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CSCAP cooperation solves best via preventative diplomacy and spurs follow on – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation

-Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development

This book provide assessment of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific and CSCAP widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization It describes CSCAP’s relationship with ARF its Track 1 counterpart It also identifies perceived weaknesses in CSCAP which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The CSCAP was set up to provide “a structured process of non-governmental nature to contribute to confidence building and enhancing regional security 1 It was the most ambitious proposal for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process and one of the most important developments since the Cold War CSCAP is a generally recognized feature of the architecture of Asia achievements have been extraordinary ARF is centrepiece of institutionalization of multilateral dialogue and confidence building CSCAP’s ability to provide policy-relevant studies for the ARF has been accorded highest priority Simon found CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 He reported CSCAP achieved noteworthy successes including preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF agreements on oceanic management taken up by the ARF and database on nuclear energy safety other recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and attained important place on the latter’s own agenda CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific Job argues they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security Kraft argues blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis

book assess CSCAP widely regarded as premier Track 2 weaknesses derive from connections with Track 1 CSCAP contribute to confidence building and security It was one of most important developments achievements have been extraordinary CSCAP’s ability to provide policy for ARF has been highest priority CSCAP achieved successes, including preventive diplomacy adopted oceanic management taken up by ARF and nuclear safety recommendations attained place on latter’s agenda CSCAP epistemic community played “a significant role in Track 1 deliberations they served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis

Ball 10 {Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR} This book is intended to provide a critical assessment of the role of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), widely regarded as the premier Track 2 organization in the region. It describes CSCAP’s formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), its declared Track 1 counterpart. It also identifies and analyses perceived weaknesses in CSCAP’s organization and failures in its processes, some of which derive from its fundamental connections with official (governmental) agencies constituting Track 1. The main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. CSCAP was set up in 1992–1993 to provide “a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.1 It was described at the time as “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters”,2 and as “one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. CSCAP is now a generally recognized feature of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Its achievements since 1992–1993 have been extraordinary. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The ARF is the centrepiece of the institutionalization of multilateral security dialogue and confidence building in the region. Among the different views about CSCAP’s purposes, its ability to provide policy-relevant studies and analyses for the ARF has generally been accorded highest priority. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by Simon published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He found that CSCAP was a “fine exemplar” of Track 2 diplomacy. He reported that CSCAP had “achieved some noteworthy successes, including a definition of preventive diplomacy adopted by the ARF, a number of agreements on oceanic management which have been taken up by the ARF, and the establishment of a database on nuclear energy safety practices”, and that “these and a number of other CSCAP recommendations have been passed on to the ARF and have attained an important place on the latter’s own agenda”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that CSCAP formed an “epistemic community”, which played “a significant role in Track 1 security deliberations in the Asia Pacific”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. Job addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he argues that, ideationally, “they have served as agents of change and norm entrepreneurs working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities (both individual and collective), and acceptance of the key principles of open regionalism and cooperative security”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman Kraft, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He argues that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests.

<h4>CSCAP cooperation <u>solves best</u> via preventative diplomacy and <u>spurs follow on</u> – perm fails because it inserts USFG officials before CSCAP has done sufficient deliberation</h4><p>-Specific examples of success/follow-on include: regional security, confidence building measures, environmental oceanic management, nuclear energy, regionalism/multilateralism, norm formation, and collective identity development </p><p><strong>Ball 10 </strong>{Desmond, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (The Australian National University), former member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader, Published through the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), “Introduction: Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf#THUR}</p><p><u>This <mark>book</u></mark> is intended to <u>provide</u> a critical <u><mark>assess</mark>ment of</u> the role of <u>Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific</u> region, <u>and</u>, more specifically, of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (<u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark>), <u><strong><mark>widely regarded</u></strong> <u>as</mark> the</u> <u><mark>premier Track 2</mark> organization</u> in the region. <u>It describes CSCAP’s</u> formation and development, reviewing its principal activities since its establishment, particularly with respect to its <u>relationship with</u> the ASEAN Regional Forum (<u>ARF</u>), <u>its</u> declared <u>Track 1 counterpart</u>. <u>It also identifies</u> and analyses <u><strong>perceived <mark>weaknesses</u></strong></mark> <u>in CSCAP</u>’s organization and failures in its processes, some of <u>which <mark>derive from</mark> its fundamental <mark>connections with</mark> official (governmental) agencies constituting <mark>Track 1</mark>. The</u> main body of the book is prospective, providing analyses of current and projected developments with respect to the evolving regional architectures, the increasingly “crowded” institutional landscape, the place of ASEAN and the ARF in contending architectures, the role of Track 2, and the increasing challenges of non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This sets the context for the assessment of CSCAP’s prospects for its next couple of decades. <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> was set up</u> in 1992–1993 <u>to provide “a</u> more <u>structured</u> regional <u>process of</u> a <u><strong>non-governmental</u></strong> <u>nature</u> <u>to <mark>contribute to</u></mark> the efforts towards regional <u><strong><mark>confidence building</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong>enhancing regional <mark>security</u></strong></mark> through dialogues, consultation and cooperation”.<u>1 <mark>It was</u></mark> described at the time as “<u><strong>the most ambitious</u></strong> <u>proposal</u> to date <u>for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process</u> on Pacific security matters”,2 <u>and</u> as “<u><mark>one of</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>most important developments</u></strong></mark> in regional security <u>since</u> the end of <u>the Cold War</u>”.3 It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension—such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organization. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating. <u>CSCAP is</u> now <u><strong>a generally recognized feature</u></strong> <u>of the</u> security <u>architecture of</u> the <u>Asia</u>-Pacific region. Its <u><mark>achievements</u></mark> since 1992–1993 <u><strong><mark>have been extraordinary</u></strong></mark>. These are described in Chapter 2 Chapter 3 by Desmond Ball discusses the development of the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF. The <u>ARF is</u> the <u><strong>centrepiece</u></strong> <u>of</u> the <u>institutionalization of multilateral</u> security <u>dialogue and confidence building</u> in the region. Among the different views about <u><mark>CSCAP’s</u></mark> purposes, its <u><mark>ability to provide</u> <u><strong>policy</mark>-relevant studies</u></strong> and analyses <u><mark>for</mark> the <mark>ARF has</u></mark> generally <u><mark>been</mark> accorded</u> <u><strong><mark>highest priority</u></strong></mark>. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Part II of this volume consists of three previously published articles by Sheldon Simon, Brian Job and Herman Kraft, which are now nearly a decade old, but which are classics in the field. They have raised issues that are critical to any critique of CSCAP and Track 2 processes in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The three respective authors have each added a brief postscript to their papers. Chapter 4, by Sheldon Simon, was published in The Pacific Review in 2002;4 it was drawn from a longer report by <u>Simon</u> published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in September 2001.5 He <u>found</u> that <u>CSCAP was a</u> <u><strong>“fine exemplar”</u></strong> <u>of Track 2</u> diplomacy. <u>He reported</u> that <u><mark>CSCAP</u></mark> had “<u><mark>achieved</u></mark> some <u>noteworthy <mark>successes</u>, <u>including</u></mark> a definition of <u><strong><mark>preventive diplomacy adopted</mark> by the ARF</u></strong>, a number of <u>agreements on</u> <u><mark>oceanic management</u></mark> which have been <u><strong><mark>taken up by</mark> the <mark>ARF</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the establishment of a <u>database on <mark>nuclear</mark> energy</u> <u><mark>safety</u></mark> practices”, and that “these and a number of <u>other</u> CSCAP <u><mark>recommendations</u></mark> <u><strong>have been passed on to the ARF</u></strong> <u>and</u> have <u><mark>attained</u></mark> an <u><strong>important <mark>place on</mark> the <mark>latter’s</mark> own <mark>agenda</u></strong></mark>”. However, he also noted “the tendency of Track 2 security specialists to limit the range of their conceptualizations to what they believe is acceptable to governments”, and “the fact that national differences frequently trump scholarly objectivity”. He concluded that <u><mark>CSCAP</mark> formed an “<mark>epistemic</u> <u>community</mark>”, which <mark>played “a significant role in Track 1</mark> security <mark>deliberations</mark> in the Asia Pacific</u>”. Chapter 5 by Brian Job was published in 2003.6 It was prepared for a volume concerned with exploring “the existence and nature of order in the management of Asian security affairs”, and covers broader ground. It assesses the ideational contribution of Track 2 diplomacy to the “evolving Asia security order”. <u>Job</u> addresses two basic questions: first, he attempts to ascertain the impact that Track 2 processes have had on “determining the character of the post-Cold War security architecture in Asia”; he <u>argues</u> that, ideationally, “<u><mark>they</mark> have <mark>served as</u> <u><strong>agents of change and norm entrepreneurs</u></strong></mark> <u>working to alter perceptions of interests, redefinition of identities</u> (both individual and collective), <u>and</u> <u>acceptance of the key principles of</u> <u><strong>open regionalism</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>cooperative security</u></strong>”. Second, he discusses the prospects for “sustaining forward momentum on enhancing the norms and modalities” of regional security cooperation; he argues here that Track 2 institutions needed to adapt to “the effects of generational change and forces of democratization and globalization”, and that “encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order”. Chapter 6 by Herman <u>Kraft</u>, on the “autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy”, was published in Security Dialogue in September 2000.7 He examines the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and CSCAP, and their contribution towards strengthening regional security cooperation, including the establishment of the ARF. He <u>argues</u> that the success of Track 2 processes in the 1990s was largely due to “their linkages with governments in the region”, but that the “increasingly <u><mark>blurred distinction” between Tracks 1 and 2 has reduced Track 2’s capacity for critical thinking, discussion and analysis</u></mark>. He argues that, by the end of the 1990s, the most interesting initiatives, especially those concerning broader aspects of security, were originating from NGOs in Track 3, and that greater collaboration between Tracks 2 and 3 provided a possible means of weaning Track 2 away from its official linkages and constraints, and revitalizing its capacity to think beyond the confines of official diplomacy based on state interests.</p>

1nc

Offcase

CP

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

N

Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

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HS Policy 2016-17

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Sanctions key to solve adventurism and democracy

Pascrell 12/19

Pascrell 12/19/16 (Bill, Member of Congress, “Thank you very much for your attention to this matter,” https://pascrell.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-pascrell-says-congress-must-increase-russia-sanctions)//cmr

In light of Putin’s continued aggression around the globe, I encourage you to prioritize our national security in the 115th Congress One of the first items of business Congress must consider is legislation to further tighten economic sanctions against Russia. this would be an important show of American strength. Putin’s attempts to undermine global stability are boundless Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty continues to support the Syrian Government The clear intent is to preserve Assad and his regime .S. intelligence clearly demonstrates the Russian Government directed an extensive breach of e-mails from U.S. citizens and institutions during our election These actions threaten our democratic institutions, national security, and sovereignty and warrant a swift, strong response. the current sanctions on Russia were implemented through executive orders These sanctions serve as an important tool to ensure Russia abandons its aggression abroad The U S must send a clear message that we will not stand idly by as Putin bullies his neighbors, tests the commitment of NATO, and works to fracture Western democracies legislation builds on existing sanctions and sends a clear signal Russia about the U.S.’s commitment Maintaining strict sanctions on Russia until it abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad has always been a source of bipartisan support Now, more than ever, it is critical the U S stand up to Putin by sending a clear message that Russia’s aggression will not be tolerated

legislation to tighten sanctions would be an important show of American strength. Putin’s attempts to undermine global stability are boundless Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty support the Syrian Government intelligence clearly demonstrates Russia threaten our democratic institutions sanctions ensure Russia abandons its aggression abroad The U S must send a clear message we will not stand by as Putin bullies his neighbors tests NATO and works to fracture democracies

In light of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued meddling and aggression around the globe, I encourage you to prioritize our national security in the 115th Congress. One of the first items of business the Congress must consider next year is legislation to further tighten economic sanctions against Russia. Earlier this year, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the STAND for Ukraine Act to contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine; support the sovereignty of Crimea against Russia’s illegal annexation; and ultimately assist Ukraine’s democratic transition. Advancing this bill would be an important show of American strength. President Putin’s attempts to undermine global stability are boundless. Russia has cultivated networks of patronage across Central and Eastern Europe in order to influence and direct decision-making to serve the Kremlin's interests. Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty by providing aid to separatists who attack Ukrainian military positions in Donetsk and Donbass, resulting in civilian casualties. In a similar vein, Russia continues to support the Syrian Government through its supply of ammunition and weapons, as well as its efforts to destroy opposition-controlled population zones and civilian infrastructure. The clear intent of these actions is to preserve Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. Finally, U.S. intelligence clearly demonstrates that the Russian Government directed an extensive breach of e-mails from U.S. citizens and institutions, including U.S. political organizations, during our election. These actions threaten our democratic institutions, national security, and sovereignty – and warrant a swift, strong response. As you know, the current sanctions on Russia were implemented in 2014 through executive orders relating to its actions in Ukraine. These sanctions serve as an important tool to ensure Russia abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad, which is why I am so concerned that they could be easily undone with the stroke of a pen by a future administration. The United States must send a clear message that we will not stand idly by as President Putin bullies his neighbors, tests the commitment of NATO, and works to fracture Western democracies. That is why it is critical for the Congress to pass the STAND for Ukraine Act. The STAND for Ukraine Act would codify the 2014 sanctions levied against Russia through executive orders into U.S. law, making it more difficult for future administrations to unravel our efforts to deter President Putin’s aggression and disrespect for global order. This legislation builds on existing sanctions and sends a clear signal to Russia about the U.S.’s commitment to this policy, just as we did during the Soviet Union’s decades-long occupation of the Baltic States. Maintaining strict sanctions on Russia until it abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad has always been a source of bipartisan support, evidenced by the strong bipartisan passage of every piece of legislation ramping up Russian sanctions. Now, more than ever, it is critical the United States stand up to President Putin by sending a clear message that Russia’s aggression will not be tolerated.

<h4>Sanctions key to solve adventurism and democracy</h4><p><strong>Pascrell 12/19</strong>/16 (Bill, Member of Congress, “Thank you very much for your attention to this matter,” https://pascrell.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-pascrell-says-congress-must-increase-russia-sanctions)//cmr</p><p><u>In light of</u> Russian President Vladimir <u>Putin’s continued </u>meddling and<u> aggression around the globe, I encourage you to prioritize our national security in the 115th Congress</u>. <u>One of the first items of business</u> the <u>Congress must consider</u> next year <u>is <mark>legislation to</mark> further <mark>tighten</mark> economic <mark>sanctions</mark> against Russia.</u> Earlier this year, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the STAND for Ukraine Act to contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine; support the sovereignty of Crimea against Russia’s illegal annexation; and ultimately assist Ukraine’s democratic transition. Advancing <u><strong>this</u></strong> bill <u><strong><mark>would be an important show of American strength.</mark> </u></strong>President <u><mark>Putin’s attempts to undermine <strong>global stability</strong> are <strong>boundless</u></strong></mark>. Russia has cultivated networks of patronage across Central and Eastern Europe in order to influence and direct decision-making to serve the Kremlin's interests. <u><mark>Russia has continued to violate Ukrainian sovereignty</u></mark> by providing aid to separatists who attack Ukrainian military positions in Donetsk and Donbass, resulting in civilian casualties. In a similar vein, Russia <u>continues to <mark>support the Syrian Government</u></mark> through its supply of ammunition and weapons, as well as its efforts to destroy opposition-controlled population zones and civilian infrastructure. <u>The clear intent</u> of these actions <u>is to preserve</u> Syrian President Bashar al-<u>Assad and his regime</u>. Finally, U<u>.S. <mark>intelligence clearly demonstrates</u></mark> that <u>the <mark>Russia</mark>n Government directed an extensive breach of e-mails from U.S. citizens and institutions</u>, including U.S. political organizations, <u>during our election</u>. <u>These actions <mark>threaten our democratic institutions</mark>, national security, and sovereignty</u> – <u>and warrant a swift, strong response. </u>As you know, <u>the current sanctions on Russia were implemented</u> in 2014 <u>through executive orders</u> relating to its actions in Ukraine. <u>These <mark>sanctions</mark> serve as an important tool to <mark>ensure Russia <strong>abandons its</strong></mark> </u>oppression at home and<u> <strong><mark>aggression abroad</u></strong></mark>, which is why I am so concerned that they could be easily undone with the stroke of a pen by a future administration. <u><mark>The <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>must send a <strong>clear message</strong></mark> that <mark>we will not stand</mark> idly <mark>by as</mark> </u>President <u><mark>Putin bullies his neighbors</mark>, <mark>tests</mark> the commitment of <mark>NATO</mark>, <mark>and works to fracture</mark> Western <mark>democracies</u></mark>. That is why it is critical for the Congress to pass the STAND for Ukraine Act. The STAND for Ukraine Act would codify the 2014 sanctions levied against Russia through executive orders into U.S. law, making it more difficult for future administrations to unravel our efforts to deter President Putin’s aggression and disrespect for global order. This <u>legislation builds on existing sanctions and sends a <strong>clear signal</u></strong> to <u>Russia about the U.S.’s commitment</u> to this policy, just as we did during the Soviet Union’s decades-long occupation of the Baltic States. <u>Maintaining strict sanctions on Russia until it abandons its oppression at home and aggression abroad has always been a source of bipartisan support</u>, evidenced by the strong bipartisan passage of every piece of legislation ramping up Russian sanctions. <u>Now, more than ever, it is critical the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>stand up to</u> President <u>Putin by sending a <strong>clear message</strong> that Russia’s aggression will not be tolerated</u>.</p>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

3

./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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HS Policy 2016-17

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U.S. and Japan are in lock step now over the AIIB and Abe’s reforms are currently designed to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance --- mutual distrust runs deep between China and Japan

Pollack, 16

Pollack, 16 (Jonathon D, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Changes and prospects for the structure of regional stability in East Asia: A U.S. perspective,” Jan 25, http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2016/01/25-regional-stability-east-asia-pollack, CMR+JMP)

bilateral ties between China and Japan are increasingly fraught with tension and public animosity. There is now deep mutual wariness between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships and plummeting levels of public support for bilateral relations in both countries The return of Abe to leadership in Japan and the accession of Xi to leadership in China exacerbated these growing differences the sources of increased estrangement run much deeper. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing debate among Japanese leaders about the country’s political identity, centering on the question of its quest for “normal country” status. Prime Minister Abe’s convictions about elevating Japan’s geopolitical status derive from multiple sources. Abe is determined to reinterpret and ultimately revise the post-war constitution including the “no war” clause that severely limited Tokyo’s involvement in international security beyond missions associated directly with the defense of Japan He has sought to put the most positive gloss possible on these shifts in policy, emphasizing Japan’s efforts at economic revival and the parallel pursuit of what he terms “proactive pacifism.” Abe has also embedded these policy initiatives in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, asserting that constitutional reinterpretation will enable Tokyo to buttress the alliance within a collective security framework. Abe’s behavior is animated primarily by his growing anxieties about Japan’s longer-term economic, political and security prospects in relation to a much more powerful China. By tethering Japanese strategy to that of the U S he hopes to preclude any erosion in Japan’s position in U.S. regional strategy, and to ensure that the U.S. remains equally identified with Japanese security concerns. Japan’s decision not to seek founding member status in the A I I B also put Tokyo and Washington on the same page Abe’s strategic calculation relative to China is very different, and tilted in much more adversarial directions.

deep mutual wariness between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships Abe has also embedded these policy initiatives in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance Abe’s behavior is animated primarily by his growing anxieties about Japan’s longer-term economic, prospects hopes to preclude any erosion in Japan’s position in U.S. regional strategy, and to ensure that the U.S. remains equally identified with Japanese security concerns. Japan’s decision not to seek founding member status in the A I I B also put Tokyo and Washington on the same page,

China and Japan More than four decades after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, bilateral ties between China and Japan are increasingly fraught with tension and public animosity. There is now deep mutual wariness between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships and plummeting levels of public support for bilateral relations in both countries. These conditions create the possibility of longer-term estrangement between East Asia’s two major powers that would seriously undermine the prospects for a stable regional order, which would also entail pronounced implications for the ROK. There has been some modest improvement in recent months in working relations between Beijing and Tokyo, but it is closer to a truce than a major shift in policy direction. Although there is a partial recognition in both capitals of the risks of a deeper estrangement, neither leadership seems overly exercised by prevailing circumstances. If anything, both seem to feel that heightened security tensions advances the bureaucratic interests of security constituencies in both countries. The immediate trigger for the Sino-Japanese estrangement was the 2012 decision of former Prime Minister Noda to initiate governmental purchase of the Senkakus/Diaoyus long held in private hands; China’s decision to appreciably increase its maritime and air activities near the islands in response to Japan’s decision; and the political exploitation of these developments in both countries.[vi] But these events emerged in the context of prior incidents and episodes, with leaders in both capitals far less prepared to devote appreciable energy or political capital to protecting bilateral relations. The return of Abe Shinzo to leadership in Japan and the accession of Xi Jinping to leadership in China exacerbated these growing differences. However, the sources of increased estrangement run much deeper. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing debate among Japanese leaders about the country’s political identity, centering on the question of its quest for “normal country” status.[vii] Sharp declines in support for the political left in Japan removed a principal impediment to advancement of this goal. But it has only been with the return to power of a deeply nationalistic Prime Minister that this objective has advanced in definitive ways. Prime Minister Abe’s convictions about elevating Japan’s geopolitical status derive from multiple sources. Abe is determined to reinterpret and ultimately revise the post-war constitution drafted during the American occupation, including the “no war” clause that severely limited Tokyo’s involvement in international security beyond missions associated directly with the defense of Japan.[viii] He has sought to put the most positive gloss possible on these shifts in policy, emphasizing Japan’s efforts at economic revival and the parallel pursuit of what he terms “proactive pacifism.” Abe has also embedded these policy initiatives in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, asserting that constitutional reinterpretation (in conjunction with redrafted U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Guidelines) will enable Tokyo to buttress the alliance within a collective security framework. His reelection as president of the Liberal Democratic Party until 2018 affords him time and political opportunity to advance all these goals. Abe’s behavior is animated primarily by his growing anxieties about Japan’s longer-term economic, political and security prospects in relation to a much more powerful China. By tethering Japanese strategy to that of the United States, he hopes to preclude any erosion in Japan’s position in U.S. regional strategy, and to ensure that the U.S. remains equally identified with Japanese security concerns. Japan’s decision not to seek founding member status in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank also put Tokyo and Washington on the same page, even as other close U.S. allies across Europe and in the ROK and Australia made a different decision. For many years, leaders in Tokyo contended that Japanese security planning was directed principally against threats from North Korea rather than threats from China, a claim that Chinese analysts long insisted was a convenient rationale for building capabilities against Beijing.[ix] Regardless of the credibility of these competing arguments, there is no longer any ambiguity about the underlying rationales for Japan’s long-term military development: it is China-directed. Japan’s latest Defense White Paper makes these arguments explicit. Though North Korea’s fourth nuclear test reaffirms Tokyo’s strong opposition to Pyongyang’s actions and its decided preference for enhanced U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation (including on ballistic missile defense), its eyes are increasingly cast on Beijing, seeking wherever possible to consolidate relationships across the region to counterbalance Chinese power. It also seems increasingly apparent that the only U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific region that truly perturbs Chinese defense planners is a deeper and more expanded security relationship between the U.S. and Japan defined primarily by an anti-China rationale.[x] Though China routinely depicts U.S. bilateral alliances as artifacts of the Cold War and it routinely objects to most enhancements of the U.S. regional security role, these issues matter to China only insofar as they seek to constrain Chinese security objectives, especially along Beijing’s maritime and air periphery. These circumstances highlight the competing assumptions underlying strategic thinking on the part of the Japan and the ROK. Though the U.S. deeply values both of these bilateral alliances, the predominant calculations of Park Geun-hye and Abe Shinzo are very different with respect to China. Even acknowledging Seoul’s dissatisfaction with Beijing’s equivocal responses to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, President Park sees China as an ever more important economic and political partner, and (prospectively) the key to ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK sees itself in a bridging role in relation to China, and it does not see its growing ties with Beijing as detrimental or undermining of alliance ties with the United States. Abe’s strategic calculation relative to China is very different, and tilted in much more adversarial directions.

<h4>U.S. and Japan are in lock step now over the AIIB and Abe’s reforms are currently designed to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance --- mutual distrust runs deep between China and Japan </h4><p><strong>Pollack, 16</strong> (Jonathon D, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Changes and prospects for the structure of regional stability in East Asia: A U.S. perspective,” Jan 25, http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2016/01/25-regional-stability-east-asia-pollack, CMR+JMP) </p><p>China and Japan More than four decades after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, <u>bilateral ties between China and Japan are increasingly fraught with tension and public animosity. <strong>There is now <mark>deep mutual wariness between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships</strong></mark> and plummeting levels of public support for bilateral relations in both countries</u>. These conditions create the possibility of longer-term estrangement between East Asia’s two major powers that would seriously undermine the prospects for a stable regional order, which would also entail pronounced implications for the ROK. There has been some modest improvement in recent months in working relations between Beijing and Tokyo, but it is closer to a truce than a major shift in policy direction. Although there is a partial recognition in both capitals of the risks of a deeper estrangement, neither leadership seems overly exercised by prevailing circumstances. If anything, both seem to feel that heightened security tensions advances the bureaucratic interests of security constituencies in both countries. The immediate trigger for the Sino-Japanese estrangement was the 2012 decision of former Prime Minister Noda to initiate governmental purchase of the Senkakus/Diaoyus long held in private hands; China’s decision to appreciably increase its maritime and air activities near the islands in response to Japan’s decision; and the political exploitation of these developments in both countries.[vi] But these events emerged in the context of prior incidents and episodes, with leaders in both capitals far less prepared to devote appreciable energy or political capital to protecting bilateral relations. <u>The return of Abe</u> Shinzo <u>to leadership in Japan and the accession of Xi</u> Jinping <u>to leadership in China exacerbated these growing differences</u>. However, <u>the sources of increased estrangement run much deeper. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing debate among Japanese leaders about the country’s political identity, centering on the question of its quest for “normal country” status.</u>[vii] Sharp declines in support for the political left in Japan removed a principal impediment to advancement of this goal. But it has only been with the return to power of a deeply nationalistic Prime Minister that this objective has advanced in definitive ways. <u>Prime Minister Abe’s convictions about elevating Japan’s geopolitical status derive from multiple sources. Abe is determined to reinterpret and ultimately revise the post-war constitution</u> drafted during the American occupation, <u>including the “no war” clause that severely limited Tokyo’s involvement in international security beyond missions associated directly with the defense of Japan</u>.[viii] <u>He has sought to put the most positive gloss possible on these shifts in policy, emphasizing Japan’s efforts at economic revival and the parallel pursuit of what he terms “proactive pacifism.” <strong><mark>Abe has also embedded these policy initiatives in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance</strong></mark>, asserting that constitutional reinterpretation</u> (in conjunction with redrafted U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Guidelines) <u>will enable Tokyo to buttress the alliance within a collective security framework.</u> His reelection as president of the Liberal Democratic Party until 2018 affords him time and political opportunity to advance all these goals. <u><strong><mark>Abe’s behavior is animated primarily by his growing anxieties about Japan’s longer-term economic,</mark> political and security <mark>prospects</mark> in relation to a much more powerful China.</u></strong> <u><strong>By tethering Japanese strategy to that of the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>he <mark>hopes to preclude any erosion in Japan’s position in U.S. regional strategy, and to ensure that the U.S. remains equally identified with Japanese security concerns.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Japan’s decision not to seek founding member status in the</u></strong> <u><strong>A</u></strong></mark>sian <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>nfrastructure <u><strong><mark>I</u></strong></mark>nvestment <u><strong><mark>B</u></strong></mark>ank <u><strong><mark>also put Tokyo and Washington on the same page</u></strong>,</mark> even as other close U.S. allies across Europe and in the ROK and Australia made a different decision. For many years, leaders in Tokyo contended that Japanese security planning was directed principally against threats from North Korea rather than threats from China, a claim that Chinese analysts long insisted was a convenient rationale for building capabilities against Beijing.[ix] Regardless of the credibility of these competing arguments, there is no longer any ambiguity about the underlying rationales for Japan’s long-term military development: it is China-directed. Japan’s latest Defense White Paper makes these arguments explicit. Though North Korea’s fourth nuclear test reaffirms Tokyo’s strong opposition to Pyongyang’s actions and its decided preference for enhanced U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation (including on ballistic missile defense), its eyes are increasingly cast on Beijing, seeking wherever possible to consolidate relationships across the region to counterbalance Chinese power. It also seems increasingly apparent that the only U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific region that truly perturbs Chinese defense planners is a deeper and more expanded security relationship between the U.S. and Japan defined primarily by an anti-China rationale.[x] Though China routinely depicts U.S. bilateral alliances as artifacts of the Cold War and it routinely objects to most enhancements of the U.S. regional security role, these issues matter to China only insofar as they seek to constrain Chinese security objectives, especially along Beijing’s maritime and air periphery. These circumstances highlight the competing assumptions underlying strategic thinking on the part of the Japan and the ROK. Though the U.S. deeply values both of these bilateral alliances, the predominant calculations of Park Geun-hye and Abe Shinzo are very different with respect to China. Even acknowledging Seoul’s dissatisfaction with Beijing’s equivocal responses to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, President Park sees China as an ever more important economic and political partner, and (prospectively) the key to ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK sees itself in a bridging role in relation to China, and it does not see its growing ties with Beijing as detrimental or undermining of alliance ties with the United States. <u>Abe’s strategic calculation relative to China is very different, and tilted in much more adversarial directions. </p></u>

1nc

Offcase

DA

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

N

Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

GoSc

Glenbrook South GoSc

Dy.....

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Glenbrook South

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HS Policy 2016-17

cx

hs

Sixth, tensions over Taiwan are the root cause of other regional tensions. A grand bargain would eliminate the most likely scenarios for major war.

Glaser 15

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)

China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the U S If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the U S could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The U S is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the U S Consequently, the U S should consider ending this commitment Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would reduce the probability of war between the U S and China over Taiwan. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the U S ’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations terminating this commitment could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the U S and China. Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the SLOCs in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The U S has devised AirSea Battle to counter China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the U S into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition

If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the U S could find itself in a new cold war Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would reduce the probability of war between the U S and China over Taiwan support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions terminating this commitment could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the SLOCs in the South and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The U S has devised AirSea Battle to counter Ending the U.S. commitment would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the U S into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate competition

Reevaluating The U.S. Commitment To Taiwan China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the United States. If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the United States could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The United States is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the United States. Consequently, the United States should consider ending this commitment. Doing so would have both benefits and costs. Benefits. Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would have three main benefits. First, it would reduce the probability of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the United States’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations. Third, terminating this commitment could also greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China. Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The United States has devised a concept, widely known as AirSea Battle, to counter China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the United States into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition.

<h4><u>Sixth</u>, tensions over Taiwan are the <u>root cause</u> of other regional tensions. A grand bargain would eliminate the <u>most likely scenarios</u> for major war. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)</p><p>Reevaluating The U.S. Commitment To Taiwan</p><p><u>China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>could find itself</mark> engaged <mark>in <strong>a new cold war</strong></mark>. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>Consequently, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should consider ending this commitment</u>. Doing so would have both benefits and costs.</p><p>Benefits. <u><mark>Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would</u></mark> have three main benefits. First, it would <u><mark>reduce the probability of war between the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China over Taiwan</mark>. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates<u>’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means</u>. Second, <u>U.S. <mark>support for Taiwan may be <strong>the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions</strong> about U.S. motives and intentions</mark> in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations</u>. Third, <u><mark>terminating this commitment could</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>greatly moderate</strong> the intensifying military competition</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China. <mark>Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the</u></mark> sea lines of communication (<u><mark>SLOCs</u></mark>) <u><mark>in the South</mark> China <mark>and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>has devised</u></mark> a concept, widely known as <u><mark>AirSea Battle</u></mark>, <u><mark>to counter</mark> China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. <mark>Ending the U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan <mark>would <strong>eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>into a large war with China</strong>, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to <strong>significantly moderate</mark> U.S.-China <mark>competition</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1AC

Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)

./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx

A

Damus

1

Milpitas BP

Zeppos

1AC - Grand Bargain

hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx

CaCy

Georgetown Day CaCy

Fi.....

Ca.....

Ar.....

Cy.....

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Georgetown Day

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HS Policy 2016-17

cx

hs

Democracy prevents extinction by promoting peace and human rights

Teune, 2

Teune, 2 (Henry Teune, American Academy of Political and Social Science, “Global Democracy”, May 2002, JSTOR)

inclusion of the world's populations into global democratic institutions and political processes on a foundation of an expanded normative system of human rights. The outlines of a global democracy can be seen now only through visionary lenses. Democracy began to become the bedrock of the prosperity promised by globalization. It may well turn out to be the best invention for human survival and the betterment of everyday living. Indeed, in time, democracy in large-scale societies may be judged the most important discovery of the twentieth century since vaccines. Governments systematically killing their own peoples and nearly nonstop international wars of scale marked the first half of the twentieth century (Rummel 1996). By that century's end, the beginning of the institutionalization of a second democratic revolution, not only had major international wars ceased, but almost all governments openly subscribed to the principle that they should improve people's lives and should not kill, incarcerate, or expel them.

democratic institutions a foundation of human rights Democracy began to become the bedrock of the prosperity the best invention for human survival and the betterment of everyday living Governments systematically killing their own peoples and nearly nonstop international wars marked the twentieth century almost all governments openly subscribed to the principle that they should improve people's lives and should not kill

GLOBALIZATION exploded in the 1990s following the second democratic revolution. That era of globalization began in the middle of the 1970s. It was signaled by the oil crisis of 1973, a massive increase in the debt of developing countries from loans processed by the oil importing countries, and the promise and then the reality of the opening of China. It took another decade before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the home of the last great secular communalisms of the twentieth century, and the embrace of democracy by its successor states. By that time, nearly all the political barriers to the encapsulation of the world into a single economic system were gone. Only then, at the beginning of the 1990s, did globalization receive general notice. But democratization and globalization, even though tied together in a cascade of visible changes, were treated more or less independently. They both, however, were part of broader developmental processes, locked in a dynamic relationship still to be understood fully. The main question of today is democracy on a global scale. The issues concerning global institutions and processes accountable to people everywhere have superseded those of national and local democracy of only a few years ago. It has long been believed that world development required including poor countries and populations into a global economy of growth, either to avoid the threat of angry disruptions or to sustain the moral underpinnings of capitalism. Today, an additional matter has been piled on top of this one: inclusion of the world's populations into global democratic institutions and political processes on a foundation of an expanded normative system of human rights. The outlines of a global democracy can be seen now only through visionary lenses. During the past three decades, social scientists and professional observers described an emerging global political economy, but without democracy.1 It took most of the 1990s to grasp that without democracy, globalization could not continue in a peaceful, orderly fashion. Democracy began to become the bedrock of the prosperity promised by globalization. It may well turn out to be the best invention for human survival and the betterment of everyday living. Indeed, in time, democracy in large-scale societies may be judged the most important discovery of the twentieth century since vaccines. Governments systematically killing their own peoples and nearly nonstop international wars of scale marked the first half of the twentieth century (Rummel 1996). By that century's end, the beginning of the institutionalization of a second democratic revolution, not only had major international wars ceased, but almost all governments openly subscribed to the principle that they should improve people's lives and should not kill, incarcerate, or expel them. As important was the muting of any credible national political challenges to rudimentary human rights. The killing of masses of people by legitimate authorities may be the most important international fact of the first half of the twentieth century. But the most important fact of this era of globalization is that almost all governments, save one or two, stopped doing that around the century's end, following the spread of democracy.

<h4>Democracy prevents extinction by promoting peace and human rights</h4><p><strong>Teune, 2</strong> (Henry Teune, American Academy of Political and Social Science, “Global Democracy”, May 2002, JSTOR) </p><p>GLOBALIZATION exploded in the 1990s following the second democratic revolution. That era of globalization began in the middle of the 1970s. It was signaled by the oil crisis of 1973, a massive increase in the debt of developing countries from loans processed by the oil importing countries, and the promise and then the reality of the opening of China. It took another decade before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the home of the last great secular communalisms of the twentieth century, and the embrace of democracy by its successor states. By that time, nearly all the political barriers to the encapsulation of the world into a single economic system were gone. Only then, at the beginning of the 1990s, did globalization receive general notice. But democratization and globalization, even though tied together in a cascade of visible changes, were treated more or less independently. They both, however, were part of broader developmental processes, locked in a dynamic relationship still to be understood fully. The main question of today is democracy on a global scale. The issues concerning global institutions and processes accountable to people everywhere have superseded those of national and local democracy of only a few years ago. It has long been believed that world development required including poor countries and populations into a global economy of growth, either to avoid the threat of angry disruptions or to sustain the moral underpinnings of capitalism. Today, an additional matter has been piled on top of this one: <u><strong>inclusion of the world's populations into global <mark>democratic institutions</mark> and political processes on <mark>a foundation</mark> <mark>of</mark> an expanded normative system of <mark>human rights</mark>. The outlines of a global democracy can be seen now only through visionary lenses.</u></strong> During the past three decades, social scientists and professional observers described an emerging global political economy, but without democracy.1 It took most of the 1990s to grasp that without democracy, globalization could not continue in a peaceful, orderly fashion. <u><strong><mark>Democracy began to become the bedrock of the prosperity</mark> promised by globalization. It may well turn out to be <mark>the best invention for human survival and the betterment of everyday living</mark>. Indeed, in time, democracy in large-scale societies may be judged the most important discovery of the twentieth century since vaccines. <mark>Governments systematically killing their own peoples and nearly nonstop international wars</mark> of scale <mark>marked</mark> the first half of <mark>the twentieth century</mark> (Rummel 1996). By that century's end, the beginning of the institutionalization of a second democratic revolution, not only had major international wars ceased, but <mark>almost all governments openly subscribed to the principle that they should improve people's lives and should not kill</mark>, incarcerate, or expel them.</u></strong> As important was the muting of any credible national political challenges to rudimentary human rights. The killing of masses of people by legitimate authorities may be the most important international fact of the first half of the twentieth century. But the most important fact of this era of globalization is that almost all governments, save one or two, stopped doing that around the century's end, following the spread of democracy. </p>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

3

./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

N

GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

AdMu

Chattahoochee AdMu

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Chattahoochee

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cx

hs

Loss of alliance cred causes Japan prolif – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – nuke war – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes South Korean prolif and preemptive conflicts and kills heg

-Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization

} **Modified for ableist language Nuclear allies become security risks Narang demonstrates when [junior] states gain nuclear weapons they coerce senior partners into intervening by threatening to use nuclear weapons That’s Israel at 73 South Africa during 88 And Pakistan with India Instead of relieving U S more nuclear allies increase risk U S would get involved in conflicts that turn nuclear were Japan to develop nuclear weapons rivals might launch preventive military strikes which research suggests has been frequently considered road to acquisition is rocky and increases likelihood of militarized conflict Soviet worries West Germany would acquire trigger Berlin Crisis if Japan actually acquired weapons, we could see nuclear arms race in Asia Japan’s neighbors, including So Ko would fear Japanese militarism No Ko would expand capabilities. China would expand its arsenal Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common But that’s largely because of U.S. efforts to stop them. Research suggests NPT has been instrumental in limiting spread of nuclear weapons by coordinating beliefs about commitments. To develop Japan would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt allies and adversaries including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran to question the treaty and consider their own nuclear arsenals Would this be so bad? no nuclear states have fought major war But conclusion nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate no war may be due to other factors quantitative evidence is limited at best theoretical and historical evidence suggests accidents and miscalculations are likely More countries mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes nuclear prolif is anything but inevitable U.S. efforts have been successful Without U.S. opposition to spread of nuclear weapons through “carrots” like alliances world would have more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. research suggests nuclear prolif would reduce U.S. world influence undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war.

allies coerce senior partners into intervening by threatening nuclear nuclear allies increase risk U S get in conflicts that turn nuclear Japan rivals might launch preventive strikes road to acquisition increases militarized conflict if Japan acquired we could see arms race So Ko would fear militarism No Ko would expand China would expand domino have not been But that’s because of U.S. efforts NPT has limit spread by beliefs Japan would withdraw That prompt Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran to consider nuclear accidents and miscalc are likely. More mean catastrophic nuclear mistakes prolif is anything but inevitable Without U.S. opposition through “carrots” like alliances world would have more weapons prolif reduce influence, undermine stability and increase nuclear war

-NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif -Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances -Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based Miller 16 {Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/#THUR} **Modified for ableist language Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker [junior] states gain nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India. Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could increase the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear. Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis. And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals. Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best. Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war.

<h4>Loss of alliance cred causes Japan prolif – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT – nuke war – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even ineffective development causes South Korean prolif and preemptive conflicts and kills heg</h4><p>-Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical proliferation/modernization</p><p>-NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif </p><p>-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances </p><p><strong>-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based</p><p>Miller 16 </strong>{Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,” Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/#THUR<u><strong>} **Modified for ableist language </p><p></strong>Nuclear <mark>allies</u></mark> can also <u>become <strong>security risks</u></strong>. Vipin <u>Narang demonstrates</u> that <u>when</u> weaker <u>[junior] states gain nuclear weapons</u>, <u>they</u> often seek to <u><strong><mark>coerce</u></strong></mark> their <u><mark>senior partners into intervening</u></mark> on their behalf <u><mark>by threatening</mark> to use <mark>nuclear</mark> weapons</u>. <u>That’s</u> what <u>Israel</u> did <u>at</u> the height of the 19<u><strong>73</u></strong> Arab-Israeli War. That’s what <u>South Africa</u> did <u>during</u> its 19<u><strong>88 </u></strong>confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. <u>And</u> that’s what <u>Pakistan</u> did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis <u>with India</u>. <u>Instead of relieving</u> the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having <u>more <mark>nuclear allies</u></mark> could <u><strong><mark>increase</u></strong></mark> the <u><mark>risk</u></mark> that the <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u>would <mark>get</mark> involved <mark>in conflicts that</u></mark> might <u><strong><mark>turn nuclear</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>were</u> South Korea or <u><mark>Japan</mark> to</u> begin <u>develop</u>ing <u>nuclear weapons</u>, their <u><mark>rivals might</u></mark> be tempted to <u><strong><mark>launch</mark> <mark>preventive</mark> military <mark>strikes</u></strong></mark>, <u>which research suggests has been <strong>frequently considered</u></strong> in the past. The <u><mark>road to</u></mark> nuclear <u><mark>acquisition</mark> is</u> often <u>rocky and <mark>increases</u></mark> the <u>likelihood of <strong><mark>militarized conflict</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u>Soviet worries</u> that <u>West Germany would acquire</u> nuclear weapons helped <u>trigger</u> the <u>Berlin Crisis</u>. And <u><mark>if Japan</mark> </u>or South Korea <u>actually <mark>acquired</u></mark> nuclear <u>weapons, <mark>we could</u></mark> possibly <u><mark>see</u></mark> a <u><strong>nuclear <mark>arms race </mark>in Asia</u></strong>. <u>Japan’s neighbors, including</u> <u><strong><mark>So</u></strong></mark>uth <u><strong><mark>Ko</u></strong></mark>rea, <u><mark>would fear</mark> </u>resurgent <u>Japanese <mark>militarism</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>No</u></strong></mark>rth <u><strong><mark>Ko</u></strong></mark>rea <u><mark>would expand</u></mark> its nuclear <u>capabilities. <mark>China would</u></mark> continue to <u><mark>expand</mark> its</u> own nuclear <u>arsenal</u>. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? <u>Nuclear “<mark>domino</mark> effects” <mark>have not been</mark> common</u> historically. <u><strong><mark>But</u></strong> <u>that’s</mark> largely <mark>because of</u></mark> determined <u><strong><mark>U.S. efforts</mark> to stop them. </u></strong>Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). <u>Research suggests</u> the <u><mark>NPT has</mark> been <strong>instrumental</u></strong> <u>in <mark>limit</mark>ing</u> the <u><mark>spread</mark> of nuclear weapons</u>, in part <u><mark>by</mark> coordinating</u> states’ <u><mark>beliefs</mark> about</u> one another’s nonproliferation <u>commitments. To develop</u> nuclear weapons, <u><mark>Japan</u></mark> and South Korea <u><mark>would</mark> need to violate or <mark>withdraw</mark> from the NPT. <mark>That</mark> could <mark>prompt</u></mark> U.S. <u><strong>allies and adversaries</u></strong> in other regions — <u>including <mark>Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran</u></mark> — <u><mark>to</mark> question the treaty</u>’s viability <u>and <mark>consider</u></mark> seeking <u><strong>their own <mark>nuclear</mark> arsenals</u></strong>. <u>Would this be so bad?</u> After all, <u>no</u> two <u>nuclear</u> armed <u>states have fought</u> a <u>major war</u> with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. <u><strong>But</u></strong> the <u>conclusion</u> that <u>nuclear weapons produce peace is <strong>subject to debate</u></strong>. It’s true that there has been <u>no war</u> between major powers since 1945. But that <u>may be due to other factors</u>. The <u><strong>quantitative evidence</u></strong> linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict <u>is limited at best</u>. Further, <u>theoretical and historical evidence suggests</u> that nuclear <u><strong><mark>accidents and miscalc</mark>ulations</u></strong> <u><mark>are likely</u>. <u>More</mark> countries</u> with nuclear weapons would <u><mark>mean</mark> more opportunities</u> <u>for <strong><mark>catastrophic nuclear mistakes</u></strong></mark>. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that <u>nuclear <mark>prolif</u></mark>eration <u><strong><mark>is anything but inevitable</u></strong></mark>. <u>U.S.</u> nonproliferation <u>efforts have been</u> surprisingly <u><strong>successful</u></strong>, even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. <u><mark>Without</u></mark> firm <u><mark>U.S. opposition</mark> to</u> the <u>spread of nuclear weapons</u> — a policy implemented <u><strong><mark>through “carrots” like alliances</u></strong></mark> and “sticks” like sanctions — the <u><mark>world would</u></mark> probably <u><mark>have</u></mark> far <u><mark>more</mark> than nine countries with nuclear <mark>weapons</mark>.</u> What’s more, <u>research suggests</u> that <u>nuclear <mark>prolif</u></mark>eration <u>would <strong><mark>reduce</mark> U.S. world <mark>influence</u></strong>, <u><strong>undermine</mark> global <mark>stability</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u>increase</mark> the risk of</u> <u><strong><mark>nuclear war</mark>.</p></u></strong>

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Finally, U.S.-China war immediately kills millions — and the fallout would destroy the planet.

Wittner 11

Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon The gathering tension between the U S and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” need this lead to nuclear war? there are signs that it could both the U S and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-arme d nations But the Kargil War of 1999 between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan should convince us that such wars can occur A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons The second is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger they will be used The deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up an example gathering tension is clear need this lead to nuclear war? there are signs that it could Some argue nuclear weapons prevent wars the Kargil War should convince us that such wars can occur A nuclear attack would immediately slaughter 10 million Americans leaving many more dying horribly The Chinese death toll would be far higher Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands debris would blot out the sun and bring on nuclear winter destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction To avert the enormous disaster improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should encourage these policies

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-arme d nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

<h4><u>Finally</u>, U.S.-China war <u>immediately kills millions</u> — and the fallout would <u>destroy the planet</u>. </h4><p><strong>Wittner 11</strong> — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)</p><p><u><mark>While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger</mark> that <strong><mark>they will be used</u></strong></mark>. After all, <u>for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing <strong>their deadliest weapons</strong>. <mark>The</mark> current <mark>deterioration of <strong>U.S. relations with China</strong> might end up</mark> providing us with <strong>yet <mark>an</mark>other <mark>example</strong></mark> of this phenomenon</u>.</p><p><u>The <mark>gathering tension</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>is <strong>clear</strong></mark> enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.”</p><p></u>But <u><mark>need this lead to nuclear war?</p><p></u></mark>Not necessarily. And yet, <u><mark>there are signs that <strong>it could</u></strong></mark>. After all, <u>both the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China possess <strong>large numbers</strong> of nuclear weapons</u>. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”</p><p><u>Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.</p><p><mark>Some</mark> pundits <mark>argue</mark> that <mark>nuclear weapons prevent wars</mark> between nuclear-arme</p><p>d nations</u>; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. <u>But <mark>the <strong>Kargil War</strong></mark> of 1999</u>, <u>between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan</u>, <u><mark>should convince us that such wars <strong>can</strong> occur</u></mark>. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.</p><p>At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?</p><p>Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.</p><p>But what would that “victory” entail? <u><mark>A nuclear attack</mark> by China <mark>would <strong>immediately slaughter</strong></mark> at least <mark>10 million Americans</mark> in a great storm of blast and fire, while <mark>leaving many more dying horribly</mark> of sickness and radiation poisoning. <mark>The Chinese death toll</mark> in a nuclear war <mark>would be <strong>far higher</strong></mark>. <mark>Both nations would be reduced to <strong>smoldering, radioactive wastelands</u></strong></mark>. Also, <u>radioactive <mark>debris</mark> sent aloft by the nuclear explosions <mark>would <strong>blot out the sun</strong> and bring on</mark> a “<strong><mark>nuclear winter</strong></mark>” around the globe—<strong><mark>destroying agriculture</strong>, <strong>creating worldwide famine</strong>, and <strong>generating chaos and destruction</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.</p><p><u><mark>To avert the enormous disaster</mark> of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are</u> two <u><strong>obvious actions</strong> that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons</u>, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. <u>The second</u>, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, <u>is to <strong><mark>improve U.S.-China relations</strong>. If the American and Chinese people are interested in <strong>ensuring their survival and that of the world</strong>, they should</mark> be working to <strong><mark>encourage these policies</u></strong></mark>.</p>

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Obamacare repeal will strip away coverage from millions in poverty overnight—judge should err on ethics

Cassidy 11-30

Cassidy 11-30

Donald Trump’s full-blown repeal of the Affordable Care Act would roll back the expansion of Medicaid that has benefitted millions of poor families and return the country to a system where private insurers more than twenty million Americans have obtained health coverage, and the proportion of Americans without it has fallen to a historic low there is still a great deal of uncertainty about what sort of health-care legislation Trump and the Republican Congress will actually pass the big losers in whatever legislation might emerge will be the poor and the sick reversing Medicaid alone would mean that about fifteen million people would lose their health-care coverage overnight members of families whose earnings are above the poverty line but less than forty thousand dollars a year would once again be subjected to the mercies of private insurers

blown repeal of the Affordable Care Act would roll back the expansion at has benefitted millions of poor families the big losers in whatever legislation might emerge will be the poor and the sick reversing alone would mean that about fifteen million people would lose their health-care coverage overnight members of families whose earnings are above the poverty line but less than forty thousand dollars a year

John is a senior editor for the New Yorker covering Foreign Policy since 1995, “THE FIRST VICTIMS OF REPEALING OBAMACARE WILL BE THE SICK AND THE POOR”, The New Yorker, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-first-victims-of-repealing-obamacare-will-be-the-sick-and-the-poor, Accessed 12-20 It has been widely noted that Donald Trump’s choice of Tom Price, the Republican congressman from Georgia, to be his Secretary of Health and Human Services makes a full-blown repeal of the Affordable Care Act more likely. Price, an orthopedic surgeon, isn’t just an armchair critic of Obamacare. In 2009, he put forward the Empowering Patients First Act, which was then intended as an alternative to the Affordable Care Act. It has since evolved into a replacement for it. In a very useful piece on Price’s proposal, which he reintroduced in 2011, 2013, and 2015, Vox’s Sarah Kliff explains how Price’s bill goes beyond other Republican repeal plans, including the one endorsed by Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House. Not only would Price scrap the Obamacare insurance exchanges and the generous subsidies that make them work, he would roll back the expansion of Medicaid that has benefitted millions of poor families and return the country to a system where private insurers have little incentive to cover high-risk individuals. During the past four years, more than twenty million Americans have obtained health coverage, and the proportion of Americans without it has fallen to a historic low: 8.6 per cent. If Trump’s real goal is to return to a market-based health-insurance system, with all the inequities and gaps in coverage that such a system inevitably entails, Price’s plan presents a possible blueprint for how to get there. Of course, there’s no guarantee that Price’s plan, or anything close to it, will end up being enacted. Indeed, despite his selection for a Cabinet position, there is still a great deal of uncertainty about what sort of health-care legislation Trump and the Republican Congress will actually pass. Repealing Obamacare might appear straightforward as a general principle, but the details are immensely complicated. At this stage, about the only thing we can say for certain, or near certain, is that the big losers in whatever legislation might emerge will be the poor and the sick. Under Price’s plan, reversing the post-2010 expansion of Medicaid alone would mean that about fifteen million people would lose their health-care coverage overnight. These people—members of families whose earnings are above the poverty line but less than forty thousand dollars a year—would once again be subjected to the mercies of private insurers. They would be eligible for tax credits to help them purchase private plans, but these credits would, in general, cover only a small portion of the monthly premiums.

<h4><strong>Obamacare repeal will strip away coverage from millions in poverty overnight—judge should err on ethics</h4><p>Cassidy 11-30</p><p></strong>John is a senior editor for the New Yorker covering Foreign Policy since 1995, “THE FIRST VICTIMS OF REPEALING OBAMACARE WILL BE THE SICK AND THE POOR”, The New Yorker, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-first-victims-of-repealing-obamacare-will-be-the-sick-and-the-poor, Accessed 12-20</p><p>It has been widely noted that <u>Donald Trump’s </u>choice of Tom Price, the Republican congressman from Georgia, to be his Secretary of Health and Human Services makes a <u>full-<mark>blown repeal of the Affordable Care Act</mark> </u>more likely. Price, an orthopedic surgeon, isn’t just an armchair critic of Obamacare. In 2009, he put forward the Empowering Patients First Act, which was then intended as an alternative to the Affordable Care Act. It has since evolved into a replacement for it. In a very useful piece on Price’s proposal, which he reintroduced in 2011, 2013, and 2015, Vox’s Sarah Kliff explains how Price’s bill goes beyond other Republican repeal plans, including the one endorsed by Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House. Not only would Price scrap the Obamacare insurance exchanges and the generous subsidies that make them work, he <u><mark>would roll back the expansion</mark> of Medicaid th<mark>at has benefitted <strong>millions of poor families</strong></mark> and return the country to a system where private insurers</u> have little incentive to cover high-risk individuals. During the past four years, <u>more than twenty million Americans have obtained health coverage, and the proportion of Americans without it has fallen to a historic low</u>: 8.6 per cent. If Trump’s real goal is to return to a market-based health-insurance system, with all the inequities and gaps in coverage that such a system inevitably entails, Price’s plan presents a possible blueprint for how to get there. Of course, there’s no guarantee that Price’s plan, or anything close to it, will end up being enacted. Indeed, despite his selection for a Cabinet position, <u>there is still a great deal of uncertainty about what sort of health-care legislation Trump and the Republican Congress will actually pass</u>. Repealing Obamacare might appear straightforward as a general principle, but the details are immensely complicated. At this stage, about the only thing we can say for certain, or near certain, is that <u><mark>the big losers in whatever legislation might emerge will be <strong>the poor and the sick</u></strong></mark>. Under Price’s plan, <u><mark>reversing</u></mark> the post-2010 expansion of <u>Medicaid</u> <u><strong><mark>alone would mean that about fifteen million people would lose their health-care coverage overnight</u></strong></mark>. These people—<u><mark>members of families whose earnings are above the poverty line but less than forty thousand dollars a year</u></mark>—<u>would once again be subjected to the mercies of private insurers</u>. They would be eligible for tax credits to help them purchase private plans, but these credits would, in general, cover only a small portion of the monthly premiums.</p>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

3

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GFCA State But not really JV

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Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

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Contention Two: U.S.-China Relations

<h4><u>Contention Two: U.S.-China Relations</h4></u>

1AC

1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

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Milpitas BP

Zeppos

1AC - Grand Bargain

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Congress passed a clean continuing resolution – the GOP is looking for a new vehicle to unravel Dodd-Frank

Bauman 12-8

Bauman 12-8

Congressional Republicans have dropped plans to enact changes to the CFPB through the appropriations process Congressional negotiators this week released their version of a Continuing Resolution that is considered to be must-pass legislation That legislation includes programs normally found in the annual Financial Services spending measure. Obama’s veto a bill that would subject the CFPB to the annual appropriations process. House Republicans had proposed reining in the CFPB in their version of that bill. The Senate version of the bill did not contain those changes, and the final agreement also does not include them. the CFPB changes were not among the anomalies That likely means that the agency will be able to move on initiatives unabated. The House bill prohibited those rules from being released until the agency conducted a more detailed study of the issue. That provision is not included in the final spending measure. the House appropriations measure would have converted the agency into one that was governed by a board rather than the director of the agency. And the House bill would have delayed the issuing of controversial payday lending rules. That provision is not included in the bill; nor is a plan to make the CFPB subject to the annual appropriations process. Those proposals are contained in a Dodd-Frank overhaul bill sponsored by Hensarling That legislation will not be enacted this year but House Republicans have said they will push that legislation again

Republicans dropped plans to change CFPB Congress released their version of a Continuing Resolution that is must-pass legislation Obama’s veto House Republicans had proposed reining in the CFPB . The Senate version did not contain those changes the final does not include them CFPB changes not the agency will be able to move on initiatives unabated The House bill is not included in the final spending measur rovision is not included in the bill proposals are contained in Dodd-Frank overhaul will not be enacted this year, but epublicans will push that legislation again

[David. “CFPB Changes Omitted From Final Spending Bill” 12/8/16 http://www.cutimes.com/2016/12/08/cfpb-changes-omitted-from-final-spending-bill?page=2 //GBS-JV] Congressional Republicans have dropped plans to enact changes to the CFPB through the appropriations process. Congressional negotiators this week released their version of a Continuing Resolution that, in most cases, would fund federal programs until April 28. The bill is considered to be must-pass legislation since, without its enactment, funding for most federal programs would expire on Dec. 9. That legislation includes programs normally found in the annual Financial Services spending measure. Obama’s senior aids recommend vetoing a bill that would subject the CFPB to the annual appropriations process. House Republicans had proposed reining in the CFPB in their version of that bill. The Senate version of the bill did not contain those changes, and the final agreement also does not include them. The spending bill does include some non-spending matters—most notably a waiver that would allow retired Marine Corps General James Mattis to be nominated as Defense Secretary. “The legislation also includes a limited number of ‘anomalies,’ which are programmatic or funding changes related to unique situations arising during the duration of the continuing resolution,” Senate Republican appropriators said, in unveiling the bill. However, the CFPB changes were not among the anomalies. That likely means that the agency will be able to move on initiatives unabated. For instance, in the latest version of its regulatory agenda, the agency said final rules regulating mandatory arbitration agreements in financial and employment contracts could be released in February. The House bill prohibited those rules from being released until the agency conducted a more detailed study of the issue. That provision is not included in the final spending measure. The agency has said such clauses in contracts prevent consumers – including credit union members – from joining together in a suit to accuse financial institutions of wrongdoing. Critics of the CFPB have alleged that a study the agency was required to conduct before issuing the rules was poorly conducted and did not meet the statutory requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act. In addition to delaying the rules, the House appropriations measure would have converted the agency into one that was governed by a board rather than the director of the agency. And the House bill would have delayed the issuing of controversial payday lending rules. The agency issued preliminary rules governing such loans earlier this year. That provision is not included in the bill; nor is a plan to make the CFPB subject to the annual appropriations process. Those proposals—and more—are contained in a Dodd-Frank overhaul bill sponsored by House Financial Services Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas). That legislation will not be enacted this year, but Hensarling recently was selected for another term at the helm of the Financial Services panel. House Republicans have said they will push that legislation again next year.

<h4>Congress passed a <u>clean continuing resolution</u> – the GOP is looking for a new vehicle to unravel <strong>Dodd-Frank</h4><p>Bauman 12-8</p><p></strong>[David. “CFPB Changes Omitted From Final Spending Bill” 12/8/16 http://www.cutimes.com/2016/12/08/cfpb-changes-omitted-from-final-spending-bill?page=2 //GBS-JV]</p><p><u>Congressional <mark>Republicans </mark>have <strong><mark>dropped plans</strong> to </mark>enact<mark> change</mark>s to the <mark>CFPB </mark>through the appropriations process</u>. <u><mark>Congress</mark>ional negotiators this week <mark>released their version of a Continuing Resolution that</u></mark>, in most cases, would fund federal programs until April 28. The bill <u><mark>is</mark> considered to be <strong><mark>must-pass legislation</strong></mark> </u>since, without its enactment, funding for most federal programs would expire on Dec. 9. <u>That legislation includes programs normally found in the annual Financial Services spending measure. <mark>Obama’s</u></mark> senior aids recommend <u><strong><mark>veto</u></strong></mark>ing <u>a bill that would subject the CFPB to the annual appropriations process. <mark>House Republicans had proposed reining in the CFPB</mark> in their version of that bill<mark>. The Senate version </mark>of the bill <strong><mark>did not contain those changes</mark>,</strong> and <mark>the final </mark>agreement also <strong><mark>does not include them</strong></mark>. </u>The spending bill does include some non-spending matters—most notably a waiver that would allow retired Marine Corps General James Mattis to be nominated as Defense Secretary. “The legislation also includes a limited number of ‘anomalies,’ which are programmatic or funding changes related to unique situations arising during the duration of the continuing resolution,” Senate Republican appropriators said, in unveiling the bill. However, <u><strong>the <mark>CFPB changes</mark> were <mark>not</mark> among the anomalies</u></strong>. <u>That likely means that <mark>the agency <strong>will be able to move on initiatives unabated</strong></mark>. </u>For instance, in the latest version of its regulatory agenda, the agency said final rules regulating mandatory arbitration agreements in financial and employment contracts could be released in February. <u><mark>The House bill</mark> prohibited those rules from being released until the agency conducted a more detailed study of the issue. <strong>That provision <mark>is not included in the final spending measur</mark>e. </u></strong>The agency has said such clauses in contracts prevent consumers – including credit union members – from joining together in a suit to accuse financial institutions of wrongdoing. Critics of the CFPB have alleged that a study the agency was required to conduct before issuing the rules was poorly conducted and did not meet the statutory requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act. In addition to delaying the rules, <u>the House appropriations measure would have converted the agency into one that was governed by a board rather than the director of the agency. And the House bill would have delayed the issuing of controversial payday lending rules.</u> The agency issued preliminary rules governing such loans earlier this year. <u><strong>That p<mark>rovision is not included in the bill</mark>; nor is a plan to make the CFPB subject to the annual appropriations process. </strong>Those <mark>proposals</u></mark>—and more—<u><strong><mark>are contained in</mark> a <mark>Dodd-Frank overhaul</mark> bill sponsored by</u></strong> House Financial Services Chairman Jeb <u><strong>Hensarling</u></strong> (R-Texas). <u>That legislation <strong><mark>will not be enacted this year</u></strong>, <u>but</u></mark> Hensarling recently was selected for another term at the helm of the Financial Services panel. <u><strong>House R<mark>epublicans</mark> have said they <mark>will push that legislation again</u></strong></mark> next year.</p>

1nc

Offcase

“DA”(lol)

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Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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Text: The United States Federal Government and the government of Canada should increase its innovation and spread blood screening tools, insecticidal nets, adaptive clothing, disseminate quality drugs, disease diagnosis devices, and nanostructured microelectrodes to detect malaria in Angola, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi and Uganda.

<h4>Text: The United States Federal Government and the government of Canada should increase its innovation and spread blood screening tools, insecticidal nets, adaptive clothing, disseminate quality drugs, disease diagnosis devices, and nanostructured microelectrodes to detect malaria in Angola, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi and Uganda.</h4>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

4

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GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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Legislation that scraps Dodd-Frank rides the plan

Gilbert 11-10

Gilbert 11-10 [Gilbert is director of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch Division. “Court Ruling Is an Unexpected Win for the CFPB” Morning Consult, 11/10/16 ln //GBS-JV]

current law still exempts the CFPB from complying with OIRA review to force the CFPB to undergo OIRA review Congress would have to pass a new law to remove the CFPB from the list of independent agencies wouldn’t be difficult for an unscrupulous member of Congress to sneak a policy rider that accomplishes this into must-pass legislation CFPB supporters should be keenly aware of the threat that a potential rider could pose to the agency’s independence.

current law exempts the CFPB from complying with OIRA It wouldn’t be difficult for an unscrupulous member of Congress to sneak a policy rider that accomplishes this into must-pass legislation a rider could pose to the agency’s independence

Even if the decision is upheld on appeal, current law still exempts the CFPB from complying with OIRA review. The Paperwork Reduction Act continues to list the CFPB explicitly as an independent agency and the court opinion did nothing to change that law. Moreover, independent agencies listed in the PRA are exempt from OIRA review by the very terms of the executive orders authorizing and governing OIRA review in the first place. Thus, to force the CFPB to undergo OIRA review, Congress would have to pass a new law to remove the CFPB from the list of independent agencies in the PRA. It wouldn’t be difficult for an unscrupulous member of Congress to sneak a policy rider that accomplishes this into must-pass legislation, such as appropriations. CFPB supporters should be keenly aware of the threat that a potential rider could pose to the agency’s independence.

<h4><strong>Legislation that scraps Dodd-Frank rides the plan </h4><p>Gilbert 11-10</p><p></strong>[Gilbert is director of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch Division. “Court Ruling Is an Unexpected Win for the CFPB” Morning Consult<u>, 11/10/16 ln //GBS-JV]</p><p></u>Even if the decision is upheld on appeal, <u><mark>current law</mark> still <mark>exempts the CFPB from complying with OIRA </mark>review</u>. The Paperwork Reduction Act continues to list the CFPB explicitly as an independent agency and the court opinion did nothing to change that law. Moreover, independent agencies listed in the PRA are exempt from OIRA review by the very terms of the executive orders authorizing and governing OIRA review in the first place. Thus, <u>to force the CFPB to undergo OIRA review</u>, <u>Congress would have to pass a new law to remove the CFPB from the list of independent agencies</u> in the PRA. <mark>It <u><strong>wouldn’t be difficult for an unscrupulous member of Congress to sneak a policy rider that accomplishes this into must-pass legislation</u></strong></mark>, such as appropriations. <u>CFPB supporters should be keenly aware of the <strong>threat</strong> that <mark>a</mark> <strong>potential <mark>rider could pose to the agency’s independence</strong></mark>.</p></u>

1nc

Offcase

“DA”(lol)

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

N

Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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First, U.S.-China relations have reached a dangerous tipping point — overcoming mutual hostility is vital.

Lampton 15

Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“China and the United States: A Conversation with David M. Lampton,” The Asia Foundation, July 29th, Available Online at http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/, Accessed 06-29-2016)

I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer to it than I’d like to be For the 40-plus years since Nixon went to China most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs Conversely, most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction in terms of policy towards China Somewhere around 2008 to 2010, each side began to wonder about the direction of the other. With the rise of S C S problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. It seemed that China was successful but at the same time was going the wrong way in terms of foreign and domestic policy most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election is going to give voice to that In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place We’re moving from a relationship that was trying to find partnership to one now of deterrence. And threats are a key part of that. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the S C S China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with the Pivot creates anxiety in Beijing. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”

I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer than I’d like For 40 years most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction around 2008 each side began to wonder about the direction of the other It seemed that China was going the wrong way in foreign and domestic policy In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” We’re moving from a relationship trying to find partnership to one of deterrence threats are a key part of that the Pivot creates anxiety in Beijing The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating

You have publicly warned that the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical “tipping point.” From your perspective as a longtime China watcher, what do you think about the future trajectory of bilateral relations? I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer to it than I’d like to be. For the 40-plus years since Nixon went to China, and certainly since Deng Xiaoping came back to power in 1977, most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs, to be sure. 1989 raised questions. But Deng Xiaoping and George H. W. Bush got ties modestly back on track. China was opening up, investing in the world. Most Americans saw China as moving in the right direction. Conversely, most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction in terms of policy towards China. Somewhere around 2008 to 2010, each side began to wonder about the direction of the other. With the rise of South China Sea problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. It seemed that China was successful but at the same time was going the wrong way in terms of foreign and domestic policy. I think most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election coming up is going to give voice to that. In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place. We’re moving from a relationship that was trying to find partnership to one now of deterrence. And threats are a key part of that. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the South China Sea. China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with the Pivot announcement in 2011, rotating troops – small forces – through Australia, and tightening up our alliance structure with Japan, all that creates anxiety in Beijing. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”

<h4><u>First</u>, U.S.-China relations have reached a <u>dangerous tipping point</u> — overcoming <u>mutual hostility</u> is vital. </h4><p><strong>Lampton 15</strong> — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“China and the United States: A Conversation with David M. Lampton,” The Asia Foundation, July 29th, Available Online at http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p>You have publicly warned that the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical “tipping point.” From your perspective as a longtime China watcher, what do you think about the future trajectory of bilateral relations?</p><p><u><mark>I said we were <strong>approaching a tipping point</strong>. I <strong>didn’t</strong> say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, </mark>five yards, <mark>or five miles from that point, but we’re <strong>a lot closer</strong></mark> to it <mark>than I’d like</mark> to be</u>.</p><p><u><mark>For</mark> the <mark>40</mark>-plus <mark>years</mark> since Nixon went to China</u>, and certainly since Deng Xiaoping came back to power in 1977, <u><mark>most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction”</mark> in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs</u>, to be sure. 1989 raised questions. But Deng Xiaoping and George H. W. Bush got ties modestly back on track. China was opening up, investing in the world. Most Americans saw China as moving in the right direction. <u>Conversely, <mark>most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction</mark> in terms of policy towards China</u>.</p><p><u>Somewhere <mark>around 2008</mark> to 2010, <mark>each side began to wonder about the direction of the other</mark>. With the rise of S</u>outh <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea <u>problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. <mark>It seemed that China was</mark> successful but at the same time was <mark>going the wrong way in</mark> terms of <mark>foreign and domestic policy</u></mark>. I think <u>most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election</u> coming up <u>is going to give voice to that</u>.</p><p><u><mark>In China, one of <strong>the first questions</strong> they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to <strong>keep China down</strong> or <strong>contain China</strong>?”</mark> One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place</u>.</p><p><u><mark>We’re moving from a relationship</mark> that was <mark>trying to find partnership to one</mark> now <mark>of <strong>deterrence</strong></mark>. And <strong><mark>threats are a key part of that</strong></mark>. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the S</u>outh <u>C</u>hina <u>S</u>ea. <u>China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with <mark>the Pivot</u></mark> announcement in 2011, rotating troops – small forces – through Australia, and tightening up our alliance structure with Japan, all that <u><mark>creates anxiety in Beijing</mark>. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. <mark>The relationship is becoming <strong>fundamentally more competitive</strong></mark>. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. <mark>And the underlying security relationship is <strong>deteriorating</strong></mark>. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”</p></u>

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Integrating Canada’s innovation method is key to solve malaria—spurs innovation. Current Canadian methods are not wide spread

Simiyu 2014

Simiyu 2014

Canada has shown leadership in saving and improving the lives of women and children in developing countries Putting a halt to malaria is a crucial part of this fight many of these innovations are still in very early stages and consolidates healthcare services has resulted in expanded access to malaria diagnosis and treatment to 7,400 individuals and the training of 50 medical practitioners. So far 50,000 individuals in the slum are aware of the availability of the system to tackle malaria include: prevention with long-lasting insecticidal nets and indoor residual spraying; diagnostic testing and treatment with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines; preventive therapies for infants, children and pregnant women; tracking every malaria case in a surveillance system; and scaling up the fight against emerging drug and insecticide resistance 19% of the innovations categorized under ‘infectious diseases’ The benefits of using long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets in the prevention of malaria are well known and, when used properly, prevent almost 80% of malaria infections Canada is supporting innovators who are developing several strategies that complement the use of long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets to prevent bites from mosquitoes that transmit malaria Outdoor mosquito control Another project from Ifakara Health Institute is developing an innovative device to attract and kill malaria-transmitting mosquitoes outside the home Quality-Assured Anti-Malarial Medicines Diagnostic testing Testing and early detection of malaria is essential to eradicate the illness Canada is supporting many innovators who are developing novel diagnostic approaches and devices University of Toronto is developing a low-cost test using nanostructured microelectrodes to detect malaria in unpurified blood samples with high sensitivity and specificity University of Toronto is creating a ready-to-use, yeast-based blood screening tool for simultaneous detection of combinations of diseases, implemented in Belize and Jamaica it can be stored dry; it can be grown locally with minimal equipment/training, improving accessibility in rural and low-resource areas led by University of Alberta to develop point-of-care disease diagnostic devices capable of identifying multiple biomarkers for a single disease This device will be cost-effective and easy to use by people with minimal or no training, and will address disease over-treatment with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines that will be developed for virtual screening The hits from the virtual screen will then be synthesized and optimized for maximum antimalarial activity

Canada has shown leadership many of these innovations are still in very early stages to tackle malaria include: prevention with long-lasting insecticidal nets diagnostic testing and treatment long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets prevent almost 80% of malaria infections Quality-Assured Anti-Malarial Medicines Diagnostic testing Testing and early detection of malaria is essential to eradicate the illness Toronto is developing nanostructured microelectrodes to detect University of Toronto is creating a blood screening tool for simultaneous detection of combinations of diseases University of Alberta to develop point-of-care disease diagnostic devices capable of identifying multiple biomarkers with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines that will be developed for virtual screening The hits from the virtual screen will then be synthesized and optimized for maximum antimalarial activity

Ken is a Program Officer at Grand Challenges Canada. He leads the Stars in Global Health program that is designed to enable innovators in low- and lower-middle-income countries and Canada to develop their bold ideas with big impact to improve global health conditions. “Canada is helping to defeat malaria by investing in the future through 40 innovative projects”, Grand Challenges, April 24, http://www.grandchallenges.ca/2014/canada-is-helping-to-fight-malaria-by-investing-in-the-future-through-40-innovative-projects/, Accessed 2-10 Canada has shown leadership in saving and improving the lives of women and children in developing countries through the Muskoka Initiative. Putting a halt to malaria is a crucial part of this fight. Grand Challenges Canada, which is funded by the Government of Canada, is assisting in global efforts to defeat the disease by investing in bold ideas with big impact. We are supporting a total of 40 innovations that address malaria. We have committed more than $12 million to this important threat to global health. Although many of these innovations are still in very early stages, we have started to see preliminary results. For example, in Nairobi (Kenya) in Kibera – one of Africa’s largest slums – development of an integrated standardized patient medical record system that links and consolidates healthcare services has resulted in expanded access to malaria diagnosis and treatment to 7,400 individuals and the training of 50 medical practitioners. So far 50,000 individuals in the slum are aware of the availability of the system. WHO-recommended strategies to tackle malaria include: prevention with long-lasting insecticidal nets and indoor residual spraying; diagnostic testing and treatment with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines; preventive therapies for infants, children and pregnant women; tracking every malaria case in a surveillance system; and scaling up the fight against emerging drug and insecticide resistance. About 19% of the innovations categorized under ‘infectious diseases’ in our Stars in Global Health portfolio are in the area of malaria. Prevention of Infection The first step in controlling malaria is prevention of mosquito bites. The benefits of using long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets in the prevention of malaria are well known and, when used properly, prevent almost 80% of malaria infections. The remaining 20% of transmission occurs both indoors before people go to bed and outdoors. Grand Challenges Canada is supporting innovators who are developing several strategies that complement the use of long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets to prevent bites from mosquitoes that transmit malaria, such as the following. Protective clothing A to Z Textile Mills is developing technology for personal protection against vector-borne diseases (like malaria) by innovative treatment of clothing with novel and safer insecticides, to be tested in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Footwear made from repellent-impregnated material to deter mosquitoes will add protection in places (outdoors) and at times (early evenings) where current bed nets cannot be used. Developed by Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania). Indoor residual spraying Med Biotech Laboratories (MBL) in Uganda is training villagers to mix insecticides with locally available plaster materials into an insecticidal plaster. which is smeared onto mud walls of huts. Modifying housing Innovators from Maseno University (Kenya) are modifying typical rural houses by installing a ventilated ceiling made from local mats. This will make it harder for malaria vectors to enter and stay in the house, thus decreasing malaria transmission. Subsistence itinerant rice farmers often live in improvised semi-open shacks, where they are disproportionately more exposed to infectious mosquito bites than the general population. Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) is designing portable and low-cost huts that are both fire-proof and mosquito-proof to prevent mosquito-borne illnesses, and hence increase productivity of these itinerant farming households. Outdoor mosquito control Another project from Ifakara Health Institute, co-funded with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, is developing an innovative device to attract and kill malaria-transmitting mosquitoes outside the home. Testing new insecticides Kenyatta University (Kenya) is looking into a novel anti-mosquito blend of insecticide. Using selected medicinal plants from Kenya and Nigeria, a project led by Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (Kenya, Nigeria) aims to produce an affordable, accessible and efficacious phytomedicine that can be dispensed as is, to prevent mosquito bites. Using locally produced sisal fibers treated with transfluthrin to reduce mosquito bites by 80% is the goal of a project by Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania). Vaccines and new drugs Laval University is using nanoparticles derived from papaya mosaic virus (PapMV-NP) as an adjuvant for a novel malaria vaccine that would be safe, efficacious and low cost. International Centre for Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology (India) is developing novel vaccines that block entry of a malaria parasite (P. vivax) into human red blood cells and reduce disease burden. Biological control of mosquitoes University of Abomey-Calavi (Benin) proposes to develop sustainable, non-chemical control of malaria vectors through the use of a roundworm (Romanomermis iyengari). Near-infrared spectroscopy can rapidly, non-destructively and simultaneously differentiate the age and species of Anopheles gambiae and An. arabiensis. Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) is applying this technology to reduce or remove potentially infectious mosquitoes in a population. Diagnostic Testing and Treatment with Quality-Assured Anti-Malarial Medicines Diagnostic testing Testing and early detection of malaria is essential to eradicate the illness. Grand Challenges Canada is supporting many innovators who are developing novel diagnostic approaches and devices. Rapid tests specific for malaria University of Toronto is developing a low-cost test using nanostructured microelectrodes to detect malaria in unpurified blood samples with high sensitivity and specificity. (Tanzania) Kenya Medical Research Institute is developing a non-invasive test that can detect and quantify malaria parasites in saliva. Implemented in Kenya and Nigeria. A project managed by Ustar Biotechnologies Ltd. (China) has developed an affordable, rapid and simple nucleic acid extraction device and isothermal nucleic acid amplification assay that can be used at the village level by minimally trained personnel. A project in Vietnam, by National Hospital for Tropical Diseases, aims to develop a patient-to-chip microfludics component for the collection and processing of whole blood into plasma and cells for downstream testing for highly prevalent tropical diseases. University of Alberta innovators have revamped the classic blood capillary tube into a diagnostic device that integrates whole blood collection with molecular testing to detect malaria. A prototype has been developed. A project by Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) is introducing new e-health technologies that provide accurate diagnostics and better patient management at point-of-care allowing for immediate electronic reporting of cases in low resource settings, and improved efficiency of health care system and public health outcome efficiencies. Neurosynaptic Communications Private Limited (India) is developing a cost-effective remote diagnostic device that can perform several tests with limited skill-set operators, making diagnostics affordable and accessible to rural populations. Multiplexed diagnostic test In addition to single test assays, innovators are developing technologies that can diagnose multiple conditions, including malaria, using one platform. Achira Labs Pvt. Ltd. (India) is developing weaving as a platform for the manufacture of Fabchips (fabric chips) that can be used to perform low-cost, rapid and multiplexed diagnostic tests. International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (Kenya) is using silkworms to generate diagnostic proteins for multiple pathogens with overlapping symptoms to develop a multi-disease diagnostic kit. University of Toronto is creating a ready-to-use, yeast-based blood screening tool for simultaneous detection of combinations of diseases, implemented in Belize and Jamaica. Like baking yeast, it can be stored dry; it can be grown locally with minimal equipment/training, improving accessibility in rural and low-resource areas. The aim of a project led by University of Alberta (implemented in Nigeria and Pakistan) is to develop point-of-care disease diagnostic devices capable of identifying multiple biomarkers for a single disease. This device will be cost-effective and easy to use by people with minimal or no training, and will address disease over-treatment. Treatment with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines Dispensing antimicrobials to patients in need could avert millions of deaths annually, while avoiding their unnecessary consumption reduces antimicrobial resistance. A project led by innovators in Thailand (Mahidol University) is exploring whether procalcitonin levels predict the need for antimicrobials in tropical diseases, e.g. malaria. This will be implemented in Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laos, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Science (Tanzania) is using the growing motorcycle transport business in Tanzania: the project is ensuring that antimalarials reach the neediest to ensure access to effective antimalarials in remote rural areas, where malaria burden is highest. Chematria Inc. (India) is working to find new malaria treatments using existing drugs, since most drugs have multiple medical effects. Re-purposing approved and existing drugs for neglected diseases reduces development time and cost, and makes treatments accessible to the developing world. Artemisinin, extracted from the Artemisia annua plant, is used as a frontline drug to combat malaria. A project by Botanical Extracts EPZ Limited (Kenya) aims to increase the yield of artemisinin from Artemisia. The University of Nairobi (Kenya) is drafting a web-based InSilico database of Kenyan natural products that will be developed for virtual screening against the malaria parasite. The hits from the virtual screen will then be synthesized and optimized for maximum antimalarial activity. A project by MOI University (Kenya) aims to improve access to medicines, including malaria medicines, through a Revolving Fund Pharmacy model. With communities and the government, these pharmacies provide quality, low-cost medications. The revenue is used to sustainably restock the pharmacies, positively impacting the health of the community. In Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania, innovators from Mahidol University (Thailand) are determining if early, community-based treatment for suspected severe malaria would reduce long-term neurological complications in children who survive severe malaria. The University Health Network is testing if using PPARγ agonists, a type of anti-diabetic drug, to treat cerebral malaria reduces and repairs brain injury. Read the guest blog post of innovator Lena Serghides.

<h4><strong>Integrating Canada’s innovation method is key to solve malaria—spurs innovation. Current Canadian methods are not wide spread</h4><p>Simiyu 2014</p><p></strong>Ken is a Program Officer at Grand Challenges Canada. He leads the Stars in Global Health program that is designed to enable innovators in low- and lower-middle-income countries and Canada to develop their bold ideas with big impact to improve global health conditions. “Canada is helping to defeat malaria by investing in the future through 40 innovative projects”, Grand Challenges, April 24, http://www.grandchallenges.ca/2014/canada-is-helping-to-fight-malaria-by-investing-in-the-future-through-40-innovative-projects/, Accessed 2-10</p><p><u><mark>Canada has shown leadership</mark> in saving and improving the lives of women and children in developing countries</u> through the Muskoka Initiative. <u><strong>Putting a halt to malaria is a crucial part of this fight</u></strong>. Grand Challenges Canada, which is funded by the Government of Canada, is assisting in global efforts to defeat the disease by investing in bold ideas with big impact. We are supporting a total of 40 innovations that address malaria. We have committed more than $12 million to this important threat to global health. Although <u><strong><mark>many of these innovations are still in very early stages</u></strong></mark>, we have started to see preliminary results. For example, in Nairobi (Kenya) in Kibera – one of Africa’s largest slums – development of an integrated standardized patient medical record system that links <u>and consolidates healthcare services has resulted in expanded access to malaria diagnosis and treatment to 7,400 individuals and the training of 50 medical practitioners. So far 50,000 individuals in the slum are aware of the availability of the system</u>. WHO-recommended strategies <u><mark>to tackle malaria include: prevention with long-lasting insecticidal nets</mark> and indoor residual spraying; <mark>diagnostic testing and treatment</mark> with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines; preventive therapies for infants, children and pregnant women; tracking every malaria case in a surveillance system; and scaling up the fight against emerging drug and insecticide resistance</u>. About <u>19% of the innovations categorized under ‘infectious diseases’</u> in our Stars in Global Health portfolio are in the area of malaria. Prevention of Infection The first step in controlling malaria is prevention of mosquito bites. <u>The benefits of using <mark>long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets</mark> in the prevention of malaria are well known and, when used properly, <strong><mark>prevent almost 80% of malaria infections</u></strong></mark>. The remaining 20% of transmission occurs both indoors before people go to bed and outdoors. Grand Challenges <u>Canada is supporting innovators who are developing several strategies that complement the use of long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets to prevent bites from mosquitoes that transmit malaria</u>, such as the following. Protective clothing A to Z Textile Mills is developing technology for personal protection against vector-borne diseases (like malaria) by innovative treatment of clothing with novel and safer insecticides, to be tested in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Footwear made from repellent-impregnated material to deter mosquitoes will add protection in places (outdoors) and at times (early evenings) where current bed nets cannot be used. Developed by Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania). Indoor residual spraying Med Biotech Laboratories (MBL) in Uganda is training villagers to mix insecticides with locally available plaster materials into an insecticidal plaster. which is smeared onto mud walls of huts. Modifying housing Innovators from Maseno University (Kenya) are modifying typical rural houses by installing a ventilated ceiling made from local mats. This will make it harder for malaria vectors to enter and stay in the house, thus decreasing malaria transmission. Subsistence itinerant rice farmers often live in improvised semi-open shacks, where they are disproportionately more exposed to infectious mosquito bites than the general population. Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) is designing portable and low-cost huts that are both fire-proof and mosquito-proof to prevent mosquito-borne illnesses, and hence increase productivity of these itinerant farming households. <u>Outdoor mosquito control Another project from Ifakara Health Institute</u>, co-funded with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, <u>is developing an innovative device to attract and kill malaria-transmitting mosquitoes outside the home</u>. Testing new insecticides Kenyatta University (Kenya) is looking into a novel anti-mosquito blend of insecticide. Using selected medicinal plants from Kenya and Nigeria, a project led by Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (Kenya, Nigeria) aims to produce an affordable, accessible and efficacious phytomedicine that can be dispensed as is, to prevent mosquito bites. Using locally produced sisal fibers treated with transfluthrin to reduce mosquito bites by 80% is the goal of a project by Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania). Vaccines and new drugs Laval University is using nanoparticles derived from papaya mosaic virus (PapMV-NP) as an adjuvant for a novel malaria vaccine that would be safe, efficacious and low cost. International Centre for Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology (India) is developing novel vaccines that block entry of a malaria parasite (P. vivax) into human red blood cells and reduce disease burden. Biological control of mosquitoes University of Abomey-Calavi (Benin) proposes to develop sustainable, non-chemical control of malaria vectors through the use of a roundworm (Romanomermis iyengari). Near-infrared spectroscopy can rapidly, non-destructively and simultaneously differentiate the age and species of Anopheles gambiae and An. arabiensis. Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) is applying this technology to reduce or remove potentially infectious mosquitoes in a population. Diagnostic Testing and Treatment with <u><strong><mark>Quality-Assured Anti-Malarial Medicines Diagnostic testing Testing and early detection of malaria is essential to eradicate the illness</u></strong></mark>. Grand Challenges <u>Canada is supporting many innovators who are developing novel diagnostic approaches and devices</u>. Rapid tests specific for malaria <u><strong>University of <mark>Toronto is developing</mark> a low-cost test using <mark>nanostructured microelectrodes to detect</mark> malaria in unpurified blood samples with high sensitivity and specificity</u></strong>. (Tanzania) Kenya Medical Research Institute is developing a non-invasive test that can detect and quantify malaria parasites in saliva. Implemented in Kenya and Nigeria. A project managed by Ustar Biotechnologies Ltd. (China) has developed an affordable, rapid and simple nucleic acid extraction device and isothermal nucleic acid amplification assay that can be used at the village level by minimally trained personnel. A project in Vietnam, by National Hospital for Tropical Diseases, aims to develop a patient-to-chip microfludics component for the collection and processing of whole blood into plasma and cells for downstream testing for highly prevalent tropical diseases. University of Alberta innovators have revamped the classic blood capillary tube into a diagnostic device that integrates whole blood collection with molecular testing to detect malaria. A prototype has been developed. A project by Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) is introducing new e-health technologies that provide accurate diagnostics and better patient management at point-of-care allowing for immediate electronic reporting of cases in low resource settings, and improved efficiency of health care system and public health outcome efficiencies. Neurosynaptic Communications Private Limited (India) is developing a cost-effective remote diagnostic device that can perform several tests with limited skill-set operators, making diagnostics affordable and accessible to rural populations. Multiplexed diagnostic test In addition to single test assays, innovators are developing technologies that can diagnose multiple conditions, including malaria, using one platform. Achira Labs Pvt. Ltd. (India) is developing weaving as a platform for the manufacture of Fabchips (fabric chips) that can be used to perform low-cost, rapid and multiplexed diagnostic tests. International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (Kenya) is using silkworms to generate diagnostic proteins for multiple pathogens with overlapping symptoms to develop a multi-disease diagnostic kit. <u><strong><mark>University of Toronto is creating a</mark> ready-to-use, yeast-based <mark>blood screening tool for simultaneous detection of combinations of diseases</mark>, implemented in Belize and Jamaica</u></strong>. Like baking yeast, <u>it can be stored dry; it can be grown locally with minimal equipment/training, improving accessibility in rural and low-resource areas</u>. The aim of a project <u>led by <mark>University of Alberta</u></mark> (implemented in Nigeria and Pakistan) is <u><strong><mark>to develop point-of-care disease diagnostic devices capable of identifying multiple biomarkers</mark> for a single disease</u></strong>. <u>This device will be cost-effective and easy to use by people with minimal or no training, and will address disease over-treatment</u>. Treatment <u><strong><mark>with quality-assured anti-malarial medicines</u></strong></mark> Dispensing antimicrobials to patients in need could avert millions of deaths annually, while avoiding their unnecessary consumption reduces antimicrobial resistance. A project led by innovators in Thailand (Mahidol University) is exploring whether procalcitonin levels predict the need for antimicrobials in tropical diseases, e.g. malaria. This will be implemented in Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laos, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Science (Tanzania) is using the growing motorcycle transport business in Tanzania: the project is ensuring that antimalarials reach the neediest to ensure access to effective antimalarials in remote rural areas, where malaria burden is highest. Chematria Inc. (India) is working to find new malaria treatments using existing drugs, since most drugs have multiple medical effects. Re-purposing approved and existing drugs for neglected diseases reduces development time and cost, and makes treatments accessible to the developing world. Artemisinin, extracted from the Artemisia annua plant, is used as a frontline drug to combat malaria. A project by Botanical Extracts EPZ Limited (Kenya) aims to increase the yield of artemisinin from Artemisia. The University of Nairobi (Kenya) is drafting a web-based InSilico database of Kenyan natural products <u><strong><mark>that will be developed for virtual screening</u></strong></mark> against the malaria parasite. <u><strong><mark>The hits from the virtual screen will then be synthesized and optimized for maximum antimalarial activity</u></strong></mark>. A project by MOI University (Kenya) aims to improve access to medicines, including malaria medicines, through a Revolving Fund Pharmacy model. With communities and the government, these pharmacies provide quality, low-cost medications. The revenue is used to sustainably restock the pharmacies, positively impacting the health of the community. In Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania, innovators from Mahidol University (Thailand) are determining if early, community-based treatment for suspected severe malaria would reduce long-term neurological complications in children who survive severe malaria. The University Health Network is testing if using PPARγ agonists, a type of anti-diabetic drug, to treat cerebral malaria reduces and repairs brain injury. Read the guest blog post of innovator Lena Serghides.</p>

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1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

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Key to FinCEN functionality and AML effectiveness

Schulte ‘15

Schulte ‘15 [Schulte, Ross and Zabel. “The New AML Rules: Implications for Private Fund Managers” 2015 https://www.srz.com/images/content/7/0/v2/70201/090815-The-New-AML-Rules-Implications-for-Private-Fund-Managers..pdf //GBS-JV]

FinCEN issued a proposed rule requiring investment advisers registered with the SEC to establish anti - money laundering programs and report suspicious activity to FinCEN pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act there have since been significant changes in the relevant regulatory framework for investment advisers, in particular the requirement as part of the Dodd - Frank Act of 2010 that advisers to private investment funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, register with the SEC RIAs as of June 2014 managing a reported $61.9 trillion in assets As long as these investment advisers are not subject to AML program and suspicious activity reporting money launderers may see them as a low - risk way to enter the U.S. financial system In the wake of FinCEN’s previously proposed AML rules investment advisers have developed AML programs and screening measures as part of an AML best practice to “Know - Your - Investor.” But there is a substantial difference between such voluntary programs and being legally required to maintain an effective AML program which will mean oversight by the SEC and could trigger penalties and enforcement actions the Proposed Rule includes the obligation to report suspicious activity

FinCEN issued rule advisers establish anti - money laundering programs and report suspicious activity to FinCEN changes in the regulatory framework as part of Dodd - Frank Act RIAs managing 61.9 trillion in assets money launderers may see them as a low - risk way to enter the U.S. financial system. there is a substantial difference between voluntary programs and egally required to maintain an effective AML program

On Aug . 25, 2015, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN ”) issued for public comment a proposed rule (the “Proposed Rule”) 1 requiring investment advisers registered with the SEC (“RIAs”) to establish anti - money laundering (“AML”) programs and report suspicious activity to FinCEN pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA” ). The long - anticipated Proposed Rule arrives nearly seven years after FinCEN withdrew earlier proposed AML rules, published in 2002 and 2003, directed at investment advisers, unregistered investment companies and commodity trading advis o rs. 2 In issuing the current Proposed Rule, FinCEN noted that there have since been significant changes in the relevant regulatory framework for investment advisers, in particular the requirement, as part of the Dodd - Frank Act of 2010, that advisers to private investment funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, register with the SEC. According to FinCEN, there were 11,235 RIAs as of June 2014, managing a reported $61.9 trillion in assets. As long as these investment advisers are not subject to AML program and suspicious activity reporting requirements, FinCEN stated, “money launderers may see them as a low - risk way to enter the U.S. financial system.” In the wake of FinCEN’s previously proposed AML rules in the early 2000s, many investment advisers have developed AML programs and screening measures as part of an AML best practice to “Know - Your - Investor.” But there is a substantial difference between such voluntary programs and being legally required to maintain an effective AML program — which will mean oversight by the SEC and could trigger penalties and enforcement actions if that program is ineffective. In addition, the Proposed Rule includes requirements that may be unfamiliar to many RIAs, most notably the obligation to report suspicious activity . This Alert explain s the Proposed Rule in more detail and consider s some of its most significant implications, focusing on 15 of the most important practical questions it raises for investment advisers.

<h4>Key to FinCEN functionality <strong>and AML effectiveness </h4><p>Schulte ‘15</p><p></strong>[Schulte, Ross and Zabel. “The New AML Rules: Implications for Private Fund Managers” 2015 https://www.srz.com/images/content/7/0/v2/70201/090815-The-New-AML-Rules-Implications-for-Private-Fund-Managers..pdf //GBS-JV]</p><p>On Aug . 25, 2015, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“<u><strong><mark>FinCEN</u></strong></mark> ”) <u><mark>issued</u></mark> for public comment <u>a proposed <mark>rule</mark> </u>(the “Proposed Rule”) 1 <u>requiring investment <mark>advisers</mark> registered with the SEC</u> (“RIAs”) <u>to <mark>establish</mark> <mark>anti - money laundering</mark> </u>(“AML”) <u><mark>programs and report suspicious activity to FinCEN</mark> pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act </u>(“BSA” ). The long - anticipated Proposed Rule arrives nearly seven years after FinCEN withdrew earlier proposed AML rules, published in 2002 and 2003, directed at investment advisers, unregistered investment companies and commodity trading advis o rs. 2 In issuing the current Proposed Rule, FinCEN noted that <u>there have since been significant <mark>changes</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>the</mark> relevant <mark>regulatory framework</mark> for investment advisers, in particular the requirement</u>, <u><strong><mark>as part of</mark> the <mark>Dodd - Frank Act</mark> of 2010</u></strong>, <u>that advisers to private investment funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, register with the SEC</u>. According to FinCEN, there were 11,235 <u><mark>RIAs</u></mark> <u>as of June 2014</u>, <u><strong><mark>managing</mark> a reported $<mark>61.9 trillion in assets</u></strong></mark>. <u>As long as these investment advisers are not subject to AML program and suspicious activity reporting</u> requirements, FinCEN stated, “<u><strong><mark>money launderers may see them as a low - risk way to enter the U.S. financial system</u></strong>.</mark>” <u>In the wake of FinCEN’s previously proposed AML rules</u> in the early 2000s, many <u>investment advisers have developed AML programs and screening measures as part of an AML best practice to “Know - Your - Investor.”</u> <u><strong>But <mark>there is a substantial difference between</mark> such <mark>voluntary programs and </mark>being l<mark>egally required to maintain an effective AML program</mark> </u></strong>— <u>which will mean oversight by the SEC and could trigger penalties and enforcement actions</u> if that program is ineffective. In addition, <u>the Proposed Rule includes</u> requirements that may be unfamiliar to many RIAs, most notably <u><strong>the obligation to report suspicious activity </u></strong>. This Alert explain s the Proposed Rule in more detail and consider s some of its most significant implications, focusing on 15 of the most important practical questions it raises for investment advisers. </p>

1nc

Offcase

“DA”(lol)

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Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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Three net benefits: Chinese politics and the following:

<h4>Three net benefits: Chinese politics and the following:</h4>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

4

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Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

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Second, the plan is the only way to reverse this trend — resolving Taiwan overcomes every other impediment to strong relations.

Glaser 15

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the U S does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.” most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down a prominent Chinese analyst argues The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations a professor at China's N D U holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict

U.S. support for Taiwan is the most important policy-driven source of China's suspicions China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study concludes Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification thereby harming a Chinese core interest most Chinese believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down The position the U.S. takes on Taiwan determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations U.S. policies toward Taiwan are the fundamental cause of anti-American sentiment a posture change will strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people ending the U.S. commitment has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which could increase cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict

More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China's National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. … I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.

<h4><u>Second</u>, the plan is <u>the only way</u> to reverse this trend — resolving Taiwan overcomes <u>every other impediment</u> to strong relations. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p>More important, however, is that <u>focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan</u>. First, <u><mark>U.S. support for Taiwan is</mark> <strong>one of the most important, possibly <mark>the most important</strong></mark>, <mark>policy-driven source</mark>s <mark>of China's suspicions</mark> about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, <mark>China considers U.S. support of Taiwan <strong>a key source of “strategic distrust.”</strong> A recent study</mark> by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations <mark>concludes</mark> that <mark>Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan</mark> “<mark>as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification</mark> from occurring, <mark>thereby harming a</mark> clearly-articulated <strong><mark>Chinese core interest</strong></mark>.”</u> In a similar vein, <u>their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.”</u>68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “<u><mark>most Chinese</mark> see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They <mark>believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going <strong>helps the U.S. tie China down</u></strong></mark>.”69 Similarly, <u>a prominent Chinese analyst argues</u>: “<u><mark>The position the U.S. takes on</mark> the <mark>Taiwan</mark> issue <strong><mark>determines the essence of American strategy toward China</strong>, and thus <strong>determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations</u></strong></mark>.”70 Xu Hui, <u>a professor at China's N</u>ational <u>D</u>efense <u>U</u>niversity, <u>holds that “<mark>U.S. policies toward Taiwan</mark> have been and <mark>are the fundamental cause of</mark> some <mark>anti-American sentiment</mark> among the Chinese public</u>. … I assure you that <u><mark>a posture change</mark> of the U.S. policy on Taiwan <mark>will</mark> remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also <mark>strengthen Sino-American cooperation by <strong>winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people</u></strong></mark>.”71 In short, <u><mark>ending the U.S. commitment</mark> to Taiwan <mark>has the potential to <strong>dramatically improve U.S.-China relations</strong>, which</mark> in turn <mark>could <strong>increase</mark> the possibility of <mark>cooperation on other issues</strong> and <strong>reduce the probability of competition and conflict</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1AC

1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

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Damus

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Milpitas BP

Zeppos

1AC - Grand Bargain

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Cyberattacks against mission-critical financial systems are coming now and will succeed unless FinCEN stops them---NW

CORE ‘12

CORE ‘12 [CORE Securities Inc. “Cyber-Situational Awareness in the Financial Sector” 2012 http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/Financial%20Services%20Cyber-Situational%20Awareness.pdf //GBS-JV]

SARs with FinCEN an arm of the U.S. Treasury Department found 56,000 instances of fraudulent wire or funds transfers occurring Countless other reports reinforce the seemingly unstoppable encroachment of dedicated cyber - attacks leveraged against highly mission - critical, interconnected financial systems fraud are rising at very high rates, and people that have money - moving rights are being targeted This is causing material financial losses financial services organizations must assess the integrity of their ACH and check life cycles The number of computer intrusion SAR filings are growing at a fast pace The average) loss per SAR tripled Unknown unauthorized access was the most frequently identified type of computer intrusion meaning Financial Institutions could not or did not identify how the intrusion occurred Spear phishing when end users with high computer access levels are targeted via social engineering) was cited There are a rapidly increasing quantity and multiplicity of profound cyber threats known to currently stalk nearly all ele ctronic aspects of the banking and finance sectors data about specific instances and overarching cyber attack trends playing out throughout these industries remains remarkably scarce. organizations are armed with little in the way of actionable intelligence This failure is caused by a dearth of regulations requiring financial sector entities to detail both attempted and successful attacks to appropriate authorities.

FinCEN reinforce the encroachment of cyber - attacks against critical, systems causing material financial losses could not identify how the intrusion occurred profound cyber threats organizations are armed with little in the way of actionable intelligence This failure is caused by a dearth of regulations requiring financial sector entities to detail both attempted and successful attacks to appropriate authorities.

In the overview of 2009 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 3 (FinCEN), an arm of the U.S. Treasury Department, experts found that of the 56,000 instances of fraudulent wire or funds transfers occurring since 1997, more than half have occurred in the past two years. Countless other reports published in recent years across the financial and IT security sectors reinforce the seemingly unstoppable encroachment of dedicated cyber - attacks leveraged against highly mission - critical, interconnected financial systems. As evidenced Check & ACH fraud are rising at very high rates, and people that have money - moving rights are being targeted . This is causing both small and m id - size companies to experie nce material financial losses. To address this issue, financial services organizations must assess the integrity of their ACH and check life cycles. In the 2007 FDIC Technology Incident Report noted the following troubling IT security trends in the financial sector:  “The number of computer intrusion SAR filings are growing at a fast pace. The estimated mean (average) loss per SAR almost tripled the estimated mean loss per SAR identified one year ago”.  “Unknown unauthorized access was the most frequently identified type of computer intrusion: meaning the Financial Institutions (FI) could not or did not identify how the intrusion occurred -- followed by ID theft/account takeover.”  “Online bill payment applications were most frequently targeted by cyber thieves; however, unauthorized access to ACH and wire transfer applications caused the most losses to FIs in the computer intrusion category.”  “An increase in websites hosting malicious code was noted by FDIC and anti - virus software vendors.” “Spear phishing (when end users with high computer access levels are targeted via social engineering) was also cited in several sampled computer intrusion SARs.” There are a rapidly increasing quantity and multiplicity of profound cyber threats known to currently stalk nearly all ele ctronic aspects of the banking and finance sectors; yet, data about specific instances and overarching cyber attack trends playing out throughout these industries remains remarkably scarce. Industry surveys conducted by independent third parties such as in dustry analysts or media firms surface some baseline cross - sector findings, but organizations are armed with little in the way of actionable intelligence regarding the cyber - attacks faced by their peers. This failure in fostering Financial Sector Threat in cident information sharing is partially caused by a lack of standard methods for reporting or tracking these attacks and also resultant of a dearth of adequate regulations requiring financial sector entities to detail both attempted and successful attacks to appropriate authorities.

<h4>Cyberattacks against mission-critical financial systems are coming now and will succeed <strong>unless FinCEN stops them---NW</h4><p>CORE ‘12</p><p></strong>[CORE Securities Inc. “Cyber-Situational Awareness in the Financial Sector” 2012 http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/Financial%20Services%20Cyber-Situational%20Awareness.pdf<u><strong> //GBS-JV]</p><p></u></strong>In the overview of 2009 Suspicious Activity Reports (<u>SARs</u>) filed <u>with</u> the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 3 (<u><strong><mark>FinCEN</u></strong></mark>), <u>an arm of the U.S. Treasury Department</u>, experts <u>found</u> that of the <u>56,000 instances of fraudulent wire or funds transfers occurring</u> since 1997, more than half have occurred in the past two years. <u>Countless other reports</u> published in recent years across the financial and IT security sectors <u><mark>reinforce</mark> <mark>the</u> <u><strong></mark>seemingly unstoppable <mark>encroachment of </mark>dedicated <mark>cyber - attacks </mark>leveraged <mark>against </mark>highly mission - <mark>critical, </mark>interconnected financial <mark>systems</u></strong></mark>.<u> </u>As evidenced Check & ACH <u>fraud are rising at very high rates, and people that have money - moving rights are being targeted </u>. <u>This is<mark> causing</u></mark> both small and m id - size companies to experie nce <u><strong><mark>material financial losses</u></strong></mark>. To address this issue, <u>financial services organizations must assess the integrity of their ACH and check life cycles</u>. In the 2007 FDIC Technology Incident Report noted the following troubling IT security trends in the financial sector:  “<u>The number of computer intrusion SAR filings are growing at a fast pace</u>. <u>The</u> estimated mean (<u>average) loss per SAR</u> almost <u><strong>tripled</u></strong> the estimated mean loss per SAR identified one year ago”.  “<u><strong>Unknown unauthorized access</u></strong> <u>was the most frequently identified type of computer intrusion</u>: <u>meaning</u> the <u>Financial Institutions</u> (FI) <u><strong><mark>could </mark>not or did <mark>not identify how the intrusion occurred</u></strong></mark> -- followed by ID theft/account takeover.”  “Online bill payment applications were most frequently targeted by cyber thieves; however, unauthorized access to ACH and wire transfer applications caused the most losses to FIs in the computer intrusion category.”  “An increase in websites hosting malicious code was noted by FDIC and anti - virus software vendors.” “<u><strong>Spear phishing</u></strong> (<u>when end users with high computer access levels are targeted via social engineering) was </u>also <u>cited</u> in several sampled computer intrusion SARs.” <u>There are a rapidly increasing quantity and multiplicity of <mark>profound cyber threats </mark>known to currently stalk nearly all ele ctronic aspects of the banking and finance sectors</u>; yet, <u>data about specific instances and overarching cyber attack trends playing out throughout these industries remains <strong>remarkably scarce</strong>. </u>Industry surveys conducted by independent third parties such as in dustry analysts or media firms surface some baseline cross - sector findings, but <u><mark>organizations are armed with little in the way of <strong>actionable intelligence</strong></mark> </u>regarding the cyber - attacks faced by their peers. <u><mark>This failure</u></mark> in fostering Financial Sector Threat in cident information sharing <u><mark>is</u></mark> partially <u><mark>caused by</u></mark> a lack of standard methods for reporting or tracking these attacks and also resultant of <u><strong><mark>a dearth of </u></strong></mark>adequate<u><strong><mark> regulations requiring financial sector entities to detail both attempted and successful attacks to appropriate authorities.</mark> </p></u></strong>

1nc

Offcase

“DA”(lol)

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

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Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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Third, crossing the tipping point increases the risk of war and undermines cooperation. Relations aren’t resilient without the plan.

Lampton 15

Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, May 11th, Available Online at http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/, Accessed 06-29-2016)

For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments that we had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After 9/11 China was seen as non-threatening In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which negative narratives have grown Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the U S should not be dirty words Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side

policy continuity has persisted despite periodic crises no challenges ever destroyed overall assessments that we had shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed gains Things have changed dramatically since 2010. The tipping point is near We are witnessing the erosion of critical underlying supports for positive ties a sequence of developments and incidents have provided fertile soil in which negative narratives have grown the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and confusion about where China is headed If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues and, economic welfare will be diminished The words “accommodation” or “compromise” should not be dirty words Balance and stability should be our objective, not primacy

For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But, none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments in both our nations that we each had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains. Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives in either society to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” as one respected Chinese professor put it, and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After the 9/11 attacks on America, China was seen as non-threatening, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.” In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization. We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1] Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans. What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done? Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the United States should not be dirty words. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side.

<h4><u>Third</u>, crossing the tipping point increases the risk of <u>war</u> and undermines <u>cooperation</u>. Relations <u>aren’t</u> resilient <u>without the plan</u>. </h4><p><strong>Lampton 15</strong> — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, May 11th, Available Online at http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p><u>For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable <mark>policy continuity</u></mark>—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. <u>This continuity <mark>has persisted despite periodic</mark> instabilities, problems, and <mark>crises</mark>. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But</u>, <u><mark>no</mark>ne of these <mark>challenges ever destroyed overall assessments</u></mark> in both our nations <u><mark>that we</u></mark> each <u><mark>had</mark> fundamental, <mark>shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed</mark> possible <mark>gains</u></mark>.</p><p><u>Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives</u> in either society <u>to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,”</u> as one respected Chinese professor put it, <u>and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After</u> the <u>9/11</u> attacks on America, <u>China was seen as non-threatening</u>, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.”</p><p><u>In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests</u> that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. <u>The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. <strong><mark>Things</mark> unfortunately <mark>have changed dramatically since</mark> about <mark>2010</strong>. The <strong>tipping point</strong> is near</mark>. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization</u>.</p><p><u><mark>We are witnessing the erosion of</mark> some <strong><mark>critical underlying supports</strong> for</mark> predominantly <mark>positive</mark> U.S.-China <mark>ties</mark>. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability</u>.</p><p>Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1]</p><p><u>Since about 2008, there has been <mark>a sequence of</mark> regional and global <mark>developments and incidents</mark> that <mark>have provided fertile soil in which</u></mark> these <u><mark>negative narratives have grown</u></mark> in each of our societies. <u>Among them are: <mark>the <strong>2008 financial crisis</strong>, incidents in <strong>Hong Kong</strong>, developments in <strong>the south and east China seas</strong>, U.S. inability to quickly exit <strong>Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires</strong>, and</mark> the <mark>confusion</mark> in America and elsewhere <mark>about <strong>where China is headed</mark> internally and in terms of its foreign policy</u></strong>. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans.</p><p>What is happening? <u><mark>If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have <strong>progressively less security</strong></mark>, at higher cost; <mark>the probabilities of <strong>intentional</strong>, <strong>accidental</strong>, or <strong>catalytic violent confrontations</strong> will increase; the world will enjoy <strong>less cooperation on transnational issues</strong></mark> requiring joint Sino-American efforts; <mark>and, <strong>economic welfare</strong></mark> in both societies <mark>will be diminished</u></mark>. What can be done?</p><p>Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. <u><mark>The words “accommodation” or “compromise”</mark> in either China or the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><strong><mark>should not be dirty words</u></strong></mark>. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. <u><strong><mark>Balance</strong> and <strong>stability</strong></mark> in Asia <mark>should be our objective, not</mark> the <mark>primacy</mark> of either side</u>.</p>

1AC

1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

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1) We impact turn your horizontal strategy-Chinese healthcare and assistance is terrible—caused thousands of people to get diseases through poor regulations and implementation—turns the aff

Two Days Ago BBC

Two Days Ago BBC BBC news is a global network that covers a variety of global issues, “Chinese hospital infects five with HIV by reusing equipment”, BBC, 2-9-17, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38920454?ocid=socialflow_facebook&ns_mchannel=social&ns_campaign=bbcnews&ns_source=facebook, Accessed 2-10

A Chinese hospital has admitted accidentally infecting five people with HIV a technician reused a tube used to treat an individual with HIV on other patients Five people had been sacked at Hangzhou's Zhejiang Provincial Hospital of Chinese Medicine in a statement (in Chinese) they gave no information on how many other patients might have been exposed, what they were being treated for or when the infections occurred low safety standards and insufficient regulation helped spread HIV/Aids in China A provincial-level hospital doesn't follow protocols, who can we trust as average citizens Cases of HIV/Aids rose sharply in China after a major scandal . The remaining blood, now cross-contaminated, was then injected back into the donors so they could donate again soon For years officials tried to cover up the problem and it is still not clear how many were infected. between 30,000 and 50,000 people had contracted HIV through the blood-selling scandal illegal practises remain China said it had 501,000 reported cases of HIV/Aids by the end of 2014

A Chinese hospital has admitted accidentally infecting five people with HIV a technician reused a tube used to treat an individual with HIV But in a statement (in Chinese) they gave no information on how many other patients might have been exposed low safety standards and insufficient regulation helped spread HIV/Aids in China A provincial-level hospital doesn't follow protocols, who can we trust Cases of HIV/Aids rose sharply in China after a major scandal For years officials tried to cover up the problem between 30,000 and 50,000 people had contracted HIV illegal practises remain China said it had 501,000 reported cases of HIV/Aids by the end of 2014

A Chinese hospital has admitted accidentally infecting five people with HIV because a staff member reused medical equipment that should have been discarded. Officials said that a technician reused a tube used to treat an individual with HIV on other patients. Provincial authorities described it as a "severe violation of procedure". Five people had been sacked at Hangzhou's Zhejiang Provincial Hospital of Chinese Medicine, they said. Provincial health officials said they were informed of the situation on 26 January. But in a statement (in Chinese) they gave no information on how many other patients might have been exposed, what they were being treated for or when the infections occurred. Those affected would receive treatment and compensation, the brief statement said. Two decades ago low safety standards and insufficient regulation helped spread HIV/Aids in China, and the news of the hospital incident sparked shock and criticism from social media users. "A provincial-level hospital doesn't follow protocols, who can we trust as average citizens?!", wrote one person on Weibo, China's version of Twitter. "This case is exposed, but what about cases that we don't know? There must have been many more!" wrote another. Blood-selling Cases of HIV/Aids rose sharply in China after a major scandal in Henan province in the 1990s, when farmers who sold their blood contracted HIV through poor safety practices. Donors' collected blood was pooled together and the lucrative plasma removed. The remaining blood, now cross-contaminated, was then injected back into the donors so they could donate again soon. For years officials tried to cover up the problem and it is still not clear how many were infected. China said in 2001 that between 30,000 and 50,000 people had contracted HIV through the blood-selling scandal, but other officials have since suggested the figure was much higher. The scandal did help highlight the ways in which HIV could be passed, and rules surrounding blood donation and transfusions have since improved, but illegal practises remain. In 2006, a group of 19 people sued a hospital in Heilongjiang over transfusions from which they contracted HIV. In a recent report, China said it had 501,000 reported cases of HIV/Aids by the end of 2014. It gave no estimate of unreported cases.

<h4>1) We impact turn your horizontal strategy-Chinese healthcare and assistance is terrible—caused <u>thousands of people</u><strong> to get diseases through poor regulations and implementation—turns the aff</h4><p>Two Days Ago BBC</p><p></strong>BBC news is a global network that covers a variety of global issues, “Chinese hospital infects five with HIV by reusing equipment”, BBC, 2-9-17, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38920454?ocid=socialflow_facebook&ns_mchannel=social&ns_campaign=bbcnews&ns_source=facebook, Accessed 2-10</p><p><u><strong><mark>A Chinese hospital has admitted accidentally infecting five people with HIV</u></strong></mark> because a staff member reused medical equipment that should have been discarded. Officials said that <u><mark>a technician reused a tube used to treat an individual with HIV</mark> on other patients</u>. Provincial authorities described it as a "severe violation of procedure". <u>Five people had been sacked at Hangzhou's Zhejiang Provincial Hospital of Chinese Medicine</u>, they said. Provincial health officials said they were informed of the situation on 26 January. <mark>But <u><strong>in a statement (in Chinese) they gave no information on how many other patients might have been exposed</mark>, what they were being treated for or when the infections occurred</u></strong>. Those affected would receive treatment and compensation, the brief statement said. Two decades ago <u><strong><mark>low safety standards and insufficient regulation helped spread HIV/Aids in China</u></strong></mark>, and the news of the hospital incident sparked shock and criticism from social media users. "<u><mark>A provincial-level hospital doesn't follow protocols, who can we trust</mark> as average citizens</u>?!", wrote one person on Weibo, China's version of Twitter. "This case is exposed, but what about cases that we don't know? There must have been many more!" wrote another. Blood-selling <u><mark>Cases of HIV/Aids rose sharply in China after a major scandal</u></mark> in Henan province in the 1990s, when farmers who sold their blood contracted HIV through poor safety practices. Donors' collected blood was pooled together and the lucrative plasma removed<u>. The remaining blood, now cross-contaminated, was then injected back into the donors so they could donate again soon</u>. <u><strong><mark>For years officials tried to cover up the problem</mark> and it is still not clear how many were infected.</u></strong> China said in 2001 that <u><strong><mark>between 30,000 and 50,000 people had contracted HIV</strong></mark> through the blood-selling scandal</u>, but other officials have since suggested the figure was much higher. The scandal did help highlight the ways in which HIV could be passed, and rules surrounding blood donation and transfusions have since improved, but <u><strong><mark>illegal practises remain</u></strong></mark>. In 2006, a group of 19 people sued a hospital in Heilongjiang over transfusions from which they contracted HIV. In a recent report, <u><strong><mark>China said it had 501,000 reported cases of HIV/Aids by the end of 2014</u></strong></mark>. It gave no estimate of unreported cases.</p>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

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1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

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The 1ACs presentation of the China threat perpetuates an otherizing ideology that creates the conditions for military conflict. Vote Neg to reject their epistemology, this is a pre-requisite to effective policy.

Pan ’04

Pan ’04 - Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, (Chengxin, June-July 2004, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, jstor)//HH

the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93 as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would make war more likely. the "China threat" argument tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

the "China threat is derived from otherness it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening other since it is unable to fit into the U.S. scheme or guarantee security for the United States Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a multifaceted country but it leads to containment that enhance extremism, and hard-line stance Even a small dose is likely to have a dramatic impact on relations containment implies war as the U S presses with defence to guarantee invulnerability it would intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its nuclear arsenal to maintain deterrence the region might be dragged into an escalating arms race that make war likely the "China threat" make war realistic what is needed is to question this scholarship particularly its connections with the way the West represent themselves via positivist epistemology, so more nuanced ways of interpreting and debating China become possible

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93 For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

<h4><strong>The 1ACs presentation of the China threat perpetuates an otherizing ideology that creates the conditions for military conflict. Vote Neg to reject their epistemology, this is a pre-requisite to effective policy. </h4><p><mark>Pan ’04</strong></mark> - Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, (Chengxin, June-July 2004, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, jstor)//HH</p><p>I have argued above that <u><mark>the "China threat</mark>" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature <mark>is derived</mark>, primarily, <mark>from</mark> a discursive construction of <mark>otherness</u></mark>. <u>This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary.</u> Within these frameworks, <u><mark>it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening</mark>, absolute <mark>other since it is unable to fit</mark> neatly <mark>into the U.S.</mark>-led evolutionary <mark>scheme or guarantee</mark> absolute <mark>security for the United States</u></mark>, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. </p><p><u><mark>Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a</mark> dynamic, <mark>multifaceted</mark> <mark>country but it leads</mark> inevitably <mark>to</mark> a policy of <mark>containment that</mark>,</u> in turn, <u>tends to <mark>enhance</mark> the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist <mark>extremism, and hard-line stance</mark> in today's China. <mark>Even a small dose</mark> of the containment strategy <mark>is likely to have a</mark> highly <mark>dramatic impact on</mark> U.S.-China <mark>relations</u></mark>, <u>as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested.</u> In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "<u>a policy of <mark>containment</mark> toward China <mark>implies</mark> the possibility of <mark>war</mark>, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93</p><p></u>For instance, <u><mark>as the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>presses</mark> ahead <mark>with</mark> a missile-<mark>defence</mark> shield <mark>to</mark> "<mark>guarantee</mark>" its <mark>invulnerability</mark> from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, <mark>it would</mark> be almost certain to <mark>intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its</mark> current small <mark>nuclear arsenal</mark> so as <mark>to maintain</mark> the efficiency of its limited <mark>deterrence</u></mark>. In consequence, <u>it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly <mark>the</mark> whole <mark>region</mark>, <mark>might be dragged into an escalating arms race that</mark> would </u>eventually<u> <mark>make war</mark> more <mark>likely</mark>.</p><p></u>Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, <u><mark>the "China threat"</mark> argument</u>, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, <u>tends to <mark>make war</mark> preparedness the most "<mark>realistic</mark>" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives.</p><p></u>Therefore, <u>to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate</u>. Rather, <u><mark>what is needed is to question this </mark>un-self-reflective <mark>scholarship</mark> itself, <mark>particularly its connections with the</mark> dominant <mark>way</mark> in which the United States and <mark>the</mark> <mark>West</mark> in general <mark>represent themselves</mark> and others <mark>via</mark> their <mark>positivist epistemology, so </mark>that alternative, <mark>more nuanced</mark>, and less dangerous <mark>ways of interpreting and debating China</mark> might <mark>become possible</mark>.</p></u>

1nc

Offcase

5

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Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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Finally, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address all global challenges.

Cohen et al. 9

Cohen et al. 9 — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)

Sino-U.S. relations has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other arrangement many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship the most influential in the world the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation

Sino-U.S. relations have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other arrangement the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the financial stability, energy security climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must be a priority Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation.

<h4><u>Finally</u>, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address <u>all global challenges</u>. </h4><p><strong>Cohen et al. 9</strong> — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)</p><p>The evolution of <u><mark>Sino-U.S. relations</u></mark> over the next months, years, and decades <u>has the potential to <mark>have a <strong>greater impact on global security and prosperity</strong> than any other</u></mark> bilateral or multilateral <u><mark>arrangement</u></mark>. In this sense, <u>many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship</u> to be <u>the most influential in the world</u>. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, <u><mark>the <strong>trajectory of U.S.-China relations</strong> will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address <strong>the </mark>toughest global challenges</strong>: <strong>global <mark>financial stability</strong>, <strong>energy security</strong> </mark>and <strong><mark>climate change</strong>, <strong>nonproliferation</strong>, and <strong>terrorism</strong></mark>, among other pressing issues. <mark>Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must</mark> therefore <mark>be a <strong>priority</strong></mark> for Washington and Beijing. <strong><mark>Virtually no major global challenge</strong> can be met without U.S.-China cooperation</u></mark>.</p>

1AC

1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

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Milpitas BP

Zeppos

1AC - Grand Bargain

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2) China’s aid to Africa causes structural violence against citizens and causes military force—turns the aff

Kishi and Clionadh 2015

Kishi and Clionadh 2015

, Accessed 2-10 when Chinese aid to a country increases, political violence rates involving state forces also increase. receiving high levels of Chinese aid has a harmful effect on human rights and on economic and political competition across Africa. When China sends aid, a country’s government becomes more violent toward its citizens. that Chinese aid to African states increase the risk of civilian abuse by giving state leaders and politicians access to funds with which to carry out this violence. As a nation receives more Chinese aid, its military increases its violence against civilians (including bombing them). State leaders use this aid to finance their hold on power by repressing political competitors, such as other political parties and opponents, through tactics such as increased surveillance, detaining and jailing individuals, suppressing peaceful protests, and forced displacement. receipt of Chinese aid is followed by increases in police and military violence. Western aid is not followed by any such increase in violence. Chinese aid does not disproportionately go to countries that typically have high rates of repression, such as dictatorships or countries well-endowed with natural resources. China’s political agenda shapes who gets aid. For example, African states that recognize Taiwan will not receive any aid from China.

when Chinese aid to a country increases, political violence rates increase high levels of Chinese aid has a harmful effect on human rights a country’s government becomes more violent toward its citizens Chinese aid to African states increase the risk of civilian abuse by giving state leaders and politicians access to funds to carry out violence its military increases its violence against civilians (including bombing them leaders use this aid to finance their hold on power by repressing political competitors Western aid is not followed by any such increase in violence

Roudabeh is an Honorary Fellow in the Department of Political Science, the African Studies Program, and the Center for Research on Gender and Women at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. I hold a Ph.D. in Government and Politics, with a focus on international relations and quantitative methodology, from the University of Maryland at College Park. Professor of Political Geography and International Studies Coordinator for the School of Global Studies. Dr. Clionadh Raleigh is a Professor of Human Geography at the University of Sussex. She previously served as a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Trinity College, Dublin and an external researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She is a political geographer, and her work is focused mainly on conflict, governance, and the social consequences of climate change in sub-Saharan Africa. Dr. Raleigh directs the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, which tracks local conflict events in fifty countries. Her current work concerns conflict patterns, government intervention, and drought patterns in the Sahel belt, and appears in journals such as Political Geography. Dr. Raleigh earned her PhD in Geography from the University of Colorado at Boulder, December 2 2015, “When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/02/when-china-gives-aid-to-african-governments-they-become-more-violent/?utm_term=.1bb7053c3981, Accessed 2-10 Further, and most critical, is that when Chinese aid to a country increases, political violence rates involving state forces also increase. We suggest that receiving high levels of Chinese aid has a harmful effect on human rights and on economic and political competition across Africa. When China sends aid, a country’s government becomes more violent toward its citizens. In a new working paper on Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States, we find that Chinese aid to African states increase the risk of civilian abuse by giving state leaders and politicians access to funds with which to carry out this violence. As a nation receives more Chinese aid, its military increases its violence against civilians (including bombing them). State leaders and regimes further use this aid to finance their hold on power by repressing political competitors, such as other political parties and opponents, through tactics such as increased surveillance, detaining and jailing individuals, suppressing peaceful protests, and forced displacement. In countries that receive different and varying levels of Chinese and Western aid, receipt of Chinese aid is followed by increases in police and military violence. Western aid is not followed by any such increase in violence. That’s not because China funds countries that were already violent. Chinese aid does not disproportionately go to countries that typically have high rates of repression, such as dictatorships or countries well-endowed with natural resources. China’s political agenda shapes who gets aid. For example, African states that recognize Taiwan will not receive any aid from China.

<h4>2) China’s aid to Africa <u>causes structural violence</u><strong> against citizens and causes military force—turns the aff</h4><p>Kishi and Clionadh 2015</p><p></strong>Roudabeh is an Honorary Fellow in the Department of Political Science, the African Studies Program, and the Center for Research on Gender and Women at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. I hold a Ph.D. in Government and Politics, with a focus on international relations and quantitative methodology, from the University of Maryland at College Park. Professor of Political Geography and International Studies Coordinator for the School of Global Studies. Dr. Clionadh Raleigh is a Professor of Human Geography at the University of Sussex. She previously served as a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Trinity College, Dublin and an external researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She is a political geographer, and her work is focused mainly on conflict, governance, and the social consequences of climate change in sub-Saharan Africa. Dr. Raleigh directs the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, which tracks local conflict events in fifty countries. Her current work concerns conflict patterns, government intervention, and drought patterns in the Sahel belt, and appears in journals such as Political Geography. Dr. Raleigh earned her PhD in Geography from the University of Colorado at Boulder, December 2 2015, “When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/02/when-china-gives-aid-to-african-governments-they-become-more-violent/?utm_term=.1bb7053c3981<u>, Accessed 2-10</p><p></u>Further, and most critical, is that <u><mark>when Chinese aid to a country increases, <strong>political violence rates</mark> involving state forces also <mark>increase</strong></mark>. </u>We suggest that <u>receiving <mark>high levels of Chinese aid has a harmful effect on human rights</mark> and on economic and political competition across Africa.</u> <u>When China sends aid, <mark>a country’s government becomes more violent toward its citizens</mark>.</u> In a new working paper on Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States, we find <u>that <mark>Chinese aid to African states increase the risk of civilian abuse by giving state leaders and politicians access to funds</mark> with which <mark>to carry out</mark> this <mark>violence</mark>.</u> <u>As a nation receives more Chinese aid, <mark>its military increases its violence against civilians <strong>(including bombing them</strong></mark>).</u> <u>State <mark>leaders</u></mark> and regimes further <u><mark>use this aid to finance their hold on power by repressing political competitors</mark>, such as other political parties and opponents, through tactics such as increased surveillance, detaining and jailing individuals, suppressing peaceful protests, and forced displacement. </u>In countries that receive different and varying levels of Chinese and Western aid, <u>receipt of Chinese aid is followed by increases in police and military violence.</u> <u><strong><mark>Western aid is not followed by any such increase in violence</mark>.</u></strong> That’s not because China funds countries that were already violent. <u>Chinese aid does not disproportionately go to countries that typically have high rates of repression, such as dictatorships or countries well-endowed with natural resources.</u> <u>China’s political agenda shapes who gets aid. For example, African states that recognize Taiwan will not receive any aid from China.</p></u>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

4

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GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

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Contention ( ): Solvency

<h4><u>Contention ( ): Solvency</h4></u>

1AC

1AC — Solvency

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A

Damus

1

Milpitas BP

Zeppos

1AC - Grand Bargain

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China says no- no gain and don’t trust the US

Zimmerman 15

Zimmerman 15 – Thomas, Senior Program Officer at Center on International Cooperation at New York University, “The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the Future of Central Asia”, (http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf) JB

Beijing see little to no gain from coordinating its efforts in Central Asia with the United States. It suspects that the U.S. is interested in engagement only when it wants to influence China It also is concerned that any resources freed redirected toward containing China

Beijing see little to no gain from coordinating its efforts in Central Asia with the U S the U.S. is interested in engagement only when it wants to influence China It also is concerned that any resources freed redirected toward containing China

Beijing seems to see little to no gain from coordinating its efforts in Central Asia with the United States. It suspects that the U.S. is interested in engagement only when it wants to influence China (a common refrain is that “to coordinate is to be coordinated”). It also is concerned that any resources freed in Afghanistan could be redirected toward containing China. The U.S. and China, however, share a number of aligned interests in the region. The preliminary work done by the U.S. in its efforts to connect Afghanistan to its neighbors, as well as the institutional knowledge gained, may prove valuable to China’s own planning. It is also in the U.S. interest to engage China in its planning around the NSRI. China has laid out plans for significant investment in Central Asia. As the U.S. has voiced concerns about entrenching corruption, bad governance, and weakened environmental standards, it must ensure open lines of communication with Beijing to discourage policies that undermine standards. The U.S. has encouraged China’s growing role in Afghanistan, and cooperation there between both countries has been one of the highlights of their bilateral relationship in recent years. It is of mutual benefit to connect Afghanistan to Beijing’s broader regional efforts.

<h4>China says no- no gain and don’t trust the US</h4><p><strong>Zimmerman 15</strong> – Thomas, Senior Program Officer at Center on International Cooperation at New York University, “The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the Future of Central Asia”, (http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf) JB</p><p><u><strong><mark>Beijing</strong></mark> </u>seems to<u> <strong><mark>see little to no gain</u></strong> <u>from coordinating its efforts in Central Asia with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates. It suspects that <mark>the U.S. is interested in engagement <strong>only when it wants to influence China</u></strong></mark> (a common refrain is that “to coordinate is to be coordinated”). <u><mark>It also is concerned that any resources freed</mark> </u>in Afghanistan could be<u> <mark>redirected toward <strong>containing China</u></strong></mark>. The U.S. and China, however, share a number of aligned interests in the region. The preliminary work done by the U.S. in its efforts to connect Afghanistan to its neighbors, as well as the institutional knowledge gained, may prove valuable to China’s own planning. It is also in the U.S. interest to engage China in its planning around the NSRI. China has laid out plans for significant investment in Central Asia. As the U.S. has voiced concerns about entrenching corruption, bad governance, and weakened environmental standards, it must ensure open lines of communication with Beijing to discourage policies that undermine standards. The U.S. has encouraged China’s growing role in Afghanistan, and cooperation there between both countries has been one of the highlights of their bilateral relationship in recent years. It is of mutual benefit to connect Afghanistan to Beijing’s broader regional efforts.</p>

1nc

Case

OBOR

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N

Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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Text: The United States Federal Government should increase its surveillance on future epidemics through intelligence sharing and establishing a collection network to be able to predict and identify the spread of diseases.

<h4>Text: The United States Federal Government should increase its surveillance on future epidemics through intelligence sharing and establishing a collection network to be able to predict and identify the spread of diseases.</h4>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

5

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GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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ACA repeal passes now

Hughes 1-2

Hughes 1-2

, 1/2/17 ln//GBS-JV] the first goal is to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. The Senate’s opening move will be to initiate a controversial process to repeal parts of the law the effort is creating a maze of challenges most pressing is how to develop a replacement without triggering disruptions that accompanied the Democrats’ loss of their Senate majority in 2014. health insurers have stopped writing policies on the exchanges under the law Some Republican lawmakers, whose votes will be crucial to any repeal-and-replace plan, are worried that a repeal would yank the rug out from under people’s coverage. a confirmation hearing for Price will become an early focal point for debate over any repeal plan given years of working to replace the health law’s mandates with tax credits for the purchase of insurance. Republicans will start a legislative process that would allow them to repeal much of the law with a simple majority vote a political necessity given that they hold 52 seats in the chamber, shy of the 60 needed to pass most legislation The resolution would direct Senate committees to reconcile tax and spending legislation with the budget blueprint, also carry the broader goal of dismantling key pillars of the Affordable Care Act. The resulting package would have special procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority.

The Senate’s opening move maze of challenges to develop a replacement without disruptions with a simple majority vote given that they hold 52 seats resolution would reconcile tax and spending legislation The package have procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority

[“Republican Congress Promises to Move Quickly Toward Goals” Wall Street Journal, 1/2/17 ln//GBS-JV] One of the first goals for Republican leaders is to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. The Senate’s opening move, coming as soon as Tuesday, will be to initiate a controversial process to repeal parts of the law, which has brought health insurance to more than 19 million people but has taken a hit as the number of insurers offering coverage on the ACA’s exchanges has shrunk and premiums for exchange plans have jumped. As with many of the Republican goals, the effort is creating a maze of challenges. The most pressing is how to develop a replacement for the 2010 health law without triggering the sort of disruptions that accompanied the law’s rollout, which in turn contributed to the Democrats’ loss of their Senate majority in 2014. Many health insurers have stopped writing policies on the exchanges under the law, leaving individual insurance markets struggling in some states, including GOP-leaning Arizona, Alaska and Tennessee. Some Republican lawmakers, whose votes will be crucial to any repeal-and-replace plan, are worried that a repeal would yank the rug out from under people’s coverage. Republicans also know that a confirmation hearing for Rep. Tom Price (R., Ga.), nominated to serve as Health and Human Services secretary, will become an early focal point for debate over any repeal plan, given the congressman’s years of working to replace the health law’s mandates with tax credits for the purchase of insurance. Senate Republicans as soon as Tuesday will start a legislative process that would allow them to repeal much of the law with a simple majority vote—a political necessity, given that they hold 52 seats in the chamber, shy of the 60 needed to pass most legislation. The first step would be to introduce and start debate on a budget resolution for the 2017 fiscal year, setting up passage by next week. The resolution would direct Senate committees to reconcile tax and spending legislation with the budget blueprint, but also carry the broader goal of dismantling key pillars of the Affordable Care Act. The resulting package would have special procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority.

<h4><strong>ACA repeal passes now</h4><p>Hughes 1-2</p><p></strong>[“Republican Congress Promises to Move Quickly Toward Goals” Wall Street Journal<u>, 1/2/17 ln//GBS-JV]</p><p></u>One of <u>the first goal</u>s for Republican leaders <u><strong>is to dismantle the Affordable Care Act.</u></strong> <u><mark>The Senate’s <strong>opening move</u></strong></mark>, coming as soon as Tuesday, <u>will be to initiate a controversial process to repeal parts of the law</u>, which has brought health insurance to more than 19 million people but has taken a hit as the number of insurers offering coverage on the ACA’s exchanges has shrunk and premiums for exchange plans have jumped. As with many of the Republican goals, <u>the effort is creating a <strong><mark>maze</strong> of challenges</u></mark>. The <u>most pressing is how <mark>to develop a replacement</u></mark> for the 2010 health law <u><mark>without</mark> triggering </u>the sort of <u><mark>disruptions</mark> that accompanied</u> the law’s rollout, which in turn contributed to <u>the Democrats’ loss of their Senate majority in 2014. </u>Many <u>health insurers have stopped writing policies on the exchanges under the law</u>, leaving individual insurance markets struggling in some states, including GOP-leaning Arizona, Alaska and Tennessee. <u>Some Republican lawmakers, <strong>whose votes will be crucial</strong> to any repeal-and-replace plan, are worried that a repeal would <strong>yank the rug out from under people’s coverage. </u></strong>Republicans also know that <u>a confirmation hearing for</u> Rep. Tom <u>Price</u> (R., Ga.), nominated to serve as Health and Human Services secretary, <u>will become an early focal point for debate over any repeal plan</u>, <u>given</u> the congressman’s <u>years of working to replace the health law’s mandates with tax credits for the purchase of insurance. </u>Senate <u>Republicans</u> as soon as Tuesday<u> will start a legislative process that would allow them to repeal much of the law <strong><mark>with a simple majority vote</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>a political necessity</u></strong>, <u><mark>given that they</mark> <mark>hold 52 seats</mark> in the chamber, shy of the 60 needed to pass most legislation</u>. The first step would be to introduce and start debate on a budget resolution for the 2017 fiscal year, setting up passage by next week. <u>The <mark>resolution would</mark> direct Senate committees to <mark>reconcile tax and spending legislation</mark> with the budget blueprint,</u> but <u>also</u> <u><strong>carry the broader goal of dismantling key pillars of the Affordable Care Act</strong>. <mark>The</mark> resulting <mark>package</mark> would <mark>have</mark> special <mark>procedural protections allowing passage by a simple majority</mark>.</p></u>

PTX

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round4.docx

N

MBA

4

Greenhill KS

MELOCHE

we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-MBA-Round4.docx

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HS Policy 2016-17

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OBOR will fail

Holland 16 CHINA’S ‘ONE BELT, ONE ROAD’ PLAN IS DOOMED TO FAIL

Holland 16- Tom, staff writer, WHY CHINA’S ‘ONE BELT, ONE ROAD’ PLAN IS DOOMED TO FAIL, (http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/1999544/why-chinas-one-belt-one-road-plan-doomed-fail) JB

China’s One Belt, One Road plan will fail First, the idea that infrastructure projects in Central and South East Asia could absorb a sizeable portion of China’s excess industrial capacity is simply unrealistic. It is hard to imagine China building enough roads, ports and pipelines across Asia to use up the extra 300 million tonnes of capacity Asia needs infrastructure development, but the region’s capacity to absorb new projects is limited. if Beijing attempts to pursue projects at a pace and in a number sufficient to make a dent in its excess capacity, it will end up building white elephants, wasting money, and encouraging corruption the One Belt, One Road initiative will fall far short of its original objectives

First, the idea that infrastructure projects in Asia could absorb a sizeable portion of China’s excess industrial capacity is simply unrealistic It is hard to imagine China building enough roads, ports and pipelines across Asia to use up the extra 300 million tonnes of capacit Asia needs infrastructure development, but the region’s capacity to absorb new projects is limited. if Beijing attempts to pursue projects it will end up building white elephants the One Belt, One Road initiative will fall far short of its original objectives

All the signs are that China’s One Belt, One Road plan will similarly fail in its main objectives. First, the idea that infrastructure projects in Central and South East Asia could absorb a sizeable portion of China’s excess industrial capacity is simply unrealistic. Consider steel. Currently China’s steel mills can turn out some 1.1 billion tonnes of the metal annually. Yet even with economic stimulus efforts in full swing, no one expects domestic demand to exceed 700 million tonnes this year. It is hard to imagine China building enough roads, ports and pipelines across Asia to use up the extra 300 million tonnes of capacity, especially when you consider that the World Steel Association forecasts demand in the European Union, the world’s largest economy, to be just 150 million tonnes this year. China’s one belt, one road initiative set to transform economy by connecting with trading partners along ancient Silk Road Beijing could try. But if it did, it would run into another problem. Asia needs infrastructure development, but the region’s capacity to absorb new projects is limited. As China has learned at home, building a new high speed rail line or state of the art airport is easy enough given plentiful funding. But building a high speed rail line that is economically viable is altogether more difficult. Inevitably, if Beijing attempts to pursue projects at a pace and in a number sufficient to make a dent in its excess capacity, it will end up building white elephants, wasting money, and encouraging corruption on a scale never before seen. China’s one belt, one road plan covers more than half of the population, 75 per cent of energy resources and 40 per cent of world’s GDP These constraints mean China’s ambition of using lending tied to the One Belt, One Road initiative to help promote the yuan as Asia’s international currency of choice is also destined to fail. What policy-makers had in mind was something akin to the Marshall Plan, by which the United States pumped money into Western Europe in the late 1940s to fund post-war reconstruction, so confirming the US dollar’s position as the world’s dominant reserve currency. But 1940s Europe was very different from Central Asia today. Europe’s physical infrastructure may have been destroyed by war, but its know-how and institutional strength in depth were largely intact. Rebuilding on such foundations was relatively straightforward. Developing Asia’s foundations are still under construction. But while physical capital like a new port or railway can be built in just a few years, building the human and institutional capital that allow that port to operate efficiently and to contribute effectively to economic and social progress is a slower process. The two need to go hand in hand, which is why multi-lateral lenders like the World Bank lay such heavy stress on best practice. The senior officials charged with implementing China’s grand plan appreciate these capacity constraints, and appear to be scaling down their ambitions. That’s sensible, but it means the One Belt, One Road initiative will fall far short of its original objectives, just as its Japanese forerunner did almost 20 years ago.

<h4>OBOR will fail</h4><p><strong>Holland 16</strong>- Tom, staff writer, WHY <u><strong><mark>CHINA’S ‘ONE BELT, ONE ROAD’ PLAN IS DOOMED TO FAIL</u></strong></mark>, (http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/1999544/why-chinas-one-belt-one-road-plan-doomed-fail) JB</p><p>All the signs are that <u><strong>China’s One Belt, One Road plan will</u></strong> similarly <u><strong>fail</u></strong> in its main objectives. <u><mark>First, the idea that infrastructure projects in</mark> Central and South East <mark>Asia could absorb a sizeable portion of China’s excess industrial capacity is simply unrealistic</mark>.</u> Consider steel. Currently China’s steel mills can turn out some 1.1 billion tonnes of the metal annually. Yet even with economic stimulus efforts in full swing, no one expects domestic demand to exceed 700 million tonnes this year.<u> <mark>It is hard to imagine China building enough roads, ports and pipelines across Asia to use up the extra 300 million tonnes of capacit</mark>y</u>, especially when you consider that the World Steel Association forecasts demand in the European Union, the world’s largest economy, to be just 150 million tonnes this year. China’s one belt, one road initiative set to transform economy by connecting with trading partners along ancient Silk Road Beijing could try. But if it did, it would run into another problem. <u><strong><mark>Asia needs infrastructure development, but the region’s capacity to absorb new projects is limited.</mark> </u></strong>As China has learned at home, building a new high speed rail line or state of the art airport is easy enough given plentiful funding. But building a high speed rail line that is economically viable is altogether more difficult. Inevitably, <u><mark>if Beijing attempts to pursue projects</mark> at a pace and in a number sufficient to make a dent in its excess capacity, <mark>it will end up building white elephants</mark>, wasting money, and encouraging corruption</u> on a scale never before seen. China’s one belt, one road plan covers more than half of the population, 75 per cent of energy resources and 40 per cent of world’s GDP These constraints mean China’s ambition of using lending tied to the One Belt, One Road initiative to help promote the yuan as Asia’s international currency of choice is also destined to fail. What policy-makers had in mind was something akin to the Marshall Plan, by which the United States pumped money into Western Europe in the late 1940s to fund post-war reconstruction, so confirming the US dollar’s position as the world’s dominant reserve currency. But 1940s Europe was very different from Central Asia today. Europe’s physical infrastructure may have been destroyed by war, but its know-how and institutional strength in depth were largely intact. Rebuilding on such foundations was relatively straightforward. Developing Asia’s foundations are still under construction. But while physical capital like a new port or railway can be built in just a few years, building the human and institutional capital that allow that port to operate efficiently and to contribute effectively to economic and social progress is a slower process. The two need to go hand in hand, which is why multi-lateral lenders like the World Bank lay such heavy stress on best practice. The senior officials charged with implementing China’s grand plan appreciate these capacity constraints, and appear to be scaling down their ambitions. That’s sensible, but it means <u><strong><mark>the One Belt, One Road initiative will fall far short of its original objectives</u></strong></mark>, just as its Japanese forerunner did almost 20 years ago.</p>

1nc

Case

OBOR

./documents/hspolicy16/GlenbrookSouth/GoSc/Glenbrook%20South-Goldberg-Scott-Neg-Blake-Round4.docx

N

Blake

4

Harris wilson et al

GOLDBERG

went for sick new conditions cp

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1AC Penfold and Fourie 14 evidence says “the weaknesses attributed to vertical programs—which arise due to a lack of follow-through for active case surveillance, integration of disease surveillance into primary healthcare services, and specific disease response services”—proves why disease surveillance is key to implement a vertical approach

<h4>1AC Penfold and Fourie 14 evidence says “the weaknesses attributed to vertical programs—which arise due to a lack of follow-through for active case surveillance, integration of disease surveillance into primary healthcare services, and specific disease response services”—proves why disease surveillance is key to implement a vertical approach</h4>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

Off Case

5

./documents/hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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GFCA State But not really JV

1

Pace HN

Katie Marshall

1AC - Health diplomacy 1NC - China ptx Trump PTX t substantial Canada CP 2NC - CP case 1NR - China ptx Trump PTX 2NR - US PTX Case 2AR - Framing Malaria PTX

hspolicy16/Chattahoochee/AdMu/Chattahoochee-Adam-Mukherjee-Neg-GFCA%20State%20But%20not%20really%20JV-Round1.docx

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First, the plan removes the biggest potential flashpoint for U.S.-Sino nuclear conflict. This creates sustainable peace and strong U.S.-Sino relations — containment strategies are counterproductive.

Glaser 11

Glaser 11 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the U S ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the U S and China have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the U S will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the U S would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the U S found itself following events rather than leading them Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations Given such risks, the U S should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the U S and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics argue Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension

Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the U S and China have such different attitudes regarding the status quo, the issue poses special dangers placing it in a different category A crisis could easily escalate to nuclear war because each step might seem rational improvements in China's military may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements might be interpreted as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations Given such risks, the U S should back away from its commitment This would remove the most contentious flash point and smooth the way for better relations Critics argue Beijing would not be satisfied critics are wrong because accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension

Accommodation On Taiwan? The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China — whatever they might formally agree to — have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations. Given such risks, the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.

<h4><u>First</u>, the plan removes the <u>biggest potential flashpoint</u> for U.S.-Sino nuclear conflict. This creates <u>sustainable peace</u> and <u>strong U.S.-Sino relations</u> — containment strategies are <u>counterproductive</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 11</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)</p><p>Accommodation On Taiwan?</p><p><u>The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy</u> that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly <u>regarding Taiwan</u>. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, <u>China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a <strong>key political goal</strong> for Beijing. China has made clear that it will <strong>use force</strong> if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates' <u>ability to intervene. <mark>Because China places <strong>such high value on Taiwan</strong> and because the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and China</u></mark> — whatever they might formally agree to — <u><mark>have such different attitudes regarding</mark> the legitimacy of <mark>the status quo, the issue poses special dangers</mark> and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, <mark>placing it in <strong>a different category</strong></mark> than Japan or South Korea</u>.</p><p><u><mark>A crisis</mark> over Taiwan <mark>could</mark> <strong>fairly <mark>easily escalate to nuclear war</strong></mark>, <mark>because each step</mark> along the way <mark>might</mark> well <strong><mark>seem rational</strong></mark> to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against <strong>any</strong> sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>found itself following events rather than leading them</u>.</p><p><u>Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing <mark>improvements in China's military</mark> capabilities <mark>may make Beijing <strong>more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis</strong></mark>. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. <mark>China's nuclear modernization might <strong>remove that check on Chinese action</strong>, leading Beijing to behave <strong>more boldly</strong></mark> in future crises than it has in past ones. <mark>A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan</u></mark>, meanwhile, <u><mark>could fuel a <strong>conventional and nuclear arms race</strong>. Enhancements</mark> to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses <mark>might be interpreted</mark> by China <mark>as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and <strong>a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>Given such risks, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should</mark> consider <strong><mark>back</mark>ing <mark>away from its commitment</mark> to Taiwan</strong>. <mark>This would remove <strong>the most</mark> obvious and <mark>contentious flash point</strong></mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>and <strong>smooth the way for better relations</strong></mark> between them in the decades to come. <mark>Critics</u></mark> of such a move <u><mark>argue</u></mark> that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: <u><mark>Beijing would not be satisfied</mark> by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. <strong>The <mark>critics are wrong</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><mark>because</mark> territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, <mark>accommodation can be <strong>an effective policy tool.</strong> When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead</mark> not to further demands but rather <mark>to <strong>satisfaction with the new status quo</strong> and <strong>a reduction of tension</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1AC

1AC — Solvency

./documents/hspolicy16/GeorgetownDay/CaCy/Georgetown%20Day-Camper-Cymerman-Aff-Damus-Round1.docx

A

Damus

1

Milpitas BP

Zeppos

1AC - Grand Bargain

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HS Policy 2016-17

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hs

Trump fights

Mullen 12-5

Jethro Mullen, 12-5-2016, "Trump attacks China on trade but misses the mark," CNNMoney, http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/05/news/economy/trump-china-yuan-dollar-currency-taxes//SCOTT

Trump China-bashing Trump accused China of gaining an unfair advantage over American companies by devaluing its currency and slapping heavy taxes on U.S. products phone call with Taiwan's president on Friday that had already ruffled feathers in Beijing. Blasting China over its currency was a recurring theme of Trump's presidential campaign as he appealed to voters disillusioned with the effects of globalization He labeled Beijing "a big abuser," arguing it has given Chinese exports a boost -- and cost America jobs -- by keeping the yuan artificially low.

Trump accused China of gaining an unfair advantage by devaluing its currency Blasting China over its currency was a recurring theme with the effects of globalization. He labeled Beijing "a big abuser

President-elect Donald Trump has revived some of his China-bashing from the campaign trail -- but the misleading claims still puzzle economists. Trump accused China late Sunday of gaining an unfair advantage over American companies by devaluing its currency and slapping heavy taxes on U.S. products. The attack via Twitter came after a controversial phone call with Taiwan's president on Friday that had already ruffled feathers in Beijing. Blasting China over its currency, the yuan, was a recurring theme of Trump's presidential campaign as he appealed to voters disillusioned with the effects of globalization. He labeled Beijing "a big abuser," arguing it has given Chinese exports a boost -- and cost America jobs -- by keeping the yuan artificially low.

<h4>Trump fights</h4><p>Jethro <strong>Mullen</strong>, <strong>12-5</strong>-2016, "Trump attacks China on trade but misses the mark," CNNMoney, http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/05/news/economy/trump-china-yuan-dollar-currency-taxes//SCOTT</p><p>President-elect Donald <u>Trump</u> has revived some of his <u>China-bashing</u> from the campaign trail -- but the misleading claims still puzzle economists. <u><strong><mark>Trump accused China</u></strong></mark> late Sunday <u><mark>of gaining an <strong>unfair advantage</strong></mark> over American companies <mark>by <strong>devaluing its currency</strong></mark> and slapping heavy <strong>taxes</strong> on U.S. products</u>. The attack via Twitter came after a controversial <u>phone call with Taiwan's president on Friday that had already ruffled feathers in Beijing. <mark>Blasting China over its <strong>currency</u></strong></mark>, the yuan, <u><mark>was a <strong>recurring theme</strong></mark> of Trump's presidential campaign as he appealed to voters disillusioned <mark>with the <strong>effects of globalization</u></strong>. <u>He labeled Beijing "a <strong>big abuser</strong></mark>," arguing it has given Chinese exports a boost -- and cost America jobs -- by keeping the yuan <strong>artificially low</strong>.</p></u>

PTX

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we went for NSG because we didnt want to answer all the add ons we also read an advantage cp oil prices daand ACA ptx(forgot to put an impact in the 1nc whoops)

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OBOR implementation would be catastrophic—turns the case by promoting local instability, undermining economic growth—independently risks Chinese-Russian escalation

Mansharamani 16

Mansharamani 16 - Vikram Mansharamani is a lecturer in the Program on Ethics, Politics & Economics at Yale University and a senior fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. (“China is spending nearly $1 trillion to rebuild the Silk Road,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/china-is-spending-nearly-1-trillion-to-rebuild-the-silk-road/ 3/2/2016) STRYKER

Despite the benefits the Chinese strategy seems to offer, it’s not without risk the sheer ambition of the project is part and parcel with the fragmented and often contradictory process of economic policymaking in China. How implementation goes is anyone’s guess Chinese inroads abroad could produce international tensions Putin has signaled openness but it remains to be seen how far he will tolerate Chinese influence in Central Asia And the countries that are part of this new Silk Route are not without significant credit risks and political risks. Local instability could undermine investment projects in countries like Pakistan they will “provide new routes for the illicit movement of goods and people into China.” Could major Chinese cities emerge as terrorist targets

Chinese strategy risk. fragmented and often contradictory process of economic policymaking in China could produce international tensions Putin remains to be seen how far he will tolerate Chinese influence in Central Asia Local instability could undermine investment projects they will “provide new routes for the illicit movement of goods and people into China.” ,

Despite the clear benefits the Chinese strategy seems to offer, it’s not without risk. The Financial Times pointed out that the sheer ambition of the project is part and parcel with the fragmented and often contradictory process of economic policymaking in China. How implementation goes is anyone’s guess. Further, Chinese inroads abroad could produce international tensions. Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled openness to cooperating with the initiative, but it remains to be seen how far he will tolerate Chinese influence in Central Asia. And the countries that are part of this new Silk Route are not without significant credit risks and political risks. Local instability could undermine investment projects in countries like Pakistan, which is deploying thousands of troops to safeguard China’s investments. The private-intelligence firm Stratfor also points out that the flip side of stronger connections is that they will “provide new routes for the illicit movement of goods and people into China.” Could major Chinese cities emerge as terrorist targets, as New York, Paris and London have in recent years?

<h4>OBOR implementation would be catastrophic—turns the case by promoting local instability, undermining economic growth—independently risks <u>Chinese-Russian escalation</h4><p></u><strong>Mansharamani 16</strong> - Vikram Mansharamani is a lecturer in the Program on Ethics, Politics & Economics at Yale University and a senior fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. (“China is spending nearly $1 trillion to rebuild the Silk Road,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/china-is-spending-nearly-1-trillion-to-rebuild-the-silk-road/ 3/2/2016) STRYKER</p><p><u>Despite the</u> clear <u>benefits the <mark>Chinese strategy</mark> seems to offer, <strong>it’s not without <mark>risk</u></strong>.</mark> The Financial Times pointed out that <u>the sheer ambition of the project is <strong>part and parcel with the <mark>fragmented and often contradictory process of economic policymaking in China</strong></mark>. How implementation goes is anyone’s guess</u>. Further, <u>Chinese inroads abroad <mark>could <strong>produce international tensions</u></strong></mark>. Russian President Vladimir <u><mark>Putin</mark> has signaled openness</u> to cooperating with the initiative, <u>but it <mark>remains to be seen how far he will tolerate Chinese influence in Central Asia</u></mark>. <u>And the countries that are part of this new Silk Route are not without significant credit risks and political risks. <strong><mark>Local instability could undermine investment projects</strong></mark> in countries like Pakistan</u>, which is deploying thousands of troops to safeguard China’s investments. The private-intelligence firm Stratfor also points out that the flip side of stronger connections is that <u><mark>they will “provide new routes for the illicit movement of goods and people into China.” </mark>Could major Chinese cities emerge as <strong>terrorist targets</u></strong><mark>,</mark> as New York, Paris and London have in recent years?</p>

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went for sick new conditions cp

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Second, a quid-pro-quo grand bargain is key — it maintains U.S. resolve.

Glaser 15

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

Insisting on Chinese concessions would demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the U S would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting \Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the U S into dangerous crises with China

Insisting on Chinese concessions would demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the U S would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting \Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that could draw the U S into dangerous crises

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting \Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.

<h4><u>Second</u>, a <u>quid-pro-quo</u> grand bargain is key — it <u>maintains U.S. resolve</u>. </h4><p><strong>Glaser 15</strong> — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Insisting on Chinese concessions</strong> would</u></mark> also <u><mark>demonstrate <strong>U.S. resolve</strong> to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan <strong>contingent on Chinese concessions</strong>, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>would make clear that it is <strong>willing to run the risk</strong> of protecting \Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, <strong>if</strong> China were uncompromising</u></mark>. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, <u>China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests</u> (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), <u>would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, <strong><mark>compared to unilateral concessions</strong>, insisting on a package deal that included</mark> Chinese <mark>concessions would <strong>demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve</strong></mark>. In addition, <mark>resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that</mark>, via alliance commitments, <mark>could draw the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>into <strong>dangerous crises</strong></mark> with China</u>.</p>

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Only upscaled NSA’s metadata program can stop outbreaks, but greater use of the data is key

Mientka 14

Matthew Mientka January 19, 2014 Correspondent for Medical Daily specializes in disease outbreaks such as Ebola and does specific articles about CDC and FDA for over 3 years. “The NSA's Controversial Mass Surveillance Could Help Thwart Disease Outbreaks” http://www.medicaldaily.com/nsas-controversial-mass-surveillance-could-help-thwart-disease-outbreaks-267456

the digital surveillance of American society by the N S A evinces another benefit early warning for infectious disease outbreaks. Whereas traditional disease surveillance may take weeks to identify an outbreak collection of signals intelligence allows the government to predict future epidemics public health authorities might glean real-time information about disease outbreaks, offering the ability to forecast such events Dr. Wenbiao Hu, an investigator from Queensland University of Technology in Australia spikes in online searches for infectious diseases might predict outbreaks of disease, an idea long touted by academics in the United States and elsewhere By analyzing online searches a digital data collection network was found to be able to detect the SARS outbreak more than two months before the first publication by the World Health Organization Early detection means early warning and that can help reduce or contain an epidemic, as well as alert public health authorities to ensure risk management strategies, “ ,” increasing numbers of emerging diseases might be countered with the new growth of mass digital surveillance , government officials expect to make increasingly greater use of mass data.

another benefit early warning for infectious disease outbreaks. Whereas traditional disease surveillance may take weeks to identify an outbreak signals intelligence allows the government to predict future epidemics By analyzing online searches a digital data collection network was found to be able to detect the SARS outbreak more than two months before the first publication by the W H O Early detection means early warning that can contain an epidemic public health authorities to ensure risk management strategies increasing numbers of emerging diseases might be countered with the new growth of mass digital surveillance. government officials expect to make increasingly greater use of mass data.

For many, the massive digital surveillance of American society by the U.S. National Security Agency evinces deep-seated fears of authoritarian dystopia, even as former contractor Edward Snowden gains a mixed status as both traitor and hero, an idealogue who betrayed his oath of secrecy to pursue his own brand of justice. The complexity of balancing individual liberties with the promise of security notwithstanding, the Obama administration might try to soften the government’s image by touting another collective benefit of such intelligence gathering — early warning for infectious disease outbreaks. Whereas traditional disease surveillance may take weeks to identify an outbreak, the collection of signals intelligence, as well as something much less sinister — totally legal analysis of Google searches — allows the government to potentially predict future epidemics. Rather than analyzing doctor reports over time, public health authorities might glean real-time information about disease outbreaks, offering the ability to forecast such events like the weather. Dr. Wenbiao Hu, an investigator from Queensland University of Technology in Australia, told reporters last week that spikes in online searches for infectious diseases might predict outbreaks of disease, an idea long touted by academics in the United States and elsewhere. “This is because traditional surveillance relies on the patient recognizing the symptoms and seeking treatment before diagnosis, along with the time taken for health professionals to alert authorities through their health networks,” Hu said, according to Business Standard. “In contrast, digital surveillance can provide real-time detection of epidemics.” By analyzing online searches, scientists might have predicted the 2005-2006 avian influenza epidemic a week or two ahead of official reports that used traditional means. “In another example, a digital data collection network was found to be able to detect the SARS outbreak more than two months before the first publication by the World Health Organization,” Hu said. “Early detection means early warning and that can help reduce or contain an epidemic, as well as alert public health authorities to ensure risk management strategies, such as the provision of adequate medication, are implemented.” Investigators next want to incorporate more forms of digital media into the analysis, including social media platforms such as Twitter. “There is the potential for digital technology to revolutionize emerging infectious disease surveillance,” Hu said. “While this study has looked at the effectiveness of digital surveillance systems retrospectively, Australia is well-placed to take the lead in developing a real-time infectious disease warning surveillance system.” Hu and his colleagues published a paper in November in The Lancet Diseases describing how increasing numbers of emerging diseases might be countered with the new growth of mass digital surveillance. “The increase in emerging infectious diseases has led to calls for new technologies and approaches for detection, tracking, reporting, and response. Internet-based surveillance systems offer a novel and developing means of monitoring conditions of public health concern, including emerging infectious diseases,” Hu and his team wrote. Although many Americans remain leery of mass surveillance, government health officials expect to make increasingly greater use of mass data.

<h4>Only upscaled NSA’s metadata program can stop outbreaks, <u>but greater use of the data is key</h4><p></u>Matthew <strong>Mientka</strong> January 19, 20<strong>14</strong> <u>Correspondent for Medical Daily specializes in disease outbreaks such as Ebola and does specific articles about CDC and FDA for over 3 years. “The NSA's Controversial Mass Surveillance Could Help Thwart Disease Outbreaks” http://www.medicaldaily.com/nsas-controversial-mass-surveillance-could-help-thwart-disease-outbreaks-267456</p><p></u>For many, <u>the</u> massive <u>digital surveillance of American society by the</u> U.S. <u><strong>N</u></strong>ational <u><strong>S</u></strong>ecurity <u><strong>A</u></strong>gency <u>evinces</u> deep-seated fears of authoritarian dystopia, even as former contractor Edward Snowden gains a mixed status as both traitor and hero, an idealogue who betrayed his oath of secrecy to pursue his own brand of justice. The complexity of balancing individual liberties with the promise of security notwithstanding, the Obama administration might try to soften the government’s image by touting <u><mark>another</mark> </u>collective<u> <mark>benefit </u></mark>of such intelligence gathering<u> </u>— <u><strong><mark>early warning for infectious disease outbreaks.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Whereas traditional disease surveillance may take weeks to identify an outbreak</u></mark>, the <u><strong>collection of <mark>signals intelligence</u></strong></mark>, as well as something much less sinister — totally legal analysis of Google searches — <u><mark>allows the government to</mark> </u>potentially<u> <strong><mark>predict future epidemics</u></strong></mark>. Rather than analyzing doctor reports over time, <u>public health authorities might glean <strong>real-time information about disease outbreaks, offering the ability to forecast such events</u></strong> like the weather. <u>Dr. Wenbiao Hu, an investigator from Queensland University of Technology in Australia</u>, told reporters last week that <u>spikes in online searches for infectious diseases might predict outbreaks of disease, an idea long touted by academics in the United States and elsewhere</u>. “This is because traditional surveillance relies on the patient recognizing the symptoms and seeking treatment before diagnosis, along with the time taken for health professionals to alert authorities through their health networks,” Hu said, according to Business Standard. “In contrast, digital surveillance can provide real-time detection of epidemics.”<u> <mark>By analyzing online searches</u></mark>, scientists might have predicted the 2005-2006 avian influenza epidemic a week or two ahead of official reports that used traditional means. “In another example, <u><mark>a digital data <strong>collection network was found to be able to detect the SARS outbreak more than two months before the first publication by the W</mark>orld<mark> H</mark>ealth<mark> O</mark>rganization</u></strong>,” Hu said. “<u><strong><mark>Early detection means early</mark> <mark>warning</mark> and <mark>that can</mark> help reduce or <mark>contain an epidemic</strong></mark>,</u> <u>as well as alert <mark>public health authorities to ensure risk management strategies</mark>,</u> such as the provision of adequate medication, are implemented.” Investigators next want to incorporate more forms of digital media into the analysis, including social media platforms such as Twitter. <u>“</u>There is the potential for digital technology to revolutionize emerging infectious disease surveillance<u>,” </u>Hu said. “While this study has looked at the effectiveness of digital surveillance systems retrospectively, Australia is well-placed to take the lead in developing a real-time infectious disease warning surveillance system.” Hu and his colleagues published a paper in November in The Lancet Diseases describing how<u> <mark>increasing numbers of emerging diseases might be countered with the new growth of mass digital surveillance</u>.</mark> “The increase in emerging infectious diseases has led to calls for new technologies and approaches for detection, tracking, reporting, and response. Internet-based surveillance systems offer a novel and developing means of monitoring conditions of public health concern, including emerging infectious diseases,” Hu and his team wrote. Although many Americans remain leery of mass surveillance<u>, <mark>government</mark> </u>health<u> <mark>officials <strong>expect to make increasingly greater use of mass data.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC Round 1 JV State v Pace HN

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