broad military strength that will collapse now due to lack of funds

Tritten 1-24

Tritten 1-24

McCain convened a Senate hearing and urged a costly and long-term build-up of the military to reverse years of falling budgets fired the opening salvo in a coming political debate in Congress this year over Trump’s promise to rebuild a “depleted” military with an historic increase in defense spending for troops, ships and aircraft. Reed shot back with calls to also fund domestic security programs, which also have been squeezed by spending caps in recent years. The defense budget fight is only beginning McCain is pushing for a $640-billion base defense budget that would shatter a $549-billion spending cap imposed by federal law, meaning Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement to ease the limits. Rebuilding America’s military will require spending political capital and making policy trade-offs national defense must be a political priority on par with repealing and replacing Obamacare, rebuilding infrastructure and reforming the tax code. Republicans will likely be forced to meet some demands of Senate Democrats, who still control 48 seats in the chamber and could filibuster Despite Trump’s victory and Republican control of Congress, lawmakers are still stuck with federal budget caps McCain’s budget proposal was released last week and lays out a five-year build-up, calling for: The Army to grow by 8,000 soldiers each year through 2022. Navy plans for 41 new ships to increase by 18 and additional purchases of 58 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 16 EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Marine Corps to grow by 3,000 Marines each year and reach at total of 200,000 by 2022, as well as an additional 20 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the service. The Air Force to have 1,500 combat aircraft, up from 1,100 now. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have warned that falling defense budgets in recent years have stressed and eroded the military as it carries out a variety of global tasks such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS], Afghanistan and deterrence against China

McCain fired t in a political debate in Congress over defense spending The defense budget fight is only beginning Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement Rebuilding will require spending political capital making trade-offs national defense on par with Obamacare infrastructure and reforming tax code Republicans will be forced to meet some demands of Democrats McCain’s budget call for The Army to grow additional 20 F-35 Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have warned that falling defense budgets have stressed and eroded the military as it carries out global tasks such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS], Afghanistan and deterrence against China

[Travis. “McCain kicks off debate in Senate over military buildup” 1/24/17 https://www.stripes.com/news/mccain-kicks-off-debate-in-senate-over-military-buildup-1.450584//GBS-JV] Sen. John McCain on Tuesday convened a Senate hearing and urged a costly and long-term build-up of the military to reverse years of falling budgets. The Arizona Republican fired the opening salvo in a coming political debate in Congress this year over President Donald Trump’s promise to rebuild a “depleted” military with an historic increase in defense spending for troops, ships and aircraft. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee – in a possible preview of the party’s political strategy toward the Republican plans – shot back with calls to also fund domestic security programs, which also have been squeezed by spending caps in recent years. The defense budget fight is only beginning and the Armed Services Committee will play a central role in crafting 2018 military plans passed later this year by Congress. McCain is pushing for a $640-billion base defense budget that would shatter a $549-billion spending cap imposed by federal law, meaning Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement to ease the limits. “It will not be easy,” McCain said. “Rebuilding America’s military will require spending political capital and making policy trade-offs. That’s why national defense must be a political priority on par with repealing and replacing Obamacare, rebuilding infrastructure and reforming the tax code.” Indeed, Republicans will likely be forced to meet some demands of Senate Democrats, who still control 48 seats in the chamber and could filibuster efforts to remove or sidestep the spending caps that now stand in the way of the McCain and Trump plans. Democrats have demanded a deal to boost defense spending also must include more money for programs such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and the FBI. “Many of my colleagues will maintain that the defense bill is not a vehicle to discuss the fate of domestic spending,” Reed said Tuesday. “However, for the past several years, I have argued that when it comes to questions of adequate funding, we need to consider all the security responsibilities of our nation, not just those that are executed by the Department of Defense.” Despite Trump’s victory and Republican control of Congress, lawmakers are still stuck with federal budget caps passed in 2011 that block increases for the military and other programs. The Trump administration has yet to release its plans for the Defense Department but the president’s earlier proposals for a much bigger Navy fleet as well as more soldiers and Marines could require an extra $80 billion per year above planned spending, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C. think tank. McCain’s budget proposal was released last week and lays out a five-year build-up, calling for: The Army to grow by 8,000 soldiers each year through 2022. Navy plans for 41 new ships to increase by 18 and additional purchases of 58 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 16 EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Marine Corps to grow by 3,000 Marines each year and reach at total of 200,000 by 2022, as well as an additional 20 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the service. The Air Force to have 1,500 combat aircraft, up from 1,100 now. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have warned that falling defense budgets in recent years have stressed and eroded the military as it carries out a variety of global tasks such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS], stability operations in Afghanistan and deterrence against China in the Pacific region.

<h4>Political capital’s key – and a robust defense budget solves ISIS and <u>broad military strength</u> that will <u>collapse now</u><strong> due to lack of funds </h4><p>Tritten 1-24</p><p></strong>[Travis. “McCain kicks off debate in Senate over military buildup” 1/24/17 https://www.stripes.com/news/mccain-kicks-off-debate-in-senate-over-military-buildup-1.450584//GBS-JV]</p><p>Sen. John <u><mark>McCain</u></mark> on Tuesday <u>convened a Senate hearing and urged a costly and long-term build-up of the military to reverse years of falling budgets</u>. The Arizona Republican <u><strong><mark>fired t</mark>he opening salvo <mark>in a</mark> coming <mark>political debate in Congress</mark> this year <mark>over</u></strong></mark> President Donald <u>Trump’s promise to rebuild a “depleted” military with an historic increase in <mark>defense spending</mark> for troops, ships and aircraft. </u>Sen. Jack <u>Reed</u>, D-R.I., the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee – in a possible preview of the party’s political strategy toward the Republican plans – <u>shot back with calls to also fund domestic security programs, which also have been squeezed by spending caps in recent years. <strong><mark>The defense budget fight is only beginning</u></strong></mark> and the Armed Services Committee will play a central role in crafting 2018 military plans passed later this year by Congress. <u>McCain is pushing for a $640-billion base defense budget that would shatter a $549-billion spending cap imposed by federal law, meaning <strong><mark>Republicans and Democrats will need to reach an agreement </mark>to ease the limits</strong>. </u>“It will not be easy,” McCain said. “<u><mark>Rebuilding</mark> America’s military</u> <u><strong><mark>will require spending political capital </mark>and <mark>making </mark>policy <mark>trade-offs</u></strong></mark>. That’s why <u><mark>national defense </mark>must be a political priority <strong><mark>on par with</mark> repealing and replacing <mark>Obamacare</mark>, rebuilding <mark>infrastructure</mark> <mark>and reforming</mark> the <mark>tax code</mark>.</u></strong>” Indeed, <u><mark>Republicans</mark> <mark>will</mark> likely <mark>be forced to meet some demands of</mark> Senate <mark>Democrats</mark>, who still control 48 seats in the chamber and could filibuster</u> efforts to remove or sidestep the spending caps that now stand in the way of the McCain and Trump plans. Democrats have demanded a deal to boost defense spending also must include more money for programs such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and the FBI. “Many of my colleagues will maintain that the defense bill is not a vehicle to discuss the fate of domestic spending,” Reed said Tuesday. “However, for the past several years, I have argued that when it comes to questions of adequate funding, we need to consider all the security responsibilities of our nation, not just those that are executed by the Department of Defense.” <u>Despite Trump’s victory and Republican control of Congress, lawmakers are still stuck with federal budget caps </u>passed in 2011 that block increases for the military and other programs. The Trump administration has yet to release its plans for the Defense Department but the president’s earlier proposals for a much bigger Navy fleet as well as more soldiers and Marines could require an extra $80 billion per year above planned spending, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C. think tank. <u><mark>McCain’s budget</mark> proposal was released last week and lays out a five-year build-up, <mark>call</mark>ing <mark>for</mark>: <mark>The Army to grow</mark> by 8,000 soldiers each year through 2022. Navy plans for 41 new ships to increase by 18 and additional purchases of 58 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 16 EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Marine Corps to grow by 3,000 Marines each year and reach at total of 200,000 by 2022, as well as an <mark>additional <strong>20 F-35</mark> Joint Strike Fighters</strong> for the service. The Air Force to have 1,500 combat aircraft, up from 1,100 now. <mark>Lawmakers on</u> <u><strong>both sides of the aisle</u></strong> <u>have warned that falling defense budgets</mark> in recent years <mark>have</mark> <mark>stressed and eroded the military as it carries out</mark> a variety of <mark>global tasks</u> <u><strong>such as the war against the Islamic State group [ISIS],</u></strong></mark> stability operations in <u><mark>Afghanistan</u> <u>and</u> <u>deterrence against China</u></mark> in the Pacific region.</p>

OFFCASE

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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Swap lines collapse financial diplomacy---hurts Fed’s reputation

Baker 13

Baker 13 {Colleen Baker, Associate Professor University of Notre Dame Law School. Ph.D. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, JD/MBA University of Virginia, “The Federal Reserve ’s Use of International Swap Lines,” 2013, Online, PDF} GANGEEZY

Swap lines carry potential negative reputational risk for Federal Reserve swap lines seen as foreign policy role outside of the central bank's proper sphere. Use of swap lines also raises concerns about central bank performing a fiscal role, outside of its proper sphere questions concerning statutory authority continue Finally relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury about division of responsibility is highly discretionary and risks questions about independence Although an abundance of info about Federal Reserve's swap lines is available population arguably remains uninformed about complex global stability mechanisms and potential problems potential cost of swap lines is dispersed among public Therefore, little incentive exists for individuals to become informed about issue small, resource-rich, concentrated interest group banks and financial institutions-are interested in swap lines because of potential benefit and support they provide to group's risk taking level of trading activity in markets has "grown very rapidly and is very large compared to activity in other financial markets

Swap lines carry potential negative reputational risk for Federal Reserve swap lines seen as foreign policy role outside of the central bank's proper sphere raises concerns about performing a fiscal role division of responsibility potential cost of t swap lines is dispersed among public. ttle incentive exists for individuals to become well informed about issue. markets has "grown very rapidly and is very large compared

Swap lines also carry potential negative reputational risk for the Federal Reserve for several reasons. The Federal Reserve's swap lines could be seen as performing a foreign policy role, a task outside of the central bank's proper sphere.187 Use of the swap lines also raises concerns about the central bank performing a fiscal role, another task arguably outside of its proper sphere.' 8 And questions concerning the statutory authority for the Federal Reserve's swap lines continue.' 89 Finally, the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury "about the division of responsibility for foreign currency operations" 190 is highly discretionary and risks questions about the central bank's independence. Finally, swap lines are set to become critical, competitive components of global financial market infrastructure. Such developments also increase the risk of swap lines becoming a significant public choice problem.191 Without question, a large segment of the public is unhappy about the tremendous government assistance to financial institutions during the recent crisis. Although an abundance of information about the Federal Reserve's swap lines is available on the Internet, much of the population arguably remains uninformed about these complex global stability mechanisms and their potential problems, risks, and costs. Furthermore, the potential cost of the swap lines is widely dispersed among the public. Therefore, little incentive exists for individuals to become well informed about this issue. On the other hand, a small, resource-rich, concentrated interest group international banks and financial institutions-are very interested in the swap lines because of the potential benefit and support they can provide to the group's risk taking activities. This circumstance is clear from reported discussions surrounding the swap line between the Bank of England and the People's Bank of China.' 92 A small group of international banks dominate trading in the foreign currency markets.193 And the level of trading activity in these markets has "grown very rapidly and is very large compared to activity in other financial markets." 94 Because the swap lines are government insurance, their use risks a potential wealth transfer to international banks and financial institutions. Not only is it unclear whether this is a potentially productive redistribution of social wealth, but also whether this redistribution will increase the possibility of future market instability, financial crises, and the subsequent need for additional swap line use.

<h4>Swap lines collapse financial diplomacy---hurts Fed’s reputation</h4><p><strong>Baker 13</strong> {Colleen Baker, Associate Professor University of Notre Dame Law School. Ph.D. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, JD/MBA University of Virginia, “The Federal Reserve ’s Use of International Swap Lines,” 2013, Online, PDF} GANGEEZY</p><p><u><mark>Swap lines</u></mark> also <u><mark>carry potential negative reputational risk for</u></mark> the <u><mark>Federal</u> <u>Reserve</u></mark> for several reasons. The Federal Reserve's <u><mark>swap lines</u></mark> could be <u><mark>seen as</u></mark> performing a <u><strong><mark>foreign policy role</u></strong></mark>, a task <u><strong><mark>outside of the central bank's proper sphere</mark>.</u></strong>187 <u>Use of</u> the <u>swap lines also <mark>raises concerns about</u></mark> the <u>central bank <mark>performing a fiscal role</mark>, </u>another task arguably <u>outside of its proper sphere</u>.' 8 And <u>questions concerning</u> the <u>statutory authority</u> for the Federal Reserve's swap lines <u>continue</u>.' 89 <u>Finally</u>, the <u>relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury</u> "<u>about</u> the <u><mark>division of responsibility</u></mark> for foreign currency operations" 190 <u>is highly discretionary and risks questions about</u> the central bank's <u>independence</u>. Finally, swap lines are set to become critical, competitive components of global financial market infrastructure. Such developments also increase the risk of swap lines becoming a significant public choice problem.191 Without question, a large segment of the public is unhappy about the tremendous government assistance to financial institutions during the recent crisis. <u>Although an abundance</u> <u>of info</u>rmation <u>about</u> the <u>Federal Reserve's swap lines is available</u> on the Internet, much of the <u>population arguably remains uninformed about</u> these <u>complex global</u> <u>stability mechanisms and</u> their <u>potential problems</u>, risks, and costs. Furthermore, the <u><strong><mark>potential cost of</u></strong> t</mark>he <u><strong><mark>swap lines is</strong></mark> </u>widely <u><strong><mark>dispersed among</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>public</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Therefore, <strong>li<mark>ttle incentive exists for individuals to become</u></strong> well <u><strong>informed</strong> about</u></mark> this <u><mark>issue</u>.</mark> On the other hand, a <u>small, resource-rich, concentrated interest group</u> international <u>banks and financial institutions-are</u> very <u>interested in</u> the <u>swap lines</u> <u>because of</u> the <u>potential benefit and support they</u> can <u>provide to</u> the <u>group's risk taking</u> activities. This circumstance is clear from reported discussions surrounding the swap line between the Bank of England and the People's Bank of China.' 92 A small group of international banks dominate trading in the foreign currency markets.193 And the <u>level of trading activity in</u> these <u><strong><mark>markets has "grown very rapidly and is very large compared</u></strong></mark> <u>to activity in other financial markets</u>." 94 Because the swap lines are government insurance, their use risks a potential wealth transfer to international banks and financial institutions. Not only is it unclear whether this is a potentially productive redistribution of social wealth, but also whether this redistribution will increase the possibility of future market instability, financial crises, and the subsequent need for additional swap line use.</p>

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MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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The south china sea is being ravaged by unregulated fishing – fisheries are dwindling - U.S.-China ocean diplomacy and data sharing is key

Vu and Borton 15

Vu and Borton 15 7/19/15 Dr. Troung-Minh Vu is the Director for the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The Rise of China and the South China Sea Disputes (Springer, forthcoming in 2015).James Borton was a panelist at the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) symposium on the South China Sea. Parts of this analysis were presented at the CSIS program. Borton edited, The South China Sea: Challenges and Promises and is a non-resident fellow at the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/science-diplomacy-a-crucible-for-south-china-sea-disputes/)//mw

The increasingly loud accusations and declarations from Beijing and Washington over China’s ambitions to reclaim a string of small islands, coral reefs and lagoons show no signs of ending given the number of international stakeholders in the region, the real promise of science for diplomacy may now be at hand in this complex geopolitical climate. marine science, and the emergence of China’s ‘blue economy’ framed a new narrative in understanding the environmental stakes in the region’s escalating conflict this contested region is not simply about sovereignty claims, but is likely to be recognized as one of the most significant environmental issues of the 21st century. Policymakers needs to visit science laboratories where many contested nations’ researchers are sharing data about the future of South China Sea coral life. Singapore, Dr. Leong Chee Chiew, Deputy CEO, National Parks in Singapore highlighted that the ASEAN region, with its combined coastline of about 173,000 kilometers and rich coastal and marine biodiversity, faces enormous challenges to sustainability in coastal and shared ocean regions. Unless a scientific ecosystem approach is adopted trans-boundary marine areas conflicts will only become worse. Nearly 80 percent of the SCS’s coral reefs have been degraded and are under serious threat in places from , overfishing, destructive fishing practices, dwindling fisheries in the region’s coastal areas, fishing state subsidies, overlapping EEZ claims, and mega-commercial fishing trawlers competing in a multi-billion dollar industry, fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles. An ecological catastrophe is unfolding in the region’s once fertile fishing grounds The immense biodiversity that exists in the South China Sea cannot be ignored. for the expansion of cooperative research in scientific marine study on deep-sea ecosystems. The area has been recognized as a treasure trove of biological resources and is host to parts of Southeast Asia’s most productive coral reef ecosystems. Recent biological surveys in the region and even off Mainland China reveal that the losses of living coral reefs present a grim picture of decline, degradation, and destruction While science provides as many answers as questions This crisis should weigh heavily on all claimant nations who need the fish protein to feed a burgeoning 1.9 billion people.

Beijing and Washington may now be at hand in marine science Policymakers needs to visit science laboratories, where many contested nations’ researchers are sharing data about the future of S C S coral life Nearly 80 percent of the SCS’s coral reefs have been degraded and are under serious threat in places from overfishing, destructive fishing practices dwindling fisheries in the region’s coastal areas fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles An ecological catastrophe is unfolding in the region’s fishing grounds for the expansion of cooperative research in scientific marine study on deep-sea ecosystems. The area has been recognized as a treasure trove of biological resources

The increasingly loud accusations and declarations from Beijing and Washington over China’s ambitions to reclaim a string of small islands, coral reefs and lagoons show no signs of ending. However, given the number of international stakeholders in the region, the real promise of science for diplomacy may now be at hand in this complex geopolitical climate. The arena for this convergence of two words- science and diplomacy- was displayed at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington symposium, where marine science, and the emergence of China’s ‘blue economy’ framed a new narrative in understanding the environmental stakes in the region’s escalating conflict. Panelists Dr. John McManus, Rosentiel School of the University of Miami, and Professor Kathleen Walsh, U.S. Naval War College, demonstrated to policymakers how this contested region is not simply about sovereignty claims, but is likely to be recognized as one of the most significant environmental issues of the 21st century. Policymakers may do well to take a lesson or two from nature as they examine how best to address the complex and myriad of sovereignty claims. Just as scientists place their subjects under close microscopic inspection, the policymaker, now more than ever, needs to visit science laboratories, where many contested nations’ researchers are sharing data about the future of South China Sea coral life. At the 16th Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment held last month in Singapore, Dr. Leong Chee Chiew, Deputy CEO, National Parks in Singapore highlighted that the ASEAN region, with its combined coastline of about 173,000 kilometers and rich coastal and marine biodiversity, faces enormous challenges to sustainability in coastal and shared ocean regions. Unless a scientific ecosystem approach is adopted, trans-boundary marine areas conflicts will only become worse. The problems are disturbing. Nearly 80 percent of the SCS’s coral reefs have been degraded and are under serious threat in places from sediment, overfishing, destructive fishing practices, pollution and climate change. Challenges around food security and renewable fish resources are fast becoming a hardscrabble reality for more than just fishermen. With dwindling fisheries in the region’s coastal areas, fishing state subsidies, overlapping EEZ claims, and mega-commercial fishing trawlers competing in a multi-billion dollar industry, fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles. An ecological catastrophe is unfolding in the region’s once fertile fishing grounds, as repeated reclamations destroy reefs, agricultural and industrial run-off poison coastal waters, and overfishing depletes fish stocks. A recent issue of The Economist underscores the importance for science diplomacy: “The littoral states ought to be working together to manage the sea, but the dispute over sovereignty fosters the fear that any collaboration will be taken as a concession.” The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) confirms that the South China Sea accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish catches and by 2030, China will account for 38 percent of global fish consumption. Overfishing and widespread destruction of coral reefs now necessitates the intervention of science policy to safeguard the stewardship of this vital sea. The immense biodiversity that exists in the South China Sea cannot be ignored. The impact of continuous coastal development, escalating reclamation and increased maritime traffic is now regularly placed in front of an increasing number of marine scientists and policy strategists. Marine biologists, who share a common language that cuts across political, economic and social differences, recognize that the structure of a coral reef is strewn with the detritus of perpetual conflict and represents one of nature’s cruelest battlefields, pitting species against species. At the same time, the coral reef, often referred to as a jewel of the sea, offers a sanctuary to many of the sea’s life forms like the mollusk, which in turn provides lodging to a mantis shrimp and a miniature eel in exchange for food and cleaning services. While traditional diplomatic and military tactics are not completely exhausted in the latest round of diplomatic salvos between China and the U.S., perhaps the timing is excellent for the emergence of science as an optimal tool to bring together various claimants, including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan in the highly nationalistic contested sea disputes. For the analysts and ministry policy shapers, this means a shift of focus, away from military capacities and maneuvering of naval vessels and surveillance planes to a deepening of registers and practices found in science diplomacy. If the U.S. and China are to find substantive common ground in this complicated and intractable history, it requires a creative and flexible diplomatic policy. That bridge for communication may be tapped among marine scientists currently engaged in cooperative research in the region. For example, the build-up of maritime biology, maritime mapping and geology, deep-sea explorations, and systematic knowledge production was absent only 20 years ago. However, these scientific advancements fail to support a Chinese position with the UN Seabed Commission, and in other legal battles in the context of international law of the seas. On the contrary, the Commission fosters and provides the framework for the expansion of cooperative research in scientific marine study on deep-sea ecosystems. In an amplification of science’s vaulted role, the International Seabed Authority is involved in the vast effort of collecting, analyzing, rationalizing, and disseminating results of marine scientific research and data. Their one hundred and sixty seven members, including China, recently met at the United Nations to develop and to discuss the exploitation code. The scientific community does not refute the overwhelming evidence that China’s continued reclamation of atolls and rocks through the dredging of sand in the Spratlys disrupts the fragile marine ecosystem. The area has been recognized as a treasure trove of biological resources and is host to parts of Southeast Asia’s most productive coral reef ecosystems. With coral reefs threatened around the world, reef specialist, Dr. McManus in his CSIS presentation, expressed concern for the plight of the region’s hard and soft corals, parrotfish, spinner dolphins, sea turtles, groupers, and black-tipped reef sharks. Recent biological surveys in the region and even off Mainland China reveal that the losses of living coral reefs present a grim picture of decline, degradation, and destruction. More specifically, reef fish species in the contested region have declined precipitously to around 261 from 460 species. While science provides as many answers as questions, the evidence is alarming that the world may be witnessing a reef apocalypse. This crisis should weigh heavily on all claimant nations who need the fish protein to feed a burgeoning 1.9 billion people. As early as 1992, McManus was one of several marine scientists who wrote scientific articles advocating for an international peace park or marine protected area. While the geopolitical intractable SCS impediments remain, the Spratlys might be seen as a “resource savings bank,” where fish, as trans-boundary residents, spawn in the coral reefs and encircle almost all of the South China Sea waters, before returning home. In an e-mail, McManus acknowledged that others have added international gravitas in the call for a marine protected area in the Spratlys. They include, Dr. Liana Talaue-McManus, his wife and an expert on resource management, Dr. Porfirio Aliño, a coral reef ecologist, and Dr. Mike Fortes, a seagrass ecologist, and Dr. Alan White, a senior scientist at the Nature Conservancy, now responsible for the Coral Triangle Program, representing a coordinated conservation policy driven effort on the part of six countries including, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, the Philippines, Timor Leste and Malaysia. Additional marine protected area endorsements have come from conservationist Tony Claparols, former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, Vietnam’s Dr. Vo Si Tuan and Taiwan’s, Dr. Kwan-Tsao-Y Shao. The Nature Conservancy report ‘Nature’s Investment Bank’ points to improved fish catches outside MPA boundaries, increased protein intake and even poverty alleviation through ecotourism. Because of earlier scientific work and published articles, the Taiwanese government recognized Dongsha atoll’s prominence as a model for the sustainability of fishery resources in the SCS and the Taiwan Strait and was designated as the first marine protected area in March 2004. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) provides a generous definition of trans-boundary conservation: “in its simplest explanation, trans boundary conservation (TBC) implies working across boundaries to achieve conservation objectives,” writes Maja Vasilijevic, chair of the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas. Scholars or scientists should provide the interpretations and guidelines for the establishment of trans-boundary-protected areas. The classic example of ‘science diplomacy’ was the original Antarctic Treaty, which most consider to have been a direct and natural extension of the multinational research in Antarctica associated with the International Geophysical Year studies in 1957-1958. Marine scientists have disclosed that a similar well-funded project in the South China Sea would be the natural lead-in to a Spratly Island agreement. There have been several international projects in the region. However, the ones that had a serious emphasis on the Spratly Islands have been minor because of the regional tensions. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is a committee of the International Council for Science (ICSU) charged with the initiation, promotion, and co-ordination of scientific research in Antarctica. SCAR is an international, interdisciplinary, non-governmental organization that can draw on the experience and expertise of international scientists. Another function of SCAR is to provide expert scientific advice to the Antarctic Treaty System. Science Councils and Treaties Offer Diplomatic Solutions Antarctica is the one place that arguably is the archetype for what can be accomplished by science diplomacy. Under the Antarctic Treaty, no country actually owns all or part of Antarctica, and no country can exploit the resources of the continent while the Treaty is in effect. Over time, the Antarctic Treaty has developed into the Antarctic Treaty System, which includes the protection of seals and marine organisms and offers guidelines for the gathering of minerals and other resources. Additionally, the Arctic Council has been able to effectively steer the passage of domestic legislation, international regulations, and, most importantly, international cooperation among the Arctic States. Eight nations—Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States—have territories (claims) in the Artic, and the domestic laws of these nations govern actions taken within their territorial waters. Many of the adopted Arctic Council key recommendations could be adopted for the South China Sea: create a South China Sea Maritime Council or SCS Oceanographic Council; the United States should ratify UNCLOS to enhance U.S. authority on SCS issues; develop improved communications, standardized procedures and multilateral training for search and rescue, military movements, natural disasters, maritime awareness, oil spill management, shipping infrastructure, and oil, gas and mineral development; identify priorities for scientific study; develop more small-scale and renewable energy projects to improve the economic future of small communities; improve individual and community health and food security; and improve early-warning systems for environmental change. Unfortunately, none of these recommendations are operative in the political currents of the South China Sea. Dr. Michael P. Crosby, President and CEO of Mote Marine Laboratory in Sarasota, Florida weighs in on benefits of using this paradigm for interactions between scientists and resource managers through international marine science partnerships. He has even extolled the merits of the Red Sea Marine Peace Cooperative Research, Monitoring, and Resource Management Program (RSMPP). Crosby states that “RSMPP may serve as a model for improving international relations and building capacity through marine science cooperation.” Asia has the world’s largest fishing fleets, representing nearly three million of the world’s four million fishing vessels. And most estimates show that the numbers are increasing. China’s fleet of 70,000 fishing boats, the largest in the world, is increasingly flaunting the few international rules that exist around fishing. With other coastal claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam increasing their fishing fleets, it’s not surprising that China is rolling out a “blue economy” plan. Professor Kathleen Walsh’s scholarship on China’s rising blue economy reveals that some Middle Kingdom marine scientists are concerned about conservation and sustainability issues. After all, coral reefs once found off China’s own shores have shrunk by an astonishing 80 percent over the last 20 years. Pollution, overfishing and coastal development are blamed for this environmental collapse. In her examination of China’s blue economy, which includes marine, maritime, and naval sector ambitions, Walsh argues that China’s new maritime development programs could have a big impact on the United States and other nations. According to her (disclaimer: these are her personal views and not the U.S. Department of Defense, US Navy or US Naval War College), Chinese leaders are looking at water resources—including coastal areas, rivers, lakes, and oceans—as the nation’s next economic development frontier. Perhaps at the first sight, these observations and practices seem unconnected. But they operate together, and this notion of a Blue Economy reflects all of the elements of a broader strategic planning in Beijing. But the crucial point here is that the assemblage of the South China Sea is increasingly shaped in scientific terms. Nevertheless, it’s painfully clear that today’s ecological policy issues face formidable challenges to inform policy deliberations. In other words, as the disposition of regional maritime space becomes greater, adding seabed research, geology and mapping, deep-sea biology, underwater archeology, cultural registers, environmental symposia, marine protected areas and art history, there are more avenues for the creation of common ground for all claimants. In this unfolding maritime drama, science offers all claimants the ability to monitor and to intervene. Science diplomacy reveals at its core an ontological redefinition of this region. Knowledge sharing rather than naval vessels, commercial trawlers, advanced weaponry, and infrastructure, may prove to be the most powerful and essential tool to realizing peace and resolving territorial claims. Diplomats need to take a page from scientific collaboration to better understand the myriad of South China Sea environmental challenges, since China’s success or failure in developing a blue economy will have implications for the rest of the globe.

<h4>The south china sea is being ravaged by unregulated fishing – fisheries are dwindling - U.S.-China <u>ocean diplomacy</u> and <u>data sharing </u><strong>is key</h4><p>Vu and Borton 15 </p><p></strong>7/19/15 Dr. Troung-Minh Vu is the Director for the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The Rise of China and the South China Sea Disputes (Springer, forthcoming in 2015).James Borton was a panelist at the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) symposium on the South China Sea. Parts of this analysis were presented at the CSIS program. Borton edited, The South China Sea: Challenges and Promises and is a non-resident fellow at the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/science-diplomacy-a-crucible-for-south-china-sea-disputes/)//mw</p><p><u>The increasingly loud accusations and declarations from <strong><mark>Beijing and Washington</strong></mark> over China’s ambitions to reclaim a string of small islands, coral reefs and lagoons show no signs of ending</u>. However, <u>given the number of international stakeholders in the region, the <strong>real promise</strong> of <strong>science for diplomacy</strong> <mark>may now be at hand in</mark> this <strong>complex geopolitical climate</strong>. </u>The arena for this convergence of two words- science and diplomacy- was displayed at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington symposium, where<u> <strong><mark>marine science</strong></mark>, and the emergence of China’s ‘blue economy’ framed a new narrative in understanding the environmental stakes in the region’s escalating conflict</u>. Panelists Dr. John McManus, Rosentiel School of the University of Miami, and Professor Kathleen Walsh, U.S. Naval War College, demonstrated to policymakers how <u>this contested region is not simply about sovereignty claims, but is likely to be recognized as one of the most <strong>significant environmental</strong> <strong>issues</strong> of the 21st century. <strong><mark>Policymakers</u></strong></mark> may do well to take a lesson or two from nature as they examine how best to address the complex and myriad of sovereignty claims. Just as scientists place their subjects under close microscopic inspection, the policymaker, now more than ever, <u><strong><mark>needs to visit science laboratories</u></strong>, <u>where many contested nations’ researchers are <strong>sharing data</strong></mark> <mark>about the future of S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <mark>coral life</mark>. </u>At the 16th Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment held last month in <u>Singapore, Dr. Leong Chee Chiew, Deputy CEO, National Parks in Singapore highlighted that the ASEAN region, with its combined coastline of about 173,000 kilometers and rich coastal and marine biodiversity, faces enormous challenges to sustainability in coastal and shared ocean regions.</u> <u>Unless a <strong>scientific ecosystem</strong> approach is adopted</u>, <u>trans-boundary marine areas conflicts will only become worse. </u>The problems are disturbing. <u><mark>Nearly 80 percent of the SCS’s coral reefs have been degraded and are under serious threat in places from</mark> </u>sediment<u>, <strong><mark>overfishing, destructive fishing practices</strong></mark>, </u>pollution and climate change. Challenges around food security and renewable fish resources are fast becoming a hardscrabble reality for more than just fishermen. With <u><strong><mark>dwindling fisheries in the region’s coastal areas</strong></mark>, fishing state subsidies, overlapping EEZ claims, and mega-commercial fishing trawlers competing in a multi-billion dollar industry, <strong><mark>fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles</strong></mark>. <mark>An</u> <u><strong>ecological catastrophe</u></strong> <u>is unfolding in the region’s </mark>once fertile <strong><mark>fishing grounds</u></strong></mark>, as repeated reclamations destroy reefs, agricultural and industrial run-off poison coastal waters, and overfishing depletes fish stocks. A recent issue of The Economist underscores the importance for science diplomacy: “The littoral states ought to be working together to manage the sea, but the dispute over sovereignty fosters the fear that any collaboration will be taken as a concession.” The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) confirms that the South China Sea accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish catches and by 2030, China will account for 38 percent of global fish consumption. Overfishing and widespread destruction of coral reefs now necessitates the intervention of science policy to safeguard the stewardship of this vital sea. <u>The <strong>immense biodiversity</strong> that exists in the South China Sea cannot be ignored.</u> The impact of continuous coastal development, escalating reclamation and increased maritime traffic is now regularly placed in front of an increasing number of marine scientists and policy strategists. Marine biologists, who share a common language that cuts across political, economic and social differences, recognize that the structure of a coral reef is strewn with the detritus of perpetual conflict and represents one of nature’s cruelest battlefields, pitting species against species. At the same time, the coral reef, often referred to as a jewel of the sea, offers a sanctuary to many of the sea’s life forms like the mollusk, which in turn provides lodging to a mantis shrimp and a miniature eel in exchange for food and cleaning services. While traditional diplomatic and military tactics are not completely exhausted in the latest round of diplomatic salvos between China and the U.S., perhaps the timing is excellent for the emergence of science as an optimal tool to bring together various claimants, including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan in the highly nationalistic contested sea disputes. For the analysts and ministry policy shapers, this means a shift of focus, away from military capacities and maneuvering of naval vessels and surveillance planes to a deepening of registers and practices found in science diplomacy. If the U.S. and China are to find substantive common ground in this complicated and intractable history, it requires a creative and flexible diplomatic policy. That bridge for communication may be tapped among marine scientists currently engaged in cooperative research in the region. For example, the build-up of maritime biology, maritime mapping and geology, deep-sea explorations, and systematic knowledge production was absent only 20 years ago. However, these scientific advancements fail to support a Chinese position with the UN Seabed Commission, and in other legal battles in the context of international law of the seas. On the contrary, the Commission fosters and provides the framework<u> <mark>for the <strong>expansion of cooperative research</strong> in <strong>scientific marine study on deep-sea ecosystems.</mark> </u></strong>In an amplification of science’s vaulted role, the International Seabed Authority is involved in the vast effort of collecting, analyzing, rationalizing, and disseminating results of marine scientific research and data. Their one hundred and sixty seven members, including China, recently met at the United Nations to develop and to discuss the exploitation code. The scientific community does not refute the overwhelming evidence that China’s continued reclamation of atolls and rocks through the dredging of sand in the Spratlys disrupts the fragile marine ecosystem. <u><mark>The area has been recognized as a <strong>treasure trove</strong> of <strong>biological resources</strong> </mark>and is host to parts of Southeast Asia’s most productive coral reef ecosystems. </u>With coral reefs threatened around the world, reef specialist, Dr. McManus in his CSIS presentation, expressed concern for the plight of the region’s hard and soft corals, parrotfish, spinner dolphins, sea turtles, groupers, and black-tipped reef sharks. <u><strong>Recent biological surveys</u></strong> <u>in the region and even off Mainland China reveal that the losses of living coral reefs present a grim picture of <strong>decline, degradation, and destruction</u></strong>. More specifically, reef fish species in the contested region have declined precipitously to around 261 from 460 species. <u>While science provides as many answers as questions</u>, the evidence is alarming that the world may be witnessing a reef apocalypse. <u>This crisis should weigh heavily on all claimant nations who need the <strong>fish protein</strong> to feed a burgeoning <strong>1.9 billion people.</strong> </u>As early as 1992, McManus was one of several marine scientists who wrote scientific articles advocating for an international peace park or marine protected area. While the geopolitical intractable SCS impediments remain, the Spratlys might be seen as a “resource savings bank,” where fish, as trans-boundary residents, spawn in the coral reefs and encircle almost all of the South China Sea waters, before returning home. In an e-mail, McManus acknowledged that others have added international gravitas in the call for a marine protected area in the Spratlys. They include, Dr. Liana Talaue-McManus, his wife and an expert on resource management, Dr. Porfirio Aliño, a coral reef ecologist, and Dr. Mike Fortes, a seagrass ecologist, and Dr. Alan White, a senior scientist at the Nature Conservancy, now responsible for the Coral Triangle Program, representing a coordinated conservation policy driven effort on the part of six countries including, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, the Philippines, Timor Leste and Malaysia. Additional marine protected area endorsements have come from conservationist Tony Claparols, former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, Vietnam’s Dr. Vo Si Tuan and Taiwan’s, Dr. Kwan-Tsao-Y Shao. The Nature Conservancy report ‘Nature’s Investment Bank’ points to improved fish catches outside MPA boundaries, increased protein intake and even poverty alleviation through ecotourism. Because of earlier scientific work and published articles, the Taiwanese government recognized Dongsha atoll’s prominence as a model for the sustainability of fishery resources in the SCS and the Taiwan Strait and was designated as the first marine protected area in March 2004. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) provides a generous definition of trans-boundary conservation: “in its simplest explanation, trans boundary conservation (TBC) implies working across boundaries to achieve conservation objectives,” writes Maja Vasilijevic, chair of the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas. Scholars or scientists should provide the interpretations and guidelines for the establishment of trans-boundary-protected areas. The classic example of ‘science diplomacy’ was the original Antarctic Treaty, which most consider to have been a direct and natural extension of the multinational research in Antarctica associated with the International Geophysical Year studies in 1957-1958. Marine scientists have disclosed that a similar well-funded project in the South China Sea would be the natural lead-in to a Spratly Island agreement. There have been several international projects in the region. However, the ones that had a serious emphasis on the Spratly Islands have been minor because of the regional tensions. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is a committee of the International Council for Science (ICSU) charged with the initiation, promotion, and co-ordination of scientific research in Antarctica. SCAR is an international, interdisciplinary, non-governmental organization that can draw on the experience and expertise of international scientists. Another function of SCAR is to provide expert scientific advice to the Antarctic Treaty System. Science Councils and Treaties Offer Diplomatic Solutions Antarctica is the one place that arguably is the archetype for what can be accomplished by science diplomacy. Under the Antarctic Treaty, no country actually owns all or part of Antarctica, and no country can exploit the resources of the continent while the Treaty is in effect. Over time, the Antarctic Treaty has developed into the Antarctic Treaty System, which includes the protection of seals and marine organisms and offers guidelines for the gathering of minerals and other resources. Additionally, the Arctic Council has been able to effectively steer the passage of domestic legislation, international regulations, and, most importantly, international cooperation among the Arctic States. Eight nations—Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States—have territories (claims) in the Artic, and the domestic laws of these nations govern actions taken within their territorial waters. Many of the adopted Arctic Council key recommendations could be adopted for the South China Sea: create a South China Sea Maritime Council or SCS Oceanographic Council; the United States should ratify UNCLOS to enhance U.S. authority on SCS issues; develop improved communications, standardized procedures and multilateral training for search and rescue, military movements, natural disasters, maritime awareness, oil spill management, shipping infrastructure, and oil, gas and mineral development; identify priorities for scientific study; develop more small-scale and renewable energy projects to improve the economic future of small communities; improve individual and community health and food security; and improve early-warning systems for environmental change. Unfortunately, none of these recommendations are operative in the political currents of the South China Sea. Dr. Michael P. Crosby, President and CEO of Mote Marine Laboratory in Sarasota, Florida weighs in on benefits of using this paradigm for interactions between scientists and resource managers through international marine science partnerships. He has even extolled the merits of the Red Sea Marine Peace Cooperative Research, Monitoring, and Resource Management Program (RSMPP). Crosby states that “RSMPP may serve as a model for improving international relations and building capacity through marine science cooperation.” Asia has the world’s largest fishing fleets, representing nearly three million of the world’s four million fishing vessels. And most estimates show that the numbers are increasing. China’s fleet of 70,000 fishing boats, the largest in the world, is increasingly flaunting the few international rules that exist around fishing. With other coastal claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam increasing their fishing fleets, it’s not surprising that China is rolling out a “blue economy” plan. Professor Kathleen Walsh’s scholarship on China’s rising blue economy reveals that some Middle Kingdom marine scientists are concerned about conservation and sustainability issues. After all, coral reefs once found off China’s own shores have shrunk by an astonishing 80 percent over the last 20 years. Pollution, overfishing and coastal development are blamed for this environmental collapse. In her examination of China’s blue economy, which includes marine, maritime, and naval sector ambitions, Walsh argues that China’s new maritime development programs could have a big impact on the United States and other nations. According to her (disclaimer: these are her personal views and not the U.S. Department of Defense, US Navy or US Naval War College), Chinese leaders are looking at water resources—including coastal areas, rivers, lakes, and oceans—as the nation’s next economic development frontier. Perhaps at the first sight, these observations and practices seem unconnected. But they operate together, and this notion of a Blue Economy reflects all of the elements of a broader strategic planning in Beijing. But the crucial point here is that the assemblage of the South China Sea is increasingly shaped in scientific terms. Nevertheless, it’s painfully clear that today’s ecological policy issues face formidable challenges to inform policy deliberations. In other words, as the disposition of regional maritime space becomes greater, adding seabed research, geology and mapping, deep-sea biology, underwater archeology, cultural registers, environmental symposia, marine protected areas and art history, there are more avenues for the creation of common ground for all claimants. In this unfolding maritime drama, science offers all claimants the ability to monitor and to intervene. Science diplomacy reveals at its core an ontological redefinition of this region. Knowledge sharing rather than naval vessels, commercial trawlers, advanced weaponry, and infrastructure, may prove to be the most powerful and essential tool to realizing peace and resolving territorial claims. Diplomats need to take a page from scientific collaboration to better understand the myriad of South China Sea environmental challenges, since China’s success or failure in developing a blue economy will have implications for the rest of the globe.</p>

Advantage one is oceans

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Emory

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Kevin McCaffrey

1ac - this one 1nc - T-qpq T-crocker Antarctica CP ASEAN CP Appeasement CCP Collapse good 2nr - appeasement ASEAN CP

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F35 supremacy key to airpower

Matthews ‘8

Matthews ‘8 William Matthews, Air Forces Journal, “Pumping Up The Numbers,” 6-30-2008 (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/04/3392707)

The Air Force today struggles “with the oldest inventory in history, battered by 17 years of continuous combat The service’s “ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested If we don’t get into some coherent, integrated, synchronized plan, then we won’t serve our nation the way we should Corley spoke of an Air Force whose air dominance was now being challenged. “Our F-15s and F-16s are overmatched by China and Russia and this poses a significant risk to our air dominance and to our nation’s safety He spoke of the need for a hybrid solution that would include ramping up production of the Joint Strike Fighter you need those aircraft in sufficient capacity

service’s “ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested this poses a significant risk to our air dominance to safety, hybrid solution would ramping up production of Joint Strike Fighter

**Michael Moseley is Chief of Staff of the US Air Force In February, Moseley released a “chief of staff’s white paper.” The Air Force today struggles “with the oldest inventory in history, battered by 17 years of continuous combat,” Moseley said. The service’s “ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested.” Air Combat Command chief Gen. John Corley also revealed in February that a Combat Air Force Strategic Master Plan to create a roadmap for the command was being drafted and would be released in three to six months. “I no longer want to play the whack-a-mole game. If we don’t get into some coherent, integrated, synchronized plan, then we won’t serve our nation the way we should,” Corley said at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla. Corley spoke of an Air Force whose air dominance was now being challenged. “Our F-15s and F-16s are overmatched by China and Russia and this poses a significant risk to our air dominance and to our nation’s safety,” Corley said. He spoke of the need for a hybrid solution that would include ramping up production of the F-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but insisted neither could be done at the expense of the other. “It’s my belief that you need to have both of those aircraft in sufficient capacity and I am not about cannibalizing either program or cannibalizing the bomber program. I think you need all of these,” he said.

<h4><strong>F35 supremacy key to airpower </h4><p>Matthews ‘8</p><p></strong>William <u><strong><mark>Matthews</u></strong></mark>, Air Forces Journal, “Pumping Up The Numbers,” 6-30-<u><strong>20<mark>08</u></strong></mark> (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/04/3392707)</p><p>**Michael Moseley is Chief of Staff of the US Air Force</p><p>In February, Moseley released a “chief of staff’s white paper.” <u>The Air Force today struggles “with the oldest inventory in history, battered by 17 years of continuous combat</u>,” Moseley said. <u>The <mark>service’s</mark> <mark>“ability to fulfill its missions is already being tested</u></mark>.” Air Combat Command chief Gen. John Corley also revealed in February that a Combat Air Force Strategic Master Plan to create a roadmap for the command was being drafted and would be released in three to six months. “I no longer want to play the whack-a-mole game. <u>If we don’t get into some coherent, integrated, synchronized plan, then we won’t serve our nation the way we should</u>,” Corley said at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium in Orlando, Fla. <u>Corley spoke of an Air Force whose air dominance was now being challenged. “Our F-15s and F-16s are overmatched by China and Russia and <mark>this poses a <strong>significant risk to our air dominance</strong></mark> and <mark>to</mark> our nation’s <mark>safety</u>,</mark>” Corley said. <u>He spoke of the need for a <mark>hybrid solution</mark> that <mark>would</mark> include <mark>ramping up production of</mark> the</u> F-22 and F-35 <u><mark>Joint Strike Fighter</u></mark>, but insisted neither could be done at the expense of the other. “It’s my belief that <u>you need</u> to have both of <u>those aircraft in sufficient capacity</u> and I am not about cannibalizing either program or cannibalizing the bomber program. I think you need all of these,” he said.</p>

OFFCASE

Politics

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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A/C---domestic surveillance driven by federal initiatives decimates local law enforcement effectiveness

Dubal 12

Dubal 12 (Veena Dubal, is an attorney and PhD candidate in Jurisprudence and Social Policy at the University of California at Berkeley, “The Demise of Community Policing? The Impact of Post-9/11 Federal Surveillance Programs on Local Law Enforcement,” 2012, Asian American Journal, Online, PDF) GANGEEZY

federal surveillance initiatives undermine the spirit of community policing because they circumvent procedural safeguards that prevent targeted surveillance of innocent individuals procedural fairness and police legitimacy are interlinked thus, police engagement that do not have accountability are perceived as less legitimate in the community lack of legitimacy destabilizes trust-building goals of community policing, and hinder community assistance in combating crime. methodology of surveillance determines both the effectiveness of crime prevention and compatibility of community policing and intel led policing contradictory values highlight ineffective emphasis on unpredicated collection community safety and the reduction of violent crime are incumbent upon mutual respect between police and the communities Intelligence-led policing relies on the notion that the collection of information can lead police to act preemptively successful detection of criminal activity depends on information it depends on the right kind of information blurred line between federal and local police is an example of how current joint local and federal law enforcement surveillance operations which do not follow local rules and oversight, can diminish trust in local law enforcement achieving neither the goals of community policing nor of intelligence gathering relationship based on mutual trust is more likely to uncover matters that are helpful in identifying criminals Police Legitimacy Relies on Procedural Justice legitimacy is a characteristic that leads people to feel that police authority “is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed Studies of public perception about the police typically reveal large racial and ethnic group differences, with minority group members expressing lower levels of trust and confidence Although shift to community-policing reforms in local police departments recognizes empirical reality trend of local police departments like the SFPD to embrace federal surveillance initiatives undermines procedural justice. room for personal bias undermines community policing but also public safety by destabilizing community trust, making community members less likely to cooperate with police in real crime investigations, and isolating entire communities from police protection

federal surveillance undermine community policing they circumvent safeguards that prevent targeted surveillance of innocent fairness and legitimacy are interlinked hinder community assistance community safety and the reduction of violent crime are incumbent upon respect between police and the communities detection of criminal activity depends on the right kind of information blurred line between federal and local police , diminish trust in local law enforcement, achieving neither the goals of community policing nor of intelligence gathering shift to community-policing reforms recognizes local police departments embrace federal surveillance initiatives undermines procedural justice. members less likely to cooperate with police in crime investigations, and isolating entire communities

Using San Francisco as a case study, I argue that the impacts of federal surveillance initiatives and their “intelligence-led” policing model on local law enforcement’s goals of crime prevention and community policing have been two-fold. First, federal surveillance initiatives such as the JTTF and SAR Initiative undermine the spirit of “community policing” because they circumvent important procedural safeguards that prevent targeted surveillance of innocent individuals based on non-criminal indicators, such as racial and ethnic identities and/or First Amendmentprotected activities. Second, I maintain, as the empirical research suggests, that procedural fairness and police legitimacy are interlinked; thus, police engagement in practices that do not have clear standards, oversight, and accountability are perceived as less legitimate in the eyes of the community. This lack of legitimacy destabilizes the trust-building goals of community policing, and may hinder community assistance in combating crime. Therefore, the methodology of surveillance and whether it is conducted with an eye towards the maintenance of community trust are what ultimately determines both the effectiveness of crime prevention and the compatibility of community policing and intelligence-led policing. Unpredicated Police Surveillance Undermines Community Policing In the post-September 11th policing environment, some scholars have maintained that the heightened intelligence objectives of police necessarily conflict with democratic reforms of the past decades.107 But many of these proponents simultaneously argue in favor of the role of community generated intelligence in the prevention of future acts of terrorism.108 The contradictory values that underlie these conclusions highlight the problematic and ineffective emphasis on unpredicated intelligence collection in the post-September 11th era. If the ultimate goal of police is security, and if community intelligence is essential to that goal, then the move away from the reforms espoused by community policing—namely the establishment of mutual trust—only undermines safety. Community policing initiatives, like the Department General Order 1.08 recently adopted in San Francisco, support the idea that community safety and the reduction of violent crime are incumbent upon the shared sense of mutual respect between the police and the communities they serve. Intelligence-led policing, on the other hand, relies on the notion that the overbroad collection of information can lead police to act preemptively in the prevention of crime. As David Thacher has discussed and the Vera Institute research confirms, police surveillance and information gathering may undermine trusting relationships between police and the community.109 In particular, unpredicated police surveillance—that is, intelligence gathering that is not based on an objective standard such as reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—may make particular communities feel unfairly targeted, thus weakening hard fought inroads in those communities. Establishing community trust is, of course, much easier said than done. The SFPD DGO 1.08 takes the vital step of formally establishing that, “[c]ommunity [p]olicing requires a transparent and mutually respectful relationship between the police and the community.”110 The inherently covert nature of police intelligence operations necessitates that in order to abide by the demands of transparency and the maintenance of community respect, these operations must be conducted under clear, objective guidelines and independent oversight. Thus far, the SFPD’s intermingling with the FBI through the JTTF and the DHS through the SAR Initiative has not met these criteria. Not only was the 2007 SFPD-FBI Memorandum of Understanding signed with an utter lack of transparency, but the Memorandum also removed SFPD-JTTF officers from the clear SFPD guidelines mandating that intelligence activity be conducted with an eye to crime, subject to local oversight, and open to public scrutiny through audits. Similarly, the SFPD’s involvement in the SAR Initiative went undetected by the San Francisco public, including civil rights groups, for two years. The SFPD’s creation of SAR reports which are populated by intelligence not necessarily predicated by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity creatively allows for the SFPD to, in some cases, violate their own policies. The tactics of both the SAR Initiative and the FBI’s JTTF are not consistent with the mutual respect norms of community policing. After decades of intelligence scandals, the strong intelligence policy standards and oversight protocol of SFPD’s DGO 8.10 resulted in over seventeen years of scandal-free intelligence gathering and growing trust between the SFPD and the local Arab-American community—a relationship that had been severely damaged after the scandals of the early 1990s.111 The coordinating and overlaying of federal surveillance programs with the SFPD’s own policies have swiftly undermined this trust. San Franciscans, from storeowners to students, have complained to community organizations and the San Francisco Police Commission that local law enforcement officers assigned to the JTTF have approached them for questioning about their political and religious beliefs. For example, one law-abiding university student received a call on his cell phone from an individual claiming to be an FBI agent. He agreed to meet the officer, who was a local law enforcement officer assigned to the FBI’s JTTF, and answered questions such as, “Why did you come to America from Yemen?” “At what mosque do you worship?” “What do you think of what is going on in Yemen?” “Do you know anyone who would want to harm the U.S.?” The student did not know how the officer got his cell phone number or why he was singled out for an interview, but he conveyed that this experience is very common in his community.112 Other San Franciscans have expressed fear that when they engage in First Amendment-protected activities, like taking pictures of the Golden Gate Bridge, or writing notes during a conference, they may be deemed “suspicious” by SFPD officers and placed into a shared federal intelligence database, only to be visited by the FBI later.113 The SFPD’s shift to unpredicated, pre-emptive intelligence policing has inflamed community concerns about harassment and profiling, and sends the message that some community members are suspect based solely on their racial or ethnic identities and non-criminal political activities. As John Murray has argued, “[t]o exclude or isolate any subgroup from a community policing service amounts to more than failing in a civic duty—it also ignores a most important source of information for police . . . .” 114 While the successful detection of criminal activity surely depends on information, it depends on the right kind of information. The blurred line between federal and local police in San Francisco is an example of how current joint local and federal law enforcement surveillance operations, which do not follow local rules, standards, and oversight, can diminish trust in local law enforcement, achieving neither the goals of community policing nor of intelligence gathering. A community-police relationship based on mutual trust is more likely to uncover matters that are helpful in identifying criminals than the indiscriminate or potentially biased collection of non-criminal information. B. Police Legitimacy Relies on Procedural Justice Police legitimacy is a characteristic that leads people to feel that police authority “is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.”115 According to Tom Tyler, police legitimacy represents “an acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior in line with the dictates of an external authority.”116 Since the establishment of the first formal full-time police force in the United States in 1837, police have endured many challenges to their legitimacy due primarily to numerous instances of police misconduct that have led the public to criticize and mistrust the police.117 Studies of public perception about the police typically reveal large racial and ethnic group differences, with minority group members expressing lower levels of trust and confidence.118 As illustrated by the previously discussed Vera Institute study, the surveillance practices of federal law enforcement in the postSeptember 11th environment has had a particularly salient impact on the legitimacy of federal police in Muslim and Arab-American communities.119 In the arena of law enforcement reform to address issues of police legitimacy, two macro theories exist. The instrumental model suggests that the success of police in achieving their goals of safety and violence prevention is linked to public perceptions that police will sanction those who break the rules and that police are effective at controlling crime.120 Traditional law enforcement strategies, including current federal surveillance initiatives, are generally hinged on this theory of deterrence— that the best way to regulate public behavior is by making undesirable behaviors risky.121 On the other hand, the procedural justice model argues: “the legitimacy of the police is linked to public judgments about the fairness of the processes through which the police make decisions and exercise authority.”122 This model is concerned with the willingness of individuals to cooperate with police and acknowledges that the effectiveness of police work is often dependent on the cooperation of the public.123 Research conducted over the last twenty years suggests that the instrumental model, and deterrence in particular, is not an effective strategy for gaining long-term compliance with the law or for eliciting cooperative behavior from community members.124 By contrast, empirical studies on police legitimacy prove that “legitimacy is connected with people’s internal sense of obligation to authority and therefore promotes voluntary, cooperative behavior.”125 Studies also confirm that due to the emphasis on trust building, community and problem-oriented policing heed the call of procedural justice research and have resulted in lower crime and improved interaction between the police and the public.126 While different variables have been shown to define “procedural justice,” respectful treatment and a fair process in which individuals are treated equally are two key components of perceived justice. For example, in their study of the Boston Ten-Point Coalition (a coalition of leaders in Boston working to mobilize around issues affecting minority youth), Christopher Winship and Jenny Berrien suggest that the Boston Police Department was able to maintain support from the AfricanAmerican community during an anti-gang enforcement initiative by acting within boundaries that they negotiated with the Ten-Point Coalition.127 As long as police respected those constraints, the community leaders offered their public support for police actions, creating an “umbrella of legitimacy” that sustained police relationships with the community.128 This Coalition did not end anti-gang policing, as some community members would have liked, but, according to Boston police officers, it enacted real communitypolicing tactics that had previously only existed on paper—addressing issues of perceived profiling and targeted policing head-on.129 The study concludes that by involving community members in formulating procedures that are perceived to be fair, community-policing measures in Boston played a critical role in the reduction of youth violence.130 Another more recent study by Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq investigated the circumstances under which Muslim Americans voluntarily collaborate with the police to fight terrorism.131 The result of their study, which involved interviewing Muslim Americans in New York City, also supports the idea that people respond favorably to the police if the police activities reflect values of procedural justice.132 The fairness of police procedures depends on the police’s neutrality in the application of the law, the transparency of their actions, their openness to community input, and their respect for members of the community.133 The parallels to the SFPD situation are clear, and the resulting conclusions are troubling. The lack of both transparency and perceived neutrality that community members in San Francisco have felt as a result of the SFPD’s involvement in federal surveillance initiatives has resulted in distrust of police and thus potentially thwarted community cooperation in counterterrorism initiatives. Although the shift to community-policing reforms in local police departments recognizes this empirical reality, the trend of local police departments like the SFPD to embrace federal surveillance initiatives undermines procedural justice. Non-criminal, unpredicated surveillance that lacks key procedural guidelines, including oversight, allows room for bias, potentially influencing whom a police officer perceives as “dangerous” and worthy of surveillance. This room for personal bias not only undermines community policing but also public safety by destabilizing community trust, making community members less likely to cooperate with police in real crime investigations, and isolating entire communities from police protection.

<h4>A/C---domestic surveillance driven by federal initiatives decimates local law enforcement effectiveness</h4><p><strong>Dubal 12</strong> (Veena Dubal, is an attorney and PhD candidate in Jurisprudence and Social Policy at the University of California at Berkeley, “The Demise of Community Policing? The Impact of Post-9/11 Federal Surveillance Programs on Local Law Enforcement,” 2012, Asian American Journal, Online, PDF) GANGEEZY</p><p>Using San Francisco as a case study, I argue that the impacts of <u><strong><mark>federal</strong> surveillance</mark> <strong>initiatives</u></strong> and their “intelligence-led” policing model on local law enforcement’s goals of crime prevention and community policing have been two-fold. First, federal surveillance initiatives such as the JTTF and SAR Initiative <u><mark>undermine</mark> the spirit of</u> “<u><strong><mark>community policing</u></strong></mark>” <u>because <mark>they circumvent</u></mark> important <u>procedural <mark>safeguards that prevent targeted surveillance</mark> <mark>of innocent</mark> individuals</u> based on non-criminal indicators, such as racial and ethnic identities and/or First Amendmentprotected activities. Second, I maintain, as the empirical research suggests, that <u>procedural <mark>fairness and</mark> police <mark>legitimacy</u> <u><strong>are interlinked</u></strong></mark>; <u>thus, police engagement</u> in practices <u>that do not have</u> clear standards, oversight, and <u>accountability are perceived <strong>as less legitimate</u></strong> <u>in</u> the eyes of <u>the community</u>. This <u>lack of legitimacy destabilizes</u> the <u>trust-building goals of community policing, and</u> may <u><strong><mark>hinder community assistance</strong></mark> in combating crime.</u> Therefore, the <u>methodology of surveillance</u> and whether it is conducted with an eye towards the maintenance of community trust are what ultimately <u><strong>determines both the effectiveness of crime prevention</u></strong> <u>and</u> the <u>compatibility of community policing and intel</u>ligence-<u>led policing</u>.<u> </u>Unpredicated Police Surveillance Undermines Community Policing In the post-September 11th policing environment, some scholars have maintained that the heightened intelligence objectives of police necessarily conflict with democratic reforms of the past decades.107 But many of these proponents simultaneously argue in favor of the role of community generated intelligence in the prevention of future acts of terrorism.108 The <u>contradictory values</u> that underlie these conclusions<u> highlight</u> the problematic and <u>ineffective emphasis on unpredicated</u> intelligence <u>collection</u> in the post-September 11th era. If the ultimate goal of police is security, and if community intelligence is essential to that goal, then the move away from the reforms espoused by community policing—namely the establishment of mutual trust—only undermines safety. Community policing initiatives, like the Department General Order 1.08 recently adopted in San Francisco, support the idea that <u><mark>community safety and the reduction of violent crime are incumbent upon</u></mark> the shared sense of <u><strong>mutual</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>respect between</u></strong></mark> the <u><mark>police and the communities</u></mark> they serve. <u>Intelligence-led policing</u>, on the other hand, <u>relies</u> <u>on the notion that the</u> overbroad <u>collection of information can lead police to act preemptively</u> in the prevention of crime. As David Thacher has discussed and the Vera Institute research confirms, police surveillance and information gathering may undermine trusting relationships between police and the community.109 In particular, unpredicated police surveillance—that is, intelligence gathering that is not based on an objective standard such as reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—may make particular communities feel unfairly targeted, thus weakening hard fought inroads in those communities. Establishing community trust is, of course, much easier said than done. The SFPD DGO 1.08 takes the vital step of formally establishing that, “[c]ommunity [p]olicing requires a transparent and mutually respectful relationship between the police and the community.”110 The inherently covert nature of police intelligence operations necessitates that in order to abide by the demands of transparency and the maintenance of community respect, these operations must be conducted under clear, objective guidelines and independent oversight. Thus far, the SFPD’s intermingling with the FBI through the JTTF and the DHS through the SAR Initiative has not met these criteria. Not only was the 2007 SFPD-FBI Memorandum of Understanding signed with an utter lack of transparency, but the Memorandum also removed SFPD-JTTF officers from the clear SFPD guidelines mandating that intelligence activity be conducted with an eye to crime, subject to local oversight, and open to public scrutiny through audits. Similarly, the SFPD’s involvement in the SAR Initiative went undetected by the San Francisco public, including civil rights groups, for two years. The SFPD’s creation of SAR reports which are populated by intelligence not necessarily predicated by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity creatively allows for the SFPD to, in some cases, violate their own policies. The tactics of both the SAR Initiative and the FBI’s JTTF are not consistent with the mutual respect norms of community policing. After decades of intelligence scandals, the strong intelligence policy standards and oversight protocol of SFPD’s DGO 8.10 resulted in over seventeen years of scandal-free intelligence gathering and growing trust between the SFPD and the local Arab-American community—a relationship that had been severely damaged after the scandals of the early 1990s.111 The coordinating and overlaying of federal surveillance programs with the SFPD’s own policies have swiftly undermined this trust. San Franciscans, from storeowners to students, have complained to community organizations and the San Francisco Police Commission that local law enforcement officers assigned to the JTTF have approached them for questioning about their political and religious beliefs. For example, one law-abiding university student received a call on his cell phone from an individual claiming to be an FBI agent. He agreed to meet the officer, who was a local law enforcement officer assigned to the FBI’s JTTF, and answered questions such as, “Why did you come to America from Yemen?” “At what mosque do you worship?” “What do you think of what is going on in Yemen?” “Do you know anyone who would want to harm the U.S.?” The student did not know how the officer got his cell phone number or why he was singled out for an interview, but he conveyed that this experience is very common in his community.112 Other San Franciscans have expressed fear that when they engage in First Amendment-protected activities, like taking pictures of the Golden Gate Bridge, or writing notes during a conference, they may be deemed “suspicious” by SFPD officers and placed into a shared federal intelligence database, only to be visited by the FBI later.113 The SFPD’s shift to unpredicated, pre-emptive intelligence policing has inflamed community concerns about harassment and profiling, and sends the message that some community members are suspect based solely on their racial or ethnic identities and non-criminal political activities. As John Murray has argued, “[t]o exclude or isolate any subgroup from a community policing service amounts to more than failing in a civic duty—it also ignores a most important source of information for police . . . .” 114 While the <u>successful <mark>detection of criminal activity</mark> </u>surely <u><strong><mark>depends on</mark> information</u></strong>, <u>it depends on <mark>the right kind of information</u></mark>. The <u><mark>blurred line between federal and local police</u></mark> in San Francisco <u>is an example of how current joint</u> <u>local and federal law enforcement surveillance operations</u>, <u><strong>which do not follow local rules</u></strong><mark>,</mark> standards, <u><strong>and oversight, can <mark>diminish trust in local law enforcement</u></strong>, <u>achieving neither the goals of community policing nor of intelligence gathering</u></mark>. A community-police <u>relationship based on mutual trust is more likely to</u> <u>uncover matters that are helpful in identifying criminals</u> than the indiscriminate or potentially biased collection of non-criminal information. B. <u>Police Legitimacy Relies on Procedural Justice</u> Police <u>legitimacy is a characteristic that leads people to feel that police authority “is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed</u>.”115 According to Tom Tyler, police legitimacy represents “an acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior in line with the dictates of an external authority.”116 Since the establishment of the first formal full-time police force in the United States in 1837, police have endured many challenges to their legitimacy due primarily to numerous instances of police misconduct that have led the public to criticize and mistrust the police.117 <u>Studies of public perception about the police typically reveal large racial and ethnic group differences, with minority group members expressing lower levels of trust and confidence</u>.118 As illustrated by the previously discussed Vera Institute study, the surveillance practices of federal law enforcement in the postSeptember 11th environment has had a particularly salient impact on the legitimacy of federal police in Muslim and Arab-American communities.119 In the arena of law enforcement reform to address issues of police legitimacy, two macro theories exist. The instrumental model suggests that the success of police in achieving their goals of safety and violence prevention is linked to public perceptions that police will sanction those who break the rules and that police are effective at controlling crime.120 Traditional law enforcement strategies, including current federal surveillance initiatives, are generally hinged on this theory of deterrence— that the best way to regulate public behavior is by making undesirable behaviors risky.121 On the other hand, the procedural justice model argues: “the legitimacy of the police is linked to public judgments about the fairness of the processes through which the police make decisions and exercise authority.”122 This model is concerned with the willingness of individuals to cooperate with police and acknowledges that the effectiveness of police work is often dependent on the cooperation of the public.123 Research conducted over the last twenty years suggests that the instrumental model, and deterrence in particular, is not an effective strategy for gaining long-term compliance with the law or for eliciting cooperative behavior from community members.124 By contrast, empirical studies on police legitimacy prove that “legitimacy is connected with people’s internal sense of obligation to authority and therefore promotes voluntary, cooperative behavior.”125 Studies also confirm that due to the emphasis on trust building, community and problem-oriented policing heed the call of procedural justice research and have resulted in lower crime and improved interaction between the police and the public.126 While different variables have been shown to define “procedural justice,” respectful treatment and a fair process in which individuals are treated equally are two key components of perceived justice. For example, in their study of the Boston Ten-Point Coalition (a coalition of leaders in Boston working to mobilize around issues affecting minority youth), Christopher Winship and Jenny Berrien suggest that the Boston Police Department was able to maintain support from the AfricanAmerican community during an anti-gang enforcement initiative by acting within boundaries that they negotiated with the Ten-Point Coalition.127 As long as police respected those constraints, the community leaders offered their public support for police actions, creating an “umbrella of legitimacy” that sustained police relationships with the community.128 This Coalition did not end anti-gang policing, as some community members would have liked, but, according to Boston police officers, it enacted real communitypolicing tactics that had previously only existed on paper—addressing issues of perceived profiling and targeted policing head-on.129 The study concludes that by involving community members in formulating procedures that are perceived to be fair, community-policing measures in Boston played a critical role in the reduction of youth violence.130 Another more recent study by Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq investigated the circumstances under which Muslim Americans voluntarily collaborate with the police to fight terrorism.131 The result of their study, which involved interviewing Muslim Americans in New York City, also supports the idea that people respond favorably to the police if the police activities reflect values of procedural justice.132 The fairness of police procedures depends on the police’s neutrality in the application of the law, the transparency of their actions, their openness to community input, and their respect for members of the community.133 The parallels to the SFPD situation are clear, and the resulting conclusions are troubling. The lack of both transparency and perceived neutrality that community members in San Francisco have felt as a result of the SFPD’s involvement in federal surveillance initiatives has resulted in distrust of police and thus potentially thwarted community cooperation in counterterrorism initiatives. <u>Although</u> the <u><mark>shift to community-policing reforms</mark> in local police departments <mark>recognizes</u></mark> this <u>empirical reality</u>, the <u>trend of <mark>local police departments</mark> like the SFPD to <mark>embrace</u> <u><strong>federal surveillance initiatives undermines procedural justice.</u></strong></mark> Non-criminal, unpredicated surveillance that lacks key procedural guidelines, including oversight, allows room for bias, potentially influencing whom a police officer perceives as “dangerous” and worthy of surveillance. This <u>room for personal bias </u>not only <u>undermines community policing but also public safety by destabilizing community trust,</u> <u>making community <mark>members</u> <u><strong>less likely to cooperate</u></strong> <u>with police in</mark> <strong>real <mark>crime</u></strong> <u>investigations, and</u> <u><strong>isolating entire communities</mark> from police protection</u></strong>.</p>

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we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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All of their ev is about AIIB- they can’t solve that

<h4>All of their ev is about AIIB- they can’t solve that</h4>

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MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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Decline in airpower causes global nuclear war

Pfaltzgraff 10

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which adversaries use a mix of capabilities against the U S a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors constraints will have important implications for budget and procurement programs and maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the U S and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the U S can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent the U S faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk major challenges for the U S and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of WMD) use cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states Technology proliferation is accelerating export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by biological agents are likely to be more lethal and as global the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing weaponry “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region These threats include ballistic missiles the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of WMD is a logical projection scenarios are illustrative A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy∂ An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists∂ A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war∂ A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula∂ What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management

potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which adversaries use a mix of capabilities against the U S the speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare Control of the air has become indispensable to national security the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain biological agents are likely to be more global world contains flashpoints North Korea Iran China the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically An unstable Pakistan Taiwan Straits indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmen who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment.∂ System Versatility∂ In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity.∂ Space Access and Control∂ Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability.∂ Cyber Capabilities∂ The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration.∂ Challenges for the Air Force∂ General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included:∂ • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness?∂ • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century?∂ • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables?∂ • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments?∂ • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations?∂ • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats?∂ • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment?∂ • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges?∂ • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests?∂ These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The∂ QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort.∂ The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions.∂ First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats.∂ Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities.∂ Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets.∂ Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations.∂ Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so.∂ Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor.∂ Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales.∂ Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive:∂ • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy∂ • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists∂ • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war∂ • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula∂ What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

<h4>Decline in airpower causes <u>global nuclear war</h4><p></u><strong>Pfaltzgraff 10</strong> – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9</p><p>The <u><mark>potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which</u></mark> state <u><mark>adversaries</u></mark> and/or non-state actors <u><mark>use a mix of</u></mark> conventional and unconventional <u><mark>capabilities against the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, <u>a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors</u>. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority.</p><p>As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts <u>constraints</u> that <u>will have important implications for budget and procurement programs</u>, basic research and development (R&D), <u>and</u> the <u>maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention</u>. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).</p><p>THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES</p><p>In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of <mark>the</mark> Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, <u>with its inherent characteristics of <strong><mark>speed</strong>, <strong>range</strong>, and <strong>flexibility</strong>, airpower has forever changed warfare</u></mark>. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. <u><mark>Control of the air has become <strong>indispensable to national security</strong></mark> because it allows the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains <mark>the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring <strong>global mobility</strong>, <strong>long-range strike</strong>, and intelligence, surveillance, and </mark>reconnaissance <mark>(<strong>ISR</strong>). The benefits of airpower <strong>extend beyond</strong> the air domain</mark>, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are <strong>increasingly interdependent</u></strong>.</p><p>General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, <u>the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk</u>. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmen who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment.∂ System Versatility∂ In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity.∂ Space Access and Control∂ Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability.∂ Cyber Capabilities∂ The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration.∂ Challenges for the Air Force∂ General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included:∂ • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness?∂ • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century?∂ • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables?∂ • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments?∂ • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations?∂ • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats?∂ • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment?∂ • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges?∂ • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests?∂ These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The∂ QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort.∂ The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines <u>major challenges for the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of</u> weapons of mass destruction (<u>WMD) use</u> against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a <u><strong>cyber or space attack</strong>; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as <strong>Arctic security</strong>, U.S. <strong>energy dependence</strong>, <strong>demographic shifts</strong> and urbanization, the potential for <strong>resource wars</strong> (particularly over access to <strong>water</strong>), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or <strong>failing states</u></strong>.</p><p>TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION</p><p><u>Technology proliferation is accelerating</u>. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international <u>export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by</u> dual-use technologies and chemical/<u><strong><mark>biological</strong> agents</u></mark>. The battlefields of the future <u><mark>are likely to be more</mark> lethal</u> as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems <u>and as <strong><mark>global</u></strong></mark> and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments.</p><p>PROLIFERATION TRENDS</p><p>The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions.∂ First, <u>the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD</u> and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats.∂ Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities.∂ Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets.∂ Fourth, <u>the twenty-first-century <mark>world contains <strong>flashpoints</strong></mark> for state-to-state conflict. This includes <strong><mark>North Korea</strong></mark>, which possesses nuclear weapons, and <strong><mark>Iran</strong></mark>, which is developing them. In addition, <strong><mark>China</strong></mark> is developing</u> an impressive array of <u>weaponry</u> which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears <u>“designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region</u> and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 <u>These threats include ballistic missiles</u>, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations.∂ Fifth, <u><mark>the potential for irregular warfare is <strong>rising dramatically</strong></mark> with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of</u> more lethal capabilities, including <u>WMD</u>, to armed non-state actors <u>is a logical projection</u> of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so.∂ Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor.∂ Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales.∂ Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop <u>scenarios</u> such as the following, which <u>are</u> more <u>illustrative</u> than comprehensive:∂ • <u>A <strong>nuclear Iran</strong> that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy∂ </u>• <u><mark>An <strong>unstable Pakistan</strong></mark> that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists∂ </u>• <u>A <strong><mark>Taiwan Straits</strong></mark> crisis that escalates to war∂ </u>• <u>A <strong>nuclear North Korea</strong> that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula∂ What all of these have in common is the <strong><mark>indispensable role</strong> that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and <strong>crisis management</u></strong>.</p></mark>

OFFCASE

Politics

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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New affs are a voter -- kill clash by side-stepping pre-round planning -- crushes education because engagement Is key

<h4>New affs are a voter -- kill clash by side-stepping pre-round planning -- crushes education because engagement Is key</h4>

OFFCASE

New affs bad

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IDCA JV state

Quarters

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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New fishery cooperation in the South China Sea creates a starting point for successful management in other areas --- otherwise, collapse spills over

Wang 16 ( abstract.)//masonw

Wang 8/1/16 (Kuan-Hsiung. PhD degree in International Law from University of Bristol, United Kingdom in 1997. He is a professor of the Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan Normal University. “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea through Fisheries, Resource Cooperation, and Management” http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1226&context=mscas abstract.)//masonw

The South China Sea dispute is complicated in terms of its nature, the sovereignty issues of the islands, delimitation issues, resources utilization as well as other matters concerning security cooperation is one of the main considerations the practice has not been realized In order to solve the dispute and promote cooperation in the South China Sea region conserving and managing fishery resources could be established as a starting point There are a great number of management means which have been developed to protect fish stocks Nonetheless, these policies should be practiced in an integrated mechanism at the national levels so that the policy objectives could be accomplished The South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Yellow Sea comprise a large marine ecosystem (LME) in East Asia any change of the marine ecosystem could create a serious impact on other maritime areas. a fisheries management organization is needed in order to conserve and manage the fishery resources in the South China Sea, which could also influence other maritime areas such

conserving and managing fishery resources could be established as a starting point. any change of the marine ecosystem could create a serious impact on other maritime areas fisheries management organization is needed in order to conserve and manage the fishery resources could also influence other maritime areas

The South China Sea dispute is complicated in terms of its nature, the sovereignty issues of the islands, delimitation issues, resources utilization as well as other matters concerning security (both traditional and non-traditional). In order to solve the dispute, cooperation is one of the main considerations. However, the practice has not been realized. In order to solve the dispute and promote cooperation in the South China Sea region, the author suggests that conserving and managing fishery resources could be established as a starting point. There are a great number of management means, institutions, and international instruments (such as conventions, treaties and arrangements), which have been developed to protect fish stocks. Nonetheless, these policies should be practiced in an integrated mechanism at the national, regional, and international levels, so that the policy objectives could be accomplished. The South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Yellow Sea comprise a large marine ecosystem (LME) in East Asia. In other words, any change of the marine ecosystem could create a serious impact on other maritime areas. This paper suggests that a regional fisheries management organization is needed in order to conserve and manage the fishery resources in the South China Sea, which could also influence other maritime areas. Furthermore, it is also the purpose of this paper that such a model could contribute the solution to the dispute in the South China Sea.

<h4>New fishery coo<strong>peration in the South China Sea creates a starting point for successful management in other areas --- otherwise, collapse spills over</h4><p>Wang </strong>8/1/<strong>16 (</strong>Kuan-Hsiung. PhD degree in International Law from University of Bristol, United Kingdom in 1997. He is a professor of the Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan Normal University. “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea through Fisheries, Resource Cooperation, and Management” http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1226&context=mscas<u><strong> abstract.)//masonw</p><p></strong>The South China Sea dispute is complicated in terms of its nature, the sovereignty issues of the islands, delimitation issues, resources utilization</u> <u>as</u> <u>well as other matters concerning security</u> (both traditional and non-traditional). In order to solve the dispute, <u><strong>cooperation is one of the main considerations</u></strong>. However, <u><strong>the practice has not been realized</u></strong>. <u>In order to solve the dispute and <strong>promote cooperation</strong> in the South China Sea region</u>, the author suggests that <u><strong><mark>conserving and managing fishery resources</u></strong> <u>could be established <strong>as a starting point</u></strong>.</mark> <u>There are a great number of management means</u>, institutions, and international instruments (such as conventions, treaties and arrangements), <u>which have been developed to protect fish stocks</u>. <u>Nonetheless, these policies should be practiced in an integrated mechanism at the national</u>, regional, and international <u>levels</u>, <u>so that the policy objectives could be accomplished</u>. <u>The South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Yellow Sea comprise a large marine ecosystem (LME) in East Asia</u>. In other words, <u><mark>any <strong>change of the marine ecosystem could create a serious impact on other maritime areas</strong></mark>. </u>This paper suggests that <u>a </u>regional<u> <strong><mark>fisheries management</strong> <strong>organization</strong> is needed in order to <strong>conserve and manage the fishery resources</strong></mark> in the South China Sea,</u> <u>which <mark>could also <strong>influence other maritime areas</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, it is also the purpose of this paper that <u><strong>such </u>a model could contribute the solution to the dispute in the South China Sea.</p></strong>

Advantage one is oceans

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1ac - this one 1nc - T-qpq T-crocker Antarctica CP ASEAN CP Appeasement CCP Collapse good 2nr - appeasement ASEAN CP

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Zero risk of an EMP attack

Stratfor, 10

Stratfor, 10 (September 9, 2010 “ Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electromagnetic_pulse_emp_attack)

In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, , a nuclear weapon would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers s Only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design andintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s an attack against the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on. the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.

In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, as discussed in many media reports, a nuclear weapon (probably in the megaton range) would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers somewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise at a third of this altitude.Only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design andintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.) The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s, when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some attack scenarios against the United States. However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such an attack against the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating. Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including opportunity cost — to the developing country. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on. In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.

<h4>Zero risk of an EMP attack</h4><p><strong>Stratfor, 10 </strong>(September 9, 2010 “ Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” <u>http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electromagnetic_pulse_emp_attack</u>)</p><p> </p><p><u>In order to have the</u> <u>best</u> <u>chance of causing</u> <u>the type of immediate and certain</u> <u>EMP damage</u> <u>to the United States on a continent-wide scale,</u> as discussed in many media reports<u>, a nuclear weapon</u> (probably in the megaton range) <u>would need to be detonated</u> <u>well above 30 kilometers s</u>omewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise at a third of this altitude.<u>Only the</u> <u><strong>U</strong>nited</u> <u><strong>S</strong>tates,</u> <u><strong>U</strong>nited</u> <u><strong>K</strong>ingdom,</u> <u>France, Russia and China possess</u> <u>both</u> <u>the</u> <u>mature</u> <u>warhead design andintercontinental ballistic missile</u> <u>(ICBM) capability</u> <u>to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades.</u><strong> </strong>(Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.) <u><strong>T</strong>he HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s</u>, when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some attack scenarios against the United States. However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such <u>an attack</u> <u>against the United States</u> <u>would</u> <u>inherently and necessarily</u> <u>represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and</u> <u>the idea that</u> <u>the</u> <u><strong>U</strong>nited</u> <u><strong>S</strong>tates</u> <u>would</u> <u>not</u> <u>respond in kind</u> <u>is absurd.</u> The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating. Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including opportunity cost — to the developing country. <u>The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on.</u> In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, <u>the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.</p></u>

A2

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MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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That ends all life on the planet

Schofield, 14

Schofield, 14 --- Director of Research at the Australian Centre for Ocean Resource and Security University of Wollongong (3/10/2014, Clive, “Why our precious oceans are under threat,” http://uowblogs.com/globalchallenges/2014/03/10/the-threats-facing-our-precious-oceans/, JMP)

The oceans clearly dominate the world spatially The oceans are critical to the global environment and human survival in numerous ways – they are vital to the global nutrient cycling, represent a key repository and supporter of biological diversity on a world scale and play a fundamental role in driving the global atmospheric system Coastal and marine environments support and sustain key habitats and living resources notably fisheries These resources continue to provide a critical source of food for hundreds of millions of people. The fishing industry supports the livelihoods of an estimated 540 million people worldwide and fisheries supply more than 15 per cent of the animal protein consumed by 4.2 billion people globally the oceans underpin the global economy through sea borne trade 61 per cent of global GNP is sourced from the oceans Coasts and marine zones provide essential ecosystem services. Coasts and marine zones are therefore of critical importance across scales . At the same time the oceans also remain largely (95 per cent) unexplored.

The oceans are critical to the global environment and human survival in they are vital to nutrient cycling biological diversity and the global atmospheric system marine environments support key habitats and living resources, notably fisheries

Science fiction author Arthur C Clarke once observed, “How inappropriate to call this planet Earth when it is quite clearly Ocean.” Good point, well made. The oceans clearly dominate the world spatially, encompassing around 72 per cent of the surface of the planet. The vast extent of the oceans only tells part of the story, however. The oceans are critical to the global environment and human survival in numerous ways – they are vital to the global nutrient cycling, represent a key repository and supporter of biological diversity on a world scale and play a fundamental role in driving the global atmospheric system. Coastal and marine environments support and sustain key habitats and living resources, notably fisheries and aquaculture. These resources continue to provide a critical source of food for hundreds of millions of people. The fishing industry supports the livelihoods of an estimated 540 million people worldwide and fisheries supply more than 15 per cent of the animal protein consumed by 4.2 billion people globally. Moreover, the oceans are an increasing source of energy resources and underpin the global economy through sea borne trade. Overall, it has been estimated that 61 per cent of global GNP is sourced from the oceans and coastal areas within 100km of the sea. Coasts and marine zones also provide essential, but often not fully acknowledged, ecosystem services. Coasts and marine zones are therefore of critical importance across scales, from the global to the regional, national and sub-national coastal community levels. At the same time the oceans also remain largely (95 per cent) unexplored.

<h4>That ends all life on the planet</h4><p><strong>Schofield, 14</strong> --- Director of Research at the Australian Centre for Ocean Resource and Security University of Wollongong (3/10/2014, Clive, “Why our precious oceans are under threat,” http://uowblogs.com/globalchallenges/2014/03/10/the-threats-facing-our-precious-oceans/, JMP)</p><p>Science fiction author Arthur C Clarke once observed, “How inappropriate to call this planet Earth when it is quite clearly Ocean.” Good point, well made. <u>The oceans clearly dominate the world spatially</u>, encompassing around 72 per cent of the surface of the planet. The vast extent of the oceans only tells part of the story, however. <u><strong><mark>The oceans are critical to the global environment and human survival in</mark> numerous ways</strong> – <mark>they are vital to</mark> the global <strong><mark>nutrient cycling</strong></mark>, represent a key repository and supporter of <strong><mark>biological diversity</strong></mark> on a world scale <mark>and</mark> play a fundamental role in driving <mark>the <strong>global atmospheric system</u></strong></mark>. <u>Coastal and <mark>marine environments support</mark> and sustain <strong><mark>key habitats</strong> and <strong>living resources</u></strong>, <u>notably <strong>fisheries</u></strong></mark> and aquaculture. <u>These resources continue to provide a <strong>critical source of food</strong> for hundreds of millions of people. The fishing industry supports the livelihoods of an estimated 540 million people worldwide and fisheries supply more than 15 per cent of the animal protein consumed by 4.2 billion people globally</u>. Moreover, <u>the oceans</u> are an increasing source of energy resources and <u>underpin the global economy through sea borne trade</u>. Overall, it has been estimated that <u>61 per cent of global GNP is sourced from the oceans</u> and coastal areas within 100km of the sea. <u>Coasts and marine zones</u> also <u>provide essential</u>, but often not fully acknowledged, <u>ecosystem services. Coasts and marine zones are therefore of critical importance across scales</u>, from the global to the regional, national and sub-national coastal community levels<u><strong>. At the same time the oceans also remain largely (95 per cent) unexplored.</p></u></strong>

Advantage one is oceans

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MBA RK

Kevin McCaffrey

1ac - this one 1nc - T-qpq T-crocker Antarctica CP ASEAN CP Appeasement CCP Collapse good 2nr - appeasement ASEAN CP

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No aff offense -- just disclose it -- still benefits of breaking new

<h4>No aff offense -- just disclose it -- still benefits of breaking new</h4>

OFFCASE

New affs bad

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IDCA JV state

Quarters

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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Second scenario is food

<h4><u>Second scenario is food</h4></u>

Advantage one is oceans

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Emory

1

MBA RK

Kevin McCaffrey

1ac - this one 1nc - T-qpq T-crocker Antarctica CP ASEAN CP Appeasement CCP Collapse good 2nr - appeasement ASEAN CP

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Independently, They have to specify their agent. Anything else kills ground because they can spike out of implementation and competition for CP’s. Fairness is a voter and CX is too late for 1NC strat.

<h4>Independently, They have to specify their agent. Anything else kills ground because they can spike out of implementation and competition for CP’s. Fairness is a voter and CX is too late for 1NC strat.</h4>

OFFCASE

New affs bad

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Quarters

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Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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Myanmar stavle now

Ghosh 12

Ghosh 12 (Palash Ghosh- has worked as a business journalist for 21 years in New York, 04, 6-4-2012, "Myanmar Abandons Nuclear Program: Defense Minister," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/myanmar-abandons-nuclear-program-defense-minister-701322//SR)

Bottom of Form Myanmar has formally abandoned its pursuit of nuclear power and has also scaled back its military nuclear program] was not for defense, it was not for weapons, it was just research in the past Lieutenant General Min indicated country’s nuclear program had not progressed very far anyway. In reality we were just ... doing academic studies. But in this new government, we have already given up all activities on nuclear issues. And we have no further plans to extend on this. As a result, he asserted, there is no need for the U.N. nuclear watchdog Myanmar, recently held free parliamentary elections and also enacted a series of democratic reforms Hla Min also indicated that the Myanmar military, which is allotted 25 percent of seats in parliament, may play a diminishing role in the country’s affairs under a new constitution.

Myanmar has formally abandoned its pursuit of nuclear power scaled back its military Min indicated nuclear program just doing academic studies in new government, already given up all activities on nuclear issues no need for watchdog military play a diminishing role in the country’s affairs under a new constitution.

Top of Form Bottom of Form Myanmar has formally abandoned its pursuit of nuclear power and has also scaled back its military and political ties with North Korea, the country’s defense minister said over the weekend. We have already said very clearly [our nuclear program] was not for defense, it was not for weapons, it was just research in the past, Lieutenant General Hla Min said at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Regional Security Dialogue, an annual security forum, in Singapore. Hla Min also indicated that his country’s nuclear program had not progressed very far anyway. In reality we were just ... doing academic studies. But in this new government, we have already given up all activities on nuclear issues. And we have no further plans to extend on this. As a result, he asserted, there is no need for the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to visit the country and monitor its weapons programs. We have nothing to check and nothing to see, so it is irrelevant, he said. In addition, with respect to Pyongyang, the general said, Because of our opening and our new [democratic] efforts, we have stopped such [military] relationships with North Korea. According to our foreign policy, we have friendly relations with all countries, so it is just a regular relationship.” Two years ago, western nations, as well as Japan and South Korea, were alarmed by reports from a defecting Burmese solider that Myanmar (also known as Burma) had acquired uranium-enrichment technology and parts for an atomic weapons program from North Korea. Now, it appears that Myanmar, which recently held free parliamentary elections and also enacted a series of democratic reforms over the past two years since a nominally civilian government replaced a repressive military regime, is gradually moving toward a more western-friendly approach to geo-politics. The country’s most famous dissident, pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi, was recently allowed to leave the country for the first time in 24 years. In mid-May, the president of Myanmar, Thein Sein, assured his South Korean counterpart, Lee Myung-bak, that his country would no longer purchase weapons from North Korea. Sein took pains to emphasize that Myanmar had only bought conventional weapons, not atomic arms, from North Korea over the past two decades. However, Reuters reported that the United Nations is probing reports that the North Koreans may have sold weapons to both Myanmar and Syria. Hla Min also indicated that the Myanmar military, which is allotted 25 percent of seats in parliament, may play a diminishing role in the country’s affairs under a new constitution.

<h4>Myanmar stavle now</h4><p><strong>Ghosh 12</strong> (Palash Ghosh- has worked as a business journalist for 21 years in New York, 04, 6-4-2012, "Myanmar Abandons Nuclear Program: Defense Minister," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/myanmar-abandons-nuclear-program-defense-minister-701322//SR)</p><p>Top of Form</p><p><u>Bottom of Form</p><p><strong><mark>Myanmar has formally abandoned its pursuit of nuclear power</mark> </strong>and has also <mark>scaled back its military</mark> </u>and political ties with North Korea, the country’s defense minister said over the weekend. We have already said very clearly [our <u>nuclear program] was not for defense, it was not for weapons, it was just research in the past</u>, <u>Lieutenant General</u> Hla Min said at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Regional Security Dialogue, an annual security forum, in Singapore. Hla <u><mark>Min</u></mark> also <u><mark>indicated</u></mark> that his <u>country’s <mark>nuclear program</mark> had not progressed very far anyway. In reality we were <mark>just</mark> ... <mark>doing academic studies</mark>. But <mark>in</mark> this <mark>new government,</mark> we have <mark>already given up all activities on nuclear issues</mark>. And we have no further plans to extend on this. As a result, he asserted, there is <mark>no</mark> <mark>need</mark> <mark>for</mark> the U.N. nuclear <mark>watchdog</u></mark>, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to visit the country and monitor its weapons programs. We have nothing to check and nothing to see, so it is irrelevant, he said. In addition, with respect to Pyongyang, the general said, Because of our opening and our new [democratic] efforts, we have stopped such [military] relationships with North Korea. According to our foreign policy, we have friendly relations with all countries, so it is just a regular relationship.” Two years ago, western nations, as well as Japan and South Korea, were alarmed by reports from a defecting Burmese solider that Myanmar (also known as Burma) had acquired uranium-enrichment technology and parts for an atomic weapons program from North Korea. Now, it appears that <u>Myanmar, </u>which<u> recently held free parliamentary elections and also enacted a series of democratic reforms</u> over the past two years since a nominally civilian government replaced a repressive military regime, is gradually moving toward a more western-friendly approach to geo-politics. The country’s most famous dissident, pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi, was recently allowed to leave the country for the first time in 24 years. In mid-May, the president of Myanmar, Thein Sein, assured his South Korean counterpart, Lee Myung-bak, that his country would no longer purchase weapons from North Korea. Sein took pains to emphasize that Myanmar had only bought conventional weapons, not atomic arms, from North Korea over the past two decades. However, Reuters reported that the United Nations is probing reports that the North Koreans may have sold weapons to both Myanmar and Syria. <u>Hla Min also indicated that the Myanmar <mark>military</mark>, which is allotted 25 percent of seats in parliament, may <mark>play</mark> <mark>a diminishing role in the country’s affairs under a new constitution.</p></u></mark>

OFFCASE

A1

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IDCA JV state

Quarters

NEW TRIER JM

Amit, Rachel boroditsky, michelle david

new myanmar aff - we looked like noobs the whole debate but somehow picked up on a stupid "abandon CP" we made up in 1nc prep and politics Also read xi good even though the plan is a massive win for xi t military and NSG which caused a fun impact turn debate

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Fish are key to Chinese food security – empirically lifts people out of famine and contributes to social stability

Zhiwen 2k

Zhiwen 2k (Song Zhiwen. Published in the food and agriculture organization of the united nations, by the FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. “The Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security in China” http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6956e/x6956e06.htm December 2000 we don’t endorse gendered language)//masonw

2. Fisheries Sector During the period from 1949 to 1957, Chinese fisheries was restored and began to develop. In 1949, the total fisheries production was 447,927 mt. After three years of hard work, at the end of 1952, the total output was 1.66 million mt, which exceeded the highest output of the past. In the following three Five-Year Plans (1966-1980), the yearly production increased at an average rate of 1.3 percent, 6.7 percent, and 0.4 percent respectively. During the 25 years from 1953 to 1978, the total production of fisheries increased by 2.75 million mt, only an average increase of 110,000 mt/year (Table 1). In 1978, reform started and the government placed unprecedented emphasis on economic development and modernization of the country. Fisheries grew rapidly again The economic reforms in fisheries, begun in 1978 included: the introduction and implementation of a production responsibility system with the household or boat as the basic accounting unit; the change of the fisheries operational system to allow private/individual fisheries and fish farming operations; the shift of fisheries trade from being a completely government controlled system to a free market system; and the gradual relaxation of price controls for all aquatic products. there were 407 fisheries townships, 6,690 fisheries villages, 3,834,729 fisheries households, 16,827,473 full-time fishermyn and 11,428,655 part-time labourers. Fisheries The production of state-owned fisheries enterprises, though comparatively small, is beneficial to market allocation and supply and is therefore still an important part of fisheries production. During the past ten years, the number of Chinese fisheries labourers has greatly increased. There is no land conflict between fisheries and agriculture and no grassland conflict between fisheries and animal husbandry When China develops her fisheries, the national revenue increases with funds for national development. fisheries import and export value was 1.52 percent of the total national foreign trade. The volume and value of exported and imported fisheries products from 1978 to 1995 is shown in Table 2. The development of Chinese fisheries, particularly the development of aquaculture, has created employment opportunities and promoted the adjustment of the rural industrial structure and the comprehensive development and utilization of land resources. etc. This system has played an important role in accelerating the development of the national economy Marine capture fisheries is a major part of fisheries production the output of marine capture fisheries reached 10,268,373 mt, still ranking first in total output, but the proportion went down to 40.8 percent China borders four seas which cover a total area of 4.7 million km 91.7 percent of the output of marine capture fisheries came from the four sea areas 8.3 percent of the total output Fisheries China is rich in inland waters. According to statistics issued by the fisheries department in 1984, inland waters cover an area of 17.6 million ha, or nearly one fiftiet The freshwater areas abound in fishery resources 3. Contribution to Food Security Aquatic products are high in protein and low in fat. They contain amino acids essential to human health. They strengthen the brain, promote longevity, contribute to fitness and improve one's looks. They are of value in dietary balance and are important to children's growth fisheries output of 1995 reached 25.11 million mt and played an important role in supplying food, particularly protein . On average 100 g of fish protein contains 10.6 g of lysine, more than milk, eggs or meat. In recent years, the output of aquatic products has increased greatly and the per-caput consumption rose from 4.4 kg at the end of the 1970s to 20 kg by 1995, equivalent to the world average. At present, one third of the animal food consumed comes from aquatic products . The Government regards the development of fisheries and increasing the supply of aquatic products as one of the most important measures in improving living standard and promoting social and economic development. The important role fisheries plays in food security is obvious, particularly in the periods when there are food shortages. beginning of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, in order to overcome the problem of food shortage, the government actively developed fisheries and encouraged people to consume more aquatic products. From 1949 to 1957, fisheries output increased from 450,000 mt to more than 3 million mt, a five-fold increase. This contributed significantly to social stability and economic improvement at that time, and to a certain extent, lightened the pressure on food supply. During the early 1960s, China's economy experienced serious difficulties. Aquatic products played a major role in easing the serious food shortage in urban and rural areas. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shortage of aquatic products in large and medium-sized cities. This was gradually remedied. According to the statistics of eight large cities, not including the suburbs, average per-caput consumption in 1995 was 38.5 kg/year, of which Beijing was 23.0 kg; Tianjin, 27.3 kg; Shanghai, 42.6 kg; Guangzhou, 60.2 kg; Harbin, 11.4 kg; Wuhan, 38.9 kg; Chendu, 21.4 kg; and Fuzhou, 60.5 kg. The differences are significant. In these eight cities, the turnover of aquatic products was 1.24 million mt or 13.37 billion yuan the large-scale construction of fish ponds in cities and suburbs in the 1970s played a major role in solving the "difficulty in buying fish" problem. China is famous for its integrated fish farming. Fish farmers develop and utilize their local water bodies and land resources and form a circle of the whole production procedure so as to gain maximum economic benefits 2 As Income/Employment The volume of exported aquatic products and values from 1985 to 1994 are shown in Table 2. During this period, the export volume went up from 124 thousand mt to 684 thousand mt, an increase of 426.4 percent. China also imports aquatic products The development of fisheries creates job opportunities on an extensive scale and increases personal income The proportion of the Chinese agricultural population was 85 percent of its total in 1970, 83 percent in 1980 and 80 percent in 1984. Along Fisheries and related occupations are an important source of livelihood in the rural areas of the country. In 1995 there were 11,428,655 million labourers engaged in fisheries production whom 5,071,940 were full-time labourers (capture fisheries, 1,672,822; aquaculture, 2,869,493; service logistics, 529,625), and 6,356,715 part-time labourers The increase of fisheries labourers from 1978 to 1995 is shown in Table 7. In fact, in 1995, fisheries labourers increased by 9,027,447 over the 2,401,208 in 1978, a rise of 375.9 percent. Of them, more than 7 million were engaged in aquaculture. It is the input of large numbers of labourers that has ensured sustained production. services before and after production develop simultaneously. These include building fishing boats and facilities; and manufacturing fishing nets, freezing and processing equipment, transportation tools, farm machinery, etc. This phenomenon is quite obvious in those areas where people are mainly engaged in fisheries; in these areas if fisheries is growing prosperously, other related industries also flourish. The economy in the whole area is vigorous. The higher income of fisheries labourers is important in attracting many rural labourers to take part in fisheries activities

When China develops fisheries, the national revenue increases system has played an important role in accelerating the development of the national economy The Government regards the development of fisheries as one of the most important measures in improving living standard and promoting social and economic development. The role fisheries plays in food security is obvious, particularly in the periods when there are food shortages , in order to overcome the problem of food shortage, the government actively developed fisheries and encouraged people to consume more aquatic products From 1949 to 1957, fisheries output increased This contributed significantly to social stability and lightened the pressure on food supply Fisheries and related occupations are an important source of livelihood

2. Fisheries Sector 2.1 Present Situation in Relation to Other Sectors During the period from 1949 to 1957, Chinese fisheries was restored and began to develop. In 1949, the total fisheries production was 447,927 mt. After three years of hard work, at the end of 1952, the total output was 1.66 million mt, which exceeded the highest output of the past. In the course of the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), fisheries production increased at an average annual rate of 13.3 percent and in 1957 rose to 3.11 million mt. But at the end of the second Five-Year Plan, it dropped to 2.28 million mt. In the three-year readjustment period (1963-1965), fisheries production went up again at an average annual increase of 9.3 percent. In the following three Five-Year Plans (1966-1980), the yearly production increased at an average rate of 1.3 percent, 6.7 percent, and 0.4 percent respectively. During the 25 years from 1953 to 1978, the total production of fisheries increased by 2.75 million mt, only an average increase of 110,000 mt/year (Table 1). In 1978, reform started and the government placed unprecedented emphasis on economic development and modernization of the country. Fisheries grew rapidly again. In 1988, China became the third country in the world whose yearly fisheries production was over 10 million mt; then from 1990 on, China's yearly fisheries production ranked first in the world. In 1994, fisheries production was 20 million mt, and in 1995 it reached 25.17 million mt, contributing about one fifth of the world total. The past ten years have been the fastest growing period, with an annual increase of 51.4 percent, much higher than the world average. The economic reforms in fisheries, begun in 1978 included: the introduction and implementation of a production responsibility system with the household or boat as the basic accounting unit; the change of the fisheries operational system to allow private/individual fisheries and fish farming operations; the shift of fisheries trade from being a completely government controlled system to a free market system; and the gradual relaxation of price controls for all aquatic products. These changes in the management and production systems are considered the most successful and thorough reforms in the process of fisheries economic reforms. In 1995, there were 407 fisheries townships, 6,690 fisheries villages, 3,834,729 fisheries households, 16,827,473 full-time fishermyn and 11,428,655 part-time labourers. Fisheries households, full-time fishermyn and part-time labourers accounted for 1.64 percent, 1.96 percent and 2.53 percent of the total agricultural households, full-time and part-time labourers respectively. These fishermyn produced 23.07 million mt, or 91.7 percent of the total fisheries production of the country. The state-owned fisheries enterprises produced 2.07 million mt, only 8.3 percent of the total production, with a work force of 293,985. The production of state-owned fisheries enterprises, though comparatively small, is beneficial to market allocation and supply and is therefore still an important part of fisheries production. During the past ten years, the number of Chinese fisheries labourers has greatly increased. There is no land conflict between fisheries and agriculture and no grassland conflict between fisheries and animal husbandry. When China develops her fisheries, the national revenue increases with funds for national development. Compared with agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, the average yearly growth rate of the value of fisheries is the highest. The proportion of the total fisheries output value to the total agriculture output value is rising each year. In 1949, it was only 0.2 percent. By the end of 1978, it had gone up to 1.6 percent. In 1995, it was 8.5 percent. The export of aquatic products is important in earning foreign exchange and promoting international trade, particularly with other developing countries. Some aquatic products have high export value, and the cost is lower than that of many other agricultural products for export. According to the customs statistics of 1995, the total amount of aquatic products imported and exported reached 2.08 million mt and the total value was US$ 4.25 billion. Exports amounted to 740,000 mt with a value of US$ 3.29 billion and the volume of imports was 1.34 million mt with a value of US$ 0.96 billion. The fisheries import and export value was 1.52 percent of the total national foreign trade. The volume and value of exported and imported fisheries products from 1978 to 1995 is shown in Table 2. In 1995, the per-caput net income of peasants was 1,578 yuan while that of fishermyn was 3,352 yuan, more than 100 percent higher than that of peasants. The development of fisheries not only creates many job opportunities but increases income. The development of Chinese fisheries, particularly the development of aquaculture, has created employment opportunities and promoted the adjustment of the rural industrial structure and the comprehensive development and utilization of land resources. Now the Chinese fisheries is a comparatively integrated industrial system composed of aquaculture, capture fisheries, processing, marketing, boat building and machinery industries, fisheries science and technology, fisheries administration, etc. This system has played an important role in accelerating the development of the national economy, especially by stimulating the rural economy and improving the economic structures and living standard. 2.2 Marine Capture Fisheries Marine capture fisheries is a major part of fisheries production. In 1949, the output of marine capture fisheries was 342,927 mt, or 76.5 percent of the total fisheries output. In recent years, owing to the speedy development of marine and freshwater aquaculture and the growth of freshwater capture fisheries, the proportion of marine capture fisheries has been going down steadily. In 1995, the output of marine capture fisheries reached 10,268,373 mt, still ranking first in total output, but the proportion went down to 40.8 percent. As mentioned earlier, China borders four seas which cover a total area of 4.7 million km2: the Bohai 77,000 km2; Huanghai or Yellow 380,000 km2; East China 770,000 km2 and the South China 3.5 million km2. The continental shelf within an isobath of 200 m, covers about 1.5 million km2. In 1995, 91.7 percent of the output of marine capture fisheries came from the four sea areas. The total output was 9,416,001 mt (the Bohai 954,020 mt; the Huanghai or Yellow 1,706,250 mt; the East China 4,378,364 mt and the South China 2,377,387 mt), of which 6,458,959 mt came from coastal and inshore areas within a water depth of less than 80 m. The output from distant fisheries was only 852,372 mt, or 8.3 percent of the total output. Along the coastal zone, thousands of rivers discharge into the seas, bringing large quantities of nutritive substances which support the fish populations. There are 1,500 species of fish along the coast, of which over 200 are of economic value and are fished commercially. The fish composition in different sea areas varies greatly because of a great disparity in environment. In terms of biomass, warm water species make up more than two thirds of the output. In 1995 there were 273,978 marine motorized boats and about 40,000 non-powered boats. Of these, 2,928 were state-owned. Over 80 percent of the motorized boats had a power of less than 44 HP and 18.4 percent, 45-440 HP. Less than 0.6 percent had more than 440 HP. There were 1.1 million full-time fishermyn and a number of part-time labourers with an output of 9,292,494 mt, while 47 state-owned enterprises with a labour force of more than 47,000 produced 975,879 mt, only 9.5 percent of the total marine capture output. The marine capture fisheries output consisted of: fish, 7,436,035 mt, or 72.5 percent; crustaceans, 1,732,115 mt or 16.8 percent; shellfish, 827,979 mt or 8.1 percent; algae, 10,637 mt or 0.1 percent and others, 261,607 mt (including jellyfish, 171,905 mt) or 2.5 percent. Fish exceeding 100,000 mt were hairtail, round scad, anchovy, chub mackerel, mackerel, red coat, pomfret, conger pike, small yellow croaker, and filefish. The output of crustaceans included northern mauxia shrimp, swimming crab, southern rough shrimp and prawns. The output of shellfish included cuttle fish (Table 3). In the order of the amount of production, the different types of fishing operations were: trawlers 5,357,999 mt, or 52.2 percent; set-nets 1,927,813 mt, or 18.7 percent; gill and drift nets 1,263,800 mt, or 12.3 percent; purse seines 552,513 mt, or 5.4 percent; lines and hooks 341,314 mt, or 33.3 percent; and miscellaneous fishing gear 824,934 mt, or 8.1 percent. During the 1950s, marine fisheries resources were developed and exploited. In the 1960s, inshore resources were fully developed and utilized. In the 1970s, motorized fishing boats increased in number and inshore resources were overfished, with fishing intensity exceeding fish recruitment. Big and small yellow croaker became nearly extinct in the Bohai and Huanghai seas. The proportion of valuable fish species became lower in all sea areas, and fish size, smaller. The per unit output of motorized fishing boats, in terms of engine power, went down. In the early 1970s, output stayed at more than 1 mt/HP; but by the end of the 1970s it was less than 0.6 mt/HP. In spite of the fact that in that period, the capture of off-shore pelagic fish progressed steadily, at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, the total output decreased. After 1985, thanks to the measures of strengthening fisheries administration and management as well as development of stocking, marine capture output went up once again. But at the same time, the number of fishing boats increased by 141,193, or 106.3 percent in ten years. At present, the declining trend of inshore fisheries resources has not been effectively managed. The problem of the increasing number of fishing boats and the destruction of fisheries resources in the coastal areas continues. 2.3 Inland Capture Fisheries China is rich in inland waters. According to statistics issued by the fisheries department in 1984, inland waters cover an area of 17.6 million ha, or nearly one fiftieth of the land area; ponds cover 1.92 million ha, or 7.2 percent; lakes, 7.53 million ha, or 42.1 percent; rivers, 5.28 million ha, or 39 percent; reservoirs, 2.30 million ha, or 11.7 percent. In these waters, the conditions for developing freshwater fisheries are good. The freshwater areas abound in fishery resources. There are more than 800 freshwater species in the country, and about 60 or so are migrant species. In recent years, more than 30 species have been introduced from abroad. Carps make up about 50 to 60 percent of the total. Most of the high-value species are warm water fishes; cold water species are found in the northern areas. Freshwater capture is the oldest method of fisheries production. At the beginning of the new China, freshwater fisheries became a focal point and developed swiftly. In 1950, the freshwater fisheries output was 365,960 mt, of which capture output was 300,000 mt, or 82 percent, and about one third of the total fisheries output. At the end of 1960, the freshwater capture output reached 668,523 mt, an increase of 1.23 times in ten years. But because the freshwater aquaculture output of the same period increased, the proportion of freshwater capture decreased to 57.2 percent of the freshwater fisheries output. After 1960, not only did the proportion decrease but the absolute yield of freshwater capture went down as well, owing to a severe decline in the natural resources. The annual yield in the 1950s was 524,000 mt; it fell to 451,000 mt in the 1960s and declined further to 316,000 mt in the 1970s. In 1978 the yield was only 296,441 mt, the lowest level in thirty years. In the first five years of the 1980s, the yield went up slightly, but was still far from the highest level of 1960. By 1988, the yield of freshwater capture fisheries had been restored and in 1995, it reached 1,372,864 mt. Compared with 1988, it had increased by more than 100 percent, but the proportion in freshwater fisheries was only 12.7 percent, or less than 5.5 percent of the total fisheries output. In the 1950s freshwater capture output increased by a big margin. It was mainly because the number of fishing boats, nets and labourers grew, fishing areas were expanded and new ones developed. For example, in 1950 the number of fishing boats was 153,000, and in 1959 there were 311,000. In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the fishing areas increased by more than 30 percent from 1958 to 1960. Qinghai Lake, Eling Lake, etc., the highest and biggest lakes in the world, located on Qing-Tibetan plateau, were virgin lakes which remained unnoticed for thousands of years but are now developed and utilized. In the 1960s and 1970s the yield of freshwater capture fisheries continued to decline for a number of reasons, but the most important was that the ecological balance had been destroyed, resulting in a serious decline in natural fisheries resources. For example, with the rapid development of water conservancy and hydroelectric power generation, a large number of culverts, sluice gates, dykes and dams played an important role in industrial and agricultural production, flood control and drought resistance, but most of them were not equipped with appropriate fishways. The passage of migrating fishes and crabs was blocked. Thus parent fishes and crabs could not migrate to spawning grounds and the juvenile fishes and crabs could not swim into lakes to grow. The most affected were the anadromous fishes such as silver carp, black carp, grass carp, bighead carp, hilsa herring, river eel and river crab. In these affected water bodies, not only did the yield decline, but the fish fauna, population structure, and age composition changed a great deal. The stretch of the Yangtze River in Hubei Province is the main producing ground for fry. During 1958-1980 the fry yield decreased from 1,143 billion to 239.6 billion, a decline of 80 percent. Land reclamation plays a direct role in reducing water areas used for freshwater capture. In the 1960s the decline in freshwater capture was directly related to large-scale land reclamation during this period. The reclaimed lake areas in the four provinces of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui exceeded one million ha. Reclamation not only reduced the water areas, but also destroyed spawning and feeding grounds. Before 1976, the reclaimed water surface in Poyang Lake averaged 5,500 ha/year, most of it being spawning grounds for common carp and crucian carp. It is known that in the 1960s there were 55 spawning grounds in the southern part of the lake, but in the 1970s the number had decreased to 33, and later only 14 were left. Thus the ecological balance in the lake as a whole was severely damaged. Moreover, some of the natural water bodies used for capture fisheries were converted into culture areas, thus narrowing capture fishing grounds and reducing yield. To account for the serious decline in freshwater capture output, in the late 1970s, many provinces pursued large-scale investigations, and found the main causes for the decline. With great effort from various quarters, appropriate measures were taken to improve the ecological environment in the lakes and apart from that, artificial propagation and stocking programmes were adopted. Therefore from 1979 on, the situation took a favourable turn. The output has steadily on the increase. In 1995, 573,368 full-time fishermyn engaged in freshwater capture fisheries and part-time fishermyn may have far exceeded that number. There were over 500,000 fishing boats, but the majority were small and non-motorized. The motorized boats, on the average, only had about 10 HP each. Only a few big boats operated in large lakes and reservoirs; the rest were small, widely scattered, and moved here and there, with low production. This is a distinguishing feature of China's freshwater capture fisheries. 2.4 Aquaculture For quite a long time aquaculture did not receive enough attention. As a result, it developed slowly. In 1949 the national aquaculture output was about 20,000 mt, of which 15,000 mt were from freshwater and 5,000 mt were from marine aquaculture, amounting to only 4.5 percent of total fisheries output. Though output had reached 22.7 percent of the total fisheries output by 1958, there was little change in the proportion in the following 20 years. The proportions were 23.2 percent in 1968, and 26.0 percent in 1978. Since 1978, aquaculture has developed rapidly. Output rose from 1.2 million mt in 1978 to 5.32 million mt in 1988, a net increase of 4.11 million mt and yearly growth rate as high as 16 percent. Marine aquaculture output was 1.425 million mt and freshwater output, 3.89 million mt, or an average annual growth rate of 12.3 percent and 17.7 percent respectively. During the same period, capture fisheries output went up from 3.44 million mt to 5.28 million mt, an average annual growth rate of only 4.4 percent. This led to a radical change in the Chinese fisheries production structure. In 1988, aquaculture output exceeded capture output for the first time, making up 50.2 percent of the total fisheries output. In the years from 1978 to 1988, 70 percent of the increased output came from aquaculture. By the end of 1995, aquaculture output had reached 13,530,557 mt, accounting for 53.7 percent of the total fisheries output, of which marine aquaculture output was 4,122,924 mt and freshwater output, 9,407,633 mt, increases of 189.4 percent and 141.3 percent respectively over 1988. Aquaculture has become the fastest growing sector of fisheries. In 1995, the nation-wide areas for aquaculture reached 5,385,090 ha, of which the freshwater aquaculture areas were 4,669,340 ha (ponds, 1,857,810 ha; lakes, 824,330 ha; reservoirs, 1,515,620 ha; rivers, 3,447,330 ha and others, 124,250 ha), and marine aquaculture areas were 715,750 ha. The number of full-time fishermyn engaged in aquaculture was 2,869,493 (freshwater, 2,470,778; marine 398,715). There were also a large number of part-time fishermyn engaged in aquaculture activities. The freshwater aquaculture output of major species in 1995 was: silver and bighead carp, 3,713,271 mt; grass carp, 2,070,988 mt; common carp, 1,398,618 mt; crucian carp, 533,740 mt; breams 335,934 mt; tilapia, 314,093 mt; black carp, 102,557 mt; freshwater prawn, 25,711 mt; river crabs, 41,515 mt; soft shell turtles, 17,445 mt; etc. The marine aquaculture output included: finfish, 144,957 mt; crustaceans, 115,881 mt; shellfish, 3,099,099 mt; seaweeds, 738,503 mt and others, 24,484 mt. According to types of feshwater areas, the output in 1995 was: ponds, 6,952,742 mt or 73.9 percent; lakes, 585,300 mt or 6 percent; rivers, 464,370 mt or 4.9 percent; reservoirs, 815,076 mt or 8.6 percent; paddy fields, 272,9442 mt or 2.9 percent; and others, 317,203 mt or 3.4 percent. Marine area output was: shallow waters, 2,265,657 mt or 54.9 percent; gulfs and bays, 304,864 mt or 7.4 percent; and mud flats, 1,552,403 mt or 37.7 percent. Nearly three fourths of freshwater aquaculture output came from pond culture and more than half of the marine aquaculture output came from culture in shallow sea waters. The water areas of the country and per hectare output are shown in Table 4. From 1978 to 1995, aquaculture output increased by a big margin. First of all, the culture areas were expanded. In the 1980s, pond culture developed swiftly and became a major source of output in freshwater aquaculture. From 1978 to 1988, pond culture areas in the provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Anhui were expanded by 433,000 ha. In North-central China, the North-East, and North-West where freshwater aquaculture was underdeveloped, pond culture also rose sharply. Compared with 1978, pond culture areas in the northern regions increased by 156 percent, 190 percent and 229 percent respectively. At the same time, the culture areas of lakes, reservoirs and rivers were also increased. Compared with 1978, the total culture area had increased by 90.7 percent by 1995. Thanks to the improvement of culture technology and management, the per-unit output of aquaculture was greatly increased. On average the per unit yield of freshwater aquaculture rose from 227.5 kg/ha in 1978 to 2,015 kg/ha in 1995, and marine aquaculture increased from 2,571 kg/ha in 1985 to 5,760 kg/ha in 1995. Apart from this, the introduction and transplantation of fine quality species, and the development of net cage culture all played an active role in the development of aquaculture production. A breakthrough in artificial propagation and kelp seedling raising laid the foundation for the rapid development of aquaculture production. In the past, fish culture depended completely upon natural fry collected in the Yangtze and the Pearl River valleys. Harvests were variable and aquaculture production was hampered. In 1958 China was the first to artificially propagate silver and bighead carp with success. In recent years, the artificial propagation of many cultured species, including fish, shrimp, crab, shellfish, algae, etc., has been successfully carried out. This not only guarantees that aquaculture undertakings will develop fast but also accelerates the development of fisheries science and technology. In 1995, the production of freshwater fish fry was 277.9 billion, of which 259.8 billion were produced by artificial propagation, making up 93.5 percent. Artificially propagated river crab fry amounted to 51,948 kg; shrimp fry, 33.3 billion; scallop seeds, 69.5 billion; abalone seeds, 190.4 million; kelp seeds, 8.9 billion; laver seedlings, 154.2 million, etc. The development of aquaculture equipment and facilities such as pumps, aerators, pond diggers, feeding machines and net cages also promoted aquaculture production. 3. Contribution to Food Security 3.1 As food Aquatic products are high in protein and low in fat. They contain amino acids essential to human health. They strengthen the brain, promote longevity, contribute to fitness and improve one's looks. They are of value in dietary balance and are important to children's growth. Studies also show that they help prevent cardiovascular disease and are useful in the prevention and treatment of goitre. An increase of aquatic products leads to more protein intake, which improves nutritional level and physical condition. The fisheries output of 1995 reached 25.11 million mt and played an important role in supplying food, particularly protein. Fish, shrimp, crab, shellfish, etc., contain more protein than meat or eggs. It has been determined that 100 g of hairtail contains 18 g of protein; silver carp, 18.6 g; lean meat, 16.7 g; beef, 17.7 g; mutton, 13.3 g; and an egg, 14.8 g. On average 100 g of fish protein contains 10.6 g of lysine, more than milk, eggs or meat. In recent years, the output of aquatic products has increased greatly and the per-caput consumption rose from 4.4 kg at the end of the 1970s to 20 kg by 1995, equivalent to the world average. At present, one third of the animal food consumed comes from aquatic products. But the animal protein share in the total protein intake in China is still low, only 10 percent; which is below the 17 percent world average. The Government regards the development of fisheries and increasing the supply of aquatic products as one of the most important measures in improving living standard and promoting social and economic development. The important role fisheries plays in food security is obvious, particularly in the periods when there are food shortages. At the beginning of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, in order to overcome the problem of food shortage, the government actively developed fisheries and encouraged people to consume more aquatic products. From 1949 to 1957, fisheries output increased from 450,000 mt to more than 3 million mt, a five-fold increase. This contributed significantly to social stability and economic improvement at that time, and to a certain extent, lightened the pressure on food supply. During the early 1960s, China's economy experienced serious difficulties. Aquatic products played a major role in easing the serious food shortage in urban and rural areas. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shortage of aquatic products in large and medium-sized cities. This was gradually remedied. According to the statistics of eight large cities, not including the suburbs, average per-caput consumption in 1995 was 38.5 kg/year, of which Beijing was 23.0 kg; Tianjin, 27.3 kg; Shanghai, 42.6 kg; Guangzhou, 60.2 kg; Harbin, 11.4 kg; Wuhan, 38.9 kg; Chendu, 21.4 kg; and Fuzhou, 60.5 kg. The differences are significant. In these eight cities, the turnover of aquatic products was 1.24 million mt or 13.37 billion yuan. Of this, the turnover handled by the state-owned enterprises was 207,573 mt or 1.88 billion yuan and by others was 1.03 million mt or 11.49 billion yuan. Open markets handled 833,320 mt or 9.38 billion yuan. This shows that large quantities of aquatic products were directly supplied to markets by producers themselves or vendors. Of the aquaculture production scattered in the vast countryside, a certain amount is consumed by rural people and the rest is sold at open markets. It is becoming the major source of animal protein in the diet. It is worth mentioning that the large-scale construction of fish ponds in cities and suburbs in the 1970s played a major role in solving the "difficulty in buying fish" problem. There is a lot of water surface in urban districts and suburbs which can be used to culture fish. Many cities have excavated ponds in wastelands for this purpose. With subsidies from the State, and three years effort, by the end of 1974, 14,666 ha of stable and high yield ponds had been built in 16 cities. For example, from the winter of 1971 to the spring of 1973, in Wuhan, 805 ha of intensive culture ponds were excavated in low-lying land and on the shores of lakes, while in Harbin, 400 ha of ponds were built from the winter of 1975 to the spring of 1976. According to the statistics of 135 large and medium-sized cities, the area of stable and high-yield fish ponds reached 230,666 ha in 1974, making up 7 percent of the total freshwater aquaculture area at that time. The per-unit yield was higher because the culture conditions in the suburbs were very good. Average yield was 2,490 kg/ha, 2.6 times higher than the national average of the same year. The total output was 125,000 mt, accounting for 12 percent of the total freshwater production of the country. The degree of self-sufficiency in fish supply has increased year by year. Then, with the development of freshwater aquaculture, "commercial fish bases" were set up. The development of fish culture in the suburbs and the setting up of commercial fish bases have proved that developing fisheries is a quick and effective way to increase aquatic products and food security. Animal protein is converted from animal feed. But fish contains fine animal protein with little feed or none at all. Capture fisheries is carried out directly, using the natural resources; in aquaculture, the feed conversion rate is rather high. Generally, 1 kg of fish is produced from 1-3 kg of feed. Shellfish and algae culture consume the least feed. This feed conversion efficiency is higher than those of the animal husbandry and poultry industries. Thus, fisheries has an obvious advantage in reduced feed consumption, and at the same time provides fine quality feed for the poultry industry. Capture fisheries output comes from natural fisheries resources, without providing any feed. Most traditional freshwater culture species are filter-feeder species, such as silver and bighead carp which account for 56 to 65 percent of the total production. The herbivorous species such as grass carp and Chinese bream, amount to 20 percent. The omnivorous species such as common carp, mud carp, crucian carp and tilapia make up 12 to 21 percent. The carnivorous species such as black carp and crustaceans make up only about 7 to 8 percent. On the whole, the food chain of the majority of cultured species is comparatively short. The fish are mainly dependent upon natural feeds. Such is also the case with algae and shellfish culture. Even though some cultured species need a certain amount of feed, the conversion rate is high. In short, capture fisheries contributes a lot but demands little, so in terms of food security, it has advantages. China is famous for its integrated fish farming. Fish farmers develop and utilize their local water bodies and land resources and form a circle of the whole production procedure so as to gain maximum economic benefits. An example of fish-cum-feeds is raising fish in ponds and planting sorghum sudeness, lolium pereme and soybeans on the pond dikes to provide green-feed for fish. Other integrated systems are fish-cum-pig-cum-grain-cum-grass, fish-cum-livestock-cum-fowl, fish-cum-fruit-cum-herbs-cum-vegetables and even fish-cum-small fish processing industries. As a result, while developing aquaculture, other kinds of food are produced. 3.2 As Income/Employment According to the fixed price of 1990, the total fisheries output value of 1995 was 111.15 billion yuan or according to the present price it was 174.37 billion yuan. The proportion of fisheries in the total agricultural output in value was 0.2 percent in 1949, 1.9 percent in 1959, 1.7 percent in 1969 and 1.5 percent in 1979. In 1989 it reached 3.4 percent and in 1995, 8.5 percent. Though the proportion is not very high, the growth rate is the fastest of any agriculture sector. The volume of exported aquatic products and values from 1985 to 1994 are shown in Table 2. During this period, the export volume went up from 124 thousand mt to 684 thousand mt, an increase of 426.4 percent. The value also rose from US$ 271.64 million to US$ 2,606.99 million, an increase of 859.7 percent. By the end of 1995, the export volume had further grown to 740,000 mt, and the value had risen to US$ 3.29 billion, an increase of about 60,000 mt and US$ 6.8 million respectively compared with 1994. The major exports in 1994 are listed in Table 5. China also imports aquatic products. From 1985 to 1994, the import volume and values are shown in Table 2. In 1985, the import volume was 329,000 mt, worth US$ 91.47 million; in 1994, the volume and value were 1.26 million mt and US$ 868 million respectively. In 1995, the volume rose to 1.34 million mt with the value being US$ 960 million, 70,000 mt and US$ 90 million over the previous year. The major imported fisheries products are listed in Table 6. The volume of imports is high, but imported fish meal formed a large proportion, and the sum of the imports is far lower than that of exports. Thus China has had a favourable balance of trade in fish and fishery products for many years. The development of fisheries creates job opportunities on an extensive scale and increases personal income. The proportion of the Chinese agricultural population was 85 percent of its total in 1970, 83 percent in 1980 and 80 percent in 1984. Along with the development of the national economy and science and technology, the proportion will go down. This is an inevitable tendency of social development. Alongside the reform of the agricultural economic system, more and more agricultural labourers will leave the land. The development of aquaculture is no doubt an effective way to absorb these labourers. Fisheries and related occupations are an important source of livelihood in the rural areas of the country. In 1995 there were 11,428,655 million labourers engaged in fisheries production, of whom 5,071,940 were full-time labourers (capture fisheries, 1,672,822; aquaculture, 2,869,493; service logistics, 529,625), and 6,356,715 part-time labourers (the period for fisheries production is less than 3 months per a year). There were 300,000 people employed by 3,133 state-owned fisheries enterprises. The increase of fisheries labourers from 1978 to 1995 is shown in Table 7. In fact, in 1995, fisheries labourers increased by 9,027,447 over the 2,401,208 in 1978, a rise of 375.9 percent. Of them, more than 7 million were engaged in aquaculture. It is the input of large numbers of labourers that has ensured sustained production. With the development of fisheries, services before and after production develop simultaneously. These include building fishing boats and facilities; and manufacturing fishing nets, freezing and processing equipment, transportation tools, farm machinery, etc. This phenomenon is quite obvious in those areas where people are mainly engaged in fisheries; in these areas if fisheries is growing prosperously, other related industries also flourish. The economy in the whole area is vigorous. The higher income of fisheries labourers is important in attracting many rural labourers to take part in fisheries activities. According to investigations made in different parts of the country, from 1978 to 1995, the average annual net income of all workers increased from 93 yuan to 3,545 yuan while each fisheries labourer's average annual net income increased from 269 yuan to 7,147 yuan. The increment of income involves the enhancement of labour productivity, but in 1995, on average, each fisheries labourer's output was 2.2 mt compared with 1.93 mt in 1978, an increase of only 14 percent. It is clear that income increased by a wide margin because prices of aquatic products went up. The prices of aquatic products are much higher than those of agricultural products and therefore a fisheries labourer's income is higher than that of other agricultural labourers.

<h4>Fish are key to Chinese food security – empirically lifts people out of famine and contributes to social stability</h4><p><strong>Zhiwen 2k</strong> (Song Zhiwen. Published in the food and agriculture organization of the united nations, by the FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. “The Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security in China” http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6956e/x6956e06.htm December 2000 we don’t endorse gendered language)//masonw</p><p><u>2. Fisheries Sector </u>2.1 Present Situation in Relation to Other Sectors <u>During the period from 1949 to 1957, Chinese fisheries was restored and began to develop. In 1949, the total fisheries production was 447,927 mt. After three years of hard work, at the end of 1952, the total output was 1.66 million mt, which exceeded the highest output of the past.</u> In the course of the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), fisheries production increased at an average annual rate of 13.3 percent and in 1957 rose to 3.11 million mt. But at the end of the second Five-Year Plan, it dropped to 2.28 million mt. In the three-year readjustment period (1963-1965), fisheries production went up again at an average annual increase of 9.3 percent. <u>In the following three Five-Year Plans (1966-1980), the yearly production increased at an average rate of 1.3 percent, 6.7 percent, and 0.4 percent respectively. During the 25 years from 1953 to 1978, the total production of fisheries increased by 2.75 million mt, only an average increase of 110,000 mt/year (Table 1). In 1978, reform started and the government placed unprecedented emphasis on economic development and modernization of the country. Fisheries grew rapidly again</u>. In 1988, China became the third country in the world whose yearly fisheries production was over 10 million mt; then from 1990 on, China's yearly fisheries production ranked first in the world. In 1994, fisheries production was 20 million mt, and in 1995 it reached 25.17 million mt, contributing about one fifth of the world total. The past ten years have been the fastest growing period, with an annual increase of 51.4 percent, much higher than the world average. <u>The economic reforms in fisheries, begun in 1978 included: the introduction and implementation of a production responsibility system with the household or boat as the basic accounting unit; the change of the fisheries operational system to allow private/individual fisheries and fish farming operations; the shift of fisheries trade from being a completely government controlled system to a free market system; and the gradual relaxation of price controls for all aquatic products.</u> These changes in the management and production systems are considered the most successful and thorough reforms in the process of fisheries economic reforms. In 1995, <u>there were 407 fisheries townships, 6,690 fisheries villages, 3,834,729 fisheries households, 16,827,473 full-time fishermyn and 11,428,655 part-time labourers. Fisheries</u> households, full-time fishermyn and part-time labourers accounted for 1.64 percent, 1.96 percent and 2.53 percent of the total agricultural households, full-time and part-time labourers respectively. These fishermyn produced 23.07 million mt, or 91.7 percent of the total fisheries production of the country. The state-owned fisheries enterprises produced 2.07 million mt, only 8.3 percent of the total production, with a work force of 293,985. <u>The production of state-owned fisheries enterprises, though comparatively small, is beneficial to market allocation and supply and is therefore still an important part of fisheries production. During the past ten years, the number of Chinese fisheries labourers has greatly increased. There is no land conflict between fisheries and agriculture and no grassland conflict between fisheries and animal husbandry</u>. <u><mark>When China develops </mark>her <mark>fisheries, the national revenue increases </mark>with funds for national development.</u> Compared with agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, the average yearly growth rate of the value of fisheries is the highest. The proportion of the total fisheries output value to the total agriculture output value is rising each year. In 1949, it was only 0.2 percent. By the end of 1978, it had gone up to 1.6 percent. In 1995, it was 8.5 percent. The export of aquatic products is important in earning foreign exchange and promoting international trade, particularly with other developing countries. Some aquatic products have high export value, and the cost is lower than that of many other agricultural products for export. According to the customs statistics of 1995, the total amount of aquatic products imported and exported reached 2.08 million mt and the total value was US$ 4.25 billion. Exports amounted to 740,000 mt with a value of US$ 3.29 billion and the volume of imports was 1.34 million mt with a value of US$ 0.96 billion. The <u>fisheries import and export value was 1.52 percent of the total national foreign trade. The volume and value of exported and imported fisheries products from 1978 to 1995 is shown in Table 2.</u> In 1995, the per-caput net income of peasants was 1,578 yuan while that of fishermyn was 3,352 yuan, more than 100 percent higher than that of peasants. The development of fisheries not only creates many job opportunities but increases income. <u>The development of Chinese fisheries, particularly the development of aquaculture, has created employment opportunities and promoted the adjustment of the rural industrial structure and the comprehensive development and utilization of land resources.</u> Now the Chinese fisheries is a comparatively integrated industrial system composed of aquaculture, capture fisheries, processing, marketing, boat building and machinery industries, fisheries science and technology, fisheries administration, <u>etc. This <mark>system has played an important role in <strong>accelerating the development of the national economy</u></strong></mark>, especially by stimulating the rural economy and improving the economic structures and living standard. 2.2 Marine Capture Fisheries <u>Marine capture fisheries is a major part of fisheries production</u>. In 1949, the output of marine capture fisheries was 342,927 mt, or 76.5 percent of the total fisheries output. In recent years, owing to the speedy development of marine and freshwater aquaculture and the growth of freshwater capture fisheries, the proportion of marine capture fisheries has been going down steadily. In 1995, <u>the output of marine capture fisheries reached 10,268,373 mt, still ranking first in total output, but the proportion went down to 40.8 percent</u>. As mentioned earlier, <u>China borders four seas which cover a total area of 4.7 million km</u>2: the Bohai 77,000 km2; Huanghai or Yellow 380,000 km2; East China 770,000 km2 and the South China 3.5 million km2. The continental shelf within an isobath of 200 m, covers about 1.5 million km2. In 1995, <u>91.7 percent of the output of marine capture fisheries came from the four sea areas</u>. The total output was 9,416,001 mt (the Bohai 954,020 mt; the Huanghai or Yellow 1,706,250 mt; the East China 4,378,364 mt and the South China 2,377,387 mt), of which 6,458,959 mt came from coastal and inshore areas within a water depth of less than 80 m. The output from distant fisheries was only 852,372 mt, or <u>8.3 percent of the total output</u>. Along the coastal zone, thousands of rivers discharge into the seas, bringing large quantities of nutritive substances which support the fish populations. There are 1,500 species of fish along the coast, of which over 200 are of economic value and are fished commercially. The fish composition in different sea areas varies greatly because of a great disparity in environment. In terms of biomass, warm water species make up more than two thirds of the output. In 1995 there were 273,978 marine motorized boats and about 40,000 non-powered boats. Of these, 2,928 were state-owned. Over 80 percent of the motorized boats had a power of less than 44 HP and 18.4 percent, 45-440 HP. Less than 0.6 percent had more than 440 HP. There were 1.1 million full-time fishermyn and a number of part-time labourers with an output of 9,292,494 mt, while 47 state-owned enterprises with a labour force of more than 47,000 produced 975,879 mt, only 9.5 percent of the total marine capture output. The marine capture fisheries output consisted of: fish, 7,436,035 mt, or 72.5 percent; crustaceans, 1,732,115 mt or 16.8 percent; shellfish, 827,979 mt or 8.1 percent; algae, 10,637 mt or 0.1 percent and others, 261,607 mt (including jellyfish, 171,905 mt) or 2.5 percent. Fish exceeding 100,000 mt were hairtail, round scad, anchovy, chub mackerel, mackerel, red coat, pomfret, conger pike, small yellow croaker, and filefish. The output of crustaceans included northern mauxia shrimp, swimming crab, southern rough shrimp and prawns. The output of shellfish included cuttle fish (Table 3). In the order of the amount of production, the different types of fishing operations were: trawlers 5,357,999 mt, or 52.2 percent; set-nets 1,927,813 mt, or 18.7 percent; gill and drift nets 1,263,800 mt, or 12.3 percent; purse seines 552,513 mt, or 5.4 percent; lines and hooks 341,314 mt, or 33.3 percent; and miscellaneous fishing gear 824,934 mt, or 8.1 percent. During the 1950s, marine fisheries resources were developed and exploited. In the 1960s, inshore resources were fully developed and utilized. In the 1970s, motorized fishing boats increased in number and inshore resources were overfished, with fishing intensity exceeding fish recruitment. Big and small yellow croaker became nearly extinct in the Bohai and Huanghai seas. The proportion of valuable fish species became lower in all sea areas, and fish size, smaller. The per unit output of motorized fishing boats, in terms of engine power, went down. In the early 1970s, output stayed at more than 1 mt/HP; but by the end of the 1970s it was less than 0.6 mt/HP. In spite of the fact that in that period, the capture of off-shore pelagic fish progressed steadily, at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, the total output decreased. After 1985, thanks to the measures of strengthening fisheries administration and management as well as development of stocking, marine capture output went up once again. But at the same time, the number of fishing boats increased by 141,193, or 106.3 percent in ten years. At present, the declining trend of inshore fisheries resources has not been effectively managed. The problem of the increasing number of fishing boats and the destruction of fisheries resources in the coastal areas continues. 2.3 Inland Capture <u>Fisheries China is rich in inland waters. According to statistics issued by the fisheries department in 1984, inland waters cover an area of 17.6 million ha, or nearly one fiftiet</u>h of the land area; ponds cover 1.92 million ha, or 7.2 percent; lakes, 7.53 million ha, or 42.1 percent; rivers, 5.28 million ha, or 39 percent; reservoirs, 2.30 million ha, or 11.7 percent. In these waters, the conditions for developing freshwater fisheries are good. <u>The freshwater areas abound in fishery resources</u>. There are more than 800 freshwater species in the country, and about 60 or so are migrant species. In recent years, more than 30 species have been introduced from abroad. Carps make up about 50 to 60 percent of the total. Most of the high-value species are warm water fishes; cold water species are found in the northern areas. Freshwater capture is the oldest method of fisheries production. At the beginning of the new China, freshwater fisheries became a focal point and developed swiftly. In 1950, the freshwater fisheries output was 365,960 mt, of which capture output was 300,000 mt, or 82 percent, and about one third of the total fisheries output. At the end of 1960, the freshwater capture output reached 668,523 mt, an increase of 1.23 times in ten years. But because the freshwater aquaculture output of the same period increased, the proportion of freshwater capture decreased to 57.2 percent of the freshwater fisheries output. After 1960, not only did the proportion decrease but the absolute yield of freshwater capture went down as well, owing to a severe decline in the natural resources. The annual yield in the 1950s was 524,000 mt; it fell to 451,000 mt in the 1960s and declined further to 316,000 mt in the 1970s. In 1978 the yield was only 296,441 mt, the lowest level in thirty years. In the first five years of the 1980s, the yield went up slightly, but was still far from the highest level of 1960. By 1988, the yield of freshwater capture fisheries had been restored and in 1995, it reached 1,372,864 mt. Compared with 1988, it had increased by more than 100 percent, but the proportion in freshwater fisheries was only 12.7 percent, or less than 5.5 percent of the total fisheries output. In the 1950s freshwater capture output increased by a big margin. It was mainly because the number of fishing boats, nets and labourers grew, fishing areas were expanded and new ones developed. For example, in 1950 the number of fishing boats was 153,000, and in 1959 there were 311,000. In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the fishing areas increased by more than 30 percent from 1958 to 1960. Qinghai Lake, Eling Lake, etc., the highest and biggest lakes in the world, located on Qing-Tibetan plateau, were virgin lakes which remained unnoticed for thousands of years but are now developed and utilized. In the 1960s and 1970s the yield of freshwater capture fisheries continued to decline for a number of reasons, but the most important was that the ecological balance had been destroyed, resulting in a serious decline in natural fisheries resources. For example, with the rapid development of water conservancy and hydroelectric power generation, a large number of culverts, sluice gates, dykes and dams played an important role in industrial and agricultural production, flood control and drought resistance, but most of them were not equipped with appropriate fishways. The passage of migrating fishes and crabs was blocked. Thus parent fishes and crabs could not migrate to spawning grounds and the juvenile fishes and crabs could not swim into lakes to grow. The most affected were the anadromous fishes such as silver carp, black carp, grass carp, bighead carp, hilsa herring, river eel and river crab. In these affected water bodies, not only did the yield decline, but the fish fauna, population structure, and age composition changed a great deal. The stretch of the Yangtze River in Hubei Province is the main producing ground for fry. During 1958-1980 the fry yield decreased from 1,143 billion to 239.6 billion, a decline of 80 percent. Land reclamation plays a direct role in reducing water areas used for freshwater capture. In the 1960s the decline in freshwater capture was directly related to large-scale land reclamation during this period. The reclaimed lake areas in the four provinces of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui exceeded one million ha. Reclamation not only reduced the water areas, but also destroyed spawning and feeding grounds. Before 1976, the reclaimed water surface in Poyang Lake averaged 5,500 ha/year, most of it being spawning grounds for common carp and crucian carp. It is known that in the 1960s there were 55 spawning grounds in the southern part of the lake, but in the 1970s the number had decreased to 33, and later only 14 were left. Thus the ecological balance in the lake as a whole was severely damaged. Moreover, some of the natural water bodies used for capture fisheries were converted into culture areas, thus narrowing capture fishing grounds and reducing yield. To account for the serious decline in freshwater capture output, in the late 1970s, many provinces pursued large-scale investigations, and found the main causes for the decline. With great effort from various quarters, appropriate measures were taken to improve the ecological environment in the lakes and apart from that, artificial propagation and stocking programmes were adopted. Therefore from 1979 on, the situation took a favourable turn. The output has steadily on the increase. In 1995, 573,368 full-time fishermyn engaged in freshwater capture fisheries and part-time fishermyn may have far exceeded that number. There were over 500,000 fishing boats, but the majority were small and non-motorized. The motorized boats, on the average, only had about 10 HP each. Only a few big boats operated in large lakes and reservoirs; the rest were small, widely scattered, and moved here and there, with low production. This is a distinguishing feature of China's freshwater capture fisheries. 2.4 Aquaculture For quite a long time aquaculture did not receive enough attention. As a result, it developed slowly. In 1949 the national aquaculture output was about 20,000 mt, of which 15,000 mt were from freshwater and 5,000 mt were from marine aquaculture, amounting to only 4.5 percent of total fisheries output. Though output had reached 22.7 percent of the total fisheries output by 1958, there was little change in the proportion in the following 20 years. The proportions were 23.2 percent in 1968, and 26.0 percent in 1978. Since 1978, aquaculture has developed rapidly. Output rose from 1.2 million mt in 1978 to 5.32 million mt in 1988, a net increase of 4.11 million mt and yearly growth rate as high as 16 percent. Marine aquaculture output was 1.425 million mt and freshwater output, 3.89 million mt, or an average annual growth rate of 12.3 percent and 17.7 percent respectively. During the same period, capture fisheries output went up from 3.44 million mt to 5.28 million mt, an average annual growth rate of only 4.4 percent. This led to a radical change in the Chinese fisheries production structure. In 1988, aquaculture output exceeded capture output for the first time, making up 50.2 percent of the total fisheries output. In the years from 1978 to 1988, 70 percent of the increased output came from aquaculture. By the end of 1995, aquaculture output had reached 13,530,557 mt, accounting for 53.7 percent of the total fisheries output, of which marine aquaculture output was 4,122,924 mt and freshwater output, 9,407,633 mt, increases of 189.4 percent and 141.3 percent respectively over 1988. Aquaculture has become the fastest growing sector of fisheries. In 1995, the nation-wide areas for aquaculture reached 5,385,090 ha, of which the freshwater aquaculture areas were 4,669,340 ha (ponds, 1,857,810 ha; lakes, 824,330 ha; reservoirs, 1,515,620 ha; rivers, 3,447,330 ha and others, 124,250 ha), and marine aquaculture areas were 715,750 ha. The number of full-time fishermyn engaged in aquaculture was 2,869,493 (freshwater, 2,470,778; marine 398,715). There were also a large number of part-time fishermyn engaged in aquaculture activities. The freshwater aquaculture output of major species in 1995 was: silver and bighead carp, 3,713,271 mt; grass carp, 2,070,988 mt; common carp, 1,398,618 mt; crucian carp, 533,740 mt; breams 335,934 mt; tilapia, 314,093 mt; black carp, 102,557 mt; freshwater prawn, 25,711 mt; river crabs, 41,515 mt; soft shell turtles, 17,445 mt; etc. The marine aquaculture output included: finfish, 144,957 mt; crustaceans, 115,881 mt; shellfish, 3,099,099 mt; seaweeds, 738,503 mt and others, 24,484 mt. According to types of feshwater areas, the output in 1995 was: ponds, 6,952,742 mt or 73.9 percent; lakes, 585,300 mt or 6 percent; rivers, 464,370 mt or 4.9 percent; reservoirs, 815,076 mt or 8.6 percent; paddy fields, 272,9442 mt or 2.9 percent; and others, 317,203 mt or 3.4 percent. Marine area output was: shallow waters, 2,265,657 mt or 54.9 percent; gulfs and bays, 304,864 mt or 7.4 percent; and mud flats, 1,552,403 mt or 37.7 percent. Nearly three fourths of freshwater aquaculture output came from pond culture and more than half of the marine aquaculture output came from culture in shallow sea waters. The water areas of the country and per hectare output are shown in Table 4. From 1978 to 1995, aquaculture output increased by a big margin. First of all, the culture areas were expanded. In the 1980s, pond culture developed swiftly and became a major source of output in freshwater aquaculture. From 1978 to 1988, pond culture areas in the provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Anhui were expanded by 433,000 ha. In North-central China, the North-East, and North-West where freshwater aquaculture was underdeveloped, pond culture also rose sharply. Compared with 1978, pond culture areas in the northern regions increased by 156 percent, 190 percent and 229 percent respectively. At the same time, the culture areas of lakes, reservoirs and rivers were also increased. Compared with 1978, the total culture area had increased by 90.7 percent by 1995. Thanks to the improvement of culture technology and management, the per-unit output of aquaculture was greatly increased. On average the per unit yield of freshwater aquaculture rose from 227.5 kg/ha in 1978 to 2,015 kg/ha in 1995, and marine aquaculture increased from 2,571 kg/ha in 1985 to 5,760 kg/ha in 1995. Apart from this, the introduction and transplantation of fine quality species, and the development of net cage culture all played an active role in the development of aquaculture production. A breakthrough in artificial propagation and kelp seedling raising laid the foundation for the rapid development of aquaculture production. In the past, fish culture depended completely upon natural fry collected in the Yangtze and the Pearl River valleys. Harvests were variable and aquaculture production was hampered. In 1958 China was the first to artificially propagate silver and bighead carp with success. In recent years, the artificial propagation of many cultured species, including fish, shrimp, crab, shellfish, algae, etc., has been successfully carried out. This not only guarantees that aquaculture undertakings will develop fast but also accelerates the development of fisheries science and technology. In 1995, the production of freshwater fish fry was 277.9 billion, of which 259.8 billion were produced by artificial propagation, making up 93.5 percent. Artificially propagated river crab fry amounted to 51,948 kg; shrimp fry, 33.3 billion; scallop seeds, 69.5 billion; abalone seeds, 190.4 million; kelp seeds, 8.9 billion; laver seedlings, 154.2 million, etc. The development of aquaculture equipment and facilities such as pumps, aerators, pond diggers, feeding machines and net cages also promoted aquaculture production. <u>3. Contribution to Food Security </u>3.1 As food <u>Aquatic products are high in protein and low in fat. They contain amino acids essential to human health. They strengthen the brain, promote longevity, contribute to fitness and improve one's looks. They are of value in dietary balance and are important to children's growth</u>. Studies also show that they help prevent cardiovascular disease and are useful in the prevention and treatment of goitre. An increase of aquatic products leads to more protein intake, which improves nutritional level and physical condition. The <u>fisheries output of 1995 reached 25.11 million mt and played an important role in supplying food, particularly protein</u>. Fish, shrimp, crab, shellfish, etc., contain more protein than meat or eggs. It has been determined that 100 g of hairtail contains 18 g of protein; silver carp, 18.6 g; lean meat, 16.7 g; beef, 17.7 g; mutton, 13.3 g; and an egg, 14.8 g<u>. On average 100 g of fish protein contains 10.6 g of lysine, more than milk, eggs or meat. In recent years, the output of aquatic products has increased greatly and the per-caput consumption rose from 4.4 kg at the end of the 1970s to 20 kg by 1995, equivalent to the world average. At present, one third of the animal food consumed comes from aquatic products</u>. But the animal protein share in the total protein intake in China is still low, only 10 percent; which is below the 17 percent world average<u>. <strong><mark>The Government</strong></mark> <mark>regards the development of fisheries</mark> and increasing the supply of aquatic products <strong><mark>as one of the most important measures in improving living standard and promoting social and economic development. The </mark>important <mark>role fisheries plays in food security is obvious</strong>, particularly in the periods when there are food shortages</mark>.</u> At the <u>beginning of the establishment of the People's Republic of China<mark>, in order to <strong>overcome the problem of food shortage</strong>, the government actively developed fisheries and encouraged people to consume more aquatic products</mark>. <mark>From 1949 to 1957, fisheries output increased</mark> from 450,000 mt to more than 3 million mt, a five-fold increase. <strong><mark>This contributed significantly to social stability</strong></mark> and economic improvement at that time, <mark>and</mark> to a certain extent, <strong><mark>lightened the pressure on food supply</strong></mark>. During the early 1960s, China's economy experienced serious difficulties. Aquatic products played a major role in easing the serious food shortage in urban and rural areas. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shortage of aquatic products in large and medium-sized cities. This was gradually remedied. According to the statistics of eight large cities, not including the suburbs, average per-caput consumption in 1995 was 38.5 kg/year, of which Beijing was 23.0 kg; Tianjin, 27.3 kg; Shanghai, 42.6 kg; Guangzhou, 60.2 kg; Harbin, 11.4 kg; Wuhan, 38.9 kg; Chendu, 21.4 kg; and Fuzhou, 60.5 kg. The differences are significant. In these eight cities, the turnover of aquatic products was 1.24 million mt or 13.37 billion yuan</u>. Of this, the turnover handled by the state-owned enterprises was 207,573 mt or 1.88 billion yuan and by others was 1.03 million mt or 11.49 billion yuan. Open markets handled 833,320 mt or 9.38 billion yuan. This shows that large quantities of aquatic products were directly supplied to markets by producers themselves or vendors. Of the aquaculture production scattered in the vast countryside, a certain amount is consumed by rural people and the rest is sold at open markets. It is becoming the major source of animal protein in the diet. It is worth mentioning that <u>the large-scale construction of fish ponds in cities and suburbs in the 1970s played a major role in solving the "difficulty in buying fish" problem. </u>There is a lot of water surface in urban districts and suburbs which can be used to culture fish. Many cities have excavated ponds in wastelands for this purpose. With subsidies from the State, and three years effort, by the end of 1974, 14,666 ha of stable and high yield ponds had been built in 16 cities. For example, from the winter of 1971 to the spring of 1973, in Wuhan, 805 ha of intensive culture ponds were excavated in low-lying land and on the shores of lakes, while in Harbin, 400 ha of ponds were built from the winter of 1975 to the spring of 1976. According to the statistics of 135 large and medium-sized cities, the area of stable and high-yield fish ponds reached 230,666 ha in 1974, making up 7 percent of the total freshwater aquaculture area at that time. The per-unit yield was higher because the culture conditions in the suburbs were very good. Average yield was 2,490 kg/ha, 2.6 times higher than the national average of the same year. The total output was 125,000 mt, accounting for 12 percent of the total freshwater production of the country. The degree of self-sufficiency in fish supply has increased year by year. Then, with the development of freshwater aquaculture, "commercial fish bases" were set up. The development of fish culture in the suburbs and the setting up of commercial fish bases have proved that developing fisheries is a quick and effective way to increase aquatic products and food security. Animal protein is converted from animal feed. But fish contains fine animal protein with little feed or none at all. Capture fisheries is carried out directly, using the natural resources; in aquaculture, the feed conversion rate is rather high. Generally, 1 kg of fish is produced from 1-3 kg of feed. Shellfish and algae culture consume the least feed. This feed conversion efficiency is higher than those of the animal husbandry and poultry industries. Thus, fisheries has an obvious advantage in reduced feed consumption, and at the same time provides fine quality feed for the poultry industry. Capture fisheries output comes from natural fisheries resources, without providing any feed. Most traditional freshwater culture species are filter-feeder species, such as silver and bighead carp which account for 56 to 65 percent of the total production. The herbivorous species such as grass carp and Chinese bream, amount to 20 percent. The omnivorous species such as common carp, mud carp, crucian carp and tilapia make up 12 to 21 percent. The carnivorous species such as black carp and crustaceans make up only about 7 to 8 percent. On the whole, the food chain of the majority of cultured species is comparatively short. The fish are mainly dependent upon natural feeds. Such is also the case with algae and shellfish culture. Even though some cultured species need a certain amount of feed, the conversion rate is high. In short, capture fisheries contributes a lot but demands little, so in terms of food security, it has advantages. <u>China is famous for its integrated fish farming. Fish farmers develop and utilize their local water bodies and land resources and form a circle of the whole production procedure so as to gain maximum economic benefits</u>. An example of fish-cum-feeds is raising fish in ponds and planting sorghum sudeness, lolium pereme and soybeans on the pond dikes to provide green-feed for fish. Other integrated systems are fish-cum-pig-cum-grain-cum-grass, fish-cum-livestock-cum-fowl, fish-cum-fruit-cum-herbs-cum-vegetables and even fish-cum-small fish processing industries. As a result, while developing aquaculture, other kinds of food are produced. 3.<u>2 As Income/Employment</u> According to the fixed price of 1990, the total fisheries output value of 1995 was 111.15 billion yuan or according to the present price it was 174.37 billion yuan. The proportion of fisheries in the total agricultural output in value was 0.2 percent in 1949, 1.9 percent in 1959, 1.7 percent in 1969 and 1.5 percent in 1979. In 1989 it reached 3.4 percent and in 1995, 8.5 percent. Though the proportion is not very high, the growth rate is the fastest of any agriculture sector. <u>The volume of exported aquatic products and values from 1985 to 1994 are shown in Table 2. During this period, the export volume went up from 124 thousand mt to 684 thousand mt, an increase of 426.4 percent.</u> The value also rose from US$ 271.64 million to US$ 2,606.99 million, an increase of 859.7 percent. By the end of 1995, the export volume had further grown to 740,000 mt, and the value had risen to US$ 3.29 billion, an increase of about 60,000 mt and US$ 6.8 million respectively compared with 1994. The major exports in 1994 are listed in Table 5. <u>China also imports aquatic products</u>. From 1985 to 1994, the import volume and values are shown in Table 2. In 1985, the import volume was 329,000 mt, worth US$ 91.47 million; in 1994, the volume and value were 1.26 million mt and US$ 868 million respectively. In 1995, the volume rose to 1.34 million mt with the value being US$ 960 million, 70,000 mt and US$ 90 million over the previous year. The major imported fisheries products are listed in Table 6. The volume of imports is high, but imported fish meal formed a large proportion, and the sum of the imports is far lower than that of exports. Thus China has had a favourable balance of trade in fish and fishery products for many years. <u>The development of fisheries creates job opportunities on an extensive scale and increases personal income</u>. <u>The proportion of the Chinese agricultural population was 85 percent of its total in 1970, 83 percent in 1980 and 80 percent in 1984. Along</u> with the development of the national economy and science and technology, the proportion will go down. This is an inevitable tendency of social development. Alongside the reform of the agricultural economic system, more and more agricultural labourers will leave the land. The development of aquaculture is no doubt an effective way to absorb these labourers. <u><strong><mark>Fisheries and related occupations are an important source of livelihood </mark>in the rural areas of the country.</u></strong> <u>In 1995 there were 11,428,655 million labourers engaged in fisheries production</u>, of <u>whom 5,071,940 were full-time labourers (capture fisheries, 1,672,822; aquaculture, 2,869,493; service logistics, 529,625), and 6,356,715 part-time labourers</u> (the period for fisheries production is less than 3 months per a year). There were 300,000 people employed by 3,133 state-owned fisheries enterprises. <u>The increase of fisheries labourers from 1978 to 1995 is shown in Table 7. In fact, in 1995, fisheries labourers increased by 9,027,447 over the 2,401,208 in 1978, a rise of 375.9 percent. Of them, more than 7 million were engaged in aquaculture. It is the input of large numbers of labourers that has ensured sustained production. </u>With the development of fisheries, <u>services before and after production develop simultaneously. These include building fishing boats and facilities; and manufacturing fishing nets, freezing and processing equipment, transportation tools, farm machinery, etc. This phenomenon is quite obvious in those areas where people are mainly engaged in fisheries; in these areas if fisheries is growing prosperously, other related industries also flourish. The economy in the whole area is vigorous. The</u> <u>higher income of fisheries labourers is important in attracting many rural labourers to take part in fisheries activities</u>. According to investigations made in different parts of the country, from 1978 to 1995, the average annual net income of all workers increased from 93 yuan to 3,545 yuan while each fisheries labourer's average annual net income increased from 269 yuan to 7,147 yuan. The increment of income involves the enhancement of labour productivity, but in 1995, on average, each fisheries labourer's output was 2.2 mt compared with 1.93 mt in 1978, an increase of only 14 percent. It is clear that income increased by a wide margin because prices of aquatic products went up. The prices of aquatic products are much higher than those of agricultural products and therefore a fisheries labourer's income is higher than that of other agricultural labourers.</p>

Advantage one is oceans

./documents/hspolicy16/IowaCityWest/WaJa/Iowa%20City%20West-Wang-Jain-Aff-Emory-Round1.docx

A

Emory

1

MBA RK

Kevin McCaffrey

1ac - this one 1nc - T-qpq T-crocker Antarctica CP ASEAN CP Appeasement CCP Collapse good 2nr - appeasement ASEAN CP

hspolicy16/IowaCityWest/WaJa/Iowa%20City%20West-Wang-Jain-Aff-Emory-Round1.docx

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HS Policy 2016-17

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hs

Food is the single most important issue for ccp stability --- all previous collapses are linked to it

Zhang 13

Hongzhou Zhang 13 - Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.(“Food in China's international relations”; December; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263182950_Food_in_China%27s_international_relations)//pk

food is the paramount necessity of the people In thousands years of history of China, rises and falls of the dynasties are closely linked Therefore understandably a regime’s political support and legitimacy derives from its contribution to the food security of the people Mao declared that ‘not even one person shall die of hunger’. And the Chinese communist party considers providing enough food for the people as one crucial means to win political support famine food was in short supply The Chinese authorities faced serious political legitimacy crisis. To restore its political Thus, for the Chinese authorities, the ‘food problem’ is of huge political importance. self-sufficiency is a matter of national pride and it has profound impacts on the Communist Party’s political legitimacy

food is the paramount necessity of the people. In thousands years of history of China, rises falls of the dynasties are closely linked understandably, a regime’s political support derives from its contribution to the food security Mao declared that ‘not one person shall die of hunger’ the Chinese communist party considers providing enough food as crucial to win political support food was in short supply The Chinese authorities faced political legitimacy crisis self-sufficiency is a matter of national pride and has profound impacts on the Communist Party’s political legitimacy

Secondly, grain self-sufficiency matters for political legitimacy. As an old Chinese saying goes, food is the paramount necessity of the people. In thousands years of history of China, rises and falls of the dynasties are closely linked to the production of grain, and the traditional Chinese worldview made the ruler responsible for producing enough grains for his people and providing relief aid in the event of famine. These rulers who ignored this responsibility would face losing the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, or the right to govern (Manning and Wemheuer 2011). Therefore, understandably, a regime’s political support and legitimacy derives from its contribution to the food security of the people. When Chinese communist party took over the rein in 1949, Mao Zedong declared that ‘not even one person shall die of hunger’. And the Chinese communist party considers providing enough food for the people as one crucial means to win political support. However, despite Mao’s vow and the authority’s efforts to build an open government system to address China’s food problems, hunger was endemic and the fail of Great Leap Forward had led to the 1959–1961 famine, which was recognized as the worst in human history and killed around 30 million Chinese. In 1978, after the 10-years Cultural Revolution, the communist ideology lost its charm. Moreover, Chinese economy was on the blink of collapse and food was in short supply; the majority of the Chinese did not have enough to eat and 250 million out of 800 million rural residents were impoverished (Du 2006). The Chinese authorities faced serious political legitimacy crisis. To restore its political legitimacy, Chinese authorities started to undertake agricultural reforms to boost the grain production and feed its hungry population. With the introduction of Household Responsibility Systems and government supports, China’s grain production, together with the productions of other food products, experienced phenomenal growth; since 1995 China has achieved self-sufficiency in grain and enjoyed grain surplus in following years. In 2001, the then premier Zhu Rongji claimed that for the first time ever in Chinese history, the Chinese Communist Party had succeeded in solving China’s food problem, once for all.2 This success has been portrayed by the Chinese government as a miracle, and presented as strong evidence that only the communist party could save China. Thus, for the Chinese authorities, the ‘food problem’ is of huge political importance. Grain self-sufficiency is a matter of national pride and it has profound impacts on the Communist Party’s political legitimacy

<h4>Food is the single most important issue for ccp stability --- all previous collapses are linked to it</h4><p>Hongzhou <strong>Zhang 13</strong> - Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.(“Food in China's international relations”; December; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263182950_Food_in_China%27s_international_relations)//pk</p><p>Secondly, grain self-sufficiency matters for political legitimacy. As an old Chinese saying goes, <u><strong><mark>food is the paramount necessity of the people</u></strong>. <u>In thousands years of history of China, rises </mark>and <strong><mark>falls</strong></mark> <mark>of the dynasties are</mark> <strong><mark>closely linked</strong> </u></mark>to the production of grain, and the traditional Chinese worldview made the ruler responsible for producing enough grains for his people and providing relief aid in the event of famine. These rulers who ignored this responsibility would face losing the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, or the right to govern (Manning and Wemheuer 2011). <u>Therefore</u>, <u><mark>understandably</u>, <u>a <strong>regime’s political support</strong></mark> and legitimacy <mark>derives from its <strong>contribution to the food security</strong></mark> of the people</u>. When Chinese communist party took over the rein in 1949, <u><mark>Mao</u></mark> Zedong <u><mark>declared that ‘not</mark> even <mark>one person shall die of hunger’</mark>. And <mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>Chinese communist party</strong> considers providing enough food </mark>for the people <mark>as</mark> one <strong><mark>crucial</strong></mark> means <mark>to win political support</u></mark>. However, despite Mao’s vow and the authority’s efforts to build an open government system to address China’s food problems, hunger was endemic and the fail of Great Leap Forward had led to the 1959–1961 <u>famine</u>, which was recognized as the worst in human history and killed around 30 million Chinese. In 1978, after the 10-years Cultural Revolution, the communist ideology<u> </u>lost its charm. Moreover, Chinese economy was on the blink of collapse and <u><mark>food was in short supply</u></mark>; the majority of the Chinese did not have enough to eat and 250 million out of 800 million rural residents were impoverished (Du 2006).<u> <mark>The Chinese authorities faced </mark>serious <strong><mark>political legitimacy crisis</strong></mark>. To restore its political </u>legitimacy, Chinese authorities started to undertake agricultural reforms to boost the grain production and feed its hungry population. With the introduction of Household Responsibility Systems and government supports, China’s grain production, together with the productions of other food products, experienced phenomenal growth; since 1995 China has achieved self-sufficiency in grain and enjoyed grain surplus in following years. In 2001, the then premier Zhu Rongji claimed that for the first time ever in Chinese history, the Chinese Communist Party had succeeded in solving China’s food problem, once for all.2 This success has been portrayed by the Chinese government as a miracle, and presented as strong evidence that only the communist party could save China. <u><strong>Thus, for the Chinese authorities, the ‘food problem’ is of huge political importance. </u></strong>Grain<u><strong> <mark>self-sufficiency is a matter of national pride and</mark> it <mark>has profound impacts on the Communist Party’s political legitimacy</p></u></strong></mark>

Advantage one is oceans

./documents/hspolicy16/IowaCityWest/WaJa/Iowa%20City%20West-Wang-Jain-Aff-Emory-Round1.docx

A

Emory

1

MBA RK

Kevin McCaffrey

1ac - this one 1nc - T-qpq T-crocker Antarctica CP ASEAN CP Appeasement CCP Collapse good 2nr - appeasement ASEAN CP

hspolicy16/IowaCityWest/WaJa/Iowa%20City%20West-Wang-Jain-Aff-Emory-Round1.docx

WaJa

Iowa City West WaJa

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Ch.....

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IowaCityWest

Iowa City West

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HS Policy 2016-17

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No nuke terror—this card is unbeatable

Weiss 2/13