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The attempt to create a public consciousness over disability within contemporary culture only serves to commodify and destroy the Other vampirically

Wood ‘09. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009).

Julia Frances Gruson-Wood ‘09. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009).

The docile body, through simulacra, mutates the materiality of the body into iconography designed to enter and refuse entrance to a controlled system of embodiment inclusion that constitute contemporary quests for diversity reassert white-washed commodification of “The Other” Otherness is offered as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and feeling race and ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture The kitsch aesthetic—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—is exclusively an ableist aesthetic. This incorporates the disenfranchisement of racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed Others due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves disabled African Americans often remained chained to serving their white masters As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity “an inappropriate style obfuscates the content” “the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action” In normate kitsch culture, coherence and competence are a matter of readability and simulacra an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style not only obfuscates the content, but is misunderstood as lack of content, void of sentience. The true function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, above all, the reality of “shit and death”— while simultaneously killing difference off In this politico-aesthetic stringency, any slight deviation is hyperbolized, monstrosized, and stigmatized. Yet mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. Othered bodies are adorned and gawked at Because there is no recognition, accountability, or justice connected to arts preoccupation of disability the value embedded in disability aesthetics is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation in order to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is yet another spice that seasons normate culture. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten” disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.

The body mutates materiality inclusion that constitute for diversity reassert white-washed commodification of “The Other”. Otherness is a new delight intense satisfying way of doing and feeling ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice that can liven up the dull dish that is culture The kitsch aesthetic is an ableist aesthetic This incorporates the disenfranchisement of Others In normate culture competence are a matter of readability an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style obfuscates the content void of sentience The function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, the reality of “shit and death while simultaneously killing difference off any slight deviation is stigmatized Othered bodies are adorned and gawked at Because there is no recognition connected to arts preoccupation of disability the value embedded in disability is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is a spice that seasons normate culture differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.

The docile body, through simulacra, mutates the materiality of the body into iconography. It transforms the body into a coding process, designed to enter and refuse entrance to a meticulously controlled system of embodiment. Davide Panagia (2006) claims, “our understandings of political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 2). The normative aesthetic of standardization acts as metaphor for ableist values and notions of what it means to be human. In the article “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance”, bell hooks (1992) critiques how the modes of inclusion that constitute contemporary quests for diversity reassert an ahistorical account of white-washed commodification of “The Other”. hooks argues: “The commodification of Otherness has been so successful because it is offered as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and feeling” (1992, p. 21). She goes on to explain how race and ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” (1992, p. 21). hooks’s notion of delight and satisfaction found in racial Otherness articulates how the design of normate commodity culture is built around the mass production of “familiarity”, in which the docile body mushrooms into the realm of omnipresence. The normalization of contemporary culture inverts democratic citizenship to simulacratic citizenship, reduces the phenomenology of existence, and shrinks modes of doing and feeling into the sum total of replication (of ableist embodiment) and consumption (of internalizing, purchasing, and enforcing ableist embodiment). [Continues] There are many forms of disability that inhibit the ability to enact the compulsory embodiment of normate kitsch scripture. The kitsch aesthetic—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—is exclusively an ableist aesthetic. This incorporates the disenfranchisement of racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed Others due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits. For example, in climates where whiteness is considered an essential trait, people of colour will be framed as deficient; in climates where heterosexuality is perceived as an essential trait, queer people will be contextualized under the rubric of impairment; in a capitalistic culture that valorizes economic competitiveness, having low income or not engaging in the paid economy will be constructed as blemished. Jim Downs (2008) provides a poignant example of kitsch as an exclusively ableist form of cultural mobility when he explicates the ways in which the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves. While able-bodied people of colour were able to physically leave the plantation and join the workforce, disabled African Americans who were physically unable to exit the plantation, and were unaccounted for in the paid workforce, often remained chained to their previous duties of serving their white masters. Thus, what is known as the end of slavery was, more specifically, the end of slavery for able-bodied people of colour. Tamar Mayer (2000) discusses the Zionist invention of “The Muscle Jew” as born out of the need to “free the Jews of Europe from their constant battles with anti-Semitism” by constructing a hyper-able-bodied soldier, with the body of a gymnast, as the New Jew. Nordau, one of the leaders of Zionism, claimed that “ghetto Jews”, with their “limp” and “frail” bodies and relationship to intellectualism and the arts, likened them to “degenerates” (2000, p. 286–287). In so doing, Nordau, along with other Zionists, conceptualized the emancipation from anti-Semitism as possible by escaping comparability with degeneracy through the brute force of able-bodied kitsch embodiment, which was simultaneously utilized as the basis and symbol for the Jewish nation-state. Accordingly, able-bodiedness sometimes conceptually or materially ameliorates the level of disenfranchisement an individual will endure. The end of slavery, along with the Muscle Jew, is indicative of the divergent ways in which the prioritization of the body as machinery of power has been expressed when considering intersectional identities, oppression, and emancipation. As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity, embodied normality does not just encapsulate the physical appearance of the body as machinery of power, but also the meticulous control of the machine as a whole. The objective of Davide Panagia’s (2006) text, “A Poetics of Political Thinking”, is to be “attuned to the normative dimensions of the technologies of evaluation …of competence that govern political participation” (p. 9). Within normative modes of ethical political thought, Panagia explains how “an inappropriate style obfuscates the content” (2006, p. 11). He continues, arguing “the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action” (2006, p. 17). The insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent depends on the a priori assumption that coherence is a definable, knowable phenomenon. But the only way in which coherence can be seamlessly identified and enforced is through the regulation of a particular style, that is, through the process of replication and standardization, deemed appropriate. Accordingly, “the kind of language we use, its tone, cadence, and appearance–carry ethical weight in that they count as systems of control that qualify access to the institutions of power in our political systems” (Panagia, 2006, p. 9). In the milieu of normate kitsch culture, coherence and competence are a matter of readability and simulacra. Embodiments that deviate from the hyper-real presence of docile subjectivity are thus perceived as a severe and rare mutation from the dominance of the norm, interpreted as incoherent, chaotic, and faulty. An example of this is the story of a quadriplegic women, Ruth, who communicated by smiling, frowning, making vocalizations, and facial expressions (Stefans, 1993). Once her parents became elderly, Ruth was sent to an institution in which she was labelled “imbecile” and treated as if she was not sentient. It was through forming bonds with other residents that Ruth began to communicate again with others. The staff did not notice Ruth communicating because “she had been presented to them as an imbecile” (Stefans, 1993, p. 1). Once, by sheer chance, two attendants in the room noticed Ruth communicating. It was from this that Ruth was given a communication board. Now Ruth has started a family and is writing her memoirs. In “A Voice Unheard: The Latimer Case and People with Disabilities”, Ruth Enns (1999) discusses how Laura and Robert Latimer turned down a recommended surgery for their daughter, Tracy, on the basis that it would result in her being “mutilated” (p. 3). In court, after Tracy’s murder, Enns argues that the defence’s description of Tracy’s never-to-be surgery was, “grotesquely dehumanizing: ‘in effect sawing off the leg but cosmetically leaving it dangling there’” (1999, p. 12). Enns argues that this articulation framed Tracy in such a way that her “leg would not have been a part of her body, as though she had been a collection of defective body parts and the surgery would have rendered her life even less valuable than before” (1999, p. 12). In the second trial, the defence added that her leg would be “flailing around there” and “flopping” (1999, p. 12). Robert Latimer, on the other hand, was constructed as benevolent in murdering his daughter, his motives were “normal human instinct…the only reasonable course” (1999, p. 12). The experiences of Ruth and Tracy articulate the ways in which an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style—whether linguistic and/or physical—not only obfuscates the content, but is misunderstood as lack of content, void of sentience. The true function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, above all, the reality of “shit and death”— while simultaneously killing difference off (Foster, 2005, p. 29). In this milieu of politico-aesthetic stringency, any slight deviation from the perceived norm is hyperbolized, monstrosized, and stigmatized. Yet inevitably, the tight rigidity of mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze, in which it becomes more and more difficult to feel. Thus, subjects who fall under the rubric of normality may feel burdened by the banality of their object of mimicry and consumption, and thus learn to manage and internalize the weight of obligation involved in adhering to kitsch. Because kitschy cuisine cannot satisfy the complexities and various longings of the human appetite for existence, racialized and disabled Others have been the spice and the seasoning that liven up the dull dish of white-washed, ableist predictability. Portholes of temporary escapism and release become a necessary fixture within the construct of normate culture. The effect of “consumer cannibalism” not only “displaces the Other but denies the significance of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (hooks, 1992, p. 31). Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real and commonness of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. Othered bodies are simultaneously adorned and gawked at through the voyeuristic gaze of the various and versatile, high and low, cultural texts of the secularized arts. As hooks claims, “fantasies about the Other can be continually exploited…such exploitation will occur in a manner that re-inscribes and maintains the status quo” (1992, p. 22). Because there is no recognition, accountability, or justice connected to arts preoccupation and favouring of disability as its primary aesthetic, the value embedded in disability aesthetics is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation in order to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is yet another spice that seasons normate culture. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference. hooks’s greatest fear is that “cultural, ethnic, and racial differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate—that the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten” (1992, p. 39). I share her alarm as it is presented with disability aesthetics, in which disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.

<h4><strong>The attempt to create a public consciousness over disability within contemporary culture only serves to commodify and destroy the Other vampirically</h4><p></strong>Julia Frances Gruson-<strong>Wood ‘09<u>. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009).</p><p><mark>The</mark> docile <mark>body</mark>, through simulacra, <mark>mutates</mark> the <mark>materiality</mark> of the body into iconography</u></strong>. It transforms the body into a coding process, <u><strong>designed to enter and refuse entrance to a</u></strong> meticulously <u><strong>controlled system of embodiment</u></strong>. Davide Panagia (2006) claims, “our understandings of political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 2). The normative aesthetic of standardization acts as metaphor for ableist values and notions of what it means to be human. In the article “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance”, bell hooks (1992) critiques how the modes of <u><strong><mark>inclusion that constitute</mark> contemporary quests <mark>for diversity reassert</u></strong></mark> an ahistorical account of <u><strong><mark>white-washed commodification of “The Other”</u></strong>.</mark> hooks argues: “The commodification of <u><strong><mark>Otherness</u></strong></mark> has been so successful because it <u><strong><mark>is</mark> offered as <mark>a new delight</mark>, more <mark>intense</mark>, more <mark>satisfying</mark> than normal <mark>way</mark>s <mark>of doing and feeling</u></strong></mark>” (1992, p. 21). She goes on to explain how <u><strong>race and <mark>ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice</u></strong></mark>, seasoning <u><strong><mark>that can liven up the dull dish that is</mark> mainstream white <mark>culture</u></strong></mark>” (1992, p. 21). hooks’s notion of delight and satisfaction found in racial Otherness articulates how the design of normate commodity culture is built around the mass production of “familiarity”, in which the docile body mushrooms into the realm of omnipresence. The normalization of contemporary culture inverts democratic citizenship to simulacratic citizenship, reduces the phenomenology of existence, and shrinks modes of doing and feeling into the sum total of replication (of ableist embodiment) and consumption (of internalizing, purchasing, and enforcing ableist embodiment). [Continues] There are many forms of disability that inhibit the ability to enact the compulsory embodiment of normate kitsch scripture. <u><strong><mark>The kitsch aesthetic</mark>—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—<mark>is</mark> exclusively <mark>an ableist aesthetic</mark>. <mark>This incorporates the disenfranchisement of</mark> racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed <mark>Others</mark> due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits</u></strong>. For example, in climates where whiteness is considered an essential trait, people of colour will be framed as deficient; in climates where heterosexuality is perceived as an essential trait, queer people will be contextualized under the rubric of impairment; in a capitalistic culture that valorizes economic competitiveness, having low income or not engaging in the paid economy will be constructed as blemished. Jim Downs (2008) provides a poignant example of kitsch as an exclusively ableist form of cultural mobility when he explicates the ways in which <u><strong>the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves</u></strong>. While able-bodied people of colour were able to physically leave the plantation and join the workforce, <u><strong>disabled African Americans</u></strong> who were physically unable to exit the plantation, and were unaccounted for in the paid workforce, <u><strong>often remained chained to</u></strong> their previous duties of <u><strong>serving their white masters</u></strong>. Thus, what is known as the end of slavery was, more specifically, the end of slavery for able-bodied people of colour. Tamar Mayer (2000) discusses the Zionist invention of “The Muscle Jew” as born out of the need to “free the Jews of Europe from their constant battles with anti-Semitism” by constructing a hyper-able-bodied soldier, with the body of a gymnast, as the New Jew. Nordau, one of the leaders of Zionism, claimed that “ghetto Jews”, with their “limp” and “frail” bodies and relationship to intellectualism and the arts, likened them to “degenerates” (2000, p. 286–287). In so doing, Nordau, along with other Zionists, conceptualized the emancipation from anti-Semitism as possible by escaping comparability with degeneracy through the brute force of able-bodied kitsch embodiment, which was simultaneously utilized as the basis and symbol for the Jewish nation-state. Accordingly, able-bodiedness sometimes conceptually or materially ameliorates the level of disenfranchisement an individual will endure. The end of slavery, along with the Muscle Jew, is indicative of the divergent ways in which the prioritization of the body as machinery of power has been expressed when considering intersectional identities, oppression, and emancipation. <u><strong>As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity</u></strong>, embodied normality does not just encapsulate the physical appearance of the body as machinery of power, but also the meticulous control of the machine as a whole. The objective of Davide Panagia’s (2006) text, “A Poetics of Political Thinking”, is to be “attuned to the normative dimensions of the technologies of evaluation …of competence that govern political participation” (p. 9). Within normative modes of ethical political thought, Panagia explains how <u><strong>“an inappropriate style obfuscates the content”</u></strong> (2006, p. 11). He continues, arguing <u><strong>“the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action”</u></strong> (2006, p. 17). The insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent depends on the a priori assumption that coherence is a definable, knowable phenomenon. But the only way in which coherence can be seamlessly identified and enforced is through the regulation of a particular style, that is, through the process of replication and standardization, deemed appropriate. Accordingly, “the kind of language we use, its tone, cadence, and appearance–carry ethical weight in that they count as systems of control that qualify access to the institutions of power in our political systems” (Panagia, 2006, p. 9). <u><strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> the milieu of <u><strong><mark>normate</mark> kitsch <mark>culture</mark>, coherence and <mark>competence are a matter of readability</mark> and simulacra</u></strong>. Embodiments that deviate from the hyper-real presence of docile subjectivity are thus perceived as a severe and rare mutation from the dominance of the norm, interpreted as incoherent, chaotic, and faulty. An example of this is the story of a quadriplegic women, Ruth, who communicated by smiling, frowning, making vocalizations, and facial expressions (Stefans, 1993). Once her parents became elderly, Ruth was sent to an institution in which she was labelled “imbecile” and treated as if she was not sentient. It was through forming bonds with other residents that Ruth began to communicate again with others. The staff did not notice Ruth communicating because “she had been presented to them as an imbecile” (Stefans, 1993, p. 1). Once, by sheer chance, two attendants in the room noticed Ruth communicating. It was from this that Ruth was given a communication board. Now Ruth has started a family and is writing her memoirs. In “A Voice Unheard: The Latimer Case and People with Disabilities”, Ruth Enns (1999) discusses how Laura and Robert Latimer turned down a recommended surgery for their daughter, Tracy, on the basis that it would result in her being “mutilated” (p. 3). In court, after Tracy’s murder, Enns argues that the defence’s description of Tracy’s never-to-be surgery was, “grotesquely dehumanizing: ‘in effect sawing off the leg but cosmetically leaving it dangling there’” (1999, p. 12). Enns argues that this articulation framed Tracy in such a way that her “leg would not have been a part of her body, as though she had been a collection of defective body parts and the surgery would have rendered her life even less valuable than before” (1999, p. 12). In the second trial, the defence added that her leg would be “flailing around there” and “flopping” (1999, p. 12). Robert Latimer, on the other hand, was constructed as benevolent in murdering his daughter, his motives were “normal human instinct…the only reasonable course” (1999, p. 12). The experiences of Ruth and Tracy articulate the ways in which <u><strong><mark>an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style</u></strong></mark>—whether linguistic and/or physical—<u><strong>not only <mark>obfuscates the content</mark>, but is misunderstood as lack of content, <mark>void of sentience</mark>. <mark>The</mark> true <mark>function of kitsch is “to curtain off”,</mark> above all, <mark>the reality of “shit and death</mark>”— <mark>while simultaneously killing difference off</u></strong></mark> (Foster, 2005, p. 29). <u><strong>In this</u></strong> milieu of <u><strong>politico-aesthetic stringency, <mark>any slight deviation</u></strong></mark> from the perceived norm <u><strong><mark>is</mark> hyperbolized, monstrosized, and <mark>stigmatized</mark>. Yet</u></strong> inevitably, the tight rigidity of <u><strong>mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze</u></strong>, in which it becomes more and more difficult to feel. Thus, subjects who fall under the rubric of normality may feel burdened by the banality of their object of mimicry and consumption, and thus learn to manage and internalize the weight of obligation involved in adhering to kitsch. Because kitschy cuisine cannot satisfy the complexities and various longings of the human appetite for existence, racialized and disabled Others have been the spice and the seasoning that liven up the dull dish of white-washed, ableist predictability. Portholes of temporary escapism and release become a necessary fixture within the construct of normate culture. The effect of “consumer cannibalism” not only “displaces the Other but denies the significance of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (hooks, 1992, p. 31). <u><strong>Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real</u></strong> and commonness <u><strong>of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. <mark>Othered bodies are</u></strong></mark> simultaneously <u><strong><mark>adorned and gawked at</u></strong></mark> through the voyeuristic gaze of the various and versatile, high and low, cultural texts of the secularized arts. As hooks claims, “fantasies about the Other can be continually exploited…such exploitation will occur in a manner that re-inscribes and maintains the status quo” (1992, p. 22). <u><strong><mark>Because there is no recognition</mark>, accountability, or justice <mark>connected to arts preoccupation</u></strong></mark> and favouring <u><strong><mark>of disability</u></strong></mark> as its primary aesthetic, <u><strong><mark>the value embedded in disability</mark> aesthetics <mark>is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation </mark>in order <mark>to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is </mark>yet <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>spice that seasons normate culture</mark>. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference</u></strong>. hooks’s greatest fear is that “cultural, ethnic, and racial <u><strong><mark>differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate</u></strong></mark>—that <u><strong><mark>the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten</mark>”</u></strong> (1992, p. 39). I share her alarm as it is presented with disability aesthetics, in which <u><strong><mark>disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.</p></u></strong></mark>

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U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes

Padgett 13 , AB

Tim Padgett 13 WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/, AB

the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey But the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence That conclusion by OAS , is one that a growing number of Latin American governments which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana is in reality an “exit” drug. it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The OAS concludes trends in the hemisphere “lean toward legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies have jointly called for marijuana legalization Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

the O A S has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey. the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard to ignore. Most Latin American leaders already made it clear to Obama that it’s time to legaliz The OAS concludes trends lean toward legalization of marijuana Now that the OAS has joined that chorus the White House and Congress need to join the discussion

On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved, as Washington’s lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear: It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, by OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments — including Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept. Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — is in reality an “exit” drug. If so, it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza acknowledged the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes that trends in the hemisphere “lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — have jointly called for marijuana legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

<h4>U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes</h4><p>Tim <strong>Padgett 13</strong> WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/<u><strong>, AB</p><p></u></strong>On the Latin American street, <u><mark>the O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has always borne a reputation</u></mark>, often undeserved, <u><mark>as Washington’s</u> <u>lackey</u>.</mark> <u>But <mark>the OAS</u></mark>, based in Washington, <u><mark>just sent the western hemisphere a message</mark> the White House would rather not hear</u>: <u><strong><mark>It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana</strong></mark> as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence</u>. <u>That conclusion</u>, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, <u>by OAS</u> Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza<u>, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments</u> — including Uruguay, <u>which</u> <u>might legalize marijuana this year — are <strong>urging</strong> the <strong>Obama</strong> Administration</u> <u><strong>to accept</u></strong>. <u><mark>Having the motion seconded by <strong>Washington’s “lackey”</strong> makes it hard</mark>er <mark>to ignore.</mark> </u>But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. <u>It</u> <u>will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana</u> — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — <u>is in reality an “exit” drug.</u> If so, <u>it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug</u>, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” <u><mark>Most Latin American leaders</mark> — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — <mark>already made it clear to</mark> President <mark>Obama</mark> at last year’s Summit of the Americas in</u> Cartagena, Colombia, <u><mark>that it’s <strong></mark>high <mark>time</strong> to </mark>ask whether marijuana <mark>legaliz</mark>ation might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem</u>. (Studies indicate <u>it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.)</u> Insulza acknowledged <u>the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. <mark>The</u></mark> 400-page <u><mark>OAS</u></mark> study itself <u><mark>concludes</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>trends</strong></mark> in the hemisphere “<strong><mark>lean toward</mark> </u></strong>decriminalization or<u><strong> <mark>legalization</strong></mark> <mark>of </mark>the production, sale and use of <mark>marijuana</u></mark>. Sooner or later, <u><strong>decisions in this area will need to be taken.”</u></strong> Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. <u>Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies</u> — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — <u><strong>have jointly called for marijuana legalization</u></strong>. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. <u><strong><mark>Now that the OAS has joined that chorus</mark>, both <mark>the White House and</mark> the U.S. <mark>Congress need to join the discussion</mark> with more open ears.</p></u></strong>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes

Padgett 13 , AB

Tim Padgett 13 WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/, AB

the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey But the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence That conclusion by OAS , is one that a growing number of Latin American governments which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana is in reality an “exit” drug. it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The OAS concludes trends in the hemisphere “lean toward legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies have jointly called for marijuana legalization Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

the O A S has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey. the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard to ignore. Most Latin American leaders already made it clear to Obama that it’s time to legaliz The OAS concludes trends lean toward legalization of marijuana Now that the OAS has joined that chorus the White House and Congress need to join the discussion

On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved, as Washington’s lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear: It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, by OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments — including Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept. Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — is in reality an “exit” drug. If so, it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza acknowledged the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes that trends in the hemisphere “lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — have jointly called for marijuana legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

<h4>U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes</h4><p>Tim <strong>Padgett 13</strong> WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/<u><strong>, AB</p><p></u></strong>On the Latin American street, <u><strong><mark>the O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has always borne a reputation</u></strong></mark>, often undeserved, <u><strong><mark>as Washington’s</u></strong> <u><strong>lackey</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>But <mark>the OAS</u></strong></mark>, based in Washington, <u><strong><mark>just sent the western hemisphere a message</mark> the White House would rather not hear</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana</mark> as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence</u></strong>. <u><strong>That conclusion</u></strong>, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, <u><strong>by OAS</u></strong> Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza<u><strong>, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments</u></strong> — including Uruguay, <u><strong>which</u></strong> <u><strong>might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration</u></strong> <u><strong>to accept</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard</mark>er <mark>to ignore.</mark> </u></strong>But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. <u><strong>It</u></strong> <u><strong>will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana</u></strong> — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — <u><strong>is in reality an “exit” drug.</u></strong> If so, <u><strong>it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug</u></strong>, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” <u><strong><mark>Most Latin American leaders</mark> — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — <mark>already made it clear to</mark> President <mark>Obama</mark> at last year’s Summit of the Americas in</u></strong> Cartagena, Colombia, <u><strong><mark>that it’s </mark>high <mark>time to </mark>ask whether marijuana <mark>legaliz</mark>ation might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem</u></strong>. (Studies indicate <u><strong>it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.)</u></strong> Insulza acknowledged <u><strong>the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. <mark>The</u></strong></mark> 400-page <u><strong><mark>OAS</u></strong></mark> study itself <u><strong><mark>concludes</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>trends</mark> in the hemisphere “<mark>lean toward</mark> </u></strong>decriminalization or<u><strong> <mark>legalization</mark> <mark>of </mark>the production, sale and use of <mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark>. Sooner or later, <u><strong>decisions in this area will need to be taken.”</u></strong> Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. <u><strong>Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies</u></strong> — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — <u><strong>have jointly called for marijuana legalization</u></strong>. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. <u><strong><mark>Now that the OAS has joined that chorus</mark>, both <mark>the White House and</mark> the U.S. <mark>Congress need to join the discussion</mark> with more open ears.</p></u></strong>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything

Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

<h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley 10<u><mark> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <mark>military and corporate research</mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <mark>social conditioning</mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <mark>concentration of privilege</mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u></strong>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><strong><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</mark> waged on a daily basis</u></strong>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death is</mark> our <mark>banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u><strong>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u><strong>The cemetery no longer exists because <mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function: they <mark>are ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><strong><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></strong></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</mark>.</u></strong> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><strong><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is counter-offensive</mark> and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><strong><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <mark>generated its own antithesis</mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u></strong> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></strong></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><strong><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</mark> to the socia</u></strong>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><strong><mark>a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic</mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u></strong>.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u><strong>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u></strong>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><strong><mark>they are insistent on saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living</mark>, when it is as good as social death</u></strong>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u><strong>human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50] In reality, “<u><strong><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><strong><mark>seeking to consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u><strong>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u></strong>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u><strong>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></strong></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><strong><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u></strong>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "<u><strong><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u><strong>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u></strong>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><strong><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u><strong>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><strong><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></strong></mark> might suffice: "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u><strong>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><strong><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>

1NC

1NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Berkeley WT

Meyer, Andrew

1AC - Black Scholarship 1NC - University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

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Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

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college

Authorize means

au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\

to give power or permission to (someone or something) to give legal or official approval to or for (something)

to give legal or official approval for something That’s Merriam Webster 14

: to give power or permission to (someone or something) : to give legal or official approval to or for (something) That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]

<h4>Authorize means</h4><p>au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\</p><p>: <u><strong>to give power or permission to (someone or something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to give legal or official approval </mark>to or <mark>for</mark> (<mark>something</mark>)</p><p></u><mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14</strong></mark> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]</p>

2NC

CP

AT: Perm Do the CP

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

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Their acceptance of the “multiplicity of identity” in the 1AC trades off with a Universalist class analysis

Bjerre & Lausten ’10 , accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj

Bjerre & Lausten ’10 Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj

If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level Two fatal consequences follow from this Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics is part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests The right to narrate which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems the background cannot be addressed within the frame of identity politics we are fighting our PC battles for minor - ities gays and lesbians while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible the very mention of capitalism tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’ The price of this depoliticization of the economy political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities Identity politics reduces the economy to one among several questions fatal consequences follow from this the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism The central question becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism identity politics appears to be fundamentally apolitical The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all The right to narrate is blocking the universalisation of specific demands there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and the division of groups lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? Postmodernists’ do not have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game

If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

<h4>Their acceptance of the “multiplicity of identity” in the 1AC trades off with a Universalist class analysis </h4><p><strong><mark>Bjerre & Lausten ’10</strong></mark> Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20<u><strong>, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj</p><p>If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, <mark>which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of</mark> the <mark>class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>They fight to reduce suffering, but <mark>the background</mark> of it <mark>cannot be addressed</mark> adequately <mark>within the</mark> political <mark>frame of identity politics</u></strong></mark>. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So <u><strong><mark>we are fighting our PC battles for</mark> the right of ethnic <mark>minor - ities</mark>, of <mark>gays and lesbians</mark>, of different lifestyles,</u></strong> and so forth, <u><strong><mark>while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for</mark> the unrestrained development of <mark>capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible</mark>: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, <mark>the very mention of capitalism</mark> as a world system <mark>tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’</mark>, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The price of this depoliticization of the economy</mark> is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: <mark>political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities </mark>and the tolerance of differences</u></strong>. (Žižek 1999: 218) <u><strong>The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing</u></strong>. ‘<u><strong>Class antagonism</u></strong> <u><strong>certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others</u></strong>. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). <u><strong><mark>Identity politics</mark> <mark>reduces the</mark> question concerning <mark>economy to one among several questions</mark> on an equal level</u></strong>. <u><strong>Two <mark>fatal consequences follow from this</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits</u></strong>. <u><strong>Secondly, and related to the former point, <mark>the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism</u></strong></mark>. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. <u><strong>The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics</u></strong> (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, <u><strong>is</u></strong> not a simple epistemological progress but <u><strong>part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety</u></strong>. (Žižek 2000a: 106) <u><strong><mark>The central question</mark> after this conclusion <mark>becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism</mark> for a way to think revolutionary change</u></strong>. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. <u><strong>Postmodern <mark>identity politics</mark> on this background <mark>appears to be fundamentally apolitical</mark>. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like</u></strong>. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). <u><strong>The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all</mark>, which in turn means that the new left</u></strong>, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, <u><strong>are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests</u></strong> (Žižek 2000a: 108). <u><strong><mark>The right to narrate</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which is the point of departure of identity politics, <mark>is blocking the universalisation of specific demands</u></strong></mark>. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? <u><strong>Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate</u></strong> (Žižek 2002b: 177). <u><strong>Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected</u></strong>. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that <u><strong><mark>there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and</mark> thereby <mark>the division of groups</mark> that need special treat - ment: <mark>lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end?</u></strong></mark> ‘<u><strong><mark>Postmodernists’ do not</mark> seem to <mark>have an answer for that</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not</u></strong> (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. <u><strong><mark>Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game</mark> so that such trumps lose their significance.</p></u></strong>

1NC

1NC

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N

UNLV

7

Weber HV

Thiele, Chris

1AC - PAS Disability 1NC - Framework Cap K 2NC - Cap K 1NR - Framework 2NR - Framework

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SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes

<h4><strong>SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes</h4></strong>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes

<h4><strong>SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes</h4></strong>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value

Berlant ‘98

Berlant ‘98

, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption explains why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. the postsentimental modality challenges what storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom insistence that subjects "bargain" for redemption with their own mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream. whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The politico-sentimental uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift and emancipation Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life This presumption explains why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. The desire for unconflictedness might motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. the postsentimental modality challenges what storytelling have come to stand for the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of trauma as models for having and remembering collective experience in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is a condition of that violence. They cut the complexity of human motives "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth insistence that subjects "bargain" for redemption with their own mortification violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream. whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs of whiteness, which involve self-loathing and confusing happiness with analgesia. The politico-sentimental uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

<h4>Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value </h4><p><strong>Berlant ‘98<u> </p><p></u></strong>(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature<u>, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)</p><p></u>What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. <u><strong><mark>In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift</mark>, amelioration, <mark>and emancipation</mark>, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus</mark> to <mark>a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life</mark> into being. <mark>This presumption</u></strong></mark>, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, <u><strong><mark>explains</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance.</u></strong></mark> Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. <u><strong><mark>The desire for unconflictedness might</mark> very well <mark>motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed.</u></strong></mark> What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, <u><strong><mark>the postsentimental modality</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>challenges what</u></strong></mark> literature and <u><strong><mark>storytelling have come to stand for</mark> in the creation of sentimental national subjects</u></strong> across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which <u><strong><mark>the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of</mark> the Holocaust and <mark>trauma as models for having and remembering collective</mark> social <mark>experience</u></strong></mark>.20 Currently, as <u><strong><mark>in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence.</u></strong></mark> Baldwin asserts that <u><strong><mark>the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is</mark> precisely <mark>a condition of that violence</u>.</strong></mark> Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." <u><strong><mark>They cut the complexity of human motives</mark> and self-understanding <mark>"down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the</mark> social and <mark>material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has</mark>, or doesn't have, <mark>on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth</mark>, justice, and freedom</u></strong>.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her <u><strong><mark>insistence that subjects "bargain" for</u></strong></mark> heavenly <u><strong><mark>redemption with their own</u></strong></mark> physical and spiritual <u><strong><mark>mortification</mark>, merely and <mark>violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it.</u></strong></mark> Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. <u><strong><mark>This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he</mark> elsewhere <mark>calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.</u></strong></mark>23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, <u><strong><mark>whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs</mark> or ghosts <mark>of whiteness, which involve</mark> religious traditions of <mark>self-loathing and</mark> cultural traditions <mark>confusing happiness with analgesia.</u></strong></mark> The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 <u><strong><mark>The politico-sentimental</u></strong></mark> novel <u><strong><mark>uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject,</mark> thereby <mark>making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject</u></strong></mark>. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. <u><strong><mark>This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful</mark>, objectified, <mark>cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are</mark>, in some way, <mark>fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

1NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Berkeley WT

Meyer, Andrew

1AC - Black Scholarship 1NC - University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

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The impact is large scale structural violence, escalating systemic warfare and environmental destruction

Parr ’13

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics, pp. 145-147)

an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq Greek economy in ruins escalation of global food prices bee colonies in global extinction 925 million hungry in 2010 the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on Sounds like a ticking time bomb it is. massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something Gilding explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism. a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose. Adaptability, modifications, and displacement constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

economic meltdown frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business prolonged war in Iraq Greek economy in ruins escalation of global food prices bee colonies in extinction 925 million hungry five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than the poorest 416 million planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather Sounds like a ticking time bomb it is. massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the Holocaust two world wars genocides in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur 1 million left homeless and 316,000 killed in Haiti We are in the last decade where we can do something We do not see the crisis for what it is we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of capitalism Adaptability, modifications, and displacement constitute the essence of capitalism. choices abound, and they all lead us down through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. there is no choice when everything is expendable. all you can do is survive each and every one of us has skills to making the solutions to climate change effective and realistic our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5 The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

<h4>The impact is large scale structural violence, escalating systemic warfare and environmental destruction </h4><p><strong>Parr ’13</strong> (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics<u>, pp. 145-147)</p><p></u>A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: <u><strong>an <mark>economic meltdown</mark>; a <mark>frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business</u></strong></mark> as President George W Bush exited the White House; <u><strong>a <mark>prolonged</mark>, costly, and unjustified <mark>war in Iraq</u></strong></mark>; the <u><strong><mark>Greek economy in ruins</u></strong></mark>; an <u><strong><mark>escalation of global food prices</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>bee colonies in</mark> global <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>925 million hungry</u></strong></mark> reported <u><strong>in 2010</u></strong>; as of 2005, <u><strong>the world's <mark>five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than</mark> that of <mark>the poorest 416 million</mark> people</u></strong>, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; <u><strong>a <mark>planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather</mark> conditions; and the list goes on and on</u></strong> and on.2 <u><strong><mark>Sounds like a ticking time bomb</u></strong></mark>, doesn't it? Well <u><strong><mark>it is.</mark> </u></strong>It is shameful to think that <u><strong><mark>massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison</mark> the 6 million murdered during <mark>the Holocaust</mark>; the millions killed in <mark>two world wars</mark>; the <mark>genocides in</mark> the former <mark>Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur</mark>; the <mark>1 million left homeless and</mark> the <mark>316,000 killed</mark> by the 2010 earthquake <mark>in Haiti</mark>.</u></strong> The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that <u><strong>we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are in the last decade where we can do something</u></strong></mark> about the situation. Paul <u><strong>Gilding</u></strong>, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, <u><strong>explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure</u></strong>;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 <u><strong>Once we move higher than 2°C of warming,</u></strong> which is what is <u><strong>projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will</u></strong> begin to <u><strong>kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. <mark>We do not see the crisis for what it is</mark>; <mark>we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with</mark>.</u></strong> This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, <u><strong><mark>the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of</mark> the capital and its model: <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong>”5 The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, <u><strong>a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.</u></strong>6 <u><strong><mark>Adaptability, modifications, and displacement</u></strong></mark>, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, <u><strong><mark>constitute the</mark> very <mark>essence of capitalism.</mark> Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat.</u></strong> Under capitalism, <u><strong>one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it</u></strong>, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. <u><strong>In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon</u></strong> here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, <u><strong>although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness.</u></strong> By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how <u><strong>all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; <mark>choices abound, and</mark> yet <mark>they all lead us down</mark> one path and <mark>through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.</mark> </u></strong>For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – <u><strong>outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for <mark>there is no choice when everything is expendable.</mark> There is nothing substantial about the future when <mark>all you can do is survive</mark> by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength</u></strong>, stamina, and courage <u><strong>with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.</u></strong> In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that <u><strong><mark>each and every one of us has</mark> certain <mark>skills</mark> that can contribute <mark>to making the solutions</mark> that we introduce in response <mark>to climate change</mark> and environmental degradation more <mark>effective and</mark> more <mark>realistic</mark>.</u></strong> In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: <u><strong><mark>our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

1NC

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Thiele, Chris

1AC - PAS Disability 1NC - Framework Cap K 2NC - Cap K 1NR - Framework 2NR - Framework

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***Legalization advocates concede LEGISLATIVE ACTION is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum

Sheets 13

Sheets 13

The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make headway toward legalizing pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill which is gaining supporters by the week The legislation proposes changes to federal law regarding marijuana remove it from its list of controlled substances and instead leave it to the states to regulate The bill continues to gain support in Congress Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had the timing may be good for such a full-bore push public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization

The fight by marijuana advocates toward legalizing pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope in the HR 499 which is gaining supporters by the week. The legislation proposes to remove it from its list of controlled substances and leave it to the states to regulate The bill continues to gain support Legalization advocates are focusing attention and energy propping it up as the best hope a piece of legislation has had the timing may be good for such a full push public opinion is moving in the direction of legalizing marijuana 52 percent support legalization

Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make some headway toward legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill, which is gaining supporters by the week. The proposed legislation, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, proposes a range of changes to federal law regarding marijuana, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and remove it from its list of controlled substances, and instead leave it to the states to regulate it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. The bill -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it continues to gain support in Congress. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that the timing may be good for such a full-bore push, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.

<h4><strong>***Legalization advocates concede LEGISLATIVE ACTION is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum </h4><p>Sheets 13</p><p></strong>Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> long, hard <mark>fight by marijuana advocates</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>make</u></strong> some <u><strong>headway <mark>toward legalizing</u></strong></mark>, or at least decriminalizing, <u><strong><mark>pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope</mark> this year in the U.S. Congress</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in</mark> the form of <mark>the HR 499</mark> bill</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>which is gaining supporters by the week</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> proposed <u><strong><mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, <u><strong><mark>proposes</u></strong></mark> a range of <u><strong>changes <mark>to</mark> federal law regarding marijuana</u></strong>, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and <u><strong><mark>remove it from</mark> <mark>its list of</mark> <mark>controlled substances</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> instead <mark>leave it to the states to regulate</u></strong></mark> it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. <u><strong><mark>The bill</u></strong></mark> -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it <u><strong><mark>continues to gain support</mark> in Congress</u></strong>. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. <u><strong><mark>Legalization advocates</mark> <mark>are focusing</mark> a lot of <mark>attention and energy</mark> on the bill, <mark>propping it up as the best hope</mark> such <mark>a piece of legislation has had</mark> </u></strong>in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that <u><strong><mark>the timing may be good for such a full</mark>-bore <mark>push</u></strong></mark>, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that <u><strong><mark>public</mark> <mark>opinion is moving</mark> quickly <mark>in the direction of legalizing marijuana</mark>, and that in fact <mark>52 percent</mark> of people asked in the survey said they <mark>support legalization</u></strong></mark>, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.</p>

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Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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Vote negative to endorse a tactic for mass mobilization to legalize cannabis in opposition to racial oppression and the use of incarceration to maintain a racial caste system.

<h4><strong>Vote negative to endorse a tactic for mass mobilization to legalize cannabis in opposition to racial oppression and the use of incarceration to maintain a racial caste system.</h4></strong>

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1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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They are coming now despite economic integration

Oppenheimer 13

Andres Oppenheimer 13 Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts. it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation. Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

Despite summits proclaiming Latin American economic integration an escalation of border conflicts should draw alarm bells escalating tensions between Latin American countries over border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures but are affecting talks on trade, investment and security with the region it is a concern when partners have tensions It complicates cooperation no extra-regional interlocutor will be interested in conducting a negotiation

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region. U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

<h4><strong>They are coming now despite economic integration</h4><p></strong>Andres <strong>Oppenheimer 13</strong> Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/</p><p><u><mark>Despite </mark>constant presidential <mark>summits proclaiming </mark>a new era of <mark>Latin American economic integration</mark> and political brotherhood, <mark>an <strong>escalation of border conflicts</strong></mark> in recent weeks <strong><mark>should draw alarm bells</strong></mark> everywhere</u>.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, <u><strong><mark>escalating tensions</strong> between</mark> several <mark>Latin American countries <strong>over</strong></mark> century-old <strong><mark>border disputes are</strong> not only resulting in growing <strong>military expenditures</strong></mark>, <mark>but are</mark> also <mark>affecting talks on trade, investment and security</mark> issues <mark>with the region</u></mark>. <u>U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.</u>¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “<u><mark>it is </mark>always<mark> a concern when partners </mark>and allies in this hemisphere <mark>have tensions </mark>with each other. <mark>It</mark> <mark>complicates cooperation</mark>.</u>”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ <u>Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because <strong><mark>no extra-regional interlocutor</strong> will be </mark>very <mark>interested in <strong>conducting a negotiation</strong> </mark>when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”</p></u>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

They are coming now despite economic integration

Oppenheimer 13

Andres Oppenheimer 13 Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts. it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation. Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

Despite summits proclaiming Latin American economic integration an escalation of border conflicts should draw alarm bells escalating tensions between Latin American countries over border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures but are affecting talks on trade, investment and security with the region it is a concern when partners have tensions It complicates cooperation no extra-regional interlocutor will be interested in conducting a negotiation

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region. U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

<h4><strong>They are coming now despite economic integration</h4><p></strong>Andres <strong>Oppenheimer 13</strong> Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/</p><p><u><strong><mark>Despite </mark>constant presidential <mark>summits proclaiming </mark>a new era of <mark>Latin American economic integration</mark> and political brotherhood, <mark>an escalation of border conflicts</mark> in recent weeks <mark>should draw alarm bells</mark> everywhere</u></strong>.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, <u><strong><mark>escalating tensions between</mark> several <mark>Latin American countries over</mark> century-old <mark>border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures</mark>, <mark>but are</mark> also <mark>affecting talks on trade, investment and security</mark> issues <mark>with the region</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.</u></strong>¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “<u><strong><mark>it is </mark>always<mark> a concern when partners </mark>and allies in this hemisphere <mark>have tensions </mark>with each other. <mark>It</mark> <mark>complicates cooperation</mark>.</u></strong>”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ <u><strong>Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because <mark>no extra-regional interlocutor will be </mark>very <mark>interested in conducting a negotiation </mark>when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”</p></u></strong>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

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Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Vote negative as a strategy to uncover the banal nature of the university -- The insurrection is here and we refuse to believe that debate will make the university a better place. Of course our role as debaters necessarily implicates us, but that is precisely the point—we reject and destroy scholarship within the academy

Bryant 13

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/)

There’s a contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity Thus academic emancipatory theory reveals itself as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention but rather only as a moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia it functions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries out its self-reproduction It thus functions the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system despite how we think about our work but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse Were the aim political change then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the presentation structure To produce political change, the academic would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication scholasticism presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse and the content; they want to produce change emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields and no, the classroom doesn’t count recognition of this paradox might be why we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish the academic fantasy of a avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for the people The idea of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy would be a little less pompous and self-righteous

There’s a contradiction at the heart of all academic theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a commodity emancipatory theory reveals itself as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention but rather only as a moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia it functions as a strategy through which the university carries out self-reproduction It functions as a commodity The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of discourse Were the aim political change discourse would have to find a way outside the academy but theory cannot do due to the structure To produce political change, the academic would have to sacrifice scholarship They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication emancipatory academic political discourse is apolitical it simply reproduces its own discourse and no, the classroom doesn’t count

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, it functions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries out its autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

<h4>Vote negative as a strategy to uncover the banal nature of the university -- The insurrection is here and we refuse to believe that debate will make the university a better place. Of course our role as debaters necessarily implicates us, but that is precisely the point—we reject and destroy scholarship within the academy </h4><p><strong>Bryant 13</strong>—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/)</p><p><u><strong><mark>There’s a</u></strong></mark> sort of Hegelian <u><strong><mark>contradiction at the heart of all academic</mark> political <mark>theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory.</u></strong></mark> In a nutshell, <u><strong><mark>the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a</mark> sort of <mark>commodity</u></strong></mark>. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. <u><strong>Thus</u></strong>, <u><strong>academic <mark>emancipatory</u></strong></mark> political <u><strong><mark>theory reveals itself</u></strong></mark> in its truth <u><strong><mark>as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention</mark> </u></strong>at all, <u><strong><mark>but rather only as a</mark> </u></strong>move or <u><strong><mark>moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia</u></strong></mark>. That is, <u><strong><mark>it functions</mark> <mark>as</mark> <mark>a</mark>nother line on the CVand is one <mark>strategy through which the university</mark> system <mark>carries</mark> <mark>out</mark> its</u></strong> autopoiesis or <u><strong><mark>self-reproduction</u></strong></mark> across time. <u><strong><mark>It </mark>thus <mark>functions</u></strong></mark>– <u><strong>the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics</u></strong>, but how things function –<u><strong><mark>as</mark> something like <mark>a commodity</mark> within the academic system. <mark>The function is not to intervene in the broader political system</u></strong>– <u><strong>despite</u></strong></mark> what all of us doing political theory say and <u><strong><mark>how we think about our work</u></strong> –<u><strong>but rather to carry out yet another iteration of</mark> the academic <mark>discourse</u></strong></mark> (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). <u><strong><mark>Were the aim political change</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>then the <mark>discourse would have to find a way</mark> to reach <mark>outside the academy</mark>, <mark>but</mark> this is precisely what academic political <mark>theory cannot do due to the</mark> </u></strong>publication and <u><strong>presentation <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. <u><strong><mark>To produce political change, the academic</u></strong></mark> political theorist <u><strong><mark>would have to sacrifice</mark> his or her erudition or <mark>scholarship</u></strong></mark>, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. <u><strong><mark>They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication</u></strong></mark>. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval <u><strong>scholasticism</u></strong> that only schoolmen can appreciate, which <u><strong>presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse</u></strong>– only other experts can understand it –<u><strong>and the content; they want to produce change</u></strong>). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of <u><strong><mark>emancipatory academic political discourse</mark> is thus that it <mark>is</mark> formally and functionally</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>apolitical</u></strong></mark>. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, <u><strong><mark>it simply reproduces its own discourse</mark> and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>and no, the classroom doesn’t count</u></strong></mark>). Unconscious <u><strong>recognition of this paradox might be why</u></strong>, in some corners, <u><strong>we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish</u></strong> “the party”. The party is <u><strong>the academic fantasy of a </u></strong>philosopher-king or an academic <u><strong>avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for </u></strong>all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize <u><strong>the people</u></strong> (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). <u><strong>The idea of the</u></strong> party and of the <u><strong>intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox</u></strong> I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. <u><strong>Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy</u></strong> for reproducing the university discourse <u><strong>would be a little less pompous and self-righteous</u></strong>, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.</p>

1NC

1NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Berkeley WT

Meyer, Andrew

1AC - Black Scholarship 1NC - University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization

Robelo 13

Robelo 13

When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years

When Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the house politicians spoke of holding a national referendum

Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress, while other politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”

<h4><strong>Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization</h4><p>Robelo 13 </p><p></strong>Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>When</mark> the people of <mark>Colorado and Washington</mark> <mark>made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world</u></strong></mark> — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. <u><strong><mark>A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the</mark> lower <mark>house</mark> of congress</u></strong>, while other <u><strong><mark>politicians</mark> <mark>spoke of holding a national referendum </mark>in three years</u></strong>. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”</p>

2NC

CP

2NC AT: Theory

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

McLaren ‘06 , jj)

McLaren ‘06 (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm, jj)

class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements want revolution without revolution; His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken The critical pedagogical act is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

class antagonism is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements want revolution without revolution strategic focus on capitalist exploitation rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken The critical pedagogical act is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (Totalitarianism 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

<h4>Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics </h4><p><u><strong><mark>McLaren ‘06</u></strong></mark> (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm<u><strong>, jj)</p><p></u></strong>Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that <u><strong><mark>class antagonism</mark> or struggle <mark>is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race,</mark> class, <mark>gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself</mark>.</u></strong> In other words, <u><strong><mark>class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series</u></strong></mark>. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (Totalitarianism 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), <u><strong><mark>Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality</u></strong></mark> and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, <u><strong>class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms.</u></strong> Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). <u><strong>In his terms, <mark>class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism</u></strong></mark>). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that <u><strong>post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital</u></strong> (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) <u><strong>but have done little to uncover its reality.</u></strong> <u><strong>Those <mark>post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements</u></strong></mark> (such as Laclau and Mouffe) <u><strong><mark>want revolution without revolution</mark>;</u></strong> in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. <u><strong>His <mark>strategic focus on capitalist exploitation</u></strong></mark> (while often confusing and inconsistent) <u><strong><mark>rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one</u></strong></mark>: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. <u><strong><mark>The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level</u></strong></mark>. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. <u><strong>An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts</u></strong>" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that <u><strong>capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations</u></strong>" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. <u><strong><mark>All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions</mark> and effects, <mark>regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken</u></strong></mark>. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. <u><strong><mark>The critical pedagogical act</u></strong></mark> of interro-gating experiences <u><strong><mark>is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. <mark>The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations?</mark> <mark>How can these structures</mark>—these lawless laws of capital—<mark>be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis</mark> into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?</p><p></u></strong> </p>

1NC

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

N

UNLV

7

Weber HV

Thiele, Chris

1AC - PAS Disability 1NC - Framework Cap K 2NC - Cap K 1NR - Framework 2NR - Framework

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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Baylor BaSh

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The term “marijuana” recreates historically racist rhetoric and should be replaced with cannabis

Leafly 14

Leafly 14

The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture Many organizations publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of cannabis why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used in Between the years of 1910 and 1920 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression hit the United States, Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants in the South Americans began to treat cannabis and the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger testified Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon

The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in culture. organizations denounced the M word” in favor of cannabis the word gained publicity as a racist term Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist in American culture Rather cannabis” was used the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. Anslinger used the term “marijuana adding to the herb’s new “foreign” identity Though the word marijuana is common its history is deeply steeped in race the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction

http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon.

<h4>The term “marijuana” recreates historically racist rhetoric and should be replaced<strong> with cannabis </h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in</mark> cannabis <mark>culture</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Many</u></strong> well-known <u><strong><mark>organizations</u></strong></mark> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u><strong>publicly <mark>denounced</mark> “<mark>the M word” in favor of</u></strong></mark> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u><strong><mark>cannabis</u></strong></mark>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u><strong>why has <mark>the word</mark> <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u></strong>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word <mark>in American</mark> <mark>culture</mark>. <mark>Rather</mark>, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u><strong>in</u></strong> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u><strong>Between the years of 1910 and 1920</u></strong>, over <u><strong>890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war.</u></strong> <u><strong>Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption</u></strong>. <u><strong>The idea of smoking cannabis entered</u></strong> <u><strong>mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. </u></strong>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><strong>Aftermath</u></strong> <u><strong>1930s: The Great Depression</u></strong> had just <u><strong>hit the United States,</u></strong> and <u><strong>Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants</u></strong> (particularly <u><strong>in the South</u></strong>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><strong>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></strong> (<u><strong>and</u></strong>, arguably, <u><strong><mark>the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals.</mark> </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u><strong>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u></strong>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u><strong>Anslinger</u></strong> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u><strong>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u></strong>. In one documented incident, <u><strong>Anslinger</u></strong> <u><strong>testified</u></strong> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u><strong>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u></strong>In another statement, <u><strong>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u></strong>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><strong><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the term “marijuana</mark>” when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u></strong> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><strong><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u></strong> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u></strong>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong><mark>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word</mark> yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications</mark> <mark>of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p>

1NC

Offcase

1NC MJ PIC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

N

Wake

2

Cal MS

JJustice

1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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college

OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes

Herz 08

Monica Herz 08, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April

boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks Among these the OAS is the most universal including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant since the Summit process has provided guidance for action in the sphere of security The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes The legalist tradition is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it The OAS has had success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict Investigative commissions offer assessments and indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution norms developed are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict the norm of information sharing and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords

boundary disputes exist economic problems give rise to international conflicts The situation could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the Americas. the OAS is the most universal, including all countries The OAS was designed for collective security and dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. The OAS has had success in preventing conflicts from escalating It has been a major forum for generating regional norms on security The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS has become active in confidence-building measures and continued its dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict in preventing intra-state conflicts. the OAS remains an important pillar of peaceful solution of disputes the OAS prevented international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords.

<h4>OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes </h4><p>Monica <strong>Herz 08</strong>, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April</p><p>Nevertheless, one must remember that <u><strong><mark>boundary disputes exist </mark>today</strong> and were sources of conflict in the past.</u> The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently <u>drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike</u>, and the social and <u><mark>economic problems </mark>that characterise the region could <mark>give rise to <strong>international conflicts</strong></mark> over resources and migration</u>. <u><mark>The</mark> domestic political and social <mark>situation</mark> in many Latin American countries <mark>could generate internal conflicts</u></mark>. The <u><mark>fragility of domestic mechanisms for</mark> conflict <mark>resolution</u></mark> and the state apparatus in general has <u><mark>generated <strong>political crises throughout the history</strong></mark> of the southern part <mark>of the Americas.</u></mark> <u>Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term</u>. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that <u>the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks</u>: <u>Among these</u> institutions, <u><mark>the OAS is the <strong>most universal</u></strong>, <u>including all countries</mark> in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place</u>. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. <u>The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework</u>. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two <u>specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions:</u> the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ <u>The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant </u>for the purposes of this article <u>since the Summit process has provided <strong>guidance</u></strong> beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty <u><strong>for action in the sphere of security</u></strong>. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ <u><mark>The OAS </mark>security structure <mark>was designed for collective security </mark>operations <mark>and </mark>for <strong><mark>dispute settlement</strong> through <strong>diplomatic consultation</u></strong>.</mark> Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – <u>an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes</u>. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. <u>The legalist tradition</u>, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, <u>is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it</u>. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ <u><mark>The OAS has had</u> </mark>some <u><mark>success in</mark> reducing regional tensions and <strong><mark>preventing conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark> (Shaw 2004: 96). <u>This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua</u> between 1948 and 1979, <u>and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador</u> in 1969. <u>It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict</u> since its creation. <u>Investigative commissions</u> were created in a number of cases to <u>offer assessments and</u> sometimes <u>indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy</u>. <u><mark>It has </mark>also <mark>been a major forum for </mark>the process of <strong><mark>generating regional norms on security</u></strong></mark>, <u>regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality</u>. <u><mark>The use of military capabilities is extremely rare</u></mark>. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. <u>The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability</u> or status quo <u>in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution</u>. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. <u><mark>The OAS has become active in</mark> fostering <mark>confidence-building measures</u></mark> and land-mine clearing, <u><mark>and</mark> has <mark>continued its </mark>work on the <strong><mark>dialogue on border disputes</strong> and attempts to prevent conflict</u></mark>. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that <u>the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an <strong>active role <mark>in preventing intra-state conflicts</u></strong>.</mark> In addition, <u><mark>the OAS remains an <strong>important pillar</strong> of</mark> the norm of <mark>peaceful solution of disputes</u></mark>, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, <u>one can see these norms functioning as <strong>preventive diplomacy mechanisms</u></strong>. Secondly, I will show that <u><mark>the OAS prevented</mark> a number of <mark>international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and <strong>was essential</strong> in diffusing several crises</u></mark>. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states</u></strong></mark>. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that <u>the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate</u>, particularly after the 1990s, <u>in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role <mark>in preventing the <strong>escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts</u></strong></mark>. I have pointed out that <u>in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict</u>. <u>The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution</u>. ¶ Three <u>norms developed</u> partly within the organisation <u>are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict</u>; <u>the norm of information sharing</u> built into the confidence-building agenda; <u>and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability</u>, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ <u>I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile</u>. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. <u>This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords</u>. </p>

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OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes

Herz 08

Monica Herz 08, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April

boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks Among these the OAS is the most universal including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant since the Summit process has provided guidance for action in the sphere of security The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes The legalist tradition is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it The OAS has had success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict Investigative commissions offer assessments and indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution norms developed are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict the norm of information sharing and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords

boundary disputes exist economic problems give rise to international conflicts The situation could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the Americas. the OAS is the most universal, including all countries The OAS was designed for collective security and dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. The OAS has had success in preventing conflicts from escalating It has been a major forum for generating regional norms on security The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS has become active in confidence-building measures and continued its dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict in preventing intra-state conflicts. the OAS remains an important pillar of peaceful solution of disputes the OAS prevented international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords.

<h4>OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes </h4><p>Monica <strong>Herz 08</strong>, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April</p><p>Nevertheless, one must remember that <u><strong><mark>boundary disputes exist </mark>today and were sources of conflict in the past.</u></strong> The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently <u><strong>drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike</u></strong>, and the social and <u><strong><mark>economic problems </mark>that characterise the region could <mark>give rise to international conflicts</mark> over resources and migration</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> domestic political and social <mark>situation</mark> in many Latin American countries <mark>could generate internal conflicts</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>fragility of domestic mechanisms for</mark> conflict <mark>resolution</u></strong></mark> and the state apparatus in general has <u><strong><mark>generated political crises throughout the history</mark> of the southern part <mark>of the Americas.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term</u></strong>. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that <u><strong>the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks</u></strong>: <u><strong>Among these</u></strong> institutions, <u><strong><mark>the OAS is the most universal</u></strong>, <u><strong>including all countries</mark> in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place</u></strong>. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. <u><strong>The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework</u></strong>. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two <u><strong>specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions:</u></strong> the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ <u><strong>The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant </u></strong>for the purposes of this article <u><strong>since the Summit process has provided guidance</u></strong> beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty <u><strong>for action in the sphere of security</u></strong>. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS </mark>security structure <mark>was designed for collective security </mark>operations <mark>and </mark>for <mark>dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation</u></strong>.</mark> Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – <u><strong>an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes</u></strong>. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. <u><strong>The legalist tradition</u></strong>, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, <u><strong>is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it</u></strong>. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS has had</u></strong> </mark>some <u><strong><mark>success in</mark> reducing regional tensions and <mark>preventing conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark> (Shaw 2004: 96). <u><strong>This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua</u></strong> between 1948 and 1979, <u><strong>and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador</u></strong> in 1969. <u><strong>It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict</u></strong> since its creation. <u><strong>Investigative commissions</u></strong> were created in a number of cases to <u><strong>offer assessments and</u></strong> sometimes <u><strong>indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It has </mark>also <mark>been a major forum for </mark>the process of <mark>generating regional norms on security</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The use of military capabilities is extremely rare</u></strong></mark>. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. <u><strong>The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability</u></strong> or status quo <u><strong>in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution</u></strong>. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. <u><strong><mark>The OAS has become active in</mark> fostering <mark>confidence-building measures</u></strong></mark> and land-mine clearing, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> has <mark>continued its </mark>work on the <mark>dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict</u></strong></mark>. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that <u><strong>the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role <mark>in preventing intra-state conflicts</u></strong>.</mark> In addition, <u><strong><mark>the OAS remains an important pillar of</mark> the norm of <mark>peaceful solution of disputes</u></strong></mark>, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, <u><strong>one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms</u></strong>. Secondly, I will show that <u><strong><mark>the OAS prevented</mark> a number of <mark>international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises</u></strong></mark>. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states</u></strong></mark>. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that <u><strong>the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate</u></strong>, particularly after the 1990s, <u><strong>in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role <mark>in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts</u></strong></mark>. I have pointed out that <u><strong>in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution</u></strong>. ¶ Three <u><strong>norms developed</u></strong> partly within the organisation <u><strong>are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict</u></strong>; <u><strong>the norm of information sharing</u></strong> built into the confidence-building agenda; <u><strong>and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability</u></strong>, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ <u><strong>I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile</u></strong>. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. <u><strong>This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords</u></strong>. </p>

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The process of discoursing suffering within the academia gives way to a bureaucratization of the Other’s suffering which further entrenches domination while positioning the affirmative as savior -- ensures imperial intervention

Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz

suffering when appropriated for ossesses no experiential meaning launch-pads for intervention no point The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist to be solved by the theorist prescription is divorced from experience becomes secondary to the philosopher’ imperial recognition, response and intervention as commodity to be exploited depoliticised experience technical/bureaucratic interventions every call should’-assertions crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity should should should should should democratise institutions the list, goes on the ways of the world remain the normalities of business-as-usual

People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of ossesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition;voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport tooffer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itselfbecomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’ – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking sufferingand its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench theLevinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, tofurther serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, asdepoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi forlegitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. Acorrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, every call (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity – that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; shouldredress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, shouldenforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, shouldreform and democratise international institutions, the list, again, goes on. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009).

<h4>The process of discoursing suffering within the academia gives way to a bureaucratization of the Other’s suffering which further entrenches domination while positioning the affirmative as savior -- ensures imperial intervention</h4><p>Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz</p><p>People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the <u><strong>suffering</u></strong> condition <u><strong>when appropriated for</u></strong> the purposes of <u><strong>ossesses no experiential meaning</u></strong>. Whilst lip service is paid to‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition;voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory <u><strong>launch-pads for intervention</u></strong>. At <u><strong>no point</u></strong>, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 <u><strong>The politics of</u></strong> <u><strong>discoursing</u></strong> <u><strong>suffering</u></strong> <u><strong>therefore</u></strong> <u><strong>is a politics of the theorist</u></strong>, suffering a problem <u><strong>to be solved by the theorist</u></strong>, where <u><strong>prescription is divorced from experience</u></strong>, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport tooffer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itself<u><strong>becomes secondary to the</u></strong> politics of the ‘theorist/<u><strong>philosopher’</u></strong> – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of <u><strong>imperial recognition, response and intervention</u></strong>.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking sufferingand its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench theLevinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, tofurther serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, <u><strong>as commodity to be exploited</u></strong>, as<u><strong>depoliticised</u></strong> category rather than <u><strong>experience</u></strong>, as a <u><strong>technical/bureaucratic</u></strong>/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi forlegitimate <u><strong>interventions</u></strong> amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. Acorrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, <u><strong>every call</u></strong> (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘<u><strong>should’-assertions</u></strong> that <u><strong>crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity</u></strong> – that the world community <u><strong>should</u></strong> respond to suffering; <u><strong>should</u></strong> expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; <u><strong>should</u></strong>redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, <u><strong>should</u></strong>enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, <u><strong>should</u></strong>reform and <u><strong>democratise</u></strong> international <u><strong>institutions</u></strong>, <u><strong>the list,</u></strong> again, <u><strong>goes on</u></strong>. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, <u><strong>the ways of the world</u></strong> in which betrayals <u><strong>remain the normalities of business-as-usual</u></strong> (Robinson and Tormey 2009).</p>

1NC

1NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Berkeley WT

Meyer, Andrew

1AC - Black Scholarship 1NC - University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally-- that’s Parr. This question of self-orientation comes first

Johnston ’04 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

Johnston ’04 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

given the exhaustion of the socio-political under capitalism the liberation of thinking from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. action must be inverted one must resist the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are co-opted by it.

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

<h4>That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally-- that’s Parr<u>.</u> This question of self-orientation comes first</h4><p><u><strong>Johnston ’04</u></strong> <strong>(Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)</p><p></strong>The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, <u><strong><mark>given the</mark> contemporary <mark>exhaustion of the socio-political </mark>imagination <mark>under</mark> the hegemony of liberal-democratic <mark>capitalism</mark>,</u></strong> he sees <u><strong><mark>the liberation of thinking </mark>itself <mark>from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.</u></strong></mark> In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that <u><strong>Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete <mark>action</mark> </u></strong>(thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") <u><strong><mark>must be inverted</mark> given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, <mark>one must resist</mark> succumbing to <mark>the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all </mark>such <mark>rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are</mark> ideologically <mark>co-opted by it.</p></u></strong></mark>

2NC

2NC Impact Overview

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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UNLV

7

Weber HV

Thiele, Chris

1AC - PAS Disability 1NC - Framework Cap K 2NC - Cap K 1NR - Framework 2NR - Framework

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Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves

Quinn 14

Quinn 14 Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB

A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August The means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled

A ballot initiative that could make Alaska legalize marijuana will go before voters in a general election rather than in August The means a broader swath of the public is likely vote than if it had gone before voters as scheduled

(Reuters) - A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. The move means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled during a state primary election in August.

<h4><strong>Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves </h4><p>Quinn 14</p><p></strong>Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB </p><p>(Reuters) - <u><strong><mark>A ballot initiative that could make Alaska </mark>the third U.S. state to <mark>legalize </mark>recreational <mark>marijuana will go before voters in a general election</mark> in November <mark>rather than in August</u></strong></mark> as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> move <u><strong><mark>means</mark> that <mark>a broader swath of the public is likely</mark> to <mark>vote</mark> on the issue <mark>than if it had gone before voters as scheduled</u></strong></mark> during a state primary election in August.</p>

2NC

CP

2NC AT: Theory

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

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The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion

Chow 1993

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?

The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper

(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

<h4><u><strong>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p></u>Chow</strong> – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - <strong>1993</p><p></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to haunt us.</u></strong> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>

1NC

Offcase

1NC University K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

N

Wake

2

Cal MS

JJustice

1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Latin American instability causes nuclear war

Fleishmann 13

Luis Fleishmann 13 Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, #SPS

the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. the deterioration to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. the Bolivarian revolution will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

financial and material assistance revitalized FARC and incorporated it the Bolivarian revolution. He promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that will see the proliferation of authoritarianism anarchy, insurgency international terrorism rogue states' an arms race and nuclear activity the deterioration has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it The effects of authoritarianism and the proliferation of non-state actors are likely to continue if no one moves to counter them.

The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

<h4>Latin American instability causes nuclear war </h4><p>Luis <strong>Fleishmann 13</strong> Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, <u>#SPS</p><p></u>The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But <u>the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony.</u> It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, <u>the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran</u>. <u>His <mark>financial and material assistance </mark>has <mark>revitalized </mark>a moribund <mark>FARC and incorporated it </mark>with the insurgent force of <mark>the Bolivarian revolution.</u></mark> <u><mark>He </mark>has <mark>promoted</u></mark> Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—<u><strong><mark>asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation.</u></strong></mark> Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create <u><mark>chaos in a region that </mark>in the future <mark>will see the proliferation of</mark> nothing but more adverse conditions: <mark>authoritarianism</mark>, further <mark>anarchy, insurgency</mark>, local and <mark>international terrorism</mark>, <mark>rogue states'</mark> involvement, and other negative elements such as <mark>an arms race and <strong>nuclear activity</strong></mark>.</u> <u>The continent's</u> <u>current economic prosperity,</u> about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, <u>is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries.</u> Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, <u>the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se</u>. Instead, <u>it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it.</u> Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, <u><mark>the deterioration</mark> </u>of democracy<u> to this extent <mark>has security implications insofar as <strong>external forces</strong> can penetrate it</mark>.</u> The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, <u>the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent.</u> As stated in chapter 9, however, <u>the Bolivarian revolution</u> will not die along with Chavez. It <u>will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place,</u> not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. <u>The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue.</u> <u><mark>The effects of authoritarianism</mark>, the destruction of the State, <mark>and the proliferation of non-state actors</mark> and rogue States <mark>are likely to continue </mark>their course <mark>if no one moves to counter them.</u></mark> As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. <u>Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. </p></u>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Latin American instability causes nuclear war

Fleishmann 13 #SPS

Luis Fleishmann 13 Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, #SPS

the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. the deterioration to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. the Bolivarian revolution will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

financial and material assistance revitalized FARC and incorporated it the Bolivarian revolution. He promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that will see the proliferation of authoritarianism anarchy, insurgency international terrorism rogue states' an arms race and nuclear activity the deterioration has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it The effects of authoritarianism and the proliferation of non-state actors are likely to continue if no one moves to counter them.

The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

<h4>Latin American instability causes nuclear war </h4><p>Luis <strong>Fleishmann 13</strong> Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, <u><strong>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But <u><strong>the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony.</u></strong> It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, <u><strong>the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran</u></strong>. <u><strong>His <mark>financial and material assistance </mark>has <mark>revitalized </mark>a moribund <mark>FARC and incorporated it </mark>with the insurgent force of <mark>the Bolivarian revolution.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>He </mark>has <mark>promoted</u></strong></mark> Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—<u><strong><mark>asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation.</u></strong></mark> Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create <u><strong><mark>chaos in a region that </mark>in the future <mark>will see the proliferation of</mark> nothing but more adverse conditions: <mark>authoritarianism</mark>, further <mark>anarchy, insurgency</mark>, local and <mark>international terrorism</mark>, <mark>rogue states'</mark> involvement, and other negative elements such as <mark>an arms race and nuclear activity</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The continent's</u></strong> <u><strong>current economic prosperity,</u></strong> about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, <u><strong>is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries.</u></strong> Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, <u><strong>the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong>it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it.</u></strong> Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, <u><strong><mark>the deterioration</mark> </u></strong>of democracy<u><strong> to this extent <mark>has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it</mark>.</u></strong> The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, <u><strong>the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent.</u></strong> As stated in chapter 9, however, <u><strong>the Bolivarian revolution</u></strong> will not die along with Chavez. It <u><strong>will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place,</u></strong> not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. <u><strong>The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The effects of authoritarianism</mark>, the destruction of the State, <mark>and the proliferation of non-state actors</mark> and rogue States <mark>are likely to continue </mark>their course <mark>if no one moves to counter them.</u></strong></mark> As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. <u><strong>Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. </p></u></strong>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

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Baylor BaSh

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

K turns the case -- notions of productivity is the PROXIMATE cause of your impacts

Kitchin 98 (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836)

Kitchin 98 (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836)

disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation. the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory. Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process. exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism (disability is an individual rather than societal problem Oliver views disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns, with the experiences of disability determined by the economy

disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism disability is an individual rather than societal problem disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns the experiences of disability determined by the econom

It is now generally recognised that disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society. Disabled people represent one of the poorest groups in Western society. Apart from being excluded and marginalised from the workplace disabled people are often segregated within schooling, unable to find suitable housing, and have restricted access to public transport (Oliver, 1996). In general, our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history. For example, adopting a Marxist (materialist) approach, Michael Oliver (1990) has sought to demonstrate that disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation. He suggests that the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory. Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process. He argues that exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism (disability is an individual rather than societal problem) and medicalisation (the need for disability to be treated). As such, Oliver (1990) views disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns, with the experiences of disability determined by the economy (Oliver, 1996). A Marxist or political economy approach is not, however, the only way to try and explain the bases of social exclusion.

<h4>K turns the case -- notions of productivity is the PROXIMATE cause of your impacts </h4><p><strong><mark>Kitchin 98</mark> (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836) </p><p></strong>It is now generally recognised that <u><strong><mark>disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society</u></strong></mark>. Disabled people represent one of the poorest groups in Western society. Apart from being excluded and marginalised from the workplace disabled people are often segregated within schooling, unable to find suitable housing, and have restricted access to public transport (Oliver, 1996). In general, <u>our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history</u>. For example, adopting a Marxist (materialist) approach, Michael Oliver (1990) has sought to demonstrate that <u><strong><mark>disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation</strong></mark>.</u> He suggests that <u><strong><mark>the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process</strong></mark>.</u> He argues that <u><mark>exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism</mark> (<strong><mark>disability is an individual rather than societal problem</u></strong></mark>) and medicalisation (the need for disability to be treated). As such, <u>Oliver</u> (1990) <u>views <strong><mark>disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns</strong></mark>, with <strong><mark>the experiences of disability determined by the econom</strong></mark>y</u> (Oliver, 1996). A Marxist or political economy approach is not, however, the only way to try and explain the bases of social exclusion. </p>

2NC

2NC Impact Overview

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

N

UNLV

7

Weber HV

Thiele, Chris

1AC - PAS Disability 1NC - Framework Cap K 2NC - Cap K 1NR - Framework 2NR - Framework

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

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Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Second is liberalism – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to endless imperial warfare and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality

Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States During World War I some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles It is World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on racial statecraft, militarized science, and civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through scholarly theories staked out in conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures has been a cornerstone of the management of “difference” as well as the conquest of native populations inclusion “there,” became governmentality “here,” universities must be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” constructed by anthropology constructions such as “savage” helped create the scaffoldings of imperial cartographies During World War I archaeologists worked as spies to offer “on ground geographical knowledges The Manhattan Project and the bomb sealed this inextricable link between research and militarism U.S. forces recognized they needed training about the peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for teaching the languages of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 campuses anthropologists monitored Native American reservations were involved in studying Japanese American concentration camps McCarthyism ensured questions were not asked about the reasons the business of war was becoming an academic business This intersection of D o D Pentagon, and research interests shifted the fiscal nature of patronage to the defense establishment the CIA supported research to perfect psychological torture social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations and became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

<h4><u>Second is liberalism</u> – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to <u>endless imperial warfare</u> and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality </h4><p><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Empires of knowledge rest on</mark> the foundation of <mark>racial statecraft, militarized science, and</mark> enduring notions of <mark>civilizational superiority</u></strong></mark>. What we call “<u><strong><mark>imperial cartographies” can be traced through</mark> the meshed contours of research methods and <mark>scholarly theories</mark> as they are <mark>staked out in</mark> the pragmatic mappings of <mark>conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire</u></strong></mark>.14 It is important to note that <u><strong><mark>expert knowledge on “other” cultures</mark> and civilizations <mark>has been a cornerstone of</mark> the development of academic disciplines and used in <mark>the management of “difference”</mark> within the nation <mark>as well as the conquest</mark> and management <mark>of native populations</mark> by the United States, here and overseas</u></strong>. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how <u><strong>educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission</u></strong>. <u><strong>Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for <mark>inclusion</mark> and civilization <mark>“there,”</mark> on the periphery, <mark>became</mark> a laboratory for new regimes of <mark>governmentality “here,”</mark> within the immediate territorial borders of the United States</u></strong>. <u><strong>If <mark>universities</mark> of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes <mark>must </mark>also <mark>be understood within the epistemologies of “othering”</mark> being <mark>constructed by</mark> disciplines such as <mark>anthropology</u></strong></mark>. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 <u><strong>Theoretical <mark>constructions</mark> of categories <mark>such as “savage”</mark> and “primitive”</u></strong> were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but <u><strong><mark>helped create the</mark> very <mark>scaffoldings of</mark> European and later U.S. <mark>imperial cartographies</u></strong></mark>.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, <u><strong>what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States</u></strong>, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. <u><strong><mark>During World War I</u></strong></mark>, for instance, <u><strong>some <mark>archaeologists worked as spies to</mark> literally <mark>offer “on ground geographical knowledges</mark>” that</u></strong>, as David Price argues, <u><strong>were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles</u></strong>.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 <u><strong>It is</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong>World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. <mark>The Manhattan Project and the</mark> development of the atom <mark>bomb sealed this</mark> intimate and soon <mark>inextricable link</mark> <mark>between</mark> scientific <mark>research and militarism</u></strong></mark>. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “<u><strong>It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field</u></strong>. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 <u><strong>As <mark>U.S.</mark> and Allied <mark>forces</mark> launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they <mark>recognized</mark> that <mark>they needed</mark> condensed, accelerated <mark>training about the</mark> geographies and <mark>peoples they were encountering</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based <u><strong><mark>linguistic anthropology</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>created the capacity for</mark> “quickly learning and <mark>teaching the languages of</mark> the new theatres of <mark>warfare</u></strong></mark>.”24 Further, <u><strong><mark>Army Specialized Training Programs</u></strong></mark> (ASTPs) <u><strong><mark>were established on 227</mark> college and university <mark>campuses</mark>, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces</u></strong>. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 <u><strong>early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. </u></strong>If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, <u><strong>other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state</u></strong>. For instance, <u><strong><mark>anthropologists</mark> at the Bureau of Indian Affairs <mark>monitored</mark> and influenced war-related opinion on <mark>Native American reservations</u></strong></mark>. 27 Some <u><strong>anthropologists <mark>were involved in studying</mark> <mark>Japanese American</mark> communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the <mark>concentration camps</u></strong></mark> set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 <u><strong>Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world</u></strong>. <u><strong>By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured</u></strong>. Noam Chomsky has argued that <u><strong>by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history</u></strong>.”29 <u><strong>Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities</u></strong>.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but <u><strong><mark>McCarthyism</mark> and a new wave of political repression <mark>ensured</mark> that <mark>questions were not asked about</mark> the business of war—or <mark>the reasons</mark> that <mark>the business of war was</mark> also <mark>becoming an academic business</u></strong></mark>.34 <u><strong><mark>This intersection of D</mark>epartment <mark>o</mark>f <mark>D</mark>efense, <mark>Pentagon, and research </mark>university <mark>interests </mark>resulted in massive amounts of funding and <mark>shifted the fiscal nature of</mark> universities’ state <mark>patronage</mark> from land-grant, agricultural resources <mark>to the</mark> huge war chest of the <mark>defense establishment</u></strong></mark>. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that <u><strong>in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations</u></strong>.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “<u><strong><mark>the CIA supported</mark> social science <mark>research</mark> throughout the 1950s and 1960s <mark>to perfect psychological torture</mark> techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education</u></strong>.”36 At the height of the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations</mark>—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—<mark>and</mark> after 9/11, <mark>became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq</u></strong></mark>.37</p>

2NC

2NC Overview

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Berkeley WT

Meyer, Andrew

1AC - Black Scholarship 1NC - University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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They cause serial policy failure.

Dillon and Reid 00

Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

Governmentality creates a market for policy serial policy failure--the fate of all policy--compels a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy will overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life governance installs inequitable distributions of danger through the ways in which life is problematized by it

Governmentality creates a market for policy serial policy failure the fate of all policy compels a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy will overcome Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which governance problematizes life governance installs inequitable distributions of danger

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

<h4>They cause serial policy failure.</h4><p><strong>Dillon and Reid 00</strong> (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))</p><p>More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.<u> <mark>Governmentality</mark> </u>thereby<u> <mark>creates a market for policy</u></mark>, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet<u> <mark>serial policy failure</mark>--<mark>the fate</u></mark> and the fuel <u><mark>of all policy</mark>--<mark>compels</u></mark> them into <u><mark>a continuous search for</u></mark> the <u><mark>new analysis</u></mark> that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] <u><mark>Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that</mark> </u>science and <u><mark>policy</u></mark>--and policy science--<u><mark>will</mark> </u>ultimately<u> <mark>overcome</mark>. <mark>Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which</mark> global <mark>governance</mark> encounters and <mark>problematizes life</u></mark> as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal<u> <mark>governance</mark> </u>is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately<u> <mark>installs</mark> </u>socially specific and radically<u> <mark>inequitable distributions of</mark> </u>wealth, opportunity, and mortal<u> <mark>danger</mark> </u>both locally and globally<u> through the </u>very detailed<u> ways in which life is</u> variously (policy) <u>problematized by it</u>. </p>

2NC

K

2NC Framework - Core

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N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation

<h4>SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation </h4>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- OAS

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A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

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SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation

<h4>SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation </h4>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- OAS

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

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The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable

Occupied UC Berkeley 10

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the mostf, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything

Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the mostf, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

<h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley 10</strong> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <mark>military and corporate research</mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <mark>social conditioning</mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <mark>concentration of privilege</mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u></strong>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><strong><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</mark> waged on a daily basis</u></strong>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death is</mark> our <mark>banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u><strong>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u><strong>The cemetery no longer exists because <mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function: they <mark>are ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><strong><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></strong></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</mark>.</u></strong> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><strong><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is counter-offensive</mark> and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><strong><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <mark>generated its own antithesis</mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u></strong> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></strong></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><strong><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</mark> to the socia</u></strong>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><strong><mark>a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic</mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u></strong>.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u><strong>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u></strong>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</mark> fear the incursions the mostf, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><strong><mark>they are insistent on saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living</mark>, when it is as good as social death</u></strong>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u><strong>human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50] In reality, “<u><strong><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><strong><mark>seeking to consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u><strong>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u></strong>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u><strong>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></strong></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><strong><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u></strong>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "<u><strong><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u><strong>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u></strong>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><strong><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u><strong>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><strong><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></strong></mark> might suffice: "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u><strong>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><strong><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>

1NC

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1NC University K

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Wake

2

Cal MS

JJustice

1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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This process ensures endless error replication and locks the Other into a constant state of oppression

Nayar 13 ) gz

Nayar 13 (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975) gz

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.

Suffering serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of colonial) theory for the theory-producer s/he progresses through academic career paths these are mega-industries whose reach covers the colonised world Suffering does indeed generate surplus value There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer Neither do we have to suffer the material nature of bodies that suffer Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account to any real embodiment of suffering the suffering-Other remains in her place compliantly

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured.15 And these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption.16 Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! And most advantageously, suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.

<h4>This process ensures endless error replication and locks the Other into a constant state of oppression </h4><p><strong>Nayar 13</strong> (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975<u><strong>) gz</p><p><mark>Suffering</mark>, as a witnessed condition of others, <mark>serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of</mark> (still <mark>colonial) theory</mark> production, both individually <mark>for the theory-producer</mark> as <mark>s/he progresses through</mark> professional and <mark>academic career paths</mark>, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured</u></strong>.15 And <u><strong><mark>these are mega-industries whose reach covers</mark> vast spans of <mark>the</mark> (neo/post)<mark>colonised</mark>/integrated/globalised, <mark>world </mark>where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training</u></strong>. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. <u><strong><mark>Suffering does indeed generate surplus value</mark>. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. <mark>There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer</mark> seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption</u></strong>.16 <u><strong><mark>Neither</u></strong> <u><strong>do we have to suffer</mark> the inconvenience of <mark>the material nature of bodies that suffer</mark> contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality!</u></strong> And most advantageously, <u><strong>suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? <mark>Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account</mark> in any way, <mark>to any</mark> one <mark>real embodiment of suffering</mark> (in)Humanity; <mark>the suffering-Other</mark> plays her part well in this, and importantly, <mark>remains in her place compliantly</mark>. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.</p></u></strong>

2NC

2NC Overview

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N

UNLV

1

Berkeley WT

Meyer, Andrew

1AC - Black Scholarship 1NC - University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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Rhetoric and consciousness is insufficient to solve -- material action is needed - if we win a risk that the nature of the affirmative necessarily pacifies material action then this completely turns the aff

Watson ’13

Simo Vehmas and Watson ’13, “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of Critical Disability Studies.” Disability and Society. 2013.

Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to employment and social participation and subordinated to oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement Disability demands redistribution of goods In contrast to other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice Whatever the size, it is an extra cost to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences Whilst these differences’ can be presented as the result of ableist discourses this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change

Disabled people experience oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement Disability demands redistribution of goods disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice it is an extra cost to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Whilst these differences’ can be presented as the result of ableist discourses this does not solve the problem. The problems require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change

Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change.

<h4><strong>Rhetoric and consciousness is insufficient to solve -- material action is needed - if we win a risk that the nature of the affirmative necessarily pacifies material action then this completely turns the aff </h4><p></strong>Simo Vehmas and<strong> Watson ’13</strong>, “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of Critical Disability Studies.” Disability and Society. 2013.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Disabled people</mark> typically <mark>experience</mark> disadvantage in relation to</u></strong> the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from <u><strong>employment and</u></strong> from equal <u><strong>social participation</u></strong>, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, <u><strong>and</u></strong> also <u><strong>subordinated to</u></strong> various <u><strong><mark>oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement</u></strong></mark> (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). <u><strong><mark>Disability</u></strong></mark> is rooted in the economic structures of society and <u><strong><mark>demands redistribution of goods</u></strong></mark> and wealth. <u><strong>In contrast to</u></strong> some <u><strong>other oppressed groups, <mark>disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice</u></strong></mark>. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. <u><strong>Whatever the size, <mark>it is an extra cost</u></strong></mark> both to employers and <u><strong><mark>to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences</u></strong>.</mark> Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. <u><strong><mark>Whilst these</u></strong></mark> ‘real <u><strong><mark>differences’ can be presented as the result of</u></strong></mark> dominant <u><strong><mark>ableist discourses</u></strong></mark> where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, <u><strong><mark>this does not solve the problem. The problems</mark> disabled people face <mark>require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change</u></strong></mark>.</p>

2NC

2NC Impact Overview

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UNLV

7

Weber HV

Thiele, Chris

1AC - PAS Disability 1NC - Framework Cap K 2NC - Cap K 1NR - Framework 2NR - Framework

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Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny

Antonio 95

Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)

Nietzsche considered roles" as "external," phenomena symptomatic of estrangement persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in fabrications to obtain advancement They are so absorbed in simulating role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible consequences and dialogue about what others might expect rotation of "masks" reduces persons to simulacra One adopts "many roles," playing them " superficially Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine This type of actor cannot plan for the long term Superficiality rules Nietzsche feared the simulated versions. they are "violent exploitative, , arrogant according to circumstances The combination of desperate conforming overreaching and ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

Nietzsche considered roles" as "external," phenomena symptomatic of estrangement persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in fabrications to obtain advancement They are so absorbed in simulating role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term Superficiality rules Nietzsche feared the simulated versions they are "violent, exploitative arrogant according to circumstances The combination of desperate conforming overreaching and ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

<h4><u><strong>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He <u><mark>considered</mark> </u>"<u><mark>roles" as "external,"</mark> </u>"surface," or "foreground" <u><mark>phenomena</mark> </u>and viewed close personal identification with them as <u><mark>symptomatic of estrangement</u></mark>. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><mark>persons</mark> </u>(especially male professionals) <u><mark>in</mark> <mark>specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and</mark> <mark>engage in</mark> </u>gross<u> <mark>fabrications to obtain advancement</u></mark>. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><mark>They are so</mark> </u>thoroughly <u><mark>absorbed in simulating</mark> </u>effective<u> <mark>role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity.</u></mark> The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, <u>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible </u>causes, meanings, and <u>consequences </u>of acts <u>and </u>unending internal <u>dialogue about what others might </u>think,<u> expect</u>, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous <u>rotation of </u>socially appropriate <u>"masks" reduces persons to </u>hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or <u>simulacra</u>. <u>One adopts "many roles," playing them "</u>badly and <u>superficially</u>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" <u>Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine </u>article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. <u><mark>This type of actor cannot plan for the long term</u></mark> or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><mark>Superficiality rules </u></mark>in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply<u> <mark>feared the</mark> </u>new <u><mark>simulated versions</mark>. </u>Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; <u><mark>they are "violent</u>,</mark> envious,<u> <mark>exploitative</mark>, </u>scheming, fawning, cringing<u>, <mark>arrogant</u></mark>, all<u> <mark>according to</mark> <mark>circumstances</u></mark>. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><mark>The</mark> </u>deadly<u> <mark>combination</mark> <mark>of desperate conforming</mark> </u>and<u> <mark>overreaching</mark> <mark>and</mark> </u>untrammeled<u> <mark>ressentiment</mark> <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</mark> </u>(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p>

2NC

K

2NC Framework - Core

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

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Baylor

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The aff’s biological understanding of life and death turns the body into a diseased object in need of continual mortification. The attempted securitization of a subject results in violent control of objects viewed as inert

Baudrillard ’76

Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order Death is not a due payment it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death our modern idea of death is controlled by representations of the machine and the function A machine either works or it does not the biological machine is either dead or alive The symbolic order is ignorant of this And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself There is no longer any objective progress here: the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is no possible definition of death. We are living within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics The subject's identity is continually falling apart But this death is not at all biological. At the symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying It is according to the mind that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics but it no longer declares this it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture. Every other culture says death begins before death life goes on after we must try to see the radical indeterminacy Death is a nuance of life our modern idea is controlled by representations death articulates life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death life nor death can be assigned a given end there is no definition of death We are living within evolutionist thought this is the illusion of the subject Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual subject does death take on irreversible meaning. death is not an event, but a myth The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution an end­less cycle impelled by death This death must be conjured up and localised in a precise point death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. death objectifies the body as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying Biology has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and world

The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'

<h4><u><strong>The aff’s biological understanding of life and death turns the body into a diseased object in need of continual mortification. The attempted securitization of a subject results in violent control of objects viewed as inert </h4><p></u>Baudrillard ’76</strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></strong></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><strong><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></strong></mark>. It is <u><strong><mark>specific to our culture</u></strong>. <u><strong>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u></strong>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><strong><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u></strong> [echeance], <u><strong>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></strong></mark> a very different system of <u><strong><mark>representations</u></strong></mark>: that <u><strong>of the machine and the function</u></strong>. <u><strong>A machine either works or it does not</u></strong>. Thus <u><strong>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u></strong>. <u><strong>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u></strong> digital abstraction. <u><strong>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u></strong>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u><strong>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u></strong>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u><strong>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u></strong>something of <u><strong>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u></strong>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u></strong>: for then <u><strong><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <mark>life nor death can</mark> any longer <mark>be assigned a given end</mark>: <mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> punctuality nor any <u><strong>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are living</u></strong></mark> entirely <u><strong><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u></strong> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u><strong>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u></strong>, falling into God's forgetting. <u><strong>But this death is not at all biological.</u></strong> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u><strong>At the</u></strong> other, <u><strong>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form its identity.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In reality, <mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</mark>, <mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be conjured up and localised in a precise point</mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u></strong>. <u><strong>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u></strong> In a certain sense, <u><strong>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u><strong>It is according to the mind</u></strong>, this imaginary schizz, <u><strong>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u></strong>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><strong><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u></strong>, <u><strong>but it no longer declares this</u></strong>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u><strong>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u></strong>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p>

1NC

K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

N

Kentucky

7

Georgetown EK

Box, Brian

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ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15