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740,105
Their “changing the world” attitude is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout
Baudrillard 5
Baudrillard 5 [Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]
death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for bette A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species' From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it forgotten discrimination We need evil from which there is no redemption There is nothing immoral in this. nothing immoral in some losing and What would be immoral would be for everyone to win the imperative of salvation will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed which retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice Individuals carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance Summoned to greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves human beings are at odds; and their existences dislocated An existence realized but denied, thwarted, disowned
death has to be redeemed by a effort to transform the world. One has to ensure salvation at all costs by realizing the world better A performance of transforming it is no longer a question of glory; it is a question of death The point is to make the world transparent by extirpating any evil force under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and no hell no damnation Everything becomes susceptible of redemption From this point good and evil, which were still opposing are dissociated for the realization of the world under the banner of happiness It is to manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment show signs of happiness the future will be modified to" attain perfection of the species' From the point when everyone is saved, no one is Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons democratic enterprise it forgot discrimination We need evil from which there is no redemption There is nothing immoral in this. nothing immoral in some losing What would be immoral would be for everyone to win the imperative of salvation will always be thwarted by challenge elsewhere and personal beatitude sacrificed which retains the fateful quality that in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears misfortune in the form of disavowal and secret disillusionment performance is collective form of human sacrifice, Individuals carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world irrelevant even in their own eyes they do what they do for no other possibility No authority to appeal to They have sacrificed their lives to functional existences They are one with calculation of performance Summoned to efficiency human beings are at odds existences dislocated realized but denied, thwarted, disowned
'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That death has to be redeemed by a com- pulsive effort to transform the world. One has to ensure one's salvation at all costs by realizing the world for better or for worse. A performance that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that of transforming the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But it is no longer a question now of his glory; it is a question of his death and of exorcizing it. The point is to make the world transparent and operational by extirpating from it any illusion and any evil force. And so, under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and, at the same time, going from bad to worse: no hell any more, and no damnation. Everything becomes susceptible of redemption. From this point on, good and evil, which were still opposing powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, are to be dissociated for the purposes of a definitive realization of the world under the banner of happiness. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. It is to such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and show all the signs of happiness!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for the future, it is better and worse yet: everything will be genetically modified to" attain the biological and democratic perfection of the species'; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. From the point when everyone is potentially saved, no one is. Salvation no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons for our democratic enterprise: it is stifled at birth for having forgotten the necessary discrimination, for the omission of evil. We need, then, an irrevocable presence of evil, an evil from which there is no possible redemption, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. There is nothing immoral in this. According to the rules of the game, there is nothing immoral in some losing and others winning, or even in everyone losing. What would be immoral would be for everyone to win. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since the imperative of salvation, of the individual state of grace, will always be thwarted by some challenge or passion from elsewhere, and any form of personal beatitude may be sacrificed to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but which, in any event, retains the fateful quality of that which, in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass. Behind its euphoric exaltation, this imperative of maximum performance bears within it evil and misfortune in the form of a deep disavowal and a secret disillusionment. Perhaps performance is merely a collective form of human sacrifice, but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. Individuals, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they carry on their lives like a useless function in the eyes of another world, irrelevant even in their own eyes. And they do what they do all the better for the fact that there is no other possibility. No authority to appeal to. They have sacrificed their lives to their functional existences. They are one with the exact numerical calculation of their lives and their performance. Summoned to get the greatest efficiency and pleasure out of themselves, human beings are suddenly at odds; and their existences dislocated. An existence realized, then, but at the same time denied, thwarted, disowned. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement.
7,161
<h4>Their “changing the world” attitude is bullshit and leads to a hatred of the self and lashout</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 5 </strong>[Jean. French postmodern dude: philosopher, sociologist, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact. Page 146-150]</p><p>'Bis Gottes Fehle hilft,' says H6lderlin. 'Until God's absence comes to our aid.' The death of God is, in fact, the deliverance from all re- sponsibility to another world. But our responsibility for this world then becomes total, and there is no longer any possible redemption. Or, rather, redemption changes meaning: it is no longer the redemption of man and his sin, but the redemption of the death of God. That <u><strong><mark>death has to be redeemed by a</mark> com- pulsive <mark>effort to transform the world. One has to ensure</mark> one's <mark>salvation at all costs by realizing the world</mark> for <mark>bette</u></strong>r</mark> or for worse. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> <mark>performance</mark> that tops off the one described by Max Weber in The Spirit ofCapitalism: that <mark>of transforming</u></strong></mark> the world into wealth for the greater glory of God. But <u><strong><mark>it is no longer a question</mark> now <mark>of</mark> his <mark>glory; it is a</mark> <mark>question of</mark> his <mark>death</mark> and of exorcizing it. <mark>The point is to make the world transparent</u></strong></mark> and operational <u><strong><mark>by extirpating</mark> from it any illusion and <mark>any evil force</mark>. And so, <mark>under the hegemony of good, everything is getting better and</u></strong></mark>, at the same time, going from bad to worse: <u><strong><mark>no hell</mark> any more, and <mark>no</mark> <mark>damnation</mark>. <mark>Everything becomes susceptible of redemption</mark>. <mark>From this point </mark>on, <mark>good and evil, which were still opposing</mark> powers, but linked to each other in transcendence, <mark>are</mark> to be <mark>dissociated for the</mark> purposes of a definitive <mark>realization of the world under the banner of happiness</u></strong></mark>. In fact, this idea of happiness bears merely a distant relation to good. For if good is moral in essence, happiness, the performance of happiness - is in essence perfectly immoral. <mark>It <u><strong>is to</mark> such an evangelization that we can ascribe all the <mark>manifest signs of well-being and accomplishment</mark> Offered to us by a paradisiac civilization subject to the eleventh commandment, the commandment that sweeps away ~1l others: 'Be happy and <mark>show</mark> all the <mark>signs of happiness</u></strong></mark>!' . We can see this demand for universal redemption in the way all current violence and injustice is being put on "trial, and also, retrospectively, all the crimes and violent events of the past: the French Revolution, slavery, original sin and battered wives, the ozone layer and sexual harassment. In short, the investigative process for the Last Judgement is already well under way and we are doomed first to condemn, then to absolve and whitewash the whole of our history; to exterminate evil from even the tiniest interstices, so as to offer the image of a radiant universe ready to pass over into the next world. An inhuman, superhuman, all-too-human undertaking? And why fuel this eternal repentance, this chain reaction of bad conscience? Because everything must be saved. This is where we have got to today. Everything will be re- deemed, the whole past will be rehabilitated, buffed up to the point of transparency. As for <u><strong><mark>the future</mark>, it is better and worse yet: everything <mark>will be</mark> genetically <mark>modified to" attain</mark> the biological and democratic <mark>perfection of the species'</u></strong></mark>; The salvation that was defined by the equivalence of merit and grace will be defined, once the fixation with evil and Hell has been overcome, by the equivalence of genes and performance. To tell the truth, once happiness becomes the general equi- valent of salvation, pure and simple, then heaven itself is no longer needed. <u><strong><mark>From the point when everyone is</mark> potentially <mark>saved, no one is</mark>. <mark>Salvation</mark> <mark>no longer has any meaning. This is the destiny that beckons</mark> for our <mark>democratic enterprise</mark>: <mark>it</u></strong></mark> is stifled at birth for having <u><strong><mark>forgot</mark>ten</u></strong> the necessary <u><strong><mark>discrimination</u></strong></mark>, for the omission of evil. <u><strong><mark>We need</u></strong></mark>, then, an irrevocable presence of <u><strong><mark>evil</u></strong></mark>, an evil <u><strong><mark>from which there is no</u></strong></mark> possible <u><strong><mark>redemption</u></strong></mark>, an irrevocable dis- crimination, a perpetual duality of Heaven and Hell, and even, in a sense, a predestination of evil, for there can be no destiny without some predestination. <u><strong><mark>There is nothing immoral in this.</mark> </u></strong>According to the rules of the game, there is <u><strong><mark>nothing immoral in some losing </mark>and</u></strong> others winning, or even in everyone losing. <u><strong><mark>What would be immoral would be for everyone to win</u></strong></mark>. This is the contemporary ideal of our democracy: that all should be saved. But that is possible only at the cost of a perpetual inflation and upping of the stakes. And this is reassuring, since <u><strong><mark>the imperative of salvation</u></strong></mark>, of the individual state of grace, <u><strong><mark>will always be thwarted by</mark> some <mark>challenge</mark> or passion from <mark>elsewhere</mark>, <mark>and</mark> any form of <mark>personal</mark> <mark>beatitude</mark> may be <mark>sacrificed</u></strong></mark> to something more vital, which may be of the order of the will in Schopenhauer's terms or of the will to power in Nietzsche's, but <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark>, in any event, <u><strong><mark>retains the fateful quality</mark> of <mark>that</mark> which, <mark>in opposition to any happy finality, is predestined to come to pass.</mark> <mark>Behind</mark> its <mark>euphoric exaltation, this</mark> <mark>imperative of maximum performance</mark> <mark>bears</mark> within it evil and <mark>misfortune in the form of</mark> a deep <mark>disavowal</mark> <mark>and</mark> a <mark>secret disillusionment</mark>. Perhaps <mark>performance</mark> <mark>is</mark> merely a <mark>collective form of human sacrifice</u></strong>, </mark>but disembodied and distilled into our entire technological machinery. In this strange world, where everything is potentially available - the body, sex, space, money, pleasure - to be taken or rejected en bloc, everything is there; nothing has disappeared physically, but everything has disappeared metaphysically. 'As if by magic,' one might say, except that it has disappeared not so much by enchantment as by disenchantment. <u><strong><mark>Individuals</u></strong></mark>, such as they are, become exactly what they are. Without transcendence and without image, they <u><strong><mark>carry on their lives like a useless function in</mark> <mark>the eyes of another world</mark>, <mark>irrelevant even in their own eyes</mark>. And <mark>they do what they do</mark> all the better <mark>for</mark> the fact that there is <mark>no other possibility</mark>. <mark>No authority to appeal to</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They have sacrificed their lives to</mark> their <mark>functional existences</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are one with</mark> the exact numerical <mark>calculation</mark> <mark>of</mark> their lives and their <mark>performance</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Summoned to</u></strong></mark> get the <u><strong>greatest <mark>efficiency</mark> and pleasure out of themselves</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>human beings are</u></strong></mark> suddenly <u><strong><mark>at odds</mark>; and their <mark>existences dislocated</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>An existence <mark>realized</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> at the same time <u><strong><mark>denied, thwarted, disowned</u></strong></mark>. Wherever humans are condemned to total freedom or to an ideal fulfilment, this automatic abreaction to ;their own good and their own happiness seeps in. This imperative of maximum performance also comes into contradiction with the moral law, which dictates that everyone shall be put on an equal basis and everything set to zero in the name of democracy and an equal division of opportunity and advantage. From the perspective of universal redemption no one must stand out. For justice to be done, all privilege must disappear; everyone is called on to shed any specific qualities and to become once again an elementary particle - collective happiness being that of the lowest common denominator. This is like potlatch in reverse, each outbidding the other in insignificance, while zealously cultivating their tiniest difference and cobbling together their multiple identities. Recrimination means going back over the crime to correct its trajectory and its effects. This is what we are doing in going back over the whole of our history, over the criminal history of the human species, so that we may do penance right now as we await the Last Judgement. </p>
2NC
1NC Market
2NC AT: Action Good
429,537
4
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,106
Dems win – ad war
Blake 10/17
Blake 10/17 <Aaron, The Fix, “How Democrats are winning the ad wars — in 2 charts,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/10/17/how-democrats-are-winning-the-ad-wars-in-2-charts/>#SPS
One of the less-publicized realities of the 2014 Senate campaign is that Democrats are getting considerably more bang for their buck. they figure to have at least a slight advertising advantage in most of the key races -- despite being outspent overall. in Alaska Republicans figure to spend more than 72 percent of the ad dollars in the final few weeks. they will run less than half the ads There's a similar disparity in Arkansas in only two of the races above are Republicans getting more bang for their buck than Democrats, and those two states are Michigan and Virginia, which aren't really top-tier contests. The number of ads run isn't quite the same thing as the number of people reached by ads. Candidates get lower ad rates than outside groups, and incumbents tend to raise more money than challengers. Given Democrats have so many incumbents in the races above (nine) and Republicans have just two, that means Democrats tend to benefit more from lower rates for candidates. reserving ads early secures lower rates. Buying ads at this point in an election can be very expensive, because the airwaves are flooded in the markets playing host to competitive races GOP groups trying to play catch-up and even the advertising battlefield in the states that wound up being competitive have to spend considerably more on ads today than Democrats did when they reserved the space months ago. Republicans are about to get lapped on the airwaves Republicans are getting pummeled in Michigan, Oregon and Virginia. These are no longer expected to be potential pickup opportunities, and the ad-spending imbalance certainly won't do much to change that.
Democrats are getting considerably more bang for their buck The number of ads run isn't quite the same thing as the number of people reached by ads Candidates get lower ad rates than outside groups, and incumbents tend to raise more money than challengers. Given Democrats have so many incumbents that means Democrats tend to benefit more from lower rates for candidates. reserving ads early secures lower rates. GOP groups trying to play catch-up Republicans are about to get lapped on the airwaves
Over the final 18 days of the 2014 campaign, Republicans are set to outspend Democrats on ads in seven of the top 11 Senate races in the country. In only four of those races, though, will the GOP actually put more ads on the air. One of the less-publicized realities of the 2014 Senate campaign is that, while both parties are spending hundreds of millions of dollars of money trying to secure the majority, Democrats are getting considerably more bang for their buck. And down the stretch, they figure to have at least a slight advertising advantage in most of the key races -- despite being outspent overall. That's according to data compiled by Echelon Insights, a Republican research and analytics firm that has launched an effort to predict future ad spending using Federal Communications Commission data. (This, we would emphasize, is an inexact science, so keep in mind that these are estimates.) Here's the breakdown, both on total dollars being spent (on top) and on actual ads set to run (on bottom): You'll notice in Alaska, for example, that Republicans figure to spend more than 72 percent of the ad dollars in the final few weeks. Despite that spending advantage, though, they will run less than half the ads, according to these data. There's a similar disparity in Arkansas, though the GOP still figures to run slightly more ads than Democrats there. In fact, in only two of the races above are Republicans getting more bang for their buck than Democrats, and those two states are Michigan and Virginia, which aren't really top-tier contests. So why the disparity between dollars spent and ads run? 1) The number of ads run isn't quite the same thing as the number of people reached by ads. You can run a bunch of ads in Grand Junction, Colo., for example, for the same price as one ad in Denver. So looking at raw numbers of ads doesn't necessarily mean Democrats will reach more people with their ads. (At the same time, it's likely both sides spend relatively similar portions of their ad dollars in big markets vs. small markets across the country, so it's still a valuable measure.) 2) Candidates get lower ad rates than outside groups, and incumbents tend to raise more money than challengers. Given Democrats have so many incumbents in the races above (nine) and Republicans have just two, that means Democrats tend to benefit more from lower rates for candidates. 3) The following tweet is from Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee executive director Guy Cecil on Friday: What Cecil is referring to is the fact that reserving ads early secures lower rates. Buying ads at this point in an election can be very expensive, because the airwaves are flooded in the markets playing host to competitive races (such as Manchester). The best strategy, then, is always to reserve the ad space early, while it's still cheap. In this area, Democrats also benefit, because they tend to reserve the space earlier. The DSCC has raised considerably more money than its GOP counterpart this cycle and, as an incumbent-protection organization, had a pretty good idea where it needed to put that money early on. And it did so. Thus, GOP groups trying to play catch-up and even the advertising battlefield in the states that wound up being competitive have to spend considerably more on ads today than Democrats did when they reserved the space months ago. "While Republican candidates are getting better rates than their Democratic competitors, Democrats seem to be getting much more favorable rates for issue groups and party committees," said Patrick Ruffini, a co-founder of Echelon. "Republicans are obviously much more reliant on these, which further exacerbates that ad-efficiency gap." Republicans in the past complained that they faced sizeable advertising deficits in key states like Iowa and North Carolina, and outside groups soon came to the rescue. Similarly, on Thursday, National Republican Senatorial Committee executive director Rob Collins (Cecil's counterpart) mentioned that the race in Georgia is tightening. That's no coincidence; if you look at the chart above, Republicans are about to get lapped on the airwaves in Georgia, and Collins -- who can't communicate directly with outside groups but can send such smoke signals -- is doing just that. We'll see if GOP outside groups come in to close the gap. If they can afford it, of course. A few final observations about the above chart: Independent Greg Orman is running only 16 percent of the ads in his race with Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) down the stretch. He'll probably close the gap, but it's pretty clear he's getting vastly outspent now that the cavalry has come to Roberts's aid. Alison Lundergan Grimes (D) faces a huge ad deficit in the Kentucky Senate race. This is because the DSCC just pulled out of Kentucky. There were some whispers that Grimes and other outside groups could pick up the slack and keep her competitive; this shows they would have plenty of ground to make up. Republicans are getting pummeled in Michigan, Oregon and Virginia. These are no longer expected to be potential pickup opportunities, and the ad-spending imbalance certainly won't do much to change that. And finally, the below chart is the same as above, except that it's for the past 21 days rather than the next 18. What you'll notice is that Republicans in most races have run a higher percentage of the ads than they are scheduled to down the stretch. So the GOP's projected advertising deficit down the stretch is relatively new. It also suggests that things change, and given GOP outside groups have come to the rescue before, they could tip the balance again. If they want to pay the price.
5,669
<h4><strong>Dems win – ad war</h4><p>Blake 10/17 </strong><Aaron, The Fix, “How Democrats are winning the ad wars — in 2 charts,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/10/17/how-democrats-are-winning-the-ad-wars-in-2-charts/>#SPS</p><p>Over the final 18 days of the 2014 campaign, Republicans are set to outspend Democrats on ads in seven of the top 11 Senate races in the country. In only four of those races, though, will the GOP actually put more ads on the air. <u><strong>One of the less-publicized realities of the 2014 Senate campaign is that</u></strong>, while both parties are spending hundreds of millions of dollars of money trying to secure the majority, <u><strong><mark>Democrats are getting considerably more bang for their buck</mark>.</u></strong> And down the stretch, <u><strong>they figure to have at least a slight advertising advantage in most of the key races -- despite being outspent overall. </u></strong>That's according to data compiled by Echelon Insights, a Republican research and analytics firm that has launched an effort to predict future ad spending using Federal Communications Commission data. (This, we would emphasize, is an inexact science, so keep in mind that these are estimates.) Here's the breakdown, both on total dollars being spent (on top) and on actual ads set to run (on bottom): You'll notice <u><strong>in Alaska</u></strong>, for example, that <u><strong>Republicans figure to spend more than 72 percent of the ad dollars in the final few weeks.</u></strong> Despite that spending advantage, though, <u><strong>they will run less than half the ads</u></strong>, according to these data. <u><strong>There's a similar disparity in Arkansas</u></strong>, though the GOP still figures to run slightly more ads than Democrats there. In fact, <u><strong>in only two of the races above are Republicans getting more bang for their buck than Democrats, and those two states are Michigan and Virginia, which aren't really top-tier contests. </u></strong>So why the disparity between dollars spent and ads run? 1) <u><strong><mark>The number of ads run isn't quite the same thing as the number of people reached by ads</mark>.</u></strong> You can run a bunch of ads in Grand Junction, Colo., for example, for the same price as one ad in Denver. So looking at raw numbers of ads doesn't necessarily mean Democrats will reach more people with their ads. (At the same time, it's likely both sides spend relatively similar portions of their ad dollars in big markets vs. small markets across the country, so it's still a valuable measure.) 2) <u><strong><mark>Candidates get lower ad rates than outside groups, and incumbents tend to raise more money than challengers.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Given Democrats have so many incumbents</mark> in the races above (nine) and Republicans have just two, <mark>that means Democrats tend to benefit more from lower rates for candidates.</mark> </u></strong>3) The following tweet is from Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee executive director Guy Cecil on Friday: What Cecil is referring to is the fact that <u><strong><mark>reserving ads early secures lower rates.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Buying ads at this point in an election can be very expensive, because the airwaves are flooded in the markets playing host to competitive races</u></strong> (such as Manchester). The best strategy, then, is always to reserve the ad space early, while it's still cheap. In this area, Democrats also benefit, because they tend to reserve the space earlier. The DSCC has raised considerably more money than its GOP counterpart this cycle and, as an incumbent-protection organization, had a pretty good idea where it needed to put that money early on. And it did so. Thus, <u><strong><mark>GOP groups trying to play catch-up</mark> and even the advertising battlefield in the states that wound up being competitive have to spend considerably more on ads today than Democrats did when they reserved the space months ago. </u></strong>"While Republican candidates are getting better rates than their Democratic competitors, Democrats seem to be getting much more favorable rates for issue groups and party committees," said Patrick Ruffini, a co-founder of Echelon. "Republicans are obviously much more reliant on these, which further exacerbates that ad-efficiency gap." Republicans in the past complained that they faced sizeable advertising deficits in key states like Iowa and North Carolina, and outside groups soon came to the rescue. Similarly, on Thursday, National Republican Senatorial Committee executive director Rob Collins (Cecil's counterpart) mentioned that the race in Georgia is tightening. That's no coincidence; if you look at the chart above, <u><strong><mark>Republicans are about to get lapped on the airwaves</mark> </u></strong>in Georgia, and Collins -- who can't communicate directly with outside groups but can send such smoke signals -- is doing just that. We'll see if GOP outside groups come in to close the gap. If they can afford it, of course. A few final observations about the above chart: Independent Greg Orman is running only 16 percent of the ads in his race with Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) down the stretch. He'll probably close the gap, but it's pretty clear he's getting vastly outspent now that the cavalry has come to Roberts's aid. Alison Lundergan Grimes (D) faces a huge ad deficit in the Kentucky Senate race. This is because the DSCC just pulled out of Kentucky. There were some whispers that Grimes and other outside groups could pick up the slack and keep her competitive; this shows they would have plenty of ground to make up. <u><strong>Republicans are getting pummeled in Michigan, Oregon and Virginia.</u></strong> <u><strong>These are no longer expected to be potential pickup opportunities, and the ad-spending imbalance certainly won't do much to change that. </u></strong>And finally, the below chart is the same as above, except that it's for the past 21 days rather than the next 18. <strong>What you'll notice is that Republicans in most races have run a higher percentage of the ads than they are scheduled to down the stretch. So the GOP's projected advertising deficit down the stretch is relatively new. It also suggests that things change, and given GOP outside groups have come to the rescue before, they could tip the balance again. If they want to pay the price.</p></strong>
1NC
null
1NC
429,681
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
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48,385
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Baylor BaSh
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,107
Econ hegemony is resilient but doesn’t solve war
Kritzer 10
Adam Kritzer 10 is the lead editor of the Forex Blog and contributor to other leading financial news sites. B.A. in Economics from Penn, "Dollar Returns to Favor as World’s Reserve Currency" March 16 www.forexblog.org/2010/03/dollar-returns-to-favor-as-worlds-reserve-currency.html
. As the credit crisis slowly subsides investors are once again looking at the long-term, and they like what they see when it comes to the Dollar 2008 was a great year for the Dollar, as the credit crisis precipitated an increase in risk aversion, and investors realized that despite its pitfalls, the Dollar was (and still is) the most stable and really the only viable global reserve currency. Then came the debt crises Suddenly, a handful of smaller EU countries appeared vulnerable to fiscal crises. Japan officially became the first of the Aaa economies to receive a downgrade the crises are worse in (every) other countries, the base currency still looks attractive.¶ This is precisely the case when it comes to the US Dollar the economy is still flawed, financial markets have yet to fully to recover, the deficit topped $1.8 Trillion and government finances seem close to the breaking point And yet, when you look at the situation in every other currency that currently rivals the US for reserve currency status, the Dollar still wins hands down.¶ Its economy is the world’s largest. So are its financial markets, which are also the deepest and most liquid. Its sovereign finances are still manageable It is the only currency whose circulation can even come close to meeting the needs of global trade. The dollar’s widespread acceptance stems from the U.S. economy’s fundamental strength, which comes from the economy’s size and the flexibility of labor and product markets That’s why auctions of US Treasury bonds remain heavily oversubscribed (demand exceeds supply), despite the rock-bottom interest coupons. China has reaffirmed its commitment to Treasuries confirmed by some forensic accounting work none of these will seriously rival the US Dollar when it comes to the other majors, the Dollar is still King the dollar is the currency of last resort. It’s the currency people want in a crisis
investors are looking at the long-term, realized that the Dollar still is) the only viable currency when you look at every other currency the Dollar wins Its economy is the largest. So are its markets Its finances are manageable The dollar’s widespread acceptance stems from the economy’s fundamental strength
Rumor has it that the Dollar is about to make a run. As the credit crisis slowly subsides, (currency) investors are once again looking at the long-term, and they like what they see when it comes to the Dollar.¶ For those that care to remember, 2008 was a great year for the Dollar, as the credit crisis precipitated an increase in risk aversion, and investors realized that despite its pitfalls, the Dollar was (and still is) the most stable and really the only viable global reserve currency. [This reversed a trend which had essentially been in place since the inception of the Euro in 1999]. In 2009, meanwhile, the Dollar resumed its multi-year decline, and many analysts were quick to label the rally of 2008 as an aberration.¶ Then came the debt crises, first in Dubai, then in Greece. Suddenly, a handful of smaller EU countries appeared vulnerable to fiscal crises. Japan officially became the first of the Aaa economies to receive a downgrade in its credit rating. The British Pound is dealing with crises on both the political and economic fronts. According to Moody’s, “The ratings of the Aaa governments — which also include Britain, France, Spain and the Nordic countries — are currently ’stable’…But…their ‘distance-to-downgrade’ has in all cases substantially diminished.” Suddenly, the Greenback doesn’t look so bad.¶ I want to point out that in forex, everything is relative. (Novice) forex investors are often baffled by how sustained economic and financial crises don’t immediately result in currency depreciation. The explanation is that when the crises are worse in (every) other countries, the base currency still looks attractive.¶ This is precisely the case when it comes to the US Dollar. To be sure, the economy is still flawed, financial markets have yet to fully to recover, the federal budget deficit topped $1.8 Trillion in 2009, and government finances seem close to the breaking point. Moody’s has also identified the US as a candidate for a ratings downgrade. And yet, when you look at the situation in every other currency that currently rivals the US for reserve currency status, the Dollar still wins hands down.¶ Its economy is the world’s largest. So are its financial markets, which are also the deepest and most liquid. Its sovereign finances are still manageable from the standpoint of debt-to-GDP and interest-to-revenue ratios. It is the only currency whose circulation can even come close to meeting the needs of global trade. Summarized S&P – when it confirmed the AAA credit rating of the US, “The dollar’s widespread acceptance stems from the U.S. economy’s fundamental strength, which in our view comes from the economy’s size and the flexibility of labor and product markets. We view U.S. banking and capital markets to be dynamic and unfettered relative to their peers.”¶ That’s why auctions of US Treasury bonds remain heavily oversubscribed (demand exceeds supply), despite the rock-bottom interest coupons. China has reaffirmed its commitment to Treasuries (what other choice does it have), confirmed by some forensic accounting work. Gold might continue to rally. So will other commodities, for all I know. Emerging market currencies are still in good shape as well, but none of these will seriously rival the US Dollar for a long-time, if ever. In short, when it comes to the other majors, the Dollar is still King: “You can say whatever you want, but the dollar is the currency of last resort. It’s the currency people want in a crisis
3,491
<h4>Econ hegemony is resilient but doesn’t solve war</h4><p>Adam <strong>Kritzer 10<u></strong> is the lead editor of the Forex Blog and contributor to other leading financial news sites. B.A. in Economics from Penn, "Dollar Returns to Favor as World’s Reserve Currency" March 16 www.forexblog.org/2010/03/dollar-returns-to-favor-as-worlds-reserve-currency.html</p><p></u>Rumor has it that the Dollar is about to make a run<u><strong>. As the credit crisis slowly subsides</u></strong>, (currency) <u><strong><mark>investors are</mark> once again <mark>looking at the long-term, </mark>and they like what they see when it comes to the Dollar</u></strong>.¶ For those that care to remember, <u><strong>2008 was a great year for the Dollar, as the credit crisis precipitated an increase in risk aversion, and investors <mark>realized that </mark>despite its pitfalls, <mark>the Dollar</mark> was (and <mark>still is) the</mark> most stable and really the <mark>only viable</mark> global reserve <mark>currency</mark>. </u></strong>[This reversed a trend which had essentially been in place since the inception of the Euro in 1999]. In 2009, meanwhile, the Dollar resumed its multi-year decline, and many analysts were quick to label the rally of 2008 as an aberration.¶ <u><strong>Then came the debt crises</u></strong>, first in Dubai, then in Greece. <u><strong>Suddenly, a handful of smaller EU countries appeared vulnerable to fiscal crises. Japan officially became the first of the Aaa economies to receive a downgrade</u></strong> in its credit rating. The British Pound is dealing with crises on both the political and economic fronts. According to Moody’s, “The ratings of the Aaa governments — which also include Britain, France, Spain and the Nordic countries — are currently ’stable’…But…their ‘distance-to-downgrade’ has in all cases substantially diminished.” Suddenly, the Greenback doesn’t look so bad.¶ I want to point out that in forex, everything is relative. (Novice) forex investors are often baffled by how sustained economic and financial crises don’t immediately result in currency depreciation. The explanation is that when <u><strong>the crises are worse in (every) other countries, the base currency still looks attractive.¶ This is precisely the case when it comes to the US Dollar</u></strong>. To be sure, <u><strong>the economy is still flawed, financial markets have yet to fully to recover, the</u></strong> federal budget <u><strong>deficit topped $1.8 Trillion</u></strong> in 2009, <u><strong>and government finances seem close to the breaking point</u></strong>. Moody’s has also identified the US as a candidate for a ratings downgrade. <u><strong>And yet, <mark>when you look at</mark> the situation in <mark>every other currency</mark> that currently rivals the US for reserve currency status, <mark>the Dollar </mark>still <mark>wins </mark>hands down.¶ <mark>Its economy is the </mark>world’s <mark>largest. So are its</mark> financial <mark>markets</mark>, which are also the deepest and most liquid. <mark>Its</mark> sovereign <mark>finances are</mark> still <mark>manageable</u></strong></mark> from the standpoint of debt-to-GDP and interest-to-revenue ratios. <u><strong>It is the only currency whose circulation can even come close to meeting the needs of global trade.</u></strong> Summarized S&P – when it confirmed the AAA credit rating of the US, “<u><strong><mark>The dollar’s widespread acceptance stems from the</mark> U.S. <mark>economy’s fundamental strength</mark>, which</u></strong> in our view <u><strong>comes from the economy’s size and the flexibility of labor and product markets</u></strong>. We view U.S. banking and capital markets to be dynamic and unfettered relative to their peers.”¶ <u><strong>That’s why auctions of US Treasury bonds remain heavily oversubscribed (demand exceeds supply), despite the rock-bottom interest coupons. China has reaffirmed its commitment to Treasuries</u></strong> (what other choice does it have), <u><strong>confirmed by some forensic accounting work</u></strong>. Gold might continue to rally. So will other commodities, for all I know. Emerging market currencies are still in good shape as well, but <u><strong>none of these will seriously rival the US Dollar</u></strong> for a long-time, if ever. In short, <u><strong>when it comes to the other majors, the Dollar is still King</u></strong>: “You can say whatever you want, but <u><strong>the dollar is the currency of last resort. It’s the currency people want in a crisis</p></u></strong>
1NC
Regulations
1NC Dollar Hegemony
429,682
12
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
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Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
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18,750
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1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,108
Warming causes extinction
Potsdam 12
Potsdam 12 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf)
If emissions continue at current rates, resilience is likely to be exceeded . major changes are projected in ecological interactions and shifts in geographical ranges, with negative consequences for biod degradation of ecosystem services occurs With high levels of warming, stresses on ecosystems trigger large-scale ecosystem collapse there is a risk of feedbacks At greater than 4° biomes will be substantially affected. climatic variables are decisive vulnerability to heat and drought will likely lead species extinction Ecosystems will be affected by extremes rapid shifts such as sudden forest loss or desertification poleward biome shifts are possible in a 4° world In mountaintop ecosystems, such a shift is not possible, putting them at risk of extinction competition for space with ag is likely to prevent vegetation there exists a strong link between bio d and eco productivity overall diversity of species characterizes the evolutionary legacy of life loss of species classified as ‘endangered’ would confirm the sixth mass extinction episode With limitations on how fast species can disperse many species may face extinction Limiting warming to lower levels showed substantially reduced effects, with magnitude scaling linearly While human stresses are manifold, in a 4° world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver climate change, , will cause the irreversible transition of Earth´s ecosystems
If emissions continue at current rates, resilience is likely to be exceeded major changes are projected in ecological interactions and shifts in geographical ranges with negative consequences for biod degradation of ecosystem services occurs With high levels of warming, stresses on ecosystems trigger large-scale collapse there is a risk of feedbacks At greater than 4° biomes will be substantially affected. climatic variables are decisive vulnerability to heat and drought will likely lead species extinction Ecosystems will be affected by extremes rapid shifts such as sudden forest loss or desertification poleward biome shifts are possible in a 4° world In mountaintop ecosystems such a shift is not possible, putting them at risk of extinction competition for space with ag is likely to prevent vegetation there exists a strong link between bio d and eco productivity overall diversity of species characterizes the evolutionary legacy of life loss of species classified as ‘endangered’ would confirm the sixth mass extinction episode With limitations on how fast species can disperse many species may face extinction Limiting warming to lower levels showed substantially reduced effects with magnitude scaling linearly While human stresses are manifold, in a 4° world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver climate change will cause the irreversible transition of Earth´s ecosystems
Ecosystems and their species provide a range of important goods and services for human society. These include water, food, cultural and other values. In the AR4 an assessment of climate change effects on ecosystems and their services found the following: • If greenhouse gas emissions and other stresses continue at or above current rates, the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (for example, flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other stressors (global change drivers) including land use change, pollution and over-exploitation of resources. • Approximately 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction, if increases in global average temperature exceed of 2–3° above preindustrial levels. • For increases in global average temperature exceeding 2 to 3° above preindustrial levels and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, major changes are projected in ecosystem structure and function, species’ ecological interactions and shifts in species’ geographical ranges, with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem goods and services, such as water and food supply. It is known that past large-scale losses of global ecosystems and species extinctions have been associated with rapid climate change combined with other ecological stressors. Loss and/or degradation of ecosystems, and rates of extinction because of human pressures over the last century or more, which have intensified in recent decades, have contributed to a very high rate of extinction by geological standards. It is well established that loss or degradation of ecosystem services occurs as a consequence of species extinctions, declining species abundance, or widespread shifts in species and biome distributions (Leadley et al. 2010). Climate change is projected to exacerbate the situation. This section outlines the likely consequences for some key ecosystems and for biodiversity. The literature tends to confirm the conclusions from the AR4 outlined above. Despite the existence of detailed and highly informative case studies, upon which this section will draw, it is also important to recall that there remain many uncertainties (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). However, threshold behavior is known to occur in biological systems (Barnosky et al. 2012) and most model projections agree on major adverse consequences for biodiversity in a 4°C world (Bellard et al., 2012). With high levels of warming, coalescing human induced stresses on ecosystems have the potential to trigger large-scale ecosystem collapse (Barnosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, while uncertainty remains in the projections, there is a risk not only of major loss of valuable ecosystem services, particularly to the poor and the most vulnerable who depend on them, but also of feedbacks being initiated that would result in ever higher CO2 emissions and thus rates of global warming. Significant effects of climate change are already expected for warming well below 4°C. In a scenario of 2.5°C warming, severe ecosystem change, based on absolute and relative changes in carbon and water fluxes and stores, cannot be ruled out on any continent (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, & Lucht, 2011). If warming is limited to less than 2°C, with constant or slightly declining precipitation, small biome shifts are projected, and then only in temperate and tropical regions. Considerable change is projected for cold and tropical climates already at 3°C of warming. At greater than 4°C of warming, biomes in temperate zones will also be substantially affected. These changes would impact not only the human and animal communities that directly rely on the ecosystems, but would also exact a cost (economic and otherwise) on society as a whole, ranging from extensive loss of biodiversity and diminished land cover, through to loss of ecosystems services such as fisheries and forestry (de Groot et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2012). Ecosystems have been found to be particularly sensitive to geographical patterns of climate change (Gonzalez, Neilson, Lenihan, and Drapek, 2010). Moreover, ecosystems are affected not only by local changes in the mean temperature and precipitation, along with changes in the variability of these quantities and changes by the occurrence of extreme events. These climatic variables are thus decisive factors in determining plant structure and ecosystem composition (Reu et al., 2011). Increasing vulnerability to heat and drought stress will likely lead to increased mortality and species extinction. For example, temperature extremes have already been held responsible for mortality in Australian flying-fox species (Welbergen, Klose, Markus, and Eby 2008), and interactions between phenological changes driven by gradual climate changes and extreme events can lead to reduced fecundity (Campbell et al. 2009; Inouye, 2008). Climate change also has the potential to facilitate the spread and establishment of invasive species (pests and weeds) (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen, & Dukes, 2008; Rahel & Olden, 2008) with often detrimental implications for ecosystem services and biodiversity. Human land-use changes are expected to further exacerbate climate change driven ecosystem changes, particularly in the tropics, where rising temperatures and reduced precipitation are expected to have major impacts (Campbell et al., 2009; Lee & Jetz, 2008). Ecosystems will be affected by the increased occurrence of extremes such as forest loss resulting from droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion (Fischlin et al., 2007). Climate change also has the potential to catalyze rapid shifts in ecosystems such as sudden forest loss or regional loss of agricultural productivity resulting from desertification (Barnosky et al., 2012). The predicted increase in extreme climate events would also drive dramatic ecosystem changes (Thibault and Brown 2008; Wernberg, Smale, and Thomsen 2012). One such extreme event that is expected to have immediate impacts on ecosystems is the increased rate of wildfire occurrence. Climate change induced shifts in the fire regime are therefore in turn powerful drivers of biome shifts, potentially resulting in considerable changes in carbon fluxes over large areas (Heyder et al., 2011; Lavorel et al., 2006) It is anticipated that global warming will lead to global biome shifts (Barnosky et al. 2012). Based on 20th century observations and 21st century projections, poleward latitudinal biome shifts of up to 400 km are possible in a 4° C world (Gonzalez et al., 2010). In the case of mountaintop ecosystems, for example, such a shift is not necessarily possible, putting them at particular risk of extinction (La Sorte and Jetz, 2010). Species that dwell at the upper edge of continents or on islands would face a similar impediment to adaptation, since migration into adjacent ecosystems is not possible (Campbell, et al. 2009; Hof, Levinsky, Araújo, and Rahbek 2011). The consequences of such geographical shifts, driven by climatic changes as well as rising CO2 concentrations, would be found in both reduced species richness and species turnover (for example, Phillips et al., 2008; White and Beissinger 2008). A study by (Midgley and Thuiller, 2011) found that, of 5,197 African plant species studied, 25–42 percent could lose all suitable range by 2085. It should be emphasized that competition for space with human agriculture over the coming century is likely to prevent vegetation expansion in most cases (Zelazowski et al., 2011) Species composition changes can lead to structural changes of the entire ecosystem, such as the increase in lianas in tropical and temperate forests (Phillips et al., 2008), and the encroachment of woody plants in temperate grasslands (Bloor et al., 2008, Ratajczak et al., 2012), putting grass-eating herbivores at risk of extinction because of a lack of food available—this is just one example of the sensitive intricacies of ecosystem responses to external perturbations. There is also an increased risk of extinction for herbivores in regions of drought-induced tree dieback, owing to their inability to digest the newly resident C4 grasses (Morgan et al., 2008). The following provides some examples of ecosystems that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change. The discussion is restricted to ecosystems themselves, rather than the important and often extensive impacts on ecosystems services. Boreal-temperate ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, although there are large differences in projections, depending on the future climate model and emission pathway studied. Nevertheless there is a clear risk of large-scale forest dieback in the boreal-temperate system because of heat and drought (Heyder et al., 2011). Heat and drought related die-back has already been observed in substantial areas of North American boreal forests (Allen et al., 2010), characteristic of vulnerability to heat and drought stress leading to increased mortality at the trailing edge of boreal forests. The vulnerability of transition zones between boreal and temperate forests, as well as between boreal forests and polar/tundra biomes, is corroborated by studies of changes in plant functional richness with climate change (Reu et al., 2011), as well as analyses using multiple dynamic global vegetation models (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Subtle changes within forest types also pose a great risk to biodiversity as different plant types gain dominance (Scholze et al., 2006). Humid tropical forests also show increasing risk of major climate induced losses. At 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels, the land extent of humid tropical forest, characterized by tree species diversity and biomass density, is expected to contract to approximately 25 percent of its original size [see Figure 3 in (Zelazowski et al., 2011)], while at 2°C warming, more than 75 percent of the original land can likely be preserved. For these ecosystems, water availability is the dominant determinant of climate suitability (Zelazowski et al., 2011). In general, Asia is substantially less at risk of forest loss than the tropical Americas. However, even at 2°C, the forest in the Indochina peninsula will be at risk of die-back. At 4°C, the area of concern grows to include central Sumatra, Sulawesi, India and the Philippines, where up to 30 percent of the total humid tropical forest niche could be threatened by forest retreat (Zelazowski et al., 2011). There has been substantial scientific debate over the risk of a rapid and abrupt change to a much drier savanna or grassland ecosystem under global warming. This risk has been identified as a possible planetary tipping point at around a warming of 3.5–4.5°C, which, if crossed, would result in a major loss of biodiversity, ecosystem services and the loss of a major terrestrial carbon sink, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Lenton et al., 2008)(Cox, et al., 2004) (Kriegler, Hall, Held, Dawson, and Schellnhuber, 2009). Substantial uncertainty remains around the likelihood, timing and onset of such risk due to a range of factors including uncertainty in precipitation changes, effects of CO2 concentration increase on water use efficiency and the CO2 fertilization effect, land-use feedbacks and interactions with fire frequency and intensity, and effects of higher temperature on tropical tree species and on important ecosystem services such as pollinators. While climate model projections for the Amazon, and in particular precipitation, remain quite uncertain recent analyses using IPCC AR4 generation climate indicates a reduced risk of a major basin wide loss of precipitation compared to some earlier work. If drying occurs then the likelihood of an abrupt shift to a drier, less biodiverse ecosystem would increase. Current projections indicate that fire occurrence in the Amazon could double by 2050, based on the A2 SRES scenario that involves warming of approximately 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Silvestrini et al., 2011), and can therefore be expected to be even higher in a 4°C world. Interactions of climate change, land use and agricultural expansion increase the incidence of fire (Aragão et al., 2008), which plays a major role in the (re)structuring of vegetation (Gonzalez et al., 2010; Scholze et al., 2006). A decrease in precipitation over the Amazon forests may therefore result in forest retreat or transition into a low biomass forest (Malhi et al., 2009). Moderating this risk is a possible increase in ecosystem water use efficiency with increasing CO2 concentrations is accounted for, more than 90 percent of the original humid tropical forest niche in Amazonia is likely to be preserved in the 2°C case, compared to just under half in the 4°C warming case (see Figure 5 in Zelazowski et al., 2011) (Cook, Zeng, and Yoon, 2012; Salazar & Nobre, 2010). Recent work has analyzed a number of these factors and their uncertainties and finds that the risk of major loss of forest due to climate is more likely to be regional than Amazon basin-wide, with the eastern and southeastern Amazon being most at risk (Zelazowski et al., 2011). Salazar and Nobre (2010) estimates a transition from tropical forests to seasonal forest or savanna in the eastern Amazon could occur at warming at warming of 2.5–3.5°C when CO2 fertilization is not considered and 4.5–5.5°C when it is considered. It is important to note, as Salazar and Nobre (2010) point out, that the effects of deforestation and increased fire risk interact with the climate change and are likely to accelerate a transition from tropical forests to drier ecosystems. Increased CO2 concentration may also lead to increased plant water efficiency (Ainsworth and Long, 2005), lowering the risk of plant die-back, and resulting in vegetation expansion in many regions, such as the Congo basin, West Africa and Madagascar (Zelazowski et al., 2011), in addition to some dry-land ecosystems (Heyder et al., 2011). The impact of CO2 induced ‘greening’ would, however, negatively affect biodiversity in many ecosystems. In particular encroachment of woody plants into grasslands and savannahs in North American grassland and savanna communities could lead to a decline of up to 45 percent in species richness ((Ratajczak and Nippert, 2012) and loss of specialist savanna plant species in southern Africa (Parr, Gray, and Bond, 2012). Mangroves are an important ecosystem and are particularly vulnerable to the multiple impacts of climate change, such as: rise in sea levels, increases in atmospheric CO2 concentration, air and water temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns. Sea-level rise can cause a loss of mangroves by cutting off the flow of fresh water and nutrients and drowning the roots (Dasgupta, Laplante et al. 2010). By the end of the 21st century, global mangrove cover is projected to experience a significant decline because of heat stress and sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Beaumont et al., 2011). In fact, it has been estimated that under the A1B emissions scenario (3.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels) mangroves would need to geographically move on average about 1 km/year to remain in suitable climate zones (Loarie et al., 2009). The most vulnerable mangrove forests are those occupying low-relief islands such as small islands in the Pacific where sea-level rise is a dominant factor. Where rivers are lacking and/ or land is subsiding, vulnerability is also high. With mangrove losses resulting from deforestation presently at 1 to 2 percent per annum (Beaumont et al., 2011), climate change may not be the biggest immediate threat to the future of mangroves. However if conservation efforts are successful in the longer term climate change may become a determining issue (Beaumont et al., 2011). Coral reefs are acutely sensitive to changes in water temperatures, ocean pH and intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones. Mass coral bleaching is caused by ocean warming and ocean acidification, which results from absorption of CO2 (for example, Frieler et al., 2012a). Increased sea-surface temperatures and a reduction of available carbonates are also understood to be driving causes of decreased rates of calcification, a critical reef-building process (De’ath, Lough, and Fabricius, 2009). The effects of climate change on coral reefs are already apparent. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has been estimated to have lost 50 percent of live coral cover since 1985, which is attributed in part to coral bleaching because of increasing water temperatures (De’ath et al., 2012). Under atmospheric CO2 concentrations that correspond to a warming of 4°C by 2100, reef erosion will likely exceed rates of calcification, leaving coral reefs as “crumbling frameworks with few calcareous corals” (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). In fact, frequency of bleaching events under global warming in even a 2°C world has been projected to exceed the ability of coral reefs to recover. The extinction of coral reefs would be catastrophic for entire coral reef ecosystems and the people who depend on them for food, income and shoreline. Reefs provide coastal protection against coastal floods and rising sea levels, nursery grounds and habitat for a variety of currently fished species, as well as an invaluable tourism asset. These valuable services to often subsistence-dependent coastal and island societies will most likely be lost well before a 4°C world is reached. The preceding discussion reviewed the implications of a 4°C world for just a few examples of important ecosystems. The section below examines the effects of climate on biological diversity Ecosystems are composed ultimately of the species and interactions between them and their physical environment. Biologically rich ecosystems are usually diverse and it is broadly agreed that there exists a strong link between this biological diversity and ecosystem productivity, stability and functioning (McGrady-Steed, Harris, and Morin, 1997; David Tilman, Wedin, and Knops, 1996)(Hector, 1999; D Tilman et al., 2001). Loss of species within ecosystems will hence have profound negative effects on the functioning and stability of ecosystems and on the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and services to human societies. It is the overall diversity of species that ultimately characterizes the biodiversity and evolutionary legacy of life on Earth. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, species extinction rates are now at very high levels compared to the geological record. Loss of those species presently classified as ‘critically endangered’ would lead to mass extinction on a scale that has happened only five times before in the last 540 million years. The loss of those species classified as ‘endangered’ and ‘vulnerable’ would confirm this loss as the sixth mass extinction episode (Barnosky 2011). Loss of biodiversity will challenge those reliant on ecosystems services. Fisheries (Dale, Tharp, Lannom, and Hodges, 2010), and agronomy (Howden et al., 2007) and forestry industries (Stram & Evans, 2009), among others, will need to match species choices to the changing climate conditions, while devising new strategies to tackle invasive pests (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). These challenges would have to be met in the face of increasing competition between natural and agricultural ecosystems over water resources. Over the 21st-century climate change is likely to result in some bio-climates disappearing, notably in the mountainous tropics and in the poleward regions of continents, with new, or novel, climates developing in the tropics and subtropics (Williams, Jackson, and Kutzbach, 2007). In this study novel climates are those where 21st century projected climates do not overlap with their 20th century analogues, and disappearing climates are those 20th century climates that do not overlap with 21st century projected climates. The projections of Williams et al (2007) indicate that in a 4°C world (SRES A2), 12–39 percent of the Earth’s land surface may experience a novel climate compared to 20th century analogues. Predictions of species response to novel climates are difficult because researchers have no current analogue to rely upon. However, at least such climates would give rise to disruptions, with many current species associations being broken up or disappearing entirely. Under the same scenario an estimated 10–48 percent of the Earth’s surface including highly biodiverse regions such as the Himalayas, Mesoamerica, eastern and southern Africa, the Philippines and the region around Indonesia known as Wallacaea would lose their climate space. With limitations on how fast species can disperse, or move, this indicates that many species may find themselves without a suitable climate space and thus face a high risk of extinction. Globally, as in other studies, there is a strong association apparent in these projections between regions where the climate disappears and biodiversity hotspots. Limiting warming to lower levels in this study showed substantially reduced effects, with the magnitude of novel and disappearing climates scaling linearly with global mean warming. More recent work by Beaumont and colleagues using a different approach confirms the scale of this risk (Beaumont et al., 2011, Figure 36). Analysis of the exposure of 185 eco-regions of exceptional biodiversity (a subset of the so-called Global 200) to extreme monthly temperature and precipitation conditions in the 21st century compared to 1961–1990 conditions shows that within 60 years almost all of the regions that are already exposed to substantial environmental and social pressure, will experience extreme temperature conditions based on the A2 emission scenario (4.1°C global mean temperature rise by 2100) (Beaumont et al., 2011). Tropical and sub-tropical eco-regions in Africa and South America are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability to such extremes is particularly acute for high latitude and small island biota, which are very limited in their ability to respond to range shifts, and to those biota, such as flooded grassland, mangroves and desert biomes, that would require large geographical displacements to find comparable climates in a warmer world. The overall sense of recent literature confirms the findings of the AR4 summarized at the beginning of the section, with a number of risks such as those to coral reefs occurring at significantly lower temperatures than estimated in that report. Although non-climate related human pressures are likely to remain a major and defining driver of loss of ecosystems and biodiversity in the coming decades, it is also clear that as warming rises so will the predominance of climate change as a determinant of ecosystem and biodiversity survival. While the factors of human stresses on ecosystems are manifold, in a 4°C world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver of ecosystem shifts and large-scale biodiversity loss (Bellard et al., 2012; New et al., 2011). Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Such damages to ecosystems would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (e.g., hydrology—quantity flow rates, quality; fisheries (corals), protection of coastline (loss of mangroves). Barnosky has described the present situation facing the biodiversity of the planet as “the perfect storm” with multiple high intensity ecological stresses because of habitat modification and degradation, pollution and other factors, unusually rapid climate change and unusually high and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the past, as noted above, this combination of circumstances has led to major, mass extinctions with planetary consequences. Thus, there is a growing risk that climate change, combined with other human activities, will cause the irreversible transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience (Barnosky et al., 2012).
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<h4>Warming causes extinction </h4><p><strong>Potsdam 12</strong> (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, “Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided”, A report for the World Bank, November, http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf)</p><p>Ecosystems and their species provide a range of important goods and services for human society. These include water, food, cultural and other values. In the AR4 an assessment of climate change effects on ecosystems and their services found the following: • <u><strong><mark>If</mark> </u></strong>greenhouse gas<u><strong> <mark>emissions</mark> </u></strong>and other stresses<u><strong> <mark>continue at</mark> </u></strong>or above<u><strong> <mark>current rates, </u></strong></mark>the<u><strong> <mark>resilience </u></strong></mark>of many ecosystems<u><strong> <mark>is likely to be exceeded</u></strong></mark> by an unprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (for example, flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other stressors (global change drivers) including land use change, pollution and over-exploitation of resources. • Approximately 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction, if increases in global average temperature exceed of 2–3° above preindustrial levels<u><strong>. </u></strong>• For increases in global average temperature exceeding 2 to 3° above preindustrial levels and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, <u><strong><mark>major changes are projected in</mark> </u></strong>ecosystem structure and function, species’<u><strong> <mark>ecological</mark> <mark>interactions and shifts in</mark> </u></strong>species’ <u><strong><mark>geographical ranges</mark>, <mark>with</mark> </u></strong>predominantly<u><strong> <mark>negative consequences for biod</u></strong></mark>iversity<u><strong> </u></strong>and ecosystem goods and services, such as water and food supply. It is known that past large-scale losses of global ecosystems and species extinctions have been associated with rapid climate change combined with other ecological stressors. Loss and/or degradation of ecosystems, and rates of extinction because of human pressures over the last century or more, which have intensified in recent decades, have contributed to a very high rate of extinction by geological standards. It is well established that loss or<u><strong> <mark>degradation of ecosystem services occurs </u></strong></mark>as a consequence of species extinctions, declining species abundance, or widespread shifts in species and biome distributions (Leadley et al. 2010). Climate change is projected to exacerbate the situation. This section outlines the likely consequences for some key ecosystems and for biodiversity. The literature tends to confirm the conclusions from the AR4 outlined above. Despite the existence of detailed and highly informative case studies, upon which this section will draw, it is also important to recall that there remain many uncertainties (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). However, threshold behavior is known to occur in biological systems (Barnosky et al. 2012) and most model projections agree on major adverse consequences for biodiversity in a 4°C world (Bellard et al., 2012). <u><strong><mark>With high levels of warming, </u></strong></mark>coalescing human induced<u><strong> <mark>stresses on ecosystems </u></strong></mark>have the potential to<u><strong> <mark>trigger large-scale </mark>ecosystem <mark>collapse</u></strong></mark> (Barnosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, while uncertainty remains in the projections, <u><strong><mark>there is a risk</mark> </u></strong>not only of major loss of valuable ecosystem services, particularly to the poor and the most vulnerable who depend on them, but also <u><strong><mark>of feedbacks </u></strong></mark>being initiated that would result in ever higher CO2 emissions and thus rates of global warming. Significant effects of climate change are already expected for warming well below 4°C. In a scenario of 2.5°C warming, severe ecosystem change, based on absolute and relative changes in carbon and water fluxes and stores, cannot be ruled out on any continent (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, & Lucht, 2011). If warming is limited to less than 2°C, with constant or slightly declining precipitation, small biome shifts are projected, and then only in temperate and tropical regions. Considerable change is projected for cold and tropical climates already at 3°C of warming. <u><strong><mark>At greater than 4°</u></strong></mark>C of warming,<u><strong> <mark>biomes</mark> </u></strong>in temperate zones<u><strong> <mark>will</mark> </u></strong>also<u><strong> <mark>be substantially affected. </u></strong></mark>These changes would impact not only the human and animal communities that directly rely on the ecosystems, but would also exact a cost (economic and otherwise) on society as a whole, ranging from extensive loss of biodiversity and diminished land cover, through to loss of ecosystems services such as fisheries and forestry (de Groot et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2012). Ecosystems have been found to be particularly sensitive to geographical patterns of climate change (Gonzalez, Neilson, Lenihan, and Drapek, 2010). Moreover, ecosystems are affected not only by local changes in the mean temperature and precipitation, along with changes in the variability of these quantities and changes by the occurrence of extreme events. These <u><strong><mark>climatic variables are </u></strong></mark>thus<u><strong> <mark>decisive </u></strong></mark>factors in determining plant structure and ecosystem composition (Reu et al., 2011). Increasing<u><strong> <mark>vulnerability to heat and drought</mark> </u></strong>stress<u><strong> <mark>will likely lead </u></strong></mark>to increased mortality and<u><strong> <mark>species extinction</u></strong></mark>. For example, temperature extremes have already been held responsible for mortality in Australian flying-fox species (Welbergen, Klose, Markus, and Eby 2008), and interactions between phenological changes driven by gradual climate changes and extreme events can lead to reduced fecundity (Campbell et al. 2009; Inouye, 2008). Climate change also has the potential to facilitate the spread and establishment of invasive species (pests and weeds) (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen, & Dukes, 2008; Rahel & Olden, 2008) with often detrimental implications for ecosystem services and biodiversity. Human land-use changes are expected to further exacerbate climate change driven ecosystem changes, particularly in the tropics, where rising temperatures and reduced precipitation are expected to have major impacts (Campbell et al., 2009; Lee & Jetz, 2008).<u><strong> <mark>Ecosystems will be affected by</mark> </u></strong>the increased occurrence of<u><strong> <mark>extremes</mark> </u></strong>such as forest loss resulting from droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion (Fischlin et al., 2007). Climate change also has the potential to catalyze<u><strong> <mark>rapid shifts</mark> </u></strong>in ecosystems<u><strong> <mark>such as sudden forest loss or</mark> </u></strong>regional loss of agricultural productivity resulting from<u><strong> <mark>desertification</u></strong></mark> (Barnosky et al., 2012). The predicted increase in extreme climate events would also drive dramatic ecosystem changes (Thibault and Brown 2008; Wernberg, Smale, and Thomsen 2012). One such extreme event that is expected to have immediate impacts on ecosystems is the increased rate of wildfire occurrence. Climate change induced shifts in the fire regime are therefore in turn powerful drivers of biome shifts, potentially resulting in considerable changes in carbon fluxes over large areas (Heyder et al., 2011; Lavorel et al., 2006) It is anticipated that global warming will lead to global biome shifts (Barnosky et al. 2012). Based on 20th century observations and 21st century projections, <u><strong><mark>poleward</mark> </u></strong>latitudinal<u><strong> <mark>biome shifts</mark> </u></strong>of up to 400 km<u><strong> <mark>are possible in a 4°</mark> </u></strong>C<u><strong> <mark>world</u></strong></mark> (Gonzalez et al., 2010). <u><strong><mark>In </u></strong></mark>the case of<u><strong> <mark>mountaintop ecosystems</mark>,</u></strong> for example, <u><strong><mark>such a shift is not</mark> </u></strong>necessarily<u><strong> <mark>possible, putting them at</mark> </u></strong>particular<u><strong> <mark>risk of extinction</u></strong></mark> (La Sorte and Jetz, 2010). Species that dwell at the upper edge of continents or on islands would face a similar impediment to adaptation, since migration into adjacent ecosystems is not possible (Campbell, et al. 2009; Hof, Levinsky, Araújo, and Rahbek 2011). The consequences of such geographical shifts, driven by climatic changes as well as rising CO2 concentrations, would be found in both reduced species richness and species turnover (for example, Phillips et al., 2008; White and Beissinger 2008). A study by (Midgley and Thuiller, 2011) found that, of 5,197 African plant species studied, 25–42 percent could lose all suitable range by 2085. It should be emphasized that<u><strong> <mark>competition for space with</mark> </u></strong>human<u><strong> <mark>ag</u></strong></mark>riculture<u><strong> </u></strong>over the coming century<u><strong> <mark>is likely to prevent vegetation </u></strong></mark>expansion in most cases (Zelazowski et al., 2011) Species composition changes can lead to structural changes of the entire ecosystem, such as the increase in lianas in tropical and temperate forests (Phillips et al., 2008), and the encroachment of woody plants in temperate grasslands (Bloor et al., 2008, Ratajczak et al., 2012), putting grass-eating herbivores at risk of extinction because of a lack of food available—this is just one example of the sensitive intricacies of ecosystem responses to external perturbations. There is also an increased risk of extinction for herbivores in regions of drought-induced tree dieback, owing to their inability to digest the newly resident C4 grasses (Morgan et al., 2008). The following provides some examples of ecosystems that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change. The discussion is restricted to ecosystems themselves, rather than the important and often extensive impacts on ecosystems services. Boreal-temperate ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, although there are large differences in projections, depending on the future climate model and emission pathway studied. Nevertheless there is a clear risk of large-scale forest dieback in the boreal-temperate system because of heat and drought (Heyder et al., 2011). Heat and drought related die-back has already been observed in substantial areas of North American boreal forests (Allen et al., 2010), characteristic of vulnerability to heat and drought stress leading to increased mortality at the trailing edge of boreal forests. The vulnerability of transition zones between boreal and temperate forests, as well as between boreal forests and polar/tundra biomes, is corroborated by studies of changes in plant functional richness with climate change (Reu et al., 2011), as well as analyses using multiple dynamic global vegetation models (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Subtle changes within forest types also pose a great risk to biodiversity as different plant types gain dominance (Scholze et al., 2006). Humid tropical forests also show increasing risk of major climate induced losses. At 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels, the land extent of humid tropical forest, characterized by tree species diversity and biomass density, is expected to contract to approximately 25 percent of its original size [see Figure 3 in (Zelazowski et al., 2011)], while at 2°C warming, more than 75 percent of the original land can likely be preserved. For these ecosystems, water availability is the dominant determinant of climate suitability (Zelazowski et al., 2011). In general, Asia is substantially less at risk of forest loss than the tropical Americas. However, even at 2°C, the forest in the Indochina peninsula will be at risk of die-back. At 4°C, the area of concern grows to include central Sumatra, Sulawesi, India and the Philippines, where up to 30 percent of the total humid tropical forest niche could be threatened by forest retreat (Zelazowski et al., 2011). There has been substantial scientific debate over the risk of a rapid and abrupt change to a much drier savanna or grassland ecosystem under global warming. This risk has been identified as a possible planetary tipping point at around a warming of 3.5–4.5°C, which, if crossed, would result in a major loss of biodiversity, ecosystem services and the loss of a major terrestrial carbon sink, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Lenton et al., 2008)(Cox, et al., 2004) (Kriegler, Hall, Held, Dawson, and Schellnhuber, 2009). Substantial uncertainty remains around the likelihood, timing and onset of such risk due to a range of factors including uncertainty in precipitation changes, effects of CO2 concentration increase on water use efficiency and the CO2 fertilization effect, land-use feedbacks and interactions with fire frequency and intensity, and effects of higher temperature on tropical tree species and on important ecosystem services such as pollinators. While climate model projections for the Amazon, and in particular precipitation, remain quite uncertain recent analyses using IPCC AR4 generation climate indicates a reduced risk of a major basin wide loss of precipitation compared to some earlier work. If drying occurs then the likelihood of an abrupt shift to a drier, less biodiverse ecosystem would increase. Current projections indicate that fire occurrence in the Amazon could double by 2050, based on the A2 SRES scenario that involves warming of approximately 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Silvestrini et al., 2011), and can therefore be expected to be even higher in a 4°C world. Interactions of climate change, land use and agricultural expansion increase the incidence of fire (Aragão et al., 2008), which plays a major role in the (re)structuring of vegetation (Gonzalez et al., 2010; Scholze et al., 2006). A decrease in precipitation over the Amazon forests may therefore result in forest retreat or transition into a low biomass forest (Malhi et al., 2009). Moderating this risk is a possible increase in ecosystem water use efficiency with increasing CO2 concentrations is accounted for, more than 90 percent of the original humid tropical forest niche in Amazonia is likely to be preserved in the 2°C case, compared to just under half in the 4°C warming case (see Figure 5 in Zelazowski et al., 2011) (Cook, Zeng, and Yoon, 2012; Salazar & Nobre, 2010). Recent work has analyzed a number of these factors and their uncertainties and finds that the risk of major loss of forest due to climate is more likely to be regional than Amazon basin-wide, with the eastern and southeastern Amazon being most at risk (Zelazowski et al., 2011). Salazar and Nobre (2010) estimates a transition from tropical forests to seasonal forest or savanna in the eastern Amazon could occur at warming at warming of 2.5–3.5°C when CO2 fertilization is not considered and 4.5–5.5°C when it is considered. It is important to note, as Salazar and Nobre (2010) point out, that the effects of deforestation and increased fire risk interact with the climate change and are likely to accelerate a transition from tropical forests to drier ecosystems. Increased CO2 concentration may also lead to increased plant water efficiency (Ainsworth and Long, 2005), lowering the risk of plant die-back, and resulting in vegetation expansion in many regions, such as the Congo basin, West Africa and Madagascar (Zelazowski et al., 2011), in addition to some dry-land ecosystems (Heyder et al., 2011). The impact of CO2 induced ‘greening’ would, however, negatively affect biodiversity in many ecosystems. In particular encroachment of woody plants into grasslands and savannahs in North American grassland and savanna communities could lead to a decline of up to 45 percent in species richness ((Ratajczak and Nippert, 2012) and loss of specialist savanna plant species in southern Africa (Parr, Gray, and Bond, 2012). Mangroves are an important ecosystem and are particularly vulnerable to the multiple impacts of climate change, such as: rise in sea levels, increases in atmospheric CO2 concentration, air and water temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns. Sea-level rise can cause a loss of mangroves by cutting off the flow of fresh water and nutrients and drowning the roots (Dasgupta, Laplante et al. 2010). By the end of the 21st century, global mangrove cover is projected to experience a significant decline because of heat stress and sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Beaumont et al., 2011). In fact, it has been estimated that under the A1B emissions scenario (3.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels) mangroves would need to geographically move on average about 1 km/year to remain in suitable climate zones (Loarie et al., 2009). The most vulnerable mangrove forests are those occupying low-relief islands such as small islands in the Pacific where sea-level rise is a dominant factor. Where rivers are lacking and/ or land is subsiding, vulnerability is also high. With mangrove losses resulting from deforestation presently at 1 to 2 percent per annum (Beaumont et al., 2011), climate change may not be the biggest immediate threat to the future of mangroves. However if conservation efforts are successful in the longer term climate change may become a determining issue (Beaumont et al., 2011). Coral reefs are acutely sensitive to changes in water temperatures, ocean pH and intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones. Mass coral bleaching is caused by ocean warming and ocean acidification, which results from absorption of CO2 (for example, Frieler et al., 2012a). Increased sea-surface temperatures and a reduction of available carbonates are also understood to be driving causes of decreased rates of calcification, a critical reef-building process (De’ath, Lough, and Fabricius, 2009). The effects of climate change on coral reefs are already apparent. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has been estimated to have lost 50 percent of live coral cover since 1985, which is attributed in part to coral bleaching because of increasing water temperatures (De’ath et al., 2012). Under atmospheric CO2 concentrations that correspond to a warming of 4°C by 2100, reef erosion will likely exceed rates of calcification, leaving coral reefs as “crumbling frameworks with few calcareous corals” (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). In fact, frequency of bleaching events under global warming in even a 2°C world has been projected to exceed the ability of coral reefs to recover. The extinction of coral reefs would be catastrophic for entire coral reef ecosystems and the people who depend on them for food, income and shoreline. Reefs provide coastal protection against coastal floods and rising sea levels, nursery grounds and habitat for a variety of currently fished species, as well as an invaluable tourism asset. These valuable services to often subsistence-dependent coastal and island societies will most likely be lost well before a 4°C world is reached. The preceding discussion reviewed the implications of a 4°C world for just a few examples of important ecosystems. The section below examines the effects of climate on biological diversity Ecosystems are composed ultimately of the species and interactions between them and their physical environment. Biologically rich ecosystems are usually diverse and it is broadly agreed that<u><strong> <mark>there exists a strong link between </u></strong></mark>this<u><strong> <mark>bio</u></strong></mark>logical<u><strong> <mark>d</u></strong></mark>iversity<u><strong> <mark>and eco</u></strong></mark>system<u><strong> <mark>productivity</u></strong></mark>, stability and functioning (McGrady-Steed, Harris, and Morin, 1997; David Tilman, Wedin, and Knops, 1996)(Hector, 1999; D Tilman et al., 2001). Loss of species within ecosystems will hence have profound negative effects on the functioning and stability of ecosystems and on the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and services to human societies. It is the<u><strong> <mark>overall diversity of species </u></strong></mark>that ultimately<u><strong> <mark>characterizes the </u></strong></mark>biodiversity and<u><strong> <mark>evolutionary legacy of life </u></strong></mark>on Earth. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, species extinction rates are now at very high levels compared to the geological record. Loss of those species presently classified as ‘critically endangered’ would lead to mass extinction on a scale that has happened only five times before in the last 540 million years. The<u><strong> <mark>loss of </u></strong></mark>those<u><strong> <mark>species classified as ‘endangered’ </u></strong></mark>and ‘vulnerable’<u><strong> <mark>would confirm </u></strong></mark>this loss as<u><strong> <mark>the sixth mass extinction episode</u></strong></mark> (Barnosky 2011). Loss of biodiversity will challenge those reliant on ecosystems services. Fisheries (Dale, Tharp, Lannom, and Hodges, 2010), and agronomy (Howden et al., 2007) and forestry industries (Stram & Evans, 2009), among others, will need to match species choices to the changing climate conditions, while devising new strategies to tackle invasive pests (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). These challenges would have to be met in the face of increasing competition between natural and agricultural ecosystems over water resources. Over the 21st-century climate change is likely to result in some bio-climates disappearing, notably in the mountainous tropics and in the poleward regions of continents, with new, or novel, climates developing in the tropics and subtropics (Williams, Jackson, and Kutzbach, 2007). In this study novel climates are those where 21st century projected climates do not overlap with their 20th century analogues, and disappearing climates are those 20th century climates that do not overlap with 21st century projected climates. The projections of Williams et al (2007) indicate that in a 4°C world (SRES A2), 12–39 percent of the Earth’s land surface may experience a novel climate compared to 20th century analogues. Predictions of species response to novel climates are difficult because researchers have no current analogue to rely upon. However, at least such climates would give rise to disruptions, with many current species associations being broken up or disappearing entirely. Under the same scenario an estimated 10–48 percent of the Earth’s surface including highly biodiverse regions such as the Himalayas, Mesoamerica, eastern and southern Africa, the Philippines and the region around Indonesia known as Wallacaea would lose their climate space. <u><strong><mark>With limitations on how fast species can disperse</u></strong></mark>, or move, this indicates that <u><strong><mark>many species may </u></strong></mark>find themselves without a suitable climate space and thus<u><strong> <mark>face</mark> </u></strong>a high risk of<u><strong> <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>. Globally, as in other studies, there is a strong association apparent in these projections between regions where the climate disappears and biodiversity hotspots. <u><strong><mark>Limiting warming to lower levels </u></strong></mark>in this study<u><strong> <mark>showed substantially reduced effects</mark>, <mark>with </u></strong></mark>the<u><strong> <mark>magnitude </u></strong></mark>of novel and disappearing climates<u><strong> <mark>scaling linearly </u></strong></mark>with global mean warming.<u><strong> </u></strong>More recent work by Beaumont and colleagues using a different approach confirms the scale of this risk (Beaumont et al., 2011, Figure 36). Analysis of the exposure of 185 eco-regions of exceptional biodiversity (a subset of the so-called Global 200) to extreme monthly temperature and precipitation conditions in the 21st century compared to 1961–1990 conditions shows that within 60 years almost all of the regions that are already exposed to substantial environmental and social pressure, will experience extreme temperature conditions based on the A2 emission scenario (4.1°C global mean temperature rise by 2100) (Beaumont et al., 2011). Tropical and sub-tropical eco-regions in Africa and South America are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability to such extremes is particularly acute for high latitude and small island biota, which are very limited in their ability to respond to range shifts, and to those biota, such as flooded grassland, mangroves and desert biomes, that would require large geographical displacements to find comparable climates in a warmer world. The overall sense of recent literature confirms the findings of the AR4 summarized at the beginning of the section, with a number of risks such as those to coral reefs occurring at significantly lower temperatures than estimated in that report. Although non-climate related human pressures are likely to remain a major and defining driver of loss of ecosystems and biodiversity in the coming decades, it is also clear that as warming rises so will the predominance of climate change as a determinant of ecosystem and biodiversity survival.<u><strong> <mark>While </u></strong></mark>the factors of<u><strong> <mark>human stresses</mark> </u></strong>on ecosystems<u><strong> <mark>are manifold, in a 4°</u></strong></mark>C<u><strong><mark> world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver </u></strong></mark>of ecosystem shifts and large-scale biodiversity loss (Bellard et al., 2012; New et al., 2011). Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Such damages to ecosystems would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (e.g., hydrology—quantity flow rates, quality; fisheries (corals), protection of coastline (loss of mangroves). Barnosky has described the present situation facing the biodiversity of the planet as “the perfect storm” with multiple high intensity ecological stresses because of habitat modification and degradation, pollution and other factors, unusually rapid climate change and unusually high and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the past, as noted above, this combination of circumstances has led to major, mass extinctions with planetary consequences. Thus, there is a growing risk that<u><strong> <mark>climate change</mark>, </u></strong>combined with other human activities<u><strong>, <mark>will cause the irreversible transition of </u></strong></mark>the<u><strong> <mark>Earth´s ecosystems</mark> </u></strong>into a state unknown in human experience (Barnosky et al., 2012).</p>
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Extinction Framing generates violence – The drive for survival necessitates the creation of the other and the body as enemies to be eliminated. The AFF’s universal endorsement of survival conceals its inextricable violent underbelly: genocide and war.
Bauman ‘92
Bauman ‘92 (Zygmunt, Prof. Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies, Cambridge: Polity Press, Pg. 33-39)
survival is not identical with ‘self-preservation'. The idea of self-preservation, sometimes conceived of as an instinct, sometimes as a rational choice, hides or beautifies the gruesome truth of survival. Survival is targeted on others we live through the deaths of the others, and their death gives meaning to our success I can only measure my own performance against those other performance At the extreme of survival looms murder He wants to kill so that he can survive others; he wants to stay alive so as not to have others surviving him.' This wish can be denied but cannot be effaced The cynicism with which the wish of survival is inevitably infused, comes into the open during war socially sanctioned murder the purpose to limit our casualties' the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side Kill, so that you and your beloved shalt not be killed.’ Declaration of war means suspension of the guilt and shame that the wish of survival spawns dressed as the noble mission of fighting evil or disarming the enemies of mankind It shapes itself up as liberation, restoration of order, or crusade; it ends up as genocide. The survivor is mankind's worst evil, its curse and doom War shows in a spectacular way what is always there survival is never innocent when re-forged into action. the destructive edge of survival is sharpened by the socially organized setting in which the activity takes place the survival zero-sum game split the habitat into a part that is threatening and has to be annihilated survival is deployed to build and preserve boundaries of states, nations, races, classes invoked whenever hostility is to be directed, but also whenever loyalty to the cause and group solidarity are called for it generates the energy needed to wage ever new battles. ever new battlefields and war strategies, so that the struggle may continue the purpose of the struggle is gaining exclusive mastery over one's own body surviving its unsurvivable mortality The dream of survival constitutes the body as the most important of targets, as own body is the mortal side of the self, and is also the instrument through which individual immortality has been expropriated by the species. The body is the `natural enemy' of survival in the struggle aimed at the survival of the body, the would-be survivors meet the selfsame body as the arch-enemy Society fares no better than the body: it also emerges from the existential predicament as a monster of ambivalence: half-friend, half-enemy the object and the means of the struggle. The impulse of survival renders both the body and society ambivalent. Survival is torn apart by a contradiction no amount of lies may assuage; an inner split resulting in a constant outpouring of guilt which can be no more placated than its source can be drained self-death and Thou-death) two terrors are twin aspects of the hopelessly ambivalent sentiment gestated and sustained by the impulse of survival My own survival cannot be savoured otherwise than as a macabre privilege over the others, less fortunate. Yet these others are, the very meaning of my existence The death of others may be a benchmark for my own survival success, but it is the life of others which made that success desirable in the first place the image of a world emptied of others, a world that testifies to my ultimate triumph as a survivor, is unbearable the exit of every person that inhabits my life impoverishes that life of mine feeds on the drive to survival survival , a self-destructive and self-defeating impulse it can fulfil itself only in its defeat The core of all callousness, cruelty and brutality, the survival impulse Its struggle is to cut the ambivalent human predicament into a multitude of logically and pragmatically unequivocal situation The others' are divided into those who support, and those who threaten survival Murders which the survival impulse clamours for are no more clouded with the sorrow the murder is not a murder collectivized survival succeeded in `melting the meanness of chauvinism with the generosity of messianism' Universality the code-name for unbound inclusion, is deployed as a tool of exclusion Once the cause in the service of which the survival impulse is mobilized has been proclaimed universal, nothing is left outside whatever has been left outside is now non-entity: it does not count, it has no value left, its destruction is not counted among the costs of survival. the leftovers are waste to be disposed of for survival their destruction as necessary and universally beneficent the moment the boundaries of universality closed outside their abode
survival is not identical with ‘self-preservation' self-preservation beautifies the gruesome truth of survival. At the extreme of survival looms murder This wish can be denied but cannot be effaced The cynicism with which the wish of survival is inevitably infused, comes into the open during war It shapes itself up as liberation, restoration of order, or crusade; it ends up as genocide. the survival zero-sum game split the habitat into a part that is threatening and has to be annihilated survival is deployed to build and preserve boundaries of states, nations, races, classes. it generates the energy needed to wage ever new battles. The dream of survival constitutes the body as the most important of targets, and is the instrument through which individual immortality has been expropriated by the species. two terrors are twin aspects of the hopelessly ambivalent sentiment sustained by the impulse of survival the exit of every person impoverishes that life of mine survival a self-destructive and self-defeating impulse can fulfil itself only in its defeat The core of all callousness, cruelty and brutality, the survival impulse
Inescapably, as Elias Canetti wrote, 24 man is a survivor: `the most elementary and obvious form of success is to remain alive'. We are not just alive; at every moment we are still alive. Success is always an `until further notice' success; it is never final. It must be repeated over and over again. The effort can never grind to a halt. Survival is a lifelong task. Its energizing, creative potential in never exhausted. Whatever is left of it will be just locked up, in one felt swoop, at the moment of death. Canetti insists that survival is not identical with the old and trivial notion of ‘self-preservation'. The idea of self-preservation, sometimes conceived of as an instinct, sometimes as a rational choice, hides or beautifies the gruesome truth of survival. Survival is targeted on others, not on the self. Though we never live through our own death, we do live through the deaths of the others, and their death gives meaning to our success: we have not died, we are still alive. Thus `the desire for a long life which plays such a large part in most cultures really means that most people want to survive their contemporaries. They know that many die early and they want a different fate for themselves.' I would not conceive of my own performance as a success if it were not for the fact that performances of others proved unsuccessful; I can only measure my own performance against those other performances. I want to know what I should do to escape or to postpone the others' lot -- to outlive others. Others die of smoking; perhaps if I don't smoke, I'd survive them? At the radical extreme of survival, says Canetti, looms murder: `He wants to kill so that he can survive others; he wants to stay alive so as not to have others surviving him.' This wish can be silenced, even denied, indignantly, by consciousness -- but it cannot be really effaced: `Only survival at a distance in time is wholly innocent.' 25 The cynicism with which the wish of survival is inevitably, though self-ashamedly, infused, comes blatantly into the open during war -- that socially sanctioned, legitimate murder: the declared purpose is then `to limit our casualties', and anyone knows, even if refrains from spelling it out, that the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline. ‘Kill, so that you and your beloved shalt not be killed.’ Declaration of war means suspension of the guilt and shame that the wish of survival spawns at `normal' times. That normally carefully concealed wish now emerges from hiding, dressed as the noble mission of fighting evil empires or disarming the enemies of mankind, be they carriers of disease that saps the civilized life or spoilers of harmonious world order. It shapes itself up as liberation, restoration of order, or crusade; it ends up as genocide. The survivor's `most fantastic triumphs have taken place in our own time, among people who set great store by the idea of humanity ... The survivor is mankind's worst evil, its curse and perhaps its doom.' 26 War is, admittedly, an extreme case -- but, Canetti insists, it shows in a spectacular way what is always there, though hidden; survival is never wholly innocent when re-forged into action. This is a dramatic, tragic vision of the inner tendency of survival. One wonders to what extent this tendency is truly inner (or innate); one is entitled to suspect that the destructive edge of survival is sharpened (and even more probably directed) by the socially organized setting in which the activity of survival takes place. It is this setting that may (or may not) arrange the survival as a zero-sum game, and then split the habitat into a part that is threatening and has to be subdued or better still annihilated, and another part whose well-being enhances the chance of my own survival; this is what most societies have been doing all along, and continue to do. Like other in-built qualities of the human predicament, the impulse of survival is the stuff of which societies are patched together. Even though this impulse is not the society's creation, it is keenly, skilfully and on the whole effectively manipulated by society; it is, as a rule, socially managed -- in a way that for one reason or another is deemed useful. It is deployed to build and preserve boundaries of states, nations, races, classes. It is invoked, explicitly or tacitly, whenever hostility is to be directed, but also whenever loyalty to the cause and group solidarity are called for. It is not just, and not necessarily destructive in its application. But if it can be put effectively to non-destructive uses, it is because of its destructive potential. One of such uses can be traced back to what Norman O. Brown dubbed the Oedipal project: 27 `The project of becoming God -- in Spinoza's terms, causa sui.' The Oedipal project is a flight from infantile dependency, a wish to become `the father of himself'. This stage in development always arrives, and once it arrives it is invariably directed against the parents, the true embodiment of dependency -- and this whatever the parents do and however they behave. The Oedipal project is a drive to emancipation that cannot be achieved unless the bond of dependency is broken. However, the deepest, the ultimate dependency is that on one's own mortal body -- that ultimate limit of autonomy; for this reason the battle cannot be won. Oedipal project is just a first `trial skirmish' in a long series of battles doomed to defeat (though the hubbub of successive skirmishes silences for a while, perhaps a long while, the thought of the final debacle). The causa sui project stays unfulfilled, and as long as it is unfulfilled it generates the energy needed to wage ever new battles. It also needs ever new battlefields and war strategies, so that the struggle may continue while each successive engagement is lost. The tragic paradox is that the undeclared purpose of the struggle is gaining exclusive mastery over one's own body (and thus, by proxy, surviving its unsurvivable mortality). The dream of survival constitutes the body as the most important of targets, as own body is the mortal side of the self, and -- with its procreative function -- is also the instrument through which individual immortality has been expropriated by the species. The body is the `natural enemy' of survival, and the only uncontrived enemy. A paradox indeed -- and the seat of perhaps the deepest and most hopeless of ambivalences: in the struggle aimed at the survival of the body, the would-be survivors meet the selfsame body as the arch-enemy. But let us note that even in the `struggle of liberation' targeted against one's own body it is always the socially set framework of dependence that injects meaning into the experience of the lack of mastery. These battlefronts are, like all others, socially drawn. And it is the selfsame society which has articulated the aims of the struggle and drawn the battlelines, that also supplies the weapons and the strategies with which the battles can be fought. It is therefore on this interface that the survival impulse of the developing individual meets and merges with the self-perpetuating processes of sociality. Society, in other respects the hostile field of competitors against which one's own survival can be measured and hopefully asserted, appears simultaneously as the armoury of survival's weapons, trusty ally, source of succour, encouragement, and hope. Society fares no better than the body: it also emerges from the existential predicament as a monster of ambivalence: half-friend, half-enemy – the object and the means of the struggle. The impulse of survival renders both the body and society ambivalent. Yet all ambivalence it spawns seem to pale into insignificance when compared to its own. Survival is torn apart by a contradiction no amount of lies may assuage; an inner split resulting in a constant outpouring of guilt which can be no more placated than its source can be drained. Philippe Ariès 28 suggested that the spectres of `la mort de Moi' (self-death) and `la mort de Toi' (Thou-death) were crystallization points of two successive (respectively, eighteenth-century, Enlightenment, and nineteenth-century Romanticism), and to an extent mutually exclusive, attitudes towards death. We may surmise instead that the two terrors are just twin aspects of the hopelessly ambivalent sentiment gestated and sustained by the impulse of survival at all ages of human existence. My own survival, as we have seen before, cannot be savoured otherwise than as a macabre privilege over the others, less fortunate. Yet these others may be, and more often than not are, the very meaning of my existence -- the uppermost value which makes my life worth living; the very sense of being alive: life is communicating with others, being with others, acting for others and being addressed, wanted, lifted into importance by the need of others and by the bid they make for my attention and sympathy. The death of others may be a benchmark for my own survival success, but it is the life of others which made that success desirable in the first place, as well as is making it now worthy of effort. After all, I want to survive mostly because the thought of all that communication, intercourse, loving, being loved -- all that grinding suddenly to a halt is so unbearable. My desire to survive is all the stronger the richer and more satisfying is that experience of being with others. The world without my seeing it or fantasizing it is unimaginable; but the image of a world emptied of others, a world that testifies to my ultimate triumph as a survivor, is unbearable. (The `sole survivor's' plight is no less a nightmare than death; after all, it shows what death is about, it is a mirror-image of death; moreover, only if reflected in that imaginary mirror can death be visualized in all its brutal truth.) More immediately, the exit of every person that inhabits my life and stands between sense and senselessness, fullness and void, impoverishes that life of mine which feeds and in turn feeds on the drive to survival. Is not survival, therefore, a self-destructive and self-defeating impulse? Is not it the case that it can fulfil itself only in its defeat? The core of all callousness, cruelty and brutality, the survival impulse seems also to be the fount of sociability. It is neither selfish nor selfless; or perhaps it is both, and cannot but be both at the same time. In a tormented, self-immolating and painful way it implements the order of nature: it seals the bond between individual self-preservation effort and the survival of the species. By mobilizing the emotional and rational faculties of individuals, its practice fulfils and reinforces the logical and pragmatic interdependence between perpetuity of the species and the temporal existence of its members. Its innate ambivalence has itself a survival value. It is an ambivalence all the same, and an acute one with that. One would expect therefore a drive to separate the inseparable -- a favourite point of entry for all societal managerial skills and ambitions; a stuff from which all man-made, `cultured', contrived social order is made. Making distinctions, discriminating, setting apart, classifying, is culture's foremost mark, craft and tour de force. In its intentions (though hardly ever in its practical accomplishments) culture is a war of attrition declared on ambivalence. Its promise is to separate the grain from the chaff in all their incarnations -- be they called truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness, friends and enemies, or good and evil. Its job is to see that the world is well mapped and well marked, so that confusion will have little chance to arise. Its ambition is to make the world hospitable by eliminating the torments of choice where no fully satisfying choice seems available. Its struggle -- futile yet unstoppable -- is to cut the ambivalent human predicament into a multitude of logically and pragmatically unequivocal situations. Obviously, the poignantly ambivalent survival impulse is the prime candidate for such treatment. Individual survival makes no sense and offers no allurement without survival of others; but then such others as are needed for survival to remain attractive and to make sense may be -- should be -- separated from the rest of the others who are not. This is exactly what society, through its `culturing' effort, achieves -- or at least tries hard to achieve. `The others' are divided into those who support, and those who threaten survival. The uncompromising, overwhelming self-assertion of the species is split into more palatable and easier-to-manage tribal interests. The `inside' and the `outside' are thereby created and carefully demarcated. Inside -- unity, cooperation and mutual love. Outside -- wilderness, vigilance and fight. My tribe is to be spared all casualties at all costs. Among the costs (or are they costs at all? Are they not, to be frank, gains?), the most indispensable of all is `collateral damage' inflicted on the enemy tribe once it has been appointed `the target' and, as targets are meant to be, is `hit' and `neutralized'. My tribe's survival has been offered what it demands: a measure of callous self-love and a measure of loving co-operation with others. Only such others as are earmarked for love, and the others selected for callous treatment, are no more the same others. In Reinhold Niebuhr's words, tribal patriotism `transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism'. 29 Murders which the survival impulse clamours for are no more clouded with the sorrow with which la mort de Toi tends to inject the survivor. The killed is not Tu, and so the murder is not a murder. The haunting contradiction of human survival has been resolved. The resolution is greatly helped by the ingenious game of universality and particularity: by the uncanny talent of particularity to dress up as universality. Most instances of collectivized survival succeeded in what Régis Debray described as `melting the meanness of chauvinism with the generosity of messianism'. 30 Universality, the code-name for unbound inclusion, is deployed as a tool of exclusion. Once the cause in the service of which the survival impulse is mobilized (the cause that ennobles survival exertions, legitimizes them, cleans them of the gnawing suspicion of selfishness, immorality, a sociality) has been proclaimed universal, nothing is left outside; or, rather, whatever has been left outside is now non-entity: it does not count, it has no value left, its destruction is not counted among the costs of survival. At best, the leftovers are waste to be disposed of for the sake of the health and sanity of that which has been marked for survival. If the leftovers had feelings and gumption, they would, surely, rejoice in their destruction, which has been sealed as a necessary and universally beneficent event the moment the boundaries of universality closed outside their abode. They would sing merrily on the way to the sewage gutters.
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<h4><u><strong>Extinction Framing generates violence – The drive for survival necessitates the creation of the other and the body as enemies to be eliminated. The AFF’s universal endorsement of survival conceals its inextricable violent underbelly: genocide and war.</h4><p></u>Bauman ‘92</strong> (Zygmunt, Prof. Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies, Cambridge: Polity Press, Pg. 33-39)</p><p>Inescapably, as Elias Canetti wrote, 24 man is a survivor: `the most elementary and obvious form of success is to remain alive'. We are not just alive; at every moment we are still alive. Success is always an `until further notice' success; it is never final. It must be repeated over and over again. The effort can never grind to a halt. Survival is a lifelong task. Its energizing, creative potential in never exhausted. Whatever is left of it will be just locked up, in one felt swoop, at the moment of death. Canetti insists that <u><mark>survival is not identical with</u></mark> the old and trivial notion of <u><mark>‘self-preservation'</mark>. The idea of <mark>self-preservation</mark>, sometimes conceived of as an instinct, sometimes as a rational choice, hides or <mark>beautifies the gruesome truth of survival.</mark> Survival is targeted on others</u>, not on the self. Though we never live through our own death, <u>we</u> do <u>live through the deaths of the others, and their death gives meaning to our success</u>: we have not died, we are still alive. Thus `the desire for a long life which plays such a large part in most cultures really means that most people want to survive their contemporaries. They know that many die early and they want a different fate for themselves.' I would not conceive of my own performance as a success if it were not for the fact that performances of others proved unsuccessful; <u>I can only measure my own performance against those other performance</u>s. I want to know what I should do to escape or to postpone the others' lot -- to outlive others. Others die of smoking; perhaps if I don't smoke, I'd survive them? <u><mark>At the</u></mark> radical <u><mark>extreme of survival</u></mark>, says Canetti, <u><mark>looms murder</u></mark>: `<u>He wants to kill so that he can survive others; he wants to stay alive so as not to have others surviving him.' <mark>This wish can be</u></mark> silenced, even <u><mark>denied</u></mark>, indignantly, by consciousness -- <u><mark>but</u></mark> it <u><mark>cannot be</u></mark> really <u><mark>effaced</u></mark>: `Only survival at a distance in time is wholly innocent.' 25 <u><mark>The cynicism with which the wish of survival is inevitably</u></mark>, though self-ashamedly, <u><mark>infused, comes</u></mark> blatantly <u><mark>into the open during war</u></mark> -- that <u>socially sanctioned</u>, legitimate <u>murder</u>: <u>the</u> declared <u>purpose</u> is then `<u>to limit our casualties'</u>, and anyone knows, even if refrains from spelling it out, that <u>the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side</u> of the battleline. ‘<u>Kill, so that you and your beloved shalt not be killed.’ Declaration of war means suspension of the guilt and shame that the wish of survival spawns </u>at `normal' times. That normally carefully concealed wish now emerges from hiding, <u>dressed as the noble mission of fighting evil</u> empires <u>or disarming the enemies of mankind</u>, be they carriers of disease that saps the civilized life or spoilers of harmonious world order. <u><mark>It shapes itself up as liberation, restoration of order, or crusade; it ends up as genocide.</u></mark> The survivor's `most fantastic triumphs have taken place in our own time, among people who set great store by the idea of humanity ... <u>The survivor is mankind's worst evil, its curse and</u> perhaps its <u>doom</u>.' 26 <u>War</u> is, admittedly, an extreme case -- but, Canetti insists, it <u>shows in a spectacular way what is always there</u>, though hidden; <u>survival is never</u> wholly <u>innocent when re-forged into action.</u> This is a dramatic, tragic vision of the inner tendency of survival. One wonders to what extent this tendency is truly inner (or innate); one is entitled to suspect that <u>the destructive edge of survival is sharpened</u> (and even more probably directed) <u>by the socially organized setting in which the activity</u> of survival <u>takes place</u>. It is this setting that may (or may not) arrange <u><mark>the survival</u></mark> as a <u><mark>zero-sum game</u></mark>, and then <u><mark>split the habitat into a part that is threatening and has to be</u></mark> subdued or better still <u><mark>annihilated</u></mark>, and another part whose well-being enhances the chance of my own <u><mark>survival</u></mark>; this is what most societies have been doing all along, and continue to do. Like other in-built qualities of the human predicament, the impulse of survival is the stuff of which societies are patched together. Even though this impulse is not the society's creation, it is keenly, skilfully and on the whole effectively manipulated by society; it is, as a rule, socially managed -- in a way that for one reason or another is deemed useful. It <u><mark>is deployed to build and preserve boundaries of states, nations, races, classes</u>.</mark> It is <u>invoked</u>, explicitly or tacitly, <u>whenever hostility is to be directed, but also whenever loyalty to the cause and group solidarity are called for</u>. It is not just, and not necessarily destructive in its application. But if it can be put effectively to non-destructive uses, it is because of its destructive potential. One of such uses can be traced back to what Norman O. Brown dubbed the Oedipal project: 27 `The project of becoming God -- in Spinoza's terms, causa sui.' The Oedipal project is a flight from infantile dependency, a wish to become `the father of himself'. This stage in development always arrives, and once it arrives it is invariably directed against the parents, the true embodiment of dependency -- and this whatever the parents do and however they behave. The Oedipal project is a drive to emancipation that cannot be achieved unless the bond of dependency is broken. However, the deepest, the ultimate dependency is that on one's own mortal body -- that ultimate limit of autonomy; for this reason the battle cannot be won. Oedipal project is just a first `trial skirmish' in a long series of battles doomed to defeat (though the hubbub of successive skirmishes silences for a while, perhaps a long while, the thought of the final debacle). The causa sui project stays unfulfilled, and as long as it is unfulfilled <u><mark>it generates the energy needed to wage ever new battles.</u></mark> It also needs <u>ever new battlefields and war strategies, so that the struggle may continue</u> while each successive engagement is lost. The tragic paradox is that <u>the</u> undeclared <u>purpose of the struggle is gaining exclusive mastery over one's own body</u> (and thus, by proxy, <u>surviving its unsurvivable mortality</u>). <u><mark>The dream of survival constitutes the body as the most important of targets,</mark> as own body is the mortal side of the self, <mark>and</u></mark> -- with its procreative function -- <u><mark>is</mark> also <mark>the instrument through which individual immortality has been expropriated by the species.</mark> The body is the `natural enemy' of survival</u>, and the only uncontrived enemy. A paradox indeed -- and the seat of perhaps the deepest and most hopeless of ambivalences: <u>in the struggle aimed at the survival of the body, the would-be survivors meet the selfsame body as the arch-enemy</u>. But let us note that even in the `struggle of liberation' targeted against one's own body it is always the socially set framework of dependence that injects meaning into the experience of the lack of mastery. These battlefronts are, like all others, socially drawn. And it is the selfsame society which has articulated the aims of the struggle and drawn the battlelines, that also supplies the weapons and the strategies with which the battles can be fought. It is therefore on this interface that the survival impulse of the developing individual meets and merges with the self-perpetuating processes of sociality. Society, in other respects the hostile field of competitors against which one's own survival can be measured and hopefully asserted, appears simultaneously as the armoury of survival's weapons, trusty ally, source of succour, encouragement, and hope. <u>Society fares no better than the body: it also emerges from the existential predicament as a monster of ambivalence: half-friend, half-enemy</u> – <u>the object and the means of the struggle. The impulse of survival renders both the body and society ambivalent. </u>Yet all ambivalence it spawns seem to pale into insignificance when compared to its own. <u>Survival is torn apart by a contradiction no amount of lies may assuage; an inner split resulting in a constant outpouring of guilt which can be no more placated than its source can be drained</u>. Philippe Ariès 28 suggested that the spectres of `la mort de Moi' (<u>self-death</u>) <u>and</u> `la mort de Toi' (<u>Thou-death)</u> were crystallization points of two successive (respectively, eighteenth-century, Enlightenment, and nineteenth-century Romanticism), and to an extent mutually exclusive, attitudes towards death. We may surmise instead that the <u><mark>two terrors are</u></mark> just <u><mark>twin aspects of the hopelessly ambivalent sentiment</mark> gestated and <mark>sustained by the impulse of survival</u></mark> at all ages of human existence. <u>My own survival</u>, as we have seen before, <u>cannot be savoured otherwise than as a macabre privilege over the others, less fortunate. Yet these others</u> may be, and more often than not <u>are, the very meaning of my existence</u> -- the uppermost value which makes my life worth living; the very sense of being alive: life is communicating with others, being with others, acting for others and being addressed, wanted, lifted into importance by the need of others and by the bid they make for my attention and sympathy. <u>The death of others may be a benchmark for my own survival success, but it is the life of others which made that success desirable in the first place</u>, as well as is making it now worthy of effort. After all, I want to survive mostly because the thought of all that communication, intercourse, loving, being loved -- all that grinding suddenly to a halt is so unbearable. My desire to survive is all the stronger the richer and more satisfying is that experience of being with others. The world without my seeing it or fantasizing it is unimaginable; but <u>the image of a world emptied of others, a world that testifies to my ultimate triumph as a survivor, is unbearable</u>. (The `sole survivor's' plight is no less a nightmare than death; after all, it shows what death is about, it is a mirror-image of death; moreover, only if reflected in that imaginary mirror can death be visualized in all its brutal truth.) More immediately, <u><mark>the exit of every person</mark> that inhabits my life </u>and stands between sense and senselessness, fullness and void, <u><mark>impoverishes that life of mine</u></mark> which feeds and in turn <u>feeds on the drive to survival</u>. Is not <u><mark>survival</u></mark>, therefore<u>, <mark>a self-destructive and self-defeating impulse</u></mark>? Is not it the case that <u>it <mark>can fulfil itself only in its defeat</u></mark>? <u><mark>The core of all callousness, cruelty and brutality, the survival impulse</u></mark> seems also to be the fount of sociability. It is neither selfish nor selfless; or perhaps it is both, and cannot but be both at the same time. In a tormented, self-immolating and painful way it implements the order of nature: it seals the bond between individual self-preservation effort and the survival of the species. By mobilizing the emotional and rational faculties of individuals, its practice fulfils and reinforces the logical and pragmatic interdependence between perpetuity of the species and the temporal existence of its members. Its innate ambivalence has itself a survival value. It is an ambivalence all the same, and an acute one with that. One would expect therefore a drive to separate the inseparable -- a favourite point of entry for all societal managerial skills and ambitions; a stuff from which all man-made, `cultured', contrived social order is made. Making distinctions, discriminating, setting apart, classifying, is culture's foremost mark, craft and tour de force. In its intentions (though hardly ever in its practical accomplishments) culture is a war of attrition declared on ambivalence. Its promise is to separate the grain from the chaff in all their incarnations -- be they called truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness, friends and enemies, or good and evil. Its job is to see that the world is well mapped and well marked, so that confusion will have little chance to arise. Its ambition is to make the world hospitable by eliminating the torments of choice where no fully satisfying choice seems available. <u>Its struggle</u> -- futile yet unstoppable -- <u>is to cut the ambivalent human predicament into a multitude of logically and pragmatically unequivocal situation</u>s. Obviously, the poignantly ambivalent survival impulse is the prime candidate for such treatment. Individual survival makes no sense and offers no allurement without survival of others; but then such others as are needed for survival to remain attractive and to make sense may be -- should be -- separated from the rest of the others who are not. This is exactly what society, through its `culturing' effort, achieves -- or at least tries hard to achieve. `<u>The others' are divided into those who support, and those who threaten survival</u>. The uncompromising, overwhelming self-assertion of the species is split into more palatable and easier-to-manage tribal interests. The `inside' and the `outside' are thereby created and carefully demarcated. Inside -- unity, cooperation and mutual love. Outside -- wilderness, vigilance and fight. My tribe is to be spared all casualties at all costs. Among the costs (or are they costs at all? Are they not, to be frank, gains?), the most indispensable of all is `collateral damage' inflicted on the enemy tribe once it has been appointed `the target' and, as targets are meant to be, is `hit' and `neutralized'. My tribe's survival has been offered what it demands: a measure of callous self-love and a measure of loving co-operation with others. Only such others as are earmarked for love, and the others selected for callous treatment, are no more the same others. In Reinhold Niebuhr's words, tribal patriotism `transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism'. 29 <u>Murders which the survival impulse clamours for are no more clouded with the sorrow</u> with which la mort de Toi tends to inject the survivor. The killed is not Tu, and so <u>the murder is not a murder</u>. The haunting contradiction of human survival has been resolved. The resolution is greatly helped by the ingenious game of universality and particularity: by the uncanny talent of particularity to dress up as universality. Most instances of <u>collectivized survival succeeded in</u> what Régis Debray described as <u>`melting the meanness of chauvinism with the generosity of messianism'</u>. 30 <u>Universality</u>, <u>the code-name for unbound inclusion, is deployed as a tool of exclusion</u>. <u>Once the cause in the service of which the survival impulse is mobilized</u> (the cause that ennobles survival exertions, legitimizes them, cleans them of the gnawing suspicion of selfishness, immorality, a sociality) <u>has been proclaimed universal, nothing is left outside</u>; or, rather, <u>whatever has been left outside is now non-entity: it does not count, it has no value left, its destruction is not counted among the costs of survival.</u> At best, <u>the leftovers are waste to be disposed of</u> for the sake of the health and sanity of that which has been marked <u>for survival</u>. If the leftovers had feelings and gumption, they would, surely, rejoice in <u>their destruction</u>, which has been sealed <u>as</u> a <u>necessary and universally beneficent </u>event <u>the moment the boundaries of universality closed outside their abode</u>. They would sing merrily on the way to the sewage gutters.</p>
2NC
1NC Market
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,683
1
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,110
Physician assisted suicide is a wedge issue – strong partisan gap.
Saad ’11
Saad, ’11 [Lydia, “Doctor-Assisted Suicide Is Moral Issue Dividing Americans Most”, 5-31-11, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147842/doctor-assisted-suicide-moral-issue-dividing-americans.aspx, RSR]
Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the most controversial cultural issue in Gallup's 2011 Values and Beliefs poll, with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong Partisans disagree widely on these issues with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, barely a third of Republicans
Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the most controversial cultural issue in Gallup's Values and Beliefs poll with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong Partisans disagree widely on these issues, with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, barely a third of Republicans
PRINCETON, NJ -- Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the most controversial cultural issue in Gallup's 2011 Values and Beliefs poll, with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong. Having a baby out of wedlock and abortion also closely divide Americans. However, stronger public consensus exists on 14 other issues tested. Americans are in broadest agreement about what behaviors are morally wrong. At least 8 in 10 U.S. adults interviewed in the May 5-8 survey say this about extramarital affairs, polygamy, cloning humans, and suicide. At least 6 in 10 say pornography and cloning animals are each morally wrong. Widest agreement about what is morally acceptable, ranging from 60% to 69%, is found for divorce, the death penalty, gambling, embryonic stem cell research, and premarital sex. Also, 55% or better say medical testing on animals, gay/lesbian relations, and the use of animal fur for clothing are each acceptable. The three most controversial issues -- doctor-assisted suicide, abortion, and out-of-wedlock births -- are the ones on which fewer than 15 points separate the percentage considering the issue morally acceptable from the percentage considering it morally wrong. Attitudes on each have been fairly stable in recent years. Partisans disagree widely on these issues, with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, barely a third of Republicans. Abortion is the most divisive of the three, with a 37-point Republican-Democratic gap.
1,533
<h4><strong>Physician assisted suicide is a wedge issue – strong partisan gap.</h4><p>Saad</strong>, <strong>’11</strong> [Lydia, “Doctor-Assisted Suicide Is Moral Issue Dividing Americans Most”, 5-31-11, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147842/doctor-assisted-suicide-moral-issue-dividing-americans.aspx, RSR]</p><p>PRINCETON, NJ -- <u><strong><mark>Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the most controversial cultural issue</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>Gallup's</mark> 2011 <mark>Values and Beliefs poll</mark>, <mark>with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong</u></strong></mark>. Having a baby out of wedlock and abortion also closely divide Americans. However, stronger public consensus exists on 14 other issues tested. Americans are in broadest agreement about what behaviors are morally wrong. At least 8 in 10 U.S. adults interviewed in the May 5-8 survey say this about extramarital affairs, polygamy, cloning humans, and suicide. At least 6 in 10 say pornography and cloning animals are each morally wrong. Widest agreement about what is morally acceptable, ranging from 60% to 69%, is found for divorce, the death penalty, gambling, embryonic stem cell research, and premarital sex. Also, 55% or better say medical testing on animals, gay/lesbian relations, and the use of animal fur for clothing are each acceptable. The three most controversial issues -- doctor-assisted suicide, abortion, and out-of-wedlock births -- are the ones on which fewer than 15 points separate the percentage considering the issue morally acceptable from the percentage considering it morally wrong. Attitudes on each have been fairly stable in recent years. <u><strong><mark>Partisans disagree widely on these issues</u></strong>, <u><strong>with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, barely a third of Republicans</u></strong></mark>. Abortion is the most divisive of the three, with a 37-point Republican-Democratic gap.</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,684
5
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,111
Regulations fail
Thackston 14
Thackston 14, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling Using tech undetectable to operators and regulators, House Commerce Committee witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The demonstration showed tech and techniques terror and crime use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the U S enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like 9/11 The threat is real gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
House Commerce Committee witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them to play poker online. The demo showed tech terror and crime use to operate untraceable laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from spread of poker online gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling because the website operator never has complete control. Using technology undetectable to website operators and their regulators, it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, House Energy and Commerce Committee staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The Harper demonstration showed the technology and techniques that terror and crime organizations could use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online. One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the United States enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The threat is real. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that gambling regulations in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
2,997
<h4>Regulations fail </h4><p><strong>Thackston 14</strong>, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols<u> is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317</p><p>Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling</u> because the website operator never has complete control. <u>Using tech</u>nology <u>undetectable to</u> website <u>operators and</u> their <u>regulators,</u> it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, <u><mark>House</u></mark> Energy and <u><mark>Commerce Committee</u></mark> staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., <u><mark>witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them</mark> as alias machines <mark>to play poker online. The</u></mark> Harper <u><mark>demo</mark>nstration <mark>showed</u></mark> the <u><mark>tech</u></mark>nology <u>and techniques</u> that <u><mark>terror and crime</u></mark> organizations could <u><mark>use to operate untraceable</mark> money <mark>laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from</mark> the <mark>spread of poker online</u></mark>. One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. <u>A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million </u>as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. <u>An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like </u>the <u>9/11 </u>attack on the World Trade Center. <u>The threat is real</u>. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that <u><mark>gambling regulations</mark> </u>in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey <u><mark>are no match for determined terrorists and criminals</u>,</mark> we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved <u><mark>it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.</p></u></mark>
1NC
Regulations
1NC No Regulations
429,685
23
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,112
Pragmatic warming policy is effective and key to prevent extinction
Simpson 10
Simpson 10 (Francis, College of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, “Environmental Pragmatism and its Application to Climate Change The Moral Obligations of Developed and Developing Nations to Avert Climate Change as viewed through Technological Pragmatism”, Spring 2010 | Volume 6 | Number 1)
Environmental pragmatism seeks to move beyond strictly theoretical exercises normal in philosophy and allow the movement to formulate substantial new policies This particular discipline advocates moral pluralism, implying that the environmental problems being faced have multiple correct solutions. Light argues that the urgency of ecological crises requires that action is necessary While theorists serve to further the field of environmental ethics and to debate the metaethical basis of various philosophies, some answers to questions are best left to private discussion rather than taking time to argue about them publically the commitment to solving environmental problems is the only precondition for any workable and democratic political theory pragmatism calls for bridging the gap between theory and policy/ practices By utilizing footprinting and life-cycle analysis, it becomes possible to make environmentally conscious decisions not only based upon a gut instinct but based on sound science Climate change modeling inherently contains many unknowns but these factors should not be enough to hold us back from an environmental pragmatism stand point. Rather than hiding behind a veil of uncertainty with the science, the uncertainty of the possible catastrophic outcomes demands action Since we are attempting to protect human lives and prevent unnecessary suffering, environmental pragmatism would dictate that we should take action now and stop debating the theoretical aspects of this problem. A moral obligation exists to protect human life, and it becomes our obligation to avert climate change. People inherently fear change, and it is my opinion that averting climate change requires a drastic change it is humanities responsibility to avert climate change before it is too late since we have a moral obligation to protect the future of humanity and the biosphere
Environmental pragmatism seeks to move beyond theoretical exercises and allow new policies This discipline advocates moral pluralism the urgency of ecological crises requires action While theorists serve to further the field some answers to questions are best left to private discussion rather than taking time to argue publically pragmatism bridg theory and policy Climate change contains many unknowns but these factors should not be enough to hold us back Rather than hiding behind uncertainty possible catastrophic outcomes demand action Since we are attempting to protect human lives we should take action now and stop debating theoretical aspects it becomes our obligation to avert climate change
Pragmatism and Footprinting¶ Environmental pragmatism is a relatively new field of environmental ethics that seeks to move beyond the strictly theoretical exercises normal in philosophy and allows the environmental movement to formulate substantial new policies (Light, 1). Environmental Pragmatism was initially posited by Bryan Norton and evolved to not take a stance over the dispute between non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric ethics. Distancing himself from this dispute, he preferred to distinguish between strong and weak anthropocentricism (Light, 290-291, 298). The main philosophers involved in advancing the debate in environmental pragmatism include Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and Bryan Norton. This particular discipline advocates moral pluralism, implying that the environmental problems being faced have multiple correct solutions. Light argues that the urgency of ecological crises requires that action is necessary through negotiation and compromise. While theorists serve to further the field of environmental ethics and to debate the metaethical basis of various environmental philosophies, some answers to questions are best left to private discussion rather than taking time to argue about them publically (introduction of pragmatism). Pragmatism believes that if two theories are equally able to provide solutions to a given problem, then debate on which is more is argued that: “the commitment to solving environmental problems is the only precondition for any workable and democratic political theory” (Light, 11). While the science behind a footprint is well understood, what can the synthesis of environmental pragmatism and footprinting tell us about the moral obligation to avert climate change? How does grounding the practice of sustainability footprinting in environmental pragmatism generate moral prescriptions for averting climate change?¶ Environmental Pragmatism necessitates the need for tools in engineering to be developed and applied to avert the climate change problem, since pragmatism inherently calls for bridging the gap between theory and policy/ practices. With the theory of pragmatism in mind, further research and development of tools such as life-cycle analysis and footprinting are potential policy tools that are necessary under a pragmatist viewpoint so that informed decisions can be made by policy makers. Since the role of life-cycle analysis and footprinting attempt to improve the efficiency and decrease the overall environmental impact of a given process, good, or service, environmental pragmatism would call for the further development and usage of these tools so that we can continue to develop sustainably and fulfill our moral obligation to future generations. By utilizing footprinting and life-cycle analysis, it becomes possible to make environmentally conscious decisions not only based upon a gut instinct but additionally based on sound science. Finally, in regards to averting climate change, footprinting and life-cycle analysis offer another dimension to traditional cost-benefit analysis and can allow for our moral obligation to future generations to weigh into final decisions which will eventually result in policies and/ or a production of a good or service. Since traditional cost benefit analysis does not account for the environment explicitly, pragmatism would call for the application of these tools to ensure that the environment is adequately protected for future generations.¶ Climate change modeling inherently contains many unknowns in terms of future outcomes and applied simplifications, but these factors should not be enough to hold us back from an environmental pragmatism stand point. Rather than hiding behind a veil of uncertainty with the science, the uncertainty of the possible catastrophic outcomes demands action on the part of every human individual. Environmental pragmatism could also adopt a view point like the precautionary principle where a given action has great uncertainty, but also great consequence (Haller). Since we are attempting to protect human lives and prevent unnecessary suffering, environmental pragmatism would dictate that we should take action now and stop debating the theoretical aspects of this problem. A moral obligation exists to protect human life, and it becomes our obligation to avert climate change. Despite the relatively high economic costs of averting climate change, it is worth noting that the creation of green jobs and new sectors will help to stimulate the economy rather than completely hindering it. People inherently fear change, and it is my opinion that averting climate change requires a drastic change in our consumption patterns, an important reason why people are resisting averting climate change. From an environmental pragmatism viewpoint, it is humanities responsibility to avert climate change before it is too late since we have a moral obligation to protect the future of humanity and the biosphere.
4,964
<h4>Pragmatic warming policy is effective and key to prevent extinction</h4><p><strong>Simpson 10</strong> (Francis, College of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, “Environmental Pragmatism and its Application to Climate Change The Moral Obligations of Developed and Developing Nations to Avert Climate Change as viewed through Technological Pragmatism”, Spring 2010 | Volume 6 | Number 1)</p><p>Pragmatism and Footprinting¶ <u><strong><mark>Environmental pragmatism</u></strong></mark> is a relatively new field of environmental ethics that <u><strong><mark>seeks to move beyond</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>strictly <mark>theoretical exercises</mark> normal in philosophy <mark>and allow</u></strong></mark>s <u><strong>the</u></strong> environmental <u><strong>movement to formulate substantial <mark>new policies</u></strong></mark> (Light, 1). Environmental Pragmatism was initially posited by Bryan Norton and evolved to not take a stance over the dispute between non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric ethics. Distancing himself from this dispute, he preferred to distinguish between strong and weak anthropocentricism (Light, 290-291, 298). The main philosophers involved in advancing the debate in environmental pragmatism include Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and Bryan Norton. <u><strong><mark>This</mark> particular <mark>discipline advocates moral pluralism</mark>, implying that the environmental problems being faced have multiple correct solutions.</u></strong> <u><strong>Light argues that <mark>the urgency of ecological crises requires</mark> that <mark>action</mark> is necessary</u></strong> through negotiation and compromise. <u><strong><mark>While theorists serve to further the field</mark> of environmental ethics and to debate the metaethical basis of various</u></strong> environmental <u><strong>philosophies, <mark>some answers to questions are best left to private discussion rather than taking time to argue</mark> about them <mark>publically</u></strong></mark> (introduction of pragmatism). Pragmatism believes that if two theories are equally able to provide solutions to a given problem, then debate on which is more is argued that: “<u><strong>the commitment to solving environmental problems is the only precondition for any workable and democratic political theory</u></strong>” (Light, 11). While the science behind a footprint is well understood, what can the synthesis of environmental pragmatism and footprinting tell us about the moral obligation to avert climate change? How does grounding the practice of sustainability footprinting in environmental pragmatism generate moral prescriptions for averting climate change?¶ Environmental Pragmatism necessitates the need for tools in engineering to be developed and applied to avert the climate change problem, since <u><strong><mark>pragmatism</u></strong></mark> inherently <u><strong>calls for <mark>bridg</mark>ing the gap between <mark>theory and policy</mark>/ practices</u></strong>. With the theory of pragmatism in mind, further research and development of tools such as life-cycle analysis and footprinting are potential policy tools that are necessary under a pragmatist viewpoint so that informed decisions can be made by policy makers. Since the role of life-cycle analysis and footprinting attempt to improve the efficiency and decrease the overall environmental impact of a given process, good, or service, environmental pragmatism would call for the further development and usage of these tools so that we can continue to develop sustainably and fulfill our moral obligation to future generations. <u><strong>By utilizing footprinting and life-cycle analysis, it becomes possible to make environmentally conscious decisions not only based upon a gut instinct but </u></strong>additionally <u><strong>based on sound science</u></strong>. Finally, in regards to averting climate change, footprinting and life-cycle analysis offer another dimension to traditional cost-benefit analysis and can allow for our moral obligation to future generations to weigh into final decisions which will eventually result in policies and/ or a production of a good or service. Since traditional cost benefit analysis does not account for the environment explicitly, pragmatism would call for the application of these tools to ensure that the environment is adequately protected for future generations.¶ <u><strong><mark>Climate change</mark> modeling inherently <mark>contains many unknowns</u></strong></mark> in terms of future outcomes and applied simplifications, <u><strong><mark>but these factors should not be enough to hold us back</mark> from an environmental pragmatism stand point. <mark>Rather than hiding behind</mark> a veil of <mark>uncertainty</mark> with the science, the uncertainty of the <mark>possible catastrophic outcomes demand</mark>s<mark> action</u></strong></mark> on the part of every human individual. Environmental pragmatism could also adopt a view point like the precautionary principle where a given action has great uncertainty, but also great consequence (Haller). <u><strong><mark>Since we are attempting to protect human lives</mark> and prevent unnecessary suffering, environmental pragmatism would dictate that <mark>we should take action now and stop debating</mark> the <mark>theoretical aspects</mark> of this problem. A moral obligation exists to protect human life, and <mark>it becomes our obligation to avert climate change</mark>.</u></strong> Despite the relatively high economic costs of averting climate change, it is worth noting that the creation of green jobs and new sectors will help to stimulate the economy rather than completely hindering it. <u><strong>People inherently fear change, and it is my opinion that averting climate change requires a drastic change</u></strong> in our consumption patterns, an important reason why people are resisting averting climate change. From an environmental pragmatism viewpoint, <u><strong>it is humanities responsibility to avert climate change before it is too late since we have a moral obligation to protect the future of humanity and the biosphere</u></strong>.</p>
null
1AC
1AC – Scenario 4
259,032
54
16,973
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx
564,676
A
UMKC
5
SFSU AG
Brian Rubaie
1AC Marijuana Environment 1NC Settlerism K 2NC Settlerism K 1NR Settlerism K 2NR Settlerism K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,113
The universe won’t miss us
Seed ‘88
Seed ‘88 (John; Australian environmentalist and director of the Rainforest Information Centre; THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN - TOWARDS A COUNCIL OF ALL BEINGS; http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm)
"Anthropocentrism" or "homocentrism" means human chauvinism. Human chauvinism, the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value, the measure of all things, is deeply embedded in our culture and consciousness. hen humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place. Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart. For some people however, this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth. "I am protecting the rainforest" develops to "I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking." What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin to recall our true nature. That is, the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain (3), sometimes referred to as "deep ecology". As your memory improves, as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace the outmoded anthropocentric structures in your mind, there is an identification with all life, Then follows the realisation that the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago.
the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value, is deeply embedded in our consciousness. When humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth. "I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. the change is a spiritual one, "deep ecology". , as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace anthropocentric structures there is an identification with all life the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago.
"But the time is not a strong prison either. A little scraping of the walls of dishonest contractor's concrete Through a shower of chips and sand makes freedom. Shake the dust from your hair. This mountain sea-coast is real For it reaches out far into the past and future; It is part of the great and timeless excellence of things." (1) "Anthropocentrism" or "homocentrism" means human chauvinism. Similar to sexism, but substitute "human race" for "man" and "all other species" for "woman". Human chauvinism, the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value, the measure of all things, is deeply embedded in our culture and consciousness. "And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth , and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all that moveth on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands they are delivered".(2) When humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place. Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart. Your humanness is then recognised as being merely the most recent stage of your existence, and as you stop identifying exclusively with this chapter, you start to get in touch with yourself as mammal, as vertebrate, as a species only recently emerged from the rainforest. As the fog of amnesia disperses, there is a transformation in your relationship to other species, and in your commitment to them. What is described here should not be seen as merely intellectual. The intellect is one entry point to the process outlined, and the easiest one to communicate. For some people however, this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth. "I am protecting the rainforest" develops to "I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking." What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin to recall our true nature. That is, the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain (3), sometimes referred to as "deep ecology". As your memory improves, as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace the outmoded anthropocentric structures in your mind, there is an identification with all life, Then follows the realisation that the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago.
2,535
<h4><strong>The universe won’t miss us </h4><p>Seed ‘88 </strong>(John; Australian environmentalist and director of the Rainforest Information Centre; THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN - TOWARDS A COUNCIL OF ALL BEINGS; <u>http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm</u>)</p><p>"But the time is not a strong prison either. A little scraping of the walls of dishonest contractor's concrete Through a shower of chips and sand makes freedom. Shake the dust from your hair. This mountain sea-coast is real For it reaches out far into the past and future; It is part of the great and timeless excellence of things." (1) <u>"Anthropocentrism" or "homocentrism" means human chauvinism.</u> Similar to sexism, but substitute "human race" for "man" and "all other species" for "woman". <u>Human chauvinism, <mark>the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value,</mark> the measure of all things, <mark>is deeply embedded in our</mark> culture and <mark>consciousness.</u></mark> "And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth , and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all that moveth on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands they are delivered".(2) <mark>W<u>hen humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place</mark>. Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart.</u> Your humanness is then recognised as being merely the most recent stage of your existence, and as you stop identifying exclusively with this chapter, you start to get in touch with yourself as mammal, as vertebrate, as a species only recently emerged from the rainforest. As the fog of amnesia disperses, there is a transformation in your relationship to other species, and in your commitment to them. What is described here should not be seen as merely intellectual. The intellect is one entry point to the process outlined, and the easiest one to communicate. <u>For some people however, <mark>this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth.</mark> "I am protecting the rainforest" develops to <mark>"I am part of the rainforest protecting myself.</mark> I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking." What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin to recall our true nature. That is, <mark>the change is a spiritual one, </mark>thinking like a mountain (3), sometimes referred to as <mark>"deep ecology".</mark> As your memory improves<mark>, as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace</mark> the outmoded <mark>anthropocentric structures</mark> in your mind, <mark>there is an identification with all life</mark>, Then follows the realisation that <strong><mark>the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct</strong>. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago.</u></mark> </p>
2NC
1NC Market
2NC AT: Extinction Different
224,317
14
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,114
Trade collapse inevitable – DOHA recently failed – that’s NYT – specifically says it will erode trust
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Trade collapse inevitable – DOHA recently failed – that’s NYT – specifically says it will erode trust</h4>
1NR
WTO
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,686
1
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,115
GOP Senate passes Russia sanctions---Obama won’t block it
Tayler 14
Jeffrey Tayler 14, contributing editor at The Atlantic, 8/12/14, “The Way Out of the Ukraine Crisis,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/talk-to-the-russians/375898/?single_page=true
Corker introduced a bill that seems designed to destroy what remains of relations between the U S and Russia its provisions would dramatically heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington it would deepen the conflict and shove us to the brink of war The R A P A is just a proposed bill, for now But if the Republicans take the Senate the legislation shows the direction in which Congress will push President Obama as the current standoff intensifies the measure represents a hardline approach the White House is warming to at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis Its nuclear arsenal the only such arsenal capable of destroying the West imposes an imperative: dialogue if Russia and the U S are quarreling global peace is under threat According to the legislation, the U S and NATO would accelerate European and NATO missile defense efforts The act’s chief clauses would come into force if Putin doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine within seven to 30 days from its enactment How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief would never submit to it damaging economic restrictions would strengthen Russians’ conviction that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it If American-made bombs or bullets supplied to Ukraine, end up killing Russian troops Putin would have to respond or risk appearing weak Beyond the R A P A Obama has shown little aptitude for dealing with the crisis in Ukraine
Corker introduced a bill to destroy relations its provisions would dramatically heighten tensions and shove us to the brink of war R A P A is just proposed now. if Republicans take the Senate legislation shows the direction Congress will push Obama the measure represents a hardline approach the White House is warming to Putin would never submit to it If American bombs supplied to Ukraine kill Russian troops Putin would have to respond Beyond R A P A Obama has shown little aptitude for Ukraine
In May, Bob Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a bill of stunning recklessness that seems specifically designed to destroy what remains of relations between the United States and Russia. The legislation’s very name—the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014”—is a misnomer, for its provisions, if enacted, would dramatically heighten tensions between Moscow and Washington. By foreclosing the option of doing what we really need to do—launch a serious dialogue with Russia about how to end the Ukraine crisis—it would deepen the conflict there, augment the human misery spreading as a result, and shove us to the brink of war. In fact, the bill is already doing damage to the prospect of peace by serving Kremlin propagandists as a manifesto of U.S. intent to force Russia to its knees and humiliate its leader. It presents an ultimatum to the Kremlin that no head of state, least of all the famously supercilious Vladimir Putin, would accept. The Russian Aggression Prevention Act is just a proposed bill, for now. But if the Republicans take the Senate (and retain the House of Representatives) in November’s midterm elections, the legislation shows the direction in which Congress will push President Obama as the current standoff intensifies. Elections aside, the measure represents a hardline approach that the White House is warming to—at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis when the Ukrainian military is advancing on the pro-Russian rebel stronghold of Donetsk, and Russian troops are massing on the border. Corker’s document reveals a grave, even inexplicable (in light of history) misapprehension of how to deal with an assertive Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which put Russia’s socialist, expansionist regime at loggerheads with much of the world for most of the 20th century, the West, and especially the United States, has struggled with a confounding question: What to do about Russia? In the 1970s, the Nixon administration found an answer: détente, a policy predicated not on threats, but on dialogue. Russia is too big, too resource-rich, too vital (as an energy supplier to Europe), and too technologically advanced to disregard (or “isolate” as Obama has said he hopes to do). Its nuclear arsenal alone—the only such arsenal capable of destroying the West—imposes an imperative: dialogue, as distasteful as that may be to many. In short, if Russia and the United States are quarreling, global peace is under threat. Corker’s bill purports to offer a “strategic framework for United States security assistance and cooperation in Europe and Eurasia,” but in fact directs the president to take a number of measures that would imperil both objectives. According to the legislation, the United States and NATO would, in violation of the 1997 Founding Act (concluded between the alliance and Russia), permanently station troops in the alliance member states of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and “accelerate” (in an unspecified way) “European and NATO missile defense efforts.” (There is much to specify here, since in 2009 the Obama administration, facing strong criticism from Russia and public opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland, the proposed host countries, scaled back plans for missile-defense systems in Eastern Europe.) Unprecedented “major non-NATO ally status” is to be accorded to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Military aid is promised to Ukraine, and cryptic verbiage about providing “defense articles or defense services” leaves open the possibility of doing the same for the other two former Soviet republics. There are many other troubling provisions, but significantly, the bill instructs the president to block Russian assets and dramatically broaden sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin does not withdraw its military from Crimea and the Ukrainian border, and cease destabilizing the Ukrainian government’s control over its eastern regions. It also directs the U.S. secretary of state to “increase efforts [to] … strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”—which sounds an awful lot like helping NGOs in Moscow promote regime change. (If Putin harbored any doubts that such NGOs were in the pay of the United States and working to subvert him, the bill neatly resolves them.) The act’s chief clauses would come into force if Putin doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine within seven to 30 days from its enactment. How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief, whose 14-year tenure in the country’s highest offices has bristled with televised displays of manliness and derring-do, would never submit to it. Sanctions have so far done nothing but consolidate domestic support for him and his Ukraine policy. Truly damaging economic restrictions would foment more anti-Western (and, specifically, anti-American) hostility and strengthen Russians’ conviction—generated by the virulent propaganda streaming forth endlessly over Kremlin-controlled airwaves—that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it. Indeed, this perception is already widespread, and has taken root among many Russians who were previously indifferent to politics or hostile to Putin, whose popularity now stands at 87 percent. The military measures the act proposes are positively dangerous. Providing Western arms, intelligence, and military advisors to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which are clashing or have clashed with Russia—would make possible scenarios hitherto unimaginable. If American-made bombs or bullets supplied to Ukraine, for example, end up killing Russian troops, or if American intelligence helps Ukraine score significant victories against Russian-backed separatists, Putin would have to respond or risk appearing weak. Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have never formed part of a Western political, military, or economic alliance, though they have participated in NATO’s symbolic Partnership for Peace program. With the exception of Georgia, they do, however, belong to the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. Just what these countries would bring to the United States and NATO besides trouble is hard to see. Beyond the Russian Aggression Prevention Act, the Obama administration has shown little aptitude for dealing with the crisis in Ukraine, imposing sanctions that have not prompted Putin to quit Crimea or stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, and spouting rhetoric that has only hardened Putin’s determination to not back down.
6,606
<h4>GOP Senate passes Russia sanctions---Obama won’t block it </h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Tayler 14</strong>, contributing editor at The Atlantic, 8/12/14, “The Way Out of the Ukraine Crisis,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/talk-to-the-russians/375898/?single_page=true</p><p>In May, Bob <u><strong><mark>Corker</u></strong></mark>, the ranking Republican on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, <u><strong><mark>introduced a bill</u></strong></mark> of stunning recklessness <u><strong>that seems</u></strong> specifically <u><strong>designed <mark>to destroy</mark> what remains of <mark>relations</mark> between the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and Russia</u></strong>. The legislation’s very name—the “Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014”—is a misnomer, for <u><strong><mark>its provisions</u></strong></mark>, if enacted, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>dramatically heighten tensions</mark> between Moscow and Washington</u></strong>. By foreclosing the option of doing what we really need to do—launch a serious dialogue with Russia about how to end the Ukraine crisis—<u><strong>it would deepen the conflict</u></strong> there, augment the human misery spreading as a result, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>shove us to the brink of war</u></strong></mark>. In fact, the bill is already doing damage to the prospect of peace by serving Kremlin propagandists as a manifesto of U.S. intent to force Russia to its knees and humiliate its leader. It presents an ultimatum to the Kremlin that no head of state, least of all the famously supercilious Vladimir Putin, would accept. <u><strong>The <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong> <u><strong>just</mark> a <mark>proposed</mark> bill, for <mark>now</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>But <mark>if</mark> the <mark>Republicans take the Senate</u></strong></mark> (and retain the House of Representatives) in November’s midterm elections, <u><strong>the <mark>legislation shows the direction</mark> in which</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Congress will push</mark> President <mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>as the current standoff intensifies</u></strong>. Elections aside, <u><strong><mark>the measure represents a hardline approach</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the White House is warming to</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>at a pivotal moment in the months-long crisis</u></strong> when the Ukrainian military is advancing on the pro-Russian rebel stronghold of Donetsk, and Russian troops are massing on the border. Corker’s document reveals a grave, even inexplicable (in light of history) misapprehension of how to deal with an assertive Russia. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which put Russia’s socialist, expansionist regime at loggerheads with much of the world for most of the 20th century, the West, and especially the United States, has struggled with a confounding question: What to do about Russia? In the 1970s, the Nixon administration found an answer: détente, a policy predicated not on threats, but on dialogue. Russia is too big, too resource-rich, too vital (as an energy supplier to Europe), and too technologically advanced to disregard (or “isolate” as Obama has said he hopes to do). <u><strong>Its nuclear arsenal</u></strong> alone—<u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>only such arsenal capable of destroying the West</u></strong>—<u><strong>imposes an</u></strong> <u><strong>imperative: dialogue</u></strong>, as distasteful as that may be to many. In short, <u><strong>if Russia and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>are quarreling</u></strong>, <u><strong>global peace is under threat</u></strong>. Corker’s bill purports to offer a “strategic framework for United States security assistance and cooperation in Europe and Eurasia,” but in fact directs the president to take a number of measures that would imperil both objectives. <u><strong>According to the legislation, the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and NATO would</u></strong>, in violation of the 1997 Founding Act (concluded between the alliance and Russia), permanently station troops in the alliance member states of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and “<u><strong>accelerate</u></strong>” (in an unspecified way) “<u><strong>European and NATO missile defense efforts</u></strong>.” (There is much to specify here, since in 2009 the Obama administration, facing strong criticism from Russia and public opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland, the proposed host countries, scaled back plans for missile-defense systems in Eastern Europe.) Unprecedented “major non-NATO ally status” is to be accorded to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Military aid is promised to Ukraine, and cryptic verbiage about providing “defense articles or defense services” leaves open the possibility of doing the same for the other two former Soviet republics. There are many other troubling provisions, but significantly, the bill instructs the president to block Russian assets and dramatically broaden sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin does not withdraw its military from Crimea and the Ukrainian border, and cease destabilizing the Ukrainian government’s control over its eastern regions. It also directs the U.S. secretary of state to “increase efforts [to] … strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation”—which sounds an awful lot like helping NGOs in Moscow promote regime change. (If Putin harbored any doubts that such NGOs were in the pay of the United States and working to subvert him, the bill neatly resolves them.) <u><strong>The act’s chief clauses would come into force if <mark>Putin</mark> doesn’t reverse course on Ukraine</u></strong> <u><strong>within seven to 30 days from its enactment</u></strong>. <u><strong>How would the Russian president react to such an ultimatum? The former FSB chief</u></strong>, whose 14-year tenure in the country’s highest offices has bristled with televised displays of manliness and derring-do, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>never submit to it</u></strong></mark>. Sanctions have so far done nothing but consolidate domestic support for him and his Ukraine policy. Truly <u><strong>damaging economic restrictions would</u></strong> foment more anti-Western (and, specifically, anti-American) hostility and <u><strong>strengthen Russians’ conviction</u></strong>—generated by the virulent propaganda streaming forth endlessly over Kremlin-controlled airwaves—<u><strong>that the West is ganging up on Russia and bent on destroying it</u></strong>. Indeed, this perception is already widespread, and has taken root among many Russians who were previously indifferent to politics or hostile to Putin, whose popularity now stands at 87 percent. The military measures the act proposes are positively dangerous. Providing Western arms, intelligence, and military advisors to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all of which are clashing or have clashed with Russia—would make possible scenarios hitherto unimaginable. <u><strong><mark>If American</mark>-made <mark>bombs</mark> or bullets <mark>supplied to Ukraine</mark>,</u></strong> for example, <u><strong>end up <mark>kill</mark>ing <mark>Russian troops</u></strong></mark>, or if American intelligence helps Ukraine score significant victories against Russian-backed separatists, <u><strong><mark>Putin would have to respond</mark> or risk appearing weak</u></strong>. Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have never formed part of a Western political, military, or economic alliance, though they have participated in NATO’s symbolic Partnership for Peace program. With the exception of Georgia, they do, however, belong to the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. Just what these countries would bring to the United States and NATO besides trouble is hard to see. <u><strong><mark>Beyond</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>the <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct, the <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration <u><strong><mark>has shown</u></strong> <u><strong>little aptitude for</mark> dealing with the crisis in <mark>Ukraine</u></strong></mark>, imposing sanctions that have not prompted Putin to quit Crimea or stop supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, and spouting rhetoric that has only hardened Putin’s determination to not back down.</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,542
13
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,116
Status quo solves internet laundering
Disraeli 8
Benjamin Disraeli 8, “Internet Gambling Law and Regulation in the Digital Age: Theory and Practice in the United States” http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/9781934854006.107
Accusations ignore the fundamental realities of Internet technology. All messages are packet-switched the relevant information is divided into packets, each of which contains the address of the sender and receiver. money transmitted is not only identified but pinpointed This is what a money laundering op- eration must not have The most important step is removing the illegally gained money from the original locale and turning it into negotiable assets No camouflage is possible for such on the Internet because the basic mechanics of the system require identification layering and integration, are the process of complicating the paper trail until the "dirty money" can't be told apart from "clean Records must be kept for business purposes, and for audits shipping a large sum of money and calling it pay- out provides no cover It may be possible to fake such things if the entire operation is in crooked hands but this is also true of a restaurant or a laundromat a brick-and-mortar casino, where unmarked cash can change hands rapidly, offers a more promising venue for money laundering
money transmitted is not only identified but pinpointed This is what a money laundering op- eration must not have No camouflage is possible on the Internet because the mechanics require identification shipping large sum of money and calling it pay- out provides no cover It may be possible to fake such things but this is true of a restaurant a brick-and-mortar casino, where unmarked cash can change hands offers a more promising venue
Accusations of this sort ignore the fundamental realities of Internet technology. All messages over the Internet, whether advertisements or bank wires, are packet-switched. This means that the relevant information is divided into packets, each one of which contains the address of the sender and receiver. It is therefore clear that money transmitted via the Internet is not only identified, but pinpointed at any given time. This is precisely what a money laundering op- eration must not have. The first and most important step in money laundering is placement.86 Place- ment involves removing the illegally gained money from the original locale and turning it into other negotiable assets, such as money orders or traveler's checks. No camouflage is possible for such things on the Internet, because the basic mechanics of the system require identification of where the money is coming from and where it is going. The next two stages, layering and integration, are simply the process of complicating the paper trail until the "dirty money" can't be told apart from "clean."87 While the Internet can and may be used for such things, an Internet casino is surprisingly little help. Records of wagers, bets, results, and payouts must be kept for business purposes, and of course for audits in those jurisdictions where Internet gam- bling is licensed. Simply shipping a large sum of money and calling it pay- out or settling of a gambling debt provides no cover, unless records of the bet or wager, the result, and the amount owed can also be shown. It may be possible to fake such things if the entire operation is in crooked hands—but then again, this is also true of a restaurant or a laundromat. Paradoxically, a brick-and-mortar casino, where unmarked cash can and docs change hands rapidly, offers a more promising venue for money laundering than the online version.
1,871
<h4>Status quo solves internet laundering </h4><p>Benjamin <strong>Disraeli 8</strong>, “Internet Gambling Law and Regulation in the Digital Age: Theory and Practice in the United States” http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/9781934854006.107</p><p><u><strong>Accusations</u></strong> of this sort <u><strong>ignore the fundamental realities of Internet technology. All messages</u></strong> over the Internet, whether advertisements or bank wires, <u><strong>are packet-switched</u></strong>. This means that <u><strong>the relevant information is divided into packets, each</u></strong> one <u><strong>of which contains the address of the sender and receiver.</u></strong> It is therefore clear that <u><strong><mark>money transmitted</u></strong></mark> via the Internet <u><strong><mark>is not only identified</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong> <u><strong>pinpointed</u></strong></mark> at any given time. <u><strong><mark>This is</mark> </u></strong>precisely <u><strong><mark>what a money laundering op- eration must not have</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The</u></strong> first and <u><strong>most important step </u></strong>in money laundering<u><strong> is </u></strong>placement.86 Place- ment involves <u><strong>removing</u></strong> <u><strong>the illegally gained money from the original locale and turning it into</u></strong> other <u><strong>negotiable assets</u></strong>, such as money orders or traveler's checks. <u><strong><mark>No camouflage</mark> <mark>is possible</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>for such</u></strong> things <u><strong><mark>on the Internet</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>because</mark> <mark>the</mark> basic <mark>mechanics</mark> of the system <mark>require identification</u></strong></mark> of where the money is coming from and where it is going. The next two stages, <u><strong>layering and integration, are</u></strong> simply <u><strong>the process of complicating the paper trail until the "dirty money" can't be told apart from "clean</u></strong>."87 While the Internet can and may be used for such things, an Internet casino is surprisingly little help. <u><strong>Records</u></strong> of wagers, bets, results, and payouts <u><strong>must be kept for business purposes, and</u></strong> of course <u><strong>for audits</u></strong> in those jurisdictions where Internet gam- bling is licensed. Simply <u><strong><mark>shipping</mark> a <mark>large sum of money and calling it pay- out</u></strong></mark> or settling of a gambling debt <u><strong><mark>provides no cover</u></strong></mark>, unless records of the bet or wager, the result, and the amount owed can also be shown. <u><strong><mark>It may be possible to fake such things</mark> if the entire operation is in crooked hands</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> then again, <u><strong><mark>this is</mark> also <mark>true of a restaurant</mark> or a laundromat</u></strong>. Paradoxically, <u><strong><mark>a brick-and-mortar casino, where unmarked cash can</u></strong></mark> and docs <u><strong><mark>change hands</mark> rapidly, <mark>offers a more promising venue</mark> for money laundering</u></strong> than the online version.</p>
1NC
Regulations
1NC No Laundering
429,687
7
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,117
No risk of nuke terrorism
Mearsheimer 14
Mearsheimer 14 John Mearsheimer, IR Prof at UChicago, National Interest, January 2, 2014, "America Unhinged", http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show
terrorism is a minor threat another attack of magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future there has not been a single instance over twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil Terrorism was a much bigger problem in the 70s the possibility a group might obtain a nuclear weapon? the chances of that happening are virtually nil No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients use that weapon. Political turmoil could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose weapon, but the U S already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might try to build their own bomb that scenario is extremely unlikely as well there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target Nuclear terrorism is not a serious threat
terrorism is a minor threat an attack of magnitude is highly unlikely there has not been a single instance of a bomb on American soil the possibility a group obtain a nuclear weapon are virtually nil. No state is going to supply because it would have no control over use turmoil could allow a loose weapon, but the U S has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. to build is extremely unlikely nificant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building and delivering every country has a profound interest in making sure no t group acquires a nuclear weapon Nuc terror is not a serious threat
Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled. What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.
2,039
<h4><strong>No risk of nuke terrorism</h4><p>Mearsheimer 14</p><p></strong>John Mearsheimer, IR Prof at UChicago, National Interest, January 2, 2014, "America Unhinged", http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show</p><p>Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a <u><mark>terrorism</u></mark> problem. But it <u><strong><mark>is a minor threat</u></strong></mark>. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and <u><mark>an</mark>other <mark>attack of</u></mark> that <u><mark>magnitude</u> <u><strong>is highly unlikely</mark> in the foreseeable future</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><mark>there has not been a single instance</mark> over</u> the past <u>twelve years <mark>of a</mark> terrorist organization exploding a primitive <mark>bomb on American soil</u></mark>, much less striking a major blow. <u>Terrorism</u>—most of it arising from domestic groups—<u>was a much bigger problem in</u> the United States during <u>the</u> 19<u>70s</u> than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.</p><p>What about <u><mark>the possibility</u></mark> that <u><mark>a</u></mark> terrorist <u><mark>group </mark>might <mark>obtain a nuclear weapon</mark>?</u> Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but <u><strong>the chances of that happening <mark>are virtually nil</u></strong>. <u>No </mark>nuclear-armed <mark>state</mark> <mark>is going to supply</mark> terrorists with a</u> nuclear <u>weapon <mark>because it would have no control over</mark> how the recipients</u> might <u><mark>use</mark> that weapon. Political <mark>turmoil</u></mark> in a nuclear-armed state <u><mark>could</mark> in theory <mark>allow</mark> terrorists to grab <mark>a loose</u></mark> nuclear <u><mark>weapon, but the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong>already <mark>has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.</p><p></strong></mark>Terrorists might</u> also <u>try <mark>to</u></mark> acquire fissile material and <u><mark>build</mark> their own bomb</u>. But <u><strong>that scenario <mark>is</mark> <mark>extremely unlikely</mark> as well</u></strong>: <u>there are</u> <u><strong>sig<mark>nificant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building</mark> a bomb <mark>and</mark> then <mark>delivering</mark> it</u></strong>. More generally, virtually <u><strong><mark>every country has a profound interest in making sure no t</mark>errorist <mark>group acquires a nuclear weapon</strong></mark>, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target</u> of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. <u><strong><mark>Nuc</mark>lear <mark>terror</mark>ism</u></strong>, in short, <u><strong><mark>is not a serious threat</u></strong></mark>. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.</p>
1NC
Regulations
1NC No Terror Impact
21,456
411
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,118
Triggers U.S.-Russia nuclear war and extinction
Starr 14
Steven Starr 14, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 8/22/14, ““The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA): A Direct Path to Nuclear War with Russia,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russian-aggression-prevention-act-rapa-a-direct-path-to-nuclear-war-with-russia/5397171
The R A P A will set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war since neither the US nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine RAPA, “Provides RAPA would bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO civil war in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war deployment of US/NATO forces in Ukraine would make it virtually inevitable they would come into fight with Ukraine against Russia RAPA demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act Not likely in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea” amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory RAPA stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea, Should NATO intervene Russian military action against any NATO member would trigger the alliance’s Chapter 5 mutual defense clause committing it to war with Russia major Ukrainian attack upon Crimea would make war with Russia inevitable Ukraine appears to be preparing for such an assault A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include preemptive nuclear first-strikes both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons Peer-reviewed scientific studies predict the environmental consequences of a war fought with only a fraction of US and/or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would wipe out the human race even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike would create catastrophic changes in global weather Nuclear war is suicide for humans no awareness of the existential danger posed by nuclear war is embodied by The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, which will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia
R A P A will set the US towards military conflict with Russia likely to quickly escalate into nuclear war neither would admit defeat deployment of US forces in Ukraine would make it inevitable they would fight Russia Russian action against any NATO member would trigger mutual defense committing it to war with Russia Ukrainian attack would make war inevitable. Ukraine appears preparing for an assault Peer-reviewed studies predict war with a fraction of Russian nuc s would wipe out the human race Nuclear war is suicide for humans existential danger is embodied by R A P A
The Russian Aggression Prevention Act”, introduced to Congress by U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), will set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine. Any US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war, since neither the US nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both have many thousands of nuclear weapons ready for instant use, and both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine that tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of the enemy. RAPA provides de facto NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova via RAPA The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, or RAPA, “Provides major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services.” Major non-NATO ally status would for practical purposes give NATO membership to these nations, as it would allow the US to move large amounts of military equipment and forces to them without the need for approval of other NATO member states. Thus RAPA would effectively bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO. Germans rightly fear placing US/NATO troops and US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Ukraine, given the profound and long-standing Russian objections against the expansion of NATO (especially to Ukraine and Georgia) along with deployment of European US/NATO BMD. Germany is acutely aware of the distinct possibility that the civil war raging in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war. Under such circumstances, deployment of US/NATO forces in Ukraine would make it virtually inevitable they would come into fight with Ukraine against Russia. RAPA would accelerate the “implementation of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe-based missile defense . . . by no later than the end of calendar year 2016.” In 2012, Russia’s highest ranking military officer stated that Russia might consider a pre-emptive strike against such BMD deployments “when the situation gets harder.” RAPA “Directs DOD [US Department of Defense] to assess the capabilities and needs of the Ukrainian armed forces” and “Authorizes the President, upon completion of such assessment, to provide specified military assistance to Ukraine.” RAPA would have the US quickly supply Ukraine with$100 million worth of weapons and equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, crew weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. RAPA requires the Obama administration to “use all appropriate elements of United States national power…to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and economic integrity of Ukraine and other sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia from Russian aggression.” This includes “substantially increasing United States and NATO support for the armed forces of the Republics of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia,” and “substantially increasing the complement of forward-based NATO forces in those states.” Consequently, RAPA would produce significant buildups of US/NATO forces into Poland and the Baltic States, accelerate the construction of US BMD systems in Eastern Europe, and authorize substantial U.S. intelligence and military aid for Ukrainian military forces that continue to lay siege to the largest cities in Eastern Ukraine. If RAPA did not result in the deployment of US forces to Ukraine, it would certainly position them for rapid deployment there, in the event that the Ukrainian civil war escalates into a Ukrainian-Russian conflict. RAPA intensifies support for ethnic cleansing in Eastern Ukraine In Russia, Putin now is under intense domestic political pressure to send Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the attacks by the Ukrainian military on the cities there, which were once part of the Soviet Union.These attacks have created an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. On August 5, 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 740,000 Eastern Ukrainians had fled to Russia. They go there because Russia is close, and because most of the refugees are ethnic Russians, a fact that explains why the Russophobes in Kiev have been quite willing to indiscriminately bombard their cities. What is taking place in Eastern Ukraine amounts to “ethnic cleansing,” the forced removal of ethnic Russians from Eastern Ukraine. This is a process that is fully supported by the US; RAPA would greatly enhance this support. Ukrainian military forces have surrounded Donetsk – a city of almost one million people – and have for weeks conducted daily attacks against it using inaccurate multiple-launch rockets, heavy artillery fire, ballistic missiles carrying warheads with up to 1000 pounds of high explosive, and aerial bombardments. Water supplies, power plants, train stations, airports, bridges, highways, and schools have all been targeted, along with the general population. In Lugansk, a city of more than 440,000 people, a humanitarian crisis has been declared by its mayor, because the siege of the city has left it with little medicine, no fuel,intermittent power, and no water since August 3 (three weeks at the time of this writing). After the separatists of Eastern Ukraine demanded autonomy from Kiev, and then reunion with Russia, the government in Kiev branded them as “terrorists”, and sent its military forces against them in what they euphemistically call an “anti-terrorist operation.” Framing the conflict this way makes it politically acceptable to refuse to negotiate with the separatists, and easier to justify in the US and Europe, which have grown accustomed to “the War on Terrorism.” However, the thousands of Ukrainians being killed and hundreds of thousands of being driven from their homes are just ordinary people, trying to live ordinary lives. The New York Times reports the Ukrainian military strategy has been to bombard separatist-held cities and then send paramilitary forces to carry out “chaotic, violent assaults” against them. Many of the Ukrainian paramilitary forces were recruited from ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi political parties; the Azov battalion flies the “Wolfs Hook” flag of Hitler’s SS divisions. Considering that more than 20 million Russians died fighting the Nazis during World War II, the presence of openly Nazi militias attacking ethnic Russians in Ukraine creates extreme anger in Russia. RAPA supports plans in Kiev for an attack on Crimea The Russian Aggression Prevention Act demands that Russia “withdraw from the eastern border of Ukraine,” which is by definition, the Russian border. In other words, RAPA provocatively demands that Russia remove its own military forces away from its own borders, while Ukrainian military forces are meanwhile massed on the other side, attacking predominantly Russian cities. RAPA also demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act.” Not likely to happen, given that (1) Crimea was part of the Russian empire from 1783 until 1954, (2) withdrawal from Crimea would require Russia to abandon its only warm water port at Sevastopol, where Russian forces have been based, by internationally recognized treaty, since 1997, and (3) more than three-quarters of all Crimeans voted “yes” to reunify with Russia, a vote which Russia accepted by its subsequent annexation of Crimea. Thus, in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea” amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory. Putin has just taken the entire Russian Duma (the Russian House of Representatives) to Crimea, to address them there and strongly make the point that there will be no withdrawal from Crimea. RAPA, however, stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea, and creates sanctions and legal penalties for anyone who does. RAPA therefore provides both military and political support for Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s stated goat that Ukraine will retake Crimea. This goal was recently echoed by the Ukrainian defense minister, who was applauded by the Ukrainian Parliament when he told them that the Ukrainian army will “have a victory parade in Sevastopol“. These statements are taken seriously in Moscow, where they are viewed as a promise to attack Russia. Thus, Putin’s advisers are telling him he must fight today in Eastern Ukraine, or tomorrow in Crimea. Any Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine would certainly be described in the West as Russian aggression in pursuit of empire, which would trigger deafening demands that US/NATO forces act to support Ukraine. Should NATO intervene, subsequent Russian military action against any NATO member would trigger the alliance’s Chapter 5 mutual defense clause, committing it to war with Russia. Any major Ukrainian attack upon Crimea would make war with Russia inevitable. Ukraine appears to be preparing for such an assault by drafting all men of ages 18 to 60 years, in a forced mobilization of its armed forces, which also includes calling up its active reserves of one million men, and bringing more than 1000 battle tanksout of storage. Putin is being told by his close advisers that Ukraine will have an army of half a million men in 2015. RAPA would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to train and arm the rapidly expanding Ukrainian armed forces, and position US/NATO forces for rapid intervention on the side of Ukraine in the event of a Ukrainian-Russian war. Thus, the many political and military provisions of RAPA would certainly act to fully encourage Ukraine to carry out its stated policy to retake Crimea. The Republic of Georgia attacked Russian forces in 2008 with far fewer US promises of aid. Of course, RAPA would also arm Georgia, too. RAPA moves the US towards nuclear war with Russia A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert, with both sides anticipating a nuclear first-strike from the other. Both the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include the use of preemptive nuclear first-strikes; both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use. The US has 180 B61 nuclear bombs deployed on six military bases of five other NATO states, which would be released to these NATO members in the event of a US/NATO-Russian war. Russia also has at least 1300 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian war doctrine specifies their use against overwhelming conventional (NATO) forces. Any use of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, by either side, would likely trigger an equal or greater response from the other. During the first Cold War, the US studiously avoided any direct military confrontation with Russia, because it was widely thought that such a war would inevitably escalate to become a nuclear war – which would utterly destroy both nations. However, there seems to be little thought or discussion of this in the US today, despite the fact that both the US and Russia appear to be preparing for such a war. In May, the increasing tensions in Ukraine led both nations to almost simultaneously conduct large nuclear war games. Long-range Russian nuclear bombers tested US air defenses16 times in a ten day period (July 29 – August 7). US and Russian leaders are either unaware or choose to ignore the fact that such “games” and “tests” are a dress rehearsal for human extinction. Peer-reviewed scientific studies predict the environmental consequences of a war fought with only a fraction of US and/or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would likely wipe out the human race. Scientists predict that even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of Russia’s nuclear forces before they could be launched, would create catastrophic changes in global weather that would eliminate growing seasons for years. Most humans and large animals would starve to death. Nuclear war is suicide for humans, but our leaders still have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. There seems to be absolutely no awareness, either in our Federal government or in the American public, of the existential danger posed by nuclear war. Such ignorance is embodied by The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, which if enacted will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia.
12,427
<h4>Triggers U.S.-Russia nuclear war and extinction </h4><p>Steven <strong>Starr 14</strong>, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 8/22/14, ““The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA): A Direct Path to Nuclear War with Russia,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-russian-aggression-prevention-act-rapa-a-direct-path-to-nuclear-war-with-russia/5397171</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>R</u></strong></mark>ussian <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ggression <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>revention <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct”, introduced to Congress by U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>set the US</mark> on a path <mark>towards</mark> direct <mark>military conflict with Russia</u></strong></mark> in Ukraine. Any <u><strong>US-Russian war is <mark>likely to</u></strong> <u><strong>quickly escalate into</mark> a <mark>nuclear war</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>since <mark>neither</mark> the US nor Russia <mark>would</mark> be willing to <mark>admit defeat</mark>,</u></strong> both have many thousands of nuclear weapons ready for instant use, and <u><strong>both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine</u></strong> that tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of the enemy. RAPA provides de facto NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova via RAPA The Russian Aggression Prevention Act, or <u><strong>RAPA, “Provides</u></strong> major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services.” Major non-NATO ally status would for practical purposes give NATO membership to these nations, as it would allow the US to move large amounts of military equipment and forces to them without the need for approval of other NATO member states. Thus <u><strong>RAPA would</u></strong> effectively <u><strong>bypass long-standing German opposition to the US request to make Ukraine and Georgia part of NATO</u></strong>. Germans rightly fear placing US/NATO troops and US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Ukraine, given the profound and long-standing Russian objections against the expansion of NATO (especially to Ukraine and Georgia) along with deployment of European US/NATO BMD. Germany is acutely aware of the distinct possibility that the <u><strong>civil war</u></strong> raging <u><strong>in Ukraine could evolve into a Ukrainian-Russian war</u></strong>. Under such circumstances, <u><strong><mark>deployment of US</mark>/NATO <mark>forces in Ukraine would make it</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>virtually <mark>inevitable they would</mark> come into <mark>fight</mark> with Ukraine against <mark>Russia</u></strong></mark>. RAPA would accelerate the “implementation of phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe-based missile defense . . . by no later than the end of calendar year 2016.” In 2012, Russia’s highest ranking military officer stated that Russia might consider a pre-emptive strike against such BMD deployments “when the situation gets harder.” RAPA “Directs DOD [US Department of Defense] to assess the capabilities and needs of the Ukrainian armed forces” and “Authorizes the President, upon completion of such assessment, to provide specified military assistance to Ukraine.” RAPA would have the US quickly supply Ukraine with$100 million worth of weapons and equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, crew weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns, ammunition, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. RAPA requires the Obama administration to “use all appropriate elements of United States national power…to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and economic integrity of Ukraine and other sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia from Russian aggression.” This includes “substantially increasing United States and NATO support for the armed forces of the Republics of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia,” and “substantially increasing the complement of forward-based NATO forces in those states.” Consequently, RAPA would produce significant buildups of US/NATO forces into Poland and the Baltic States, accelerate the construction of US BMD systems in Eastern Europe, and authorize substantial U.S. intelligence and military aid for Ukrainian military forces that continue to lay siege to the largest cities in Eastern Ukraine. If RAPA did not result in the deployment of US forces to Ukraine, it would certainly position them for rapid deployment there, in the event that the Ukrainian civil war escalates into a Ukrainian-Russian conflict. RAPA intensifies support for ethnic cleansing in Eastern Ukraine In Russia, Putin now is under intense domestic political pressure to send Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the attacks by the Ukrainian military on the cities there, which were once part of the Soviet Union.These attacks have created an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. On August 5, 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 740,000 Eastern Ukrainians had fled to Russia. They go there because Russia is close, and because most of the refugees are ethnic Russians, a fact that explains why the Russophobes in Kiev have been quite willing to indiscriminately bombard their cities. What is taking place in Eastern Ukraine amounts to “ethnic cleansing,” the forced removal of ethnic Russians from Eastern Ukraine. This is a process that is fully supported by the US; RAPA would greatly enhance this support. Ukrainian military forces have surrounded Donetsk – a city of almost one million people – and have for weeks conducted daily attacks against it using inaccurate multiple-launch rockets, heavy artillery fire, ballistic missiles carrying warheads with up to 1000 pounds of high explosive, and aerial bombardments. Water supplies, power plants, train stations, airports, bridges, highways, and schools have all been targeted, along with the general population. In Lugansk, a city of more than 440,000 people, a humanitarian crisis has been declared by its mayor, because the siege of the city has left it with little medicine, no fuel,intermittent power, and no water since August 3 (three weeks at the time of this writing). After the separatists of Eastern Ukraine demanded autonomy from Kiev, and then reunion with Russia, the government in Kiev branded them as “terrorists”, and sent its military forces against them in what they euphemistically call an “anti-terrorist operation.” Framing the conflict this way makes it politically acceptable to refuse to negotiate with the separatists, and easier to justify in the US and Europe, which have grown accustomed to “the War on Terrorism.” However, the thousands of Ukrainians being killed and hundreds of thousands of being driven from their homes are just ordinary people, trying to live ordinary lives. The New York Times reports the Ukrainian military strategy has been to bombard separatist-held cities and then send paramilitary forces to carry out “chaotic, violent assaults” against them. Many of the Ukrainian paramilitary forces were recruited from ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi political parties; the Azov battalion flies the “Wolfs Hook” flag of Hitler’s SS divisions. Considering that more than 20 million Russians died fighting the Nazis during World War II, the presence of openly Nazi militias attacking ethnic Russians in Ukraine creates extreme anger in Russia. RAPA supports plans in Kiev for an attack on Crimea The Russian Aggression Prevention Act demands that Russia “withdraw from the eastern border of Ukraine,” which is by definition, the Russian border. In other words, RAPA provocatively demands that Russia remove its own military forces away from its own borders, while Ukrainian military forces are meanwhile massed on the other side, attacking predominantly Russian cities. <u><strong>RAPA</u></strong> also <u><strong>demands that “Russian forces must have withdrawn from Crimea within seven days of the enactment of the Act</u></strong>.” <u><strong>Not likely</u></strong> to happen, given that (1) Crimea was part of the Russian empire from 1783 until 1954, (2) withdrawal from Crimea would require Russia to abandon its only warm water port at Sevastopol, where Russian forces have been based, by internationally recognized treaty, since 1997, and (3) more than three-quarters of all Crimeans voted “yes” to reunify with Russia, a vote which Russia accepted by its subsequent annexation of Crimea. Thus, <u><strong>in the eyes of Russia, the requirement to “withdraw from Crimea”</u></strong> <u><strong>amounts to a US demand that Russia surrender Russian territory</u></strong>. Putin has just taken the entire Russian Duma (the Russian House of Representatives) to Crimea, to address them there and strongly make the point that there will be no withdrawal from Crimea. <u><strong>RAPA</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>stipulates that the US does not recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea,</u></strong> and creates sanctions and legal penalties for anyone who does. RAPA therefore provides both military and political support for Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s stated goat that Ukraine will retake Crimea. This goal was recently echoed by the Ukrainian defense minister, who was applauded by the Ukrainian Parliament when he told them that the Ukrainian army will “have a victory parade in Sevastopol“. These statements are taken seriously in Moscow, where they are viewed as a promise to attack Russia. Thus, Putin’s advisers are telling him he must fight today in Eastern Ukraine, or tomorrow in Crimea. Any Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine would certainly be described in the West as Russian aggression in pursuit of empire, which would trigger deafening demands that US/NATO forces act to support Ukraine. <u><strong>Should NATO intervene</u></strong>, subsequent <u><strong><mark>Russian</mark> military <mark>action against any NATO member would</u></strong> <u><strong>trigger</mark> the alliance’s Chapter 5 <mark>mutual defense</mark> clause</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>committing it to war with Russia</u></strong></mark>. Any <u><strong>major <mark>Ukrainian attack</mark> upon Crimea <mark>would make war</mark> with Russia <mark>inevitable</u></strong>. <u><strong>Ukraine appears</mark> to be</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>preparing for</mark> such <mark>an assault</u></strong></mark> by drafting all men of ages 18 to 60 years, in a forced mobilization of its armed forces, which also includes calling up its active reserves of one million men, and bringing more than 1000 battle tanksout of storage. Putin is being told by his close advisers that Ukraine will have an army of half a million men in 2015. RAPA would provide hundreds of millions of dollars to train and arm the rapidly expanding Ukrainian armed forces, and position US/NATO forces for rapid intervention on the side of Ukraine in the event of a Ukrainian-Russian war. Thus, the many political and military provisions of RAPA would certainly act to fully encourage Ukraine to carry out its stated policy to retake Crimea. The Republic of Georgia attacked Russian forces in 2008 with far fewer US promises of aid. Of course, RAPA would also arm Georgia, too. RAPA moves the US towards nuclear war with Russia <u><strong>A US/NATO-Russian war would instantly put US and Russian nuclear forces at peak alert</u></strong>, with both sides anticipating a nuclear first-strike from the other. Both <u><strong>the US and Russia have changed their nuclear war-fighting plans to include</u></strong> the use of <u><strong>preemptive nuclear first-strikes</u></strong>; <u><strong>both nations have “tactical” nuclear weapons</u></strong> designed for battlefield use. The US has 180 B61 nuclear bombs deployed on six military bases of five other NATO states, which would be released to these NATO members in the event of a US/NATO-Russian war. Russia also has at least 1300 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russian war doctrine specifies their use against overwhelming conventional (NATO) forces. Any use of “tactical” or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, by either side, would likely trigger an equal or greater response from the other. During the first Cold War, the US studiously avoided any direct military confrontation with Russia, because it was widely thought that such a war would inevitably escalate to become a nuclear war – which would utterly destroy both nations. However, there seems to be little thought or discussion of this in the US today, despite the fact that both the US and Russia appear to be preparing for such a war. In May, the increasing tensions in Ukraine led both nations to almost simultaneously conduct large nuclear war games. Long-range Russian nuclear bombers tested US air defenses16 times in a ten day period (July 29 – August 7). US and Russian leaders are either unaware or choose to ignore the fact that such “games” and “tests” are a dress rehearsal for human extinction. <u><strong><mark>Peer-reviewed</mark> scientific <mark>studies</u></strong> <u><strong>predict</mark> the environmental consequences of a <mark>war</mark> fought <mark>with</mark> only <mark>a fraction of</mark> US and/or <mark>Russian</mark> strategic <mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s would</u></strong></mark> likely <u><strong><mark>wipe out the human race</u></strong></mark>. Scientists predict that <u><strong>even a “successful” US nuclear first-strike</u></strong>, which destroyed 100% of Russia’s nuclear forces before they could be launched, <u><strong>would create catastrophic changes in global weather</u></strong> that would eliminate growing seasons for years. Most humans and large animals would starve to death. <u><strong><mark>Nuclear war is suicide for humans</u></strong></mark>, but our leaders still have their fingers on the nuclear triggers. There seems to be absolutely <u><strong>no awareness</u></strong>, either in our Federal government or in the American public, <u><strong>of the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>existential danger</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>posed by nuclear war</u></strong>. Such ignorance <u><strong><mark>is embodied by</mark> The <mark>R</mark>ussian <mark>A</mark>ggression <mark>P</mark>revention <mark>A</mark>ct, which</u></strong> if enacted <u><strong>will put us on a direct course for nuclear war with Russia</u></strong>.</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,544
16
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,119
B. Dumping
Codd 07
Codd 07 Kathryn Codd is a Litigation Attorney in Arlington, VA with 6 years of experience, William and Mary Law Review, 2007, vol. 27, iss. 9, “Betting on the Wrong Horse: The Detrimental Effect of Noncompliance in the Internet Gambling Dispute on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) “, http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=wmlr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dantigua%2Bwto%2Bgambling%2Bdispute%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%252C9%26as_ylo%3D2006%26as_yhi%3D#search=%22antigua%20wto%20gambling%20dispute%22
A number of cases are still pending in which the U S has failed to bring itself into compliance with a WTO ruling. These cases include U.S.-Section 110 Section 211 and Internet gambling each of these cases requires a legislative fix to achieve compliance The Byrd Amendment dispute is one of the most often-cited examples of U.S. reluctance to comply with a DSB recommendation The complainants asserted that the Amendment violated U.S. obligations under GATT and other WTO agreements, and the Appellate Body report, largely agreed The U S failed to bring the Act into conformity with its obligations within the reasonable period of time set by the DSB and retaliatory sanctions were authorized. The U S imposed antidumping measures on Japanese imports of certain hot-rolled steel products Japan argued that such measures violated U.S. obligations under GATT the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the U.S. measure was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and ordered that the U S bring its measures into conformity the U S was granted a number of extensions to the reasonable period of time in which to conform to DSB recommendations Japan also agreed not to resort to the suspension of concessions or other obligations in exchange for agreement by the U S the only offering made by the U S was that legislation had been introduced that would bring the United States into conformity with recommendations The case is still pending the EC claimed that Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act1 prohibited Cuban nationals from registering or renewing any trademarks that were confiscated as part of the Cuban Revolution this measure violated TRIPS The Appellate Body eventually held that certain parts of Section 211 were inconsistent with TRIPS and ordered the United States to bring the measure into conformity with the agreement." the U S expressed its intention to conform with the DSB's recommendations but is currently still "working in 1999 the EC alleged violations of TRIPS The EC alleged that amended sections of the Act, which exempted certain establishments below a particular size and equipment level from paying royalties to copyright holders when music was played were violations of the TRIPS duty to protect copyright The Panel agreed, and it ordered the United States to pay royalties to copyright holders and bring the measure into conformity with TRIPS Congress has yet to pass legislation to amend the noncompliant sections of the Act
cases are still pending in which the U St failed to bring itself into compliance The Byrd dispute is one of the most cited complainants asserted the Amendment violated U.S. obligations under GATT The U S failed to bring the Act into conformity The U S imposed antidumping measures on Japanese imports that violated obligations under GATT The case is still pending Congress has yet to pass legislation to amend the noncompliant sections
D. Specific Issues with U.S. Compliance A number of cases are still pending in which the United States has failed to bring itself into compliance with a WTO ruling. These cases include U.S.-Section 110(5)(b) Copyright Act; U.S.-Section 211 Appropriation Act; U.S.-Hot-Rolled Steel; U.S.-Offset Act (Byrd Amendment); and, of course, the instant case regarding Internet gambling.96 Notably, each of these cases requires a legislative fix to achieve compliance. 1. U.S.-Byrd Amendment Dispute The Byrd Amendment dispute is one of the most often-cited examples of U.S. reluctance to comply with a DSB recommendation. In this dispute, a number of countries initiated a complaint with the DSB with regard to the Byrd Amendment to the U.S. Offset Act;9 the Amendment provided that domestic producers who supported petitions to investigate antidumping or countervailing duty violations could receive part of the duties imposed as a result of the investigations.9" The complainants asserted that the Amendment violated U.S. obligations under GATT 1994 and other WTO agreements, and the Appellate Body report, issued in 2003, largely agreed.99 The United States failed to bring the Act into conformity with its obligations within the reasonable period of time set by the DSB, however, and retaliatory sanctions were authorized.' 0 It was not until early 2006 that Congress approved the Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation Act, which may have finally brought the United States into compliance with the recommendations of the DSB in this dispute,10 1 subject to evaluation and acceptance by the WTO. 102 2. U. S.-Hot-Rolled Steel Dispute A similarly contested DSB decision occurred in the hot-rolled steel case. The United States had imposed antidumping measures on Japanese imports of certain hot-rolled steel products.0 3 Japan argued that such measures violated U.S. obligations under GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.' 4 Ultimately, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the U.S. measure was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and ordered that the United States bring its measures into conformity."' 0 With Japan's approval, the United States was granted a number of extensions to the reasonable period of time in which to conform to DSB recommendations, originally from November 23, 2002 until July 31, 2005.106 Japan also agreed not to resort to the suspension of concessions or other obligations in exchange for agreement by the United States to continue in its efforts to achieve compliance.0 7 In its most recent status report, however, the only offering made by the United States was that legislation had been introduced in May of 2005 that would bring the United States into conformity with DSB recommendations, and that the administration would continue to work with Congress to pass the legislation. 1 8 The case is still pending, more than five years after its initiation. 3. U.S.-Section 211 Dispute In the U.S.-Section 211 Appropriations Act dispute, the European Communities (EC) claimed that Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act1"9 prohibited Cuban nationals from registering or renewing any trademarks that were confiscated as part of the Cuban Revolution.110 The EC asserted that this measure violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which also falls under the purview of the WTO dispute settlement framework.' The Appellate Body eventually held that certain parts of Section 211 were inconsistent with TRIPS and ordered the United States to bring the measure into conformity with the agreement." 2 Much like the Hot-Rolled Steel dispute, the United States expressed its intention to conform with the DSB's recommendations but is currently still "working with ... Congress" to pass the appropriate legislation. 3 4. U.S.-Section 110(5)(b) Dispute In a final example of U.S. noncompliance, in 1999 the EC alleged violations of the TRIPS with regard to § 110(5)(b) of the United States Copyright Act." 4 The EC alleged that amended sections of the Act, which exempted certain establishments below a particular size and equipment level from paying royalties to copyright holders when music was played,1'5 were violations of the TRIPS duty to protect copyright.' 6 The Panel agreed, and it ordered the United States to pay royalties to copyright holders and bring the measure into conformity with TRIPS."' The United States made the royalty payments, but, as in the above three disputes, Congress has yet to pass legislation to amend the noncompliant sections of the Act.118
4,564
<h4><strong>B. Dumping</h4><p>Codd 07</p><p></strong>Kathryn Codd is a Litigation Attorney in Arlington, VA with 6 years of experience, William and Mary Law Review, 2007, vol. 27, iss. 9, “Betting on the Wrong Horse: The Detrimental Effect of Noncompliance in the Internet Gambling Dispute on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) “, http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=wmlr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dantigua%2Bwto%2Bgambling%2Bdispute%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%252C9%26as_ylo%3D2006%26as_yhi%3D#search=%22antigua%20wto%20gambling%20dispute%22</p><p>D. Specific Issues with U.S. Compliance <u><strong>A number of <mark>cases are still pending in which the U</u></strong></mark>nited<u><strong> <mark>S</u></strong>t</mark>ates <u><strong>has <mark>failed to bring itself into compliance </mark>with a WTO ruling. These cases include U.S.-Section 110</u></strong>(5)(b) Copyright Act; U.S.-<u><strong>Section 211</u></strong> Appropriation Act; U.S.-Hot-Rolled Steel; U.S.-Offset Act (Byrd Amendment); <u><strong>and</u></strong>, of course, the instant case regarding <u><strong>Internet gambling</u></strong>.96 Notably, <u><strong>each of these cases requires a legislative fix to achieve compliance</u></strong>. 1. U.S.-Byrd Amendment Dispute <u><strong><mark>The Byrd </mark>Amendment <mark>dispute is one of the most</mark> often-<mark>cited </mark>examples of U.S. reluctance to comply with a DSB recommendation</u></strong>. In this dispute, a number of countries initiated a complaint with the DSB with regard to the Byrd Amendment to the U.S. Offset Act;9 the Amendment provided that domestic producers who supported petitions to investigate antidumping or countervailing duty violations could receive part of the duties imposed as a result of the investigations.9" <u><strong>The <mark>complainants asserted </mark>that <mark>the Amendment violated U.S. obligations under GATT</u></strong></mark> 1994 <u><strong>and other WTO agreements, and the Appellate Body report,</u></strong> issued in 2003, <u><strong>largely agreed</u></strong>.99 <u><strong><mark>The U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>failed to bring the Act into conformity </mark>with its obligations within the reasonable period of time set by the DSB</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>and retaliatory sanctions were authorized.</u></strong>' 0 It was not until early 2006 that Congress approved the Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation Act, which may have finally brought the United States into compliance with the recommendations of the DSB in this dispute,10 1 subject to evaluation and acceptance by the WTO. 102 2. U. S.-Hot-Rolled Steel Dispute A similarly contested DSB decision occurred in the hot-rolled steel case. <u><strong><mark>The U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates had <u><strong><mark>imposed antidumping measures on Japanese imports </mark>of certain hot-rolled steel products</u></strong>.0 3 <u><strong>Japan argued <mark>that</mark> such measures <mark>violated</mark> U.S. <mark>obligations under GATT</u></strong> </mark>1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.' 4 Ultimately, <u><strong>the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the U.S. measure was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and ordered that the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>bring its measures into conformity</u></strong>."' 0 With Japan's approval, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>was granted a number of extensions to the reasonable period of time in which to conform to DSB recommendations</u></strong>, originally from November 23, 2002 until July 31, 2005.106 <u><strong>Japan also agreed not to resort to the suspension of concessions or other obligations in exchange for agreement by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates to continue in its efforts to achieve compliance.0 7 In its most recent status report, however, <u><strong>the only offering made by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>was that legislation had been introduced</u></strong> in May of 2005 <u><strong>that would bring the United States into conformity with</u></strong> DSB <u><strong>recommendations</u></strong>, and that the administration would continue to work with Congress to pass the legislation. 1 8 <u><strong><mark>The case is still pending</u></strong></mark>, more than five years after its initiation. 3. U.S.-Section 211 Dispute In the U.S.-Section 211 Appropriations Act dispute, <u><strong>the</u></strong> European Communities (<u><strong>EC</u></strong>) <u><strong>claimed that</u></strong> <u><strong>Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act1</u></strong>"9 <u><strong>prohibited Cuban nationals from registering or renewing any trademarks that were confiscated as part of the Cuban Revolution</u></strong>.110 The EC asserted that <u><strong>this measure violated</u></strong> the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (<u><strong>TRIPS</u></strong>) agreement, which also falls under the purview of the WTO dispute settlement framework.' <u><strong>The Appellate Body eventually held that certain parts of Section 211 were inconsistent with TRIPS and ordered the United States to bring the measure into conformity with the agreement."</u></strong> 2 Much like the Hot-Rolled Steel dispute, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>expressed its intention to conform with the DSB's recommendations but is currently still "working </u></strong>with ... Congress" to pass the appropriate legislation. 3 4. U.S.-Section 110(5)(b) Dispute In a final example of U.S. noncompliance, <u><strong>in 1999 the EC alleged violations of</u></strong> the <u><strong>TRIPS</u></strong> with regard to § 110(5)(b) of the United States Copyright Act." 4 <u><strong>The EC alleged that amended sections of the Act, which exempted certain establishments below a particular size and equipment level from paying royalties to copyright holders when music was played</u></strong>,1'5 <u><strong>were violations of the TRIPS duty to protect copyright</u></strong>.' 6 <u><strong>The Panel agreed, and it ordered the United States to pay royalties to copyright holders and bring the measure into conformity with TRIPS</u></strong>."' The United States made the royalty payments, but, as in the above three disputes, <u><strong><mark>Congress has yet to pass legislation to amend the noncompliant sections</mark> of the</u></strong> <u><strong>Act</u></strong>.118</p>
1NR
WTO
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,688
3
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,120
Non-compliance inev
Ikenson 13
Daniel J. Ikenson 13, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house
U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 followed by China with 30 and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other governmen policies No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final DSB ruling the U S remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues
U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and violate WTO rules more than any other governmen the U S remains out of compliance in subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling requirements the Byrd Amendment antidumping measures, and several other issues U.S. trade partners have retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues
U.S. policies have been the subject of more World Trade Organization disputes (119, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies. No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, the United States remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues, some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. In some of these cases, U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, yet the non-compliance continues as though the United States considers itself above the rules.
995
<h4>Non-compliance inev </h4><p>Daniel J. <strong>Ikenson 13</strong>, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house</p><p><u><strong><mark>U.S. policies have been the subject of more</u></strong> <u><strong>W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>T</u></strong></mark>rade <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganization <u><strong><mark>disputes</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong><mark>119</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>followed by </u></strong>the EU with 73, then <u><strong>China with 30</u></strong>) <u><strong><mark>and</mark> have been found to <mark>violate WTO rules more</mark> frequently <mark>than any other governmen</u></strong></mark>t’s <u><strong>policies</u></strong>. <u><strong>No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final</u></strong> WTO Dispute Settlement Body (<u><strong>DSB</u></strong>) <u><strong>ruling</u></strong> — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>remains out of compliance in</mark> cases involving U.S. <mark>subsidies to cotton farmers</u></strong></mark>, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services,<u><strong> <mark>country of origin labeling requirements </mark>on meat products, <mark>the</mark> so-called <mark>Byrd Amendment</mark>, a variety of <mark>antidumping measures, and several other issues</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. </u></strong>In some of these cases,<u><strong> <mark>U.S. trade partners have</mark> either <mark>retaliated, or been authorized to</mark> <mark>retaliate</u></strong></mark>, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, <u><strong><mark>yet</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>non-compliance continues</u></strong></mark> as though the United States considers itself above the rules.</p>
1NC
Trade
1NC Alt Causes
97,365
55
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,121
C. Non-compliance Inevitable
Ikenson 13
Daniel J. Ikenson 13, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house
U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final DSB ruling the U S remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. , U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues
U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and violate WTO rules more than any other government the U S remains out of compliance in subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling the Byrd Amendment antidumping measures, and several other issues U.S. trade partners have retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues
Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction. U.S. policies have been the subject of more World Trade Organization disputes (119, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies. No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, the United States remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues, some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. In some of these cases, U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, yet the non-compliance continues as though the United States considers itself above the rules.
1,425
<h4>C. Non-compliance Inevitable</h4><p>Daniel J. <strong>Ikenson 13</strong>, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house</p><p>Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction.</p><p><u><strong><mark>U.S. policies have been the subject of more</u></strong> <u><strong>W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>T</u></strong></mark>rade <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganization <u><strong><mark>disputes</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong><mark>119</u></strong></mark>, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) <u><strong><mark>and</mark> have been found to <mark>violate WTO rules more</mark> frequently <mark>than any other government</mark>’s policies</u></strong>. <u><strong>No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final</u></strong> WTO Dispute Settlement Body (<u><strong>DSB</u></strong>) <u><strong>ruling</u></strong> — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>remains out of compliance in</mark> cases involving U.S. <mark>subsidies to cotton farmers</u></strong></mark>, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services,<u><strong> <mark>country of origin labeling </mark>requirements on meat products, <mark>the </mark>so-called <mark>Byrd Amendment</mark>, a variety of <mark>antidumping measures, and several other issues</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. </u></strong>In some of these cases<u><strong>, <mark>U.S. trade partners have</mark> either <mark>retaliated, or been authorized to</mark> <mark>retaliate</u></strong></mark>, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, <u><strong><mark>yet</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>non-compliance continues</u></mark> as though the United States considers itself above the rules.</p></strong>
1NR
WTO
2NC AT: Extinction Different
97,365
55
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
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740,122
Medicalization is the FRAMEWORK in which thanatopolitics may exert violence -- increasing the power of physicians over life gives justification for the creation of bare life and war
null
[makes a causal claim that wars are NOT fought for the existence of the sovereign, which answers THEIR internal link of death control, they are fought based on the biological heirchies medicalized and biologized interps of the world]
[“The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary, http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf] The reverse side is the power to allow death State racism is a recoding of mechanisms through regulation Racism, as biologizing takes shape where the procedures of intervention at the level of the body health, and everyday life, received their color and justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race The use of medical language is important Because certain groups are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power The recoding of problems is made possible through techniques a division between those who must live and those who must die The "biological continuum of the human species" is fragmented The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. human continuum is divided made calculable and orderable, two centuries later to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake Bio-power is able to establish a relation not warlike but biological inferior species disappear The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical but that of the population, biological If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life if a sovereign power wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed
The reverse side is the power to allow death Racism, as biologizing takes shape where intervention "at the level of the body health and justification from concern with protecting purity of blood The use of medical language is important Because groups are conceived of in medical terms society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the abnormal species or race Bio-power is able to establish a relation not warlike but biological The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, but biological genocide is situated at the level of life Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations mobilized for slaughter in the name of life necessity
Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/2002 [“The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary, http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf] The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention "at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race" (VS, 197; WK, 149). 37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76). 38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques. A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The "biological continuum of the human species" is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes, 39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that "the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue' or ‘white' blood and breeding among aristocracies." 40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: "A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races." 41 But it is a more subtle distinction than [End Page 147] that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts. 42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one's enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: "The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I—not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate." The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). "The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population" (VS, 180; WK, 136). "If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism" (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: [End Page 148] Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux—understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136)
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<h4>Medicalization is the FRAMEWORK in which thanatopolitics may exert violence -- increasing the power of physicians over life gives justification for the creation of bare life and war </h4><p><u>[makes a causal claim that wars are NOT fought for the existence of the sovereign, which answers THEIR internal link of death control, they are fought based on the biological heirchies medicalized and biologized interps of the world]</p><p></u>Stuart <strong>Elden</strong>, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/20<strong>02 <u></strong>[“The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary, http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf] </p><p><strong><mark>The reverse side is the power to allow death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>State racism is a recoding of</u></strong> the old <u><strong>mechanisms</u></strong> of blood <u><strong>through</u></strong> the new procedures of <u><strong>regulation</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Racism, as biologizing</u></strong></mark>, as tied to a state, <u><strong><mark>takes shape where</mark> the procedures of <mark>intervention</u></strong> "<u><strong>at the level of the body</u></strong></mark>, conduct, <u><strong><mark>health</mark>, and everyday life, received their color <mark>and</u></strong></mark> their <u><strong><mark>justification</mark> <mark>from</mark> the mythical <mark>concern with protecting</mark> the <mark>purity of</mark> the <mark>blood</mark> and ensuring the triumph of the race</u></strong>" (VS, 197; WK, 149). 37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76). 38 <u><strong><mark>The use of medical language is important</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Because</mark> certain <mark>groups</u></strong></mark> in society <u><strong><mark>are conceived of in medical terms</mark>, <mark>society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from</mark> the insider: <mark>the abnormal</mark> in behavior, <mark>species</mark>, <mark>or race</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power</u></strong> (FDS, 230). <u><strong>The recoding of </u></strong>old <u><strong>problems is made possible through</u></strong> new <u><strong>techniques</u></strong>. A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: <u><strong>a division</u></strong> or incision <u><strong>between those who must live and those who must die</u></strong>. <u><strong>The "biological continuum of the human species" is fragmented</u></strong> by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. <u><strong>The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. </u></strong>In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes, 39 the <u><strong>human continuum is divided</u></strong>, that is, <u><strong>made calculable and orderable, two centuries later</u></strong>. As Anderson has persuasively argued, <u><strong>to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a</u></strong> <u><strong>mistake</u></strong>. He suggests that "the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue' or ‘white' blood and breeding among aristocracies." 40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: "A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races." 41 But it is a more subtle distinction than [End Page 147] that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts. 42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one's enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. <u><strong><mark>Bio-power is able to establish</u></strong></mark>, between my life and the death of the other, <u><strong><mark>a relation</u></strong></mark> that is <u><strong><mark>not warlike</u></strong></mark> or confrontational <u><strong><mark>but biological</u></strong></mark>: "The more <u><strong>inferior species</u></strong> tend to <u><strong>disappear</u></strong>, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I—not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate." The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). "<u><strong><mark>The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty,</mark> juridical</u></strong>; <u><strong><mark>but</mark> that of the population, <mark>biological</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>If <mark>genocide is</mark> truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is <mark>situated</mark> and exercised <mark>at the level of life</u></strong></mark>, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population" (VS, 180; WK, 136). "If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And <u><strong>if</u></strong>, inversely, <u><strong>a</u></strong> <u><strong>sovereign power</u></strong>, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, <u><strong>wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism</u></strong>" (FDS, 228). <u><strong>This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing</u></strong>. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The <u><strong>theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically.</u></strong> But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: [End Page 148] <u><strong><mark>Wars</u></strong> <u><strong>are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign</mark> who must be defended; <mark>they are waged on behalf of the existence of all;</mark> <mark>entire populations</mark> are <mark>mobilized for</mark> the purpose of wholesale <mark>slaughter in the name of life necessity</u></strong></mark>. Massacres have become vital [vitaux—understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. <u><strong>It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed</u></strong>. (VS, 180; WK, 136)</p>
1NC
null
1NC
55,906
45
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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The alternative is non-medicalized suicide
Salem 99
Salem 99
if legalized, physician-assisted suicide as a legitimate practice would become the prerogative of physicians This monopoly leads to the question of why aid in dying should be provided only by a medical practitioner Why, should assistance in suicide be understood as requiring medical authority rather than community of family or friends Assisted suicide does not even require medical skill If freeing up patients is the goal, then assisted suicide's advocates disserve patients when they do not advocate ending the physician's exclusive power to prescribe medication the advocates of patients’ rights end up empowering doctors more than they do patients Placing suicide under the stewardship of medicine is defended as a way of “enhancing public accountability of the practice But inasmuch as cultural preconceptions and loneliness are far from being exclusively medical issues, we must ask why we expect doctors to respond to them. either medicine is moving beyond its proper role, or the scope of medical competence has already been extended beyond appropriate boundaries. ceding monopoly of assistance in suicide to doctors is anchored in an inflation of the physician's role as well as in the extreme idealization of physicians’ character and the relationships they establish with patients. this idealization to delegate to physicians the exclusive right to assist suicide bespeaks the social and symbolic power already conferred on medicine it is not the need for technical expertise that impels us to physician-assisted suicide. our culture, so impregnated by medicalization takes for granted that assisted suicide should fall under the control and supervision of medicine. physician-assisted suicide necessarily involves medicalizing the moral questions surrounding suicide Physician-assisted suicide ultimately is a medical judgment about death or suicide it is a medical evaluation of the fairness and legitimacy of a person's establishing medical guidelines introduces tensions into the value of autonomy in several ways
This leads to the question of why aid in dying should be provided only by a medical practitioner Why should suicide be understood as requiring medical authority rather than community of family or friends Assisted suicide does not require medical skill assisted suicide's advocates disserve patients when they do not advocate ending the physician's power to prescribe medication ceding monopoly of assistance in suicide is anchored in an inflation of the physician's role this idealization delegate to physicians bespeaks symbolic power physician- Physician-assisted suicide is, a medical judgment it is evaluation of the fairness and legitimacy of a person's
Tania, Associate at Hospital Operations & Compliance at The Advisory Group W.L.L, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide? Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36, AB Medicalizing suicide as professional practice Medicalizing suicide also points to the fact that if legalized, physician-assisted suicide as a legitimate practice would become the prerogative of physicians. Indeed, Jack Kevorkian has seen the exclusive right as the foundation for a new medical subspeciality of “obitiatry.”17 This monopoly leads to the more general question of why aid in dying should be provided only by a medical practitioner. Why, that is, should assistance in suicide be understood as requiring medical authority rather than, for instance, a community of family or friends? The most obvious answer is that physicians—and only physicians—have the necessary technical skills to ensure a “rapid” and “painless” death. But as some critics have noted, “Assisted suicide does not even require medical skill…. If freeing up patients truly is the goal, then assisted suicide's advocates disserve patients when they do not advocate ending the physician's exclusive power to prescribe medication. Ironically, the advocates of patients’ rights end up empowering doctors more than they do patients.”18 Yet even those who maintain that technical knowledge is imperative do not confine their justification of physician-assisted suicide to this reason. Placing suicide under the stewardship of medicine is further defended as a way of “enhancing public accountability of the practice” and “protecting against abuse.”19 From the patient's perspective, the request for aid in dying may mean a “desire for companionship in pursuing a difficult course of action, a wish for confirmation of a decision about which the patient is unsure or simply a cry for help” (pp. 88–89, note 42). Moreover, since suicide is still stigmatized, “seeking a physician's assistance may be a way of trying to remove that stigma.”20 But inasmuch as cultural preconceptions and loneliness (whatever its source) are far from being exclusively medical issues, we must ask why we expect doctors to respond to them. Two possible answers come to mind: either medicine is moving beyond its proper role, or the scope of medical competence has already been extended beyond appropriate boundaries.It seems reasonable to conclude that ceding monopoly of assistance in suicide to doctors is anchored in an inflation of the physician's role, as well as in the extreme idealization of physicians’ character and the relationships they establish with patients. The bond physicians establish with patients is supposedly effective, collaborative, and committed.21 Both this idealization and the willingness to delegate to physicians the exclusive right to assist suicide bespeaks the social and symbolic power already conferred on medicine and medical professionals in our societies. In other words, it is not (or not only) the need for technical expertise that impels us to physician-assisted suicide. Rather, our culture, so impregnated by medicalization, takes for granted that assisted suicide should fall under the control and supervision of medicine. Medicalizing the morality of suicide As a legitimate domain of professional practice, then, physician-assisted suicide necessarily involves medicalizing the moral questions surrounding suicide. Physician-assisted suicide presupposes, and ultimately is, a medical judgment about death or suicide; it is a medical evaluation of the fairness and legitimacy of a person's (not simply a patient's) desire or choice to end his or her life. With some few exceptions, even the most radical advocates of physician-assisted suicide recognize the need to establish protocols and guidelines to prevent abuses, protect the vulnerable, guarantee public accountability, and even to assure the autonomous character of the patient's choice. Surely these aims are respectable and the setting up of criteria just and reasonable. Yet establishing medical guidelines also introduces tensions into the value of autonomy in several ways.
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<h4><strong>The alternative is non-medicalized suicide </h4><p>Salem 99</p><p></strong>Tania, Associate at Hospital Operations & Compliance at The Advisory Group W.L.L, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide? Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36, AB </p><p>Medicalizing suicide as professional practice Medicalizing suicide also points to the fact that <u><strong>if legalized, physician-assisted suicide as a legitimate practice would become the prerogative of physicians</u></strong>. Indeed, Jack Kevorkian has seen the exclusive right as the foundation for a new medical subspeciality of “obitiatry.”17 <u><strong><mark>This</mark> monopoly <mark>leads</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong></mark> more general <u><strong><mark>question of why aid in dying should be provided only by a medical practitioner</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Why</mark>,</u></strong> that is, <u><strong><mark>should</mark> assistance in <mark>suicide be understood as requiring medical authority</mark> <mark>rather than</u></strong></mark>, for instance, a <u><strong><mark>community of family or friends</u></strong></mark>? The most obvious answer is that physicians—and only physicians—have the necessary technical skills to ensure a “rapid” and “painless” death. But as some critics have noted, “<u><strong><mark>Assisted suicide does not</mark> even <mark>require medical skill</u></strong></mark>…. <u><strong>If freeing up patients</u></strong> truly <u><strong>is the goal, then <mark>assisted suicide's advocates disserve patients</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>when they</mark> <mark>do not advocate</mark> <mark>ending the physician's</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>exclusive</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>power to prescribe medication</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, <u><strong>the advocates of patients’ rights end up empowering doctors more than they do patients</u></strong>.”18 Yet even those who maintain that technical knowledge is imperative do not confine their justification of physician-assisted suicide to this reason. <u><strong>Placing suicide under the stewardship of medicine is</u></strong> further <u><strong>defended as a way of “enhancing public accountability of the practice</u></strong>” and “protecting against abuse.”19 From the patient's perspective, the request for aid in dying may mean a “desire for companionship in pursuing a difficult course of action, a wish for confirmation of a decision about which the patient is unsure or simply a cry for help” (pp. 88–89, note 42). Moreover, since suicide is still stigmatized, “seeking a physician's assistance may be a way of trying to remove that stigma.”20 <u><strong>But inasmuch as cultural preconceptions and loneliness</u></strong> (whatever its source) <u><strong>are far from being exclusively medical issues, we must ask why we expect doctors to respond to them.</u></strong> Two possible answers come to mind: <u><strong>either medicine is moving beyond its proper role, or the scope of medical competence has already been extended beyond appropriate boundaries.</u></strong>It seems reasonable to conclude that <u><strong><mark>ceding monopoly of assistance in suicide</mark> to doctors <mark>is anchored in an inflation of the physician's role</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as well as in the extreme idealization of physicians’ character and the relationships they establish with patients.</u></strong> The bond physicians establish with patients is supposedly effective, collaborative, and committed.21 Both <u><strong><mark>this idealization</u></strong></mark> and the willingness <u><strong>to <mark>delegate to physicians</mark> the exclusive right to assist suicide <mark>bespeaks </mark>the social and <mark>symbolic power</mark> already conferred on medicine</u></strong> and medical professionals in our societies. In other words, <u><strong>it is not</u></strong> (or not only) <u><strong>the need for technical expertise that impels us to physician-assisted suicide.</u></strong> Rather, <u><strong>our culture, so impregnated by medicalization</u></strong>, <u><strong>takes for granted that assisted suicide should fall under the control and supervision of medicine.</u></strong> Medicalizing the morality of suicide As a legitimate domain of professional practice, then, <u><strong><mark>physician-</mark>assisted suicide necessarily involves medicalizing the moral questions surrounding suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Physician-assisted suicide </u></strong></mark>presupposes, and <u><strong>ultimately <mark>is</u></strong>, <u><strong>a medical judgment</mark> about death or suicide</u></strong>; <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> a medical <mark>evaluation of the fairness and legitimacy of a person's</u></strong></mark> (not simply a patient's) desire or choice to end his or her life. With some few exceptions, even the most radical advocates of physician-assisted suicide recognize the need to establish protocols and guidelines to prevent abuses, protect the vulnerable, guarantee public accountability, and even to assure the autonomous character of the patient's choice. Surely these aims are respectable and the setting up of criteria just and reasonable. Yet <u><strong>establishing medical guidelines</u></strong> also <u><strong>introduces tensions into the value of autonomy in several ways</u></strong>.</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,689
14
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,124
WTO is resilient but irrelevant
Drezner 13
Daniel W. Drezner 13 is professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, December 3, 2013, "The End of Multilateral Trade?", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/03/the_end_of_multilateral_trade
even if something is negotiated in Bali it's unlikely the WTO will ever be the focal point for comprehensive trade talks ever again Even getting agreement on the "easy" parts of Doha has been super-hard There's very little upside to making the WTO the focal point of new talks especially given most trade talks have been of the "open regionalism" variety the "slippery slope" argument of the WTO losing relevance is also way overplayed even if there's no further WTO-guided liberalization, the rounds negotiated to date constitute far more liberalization than what can be achieved in the future the WTO rules still govern a lot of trade, and further liberalization won't erode the WTO's bailiwick that much. WTO's Dispute Settlement remains the ne plus ultra of enforcement arrangements in global governance there is zero evidence WTO enforcement has weakened as Doha bogged down That part of the trade system is still working pretty well For decades, trade commentary has implicitly embraced the "bicycle theory" belief unless trade liberalization moves ahead, the entire global trade regime will collapse The last decade suggests there are limits to that rule of thumb It is possible for the WTO to matter less on jump-starting multilateral trade negotiations while still mattering a great deal in enforcing the rules of the game
it's unlikely the WTO will ever be the focal point for talks ever again given talks have been of the "open regionalism" variety the "slippery slope" argument of the WTO losing relevance is way overplayed rounds negotiated to date constitute more liberalization than what can be achieved in the future. there is zero evidence enforcement has weakened It is possible for the WTO to matter less while still mattering a great deal in enforcing the rules of the game.
This kind of story is both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic about the state of the WTO. It's overly optimistic in assuming that, even if something is negotiated in Bali (and the odds aren't great of that happening), it's unlikely that the WTO will ever be the focal point for comprehensive trade talks ever again. Even getting agreement on the "easy" parts of Doha has been super-hard. There's very little upside to making the WTO the focal point of new talks, especially given that most of the regional and bilateral trade talks have been of the "open regionalism" variety. On the other hand, the "slippery slope" argument of the WTO losing relevance is also way overplayed. Such a statement omits two very important facts. First, even if there's no further WTO-guided liberalization, the rounds negotiated to date constitute far more liberalization than what can be achieved in the future. In other words, the WTO rules still govern a lot of trade, and further liberalization won't erode the WTO's bailiwick that much. Second, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding remains the ne plus ultra of enforcement arrangements in global governance. Contrary to the WSJ story, there is zero evidence that WTO enforcement has weakened as Doha bogged down or as protectionism increased after 2008. That part of the trade system is still working pretty well. For decades, trade commentary has implicitly embraced the "bicycle theory" - the belief that unless multilateral trade liberalization moves ahead, the entire global trade regime will collapse because of a lack of forward momentum. The last decade -- and particularly the post-2008 period -- suggests that there are limits to that rule of thumb. It is possible for the WTO to matter less on jump-starting multilateral trade negotiations while still mattering a great deal in enforcing the rules of the game. So Bali might represent the end of multilateral trade negotiations -- but it's not the end of multilateral trade.
1,982
<h4><strong>WTO is resilient but irrelevant</h4><p></strong>Daniel W. <strong>Drezner 13 </strong>is professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, December 3, 2013, "The End of Multilateral Trade?", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/03/the_end_of_multilateral_trade</p><p>This kind of story is both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic about the state of the WTO. It's overly optimistic in assuming that, <u>even if something is negotiated in Bali</u> (and the odds aren't great of that happening), <u><strong><mark>it's unlikely</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>the WTO will ever be the focal point for</mark> comprehensive trade <mark>talks ever again</u></strong></mark>. <u>Even getting agreement on the "easy" parts of Doha has been</u> <u><strong>super-hard</u></strong>. <u>There's very little upside to making the WTO the focal point of new talks</u>, <u><strong>especially <mark>given</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>most</u></strong> of the regional and bilateral <u><strong>trade <mark>talks have been of the "open regionalism" variety</u></strong></mark>. On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>the "slippery slope" argument of the WTO losing relevance is</mark> also <mark>way overplayed</u></strong></mark>. Such a statement omits two very important facts. First, <u>even if there's no further WTO-guided liberalization, the <mark>rounds negotiated to date constitute</u></mark> <u><strong>far <mark>more liberalization than what can be achieved in the future</u></strong>.</mark> In other words, <u><strong>the WTO rules still govern a lot of trade, and further liberalization won't erode the WTO's bailiwick that much.</u></strong> Second, the <u>WTO's Dispute Settlement</u> Understanding <u>remains the ne plus ultra of enforcement arrangements in global governance</u>. Contrary to the WSJ story, <u><strong><mark>there is zero evidence</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>WTO <mark>enforcement has weakened</mark> as Doha bogged down</u></strong> or as protectionism increased after 2008. <u>That part of the trade system is still working pretty well</u>. <u>For decades, trade commentary has implicitly embraced the "bicycle theory"</u> - the <u>belief</u> that <u>unless</u> multilateral <u>trade liberalization moves ahead, the entire global trade regime will collapse</u> because of a lack of forward momentum. <u><strong>The last decade</u></strong> -- and particularly the post-2008 period -- <u><strong>suggests</u></strong> that <u><strong>there are limits to that rule of thumb</u></strong>. <u><mark>It is possible for the WTO to matter less </mark>on jump-starting multilateral trade negotiations</u> <u><strong><mark>while still mattering a great deal in enforcing the rules of the game</u></strong>.</mark> So Bali might represent the end of multilateral trade negotiations -- but it's not the end of multilateral trade. </p>
1NC
Trade
1NC No WTO Impact
162,312
30
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,125
Alt cause – disputes over Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
Mackenzie 7/18,
Mackenzie 7/18, Emily, 2014, “World Trade Organization Finds United States Violated Global Trade Rules by Imposing Countervailing Duties on Chinese and Indian Products,” American Society of International Law, http://www.asil.org/blogs/world-trade-organization-finds-united-states-violated-global-trade-rules-imposing, Accessed 8/18/14
The WTO concluded that the United States acted inconsistently with global trade rules, and in particular certain provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, when it imposed countervailing duties on certain products imported into the United States from India and China.
The WTO concluded that the U S acted inconsistently with global trade rules, and certain provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, when it imposed countervailing duties on products imported from China.
On July 14, 2014, the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued two panel reports in the cases United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India (India case), and United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (China case). The WTO concluded that the United States acted inconsistently with global trade rules, and in particular certain provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, when it imposed countervailing duties on certain products imported into the United States from India and China. According to a news article, the United States argued that “it imposed the tariffs to combat artificially low prices on products from India and China's state-subsidised industries,” and has the right to appeal the ruling. Summaries of the key findings are available here (India case) and here (China case). - See more at: http://www.asil.org/blogs/world-trade-organization-finds-united-states-violated-global-trade-rules-imposing#sthash.HDFRC2vg.dpuf
1,044
<h4><strong>Alt cause – disputes over Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.</h4><p>Mackenzie 7/18, </strong>Emily, 2014, “World Trade Organization Finds United States Violated Global Trade Rules by Imposing Countervailing Duties on Chinese and Indian Products,” American Society of International Law, http://www.asil.org/blogs/world-trade-organization-finds-united-states-violated-global-trade-rules-imposing, Accessed 8/18/14</p><p>On July 14, 2014, the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued two panel reports in the cases United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India (India case), and United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (China case). <u><mark>The WTO concluded that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>acted inconsistently with global trade rules, and</mark> in particular <mark>certain provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, when it imposed countervailing duties on</mark> certain <mark>products imported</mark> into the United States <mark>from</mark> India and <mark>China.</u></mark> According to a news article, the United States argued that “it imposed the tariffs to combat artificially low prices on products from India and China's state-subsidised industries,” and has the right to appeal the ruling. Summaries of the key findings are available here (India case) and here (China case). - See more at: http://www.asil.org/blogs/world-trade-organization-finds-united-states-violated-global-trade-rules-imposing#sthash.HDFRC2vg.dpuf</p>
1NR
WTO
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,690
2
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,126
All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved
Cummisky, 96
Cummisky, 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)
even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way point still does not justify deontologieal constraints why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons am concerned with the priceless dignity of each is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? each is priceless thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can
even if one grants saving two with dignity cannot outweigh killing one dignity cannot be summed this does not justify deontologieal constraints why would not killing one be stronger than saving two my reason cannot be the two compensate for the loss of one I can save two of three priceless statutes by destroying one. 1 cannot claim saving two makes up for one. But the loss of the two is not outweighed by one not destroyed. each is priceless I have reason to save as many as I can
Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.*
1,335
<h4>All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved </h4><p><strong>Cummisky, 96</strong> (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)</p><p>Finally, <u><strong><mark>even if one grants</mark> that <mark>saving two</mark> persons <mark>with dignity cannot outweigh</mark> and compensate for <mark>killing one</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>because <mark>dignity</mark> <mark>cannot be</mark> added and <mark>summed</mark> in this way</u></strong>—<mark>this</mark> <u><strong>point still <mark>does not justify deontologieal constraints</u></strong></mark>. On the extreme interpretation, <u><strong><mark>why would not killing one</mark> person <mark>be</mark> a <mark>stronger</mark> obligation <mark>than saving two</mark> persons</u></strong>? If I <u><strong>am concerned with the priceless dignity of each</u></strong>, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it <u><strong>is just that <mark>my reason cannot be</mark> that <mark>the two compensate for the loss of</mark> the</u></strong> <mark>one</mark>. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If <u><strong><mark>I can save two of three priceless statutes </mark>only <mark>by destroying one. </mark>Then <mark>1 cannot claim</mark> that <mark>saving two makes up for</mark> the loss of the <mark>one.</u></strong> But</mark> Similarly, <mark>the loss of the two is not outweighed by</mark> the <mark>one</mark> that was <mark>not destroyed.</mark> Indeed, <u><strong>even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible?</u></strong> Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, <u><strong><mark>each is priceless</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong>thus, <mark>I have </mark>good <mark>reason to save as many as I can</u></strong></mark>. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.*</p>
1NC
null
1NC Case
84,751
179
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,127
No impact to trade
Miller 14
Miller 14 (Charles Miller, lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Globalisation and war,” April 2014) http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/
the trade flows reduc conflict conclusions their model failed to take three things into account it’s quite possible that peace causes trade rather than the other way around—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace Take any of these factors into account, and studies have shown that the apparent relationship between trade flows and peace disappears. The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in impossible.
the trade flows reduc conflict conclusions model failed to take three things into account it’s possible peace causes trade rather than the other way around no company wants to export if it anticipates war Second, conflict behaviour exhibits network effects’ third both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has been at peace Take any of these into account, and studies have shown the relationship between trade flows and peace disappears The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in impossible
John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. Analysing trade and conflict data from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, they found that trade flows do have a significant impact in reducing the chances of conflict, even when taking a variety of other factors into account. But their conclusions have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, their model failed to take three things into account. First, it’s quite possible that peace causes trade rather than the other way around—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. Take any of these factors into account, and studies have shown (here and here) that the apparent relationship between trade flows and peace disappears. Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in East Asia impossible. ‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur.
2,771
<h4>No impact to trade</h4><p><strong>Miller 14</strong> (Charles Miller, lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Globalisation and war,” April 2014) http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/</p><p>John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. Analysing trade and conflict data from the nineteenth to <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> twenty-first centuries, they found that<u><strong> <mark>trade flows</mark> </u></strong>do have a significant impact in<u><strong> <mark>reduc</u></strong></mark>ing the chances of<u><strong> <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark>, even when taking a variety of other factors into account. But their <u><strong><mark>conclusions</u></strong></mark> have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, <u><strong>their <mark>model failed to take three things into account</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong><mark>it’s </mark>quite <mark>possible </mark>that <mark>peace causes trade rather than the other way around</mark>—<mark>no company wants to </mark>start an <mark>export </mark>business to another country <mark>if it anticipates </mark>that business linkages will be cut off by <mark>war </mark>further down the line. <mark>Second, conflict behaviour exhibits </mark>what’s called ‘<mark>network effects’</mark>—<mark> </mark>if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And <mark>third</mark>, <mark>both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has </mark>already <mark>been at peace</u></strong></mark>—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. <u><strong><mark>Take any of these </mark>factors <mark>into account, and studies have shown</u></strong> </mark>(here and here) <u><strong>that <mark>the </mark>apparent <mark>relationship between trade flows and peace disappears</mark>. </u></strong>Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? <u><strong><mark>The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in </u></strong></mark>East Asia <u><strong><mark>impossible</mark>. </u></strong>‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur.</p>
1NC
Trade
1NC No Trade War
49,700
154
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,128
US isn’t in compliance with 10 other rulings
Grimmett, Legislative Attornery, 2010 Jeanne, Congressional Research Service “WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL32014.pdf
Grimmett, Legislative Attornery, 2010 Jeanne, Congressional Research Service “WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL32014.pdf
there are 10 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented or fully resolved The U S has not yet settled long disputes with the EU) regarding a music copyright statute and a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba unresolved is a dispute with Japan initiated in 1999, over a provision of U.S. antidumping law The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 remains the target of sanctions by complainants EU and Japan due to continued payments to U.S firms Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling a WTO-inconsistent cotton program in Brazil’s complaint programs were successfully challenged and the U S was found not to have fully complied Brazil has continued to pursue sanctions and on November 19, 2009, the WTO authorized Brazil to suspend tariff concessions on U.S. goods Four pending cases involve the U.S. practice of “zeroing,” in calculating dumping margins, disregards non-dumped sales. The practice was successfully challenged by the EU in two cases Japan, and Mexico The U S has yet to fully comply in EU I and in the challenges by Japan and Mexico to the extent that the WTO decisions affect the use of zeroing in other phases of U.S. antidumping With other facets of EU II remaining unaddressed, the EU has indicated that it may request a compliance panel in the proceeding.
there are 10 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented disputes with the EU a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba a dispute with Japan over antidumping a WTO-inconsistent cotton program Brazil has continued to pursue sanctions Four pending cases involve zeroing
Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes, there are currently 10 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented or the United States has taken action and the dispute has not been fully resolved. Under WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period of time to comply with an adverse WTO decision. While the Member is expected to remove the offending measure by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available if the Member has not acted or taken sufficient action by this time. Either disputing party may request a compliance panel if there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied. The United States has not yet settled long-standing disputes with the European Union (EU) regarding a music copyright statute and a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba. H.R. 1530, H.R. 1531, H.R. 2272, and S. 1189 would repeal the trademark statute, while H.R. 1103 and S. 1234 would amend the provision. Also unresolved is a dispute with Japan, initiated in 1999, over a provision of U.S. antidumping law. The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA), which was held WTO-inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed, effective October 2005, by P.L. 109-171, remains the target of sanctions by complainants EU and Japan due to continued payments to U.S firms under the CDSOA program. In addition, the United States and Antigua have been consulting on the resolution of outstanding issues in Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions. P.L. 109-171 also repealed a WTO-inconsistent cotton program at issue in Brazil’s 2002 complaint over U.S. cotton subsidies, but other programs were also successfully challenged and the United States was later found not to have fully complied. The United States has since made statutory and administrative changes affecting the export credit guarantee programs faulted in the case. At the same time, Brazil has continued to pursue sanctions and on November 19, 2009, the WTO authorized Brazil to suspend tariff concessions on U.S. goods in an amount of $294.7 million a year, a figure that may vary annually based on actual U.S. export subsidization. In addition, if a variable threshold based on U.S. trade in goods with Brazil is exceeded, Brazil may suspend WTO obligations involving U.S. intellectual property and services. Brazil has published a list of U.S. goods potentially subject to increased tariffs, but will not announce until February 2010 the final list of products and the total value of sanctions that would be imposed. On December 21, 2009, Brazil announced that, based on 2008 data provided by the United States, it is entitled to annual retaliation of $829.3 million. Four pending cases involve the U.S. practice of “zeroing,” under which the Department of Commerce (DOC), in calculating dumping margins, disregards non-dumped sales. The practice was successfully challenged by the EU in two cases (EU I and II), Japan, and Mexico. In response to EU I, DOC discontinued the use of zeroing in the price comparison employed most often in original antidumping investigations and recalculated dumping margins in the cases cited by the EU. The United States has yet to fully comply in EU I and in the challenges by Japan and Mexico to the extent that the WTO decisions affect the use of zeroing in other phases of U.S. antidumping proceedings. Compliance proceedings in EU I and Japan’s challenge, completed in 2009, found against the United States, permitting complainants to pursue sanctions requests. Also, Mexico initiated compliance proceedings in August 2009, and a compliance deadline of December 19, 2009, was established in EU II. The United States stated that it will recalculate dumping margins in four original antidumping investigations cited in EU II and that it is discussing outstanding issues with interested parties. With other facets of EU II remaining unaddressed, however, the EU has indicated that it may request a compliance panel in the proceeding.
4,122
<h4>US isn’t in compliance with 10 other rulings </h4><p><strong>Grimmett, Legislative Attornery, 2010<u> Jeanne, Congressional Research Service “WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases” http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL32014.pdf</p><p></u></strong>Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes, <u><strong><mark>there are</u></strong></mark> currently <u><strong><mark>10 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>or</u></strong> the United States has taken action and the dispute has not been <u><strong>fully resolved</u></strong>. Under WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period of time to comply with an adverse WTO decision. While the Member is expected to remove the offending measure by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available if the Member has not acted or taken sufficient action by this time. Either disputing party may request a compliance panel if there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied. <u><strong>The</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>has not yet settled long</u></strong>-standing <u><strong><mark>disputes</mark> <mark>with the</u></strong></mark> European Union (<u><strong><mark>EU</mark>)</u></strong> <u><strong>regarding</u></strong> <u><strong>a music copyright statute</u></strong> <u><strong>and <mark>a</u></strong> <u><strong>statutory trademark provision</u></strong> <u><strong>affecting property confiscated by Cuba</u></strong></mark>. H.R. 1530, H.R. 1531, H.R. 2272, and S. 1189 would repeal the trademark statute, while H.R. 1103 and S. 1234 would amend the provision. Also <u><strong>unresolved is <mark>a dispute with Japan</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>initiated in 1999, <mark>over</mark> a provision of U.S. <mark>antidumping</mark> law</u></strong>. <u><strong>The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000</u></strong> (CDSOA), which was held WTO-inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed, effective October 2005, by P.L. 109-171, <u><strong>remains the target of sanctions by complainants EU and Japan due to continued payments to U.S firms</u></strong> under the CDSOA program. In addition, the United States and Antigua have been consulting on the resolution of outstanding issues in <u><strong>Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling</u></strong> restrictions. P.L. 109-171 also repealed <u><strong><mark>a WTO-inconsistent cotton program</u></strong></mark> at issue <u><strong>in Brazil’s</u></strong> 2002 <u><strong>complaint</u></strong> over U.S. cotton subsidies, but other <u><strong>programs were</u></strong> also <u><strong>successfully challenged and the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>was</u></strong> later <u><strong>found not to have fully complied</u></strong>. The United States has since made statutory and administrative changes affecting the export credit guarantee programs faulted in the case. At the same time, <u><strong><mark>Brazil has continued to pursue sanctions</mark> and on November 19, 2009, the WTO authorized Brazil to suspend tariff concessions on U.S. goods</u></strong> in an amount of $294.7 million a year, a figure that may vary annually based on actual U.S. export subsidization. In addition, if a variable threshold based on U.S. trade in goods with Brazil is exceeded, Brazil may suspend WTO obligations involving U.S. intellectual property and services. Brazil has published a list of U.S. goods potentially subject to increased tariffs, but will not announce until February 2010 the final list of products and the total value of sanctions that would be imposed. On December 21, 2009, Brazil announced that, based on 2008 data provided by the United States, it is entitled to annual retaliation of $829.3 million. <u><strong><mark>Four</u></strong> <u><strong>pending cases involve</mark> the U.S. practice of “<mark>zeroing</mark>,”</u></strong> under which the Department of Commerce (DOC), <u><strong>in calculating dumping margins, disregards non-dumped sales. The practice was successfully challenged by the EU in two cases</u></strong> (EU I and II), <u><strong>Japan, and Mexico</u></strong>. In response to EU I, DOC discontinued the use of zeroing in the price comparison employed most often in original antidumping investigations and recalculated dumping margins in the cases cited by the EU. <u><strong>The</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>has yet to fully comply in EU I and in the challenges by Japan and Mexico to the extent that the WTO decisions affect the use of zeroing in other phases of U.S. antidumping </u></strong>proceedings. Compliance proceedings in EU I and Japan’s challenge, completed in 2009, found against the United States, permitting complainants to pursue sanctions requests. Also, Mexico initiated compliance proceedings in August 2009, and a compliance deadline of December 19, 2009, was established in EU II. The United States stated that it will recalculate dumping margins in four original antidumping investigations cited in EU II and that it is discussing outstanding issues with interested parties. <u><strong>With other facets of EU II remaining unaddressed,</u></strong> however, <u><strong>the EU has indicated that it may request a compliance panel in the proceeding.</p></u></strong>
1NR
WTO
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,691
10
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,129
Fear of deaths inevitable
Etogre ‘7
Etogre ‘7(E.T. Ogre, news website for the advance of the human species, “The Evolution of Religion: Playing on Mankind’s Greed, Hope, and Fears”, NM, http://etogre.com/the-evolution-of-religion-playing-on-mankinds-greed-hope-and-fears/168/)
The fear of death is a survival instinct hard-wired into the majority of living creatures on Earth This fear of death is perhaps best illustrated in a classic psychological example– the fight-or-flight response. This instinctive response occurs because death is essentially the unmitigated antithesis of survival, the key principle of evolution.   To suggest that humans in general naturally desire to exist forever is not exactly an unprecedented claim.
The fear of death is a survival instinct hard-wired This fear of death is illustrated in a psychological fight-or-flight response. death is the unmitigated antithesis of survival the key principle of evolution
The fear of death is a survival instinct hard-wired into the majority of living creatures on Earth. This fear of death is perhaps best illustrated in a classic psychological example– the fight-or-flight response. This is a reaction that can normally be observed by backing an animal into a corner, essentially forcing them into a stressful life or death situation. Adrenaline starts pumping, survival mode takes over, and the animal will either attempt to flee or hold its ground in a battle to the death. This instinctive response occurs because death is essentially the unmitigated antithesis of survival, the key principle of evolution.   To suggest that humans in general naturally desire to exist forever is not exactly an unprecedented claim.
748
<h4>Fear of deaths inevitable </h4><p><strong>Etogre ‘7<u></strong>(E.T. Ogre, news website for the advance of the human species, “The Evolution of Religion: Playing on Mankind’s Greed, Hope, and Fears”, NM, http://etogre.com/the-evolution-of-religion-playing-on-mankinds-greed-hope-and-fears/168/)</p><p><strong><mark>The fear of death is a survival instinct hard-wired </mark>into the majority of living creatures on Earth</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This fear of death is </mark>perhaps best <mark>illustrated in a </mark>classic <mark>psychological </mark>example– the <mark>fight-or-flight response.</u></strong></mark> This is a reaction that can normally be observed by backing an animal into a corner, essentially forcing them into a stressful life or death situation. Adrenaline starts pumping, survival mode takes over, and the animal will either attempt to flee or hold its ground in a battle to the death. <u><strong>This instinctive response occurs because <mark>death is</mark> essentially <mark>the unmitigated antithesis of survival</mark>, <mark>the key principle of evolution</mark>.   To suggest that humans in general naturally desire to exist forever is not exactly an unprecedented claim.</p></u></strong>
1NC
null
1NC Case
429,692
2
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,130
No china trade disputes
Ikenson 12
Daniel Ikenson 12, Trade Policy Priority One: Averting a U.S.-China “Trade War”, www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war
It should not be surprising that increasing exchanges produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms. both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible within the rules of global trade unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade “skirmishes” have been prosecuted in respect
It should not be surprising that exchanges produce frictions But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into arms both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible unlike free-for-all these trade “skirmishes” have been prosecuted in respect
It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world’s largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms. Rather, both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade “skirmishes” have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade. And that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1
866
<h4>No china trade disputes </h4><p>Daniel <strong>Ikenson 12</strong>, Trade Policy Priority One: Averting a U.S.-China “Trade War”, www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war</p><p><u><strong><mark>It should not be surprising that</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>increasing</u></strong> number of commercial <u><strong><mark>exchanges</u></strong></mark> between entities in the world’s largest and second largest economies <u><strong><mark>produce frictions</mark> on occasion. <mark>But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into</mark> an existential call to <mark>arms</mark>.</u></strong> Rather, <u><strong><mark>both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible</u></strong></mark> or plausibly justifiable <u><strong>within the rules of global trade</u></strong>. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, <u><strong><mark>unlike</mark> the <mark>free-for-all</mark> that erupted in the 1930s, <mark>these trade “skirmishes” have been prosecuted in</u></strong></mark> a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not <u><strong><mark>respect</u></strong></mark> for — the rules-based system of trade. And that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1</p>
1NC
Trade
1NC No China Internal
152,242
60
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,131
AT: Econ – there are a ton of things that affect our economy – also history disproves Knickmeyer 14 – State sponsers/ransom
Knickmeyer 14 – State sponsers/ransom
null
null
null
null
null
<h4><strong>AT: Econ – there are a ton of things that affect our economy – also history disproves</h4><p>Knickmeyer 14 – State sponsers/ransom</p></strong>
1NR
Market
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,693
1
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,132
“No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence
Tännsjö 11
Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf
if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide utilitarianism should be applied to collective actions It is a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living they believe they do even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living their future lives will be better My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us we should not commit suicide If I kill myself, many people will suffer Suicide leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind The fact that all our lives lack meaning if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example
if Schopenhauer is right, life is never worth living we should end humanity. But It is a possibility even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do some may believe their future lives will be better My belief is most live lives worth living for argument assume lives are not worth living, and if so, we should kill ourselves this does not answer what we should do we should not commit suicide If I kill myself, many will suffer Suicide leads to loneliness in those left behind The fact that all our lives lack meaning does not mean others will follow my example
I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well. It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future. From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do. My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic. Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).
3,131
<h4>“No value to life” <u>doesn’t</u> outweigh---prioritize <u>existence</u> </h4><p>Torbjörn <strong>Tännsjö 11</strong>, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf</p><p>I suppose it is correct to say that, <u><strong><mark>if Schopenhauer is right,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>if <mark>life is never worth living</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>then according to utilitarianism <mark>we should</mark> all commit suicide</u></strong> <u><strong>and put an <mark>end</mark> to <mark>humanity</u></strong>. <u><strong>But</mark> this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide</u></strong>. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that <u><strong>utilitarianism should be applied</u></strong>, not only to individual actions, but <u><strong>to collective actions</u></strong> as well. It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. <u><strong><mark>It is</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>a possibility</mark> that,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>even if people lead lives not worth living</u></strong>, <u><strong>they believe they do</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong>even if <mark>some may believe</mark> that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>their future lives will be better</u></strong></mark>. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future. From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do. <u><strong><mark>My</mark> strong <mark>belief is</mark> that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>most</mark> of us <mark>live lives worth living</u></strong></mark>. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic. Let us just <u><strong><mark>for</mark> the sake of the <mark>argument assume</mark> that our <mark>lives are not worth living, and</mark> let us accept that, <mark>if</mark> this is <mark>so, we should</mark> all <mark>kill ourselves</u></strong></mark>. As I noted above, <u><strong><mark>this does not answer</mark> the question <mark>what we should do</mark>, each one of us</u></strong>. My conjecture is that <u><strong><mark>we should not commit suicide</u></strong></mark>. The explanation is simple. <u><strong><mark>If I kill myself, many</mark> people <mark>will suffer</u></strong></mark>. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. <u><strong><mark>Suicide</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>leads to</mark> rage, <mark>loneliness</mark>, and awareness of vulnerability <mark>in those left behind</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. <u><strong><mark>The fact that all our lives lack meaning</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>if they do, <mark>does not mean</mark> that <mark>others will follow my example</u></strong></mark>. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).</p>
1NC
null
1NC Case
41,438
381
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,133
No China war
Stutter 14 is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, China-US Focus, March 19, 2014, "Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia", http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/
Robert Stutter 14 is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, China-US Focus, March 19, 2014, "Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia", http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/
Forecasts talk of an inevitable U.S.-China conflict However, enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern Though China has regional ambitions domestic concerns get overall priority. Xi is preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership for many years Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting Obama Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues but Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower. Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces constructive relations “Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive, assertive policy tendencies through interdependence in bilateral relationships Asian stability is essential for China’s economic growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the U S poses grave dangers.
enduring circumstances hold Chinese leaders from confronting America Chinese growth and party rule require stability Though China has regional ambitions, domestic concerns get priority Xi is preoccupied with leadership legitimacy Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting Obama Growing economic interdependence reinforces constructive relations. Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive tendencies through bilateral relationships Asian stability is essential for China’s growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule China certainly calculates confronting the U S poses grave dangers.
Forecasts talk of U.S. retreat from domineering China or an inevitable U.S.-China conflict. However, enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America, the regional leader. Domestic preoccupations Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability. And protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern. Though China also has regional and global ambitions, domestic concerns get overall priority. President Xi Jinping is preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy, pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership for many years. Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting President Obama in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship. Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues that involve the United States, but thus far Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower. Mutual interdependence Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces constructive relations. Respective “Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive, assertive, or other negative policy tendencies through webs of interdependence in bilateral and multilateral relationships. China’s insecurity in Asia Nearby Asia is China’s top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g. Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world (China is Africa’s biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea). Asian stability is essential for China’s economic growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery, China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the United States poses grave dangers.
1,919
<h4><strong>No China war </h4><p></strong>Robert <strong>Stutter 14 <u>is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, China-US Focus, March 19, 2014, "Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia", http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/</p><p></strong>Forecasts talk of</u> U.S. retreat from domineering China or <u>an inevitable U.S.-China conflict</u>. <u><strong>However, <mark>enduring circumstances hold</mark> back <mark>Chinese leaders from confronting America</u></strong></mark>, the regional leader. Domestic preoccupations <u><mark>Chinese</mark> economic <mark>growth and</mark> one-<mark>party rule require stability</u></mark>. And <u><strong>protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern</u></strong>. <u><mark>Though China</u></mark> also <u><mark>has regional</u></mark> and global <u><mark>ambitions</u>, <u><strong>domestic concerns get</mark> overall <mark>priority</mark>. </u></strong>President <u><mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping <u><mark>is</u> <u><strong>preoccupied with</mark> uncertain <mark>leadership legitimacy</u></strong></mark>, <u>pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. <mark>Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership</mark> for many years</u>. <u><strong><mark>Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship. <u>Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues</u> that involve the United States, <u><strong>but</u></strong> thus far <u><strong>Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower. </u></strong>Mutual interdependence <u><strong><mark>Growing economic</mark> and other U.S.-China <mark>interdependence reinforces constructive relations</u></strong>.</mark> Respective <u><strong>“<mark>Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive</mark>, assertive</u></strong>, or other negative <u><strong>policy <mark>tendencies through</u></strong></mark> webs of <u><strong>interdependence in <mark>bilateral</u></strong></mark> and multilateral <u><strong><mark>relationships</u></strong></mark>. China’s insecurity in Asia Nearby Asia is China’s top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g. Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world (China is Africa’s biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea). <u><strong><mark>Asian stability is essential for China’s</mark> economic <mark>growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery</u>, <u><strong><mark>China</mark> almost <mark>certainly calculates</mark> that seriously <mark>confronting the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates<u><strong> <mark>poses grave dangers.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NC
Trade
1NC No China War
95,968
92
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,134
European ransom payments are a huge alt cause to terrorist funding
Callimachi 14
Callimachi 14 (Rukmini, correspondent for the nytimes, July 29, 2014, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html?_r=0///TS)
The cash filled three suitcases: 5 million euros all sides understood that the cash was bound for an obscure group of Islamic extremists who were holding 32 European hostages, according to six senior diplomats directly involved in the exchange. The suitcases were loaded onto pickup trucks and driven hundreds of miles north into the Sahara, where the bearded fighters, who would soon become an official arm of Al Qaeda, counted the money on a blanket thrown on the sand. Eleven years later, the handoff in Bamako has become a well-rehearsed ritual, one of dozens of such transactions repeated all over the world. Kidnapping Europeans for ransom has become a global business for Al Qaeda, bankrolling its operations across the globe Al Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken in at least $125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008, of which $66 million was paid just last year. These payments were made almost exclusively by European governments, who funneled the money through a network of proxies, sometimes masking it as development aid, according to interviews conducted for this article with former hostages, negotiators, diplomats and government officials in 10 countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East In its early years, Al Qaeda received most of its money from deep-pocketed donors, but counterterrorism officials now believe the group finances the bulk of its recruitment, training and arms purchases from ransoms paid to free Europeans. Europe has become an inadvertent underwriter of Al Qaeda. the fact that Europe and its intermediaries continue to pay has set off a vicious cycle. “Kidnapping for ransom has become today’s most significant source of terrorist financing,” Each transaction encourages another transaction.” And business is booming: While in 2003 the kidnappers received around $200,000 per hostage, now they are netting up to $10 million, money that the second in command of Al Qaeda’s central leadership recently described as accounting for as much as half of his operating revenue. “Kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure The stream of income generated is so significant that internal documents show that as long as five years ago, Al Qaeda’s central command in Pakistan was overseeing negotiations for hostages grabbed as far afield as Africa. three main affiliates of the terrorist group — Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in northern Africa; Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen; and the Shabab, in Somalia — are coordinating their efforts and abiding by a common kidnapping protocol. To minimize the risk to their fighters, the terror affiliates have outsourced the seizing of hostages to criminal groups who work on commission Now the group has realized it can advance the cause of jihad by keeping hostages alive and trading them for prisoners and suitcases of cash. Only a handful of countries have resisted paying, led by the United States and Britain. The Europeans have a lot to answer for It’s a completely two-faced policy. They pay ransoms and then deny any was paid.” She added, “The danger of this is not just that it grows the terrorist movement, but it makes all of our citizens vulnerable.”
Kidnapping Europeans for ransom has become a global business for Al Qaeda, bankrolling its operations across the globe Al Qaeda and its affiliates have taken in at least $125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008 Al Qaeda now finances its purchases from ransoms Europe has become an underwriter of Al Qaeda the fact that Europe continue to pay has set off a vicious cycle. “Kidnapping for ransom has become today’s most significant source of terrorist financing The stream of income generated is so significant that documents show that Al Qaeda’s central command was overseeing negotiations for hostages grabbed as far as Africa
BAMAKO, Mali — The cash filled three suitcases: 5 million euros. The German official charged with delivering this cargo arrived here aboard a nearly empty military plane and was whisked away to a secret meeting with the president of Mali, who had offered Europe a face-saving solution to a vexing problem. Officially, Germany had budgeted the money as humanitarian aid for the poor, landlocked nation of Mali. In truth, all sides understood that the cash was bound for an obscure group of Islamic extremists who were holding 32 European hostages, according to six senior diplomats directly involved in the exchange. The suitcases were loaded onto pickup trucks and driven hundreds of miles north into the Sahara, where the bearded fighters, who would soon become an official arm of Al Qaeda, counted the money on a blanket thrown on the sand. The 2003 episode was a learning experience for both sides. Eleven years later, the handoff in Bamako has become a well-rehearsed ritual, one of dozens of such transactions repeated all over the world. Kidnapping Europeans for ransom has become a global business for Al Qaeda, bankrolling its operations across the globe. While European governments deny paying ransoms, an investigation by The New York Times found that Al Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken in at least $125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008, of which $66 million was paid just last year. In news releases and statements, the United States Treasury Department has cited ransom amounts that, taken together, put the total at around $165 million over the same period. These payments were made almost exclusively by European governments, who funneled the money through a network of proxies, sometimes masking it as development aid, according to interviews conducted for this article with former hostages, negotiators, diplomats and government officials in 10 countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The inner workings of the kidnapping business were also revealed in thousands of pages of internal Qaeda documents found by this reporter while on assignment for The Associated Press in northern Mali last year. In its early years, Al Qaeda received most of its money from deep-pocketed donors, but counterterrorism officials now believe the group finances the bulk of its recruitment, training and arms purchases from ransoms paid to free Europeans. Put more bluntly, Europe has become an inadvertent underwriter of Al Qaeda. The foreign ministries of Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland denied in emails or telephone interviews that they had paid the terrorists. “The French authorities have repeatedly stated that France does not pay ransoms,” said Vincent Floreani, deputy director of communication for France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several senior diplomats involved in past negotiations have described the decision to pay ransom for their countries’ citizens as an agonizing calculation: Accede to the terrorists’ demand, or allow innocent people to be killed, often in a gruesome, public way? Yet the fact that Europe and its intermediaries continue to pay has set off a vicious cycle. “Kidnapping for ransom has become today’s most significant source of terrorist financing,” said David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department’s under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a 2012 speech. “Each transaction encourages another transaction.” And business is booming: While in 2003 the kidnappers received around $200,000 per hostage, now they are netting up to $10 million, money that the second in command of Al Qaeda’s central leadership recently described as accounting for as much as half of his operating revenue. “Kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil,” wrote Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, “which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.” The stream of income generated is so significant that internal documents show that as long as five years ago, Al Qaeda’s central command in Pakistan was overseeing negotiations for hostages grabbed as far afield as Africa. Moreover, the accounts of survivors held thousands of miles apart show that the three main affiliates of the terrorist group — Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in northern Africa; Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen; and the Shabab, in Somalia — are coordinating their efforts and abiding by a common kidnapping protocol. To minimize the risk to their fighters, the terror affiliates have outsourced the seizing of hostages to criminal groups who work on commission. Negotiators take a reported 10 percent of the ransom, creating an incentive on both sides of the Mediterranean to increase the overall payout, according to former hostages and senior counterterrorism officials. Their business plan includes a step-by-step process for negotiating, starting with long periods of silence aimed at creating panic back home. Hostages are then shown on videos begging their government to negotiate. Although the kidnappers threaten to kill their victims, a review of the known cases revealed that only a small percentage of hostages held by Qaeda affiliates have been executed in the past five years, a marked turnaround from a decade ago, when videos showing beheadings of foreigners held by the group’s franchise in Iraq would regularly turn up online. Now the group has realized it can advance the cause of jihad by keeping hostages alive and trading them for prisoners and suitcases of cash. Only a handful of countries have resisted paying, led by the United States and Britain. Although both these countries have negotiated with extremist groups — evidenced most recently by the United States’ trade of Taliban prisoners for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl — they have drawn the line when it comes to ransoms. It is a decision that has had dire consequences. While dozens of Europeans have been released unharmed, few American or British nationals have gotten out alive. A lucky few ran away or were rescued by special forces. The rest were executed or are being held indefinitely. “The Europeans have a lot to answer for,” said Vicki Huddleston, the former United States deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, who was the ambassador to Mali in 2003 when Germany paid the first ransom. “It’s a completely two-faced policy. They pay ransoms and then deny any was paid.” She added, “The danger of this is not just that it grows the terrorist movement, but it makes all of our citizens vulnerable.”
6,506
<h4>European ransom payments are a huge alt cause to terrorist funding </h4><p><strong>Callimachi 14</strong> (Rukmini, correspondent for the nytimes, July 29, 2014, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html?_r=0///TS)</p><p>BAMAKO, Mali — <u><strong>The cash filled three suitcases: 5 million euros</u></strong>. The German official charged with delivering this cargo arrived here aboard a nearly empty military plane and was whisked away to a secret meeting with the president of Mali, who had offered Europe a face-saving solution to a vexing problem. Officially, Germany had budgeted the money as humanitarian aid for the poor, landlocked nation of Mali. In truth, <u><strong>all sides understood that the cash was bound for an obscure group of Islamic extremists who were holding 32 European hostages, according to six senior diplomats directly involved in the exchange. The suitcases were loaded onto pickup trucks and driven hundreds of miles north into the Sahara, where the bearded fighters, who would soon become an official arm of Al Qaeda, counted the money on a blanket thrown on the sand.</u></strong> The 2003 episode was a learning experience for both sides. <u><strong>Eleven years later, the handoff in Bamako has become a well-rehearsed ritual, one of dozens of such transactions repeated all over the world. <mark>Kidnapping Europeans for ransom has become a global business for Al Qaeda, bankrolling its operations across the globe</u></strong></mark>. While European governments deny paying ransoms, an investigation by The New York Times found that <u><strong><mark>Al Qaeda and its</mark> direct <mark>affiliates</mark> <mark>have taken in at least $125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008</mark>, of which $66 million was paid just last year.</u></strong> In news releases and statements, the United States Treasury Department has cited ransom amounts that, taken together, put the total at around $165 million over the same period. <u><strong>These payments were made almost exclusively by European governments, who funneled the money through a network of proxies, sometimes masking it as development aid, according to interviews conducted for this article with former hostages, negotiators, diplomats and government officials in 10 countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East</u></strong>. The inner workings of the kidnapping business were also revealed in thousands of pages of internal Qaeda documents found by this reporter while on assignment for The Associated Press in northern Mali last year. <u><strong>In its early years,<mark> Al Qaeda </mark>received most of its money from deep-pocketed donors, but counterterrorism officials <mark>now </mark>believe the group <mark>finances </mark>the bulk of<mark> its </mark>recruitment, training and arms <mark>purchases from ransoms </mark>paid to free Europeans.</u></strong> Put more bluntly, <u><strong><mark>Europe has become an</mark> inadvertent <mark>underwriter of Al Qaeda</mark>.</u></strong> The foreign ministries of Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland denied in emails or telephone interviews that they had paid the terrorists. “The French authorities have repeatedly stated that France does not pay ransoms,” said Vincent Floreani, deputy director of communication for France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several senior diplomats involved in past negotiations have described the decision to pay ransom for their countries’ citizens as an agonizing calculation: Accede to the terrorists’ demand, or allow innocent people to be killed, often in a gruesome, public way? Yet <u><strong><mark>the fact that Europe</mark> and its intermediaries <mark>continue to pay has set off a vicious cycle. “Kidnapping for ransom has become today’s most significant source of terrorist financing</mark>,”</u></strong> said David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department’s under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a 2012 speech. “<u><strong>Each transaction encourages another transaction.” And business is booming: While in 2003 the kidnappers received around $200,000 per hostage, now they are netting up to $10 million, money that the second in command of Al Qaeda’s central leadership recently described as accounting for as much as half of his operating revenue. “Kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil</u></strong>,” wrote Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, “<u><strong>which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure</u></strong>.” <u><strong><mark>The stream of income generated is so significant that</mark> internal <mark>documents show that</mark> as long as five years ago, <mark>Al Qaeda’s central command</mark> in Pakistan <mark>was overseeing negotiations for hostages grabbed as far</mark> afield <mark>as Africa</mark>.</u></strong> Moreover, the accounts of survivors held thousands of miles apart show that the <u><strong>three main affiliates of the terrorist group — Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in northern Africa; Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen; and the Shabab, in Somalia — are coordinating their efforts and abiding by a common kidnapping protocol. To minimize the risk to their fighters, the terror affiliates have outsourced the seizing of hostages to criminal groups who work on commission</u></strong>. Negotiators take a reported 10 percent of the ransom, creating an incentive on both sides of the Mediterranean to increase the overall payout, according to former hostages and senior counterterrorism officials. Their business plan includes a step-by-step process for negotiating, starting with long periods of silence aimed at creating panic back home. Hostages are then shown on videos begging their government to negotiate. Although the kidnappers threaten to kill their victims, a review of the known cases revealed that only a small percentage of hostages held by Qaeda affiliates have been executed in the past five years, a marked turnaround from a decade ago, when videos showing beheadings of foreigners held by the group’s franchise in Iraq would regularly turn up online. <u><strong>Now the group has realized it can advance the cause of jihad by keeping hostages alive and trading them for prisoners and suitcases of cash. Only a handful of countries have resisted paying, led by the United States and Britain. </u></strong>Although both these countries have negotiated with extremist groups — evidenced most recently by the United States’ trade of Taliban prisoners for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl — they have drawn the line when it comes to ransoms. It is a decision that has had dire consequences. While dozens of Europeans have been released unharmed, few American or British nationals have gotten out alive. A lucky few ran away or were rescued by special forces. The rest were executed or are being held indefinitely. “<u><strong>The Europeans have a lot to answer for</u></strong>,” said Vicki Huddleston, the former United States deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, who was the ambassador to Mali in 2003 when Germany paid the first ransom. “<u><strong>It’s a completely two-faced policy. They pay ransoms and then deny any was paid.” She added, “The danger of this is not just that it grows the terrorist movement, but it makes all of our citizens vulnerable.”</u></strong> </p>
1NR
Market
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,694
7
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,135
The plan doesn’t legalize PMs---they’re not online gambling
Ozimek 14
Adam Ozimek 14, Director of Research and Senior Economist, Econsult Solutions, Inc, March 2014, “THE REGULATION AND VALUE OF PREDICTION MARKETS,” http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Ozimek_PredictionMarkets_v1.pdf
Prediction markets have long operated under a restrictive legal environment as a result of both explicit regulation and legal uncertainty. The regulation of real-money prediction markets is complicated because they resemble, but are not equivalent to gambling
Prediction markets have long operated under a restrictive legal environment real-money prediction markets resemble, but are not equivalent to gambling
Prediction markets have long operated under a restrictive legal environment as a result of both explicit regulation and legal uncertainty. To understand this legal context, a natural first question is: why do these markets raise any legal issues to begin with? In fact, as long as there is no cash or prize offered, a prediction market would likely raise no legal issues. As a noncommercial means of reporting on opinions, it would likely be protected by the First Amendment as free expression rather than free enterprise (Bell 2011). The regulation of real-money prediction markets, on the other hand, is complicated because they resemble, but are not equivalent to, two other highly regulated goods: commodity futures and gambling. As a result, prediction markets have historically been affected by laws and regulatory bodies targeted at these industries.
857
<h4>The plan doesn’t legalize PMs---they’re not online gambling </h4><p>Adam <strong>Ozimek 14</strong>, Director of Research and Senior Economist, Econsult Solutions, Inc, March 2014, “THE REGULATION AND VALUE OF PREDICTION MARKETS,” http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Ozimek_PredictionMarkets_v1.pdf</p><p><u><strong><mark>Prediction markets have</u></strong> <u><strong>long operated under a restrictive legal environment</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>as a result of both explicit regulation and legal uncertainty.</u></strong> To understand this legal context, a natural first question is: why do these markets raise any legal issues to begin with? In fact, as long as there is no cash or prize offered, a prediction market would likely raise no legal issues. As a noncommercial means of reporting on opinions, it would likely be protected by the First Amendment as free expression rather than free enterprise (Bell 2011). <u><strong>The regulation of</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>real-money prediction markets</u></strong></mark>, on the other hand, <u><strong>is complicated because they</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>resemble, but are not equivalent to</u></strong></mark>, two other highly regulated goods: commodity futures and <u><strong><mark>gambling</u></strong></mark>. As a result, prediction markets have historically been affected by laws and regulatory bodies targeted at these industries.</p>
2NC
2NC CP
AT PM
429,695
11
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,136
Fear of death is a pre-requisite to death’s symbolic value
Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE” https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF
Cara Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE” https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF
our lives accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But finitude is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us it is rational to fear death not because death is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.
our lives accumulate value through satisfaction of our desires finitude is a necessary condition for the value of life finitude provides recognition that life itself is valuable this conclusion was not reached from arguments against the badness of death it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect is rationally held as an evil to be avoided it is rational to fear death not because death is bad, but because the prospect may be presented as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable we can attach distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect How to decide those values is a matter for judgment
(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable. Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living. 5.3 Conclusion I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because death simpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.
3,799
<h4>Fear of death is a pre-requisite to death’s symbolic value </h4><p>Cara <strong>Kalnow 9<u> A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE” https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF</p><p></u></strong>(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that <u><strong><mark>our lives</u></strong></mark> could <u><strong><mark>accumulate value through</mark> the <mark>satisfaction of our desires</mark> beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But </u></strong>Chapter Four determined that the <u><strong><mark>finitude</u></strong></mark> of life <u><strong><mark>is a necessary condition for the value of life</mark> as such and</u></strong> that many of <u><strong>our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life</u></strong>. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that <u><strong>the <mark>finitude</mark> of life is instrumentally good as it <mark>provides</mark> the <mark>recognition that life itself is valuable</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Although</u></strong> I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that <u><strong>the finitude of life cannot be an evil, <mark>this conclusion was not reached from</mark> the Epicurean <mark>arguments against the badness of death</u></strong></mark>, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable. Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, <u><strong>my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams</u></strong>, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that <u><strong><mark>it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided</u></strong></mark>. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that <u><strong>we can rationally fear our future deaths, as <mark>categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect</mark> of death <mark>is rationally held as an evil to be avoided</u></strong></mark>. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living. 5.3 Conclusion I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the <u><strong>Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us</u></strong>. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that <u><strong><mark>it is rational to fear death</u></strong></mark> and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, <u><strong><mark>not because death</u></mark> </strong>simpliciter <u><strong><mark>is bad, but</mark> rather <mark>because the prospect</mark> of our deaths <mark>may be presented</mark> to us <mark>as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires</mark>. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because <mark>it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable</u></strong></mark>. In this chapter, I concluded that <u><strong>even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, <mark>we can attach</mark> two <mark>distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect</mark> of our</u></strong> own individual <u><strong>deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. <mark>How to decide</mark> on the balance of <mark>those values is a matter for</mark> psychological <mark>judgment</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NC
null
1NC Case
195,186
102
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,137
Comprehensive review of technology concludes it can’t be stopped
Thackston 13 >#SPS
Thackston 13 <Jim, Independent Software Engineer, “FOR THE RECORD, HOUSE SUBCOMMITEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE HEARING,” December 13, http://www.undetectablelaundering.com/docs/WRITTEN_REMARKS_OF_JIM_THACKSTON_120413.pdf>#SPS
a terror organization could use fifty five money mule accounts to move approximately $240,000 per month from the United States to Europe in a way invisible to poker website countermeasures including anti-collusion and geo-location systems. My technology includes a software component that strategically selects which accounts should play in a series of games designed to move money in a particular direction. Gaming industry advocates and regulators promote the idea that the huge volumes of data collected including every card dealt to a player and every bet made as an advantage to law enforcement and regulators. it is easy for money launderers to use similar, publically available information to develop software algorithms and employ skilled players to present normal patterns to defeat any anti-collusion system.
technology includes a software component that strategically selects which accounts should play in a series of games designed to move money in a particular direction. Gaming industry advocates and regulators promote the idea that the huge volumes of data collected including every card dealt to a player and every bet made as an advantage to law enforcement and regulators it is easy for money launderers to use similar, publically available information to develop software algorithms and employ skilled players to present normal patterns to defeat any anti-collusion system.
On June 25th, 2009, I briefed two representatives of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office, two representatives from the Treasury Department, and a representative from the Department of Justice Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Office. In the briefing, I explained how a terror organization could use fifty five money mule accounts to move approximately $240,000 per month from the United States to Europe in a way invisible to poker website countermeasures including anti-collusion and geo-location systems. For those unfamiliar, the term ‘money mule’ refers to a person hired by a terror or criminal organization to open a bank account and internet poker account under a legitimate identity. In my briefing example, the fifty five legitimate accounts would be played in groups of four at nine-seat virtual poker tables. Two colluding accounts are designated winners and two are designated losers. The other five players are innocent bystanders. My technology includes a software component that strategically selects which accounts should play in a series of games designed to move money in a particular direction. For the fifty five accounts, a maximum of 341,055 different four-player account combinations can be presented to a poker website’s anticollusion system. Increase the number of mule accounts to 100 and the number of combinations increases to 3,921,225. Gaming industry advocates and regulators promote the idea that the huge volumes of data collected including every card dealt to a player and every bet made as an advantage to law enforcement and regulators. As my system clearly demonstrates, it is easy for money launderers to use similar, publically available information to develop software algorithms and employ skilled players to present normal patterns to defeat any anti-collusion system.
1,817
<h4>Comprehensive review of technology concludes it can’t be stopped</h4><p><strong>Thackston 13</strong> <Jim, Independent Software Engineer, “FOR THE RECORD, HOUSE SUBCOMMITEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE HEARING,” December 13, http://www.undetectablelaundering.com/docs/WRITTEN_REMARKS_OF_JIM_THACKSTON_120413.pdf<u><strong>>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>On June 25th, 2009, I briefed two representatives of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office, two representatives from the Treasury Department, and a representative from the Department of Justice Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Office. In the briefing, I explained how <u><strong>a terror organization could use fifty five money mule accounts to move approximately $240,000 per month from the United States to Europe in a way invisible to poker website countermeasures including anti-collusion and geo-location systems.</u></strong> For those unfamiliar, the term ‘money mule’ refers to a person hired by a terror or criminal organization to open a bank account and internet poker account under a legitimate identity. In my briefing example, the fifty five legitimate accounts would be played in groups of four at nine-seat virtual poker tables. Two colluding accounts are designated winners and two are designated losers. The other five players are innocent bystanders. <u><strong>My <mark>technology includes a software component that strategically selects which accounts should play in a series of games designed to move money in a particular direction.</u></strong></mark> For the fifty five accounts, a maximum of 341,055 different four-player account combinations can be presented to a poker website’s anticollusion system. Increase the number of mule accounts to 100 and the number of combinations increases to 3,921,225. <u><strong><mark>Gaming industry advocates and regulators promote the idea that the huge volumes of data collected including every card dealt to a player and every bet made as an advantage to law enforcement and regulators</mark>.</u></strong> As my system clearly demonstrates, <u><strong><mark>it is easy for money launderers to use similar, publically available information to develop software algorithms and employ skilled players to present normal patterns to defeat any anti-collusion system.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
Market
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,697
1
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,138
Suicide doesn’t solve thanatopolitics
Michelsen 11
Michelsen 11
. Suicide can never be an effective biopolitical response, only forming a political rejection to sovereign logics It is only in the perennial resurgence of sovereign discourses (through racial exclusion) that death again becomes again relevant to power. Suicide-bombing, therefore, leaves the zeitgeist, biopower, untouched. If we desire to investigate how suicide-bombing might represent a fundamental engagement with the structures of contemporary global order we can against Ojakangas Foucault explicitly argued that biopower and sovereign have always existed in some form of “hideous” historical combination. This refuses to firmly divide history into a progression of discrete forms of power Agamben’s reading of Foucault seems far more useful. Agamben argues that a conception of biopower (life-order) as a separate discourse entering into sovereignty (death-order) is deeply problematic sovereignty and biopower are intrinsically linked The nexus exposure to death, is an ontological feature of all political praxis (Agamben 1995). It is the fact that it is a politics of death that constitutes this link between the two diagrams of power that is crucial Every political order draws a definitive line of ‘political life’, in which the ability to decide on death is always the operative exercise. The “bios” of the political community, where life is pursued and administered, are necessarily and always predicated on the construction of thanatopolitical spaces. discourses of ‘human rights’ are so often mobilised in opposition to the deathly logics of sovereign power, precisely in these ‘biopolitically produced’ thanato-spaces that the concept of ‘life-itself’ – as a life that is fundamentally exposed to death – is originally  developed
Suicide can never be an effective biopolitical response, only forming a political rejection to sovereign logics Suicide leaves biopower, untouched. Foucault argued biopower and sovereign have always existed in combination This refuses to divide history into discrete forms of power a conception of biopower as a separate discourse entering into sovereignty is deeply problematic sovereignty and biopower are intrinsically linked. The nexus exposure to death, is an ontological feature of all political praxis a politics of death constitutes this link Every political order draws a definitive line of ‘political life’ The “bios” of the political community, are necessarily and always predicated on the construction of thanatopolitical spaces urses of ‘human rights’ are mobilised in opposition to the deathly sovereign power in these ‘biopolitically produced’ thanato-spaces life-itself’ – as a life that is fundamentally exposed to death
[Nicholas, "Suicide Terrorism, Biopolitics And Death", International Studies Association, MA International Conflict Studies From King's College London, Histories Of Suicidal Violence, Jihadism Terrorism, Complexity Theory , Poststructuralism/Continental Philosophy, The Internet] In such a case the ‘biopolitics of suicide’ is indeed a ‘dead end’. Suicide can never be an effective biopolitical response, only forming a political rejection to sovereign logics (Seery 1996). As sovereignty fades, so does the political role of death. It is only in the perennial resurgence of sovereign discourses (through racial exclusion) that death again becomes again relevant to power. Suicide-bombing, therefore, leaves the zeitgeist, biopower, untouched. If we desire to investigate how suicide-bombing might represent a fundamental engagement with the structures of contemporary global order we can however, and against Ojakangas, follow Foucault (2004) himself inasmuch as he explicitly argued that biopower and sovereign have always existed in some form of “hideous” historical combination. This refuses to firmly divide history into a progression of discrete forms of power. In this context, Giorgio Agamben’s (1995) reading of Foucault, which Ojakangas (2005) explicitly rejects, seems far more useful. Agamben argues that a conception of biopower (life-order) as a separate discourse entering into sovereignty (death-order) is deeply problematic. He feels that Foucault fails to sufficiently develop the essential relationship between biopolitical subjectivization and objectivizing sovereign power that circulates around understanding there to be a nexus or foundational intersection around the decision on ‘where death should be’ that is immanent to life-politics. Agamben breaks down the already not-so- firm distinction between sovereignty and biopower in Foucault, by arguing that the two not only cross-over, but are intrinsically linked. The nexus between biopower and sovereignty, political life and exposure to death, is an ontological feature of all political praxis (Agamben 1995). It is the fact that it is a politics of death that constitutes this link between the two diagrams of power that is the crucial point for the argument being made here. Agamben argues, following Schmitt, that political sovereignty has always functioned through making an exception - deciding who is under the law and who lies outside of it, but that this legal exception has always been tied to the question of ‘life itself’. Every political order draws a definitive line of ‘political life’, in which the ability to decide on death is always the operative exercise. The “bios” of the political community, where life is pursued and administered, are necessarily and always predicated on the construction of thanatopolitical spaces. Indeed it is, ironically given that discourses of ‘human rights’ are so often mobilised in opposition to the deathly logics of sovereign power, precisely in these ‘biopolitically produced’ thanato-spaces that the concept of ‘life-itself’ – as a life that is fundamentally exposed to death – is originally  developed (Agamben 1995, p83).
3,154
<h4><strong>Suicide doesn’t solve thanatopolitics</h4><p>Michelsen 11</p><p></strong>[Nicholas, "Suicide Terrorism, Biopolitics And Death", International Studies Association, MA International Conflict Studies From King's College London, Histories Of Suicidal Violence, Jihadism Terrorism, Complexity Theory , Poststructuralism/Continental Philosophy, The Internet]</p><p>In such a case the ‘biopolitics of suicide’ is indeed a ‘dead end’<u><strong>. <mark>Suicide can never be an effective biopolitical response, only forming a political rejection to sovereign logics</mark> </u></strong>(Seery 1996). As sovereignty fades, so does the political role of death. <u><strong>It is only in the perennial resurgence of sovereign discourses (through racial exclusion) that death again becomes again relevant to power. <mark>Suicide</mark>-bombing, therefore, <mark>leaves</mark> the zeitgeist, <mark>biopower, untouched.</mark> If we desire to investigate how suicide-bombing might represent a fundamental engagement with the structures of contemporary global order we can </u></strong>however, and <u><strong>against Ojakangas</u></strong>, follow <u><strong><mark>Foucault</u></strong></mark> (2004) himself inasmuch as he <u><strong>explicitly <mark>argued</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that <mark>biopower and sovereign have always</mark> <mark>existed in</mark> some form of “hideous” historical <mark>combination</mark>. <mark>This refuses to</mark> firmly <mark>divide history into</mark> a progression of <mark>discrete forms of power</u></strong></mark>. In this context, Giorgio <u><strong>Agamben’s </u></strong>(1995) <u><strong>reading of Foucault</u></strong>, which Ojakangas (2005) explicitly rejects, <u><strong>seems far more useful. Agamben argues that <mark>a conception of biopower</mark> (life-order) <mark>as a separate discourse entering into sovereignty</mark> (death-order) <mark>is deeply problematic</u></strong></mark>. He feels that Foucault fails to sufficiently develop the essential relationship between biopolitical subjectivization and objectivizing sovereign power that circulates around understanding there to be a nexus or foundational intersection around the decision on ‘where death should be’ that is immanent to life-politics. Agamben breaks down the already not-so- firm distinction between <u><strong><mark>sovereignty and biopower</mark> </u></strong>in Foucault, by arguing that the two not only cross-over, but <u><strong><mark>are intrinsically linked</u></strong>. <u><strong>The nexus</mark> </u></strong>between biopower and sovereignty, political life and <u><strong><mark>exposure to death,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>is an ontological feature of all political praxis</mark> (Agamben 1995). It is the fact that it is <mark>a politics of death</mark> that <mark>constitutes this link</mark> between the two diagrams of power that is </u></strong>the <u><strong>crucial </u></strong>point for the argument being made here. Agamben argues, following Schmitt, that political sovereignty has always functioned through making an exception - deciding who is under the law and who lies outside of it, but that this legal exception has always been tied to the question of ‘life itself’. <u><strong><mark>Every political order draws a definitive line of ‘political life’</mark>, in which the ability to decide on death is always the operative exercise. <mark>The “bios” of the political community,</mark> where life is pursued and administered, <mark>are necessarily and always predicated on the construction of thanatopolitical spaces</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed it is, ironically given that <u><strong>disco<mark>urses of ‘human rights’ are</mark> so often <mark>mobilised in opposition to the deathly</mark> logics of <mark>sovereign power</mark>, precisely <mark>in these ‘biopolitically produced’ thanato-spaces</mark> that the concept of ‘<mark>life-itself’ – as a life that is fundamentally exposed to death</mark> – is originally  developed </u></strong>(Agamben 1995, p83).</p>
1NC
null
1NC Case
429,696
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,139
Governments won’t utilize prediction market data
Tunkelang 10
Daniel Tunkelang 10, Head of Search Quality at LinkedIn, 6/9/10, “Why Can’t We Just Use Prediction Markets?,” http://thenoisychannel.com/2010/06/09/why-cant-we-just-use-prediction-markets
Prediction markets were all the rage a few years ago There was a proposal to have the US government run a prediction market for terrorist attacks In principle, this framework allows any event with a quantifiable outcome to be predicted prediction markets have not had a broad impact on decision making despite all of the “anys Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets it’s safe to say prediction markets have had limited traction
P m s were all the rage years ago There was a proposal to have the gov run a market In principle, this allows any event to be predicted prediction markets have not had a broad impact on decision making, despite all the “anys Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets prediction markets have had limited traction
Prediction markets were all the rage a few years ago, two of the most notable being the Iowa Electronic Market forecasting electoral results and the now defunct Tradesports offering a similar platform for betting on sports events. There was even a proposal to have the US government run a prediction market for terrorist attacks. In a prediction market, any event with a quantifiable (e.g., binary) outcome can be converted into an asset. At any given time, the asset value corresponds to the market prediction of the probability of the outcome. Just as in any security market, participants determine the value through their buying and selling actions. In principle, this framework allows any event with a quantifiable outcome to be predicted by a marketplace. But, at least from my vantage point, prediction markets have not had a broad impact on decision making, despite all of the “anys” in the previous paragraph. Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling (and of course finance itself), I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets. Sure, there’s the Hollywood Stock Exchange that applies the fantasy sports concept to the movie industry and even startup Empire Avenue that aspires to generalize this idea even further into an “online influence stock exchange”. Still, I think it’s safe to say that prediction markets have had limited traction to date.
1,430
<h4>Governments won’t <u>utilize</u> prediction market data </h4><p>Daniel <strong>Tunkelang 10</strong>, Head of Search Quality at LinkedIn, 6/9/10, “Why Can’t We Just Use Prediction Markets?,” http://thenoisychannel.com/2010/06/09/why-cant-we-just-use-prediction-markets</p><p><u><strong><mark>P</mark>rediction <mark>m</mark>arket<mark>s were</u></strong> <u><strong>all the rage</mark> a few <mark>years ago</u></strong></mark>, two of the most notable being the Iowa Electronic Market forecasting electoral results and the now defunct Tradesports offering a similar platform for betting on sports events. <u><strong><mark>There was</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>a proposal to have the</mark> US <mark>gov</mark>ernment <mark>run a</mark> prediction <mark>market</mark> for terrorist attacks</u></strong>. </p><p>In a prediction market, any event with a quantifiable (e.g., binary) outcome can be converted into an asset. At any given time, the asset value corresponds to the market prediction of the probability of the outcome. Just as in any security market, participants determine the value through their buying and selling actions. <u><strong><mark>In principle, this</mark> framework <mark>allows any event</mark> with a quantifiable outcome <mark>to be predicted</u></strong></mark> by a marketplace. But, at least from my vantage point, <u><strong><mark>prediction markets have</u></strong> <u><strong>not had a broad impact on decision making</u></strong>, <u><strong>despite all</mark> of <mark>the “anys</u></strong></mark>” in the previous paragraph. <u><strong><mark>Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling</u></strong></mark> (and of course finance itself), <u><strong><mark>I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets</u></strong></mark>. Sure, there’s the Hollywood Stock Exchange that applies the fantasy sports concept to the movie industry and even startup Empire Avenue that aspires to generalize this idea even further into an “online influence stock exchange”. Still, I think <u><strong>it’s safe to say</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>prediction markets have had limited traction</u></strong></mark> to date.</p>
2NC
2NC CP
AT PM
429,698
13
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,140
The technology just isn’t good enough
Thackston 13
Thackston 13 <Jim, Independent Software Engineer, “FOR THE RECORD, HOUSE SUBCOMMITEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE HEARING,” December 13, http://www.undetectablelaundering.com/docs/WRITTEN_REMARKS_OF_JIM_THACKSTON_120413.pdf>#SPS
I have proved, using scientifically repeatable methods, that many assertions made by internet poker legalization advocates are false. It is simply not possible to use IP address, cell tower triangulation, or any other geo-location technology to reliably determine the physical location of an internet poker player. Terror and crime organizations can use Software algorithms to strategically construct poker games that present normal patterns of play to anti-collusion systems and at the same time ensure that money is moved to specified internet poker accounts. Expanding legal internet poker in a market as big as the United States will guarantee the occurrence of criminal activity
I have proved, using scientifically repeatable methods, that many assertions made by internet poker legalization advocates are false. Terror and crime organizations can use Software algorithms to strategically construct poker games that present normal patterns of play to anti-collusion systems Expanding legal internet poker in a market as big as the United States will guarantee the occurrence of criminal activity
I have proved, using scientifically repeatable methods, that many assertions made by internet poker legalization advocates are false. It is simply not possible to use IP address, cell tower triangulation, or any other geo-location technology to reliably determine the physical location of an internet poker player. Terror and crime organizations can use Software algorithms to strategically construct poker games that present normal patterns of play to anti-collusion systems and at the same time ensure that money is moved to specified internet poker accounts. Expanding legal internet poker in a market as big as the United States will guarantee the occurrence of criminal activity because the massive amount of ‘clean’ money deposited into legal internet poker accounts will prove irresistible to criminal or terror organizations.
833
<h4>The technology just isn’t good enough</h4><p><strong>Thackston 13</strong> <Jim, Independent Software Engineer, “FOR THE RECORD, HOUSE SUBCOMMITEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE HEARING,” December 13, http://www.undetectablelaundering.com/docs/WRITTEN_REMARKS_OF_JIM_THACKSTON_120413.pdf>#SPS</p><p><u><strong><mark>I have proved, using scientifically repeatable methods, that many assertions made by internet poker legalization advocates are false.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>It is simply not possible to use IP address, cell tower triangulation, or any other geo-location technology to reliably determine the physical location of an internet poker player.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Terror and crime organizations can use Software algorithms to strategically construct poker games that present normal patterns of play to anti-collusion systems</mark> and at the same time ensure that money is moved to specified internet poker accounts.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Expanding legal internet poker in a market as big as the United States will guarantee the occurrence of criminal</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>activity</u></strong></mark> because the massive amount of ‘clean’ money deposited into legal internet poker accounts will prove irresistible to criminal or terror organizations.</p>
1NR
Market
2NC AT: Extinction Different
429,699
1
16,966
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
564,686
N
Kentucky
7
Georgetown EK
Box, Brian
1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,141
Public’s not very helpful
Somin 13
Ilya Somin 13, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, 3/30/13, “Prediction Markets and Political Ignorance,” http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/30/prediction-markets-and-political-ignorance/
political ignorance makes it difficult for prediction markets to function at all because the public is either unaware of prediction markets or does not understand their value there was little outcry over the US government’s recent crackdown
political ignorance makes difficult for prediction markets to function at all because the public is either unaware markets or does not understand their value, there was little outcry over crackdown
Finally, political ignorance makes it more difficult for prediction markets to function at all. In part because most of the public is either unaware of prediction markets or does not understand their value, there was little outcry over the US government’s recent crackdown on Intrade, one of the largest prediction market sites. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission forced Intrade to stop taking bets from Americans.
420
<h4>Public’s not very helpful </h4><p>Ilya <strong>Somin 13</strong>, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, 3/30/13, “Prediction Markets and Political Ignorance,” http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/30/prediction-markets-and-political-ignorance/</p><p>Finally, <u><strong><mark>political ignorance makes</mark> it</u></strong> more <u><strong><mark>difficult for prediction markets to function at all</u></strong></mark>. In part <u><strong><mark>because</u></strong></mark> most of <u><strong><mark>the public is either unaware</mark> of prediction <mark>markets or does not understand their value</u></strong>, <u><strong>there was little outcry over</mark> the US government’s recent <mark>crackdown</u></strong></mark> on Intrade, one of the largest prediction market sites. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission forced Intrade to stop taking bets from Americans.</p>
2NC
2NC CP
AT PM
429,700
6
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,142
Being able to engage in the regulations of the aff key to solve concepts of Death
Somerville ’01
Somerville ’01 (Margaret Somerville Death Talk pg. xii-xix McGill-Queen’s University Press)
We all need to engage in "death talk" if we are to accommodate with some degree of comfort the inevitable reality of death into the living of our lives. we must do this both as individuals and as members of society most of us participated in death talk as part of our religious practice in industrialized Western societies the debate provides a prominent context for such talk. p a s and the debate that has surrounded these issues Death confronts us with terror and aloneness even if we are accompanied by loving others. We can respond in two ways we can take control of death and view it - and life - in a reductionist way. Many advocates while they value human life and respect it within given parameters, do not view it as having any intrinsic value mystery, or meaning One reason the euthanasia debate might have emerged now in industrialized Western countries is that recent extraordinary medical successes have expanded our life span and changed the diseases from which we are most likely to die from acute ones (which killed us quickly) to chronic ones (which do e is our connection with the future, and that future need not be distant to play its essential role in allowing us to experience hope. . It is only when we can structure the chaos to understand the deep roots and complexities involved in what we do, and the symbols and values affected These decisions are often similar to those made on the basis of true simplicity, but the resemblance is superficial These decisions are based on apparent simplicity which comes with deep understanding.
We all need to engage in "death talk" if we are to accommodate with some degree of comfort the inevitable reality of death into the living of our lives. we must do this both as individuals and as members of society in industrialized Western societies the debate provides a prominent context for such talk. p a s and the debate that has surrounded these issues These decisions are often similar to those made on the basis of true simplicity, but the resemblance is superficial These decisions are based on apparent simplicity which comes with deep understanding.
We all need to engage in "death talk" if we are to accommodate, with some degree of comfort, the inevitable reality of death into the living of our lives. And we must do this both as individuals and as members of society. Until the last few decades, most of us participated in death talk as part of our religious practice. Today, in industrialized Western societies, the euthanasia debate provides a prominent context for such talk. This book contains a collection of papers, which I have written over the last twenty years, on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, and the debate that has surrounded these issues. Death confronts us with terror and aloneness, even if we are accompanied by loving others. We can respond in two ways. In the first, we can take control of death and view it - and life - in a reductionist way. Euthanasia is often a manifestation of this approach. Many advocates of euthanasia, while they value human life and respect it within given parameters, do not view it as having any intrinsic value, mystery, or meaning. Rather, they value human life for what it provides, and believe that, when the human machine deteriorates beyond some point- when we, or others, judge the quality of life as "not worth living" — euthanasia allows a dignified exit from life. One politician of this school of thought (Mr Jeff Kennett who was then premier of the state of Victoria in Australia) summed it up in this way: When you are past your "use-‘by’/"best-before” date, you should be checked out as quickly, cheaply, and efficiently as possible. This politician‘s consumer-market-values approach to death - perhaps even seeing the morality of death as being worked out in the morality of the market place - can be compared with the approach and attitudes to death captured in a beautifully bound large book placed on a stand in the non-denominational chapel of an Australian hospice. The messages written in this volume by people - from small children who have just learned to write to spouses whose lifetime partners are dying - capture an intangible reality that I am unable to describe but that can be experienced in reading the entries. The impression about what human death and dying involves that I was left with was the polar opposite of the one generated by the politician’s remarks. This reaction opens up the other way to deal with death: to search for meaning in it. People who do so often view human life as having intrinsic value, encompassing a mystery (at least the mystery of the un- known), eliciting a response that contains wonder and awe. They believe that legalizing euthanasia would put at high risk the likelihood that we will find meaning in death, and that this possibility threatens our ability to find it in life. “Death talk" and “life talk" are two sides of the same coin, and the content of these two forms of talk is inextricably intermingled: death talk forms part of life talk and vice versa. We run serious risks as individuals and societies, moreover, if we fail to balance one with the other. In this book, I want to balance the death talk articulated in the euthanasia debate-with life talk and to articulate the harmful impact that accepting euthanasia would have on the latter's content. One of the great difficulties in the euthanasia debate is that we lack a secular vocabulary that can adequately capture the non-physical - the metaphysical - realities we need to create, protect, and live in if we are to experience fully human lives. Traditionally, we have used the language of religion to create the intangible, invisible, immeasurable reality that is essential to our human well-being, both as individuals and as a society. Often, we still need to employ the vocabulary of that language to capture the dimension of “human spirit” — which we need, whether we are religious or not. The use of this language can cause difficulties for those who reject religion and the supernatural because ' they see this vocabulary as invoking these entities. But in using this language in a secular context, I do not intend to base my arguments on religion or to rely on the 'supernatural. By the human spirit I mean the “deeply intuitive sense of relatedness or connectedness to the world and the universe in which we live."2 To recognize this dimension of ourselves is to recognize that we are more than “gene machines" and more than just logical, rational beings. We can create this dimension through shared language in the broadest sense of both words. Indeed, one challenge of “globalization” is to find a language and vocabulary that will cross the boundaries of religion and of ethnic and national origin (the boundaries of culture) and capture the profound realities of the human spirit that can give meaning to our fives - and deaths. The euthanasia debate is one important context in which we have an opportunity to contribute to finding this common human spirit and the shared language that will elicit and describe it. We are story-telling animals. Some of our most important shared stories are in the form of metaphor, parable, and poetry. We communicate through imagination and intuition as much as reason and cognition. And we can find and communicate certain realities only in- directly, not directly. Some kinds of knowledge can be sought only by setting up metaphorical-metaphysical spaces within which we hope to encounter them. This is true with regard to knowledge and wisdom about death. Setting up a space of that kind depends on having a sense of be- longing to a community. Many of us have lost this sense and, consequently, have difficulty finding or entering the metaphorical- metaphysical space we need when we, or those we love, are dying. In facing the circumstances of death, it can be much harder for us than it was for our ancestors to fulfil the need to cry and to laugh through the tears; to come together to share the pain of loss and the joy of memory; and to participate with others in poetry, ritual, and song. Euthanasia is one response to this loss. In this book I explore the causes, scope, and impact of the contemporary euthanasia debate. I argue in chapter 1 in Part One that this dc- bate is part of the search for a new cultural paradigm on which to base the societal structure. This search is also being undertaken in the con- text of gene tics and reproductive technologies. What we do and choose not to do in relation to both the passing on of human life (genetics and reproductive technologies) and the ending of it (euthanasia) will create the metaphysical reality, the sense of meaning, within which we live our lives. We have always used birth and death, the two great "marker events" of human life, as central to our search for meaning. As long as we humans have been around, we have become ill, aged, suffered, and died, and others have always been able to kill us. Euthanasia is not a new question. But our kind of society has rejected it for over two thousand years. Why, then, has the legalization of euthanasia been seriously considered in industrialized Western societies within the last twenty years? These are the same societies, moreover, that have made astonishing advances in the ability to relieve pain and suffering. Not all of us agree on the reasons, though most of us admit they are multiple and complex. These factors are explored in chapter 6, “Legalizing Euthanasia: Why Now?" one of several chapters in Part Two on the evolution of the euthanasia debate. One reason the euthanasia debate might have emerged now in industrialized Western countries is that recent extraordinary medical successes have expanded our life span and changed the diseases from which we are most likely to die from acute ones (which killed us quickly) to chronic ones (which do not). In general, people who die of chronic diseases cost the health-care system much more than those who die suddenly. We are also aging populations, which means that more of us are likely to die of chronic diseases. In short, our medical successes benefit us, but they also present us with their cost and the need to recognize our inability as a society to provide all the health care that might benefit everyone who wants it. It is, and should be, very difficult to face someone whom we know we could help with very expensive medical treatment and refuse access to it. Recently, the connection between euthanasia and the saving of health-care resources has been articulated in public forums, although the topic has always been discussed privately. In chapter 2, I address the question, “Should the Grandparents Die?" The reasons behind calls for the legalization of euthanasia are complex, as is the debate itself. Consequently, we need to be aware of the ways in which the case for one side or the other is promoted. The case for legalization has been promoted, for instance, through confusion with other acts or situations that do not, in general, raise ethical and legal difficulties. This confusion must be identified and carefully explored. I aim to demonstrate in chapter 7, “Euthanasia by Confusion,” that such an investigation could make us see some of the arguments differently. Another reason given for the need to legalize euthanasia is that it is necessary to relieve pain. In Part Three I discuss pain and pain-relief treatment, and their relation to euthanasia. We have been grossly negligent, even malevolent, in our failure to treat pain. And, looking back, I find it difficult to imagine how we could have been so inhumane. Increasing sensitivity to the pain of others, especially on the part of health-care professionals, has been a major advance of the last twenty years. This awareness is particularly true with respect to those who are unable to communicate their pain easily, whether because they are too young, too old, or of a different cultural or linguistic background. Because euthanasia is a topic of debate, it matters how we carry out that debate. Often this debate centres around what is required to respect dying people. The chapters in Part Four deal with that issue. Some of these chapters consist of my responses to others‘ contributions, some of which were, in turn, responses to mine. They also include my reviews of two books written by advocates of legalization. Finally, in Part Six, I examine some foundational concepts in health ethics and law that are relevant to the euthanasia debate. Chapter 21 explores some of the concepts that govern decision-making concerning medical treatment at the end of life — autonomy, self-determination, competence, and voluntariness. The approaches taken to these concepts in law, psychiatry, and ethics are compared and contrasted. In exploring euthanasia, we need to undertake a broader analysis than one based merely on ideas that are familiar to people living in an industrialized Western democracy. Human rights was one of the most important global concepts of the second half of the twentieth century, and, in recent years, human rights in health and health care have been a focus of attention. Human rights is not, however, a universally accepted concept in all circumstances - in part because the language of “rights” can seem too Western and too legalistic to some other societies and cultures. We have always recognized that human rights necessarily encompass human responsibilities, and yet, in the West, we have been nervous of expressly naming the latter for fear they could be used as instruments to deny human fights. Governments might argue that human rights depend on fulfilling human responsibilities as defined by the state. In chapter 22, on human rights in health and health care, I identify a concept of “human ethics". This concept is not meant in any way to detract from the importance of human rights. Indeed, the contrary is true. The idea is that human ethics might be a more neutral and a more universally acceptable term than human rights, at least that term standing alone. In short, human rights and human responsibilities both express the concept of human ethics - and it ex- presses them; they are interchangeable. Adopting the concept of human ethics would mean that, even if a state does not recognize human rights (legally enforceable claims of individuals or groups against the state), it would still be bound by fundamental principles of human ethics. One of those principles, I believe, is that, except in essential self-defence, we must not kill each other — not even for reasons of the utmost mercy and compassion. Consequently, euthanasia would contravene the requirements of human ethics. The euthanasia debate has much to teach us. Those who oppose euthanasia might wish that the debate had never emerged, yet, pro- vided the outcome remains that euthanasia is prohibited, the net result of this debate might be beneficial. We have already learned much. We know, for example, that people who want euthanasia have lost all hope. When we are terminally ill, by definition, we cannot, apart from a miracle, hope for long-term survival. Yet there arc things we can still hope for - to see a loved person, to see the next sunrise and hear the dawn chorus of birds, to cuddle a kitten or pat a friendly dog. Hope is our connection with the future, and that future need not be distant to play its essential role in allowing us to experience hope. Hope is our connection with life and with the continuation of life - even when we know we will die (which is true for most of us for most of our lives). Euthanasia confirms the power of death over hope, of death over life. It fails to recognize the great mystery that allowing death to occur, when its time has come, is an act of life. Euthanasia is an act of death. There is a vast difference between natural death and euthanasia. In our often unsubtle, un-nuanced, very physically oriented, non-metaphysically sensitive world at the dawn of a new century, many of us are failing to recognize how some deaths, and some forms of death, are compatible with life and hope, but others, especially those resulting from euthanasia, are not. It might be that in less sophisticated times, certainly in less scientifically sophisticated ones, we comprehended this distinction through our intuition. We knew through true simplicity. Often, when we gain knowledge, we move from true simplicity to a chaos phase in which we find it difficult to structure our new knowledge and to formulate appropriate responses. It is only when we can structure the chaos to understand the deep roots and complexities involved in what we do, and the symbols and values affected, that we can make decisions on an adequate and comprehensive basis. These decisions are often similar to those made on the basis of true simplicity, but the resemblance is superficial. These decisions are based on apparent simplicity, which comes with deep understanding.
14,835
<h4><strong>Being able to engage in the regulations of the aff key to solve concepts of Death</h4><p>Somerville ’01</p><p></strong>(Margaret Somerville Death Talk pg. xii-xix McGill-Queen’s University Press)</p><p><u><strong><mark>We all need to engage in "death talk"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>if we are to accommodate</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>with some degree of comfort</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the inevitable reality of death into the living of our lives.</u></strong></mark> And <u><strong><mark>we must do this both as individuals and as members of society</u></strong></mark>. Until the last few decades, <u><strong>most of us participated in death talk as part of our religious practice</u></strong>. Today, <u><strong><mark>in industrialized Western societies</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> euthanasia <u><strong><mark>debate provides a prominent context for such talk.</u></strong></mark> This book contains a collection of papers, which I have written over the last twenty years, on euthanasia and <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>hysician-<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide, <u><strong><mark>and the debate that has surrounded these issues</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Death confronts us with terror and aloneness</u></strong>, <u><strong>even if we are accompanied by loving others.</u></strong> <u><strong>We can respond in two ways</u></strong>. In the first, <u><strong>we can take control of death and view it - and life - in a reductionist way. </u></strong>Euthanasia is often a manifestation of this approach. <u><strong>Many advocates</u></strong> of euthanasia, <u><strong>while they value human life and respect it within given parameters, do not view it as having any intrinsic value</u></strong>, <u><strong>mystery, or meaning</u></strong>. Rather, they value human life for what it provides, and believe that, when the human machine deteriorates beyond some point- when we, or others, judge the quality of life as "not worth living" — euthanasia allows a dignified exit from life. One politician of this school of thought (Mr Jeff Kennett who was then premier of the state of Victoria in Australia) summed it up in this way: When you are past your "use-‘by’/"best-before” date, you should be checked out as quickly, cheaply, and efficiently as possible. This politician‘s consumer-market-values approach to death - perhaps even seeing the morality of death as being worked out in the morality of the market place - can be compared with the approach and attitudes to death captured in a beautifully bound large book placed on a stand in the non-denominational chapel of an Australian hospice. The messages written in this volume by people - from small children who have just learned to write to spouses whose lifetime partners are dying - capture an intangible reality that I am unable to describe but that can be experienced in reading the entries. The impression about what human death and dying involves that I was left with was the polar opposite of the one generated by the politician’s remarks. This reaction opens up the other way to deal with death: to search for meaning in it. People who do so often view human life as having intrinsic value, encompassing a mystery (at least the mystery of the un- known), eliciting a response that contains wonder and awe. They believe that legalizing euthanasia would put at high risk the likelihood that we will find meaning in death, and that this possibility threatens our ability to find it in life. “Death talk" and “life talk" are two sides of the same coin, and the content of these two forms of talk is inextricably intermingled: death talk forms part of life talk and vice versa. We run serious risks as individuals and societies, moreover, if we fail to balance one with the other. In this book, I want to balance the death talk articulated in the euthanasia debate-with life talk and to articulate the harmful impact that accepting euthanasia would have on the latter's content. One of the great difficulties in the euthanasia debate is that we lack a secular vocabulary that can adequately capture the non-physical - the metaphysical - realities we need to create, protect, and live in if we are to experience fully human lives. Traditionally, we have used the language of religion to create the intangible, invisible, immeasurable reality that is essential to our human well-being, both as individuals and as a society. Often, we still need to employ the vocabulary of that language to capture the dimension of “human spirit” — which we need, whether we are religious or not. The use of this language can cause difficulties for those who reject religion and the supernatural because ' they see this vocabulary as invoking these entities. But in using this language in a secular context, I do not intend to base my arguments on religion or to rely on the 'supernatural. By the human spirit I mean the “deeply intuitive sense of relatedness or connectedness to the world and the universe in which we live."2 To recognize this dimension of ourselves is to recognize that we are more than “gene machines" and more than just logical, rational beings. We can create this dimension through shared language in the broadest sense of both words. Indeed, one challenge of “globalization” is to find a language and vocabulary that will cross the boundaries of religion and of ethnic and national origin (the boundaries of culture) and capture the profound realities of the human spirit that can give meaning to our fives - and deaths. The euthanasia debate is one important context in which we have an opportunity to contribute to finding this common human spirit and the shared language that will elicit and describe it. We are story-telling animals. Some of our most important shared stories are in the form of metaphor, parable, and poetry. We communicate through imagination and intuition as much as reason and cognition. And we can find and communicate certain realities only in- directly, not directly. Some kinds of knowledge can be sought only by setting up metaphorical-metaphysical spaces within which we hope to encounter them. This is true with regard to knowledge and wisdom about death. Setting up a space of that kind depends on having a sense of be- longing to a community. Many of us have lost this sense and, consequently, have difficulty finding or entering the metaphorical- metaphysical space we need when we, or those we love, are dying. In facing the circumstances of death, it can be much harder for us than it was for our ancestors to fulfil the need to cry and to laugh through the tears; to come together to share the pain of loss and the joy of memory; and to participate with others in poetry, ritual, and song. Euthanasia is one response to this loss. In this book I explore the causes, scope, and impact of the contemporary euthanasia debate. I argue in chapter 1 in Part One that this dc- bate is part of the search for a new cultural paradigm on which to base the societal structure. This search is also being undertaken in the con- text of gene tics and reproductive technologies. What we do and choose not to do in relation to both the passing on of human life (genetics and reproductive technologies) and the ending of it (euthanasia) will create the metaphysical reality, the sense of meaning, within which we live our lives. We have always used birth and death, the two great "marker events" of human life, as central to our search for meaning. As long as we humans have been around, we have become ill, aged, suffered, and died, and others have always been able to kill us. Euthanasia is not a new question. But our kind of society has rejected it for over two thousand years. Why, then, has the legalization of euthanasia been seriously considered in industrialized Western societies within the last twenty years? These are the same societies, moreover, that have made astonishing advances in the ability to relieve pain and suffering. Not all of us agree on the reasons, though most of us admit they are multiple and complex. These factors are explored in chapter 6, “Legalizing Euthanasia: Why Now?" one of several chapters in Part Two on the evolution of the euthanasia debate. <u><strong>One reason the euthanasia debate might have emerged now in industrialized Western countries is that recent extraordinary medical successes have expanded our life span and changed the diseases from which we are most likely to die from acute ones (which killed us quickly) to chronic ones (which do</u></strong> not). In general, people who die of chronic diseases cost the health-care system much more than those who die suddenly. We are also aging populations, which means that more of us are likely to die of chronic diseases. In short, our medical successes benefit us, but they also present us with their cost and the need to recognize our inability as a society to provide all the health care that might benefit everyone who wants it. It is, and should be, very difficult to face someone whom we know we could help with very expensive medical treatment and refuse access to it. Recently, the connection between euthanasia and the saving of health-care resources has been articulated in public forums, although the topic has always been discussed privately. In chapter 2, I address the question, “Should the Grandparents Die?" The reasons behind calls for the legalization of euthanasia are complex, as is the debate itself. Consequently, we need to be aware of the ways in which the case for one side or the other is promoted. The case for legalization has been promoted, for instance, through confusion with other acts or situations that do not, in general, raise ethical and legal difficulties. This confusion must be identified and carefully explored. I aim to demonstrate in chapter 7, “Euthanasia by Confusion,” that such an investigation could make us see some of the arguments differently. Another reason given for the need to legalize euthanasia is that it is necessary to relieve pain. In Part Three I discuss pain and pain-relief treatment, and their relation to euthanasia. We have been grossly negligent, even malevolent, in our failure to treat pain. And, looking back, I find it difficult to imagine how we could have been so inhumane. Increasing sensitivity to the pain of others, especially on the part of health-care professionals, has been a major advance of the last twenty years. This awareness is particularly true with respect to those who are unable to communicate their pain easily, whether because they are too young, too old, or of a different cultural or linguistic background. Because euthanasia is a topic of debate, it matters how we carry out that debate. Often this debate centres around what is required to respect dying people. The chapters in Part Four deal with that issue. Some of these chapters consist of my responses to others‘ contributions, some of which were, in turn, responses to mine. They also include my reviews of two books written by advocates of legalization. Finally, in Part Six, I examine some foundational concepts in health ethics and law that are relevant to the euthanasia debate. Chapter 21 explores some of the concepts that govern decision-making concerning medical treatment at the end of life — autonomy, self-determination, competence, and voluntariness. The approaches taken to these concepts in law, psychiatry, and ethics are compared and contrasted. In exploring euthanasia, we need to undertake a broader analysis than one based merely on ideas that are familiar to people living in an industrialized Western democracy. Human rights was one of the most important global concepts of the second half of the twentieth century, and, in recent years, human rights in health and health care have been a focus of attention. Human rights is not, however, a universally accepted concept in all circumstances - in part because the language of “rights” can seem too Western and too legalistic to some other societies and cultures. We have always recognized that human rights necessarily encompass human responsibilities, and yet, in the West, we have been nervous of expressly naming the latter for fear they could be used as instruments to deny human fights. Governments might argue that human rights depend on fulfilling human responsibilities as defined by the state. In chapter 22, on human rights in health and health care, I identify a concept of “human ethics". This concept is not meant in any way to detract from the importance of human rights. Indeed, the contrary is true. The idea is that human ethics might be a more neutral and a more universally acceptable term than human rights, at least that term standing alone. In short, human rights and human responsibilities both express the concept of human ethics - and it ex- presses them; they are interchangeable. Adopting the concept of human ethics would mean that, even if a state does not recognize human rights (legally enforceable claims of individuals or groups against the state), it would still be bound by fundamental principles of human ethics. One of those principles, I believe, is that, except in essential self-defence, we must not kill each other — not even for reasons of the utmost mercy and compassion. Consequently, euthanasia would contravene the requirements of human ethics. The euthanasia debate has much to teach us. Those who oppose euthanasia might wish that the debate had never emerged, yet, pro- vided the outcome remains that euthanasia is prohibited, the net result of this debate might be beneficial. We have already learned much. We know, for example, that people who want euthanasia have lost all hope. When we are terminally ill, by definition, we cannot, apart from a miracle, hope for long-term survival. Yet there arc things we can still hope for - to see a loved person, to see the next sunrise and hear the dawn chorus of birds, to cuddle a kitten or pat a friendly dog. Hop<u><strong>e is our connection with the future, and that future need not be distant to play its essential role in allowing us to experience hope. </u></strong>Hope is our connection with life and with the continuation of life - even when we know we will die (which is true for most of us for most of our lives). Euthanasia confirms the power of death over hope, of death over life. It fails to recognize the great mystery that allowing death to occur, when its time has come, is an act of life. Euthanasia is an act of death. There is a vast difference between natural death and euthanasia. In our often unsubtle, un-nuanced, very physically oriented, non-metaphysically sensitive world at the dawn of a new century, many of us are failing to recognize how some deaths, and some forms of death, are compatible with life and hope, but others, especially those resulting from euthanasia, are not. It might be that in less sophisticated times, certainly in less scientifically sophisticated ones, we comprehended this distinction through our intuition. We knew through true simplicity. Often, when we gain knowledge, we move from true simplicity to a chaos phase in which we find it difficult to structure our new knowledge and to formulate appropriate responses<u><strong>. It is only when we can structure the chaos to understand the deep roots and complexities involved in what we do, and the symbols and values affected</u></strong>, that we can make decisions on an adequate and comprehensive basis. <u><strong><mark>These decisions are often similar to those made on the basis of true simplicity, but the resemblance is superficial</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>These decisions are based on apparent simplicity</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which comes with deep understanding.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
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Kritik turns and outweighs the case ---
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<h4>Kritik turns and outweighs the case ---</h4>
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Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
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The need for discussing regulations OUTWEIGHS the moral issues up for debate
Prado ‘98
Prado ‘98 (Cynthia A. Prado J.D. candidate, University of Southern California Law School, 1999; B.A. Psychology, Minor Bioethics, University of Southern California, 1996. “EFFECTS OF GENDER DIFFERENCES ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: PRACTICE AND REGULATION” Fall, 1998 8 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 101, Lexis, TSW)
legislation regarding p a s , is constantly being proposed in the U S Although the United States has a long history of common law and proposals of legislation supporting this philosophy, only within the last decade has passing legislation legalizing physician-assisted suicide been likely This is due to the growing support for the practice o Moreover, passage of legislation has actually occurred in the last two years growing support for the legalization of p a s discussion on how it should be regulated take priority over moral and philosophical discussions. In all practices in areas of life familial, cultural, educational, vocational, legal and medical there will always be risk of abuses as well as people who vulnerable than others to such abuses In the practice of p a s the least powerful groups of people in the U S are generally the most vulnerable to the risk These groups include women, minorities, the elderly and the poor, all of whom are mostly aware of their vulnerability This is evidenced by their lack of support for the legalization of p a s To begin, the practice of p a s is most widely known to Americans by the media publicity of the infamous Michigan physician, Dr. Kevorkian. From the media presentation, most of his assistees n17 have [*106] been middle-aged women. the patterns have triggered needed and long overdue discussion of gender issues and gender implications in this area of bioethics.
legislation regarding p a s , is constantly being proposed in the U S growing support for the legalization of p a s discussion on how it should be regulated take priority over moral and philosophical discussions. In all practices in areas of life there will always be risk of abuses In the practice of p a s the least powerful groups of people in the U S are generally the most vulnerable to the risk
I. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUE OF GENDER American legal and philosophical movements regarding an individual's right to die have always been profound and strong. MDEL legislation, specifically regarding euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, is constantly being proposed in the United States. The first piece of such legislation was introduced in 1906. n11 The strong devotion to the Western philosophy of self-determination and autonomy was clearly demonstrated by Judge Cardozo in 1914 when he wrote that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." n12 Although the United States has a long history of common law and proposals of legislation supporting this philosophy, only within the last decade has passing legislation legalizing physician-assisted suicide been likely. This is due to the growing support for the practice of physician- assisted suicide. n13 Moreover, passage of legislation has actually occurred in the last two years with the enactment of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. It is the world's first statute affirmatively legalizing the practice of physician-assisted suicide. n14 In view of the [*105] obvious growing support for the legalization and practice of physician- assisted suicide, discussion on how it should be regulated may take priority over moral and philosophical discussions. In all practices in areas of life - familial, cultural, educational, vocational, legal and medical - there will always be risk of abuses, as well as people who are more vulnerable than others to such abuses. In the practice of physician-assisted suicide, the least powerful groups of people in the United States are generally the most vulnerable to the risk of abuses. These groups include women, minorities, the elderly and the poor, all of whom are mostly aware of their vulnerability. This is evidenced by their lack of support for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. n15 Regarding gender, most surveys and polls show that women consistently oppose euthanasia and physician- assisted suicide practices more than men. n16 Members of all these groups are also more likely to request such practices for the many different reasons discussed in part two of this Article. The recent, albeit insufficient, focus on gender in MDEL discussions has been triggered by a recognition of gender patterns, specifically the disproportionate involvement of women. To begin, the practice of physician-assisted suicide is most widely known to Americans by the media publicity of the infamous Michigan physician, Dr. Kevorkian. From the media presentation, most of his assistees n17 have [*106] been middle-aged women. n18 Thus, many critics of Kevorkian have depicted his practice of physician-assisted suicide as gender-biased. n19 One critic has even described his practice as "womanslaughter." n20 If Kevorkian's assisted suicides are viewed as typical of the requests and grants of all physician-assisted suicides, then it may be expected that the practice of physician-assisted suicide will disproportionately involve women. However, this expectation may not be correct in view of the fact that the total number of Kevorkian's assistees has been grossly underestimated. Kevorkian claims to have assisted between 70 and 100 people in ending their lives, and states that he receives two to three requests a day for his assistance. n21 It is also reported that "nearly half of the requests are from men" which may further discredit any finding or expectation of a gender pattern. n22 Therefore, in order to extrapolate from Kevorkian's physician-assisted suicide practice to that of broader society, accurate gender proportions of Kevorkian's potential and actual assistees must be obtained. A second recognized gender pattern that has triggered a focus on gender issues in MDEL are legal developments arising through case law. New precedents regarding MDEL in both American and Dutch law have primarily involved women. n23 In the United States, precedents were created by the cases of Elizabeth Bouvia, n24 Karen Ann [*107] Quinlan n25 and Nancy Cruzan. n26 In the Netherlands, recent legal developments have involved the highly controversial case of Chabot. n27 This case law pattern and Kevorkian's pattern may or may not be an accurate depiction of the current and future practice of physician- assisted suicide. Nevertheless, the patterns have triggered needed and long overdue discussion of gender issues and gender implications in this area of bioethics.
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<h4><strong>The need for discussing regulations OUTWEIGHS the moral issues up for debate</h4><p>Prado ‘98</p><p><u>(Cynthia A. Prado J.D. candidate, University of Southern California Law School, 1999; B.A. Psychology, Minor Bioethics, University of Southern California, 1996. “EFFECTS OF GENDER DIFFERENCES ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: PRACTICE AND REGULATION” Fall, 1998 8 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 101, Lexis, TSW)</p><p></u></strong>I. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUE OF GENDER American legal and philosophical movements regarding an individual's right to die have always been profound and strong. MDEL <u><strong><mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>, specifically <u><strong><mark>regarding</u></strong></mark> euthanasia and <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>hysician-<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide<u><strong><mark>, is constantly being proposed in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates. The first piece of such legislation was introduced in 1906. n11 The strong devotion to the Western philosophy of self-determination and autonomy was clearly demonstrated by Judge Cardozo in 1914 when he wrote that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." n12 <u><strong>Although the United States has a long history of common law and proposals of legislation supporting this philosophy, only within the last decade has passing legislation legalizing physician-assisted suicide been likely</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is due to the growing support for the practice o</u></strong>f physician- assisted suicide. n13 <u><strong>Moreover, passage of legislation has actually occurred in the last two years </u></strong>with the enactment of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. It is the world's first statute affirmatively legalizing the practice of physician-assisted suicide. n14 In view of the [*105] obvious <u><strong><mark>growing support for the legalization</u></strong></mark> and practice <u><strong><mark>of p</u></strong></mark>hysician- <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide, <u><strong><mark>discussion on how it should be regulated</mark> </u></strong>may <u><strong><mark>take priority over moral and philosophical discussions.</mark> <mark>In all practices in areas of life</u></strong></mark> - <u><strong>familial, cultural, educational, vocational, legal and medical</u></strong> - <u><strong><mark>there will always be risk of abuses</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as well as people who</u></strong> are more <u><strong>vulnerable than others to such abuses</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>In the practice of p</u></strong></mark>hysician-<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide, <u><strong><mark>the least powerful groups of people in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>generally</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the most vulnerable to the risk</u></strong></mark> of abuses. <u><strong>These groups include women, minorities, the elderly and the poor, all of whom are mostly aware of their vulnerability</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is evidenced by their lack of support for the legalization of p</u></strong>hysician-<u><strong>a</u></strong>ssisted <u><strong>s</u></strong>uicide. n15 Regarding gender, most surveys and polls show that women consistently oppose euthanasia and physician- assisted suicide practices more than men. n16 Members of all these groups are also more likely to request such practices for the many different reasons discussed in part two of this Article. The recent, albeit insufficient, focus on gender in MDEL discussions has been triggered by a recognition of gender patterns, specifically the disproportionate involvement of women. <u><strong>To begin, the practice of p</u></strong>hysician-<u><strong>a</u></strong>ssisted <u><strong>s</u></strong>uicide <u><strong>is most widely known to Americans by the media publicity of the infamous Michigan physician, Dr. Kevorkian. From the media presentation, most of his assistees n17 have [*106] been middle-aged women.</u></strong> n18 Thus, many critics of Kevorkian have depicted his practice of physician-assisted suicide as gender-biased. n19 One critic has even described his practice as "womanslaughter." n20 If Kevorkian's assisted suicides are viewed as typical of the requests and grants of all physician-assisted suicides, then it may be expected that the practice of physician-assisted suicide will disproportionately involve women. However, this expectation may not be correct in view of the fact that the total number of Kevorkian's assistees has been grossly underestimated. Kevorkian claims to have assisted between 70 and 100 people in ending their lives, and states that he receives two to three requests a day for his assistance. n21 It is also reported that "nearly half of the requests are from men" which may further discredit any finding or expectation of a gender pattern. n22 Therefore, in order to extrapolate from Kevorkian's physician-assisted suicide practice to that of broader society, accurate gender proportions of Kevorkian's potential and actual assistees must be obtained. A second recognized gender pattern that has triggered a focus on gender issues in MDEL are legal developments arising through case law. New precedents regarding MDEL in both American and Dutch law have primarily involved women. n23 In the United States, precedents were created by the cases of Elizabeth Bouvia, n24 Karen Ann [*107] Quinlan n25 and Nancy Cruzan. n26 In the Netherlands, recent legal developments have involved the highly controversial case of Chabot. n27 This case law pattern and Kevorkian's pattern may or may not be an accurate depiction of the current and future practice of physician- assisted suicide. Nevertheless, <u><strong>the patterns have triggered needed and long overdue discussion of gender issues and gender implications in this area of bioethics.</p></u></strong>
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Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
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A SUBPOINT - Extinction becomes inevitable due to the endless threat construction, the sovereign will inevitably create threats that it attempts to solve with pre-emptive measures – that’s Massumi.
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<h4>A SUBPOINT - Extinction becomes inevitable due to the endless threat construction, the sovereign will inevitably create threats that it attempts to solve with pre-emptive measures – that’s Massumi. </h4>
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Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
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B.) Political Analysis DA -- Focused debate over state regulations of PAS are key to cost-benefit analysis and deliberation -- the alternative is abstract moral relativism that fails to translate into material change
Smith 99
Smith 99
Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence a common thread joining all of the issues is difficult the core is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life concerns of bioethics are concerns of public policy with legislation and policy guidelines at state, local, and federal levels, that need to be enacted and enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set Outside the individual context a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted individual morality operates within a system of restraints policies affect society as a whole operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option The pivotal question thus becomes Of priorities values and goods must be weighed and compared In a more specific sense bioethics encompasses a whole political movement It is a movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with ethical problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro level It also endeavors to respond often through legislative reforms to complex issues such as physician assisted suicide contemporary society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes to guide or even control these activities to seek medical laws about areas such as death and dying there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction since the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons Each legal tool used must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by ever changing public policies with the purpose of determining tools best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and validates a final action that minimizes human suffering
concerns of bioethics are concerns of policy with legislation and policy guidelines at state and federal levels that need to be enacted and enforced Outside the individual context a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging a certain good must be promoted individual morality operates within restraints policies affect society as a whole The pivotal question becomes priorities values must be weighed and compared bioethics encompasses a whole political movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with ethical problems relating to health both at the micro and the macro level It endeavors to respond through legislative reforms to complex issues such as p a s society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes guide activities to seek medical laws about death there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction "the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons Each legal tool must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by changing public policies with the purpose of determining tools best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and validates a final action minimizes human suffering
George, Professor of Law @ The Catholic University of America, Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 13, “Judicial Decision-Making in the Age of Biotechnology”, AB Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence which sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances." While a common thread joining all of the issues is exceedingly difficult to find, the central core comprising the list of these issues, without question, is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life. Many of the concerns of bioethics are concerns of public policy—or with legislation and policy guidelines—at state, local, and federal levels, that need to be enacted and enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set. It has been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common agreement exists. Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader societal level, a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While individual morality operates primarily within a system of restraints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes, "what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" Of necessity, priorities, values, and goods must be weighed, balanced, and compared. Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal being the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good. 5 In a more specific sense, bioethics encompasses a whole political movement. 6 It is a movement which seeks to harness political forces to deal with a plethora of ethical problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro level of economic distribution. It also endeavors to respond—often through legislative reforms—to complex issues such as physician assisted suicide, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimentation, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships necessary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians. 7 All too often, contemporary society's concerns over the need for regulating ethical regimes to guide or even control these activities has driven it in turn to seek medical laws about areas such as death and dying, genetic counseling and screening, reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction since "the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons."8 And today, Americans seem to be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regulate biomedical developments. 10 Each legal tool used must be constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by ever changing public policies—all with the purpose of determining which of the tools is best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and which one validates a final action that ideally minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social or common good.
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<h4>B.) Political Analysis DA -- <strong>Focused debate over state regulations of PAS are key to cost-benefit analysis and deliberation -- the alternative is abstract moral relativism that fails to translate into material change</h4><p>Smith 99</p><p></strong>George, Professor of Law @ The Catholic University of America, Notre Dame Journal Of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 13, “Judicial Decision-Making in the Age of Biotechnology”, AB </p><p><u><strong>Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence</u></strong> which sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances." While <u><strong>a common thread joining all of the issues</u></strong> <u><strong>is</u></strong> exceedingly <u><strong>difficult</u></strong> to find, <u><strong>the</u></strong> central <u><strong>core</u></strong> comprising the list of these issues, without question, <u><strong>is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body, his mind, and quality of life</u></strong>. Many of the <u><strong><mark>concerns of bioethics are concerns of</mark> public <mark>policy</u></strong></mark>—or <u><strong><mark>with</mark> <mark>legislation and policy guidelines</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>at</mark> <mark>state</mark>, local, <mark>and federal levels</mark>, <mark>that need to be enacted and enforced</mark> with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set</u></strong>. It has been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibitions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common agreement exists. <u><strong><mark>Outside the individual context</u></strong></mark> of determining how one treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader societal level, <u><strong><mark>a democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging</mark> that <mark>a certain good must be promoted</u></strong></mark> though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While <u><strong><mark>individual morality</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>operates</u></strong></mark> primarily <u><strong><mark>within</mark> a system of <mark>restraints</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>policies</mark> <mark>affect</u></strong></mark>ing<u><strong> <mark>society as a whole</mark> operate on a level where promotion of good is a moral option</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The pivotal question </mark>thus <mark>becomes</u></strong></mark>, "what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" <u><strong>Of</u></strong> necessity, <u><strong><mark>priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>values</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and goods <mark>must be weighed</u></strong></mark>, balanced, <u><strong><mark>and compared</u></strong></mark>. Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal being the formulation and validation of a final action which minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good. 5 <u><strong>In a more specific sense</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>bioethics encompasses a whole political movement</u></strong></mark>. 6 <u><strong>It is a movement <mark>which seeks to harness political forces</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to deal with</u></strong></mark> a plethora of <u><strong><mark>ethical problems relating to health</mark> care delivery, <mark>both at the micro and the macro level</u></strong></mark> of economic distribution. <u><strong><mark>It</mark> also <mark>endeavors to respond</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>often</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>through</mark> <mark>legislative reforms</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>to complex issues such as</mark> <mark>p</mark>hysician <mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide</u></strong>, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimentation, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships necessary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians. 7 All too often, <u><strong>contemporary <mark>society's concerns over</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>the need for regulating ethical regimes</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to <mark>guide</mark> or even control these <mark>activities</u></strong></mark> has driven it in turn <u><strong><mark>to seek</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>medical</u></strong> <u><strong>laws about</mark> areas such as <mark>death</mark> and dying</u></strong>, genetic counseling and screening, reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often <u><strong><mark>there is little choice for legal passivity or inaction</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>since</u></strong> <mark>"<u><strong>the law is a primary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and the treatment of real persons</u></strong></mark>."8 And today, Americans seem to be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regulate biomedical developments. 10 <u><strong><mark>Each legal tool</mark> used <mark>must be constantly fine-tuned</mark> <mark>and re-evaluated by</mark> ever <mark>changing public policies</u></strong></mark>—all <u><strong><mark>with the purpose of determining</u></strong></mark> which of the <u><strong><mark>tools</u></strong></mark> is <u><strong><mark>best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> which one <u><strong><mark>validates a final action</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that</u></strong> ideally <u><strong><mark>minimizes human suffering</u></strong></mark> and maximizes the social or common good. </p>
2NC
T
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318,245
3
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
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Baylor BaSh
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,147
Any risk that the alt solves the root cause of their impacts means there is no reason to vote affirmative
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<h4>Any risk that the alt solves the root cause of their impacts means there is no reason to vote affirmative </h4>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Impact Wall
429,705
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
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48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
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An.....
Ba.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,148
Legalizing PAS means regulations
Urofsky ‘98
Urofsky ‘98 (Melvin I. Urofsky Professor of History and Public Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. A.B., 1961, Ph.D., 1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1983, University of Virginia. “LEAVING THE DOOR AJAR: THE SUPREME COURT AND ASSISTED SUICIDE” March, 1998 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 313, Lexis, TSW)
Initiative 119 as opening the doors to a flood of abuse. One can surmise that although doctors do help some of their patients die, they prefer to keep this part of their practice qui To legalize physician-assisted suicide would mean additional regulation of medical practice. hough early signs indicated that Initiative 119 would pass, opponents gained ground as election day approached
To legalize physician-assisted suicide would mean additional regulation of medical practice.
A number of doctors bitterly fought the proposal. They had been trained to save lives, not to take them, and they saw Initiative 119 as opening the doors to a flood of abuse. When the Washington State Medical Society debated the issue, delegates voted five to one against it, but a poll of the general membership taken earlier in the year showed doctors split rather evenly. One can surmise that although doctors do help some of their patients die, they prefer to keep this part of their practice quiet. To legalize physician-assisted suicide would mean additional regulation of medical practice. Although early signs indicated that Initiative 119 would pass, opponents gained ground as election day approached. Critics claim that American [*340] voters are apathetic, but Initiative 119 galvanized the populace, and voters came out in large numbers. The initiative failed by a 54-46% margin. n101 Both sides agreed that the debate had been useful and that an important public policy issue had been raised, one that would not quietly go away. n102 "If we don't deal with the problems raised by 119, we'll be facing this issue again and again and again," said Dr. Peter McGough, an opponent of the measure. McGough stated further that "saying no to assisted death is not enough. Now we have a responsibility to deal with the problems that brought out this concern." n103
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<h4><strong>Legalizing PAS means regulations </h4><p>Urofsky ‘98</p><p></strong>(Melvin I. Urofsky Professor of History and Public Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. A.B., 1961, Ph.D., 1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1983, University of Virginia. “LEAVING THE DOOR AJAR: THE SUPREME COURT AND ASSISTED SUICIDE” March, 1998 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 313, Lexis, TSW)</p><p>A number of doctors bitterly fought the proposal. They had been trained to save lives, not to take them, and they saw <u><strong>Initiative 119 as opening the doors to a flood of abuse.</u></strong> When the Washington State Medical Society debated the issue, delegates voted five to one against it, but a poll of the general membership taken earlier in the year showed doctors split rather evenly. <u><strong>One can surmise that although doctors do help some of their patients die, they prefer to keep this part of their practice qui</u></strong>et. <u><strong><mark>To legalize physician-assisted suicide would mean additional regulation of medical practice.</u></strong></mark> Alt<u><strong>hough early signs indicated that Initiative 119 would pass, opponents gained ground as election day approached</u></strong>. Critics claim that American [*340] voters are apathetic, but Initiative 119 galvanized the populace, and voters came out in large numbers. The initiative failed by a 54-46% margin. n101 Both sides agreed that the debate had been useful and that an important public policy issue had been raised, one that would not quietly go away. n102 "If we don't deal with the problems raised by 119, we'll be facing this issue again and again and again," said Dr. Peter McGough, an opponent of the measure. McGough stated further that "saying no to assisted death is not enough. Now we have a responsibility to deal with the problems that brought out this concern." n103</p>
2NC
T
2NC O/V
429,706
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,149
B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life
Baudrillard 76
Jean Baudrillard 76 (“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)
Security is another form of control, life blackmailed with the afterlife 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force this is above all the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system in this symbolic the gift-exchange is the challenge to one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion but because it carries a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our social principle. they die the only death the system authorizes This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.
Security is control life blackmailed with the afterlife this the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system the gift-exchange t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion but because it carries a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our social principle. they die the only death the system authorizes This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.
Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force .39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only death the system authorizes: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.
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<h4>B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life </h4><p>Jean <strong>Baudrillard 76 </strong>(“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)</p><p><u><mark>Security is </mark>another form of </u>social <u><mark>control</mark>,</u> in the form of <u><mark>life blackmailed with the afterlife</u></mark>. It is universally present for us today, and <u>'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force </u>.39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But <u><mark>this </mark>is above all</u> a question of <u><mark>the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death</u></mark>, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. <u><mark>It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system</u></mark>. Again, <u>in this symbolic </u>short-circuit, <u><mark>the gift-exchange </mark>is the challenge to </u>oneself and<u> one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because i<mark>t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion </u></mark>(the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), <u><mark>but because it carries </u></mark>in it <u><mark>a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our </u></mark>own<u> <mark>social</mark> </u>repressive <u><mark>principle.</mark> </u>To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that <u><mark>they die the only death the system authorizes</u></mark>: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. <u><mark>This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.</p></u></mark>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Impact Wall
148,321
49
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,150
Precision of PAS discussion is key to having a meaningful discussion – esoteric ethical questions are irrelevant
EPEC ‘03
EPEC ‘03
The debate about legalizing active steps to intentionally end life as a means to end suffering remains controversial Because of the added risk of misunderstanding the patient’s wishes there is currently less support for euthanasia than for physician-assisted suicide In any discussion of p a s it is important that the terminology be clear. Physician-assisted suicide is defined as the act of a physician in providing the means for a patient to hasten his or her death. p a s and euthanasia differ in whether or not the physician participates in the action In p a s the physician provides the necessary means In euthanasia, the physician performs the intervention. physicians have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering As effective approaches for responding to suffering may be time consuming, physicians will be more effective if they work collaboratively with other health care disciplines in an interdisciplinary team. requests for PAS can be intense, and even skilled and experienced physicians require access to consultative palliative care expertise as part of the spectrum of contemporary health care Sometimes a patient will use a provocative statement such as, “I hope you’ll help me die when it’s time” or “Please promise not to let me suffer,” as if to test the physician’s willingness to talk about the patient’s fears of dying badly is important to understand whether the patient is actually referring to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia Many people do not make these distinctions and while expressing themselves in the language of assisted suicide, they are actually asking for assurance of a way to escape suffering if it becomes unbearable When cases of requests to hasten death are presented in ethical papers or in public debates, they often look like ethical puzzles that involve complex, irresolvable psychosocial issues and existential suffering. In the real world of patients’ lives and clinical practice these cases are not esoteric ethical or clinical puzzles but, rather, the pleas of fearful, vulnerable people looking to their physicians for reassurance, affirmation, and practical help When a patient asks for hastened death, listen carefully to the nature of the request. Outlining specific steps that can be taken if pain or other cancer-related symptoms worsen can be reassuring for patients and their loved ones. Patients who fear dying in uncontrolled physical agony are often reassured that palliative sedation is available for situations in which suffering cannot be otherwise controlled Start by discussing the patient’s health care goals and preferences, explaining palliative care approaches and services, and describing the legal alternatives to PAS Multiple studies indicate that patients with life-threatening illnesses have many unaddressed physical issues. If left unmanaged for long periods, each can add considerably to a patient’s sense of suffering Physiatrists, nurses, and physical and occupational therapists may be helpful and knowledgeable about the exercises and aids
In any discussion of p a s it is important that the terminology be clear. Physician-assisted suicide is defined as the act of a physician in providing the means for a patient to hasten his or her death. p a s and euthanasia differ in whether or not the physician participates in the action In p a s the physician provides the necessary means is important to understand whether the patient is actually referring to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia Many people do not make these distinctions and while expressing themselves in the language of assisted suicide, they are actually asking for assurance of a way to escape suffering if it becomes unbearable When cases of requests to hasten death are presented in ethical papers or in public debates, they often look like ethical puzzles that involve complex, irresolvable psychosocial issues and existential suffering. In the real world of patients’ lives and clinical practice, these cases are not esoteric ethical puzzles but the pleas of fearful ple looking to their physicians for reassurance, affirmation, and practical help
(Education In Palliative And End-Of-Life Care For Oncology “Self-Study Module 14: Physician-Assisted Suicide” http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/cancerlibrary/epeco/selfstudy/module-14/module-14-pdf, TSW) The legal and ethical debate The debate about legalizing active steps to intentionally end life as a means to end suffering remains controversial. Because of the added risk of misunderstanding or overriding the patient’s wishes, there is currently less support for euthanasia than for physician-assisted suicide. Nonetheless, both requests do occur and physicians need to know how to respond to either type of request. In any discussion of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, it is important that the terminology be clear. Euthanasia is defined as the act of bringing about the death of a hopelessly ill and suffering person in a relatively quick and painless way for reasons of mercy. Physician-assisted suicide is defined as the act of a physician in providing the means for a patient to hasten his or her death. Although they may have similar goals, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia differ in whether or not the physician participates in the action that finally ends life. In physician-assisted suicide, the physician provides the necessary means or information and the patient performs the act. In euthanasia, the physician performs the intervention. In the current debate, there are two principles on which virtually all agree. First, physicians have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and promote the dignity of dying patients in their care. Second, the principle of patient bodily integrity requires that physicians respect patients’ competent decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment. An important event in the present debate occurred in 1997, when the United States Supreme Court recognized that there is no federal constitutional right to physician assisted suicide but did affirm that state legislatures may choose to legalize it. As of early 1999, Oregon is the only state that has voted to legalize PAS. In contrast to the PAS debate, the right to palliative care is uniformly acknowledged. The same U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ concurring opinions supported the right of all Americans to receive quality palliative care. Professional competence As most physicians are likely to receive a request for hastened death, every physician must be capable of dealing with these difficult requests in a way that responds to the needs and expectations of the patient and offers the best possible care that is both ethical and legal. The ability to respond to requests for hastened death with realistic alternatives requires a working knowledge of all aspects of palliative care. The physician must follow usual standards for communication, know how to provide aggressive symptom control and supportive care, and be skilled at approaches to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining interventions (see EPEC™-O Module 7: Communicating Effectively; EPEC™-O Module 8: Clarifying Diagnosis and Prognosis; EPEC™-O Module 2: Cancer Pain Management; EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms; and EPEC™-O Module 11: Withdrawing Nutrition, Hydration). Physicians need to be aware of the legal issues described in the original EPEC Curriculum Plenary 2: Legal Issues in End-of-life Care. As effective approaches for responding to suffering may be time consuming, physicians will be more effective if they work collaboratively with other health care disciplines in an interdisciplinary team. Some requests for PAS or euthanasia can be intense, and even skilled and experienced physicians require access to consultative palliative care expertise as part of the spectrum of contemporary health care (see EPEC™-O Plenary 2: Models of Integrated Care). Objectives The objectives of this module are to: • Define physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia. • Describe their current legal status. • Identify root causes of suffering that prompt requests. • Understand a six-step protocol for responding to requests. Six-Step Protocol for Responding to Requests for Physician- Assisted Suicide or Euthanasia Any request for PAS should be taken seriously. Response should be immediate and compassionate. Six steps can be identified for responding to such requests: 1. Clarify the request. 2. Assess the underlying causes of the request. 3. Affirm your commitment to care for the patient. 4. Address the root causes of the request. 5. Educate the patient and discuss legal alternatives. 6. Consult with colleagues. While each step will be discussed in this module in sequence, these steps should integrate smoothly and flexibly into actual practice as issues arise. Depending on the particular case, some steps may be implicit or accomplished in a few words, while others may be complex and require considerable time to respond. Step 1: Clarify the request When a patient first raises the issue it is necessary to clarify just what he or she means. The patient may assume that if there is a routine treatment available for a condition that threatens his or her life, there is little choice other than to accept it, as if doing less than everything to prolong life is tantamount to suicide. By making it clear that it is legally and ethically permissible to decline treatments—even antibiotics for infection and tube nutrition and hydration—and allow a natural death to occur, patients may be satisfied that their lives will not be prolonged against their wishes. (Ref. 29) Sometimes a patient will use a provocative statement such as, “I hope you’ll help me die when it’s time” or “Please promise not to let me suffer,” as if to test the physician’s willingness to talk about the patient’s fears of dying badly. It is important to understand whether the patient is actually referring to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, or adequate analgesia. Many people do not make these distinctions and, while expressing themselves in the language of assisted suicide, they are actually asking for assurance of a way to escape suffering if it becomes unbearable. Such patients are commonly reassured to learn that good palliative care extends to whatever treatments are necessary to alleviate physical distress. At the same time, patients may need assurance that effective pain management, including “a morphine drip” or sedation when necessary, is not a euphemism for euthanasia, but rather good medical care for a serious medical problem. In discussing sedation with patients, the practice must be distinguished from euthanasia. Sedation for otherwise intractable symptoms is consistent with the treatment of pain in burn units and surgical suites. The same principle of careful titration of anesthetic agents as necessary for adequate treatment and patient comfort applies to palliative sedation. (Ref. 30) When cases of requests to hasten death are presented in ethical papers or in public debates, they often look like ethical puzzles that involve complex, irresolvable psychosocial issues and existential suffering. In the real world of patients’ lives and clinical practice, these cases are not esoteric ethical or clinical puzzles but, rather, the pleas of fearful, vulnerable people looking to their physicians for reassurance, affirmation, and practical help. When a patient asks for hastened death, listen carefully to the nature of the request. Ask open-ended questions in a calm and nonjudgmental manner to elicit specific information about the request that is being made and the underlying causes for it. While some physicians fear that talking about suicide or hastened death will increase the likelihood that the patient will act, this fear has not been substantiated. An open discussion is more likely to reduce the intensity of the request. Once the underlying reasons are known, more directed questions can be asked. Several examples, and the common areas to which answers may point, follow: MD: “What makes you ask that?” - Desire for a pain-free death - Control over the dying process MD: “What do you expect will happen without PAS?” - Understanding and expectations of the illness - Expectation of what dying will be like MD: “What type of assistance do you want?” - Pills, injection MD: “Who do you want to be involved? Why?” - Self, family member, physician MD: “When do you think you want to die?” - Now - At some later point MD: “What do you hope to accomplish?” - Freedom from pain, disability, bankruptcy, dependency, indignity - Removing burden on others The answer to the question, “When do you think you want to die?” will provide some indication of acuity. The answer to the question, “What do you hope to accomplish?” will provide some understanding of the patient’s reasoning and what he or she is hoping for. During the course of the questioning, it is particularly important to learn whether the patient is imagining future symptoms or other conditions that are either unlikely or easily preventable. As you listen to the answers, use the therapeutic effect of empathic listening. Avoid endorsing the request for PAS in a way that confirms the patient’s perception that his or her life is worthless. Similarly, avoid rejecting the request when it is first heard as this will often serve to close rather than open discussion. Remember that empathizing is not the same as agreeing. Premature affirmation of any perspective can propel both parties to stark choices. Only when the patient’s point of view has been characterized will it be possible to talk about what suffering means to the patient and what assurances can or cannot be given. Personal biases vs. therapeutic listening To respond effectively to the needs of the patient, the physician must be aware of his or her own biases and the potential for counter-transference. If the idea of suicide is offensive to the physician, the patient may feel his or her disapproval and worry about abandonment. Conversely, if the physician feels it would be best for everyone if the patient were to die soon, the patient may sense this and become more concerned about being an unwelcome burden. Be open to the possibility that your personal reactions to the patient’s suffering may give insight into his or her experience. For example, if you feel weighed down by meeting with the patient, perhaps the patient is depressed. In making the request, the patient is opening a door for communication. The therapeutic response to a request for assisted suicide or euthanasia begins with listening. Possibly because listening involves little outward motion, it seems passive to the casual observer and its value as an active therapeutic intervention is often unrecognized. In actuality, the physician’s ability to listen and commitment to stay involved are the main components of an effective response. The therapeutic power of listening must not be underestimated. (Ref. 29) (Ref. 31) For a physician confronted with a request to hasten death, the critical early intervention often consists of a handful of minutes spent listening to the patient’s fears and acknowledging his or her suffering, coupled with firmly committing to remain involved, try new ways to improve the patient’s quality of life, and provide support the patient and family need during this difficult time. The physician-patient relationship is the most powerful therapeutic resource with which to intervene in suffering. By carefully assessing and effectively treating pain and other symptoms, a physician reaffirms the patient’s confidence in the physician’s knowledge and skills. Similarly, willingness to explore a patient’s suffering and fears engenders confidence in the physician’s compassion and willingness to be there in the hard times that may lie ahead. Patients’ suffering is often rooted in fears of the future; patients can often tolerate the current situation but worry what will happen if things get worse. (Ref. 25) Physicians can use this aspect of suffering to therapeutic benefit. It is often possible to diminish an acutely anxious patient’s distress and improve the patient’s sense of control by drawing attention to the present moment in which the discomfort is tolerable, if only barely, and by emphasizing that life is a series of present moments. The future-based nature of most suffering allows physicians to inform and affirm for patients that there is always something they can do to decrease the severity of pain or other symptoms and support patients and families through these difficult times. Outlining specific steps that can be taken if pain or other cancer-related symptoms worsen can be reassuring for patients and their loved ones. Patients who fear dying in uncontrolled physical agony are often reassured that palliative sedation is available for situations in which suffering cannot be otherwise controlled. (Ref. 32) Social suffering that comes from a felt loss of meaning, i.e. a sense of having nothing to contribute and being merely a burden to others, i.e. is not without therapeutic response. A loved one’s illness and care almost inevitably impose burdens on that person’s family. All who love the person are affected by his or her illness in emotional and practical ways. Serious illness disrupts plans and sometimes derails long-held aspirations. Here again, there are no pat answers. While it is essential for physicians to affirm their commitment to suffering patients, they need not shoulder these responsibilities alone. The multidimensional suffering of progressive cancer is best addressed by interdisciplinary approaches to care. (Ref. 33) Hospice and palliative care programs can respond in skillful ways, and often identify ways of lessening the burden and enabling families to care well and with love without losing their own lives in the process. Step 2: Assess the underlying causes of the request A request for PAS may indicate a failure to address the full scope of a patient’s needs. Focus on all four dimensions of physical, psychological, social, and spiritual suffering as well as practical concerns (see EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment). Assess for clinical depression Among all the psychological and physical possibilities, give particular consideration to the presence of clinical depression or anxiety, as research indicates correlation between requests for PAS and their presence. (Ref. 9) (Ref. 28) When evaluating psychological and social issues; explore patients’ fears about the future. Clinical depression occurs frequently and is both under-diagnosed and undertreated. It can be a source of intense mental suffering and a barrier to completing life closure and achieving a “good death.” Diagnosis of depression is more challenging in patients with advanced illness, since the physical symptoms typically associated with depression (e.g., changes in appetite, weight, energy level, libido, or sleeping) frequently occur in these patients as a result of their illness. Studies have shown that the screening question, “Do you feel depressed most of the time?” is highly sensitive and specific in the medically ill. Feelings of pervasive helplessness, hopelessness, and worthlessness are not normal. Do not assume that they are situational and leave them unattended (see EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms). Psychosocial suffering, practical concerns Emotional and coping responses to life-threatening illness may include a strong sense of shame, feelings of being unwanted, and difficulties coping. Adjustment to the loss of previous function, independence, control, and/or self-image may be difficult. Each change may lead to tension within relationships that further increase isolation and misery. Worries about practical matters (e.g., who the caregivers will be, how domestic chores will be done, who will care for dependents and pets, etc.) can create considerable distress. If support is not forthcoming or is insufficient, suffering may ensue or increase. Approaches to the assessment of psychosocial issues and practical concerns are covered in EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment. Physical suffering A host of physical symptoms may accompany advanced illness. These may include pain, breathlessness, anorexia/cachexia, weakness/fatigue, nausea/vomiting, constipation, dehydration, edema, incontinence, loss of function, sleep deprivation, etc. Their presence, particularly if they are unmanaged for long periods, may markedly increase suffering. Approaches to the assessment of physical issues are covered in EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment. The management of pain is discussed in EPEC™-O Module 2: Cancer Pain Management. The management of other common physical symptoms is discussed in EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms. Spiritual suffering The prospect of dying may evoke seemingly unresolvable existential concerns that are then experienced as suffering. As illness advances and disability increases, the patient’s sense of his or her meaning, value, and purpose in life may all come into question. If there is a sense of abandonment or punishment by God, faith and religious beliefs may be eroded and anger may ensue. Approaches to the assessment of spiritual issues are covered in EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment. Fears for the future In addition to current concerns, many patients are fearful about their future. They may worry about pain and other symptoms, loss of control or independence, abandonment, loneliness, indignity, loss of self-image, and being a burden to others. While their thoughts may be unrealistic in the setting of quality care, many have witnessed suboptimal care in others that fuels their fears and fantasies. Direct questions may be adequate to assess a patient’s fears. If not, discussing a series of scenarios and preferences, as is done during advance care planning, may be helpful. When personal values and goals of care are being discussed, clarify the things the person most wants to avoid. This may help preempt unrealistic fears (see EPEC™-O Module 13: Advance Care Planning). Step 3: Affirm your commitment to care for the patient Patients facing the end-of-life often have fears of abandonment. Listen to and acknowledge expressed feelings and fears. Make a commitment to help find solutions to the issues of concern, both current and anticipated. Reinforce that you want to continue to be the patient’s physician until the last possible moment. Explore options to allay immediate concerns and fears. As a request for hastened death affects everyone who is close to the patient, a commitment to the patient also affirms a commitment to the family and those close to the patient, including other caregivers. Step 4: Address the root causes of the request This section provides a general framework for addressing some of the potential root causes for a request for hastened death in each dimension of suffering. Start by discussing the patient’s health care goals and preferences, explaining palliative care approaches and services, and describing the legal alternatives to PAS. Remember that some patients may not trust either individual health caregivers or the health care system to meet their needs. If possible, it helps to discuss this lack of trust with the patient at the outset so the issues can be understood, if not dealt with, early (see EPEC™-O Module 13: Advance Care Planning; EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment; EPEC™-O Module 9: Negotiating Goals of Care; and EPEC™-O Module 12: Conflict Resolution). Address psychological suffering As psychological suffering can lead to requests for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, its management warrants considerable attention. Start by assessing and managing depression, anxiety, or delirium aggressively (see EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms). Because patients’ emotional responses to illness can be profound and coping responses vary, they will require careful exploration in a positive and understanding way. Supportive counseling that involves active listening and acknowledgment of the patient’s feelings may be woven into general care, or it may be provided more intensively through dedicated individual or group counseling. Social workers and chaplains trained in supportive counseling can provide considerable assistance. Referral to trained counselors, psychologists, or psychiatrists may be required if the issues are complex and/or the risks are high. Patients can be helped to see their physical dependence as an unavoidable consequence of their illness, rather than a personal failure. Clinicians can foster a sense of dignity through the manner in which care is provided. In coming to know the patient as a person, the physician acknowledges the uniqueness and inherent worth of that individual. Death awaits us all; therefore, if hope were to reside solely in avoiding death, all hope would ultimately be lost. In practice, it is often possible for patients who are approaching the end-of-life to reframe hope and discover meaningful opportunities that still exist. (Ref. 29) (Ref. 34) Physicians can assist patients to identify achievable goals, such as participating in meaningful events, engaging in life review, completing personal affairs and relationships, and feeling prepared to leave this life. (Ref. 35) Address social suffering, practical concerns Stresses and conflicts in the social or practical aspects of a person’s life can have profound effects on his or her will to live. Express interest and inquire in detail about this aspect of the patient’s life: • What is the patient’s family situation? Does he or she live with someone? Are family members supportive? Are there unresolved issues? • What is the patient’s financial situation? Is health insurance available and sufficient? • Are legal affairs in order? Does the patient have a Living Will, Power of Attorney for Health Care, Power of Attorney for Business Affairs, or Last Will and Testament? • Where would the patient like to receive care? Who is there to help? Who will the caregivers be? Is there tension over the caregiving role for either party? • Who attends to domestic chores such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, banking, and/or bill payments? • Are there any dependents the patient cares for, or pets? Who will care for them if the patient is unable to? Consider requesting assistance from other members of the health care team (e.g., social workers, nurses, chaplains, occupational therapists, etc). Additional resources for help and support may be available in the community, through a health care institution, or from a local hospice or palliative care program. Address physical suffering Multiple studies indicate that patients with life-threatening illnesses have many unaddressed physical issues. If left unmanaged for long periods, each can add considerably to a patient’s sense of suffering. Today, the field of medicine has more knowledge and tools to manage physical symptoms than ever before. Pain and symptom management are discussed in detail in EPEC™-O Module 2: Cancer Pain Management and EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms. Each symptom needs to be pursued aggressively and successful management often requires extensive and careful thought and individual clinical trials until symptoms are brought under control. Function is critical to maintaining independence. Physiatrists, nurses, and physical and occupational therapists may be helpful and knowledgeable about the exercises and aids that can be used to optimize and maintain function and ensure safety. Sexuality and intimacy are integral aspects of each individual, particularly as experienced through touch and closeness to cherished partners and family members. Illness and disfigurement may change the way people are able to interact. To determine individual desires and uncover tensions, facilitate discussions between partners and key family members. Help them look for alternatives that may be comforting.
23,834
<h4><strong>Precision of PAS discussion is key to having a meaningful discussion – esoteric ethical questions are irrelevant </h4><p>EPEC ‘03</p><p></strong>(Education In Palliative And End-Of-Life Care For Oncology “Self-Study Module 14: Physician-Assisted Suicide” http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/cancerlibrary/epeco/selfstudy/module-14/module-14-pdf, TSW)</p><p>The legal and ethical debate <u><strong>The debate about legalizing active steps to intentionally end life as a means to end suffering remains controversial</u></strong>. <u><strong>Because of the added risk of misunderstanding </u></strong>or overriding <u><strong>the patient’s wishes</u></strong>, <u><strong>there is currently less support for euthanasia than for physician-assisted suicide</u></strong>. Nonetheless, both requests do occur and physicians need to know how to respond to either type of request. <u><strong><mark>In any discussion of p</u></strong></mark>hysician-<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide or euthanasia, <u><strong><mark>it is important that the terminology be clear.</u></strong></mark> Euthanasia is defined as the act of bringing about the death of a hopelessly ill and suffering person in a relatively quick and painless way for reasons of mercy. <u><strong><mark>Physician-assisted suicide is defined as the act of a physician in providing the means for a patient to hasten his or her death.</u></strong></mark> Although they may have similar goals, <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>hysician-<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide <u><strong><mark>and euthanasia differ in whether or not the physician participates in the action</u></strong></mark> that finally ends life. <u><strong><mark>In p</u></strong></mark>hysician-<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>ssisted <u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>uicide, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>physician provides the necessary means</u></strong></mark> or information and the patient performs the act. <u><strong>In euthanasia, the physician performs the intervention.</u></strong> In the current debate, there are two principles on which virtually all agree. First, <u><strong>physicians have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering</u></strong> and promote the dignity of dying patients in their care. Second, the principle of patient bodily integrity requires that physicians respect patients’ competent decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment. An important event in the present debate occurred in 1997, when the United States Supreme Court recognized that there is no federal constitutional right to physician assisted suicide but did affirm that state legislatures may choose to legalize it. As of early 1999, Oregon is the only state that has voted to legalize PAS. In contrast to the PAS debate, the right to palliative care is uniformly acknowledged. The same U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ concurring opinions supported the right of all Americans to receive quality palliative care. Professional competence As most physicians are likely to receive a request for hastened death, every physician must be capable of dealing with these difficult requests in a way that responds to the needs and expectations of the patient and offers the best possible care that is both ethical and legal. The ability to respond to requests for hastened death with realistic alternatives requires a working knowledge of all aspects of palliative care. The physician must follow usual standards for communication, know how to provide aggressive symptom control and supportive care, and be skilled at approaches to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining interventions (see EPEC™-O Module 7: Communicating Effectively; EPEC™-O Module 8: Clarifying Diagnosis and Prognosis; EPEC™-O Module 2: Cancer Pain Management; EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms; and EPEC™-O Module 11: Withdrawing Nutrition, Hydration). Physicians need to be aware of the legal issues described in the original EPEC Curriculum Plenary 2: Legal Issues in End-of-life Care. <u><strong>As effective approaches for responding to suffering may be time consuming, physicians will be more effective if they work collaboratively with other health care disciplines in an interdisciplinary team.</u></strong> Some <u><strong>requests for PAS</u></strong> or euthanasia <u><strong>can be intense, and even skilled and experienced physicians require access to consultative palliative care expertise as part of the spectrum of contemporary health care</u></strong> (see EPEC™-O Plenary 2: Models of Integrated Care). Objectives The objectives of this module are to: • Define physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia. • Describe their current legal status. • Identify root causes of suffering that prompt requests. • Understand a six-step protocol for responding to requests. Six-Step Protocol for Responding to Requests for Physician- Assisted Suicide or Euthanasia Any request for PAS should be taken seriously. Response should be immediate and compassionate. Six steps can be identified for responding to such requests: 1. Clarify the request. 2. Assess the underlying causes of the request. 3. Affirm your commitment to care for the patient. 4. Address the root causes of the request. 5. Educate the patient and discuss legal alternatives. 6. Consult with colleagues. While each step will be discussed in this module in sequence, these steps should integrate smoothly and flexibly into actual practice as issues arise. Depending on the particular case, some steps may be implicit or accomplished in a few words, while others may be complex and require considerable time to respond. Step 1: Clarify the request When a patient first raises the issue it is necessary to clarify just what he or she means. The patient may assume that if there is a routine treatment available for a condition that threatens his or her life, there is little choice other than to accept it, as if doing less than everything to prolong life is tantamount to suicide. By making it clear that it is legally and ethically permissible to decline treatments—even antibiotics for infection and tube nutrition and hydration—and allow a natural death to occur, patients may be satisfied that their lives will not be prolonged against their wishes. (Ref. 29) <u><strong>Sometimes a patient will use a provocative statement such as, “I hope you’ll help me die when it’s time” or “Please promise not to let me suffer,” as if to test the physician’s willingness to talk about the patient’s fears of dying badly</u></strong>. It <u><strong><mark>is important to understand whether the patient is actually referring to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia</u></strong></mark>, or adequate analgesia. <u><strong><mark>Many people do not make these distinctions and</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>while expressing themselves in the language of assisted suicide, they are actually asking for assurance of a way to escape suffering if it becomes unbearable</u></strong></mark>. Such patients are commonly reassured to learn that good palliative care extends to whatever treatments are necessary to alleviate physical distress. At the same time, patients may need assurance that effective pain management, including “a morphine drip” or sedation when necessary, is not a euphemism for euthanasia, but rather good medical care for a serious medical problem. In discussing sedation with patients, the practice must be distinguished from euthanasia. Sedation for otherwise intractable symptoms is consistent with the treatment of pain in burn units and surgical suites. The same principle of careful titration of anesthetic agents as necessary for adequate treatment and patient comfort applies to palliative sedation. (Ref. 30) <u><strong><mark>When cases of requests to hasten death are presented in ethical papers or in public debates, they often look like ethical puzzles that involve complex, irresolvable psychosocial issues and existential suffering. In the real world of patients’ lives and clinical practice</u></strong>, <u><strong>these cases are not esoteric ethical</mark> or clinical <mark>puzzles</mark> <mark>but</mark>, rather, <mark>the pleas of fearful</mark>, vulnerable peo<mark>ple looking to their physicians for reassurance, affirmation, and practical help</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>When a patient asks for hastened death, listen carefully to the nature of the request. </u></strong>Ask open-ended questions in a calm and nonjudgmental manner to elicit specific information about the request that is being made and the underlying causes for it. While some physicians fear that talking about suicide or hastened death will increase the likelihood that the patient will act, this fear has not been substantiated. An open discussion is more likely to reduce the intensity of the request. Once the underlying reasons are known, more directed questions can be asked. Several examples, and the common areas to which answers may point, follow: MD: “What makes you ask that?” - Desire for a pain-free death - Control over the dying process MD: “What do you expect will happen without PAS?” - Understanding and expectations of the illness - Expectation of what dying will be like MD: “What type of assistance do you want?” - Pills, injection MD: “Who do you want to be involved? Why?” - Self, family member, physician MD: “When do you think you want to die?” - Now - At some later point MD: “What do you hope to accomplish?” - Freedom from pain, disability, bankruptcy, dependency, indignity - Removing burden on others The answer to the question, “When do you think you want to die?” will provide some indication of acuity. The answer to the question, “What do you hope to accomplish?” will provide some understanding of the patient’s reasoning and what he or she is hoping for. During the course of the questioning, it is particularly important to learn whether the patient is imagining future symptoms or other conditions that are either unlikely or easily preventable. As you listen to the answers, use the therapeutic effect of empathic listening. Avoid endorsing the request for PAS in a way that confirms the patient’s perception that his or her life is worthless. Similarly, avoid rejecting the request when it is first heard as this will often serve to close rather than open discussion. Remember that empathizing is not the same as agreeing. Premature affirmation of any perspective can propel both parties to stark choices. Only when the patient’s point of view has been characterized will it be possible to talk about what suffering means to the patient and what assurances can or cannot be given. Personal biases vs. therapeutic listening To respond effectively to the needs of the patient, the physician must be aware of his or her own biases and the potential for counter-transference. If the idea of suicide is offensive to the physician, the patient may feel his or her disapproval and worry about abandonment. Conversely, if the physician feels it would be best for everyone if the patient were to die soon, the patient may sense this and become more concerned about being an unwelcome burden. Be open to the possibility that your personal reactions to the patient’s suffering may give insight into his or her experience. For example, if you feel weighed down by meeting with the patient, perhaps the patient is depressed. In making the request, the patient is opening a door for communication. The therapeutic response to a request for assisted suicide or euthanasia begins with listening. Possibly because listening involves little outward motion, it seems passive to the casual observer and its value as an active therapeutic intervention is often unrecognized. In actuality, the physician’s ability to listen and commitment to stay involved are the main components of an effective response. The therapeutic power of listening must not be underestimated. (Ref. 29) (Ref. 31) For a physician confronted with a request to hasten death, the critical early intervention often consists of a handful of minutes spent listening to the patient’s fears and acknowledging his or her suffering, coupled with firmly committing to remain involved, try new ways to improve the patient’s quality of life, and provide support the patient and family need during this difficult time. The physician-patient relationship is the most powerful therapeutic resource with which to intervene in suffering. By carefully assessing and effectively treating pain and other symptoms, a physician reaffirms the patient’s confidence in the physician’s knowledge and skills. Similarly, willingness to explore a patient’s suffering and fears engenders confidence in the physician’s compassion and willingness to be there in the hard times that may lie ahead. Patients’ suffering is often rooted in fears of the future; patients can often tolerate the current situation but worry what will happen if things get worse. (Ref. 25) Physicians can use this aspect of suffering to therapeutic benefit. It is often possible to diminish an acutely anxious patient’s distress and improve the patient’s sense of control by drawing attention to the present moment in which the discomfort is tolerable, if only barely, and by emphasizing that life is a series of present moments. The future-based nature of most suffering allows physicians to inform and affirm for patients that there is always something they can do to decrease the severity of pain or other symptoms and support patients and families through these difficult times. <u><strong>Outlining specific steps that can be taken if pain or other cancer-related symptoms worsen can be reassuring for patients and their loved ones.</u></strong> <u><strong>Patients who fear dying in uncontrolled physical agony are often reassured that palliative sedation is available for situations in which suffering cannot be otherwise controlled</u></strong>. (Ref. 32) Social suffering that comes from a felt loss of meaning, i.e. a sense of having nothing to contribute and being merely a burden to others, i.e. is not without therapeutic response. A loved one’s illness and care almost inevitably impose burdens on that person’s family. All who love the person are affected by his or her illness in emotional and practical ways. Serious illness disrupts plans and sometimes derails long-held aspirations. Here again, there are no pat answers. While it is essential for physicians to affirm their commitment to suffering patients, they need not shoulder these responsibilities alone. The multidimensional suffering of progressive cancer is best addressed by interdisciplinary approaches to care. (Ref. 33) Hospice and palliative care programs can respond in skillful ways, and often identify ways of lessening the burden and enabling families to care well and with love without losing their own lives in the process. Step 2: Assess the underlying causes of the request A request for PAS may indicate a failure to address the full scope of a patient’s needs. Focus on all four dimensions of physical, psychological, social, and spiritual suffering as well as practical concerns (see EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment). Assess for clinical depression Among all the psychological and physical possibilities, give particular consideration to the presence of clinical depression or anxiety, as research indicates correlation between requests for PAS and their presence. (Ref. 9) (Ref. 28) When evaluating psychological and social issues; explore patients’ fears about the future. Clinical depression occurs frequently and is both under-diagnosed and undertreated. It can be a source of intense mental suffering and a barrier to completing life closure and achieving a “good death.” Diagnosis of depression is more challenging in patients with advanced illness, since the physical symptoms typically associated with depression (e.g., changes in appetite, weight, energy level, libido, or sleeping) frequently occur in these patients as a result of their illness. Studies have shown that the screening question, “Do you feel depressed most of the time?” is highly sensitive and specific in the medically ill. Feelings of pervasive helplessness, hopelessness, and worthlessness are not normal. Do not assume that they are situational and leave them unattended (see EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms). Psychosocial suffering, practical concerns Emotional and coping responses to life-threatening illness may include a strong sense of shame, feelings of being unwanted, and difficulties coping. Adjustment to the loss of previous function, independence, control, and/or self-image may be difficult. Each change may lead to tension within relationships that further increase isolation and misery. Worries about practical matters (e.g., who the caregivers will be, how domestic chores will be done, who will care for dependents and pets, etc.) can create considerable distress. If support is not forthcoming or is insufficient, suffering may ensue or increase. Approaches to the assessment of psychosocial issues and practical concerns are covered in EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment. Physical suffering A host of physical symptoms may accompany advanced illness. These may include pain, breathlessness, anorexia/cachexia, weakness/fatigue, nausea/vomiting, constipation, dehydration, edema, incontinence, loss of function, sleep deprivation, etc. Their presence, particularly if they are unmanaged for long periods, may markedly increase suffering. Approaches to the assessment of physical issues are covered in EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment. The management of pain is discussed in EPEC™-O Module 2: Cancer Pain Management. The management of other common physical symptoms is discussed in EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms. Spiritual suffering The prospect of dying may evoke seemingly unresolvable existential concerns that are then experienced as suffering. As illness advances and disability increases, the patient’s sense of his or her meaning, value, and purpose in life may all come into question. If there is a sense of abandonment or punishment by God, faith and religious beliefs may be eroded and anger may ensue. Approaches to the assessment of spiritual issues are covered in EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment. Fears for the future In addition to current concerns, many patients are fearful about their future. They may worry about pain and other symptoms, loss of control or independence, abandonment, loneliness, indignity, loss of self-image, and being a burden to others. While their thoughts may be unrealistic in the setting of quality care, many have witnessed suboptimal care in others that fuels their fears and fantasies. Direct questions may be adequate to assess a patient’s fears. If not, discussing a series of scenarios and preferences, as is done during advance care planning, may be helpful. When personal values and goals of care are being discussed, clarify the things the person most wants to avoid. This may help preempt unrealistic fears (see EPEC™-O Module 13: Advance Care Planning). Step 3: Affirm your commitment to care for the patient Patients facing the end-of-life often have fears of abandonment. Listen to and acknowledge expressed feelings and fears. Make a commitment to help find solutions to the issues of concern, both current and anticipated. Reinforce that you want to continue to be the patient’s physician until the last possible moment. Explore options to allay immediate concerns and fears. As a request for hastened death affects everyone who is close to the patient, a commitment to the patient also affirms a commitment to the family and those close to the patient, including other caregivers. Step 4: Address the root causes of the request This section provides a general framework for addressing some of the potential root causes for a request for hastened death in each dimension of suffering. <u><strong>Start by discussing the patient’s health care goals and preferences, explaining palliative care approaches and services, and describing the legal alternatives to PAS</u></strong>. Remember that some patients may not trust either individual health caregivers or the health care system to meet their needs. If possible, it helps to discuss this lack of trust with the patient at the outset so the issues can be understood, if not dealt with, early (see EPEC™-O Module 13: Advance Care Planning; EPEC™-O Module 1: Comprehensive Assessment; EPEC™-O Module 9: Negotiating Goals of Care; and EPEC™-O Module 12: Conflict Resolution). Address psychological suffering As psychological suffering can lead to requests for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, its management warrants considerable attention. Start by assessing and managing depression, anxiety, or delirium aggressively (see EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms). Because patients’ emotional responses to illness can be profound and coping responses vary, they will require careful exploration in a positive and understanding way. Supportive counseling that involves active listening and acknowledgment of the patient’s feelings may be woven into general care, or it may be provided more intensively through dedicated individual or group counseling. Social workers and chaplains trained in supportive counseling can provide considerable assistance. Referral to trained counselors, psychologists, or psychiatrists may be required if the issues are complex and/or the risks are high. Patients can be helped to see their physical dependence as an unavoidable consequence of their illness, rather than a personal failure. Clinicians can foster a sense of dignity through the manner in which care is provided. In coming to know the patient as a person, the physician acknowledges the uniqueness and inherent worth of that individual. Death awaits us all; therefore, if hope were to reside solely in avoiding death, all hope would ultimately be lost. In practice, it is often possible for patients who are approaching the end-of-life to reframe hope and discover meaningful opportunities that still exist. (Ref. 29) (Ref. 34) Physicians can assist patients to identify achievable goals, such as participating in meaningful events, engaging in life review, completing personal affairs and relationships, and feeling prepared to leave this life. (Ref. 35) Address social suffering, practical concerns Stresses and conflicts in the social or practical aspects of a person’s life can have profound effects on his or her will to live. Express interest and inquire in detail about this aspect of the patient’s life: • What is the patient’s family situation? Does he or she live with someone? Are family members supportive? Are there unresolved issues? • What is the patient’s financial situation? Is health insurance available and sufficient? • Are legal affairs in order? Does the patient have a Living Will, Power of Attorney for Health Care, Power of Attorney for Business Affairs, or Last Will and Testament? • Where would the patient like to receive care? Who is there to help? Who will the caregivers be? Is there tension over the caregiving role for either party? • Who attends to domestic chores such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, banking, and/or bill payments? • Are there any dependents the patient cares for, or pets? Who will care for them if the patient is unable to? Consider requesting assistance from other members of the health care team (e.g., social workers, nurses, chaplains, occupational therapists, etc). Additional resources for help and support may be available in the community, through a health care institution, or from a local hospice or palliative care program. Address physical suffering <u><strong>Multiple studies indicate that patients with life-threatening illnesses have many unaddressed physical issues. If left unmanaged for long periods, each can add considerably to a patient’s sense of suffering</u></strong>. Today, the field of medicine has more knowledge and tools to manage physical symptoms than ever before. Pain and symptom management are discussed in detail in EPEC™-O Module 2: Cancer Pain Management and EPEC™-O Module 3: Symptoms. Each symptom needs to be pursued aggressively and successful management often requires extensive and careful thought and individual clinical trials until symptoms are brought under control. Function is critical to maintaining independence. <u><strong>Physiatrists, nurses, and physical and occupational therapists may be helpful and knowledgeable about the exercises and aids</u></strong> that can be used to optimize and maintain function and ensure safety. Sexuality and intimacy are integral aspects of each individual, particularly as experienced through touch and closeness to cherished partners and family members. Illness and disfigurement may change the way people are able to interact. To determine individual desires and uncover tensions, facilitate discussions between partners and key family members. Help them look for alternatives that may be comforting. </p>
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<h4>Extend Appel ’07 controversy stems</h4>
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null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,152
That’s a reason to vote negative on presumption -- no VTL in squo means no reason to do the aff and only a risk the alternative rejuvenates that loss of value
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>That’s a reason to vote negative on presumption -- no VTL in squo means no reason to do the aff<u><strong> and only a risk the alternative rejuvenates that loss of value </h4></u></strong>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Impact Wall
429,708
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,153
Accurate division of ground matters – distorting the literature base mean mislearn the topic and never get into the heart of what the topic literature means turns all their education args
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Accurate division of ground matters – distorting the literature base mean mislearn the topic and never get into the heart of what the topic literature means turns all their education args</h4>
2NC
T
Spec DA
429,709
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,154
C SUBPOINT - The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan.
Kessler 2008
Kessler 2008 (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)
If risk is  defined by potential loss, even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as loss goes to infinity risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down uncertainty is a precondition for catastrophies. without a warning we find meteorites. tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. we do not know the most serious future threat, even absurd scenarios gain plausibility. By a chain , improbable events are linked "Although likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the impression is plausibility . The connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the improbable yet possible connection Rumsfeld said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."
If risk is  defined by potential loss, even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as loss goes to infinity risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down even absurd scenarios gain plausibility. By a chain improbable events Although likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the impression is plausibility The connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was refuted,  but this did not prevent the connection Rumsfeld said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence
The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is  defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of  meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will  constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct-  ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.   The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection  between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld  famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.
5,527
<h4>C SUBPOINT - <strong>The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan. </h4><p>Kessler 2008</strong> (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)</p><p>The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. <u><strong><mark>If</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>risk</u></strong></mark> of terrorism <u><strong><mark>is  defined</mark> </u></strong>in traditional terms <u><strong><mark>by</mark> </u></strong>probability and <u><strong><mark>potential loss,</mark> </u></strong>then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that <u><strong><mark>even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as</mark> </u></strong>the measure of <u><strong><mark>loss goes to infinity</u></strong></mark>.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and <u><strong><mark>risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down</u></strong></mark>. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; <u><strong>uncertainty is a </u></strong>crucial <u><strong>precondition for catastrophies.</u></strong> In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, <u><strong>without a warning</u></strong>, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, <u><strong>we find </u></strong>the impact of  <u><strong>meteorites. </u></strong>Mars attacks, the <u><strong>tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.</u></strong>  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that <u><strong>we do not </u></strong>even <u><strong>know </u></strong>who or what will  constitute <u><strong>the most serious future threat, </u></strong>"^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  <u><strong><mark>even</mark> </u></strong>the most <u><strong><mark>absurd scenarios</mark> </u></strong>can <u><strong><mark>gain plausibility. By</mark> </u></strong>construct-  ing <u><strong><mark>a chain</mark> </u></strong>of potentialities<u><strong>, <mark>improbable events</mark> are linked </u></strong>and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  <u><strong>"<mark>Although</mark> </u></strong>the <u><strong><mark>likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the</mark> </u></strong>residual <u><strong><mark>impression is</mark> </u></strong>one of <u><strong><mark>plausibility</u></strong></mark>. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of<u><strong> </u></strong>the recent war in Iraq<u><strong>.</u></strong>   <u><strong><mark>The connection between Saddam</mark> </u></strong>Hussein <u><strong><mark>and Al Qaeda</mark> </u></strong>that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence <u><strong><mark>was</mark> </u></strong>again and again <u><strong>presented and <mark>refuted,  but this did not prevent</mark> </u></strong>the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war <u><strong><mark>the</mark> improbable yet possible <mark>connection</mark>  </u></strong>between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald <u><strong><mark>Rumsfeld</mark> </u></strong> famously <u><strong><mark>said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence</mark>."</u></strong>  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.</p>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Impact Wall
10,122
937
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,155
Informed precise debate is key to correct understanding
Emanuel '98
Emanuel '98
(Chief, Department of Clinical Bioethics, Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health Ezekiel 82 Minn. L. Rev. 983) As the debate proceeds, it must be better informed The debate needs to move away from calling out for euthanasia shake off the distortions concerning end-of-life practices and carefully examine what likely benefits and harms might result from legalization there will be even more emphasis on accurate empirical assessments of likely practices and consequences related to PAS Current assumptions about PAS based on abstract argumentation and logical inferences will need to be tested empirically if public policy is to be prudent these assumptions will require a commitment to collect additional data to make public debate more informed.
As the debate proceeds, it must be better informed The debate needs to move away from calling out for euthanasia shake off the distortions concerning end-of-life practices and carefully examine what likely benefits and harms might result from legalization there will be even more emphasis on accurate empirical assessments of likely practices and consequences related to PAS Current assumptions about PAS based on abstract argumentation and logical inferences will need to be tested empirically if public policy is to be prudent these assumptions will require a commitment to collect additional data to make public debate more informed.
(Chief, Department of Clinical Bioethics, Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health Ezekiel 82 Minn. L. Rev. 983) In Washington v. Glucksberg n1 and Vacco v. Quill n2 the Supreme Court Justices did the right thing by rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or euthanasia. n3 They also reached the correct decision in not foreclosing state legalization of these interventions. The decisions will foster a lively debate in the states about the ethics and political prudence of permitting these interventions. Although a few Justices held out hope for a more narrow constitutional right to PAS or euthanasia, the majority holdings permanently shifted the forum, the arguments, the perspective, and the justifications in the debate over PAS and euthanasia. The forum is no longer the courts, but the legislatures and public squares. The arguments are no longer about constitutional rights, but ethics and prudent policies. The perspective is no longer first person, but third per- [*984] son. And the justifications no longer appeal to individual autonomy and beneficence, but to probable social goods and harms. This is as it should be in a democracy. As the debate proceeds, however, it must be better informed. The debate needs to move away from this or that heart-wrenching case calling out for euthanasia, shake off the distortions concerning end-of-life practices that have so far informed it, and carefully examine what likely benefits and harms might result from legalization. This means that there will be even more emphasis on accurate empirical assessments of likely practices and consequences related to PAS or euthanasia. Current assumptions about PAS or euthanasia based on abstract argumentation and logical inferences will need to be tested empirically if public policy is to be prudent. Some of these assumptions already have been shattered by empirical assessment. But others will require a commitment to collect additional data to make public debate more informed.
2,032
<h4><strong>Informed precise debate is key to correct understanding</h4><p>Emanuel '98</p><p><u>(Chief, Department of Clinical Bioethics, Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health Ezekiel 82 Minn. L. Rev. 983)</p><p></u></strong>In Washington v. Glucksberg n1 and Vacco v. Quill n2 the Supreme Court Justices did the right thing by rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or euthanasia. n3 They also reached the correct decision in not foreclosing state legalization of these interventions. The decisions will foster a lively debate in the states about the ethics and political prudence of permitting these interventions. Although a few Justices held out hope for a more narrow constitutional right to PAS or euthanasia, the majority holdings permanently shifted the forum, the arguments, the perspective, and the justifications in the debate over PAS and euthanasia. The forum is no longer the courts, but the legislatures and public squares. The arguments are no longer about constitutional rights, but ethics and prudent policies. The perspective is no longer first person, but third per- [*984] son. And the justifications no longer appeal to individual autonomy and beneficence, but to probable social goods and harms. This is as it should be in a democracy. <u><strong><mark>As the debate proceeds,</mark> </u></strong>however, <u><strong><mark>it must be better informed</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The debate needs to move away from</u></strong></mark> this or that heart-wrenching case <u><strong><mark>calling out for euthanasia</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>shake off the distortions concerning end-of-life practices</u></strong></mark> that have so far informed it, <u><strong><mark>and carefully examine what likely benefits and harms might result from legalization</u></strong></mark>. This means that <u><strong><mark>there will be even more emphasis on accurate empirical assessments of likely practices</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and consequences related to PAS</u></strong></mark> or euthanasia. <u><strong><mark>Current assumptions about PAS</u></strong></mark> or euthanasia <u><strong><mark>based on abstract argumentation and logical inferences will need to be tested empirically if public policy is to be prudent</u></strong></mark>. Some of <u><strong><mark>these assumptions</u></strong></mark> already have been shattered by empirical assessment. But others <u><strong><mark>will require a commitment to collect additional data to make public debate more informed.</p></u></strong></mark>
2NC
T
Spec DA
429,714
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,156
1 -- Its severance – severs out of the security frame used to justify the 1AC – voting issue because it makes the aff a moving target, making it impossible to be neg
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>1 -- Its severance – severs out of the security frame used to justify the 1AC – voting issue because it makes the aff a moving target, making it impossible to be neg</h4>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Permutation
429,711
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,157
null
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4> </h4>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Permutation
429,712
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,158
The details matter anyone can affirm in the abstract
Ignatieff 4
Ignatieff 4 (Michael, Lesser Evils, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, p. 20-1)
A moral perfectionist position holds that states can spare hazard simply by adhering to universal moral standards There are two problems with a perfectionist stance articulating nonrevocable moral standards is easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them What is the line between interrogation and torture abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them Furthermore the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law.
A moral perfectionist position holds that states can spare hazard simply by adhering to universal moral standards There are two problems with a perfectionist stance articulating nonrevocable standards is easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them Furthermore perfectionist standards contradict each other
As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.
1,904
<h4>The details matter anyone can affirm in the abstract</h4><p><strong>Ignatieff 4</strong> (Michael, Lesser Evils, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, p. 20-1)</p><p>As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. <u><strong><mark>A moral perfectionist position</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>holds that states can spare</u></strong></mark> their officials this <u><strong><mark>hazard</u></strong> <u><strong>simply by adhering to</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>universal moral standards</u></strong></mark> set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. <u><strong><mark>There are two problems with a perfectionist stance</u></strong></mark>, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that <u><strong><mark>articulating nonrevocable</u></strong></mark>, nonderogable <u><strong>moral <mark>standards is</u></strong></mark> relatively <u><strong><mark>easy.</mark> <mark>The problem is deciding</mark> <mark>how to apply them</u></strong></mark> in specific cases. <u><strong>What is the line between interrogation and torture</u></strong>, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, <u><strong><mark>abstractions are less than helpful when political</mark> <mark>leaders have to choose between them</u></strong></mark> in practice. <u><strong><mark>Furthermore</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the problem with</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>perfectionist standards</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>is that they</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>contradict each other</u></strong></mark>. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, <u><strong>the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law.</u></strong> Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.</p>
2NC
T
Spec DA
132,927
38
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,159
2 -- Links take out perm solvency
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>2 -- Links take out perm solvency </h4>
2NC
2NC K
2NC Permutation
429,713
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,160
Extinction first – VTL/ethics inevitable and reversible and lower value to life doesn’t mean no value to life
Bernstein ‘2
Bernstein ‘2 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)
There is a basic value inherent in organic being emphatic in the opposition of life to death this affirmation is in all organic has a binding obligatory force Modern technology transformed consequences of human action so traditional ethics are no longer valid human beings possess power to destroy life on this planet a new categorical imperative might be Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive:
There is a basic value inherent in being emphatic in the opposition to death this affirmation has a binding obligatory force Modern technology transformed consequences of human action so traditional ethics are no longer valid human beings possess power to destroy this planet a new categorical imperative might be Do not compromise an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth
There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."
3,310
<h4>Extinction first – VTL/ethics inevitable and reversible and lower value to life doesn’t mean no value to life</h4><p><strong>Bernstein ‘2 </strong>(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)</p><p><u><strong><mark>There is a basic value inherent in</u></mark> <u>organic <mark>being</u></strong></mark>, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes <u><strong><mark>emphatic in the opposition</mark> of life <mark>to death</u></strong></mark>. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — <u><strong><mark>this affirmation</u></strong></mark> of life that <u><strong>is in all organic</u></strong> being <u><strong><mark>has a binding obligatory force</u></strong></mark> upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. <u><strong><mark>Modern technology</u></strong></mark> has <u><strong><mark>transformed</u></strong></mark> the nature and <u><strong><mark>consequences of human action so</u></strong></mark> radically that the underlying premises of <u><strong><mark>traditional ethics are no longer valid</u></strong></mark>. For the first time in history <u><strong><mark>human beings possess</u></strong></mark> the knowledge and the <u><strong><mark>power to destroy</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>life on <mark>this planet</u></strong></mark>, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, <u><strong><mark>a new categorical imperative</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>might be</u></strong></mark> formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "<u><strong><mark>Do not compromise</mark> the conditions for <mark>an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth</mark>"; or again turned positive:</u></strong> "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."</p>
2NC
Case
2NC Cumminksy
92,494
202
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,161
Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality
Cummiskey 90
Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor
It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction In such a situation, what would an agent motivated by the unconditional value of beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of beings, If I sacrifice some for the sake of other beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of beings. Persons have "dignity but also a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many Respect requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical considerat ion to the unconditional value of beings the demand that one give equal respect to all beings lead to a consequentialist theory it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an commitment to the equal value of all beings and a recognition that moral subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.
We have a duty to promote existence Persons have "dignity but also equality which dictates that some must give way for the sake of others Respect requires that, one give considerat ion to the unconditional value of beings that one give equal respect to all beings does not involve doing evil so that good may come It requires commitment to the equal value of all beings and a recognition that moral subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.
We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), but, as rational beings, persons also have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical considerat ion to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.
3,117
<h4>Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality </h4><p><strong>Cummiskey 90 <u></strong>– Professor of Philosophy, Bates David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor</p><p></u>We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." <u>It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good</u>." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? <u>By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction</u>. <u>In such a situation, what would</u> a conscientious Kantian agent, <u>an agent motivated by the unconditional value of </u>rational <u>beings, choose? <mark>We</mark> <mark>have a duty to promote</mark> the conditions necessary for the <mark>existence </mark>of </u>rational <u>beings,</u> but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. <u>If I sacrifice some for the sake of other </u>rational <u>beings, I do not use them arbitrarily</u> <u>and I do not deny the unconditional value of </u>rational <u>beings.</u> <u><strong><mark>Persons</u></strong></mark> may <u><strong><mark>have "dignity</u></strong></mark>, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), <u><strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark>, as rational beings, persons <u><strong><mark>also</u></strong></mark> have <u><strong>a fundamental <mark>equality</u> <u>which dictates that some must</strong></mark> sometimes <strong><mark>give way for the sake of others</mark>.</strong> </u>The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then <u>equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many</u>. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. <u><mark>Respect</mark> </u>for rational beings <u><mark>requires that,</mark> in deciding what to do, <mark>one</mark> <mark>give</mark> appropriate practical <mark>considerat ion to the unconditional value of</mark> </u>rational <u><mark>beings</u></mark> and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of <u>the demand <mark>that one give equal respect to all </u></mark>rational <u><mark>beings</mark> lead to a consequentialist</u> normative <u>theory</u>. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and <u>it <mark>does not involve doing evil so that good may come </mark>of it. <mark>It </mark>simply <mark>requires</mark> an</u> uncompromising <u><mark>commitment to the equal value</u></mark> and equal claims <u><mark>of all</mark> </u>rational <u><mark>beings and a recognition that</u></mark>, in the <u><mark>moral</u></mark> consideration of conduct, one's own <u><mark>subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.</p></u></mark>
2NC
Case
2NC Cumminksy
46,747
295
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,162
The affirmative’s discourse surrounding China constitutes China as a foreign other to protect American identity. The K is prior—their discourse is part and parcel of the affirmative’s policy.
Turner 13
Turner 13 Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]
Pan argues the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers. the PRC's capabilities appear threatening from understandings about the U S itself T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’ China ‘threats’ to the U St have always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements. American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence Campbell suggests dangers in the international realm are threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’ interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a U S defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’ when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. they have always existed as dangers to that identity a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity racial and ideological deemed most fundamental to its being representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such a Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western U S this discursive process of separating China from the U S has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies such crises were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U S was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the U S are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign. This is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth. this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved They assume the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded US China policy must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states. it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies. Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the U S it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China. the U S has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the U S have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the U S functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced
T]here is no “Chinese reality” that can speak for itself’ interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign through discourses of difference American discourses have made the US foreign from China nineteenth-century racial discourses separated China from a U S defined by Caucasian foundations Cold War discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the US. These discourses constitute a boundary ‘dangers’ from China have been perceived through the lens of American identity a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect American identity racial and ideological the capabilities and intentions are only part of the story. the processes by which China is made foreign are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy American discourses of China have never been produced objectively US China policy perpetuates discursive difference ‘threats’ from China have been fantasised, socially constructed products of discourse China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions they have framed the boundaries of political possibility
In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan argues that the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.15 Pan does not deny the importance of the PRC's capabilities but asserts that they appear threatening from understandings about the United States itself. ‘[T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself’, Pan argues. ‘[T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17¶ The analysis which follows demonstrates that China ‘threats’ to the United States have to some extent always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence.¶ The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible … is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21¶ Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States.¶ It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated.¶ As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.24¶ Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced.¶ US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then, US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the United States. As the case study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30¶ In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced.
8,113
<h4>The affirmative’s discourse surrounding China constitutes China as a foreign other to protect American identity. The K is prior—their discourse is part and parcel of the affirmative’s policy.</h4><p><strong>Turner 13</p><p></strong>Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]</p><p>In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin <u><strong>Pan argues</u></strong> that <u><strong>the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.</u></strong>15 Pan does not deny the importance of <u><strong>the PRC's capabilities</u></strong> but asserts that they <u><strong>appear threatening from understandings about the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>itself</u></strong>. ‘[<u><strong><mark>T]here is no</mark> such thing as <mark>“Chinese reality” that can</mark> automatically <mark>speak for itself</u></strong>’</mark>, Pan argues. ‘[<u><strong>T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’</u></strong>.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17¶ The analysis which follows demonstrates that <u><strong>China ‘threats’ to the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>St</u></strong>ates <u><strong>have</u></strong> to some extent <u><strong>always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse.</u></strong> Michel <u><strong>Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.</u></strong>18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, <u><strong>American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence</u></strong>.¶ The article draws in part from the work of David <u><strong>Campbell</u></strong> who <u><strong>suggests</u></strong> that <u><strong>dangers in the international realm are</u></strong> invariably <u><strong>threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible</u></strong> … <u><strong>is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’</u></strong>19 As a result, <u><strong><mark>interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign</mark> from one another <mark>through discourses of</mark> separation and <mark>difference</u></strong></mark>.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that <u><strong>particular <mark>American discourses have</mark> historically <mark>made the US foreign from China</mark>.</u></strong> Case study one for example demonstrates that <u><strong><mark>nineteenth-century racial discourses</mark> of non-white immigrant Chinese <mark>separated China from a U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates largely <u><strong><mark>defined by</mark> its presumed <mark>Caucasian foundations</mark>.</u></strong> In case study two we see that <u><strong><mark>Cold War</mark> ideological <mark>discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the</mark> democratic-capitalist <mark>US. These</mark> types of <mark>discourses</mark> are shown to have <mark>constitute</mark>d <mark>a</mark> ‘specific sort of <mark>boundary</mark> producing political performance’</u></strong>.21¶ Across the history of Sino-US relations then <u><strong>when <mark>‘dangers’ from China</mark> have emerged, they <mark>have</mark> always <mark>been perceived through the lens of American identity</mark>.</u></strong> In consequence, <u><strong>they have always existed as dangers to that identity</u></strong>. In this analysis it is argued that <u><strong><mark>a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect</mark> components of <mark>American identity</u></strong></mark> (primarily <u><strong><mark>racial and ideological</u></strong></mark>) <u><strong>deemed most fundamental to its being</u></strong>. As such, <u><strong>representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity.</u></strong> The case study analyses which follow reveal that <u><strong>this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such a</u></strong>s those within the administration of President Harry <u><strong>Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates.¶ It is demonstrated that, twice before, <u><strong>this discursive process of separating China from the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies</u></strong>.22 Case studies one and two expose how <u><strong>such crises</u></strong> have previously emerged. These moments <u><strong>were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War.</u></strong> Case study three shows that <u><strong>while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated</u></strong>.¶ As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then <u><strong><mark>the capabilities and intentions </mark>of a ‘rising’ China <mark>are only part of the story.</mark> International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and <mark>the processes by which China is made foreign</mark> from, and potentially dangerous to, the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy</mark>. This is because</u></strong>, to reaffirm, <u><strong><mark>American discourses of China have never been produced objectively</mark> or in the absence of purpose or intent.</u></strong> <u><strong>Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.</u></strong>23 <u><strong>This is</u></strong> not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is <u><strong>to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.</u></strong>24¶ Accordingly, <u><strong>this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved</u></strong>.25 <u><strong>They assume</u></strong>, for instance, <u><strong>the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure</u></strong> that <u><strong>particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded</u></strong>.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced.¶ <u><strong>US China policy</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.</u></strong>27 In fact, <u><strong>it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.</u></strong>28 <u><strong>Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes</u></strong>, then, <u><strong><mark>US China policy</mark> itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. As the case study analyses show, <u><strong>it <mark>perpetuates discursive difference</mark> through the rhetoric and actions</u></strong> (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) <u><strong>by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.</u></strong>29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity</u></strong>.30¶ In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, <u><strong>throughout history <mark>‘threats’ from China</mark> towards the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They <mark>have</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>been fantasised, socially constructed products of</mark> American <mark>discourse</mark>. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that <mark>China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions</u></strong></mark>. Second, <u><strong>representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, <mark>they have framed the boundaries of political possibility</mark> so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded.</u></strong> Third, <u><strong>US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced</u></strong>.</p>
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Their economic security discourse serves to further the interests of the powerful---this causes structural violence and environmental destruction that turns the case
Nhanenge 7
Nhanenge 7 Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT
Although the world generates more wealth, the riches do not trickle down" to the poor poverty and economic inequality is growing the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment Modernization, and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity and pollution which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world a small minority live in material luxury poor people are marginalized by the global economic system people are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction The second is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat The fourth crisis is repression of fundamental human rights
Although the world generates more wealth inequality is growing militarism, dictatorship and repression is multiplied. the critique of economic activities intensified due to deterioration of the environment economic activities have been linked to pollution without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not survive faced with extinction, one must conclude progress" went astray. economic development generated a violent world poor people are marginalized domination of Others is interconnected with the spread of nuclear weapons poverty Pollution extinction repression
There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).
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<h4>Their economic security discourse serves to further the interests of the powerful---this causes structural violence and environmental destruction that turns the case</h4><p><strong><mark>Nhanenge 7</mark> </strong>Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT</p><p>There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. <u><strong><mark>Although the world</u></strong> </mark>on average <u><strong><mark>generates more</u></strong> </mark>and more <u><strong><mark>wealth</mark>, the riches do not</u></strong> appear to "<u><strong>trickle down" to the poor</u></strong> and improve their material well-being. Instead, <u><strong>poverty and economic <mark>inequality is growing</u></strong></mark>. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, <u><strong>the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong><mark>militarism, dictatorship and </mark>human <mark>repression is multiplied</u></strong>.</mark> Since the mid 1970, <u><strong><mark>the critique of </mark>global <mark>economic activities </mark>has <mark>intensified due to </mark>the escalating <mark>deterioration of the </mark>natural <mark>environment</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Modernization,</u></strong> industrialisation <u><strong>and its <mark>economic activities have been </mark>directly <mark>linked to </mark>increased scarcity</u></strong> of natural resources <u><strong>and</u></strong> generation of <u><strong><mark>pollution</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air</u></strong>. The latter threat is of great significance, because <u><strong><mark>without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not</mark> be able to <mark>survive</u></strong></mark>. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, <u><strong><mark>faced with </mark>its negative side effects and the real threat of <mark>extinction, one must conclude </mark>that somewhere along the way "<mark>progress" went astray</u></strong>.</mark> Instead of material plenty, <u><strong><mark>economic development generated a violent</mark>, unhealthy and unequal <mark>world</u></strong></mark>. It is a world where <u><strong>a small minority live in material luxury</u></strong>, while millions of people live in misery. These <u><strong><mark>poor people are marginalized </mark>by the global economic system</u></strong>. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these <u><strong>people</u></strong> are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They <u><strong>are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development</u></strong> imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the <u><strong><mark>domination of </mark>women and <mark>Others is interconnected with </mark>the domination of nature</u></strong>. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that <u><strong>humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is <mark>the spread of nuclear </mark>and other <mark>weapons </mark>of mass destruction</u></strong>, together with the high level of military spending. <u><strong>The second </u></strong>crisis <u><strong>is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and <mark>poverty</u></strong></mark>. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. <u><strong><mark>Pollution</mark>, destruction of ecosystems and <mark>extinction </mark>of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat</u></strong>. <u><strong>The fourth crisis is <mark>repression</u></strong> </mark>and denial <u><strong>of fundamental human rights</u></strong> by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins<strong> 1992: 1). </p></strong>
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1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
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Moralist foreign policymaking only results in intervention and lashout
Blackwill ’14
Blackwill ’14 (Robert D. Blackwill was deputy national-security adviser for strategic planning and U.S. ambassador to India in the George W. Bush administration, “In Defense of Kissinger”, http://nationalinterest.org/article/defense-kissinger-9642?page=show, January 2, 2014)
Yet “when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous,” giving way to “ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades.”2 The key to a sustainable foreign policy, in his view, is the avoidance of either extreme: “A country that demands moral perfection of itself as a test of its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”3 he trivializes the possibility that his human rights–dominated policy preferences could have had profoundly damaging strategic consequences for the United States. Even if a president or prime minister has credible information about atrocities . . . there must still be a cold realpolitik calculation about the costs of intervening. . . . If a humanitarian intervention would lead to a broader international crisis, or plunge the country—or the world—into a massive war, then most cabinets will decide that it is just not worth it. . . . Believing in human rights does not make one suicidal. In fact, he goes even further, allowing that the “point of a balance of power”— —“is a profound moral goal: it keeps the peace.” Nixon and Kissinger surely met that test during the South Asia crisis of 1971. Their geopolitical approach, which Bass derides, produced an extraordinarily productive Nixon visit to China in February 1972 and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, which serves as the basic framework for the two countries’ relations to this day; a broad, bipartisan U.S. policy approach to China that has lasted for more than forty years and has promoted peace and stability throughout Asia; major U.S.-Chinese intelligence cooperation against the USSR; and a May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow that saw the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the U.S.-Soviet incidents-at-sea agreement, all hallmarks of a détente that reduced the risk of superpower confrontation even while creating conditions that helped undermine the Soviet Union’s moral and geopolitical claims and bring about its destruction.
when policy becomes moralistic it turn quixotic or dangerous giving way to “ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades The key to a sustainable foreign policy is avoidance of extreme A country that demands moral perfection will achieve neither perfection nor security.” human rights–dominated policy could have had profoundly damaging strategic consequences there must still be a cold realpolitik calculation a humanitarian intervention lead to a broader international crisis, or plunge the world into war most cabinets will decide it is not worth it. . . . Believing in human rights does not make one suicidal a balance of power” is a profound moral goal: it keeps the peace.” Kissinger geopolitical approach produced Shanghai Communiqué the first Arms Limitation Treaty and the U.S.-Soviet incidents-at-sea agreement hallmarks of a détente that reduced confrontation
IN HIS BOOK Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger concludes that the United States “faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities.”1 The recent debates about U.S. military options in Libya and Syria reflect the enduring tension between these intertwined, at times competing components of our external relations. No U.S. statesman can ignore this dilemma, and none will find it easy to strike exactly the right balance between the two, especially in times of crisis. All would seek to simultaneously pursue the promotion of the national interest and the protection of human rights. Kissinger, famous for advocating an American foreign policy based on the national interest, has long stressed that values and power are properly understood as mutually supporting. As he argued in a 1973 speech, since “Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements,” a “purely pragmatic policy” would confuse allies and eventually forfeit domestic support. Yet “when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous,” giving way to “ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades.”2 The key to a sustainable foreign policy, in his view, is the avoidance of either extreme: “A country that demands moral perfection of itself as a test of its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”3 This ever-present fusion of American values and national interests was evident in the spring of 1971, as a crisis erupted in South Asia during Kissinger’s tenure as Richard Nixon’s national-security adviser. When the British Raj ended in 1947, a partition of the subcontinent led to the creation of India and Pakistan as separate, estranged sovereign states. Pakistan, envisioned as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, emerged with an unusual bifurcated structure comprising two noncontiguous majority-Muslim areas: “West Pakistan” and “East Pakistan.” While united by a shared faith, they were divided by language, ethnicity and one thousand miles of Indian territory. Over the course of a fraught sequence of events from 1970 to 1972, a party advocating East Pakistani autonomy won a national parliamentary majority, and Pakistan’s two wings split. Amid natural disaster (a cyclone of historic proportions struck the East on the eve of the vote, killing up to half a million people and devastating fields and livestock), constitutional crisis, a sweeping crackdown by West Pakistani forces attempting to hold the East, mass refugee migrations, guerilla conflict and an Indian-Pakistani war, East Pakistan achieved independence as the new state of Bangladesh. By most estimates, the victims of the Bangladeshi independence struggle, which included communal massacres unleashed during the crackdown, numbered in the hundreds of thousands. In his new book, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, Princeton professor Gary Bass, who has written previous books on humanitarian intervention and war-crimes tribunals, portrays the American president and his national-security adviser as the heartless villains of these events. While Bass makes a cursory acknowledgement of the two men’s geopolitical accomplishments, he derides the thinking that informed their actions as the product of a “familiar Cold War chessboard.” His own implicit framework is a deeply heartfelt and contrary view to Kissinger’s, one that places human-rights concerns at the pinnacle of U.S. foreign policy, at least in this crisis. But how persuasive is Bass’s history? Instead of producing a definitive account, he offers an ahistorical and tendentious rendition that, more often than not, lacks a broader context. He reduces a complex series of overlapping South Asian upheavals, Cold War alliances and diplomatic initiatives to “a reminder of what the world can easily look like without any concern for the pain of distant strangers.”4 He faults the United States for not taking a firmer, more public stand on Pakistan’s domestic repression while offering only vague assurances that this U.S. pressure would have brought about an actual improvement in conditions. Moreover, he trivializes the possibility that his human rights–dominated policy preferences could have had profoundly damaging strategic consequences for the United States. Ironically, in his previous book Freedom’s Battle, Bass sympathizes with precisely the sort of cautionary impulses that animated Kissinger: Even if a president or prime minister has credible information about atrocities . . . there must still be a cold realpolitik calculation about the costs of intervening. . . . If a humanitarian intervention would lead to a broader international crisis, or plunge the country—or the world—into a massive war, then most cabinets will decide that it is just not worth it. . . . Believing in human rights does not make one suicidal. In fact, he goes even further, allowing that the “point of a balance of power”—Kissinger’s principal preoccupation in 1971, as throughout his career as a statesman—“is a profound moral goal: it keeps the peace.”5 But in The Blood Telegram, he implies that Nixon and Kissinger should have realized that they could have had it both ways with no risk—achieved their strategic breakthrough with China, with all of its attendant geopolitical benefits, and concurrently put human rights in East Pakistan at the top of their policy agenda. If only life were that simple: as Kissinger observes, “The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable.”6 Thus, at a time of acute crisis, Kissinger judged that if Washington had mounted an all-out private and public human-rights campaign against then president Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and the Pakistan government, which was correctly convinced that the future of the state was at stake, such a campaign would not have fundamentally altered Islamabad’s policy toward East Pakistan, and the White House’s China initiative could well have collapsed. However, as will be demonstrated at length later in this essay, that hardly meant that he ignored the plight of the Bengali Hindus. Kissinger, both while in office and in his subsequent writings, rejected the proposition that circumstances inevitably force a crude either/or choice between national interests and democratic values, and during this crisis no other nation except India did as much as the United States to directly address the human-rights tragedy in East Pakistan. One wishes that the chasm between academic and policy-maker perspectives might have produced a certain modesty in Bass’s treatment of these events. Unfortunately, it doesn’t. Instead The Blood Telegram offers a strident, almost willfully biased attack on the personal motives of policy makers whom Bass condemns—from the comfortable perspective of forty years of hindsight and an American victory in the Cold War—for falling short of bringing about all desirable goals simultaneously. In Bass’s theory, Nixon and Kissinger, motivated by a mixture of “racial animus toward Indians,” indifference to human rights and an obsessive focus on Cold War geopolitics, ignored opportunities to save lives, ensured that “the United States was allied with the killers” and incurred “responsibility for a significant complicity in the slaughter of the Bengalis.”7 To reach his indictment of Nixon and Kissinger, Bass pairs a myopic account of the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China and its long-term objectives with a highly selective rendition of U.S. policy toward the breakup of Pakistan. IT IS IMPORTANT to stress what Nixon and Kissinger were trying to accomplish in U.S.-Chinese relations beginning in the fall of 1970: no less than a fundamental restructuring of the global balance of power and world order in America’s favor. By establishing a strategic understanding with Beijing based on China’s genuine worry that the relentless Soviet military buildup in the Far East could presage an attack on China, they hoped to strengthen America’s global position; meet Beijing’s test that “only an America that was strong in Asia could be taken seriously by the Chinese”8; incentivize Moscow to adopt more reasonable policies toward the United States, including in Europe and on arms control; bring an honorable end to the Vietnam War (a conflict in which half a million Americans were at war at the time of Nixon’s inauguration, but which public and elite opinion increasingly rejected); and reduce tensions throughout Asia. All these crucial objectives—in which success could fairly count as both a strategic and a moral achievement—required a fundamental reorientation of U.S.-Chinese relations. As Kissinger observes in White House Years, “The hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other. The rest could be left to the dynamic of events.”9 Nixon and Kissinger’s decision in October 1970 (before the Pakistani crisis) to reach out to China through the Pakistanis is casually dismissed by Bass as “one of many options” and potentially the worst. He suggests France and, curiously, totalitarian Romania as plausible and more ethical alternatives.10 Yet the United States explored all three, and Beijing unambiguously chose Pakistan. The first explicit indication by China that a personal envoy of Nixon would be welcome in Beijing came in December 1970 by way of the Pakistani channel, with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai stressing, “The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message.”11 On April 27, 1971, after American replies through both Romania and Pakistan, Beijing followed up through Islamabad and invited “direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries,” suggesting that the proper arrangements could “be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan.”12 As Kissinger stresses, Zhou did not “want to risk subordinates’ thwarting of our common design by their haggling over ‘modalities.’ By keeping technical arrangements in the Pakistani channel, he ensured discretion, high-level consideration, and expeditious decisions.”13 Bass, ignoring the evident Chinese insistence on Pakistan, attacks the White House’s use of Yahya Khan as an intermediary as evidence of a gratuitous Nixonian affection for military strongmen. In addition to the strong PRC preference for Pakistan and the advantages of geographic proximity, another explanation is also pertinent: it is difficult to imagine how it could have been arranged for Kissinger to visit Beijing secretly from either Paris (a world capital) or Bucharest (a prime target of Soviet penetration); secrecy was an essential requirement since Nixon could risk neither premature U.S. domestic euphoria nor a public failure in Beijing. Nothing regarding this highly sensitive matter leaked from Pakistan, and Yahya Khan discreetly managed the complex arrangements to get Kissinger secretly from Islamabad to Beijing, as Zhou had suggested. The late great Harvard historian Ernest May once observed, “What a historian chooses to leave out or minimize is often as important and telling as what he decides to include.”14 One must wonder if Bass discounts the clear Chinese preference for Yahya Khan as the intermediary between Beijing and Washington because acknowledging it would undermine one of his core assertions: that Nixon and Kissinger could have openly condemned or even attempted to unseat the Pakistani president without endangering the opening to China. In his book, Bass never directly confronts a series of major questions: If he knew that the opening to China would have faltered, as Nixon and Kissinger feared, because of U.S. pressure on Yahya over the atrocities in East Pakistan, would he nevertheless have forced a showdown with Pakistan over the plight of Hindu Bengalis? Would he have been content to face an outcome in which the China initiative collapsed even as Pakistan rejected American demands as irrelevant? Would the next step have been sanctions against Pakistan, or perhaps American support for the Bengali insurgency—and what other results would these policies have entailed? Statesmen have to make such choices; professors do not. To duck these questions, Bass must implicitly posit an alternative rosy scenario in which Nixon and Kissinger are able to establish an equally effective channel to Beijing while bringing about a swift improvement in Pakistan’s domestic conditions. But what would the Chinese reaction have been if the United States had informed an adversary of two decades at an enormously delicate moment that its watershed invitation to improve relations had been misdirected and that the Yahya Khan channel was unacceptable to Washington? What if those within the Chinese government who had wished to sabotage the possibility of an opening to the United States had used this U.S. switch in channels to delay Kissinger’s visit? Who could have known how long Zhou would be in a sufficiently strong bureaucratic position to pursue a breakthrough with Washington? (In fact, just two years later, he was “struggled against” by ultraleftists and purged.) Who could have been sure that Mao Zedong, always mercurial and then in exceedingly poor health, would not reverse course and seek to solve his Soviet problem through rapprochement with Moscow? And what conclusions might Beijing have drawn regarding American credibility if Nixon and Kissinger, as Bass advises, had dramatically changed course and abandoned a longtime ally during the defining crisis of its independent existence? AS NIXON AND KISSINGER had warned, the crisis in East Pakistan produced escalating Indian-Pakistani tensions, which culminated in war in December 1971. India, backed by a freshly signed Indo-Soviet friendship treaty with military clauses and an active Soviet supply line, crushed Pakistani forces in East Pakistan and recognized Bangladesh as an independent state. Pressing their advantage, top Indian officials considered objectives in West Pakistan including a total destruction of Pakistani military power and (as Bass himself notes) “other ways to crack up West Pakistan itself.”15 This outcome could have inaugurated an ominous precedent in international order—the destruction of a sovereign state by foreign military action—with consequences that would reverberate far beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis. If India succeeded, Kissinger warned during the crisis: The result would be a nation of 100 million people dismembered, their political structure changed by military attack, despite a treaty of alliance with and private assurances by the United States. And all the other countries, on whom we have considered we could rely . . . would know that this has been done by the weight of Soviet arms and with Soviet diplomatic support. What will be the effect in the Middle East, for example—could we tell Israel that she should give up something along a line from A to B, in return for something else, with any plausibility?16 And how would China have reacted if Washington had stood by passively and watched Beijing’s chosen channel to the United States and longtime friend crushed by a combination of Indian military action and Soviet weapons? What then for Mao’s willingness to pursue the opening of U.S.-Chinese relations? Seeking to deter such a destructive outcome, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal (where it was joined by a Soviet naval task force deployed from Vladivostok) and pushed for an immediate UN-backed cease-fire. With military aid to Pakistan frozen, the White House encouraged allies to make shows of force, including a back-channel proposal in which Iran and Jordan would transfer some of their own American-made fighter jets to the West Pakistan front. Bass expresses indignation at this proposal, suggesting that it was undertaken to assist in the repression of civilians in East Pakistan. He fails to explain that the discussion involved transferring jets to West Pakistan during a war in which India was considering a drive for total victory and an all-out destruction of the Pakistani armed forces. In any case, it is not apparent what military role, if any, the planes played in the conflict.17 In Bass’s view, these actions constituted a perverse betrayal of democratic principles by Nixon and Kissinger—American participation in “Kissinger’s secret onslaught” and an “arsenal against democracy” that drove India into the arms of the Soviet Union and “enduringly alienat[ed] not just Indira Gandhi . . . but a whole democratic society.”18 But this insults the sophistication and agency of the main Indian players, in addition to misrepresenting the actual sequence of events. Scholars will long marvel at how the world’s two largest democracies ended up on opposite sides of the Cold War. Yet their rift was growing well before the 1971 Pakistan crisis, and it transcended Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi’s mutual personal dislike. Negotiations over the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty had begun by March 1969, when the Soviet defense minister brought a draft treaty text to New Delhi. A draft text was ready by mid-1970, though by some Indian accounts its signing was postponed pending the Indian election. According to one Indian participant in the negotiations, all that remained to be negotiated at this point was the final wording of the decisive military clause.19 The 1971 crisis did strain U.S.-Indian relations—yet this was largely because Washington and New Delhi had incompatible strategic aspirations. Washington increasingly accepted that East Pakistan would become autonomous or independent, but opposed an outcome in which this was achieved through a regional war or with Soviet arms. India, pursuing a sophisticated blend of humanitarian impulses and Machiavellian calculation, opted almost immediately for a military solution. As Bass himself notes, “On March 2, over three weeks before Yahya launched his slaughter, [Indira] Gandhi ordered her best and brightest . . . to evaluate ‘giving help to Bangla Desh’ and the possibility of recognizing ‘an independent Bangla Desh.’” Bengali partisans, she assessed, would need aircraft for “quick movement inside India around the borders of Bangla Desh” and “arms and ammunition (including L[ight] M[achine] G[un]s, M[edium] M[achine] G[uns] and Mortars”—in other words, Indian military support for a cross-border separatist insurgency.20 At the beginning of April 1971, Indira Gandhi reportedly told her cabinet that “we don’t mind a war” and ordered the Indian army to prepare for an invasion of East Pakistan. According to one high-ranking Indian officer quoted by Bass, she ordered them to “move in” immediately. When the army balked at invading a flood plain on the eve of a monsoon, a compromise solution was reached: Indian conventional forces would prepare to enter East Pakistan around “the fifteenth of November,” and in the meantime India would provide Bengali separatists with “material assistance” and “training in guerilla tactics, to prepare for a long struggle.”21 Bengali guerilla units—organized, trained and armed by India—operated from border sanctuaries throughout the summer and fall, backed up by occasional Indian firepower and at least one cross-border Indian raid.22 The United States—including Kissinger, in his trip to New Delhi in July 1971, and Nixon, during his November summit with Indira Gandhi—pressed India to refrain from provocations on the border and argued that war would be best avoided if all parties committed to a peaceful political track. India, convinced that it had both a moral obligation and a historic strategic opportunity to act, denied its covert assistance to the Bengali insurgency and insisted that the problem was Pakistan’s to solve. Indira Gandhi refused American requests to send U.S. or UN observers to help administer refugee aid (in retrospect, most likely because two ambitious Indian programs were proceeding simultaneously among the refugee population—one humanitarian and the other covert). Each democracy could claim to have achieved a significant portion of its goals. While welcoming and feeding millions of refugees, India succeeded in splitting East and West Pakistan by force and emerging as the midwife of an independent Bangladesh. The United States, after attempting to head off a war through both humanitarian measures and diplomacy, successfully deterred a major Indian campaign against West Pakistan while preserving its course of rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviet Union. COINCIDING WITH these events was a violent internal crisis in Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, after the collapse of compromise talks between East and West Pakistani politicians, Pakistani forces began Operation Searchlight, a systematic plan to eliminate all resistance in East Pakistan through an overwhelming application of force. This occurred just as Nixon and Kissinger were awaiting a definitive reply from China to messages sent that winter through Pakistan and Romania concerning a prospective high-level bilateral meeting in Beijing (a reply that arrived in April through the Pakistani channel). In Bass’s account, an obsessive and unwarranted desire to preserve Pakistan as a conduit for the unfolding U.S.-Chinese rapprochement translated into “a green light for [Yahya Khan’s] killing campaign.”23 In this version of events, the opening to China, while “an epochal event,” was done at the cost of American complicity in genocide, as “the Bengalis became collateral damage for realigning the global balance of power.”24 This incendiary accusation confuses both the order of events and the ability of governments to bring about rapid changes in other states’ internal practices. To blame the White House for failing to secure a peaceful outcome to the winter 1971 East-West Pakistan political impasse, as Bass does—much less to equate this failure with complicity in genocide—sets the bar illogically high. The results of the 1970 election raised fundamental questions about Pakistan’s viability as a unified state. The military—already amply armed and equipped by China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States under Nixon’s predecessors—unsurprisingly declared its refusal to abide an East-West split. Would preemptively “threatening to cut off aid” have moderated the generals in charge of managing the transition to democracy, or reinforced a sense of siege?25 Bass never seriously considers whether, given Pakistan’s existing geographic, ethnic and political divisions, the United States could have prevented its two wings’ slide toward violent dissolution.26 In their widely respected study War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh—based on interviews with Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi participants in these events—scholars Richard Sisson and Leo Rose assessed that the American capacity to shape events within Pakistan at this time was, in fact, limited: The question remains whether Yahya would have responded to a strong public condemnation of the crackdown by moderating his repressive policy in East Pakistan. The general consensus, even among the critics in the government, was probably not. Projected U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan in 1971 was not of a magnitude to provide Washington with much leverage to pressure the leadership in Rawalpindi to change policies in East Pakistan to avoid the loss of aid. . . . By 1971 Washington lacked much clout in Rawalpindi, particularly on issues that, in West Pakistani eyes, struck at the very basis of their national existence.27 On the particular issue of American arms transfers to Pakistan, the total U.S. cutoff of the long-term weapons pipeline (which in any case was exceedingly modest) predictably had no appreciable effect on the ethnic-cleansing actions of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. As we have seen recently with respect to Egypt, such U.S. punishing actions have a poor record of actually influencing foreign governments that believe that they are fighting for the fundamental future of their countries. Even so, Bass has scoured the record for coarse quotations to back his biased and incendiary charges, sidestepping (and seeming purposefully to avoid) ample evidence that Nixon and Kissinger pursued a far more balanced and constructive course—one in which the United States emerged as the leading donor and organizer of East Pakistan’s cyclone relief; provided hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and extensive emergency supplies and financial assistance to prevent a famine in East Pakistan and among refugees in India; attempted through diplomacy and pressure to avert an Indian-Pakistani conflict; and then, when war broke out, pressed for an early UN-sponsored cease-fire to prevent the fighting from encompassing West Pakistan. All this was achieved while carrying out a historic opening to China and ultimately promoting détente with the Soviet Union, which backed India during the conflict. It takes an obsessively strained reading to find in this record, as Bass does, “one of the worst moments of moral blindness in U.S. foreign policy.”28 Much of the force of Bass’s narrative derives from vivid, often-inflammatory quotations from the Nixon tapes, and there is no shortage of those. No crass Nixon statement or sarcastic aside seems to have gone unquoted. Yet presidential vulgarity was hardly a Nixon innovation. Dwight Eisenhower swore like the trooper he was. At a 1953 summit with Winston Churchill, Eisenhower dismissed Churchill’s advice to engage the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, stating (as Churchill’s private secretary recorded) that “Russia was a woman of the streets and whether her dress was new, or just the old one patched, it was certainly the same whore underneath. America intended to drive her off her present ‘beat’ into the back streets.”29 Lyndon Johnson once pressed a point with the Greek ambassador as follows: “F*** your Parliament and your Constitution, America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea.”30 In short, Bass appears to be curiously offended that conversations in the Oval Office are often not the stuff of a church social. FURTHERMORE, BASS'S treatment of some sources suggests that he has privileged outrage over accuracy. For example, he recounts a July 30, 1971, Senior Review Group meeting convened to discuss American policy in South Asia as follows: In a Situation Room meeting, Kissinger defended the president’s man. “We’re not out of gas with Yahya,” he said. “Yahya will be reasonable.” He preferred to be gentle with Yahya, not hectoring or squeezing him. When a State Department official suggested getting the army out of running East Pakistan, Kissinger stood up for Pakistan’s sovereignty: “Why is it our business to tell the Pakistanis how to run their government?”31 Heartless realpolitik? Not quite. No reader of Bass’s account would guess that Kissinger was actually discussing how to resolve a refugee crisis and deliver emergency American food aid to the Bengali population. Responding to the argument that a push for political reconciliation should precede further humanitarian assistance, Kissinger argued that the threat of a famine was too urgent: “We’re not out of gas with Yahya. I think he will do a lot of things that are reasonable if we concentrate on the refugee problem. One thing he will not do is talk to the Awami League, at least not as an institution. He might talk to some League leaders as individuals.”32 The immediate focus, Kissinger insisted, should be on providing food aid: On famine relief, we must get a program started under any and all circumstances. If famine develops, it will generate another major outflow of refugees. This is one thing we can do something about. I think we can get considerable Pakistani cooperation on this. . . . But the famine will start in October. Under the best possible scenario, political accommodation will have barely begun in October.33 As for a colleague’s argument that the United States should “take [the Pakistani army] out of the civil administration” because a civilian presence would encourage refugees to return, Kissinger asked: “We can appropriately ask them for humanitarian behavior, but can we tell them how to run things?”34 The United States, he argued, was better off dealing with an existing government and insisting that it accept American food relief and logistical guidance: If we are faced with a huge famine and a huge new refugee outflow in October and we’re still debating political accommodation, we’ll have a heluva lot to answer for. We need an emergency relief plan and we need to tell Yahya that this is what has to be done to get the supplies delivered. Yahya will be reasonable.35 None of this discussion emerges in the Bass account, which splices out-of-context quotations to recast a discussion of emergency humanitarian assistance into a scene of careless indifference to suffering. Similar misrepresentations recur throughout the book. Bass also glosses over the action points decided upon in the meeting, which included agreement to prepare “a comprehensive relief program for East Pakistan, including what has already been moved and where the bottlenecks are” as well as “a telegram, to be approved by the President, outlining an approach to Yahya telling him what needs to be done on refugees, food relief, etc.”36 Even as delicate diplomacy unfolded, Nixon and Kissinger made repeated appeals to the Pakistani military to moderate its domestic practices and seek political compromise. In May 1971, Nixon wrote to Yahya Khan pressing him to keep the peace with India and honor his pledges of a transition to civilian governance. Nixon warned that this was both a humanitarian matter and a strategic imperative: I have also noted with satisfaction your public declaration of amnesty for the refugees and commitment to transfer power to elected representatives. I am confident that you will turn these statements into reality. I feel sure you will agree with me that the first essential step is to bring an end to the civil strife and restore peaceful conditions in East Pakistan. . . . It is absolutely vital for the maintenance of peace in the Subcontinent to restore conditions in East Pakistan conducive to the return of refugees from Indian territory as quickly as possible.37 The same week, the American ambassador, Joseph Farland (a political appointee who was personally close to Nixon), met with Yahya Khan in Karachi and told him that “the first necessity was to stop the shooting and to start the rebuilding.”38 Citing reports from Dacca of atrocities and attacks on East Pakistan’s Hindu minority, Farland warned that “without the creation of normal conditions in the East, a renewed sense of physical security among the Hindu community, and a patent movement with substance behind it toward a peaceful political accommodation . . . the refugee problem will continue.” A continuation of the present course would produce an “escalation of Indo-Pak tensions” and increasing anti-Pakistani sentiment in the United States. Farland concluded his conversation by urging Khan to state publicly his commitment “to effect political reconciliation.”39 Two weeks later Farland met again with Yahya Khan and reiterated these points in sharper terms. As he cabled back to Washington: I went on to note that the flow of refugees continued and that this flow is symptomatic of the serious situation in East Pakistan. I pointed out that the Embassy continued to receive reports of Hindu villages being attacked by the army, that fear is pervasive, and that until this situation changes the refugees will continue to cross over into India. And I reiterated the U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment]’s concern that at some point the Hindu exodus, if not checked, could lead to a military clash with India. Farland admonished Khan that “a heavy responsibility still rests on Pakistan”: “One could hardly expect the flow to cease until the level of military activity by the army is reduced and repressive measures against the local population, especially the Hindus, was ended.”40 These warnings continued even during Kissinger’s landmark secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. In Rawalpindi, on the eve of his unannounced departure for a country where no American diplomat had been for two decades, Kissinger admonished Pakistan’s foreign secretary that “7 million refugees are an intolerable burden. They overload an already overburdened Indian economy, particularly in eastern India. The Indians see enormous danger of communal riots.” Unless Pakistan could chart a path back to “normal administration” and a peaceful return of refugees, the likely result would be a “military confrontation” which “the Indians feel they would win.”41 Warning that a failure to improve domestic conditions would result in a catastrophic defeat by a historic adversary hardly counts as soft-pedaling the issue. This issue of private U.S. admonitions versus public condemnations of other governments is, of course, familiar. Similar questions have loomed over America’s recent attempts to moderate political upheavals in friendly countries such as Bahrain and Egypt (both with American-trained and -supplied armed forces responding, at times brutally, to what they regarded as existential internal crises). But these are policy dilemmas, not crimes. Under Bass’s definition of “complicity” with atrocities, few practitioners of American foreign policy would escape unindicted. THE FACT that the partition of Pakistan in 1971 involved such catastrophic loss of human life must count among the second half of the twentieth century’s greatest tragedies. But Bass’s policy prescriptions seem likely to have brought about the worst possible outcomes—a delay, if not a rupture, in the U.S. opening to China; no easing of the tragic plight of the Hindu Bengalis; and potentially even the complete disintegration of the Pakistani state itself, sending arms, trained fighters and another round of refugees into already-unstable South Asia and setting a dangerous precedent for other regional conflicts. Fortunately, none of this happened. In White House Years, Kissinger observes, “The character of leaders is tested by their willingness to persevere in the face of uncertainty and to build for a future they can neither demonstrate nor fully discern.”42 Nixon and Kissinger surely met that test during the South Asia crisis of 1971. Their geopolitical approach, which Bass derides, produced an extraordinarily productive Nixon visit to China in February 1972 and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, which serves as the basic framework for the two countries’ relations to this day; a broad, bipartisan U.S. policy approach to China that has lasted for more than forty years and has promoted peace and stability throughout Asia; major U.S.-Chinese intelligence cooperation against the USSR; and a May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow that saw the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the U.S.-Soviet incidents-at-sea agreement, all hallmarks of a détente that reduced the risk of superpower confrontation even while creating conditions that helped undermine the Soviet Union’s moral and geopolitical claims and bring about its destruction. Bass would have readers believe that all these historic U.S. foreign-policy accomplishments were written in the stars, irrespective of U.S. policy toward Pakistan in 1971—and that only grotesque callousness prevented Nixon and Kissinger from adding an abject capitulation by the Pakistani government and a consequent radical transformation of Islamabad’s human-rights record to their tally of achievements. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote that “man’s most enduring stupidity is forgetting what he is trying to do.” We should be grateful that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not forget what they were trying to do during this crisis regarding China, the Soviet Union, South Asia and the global balance of power.
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<h4>Moralist foreign policymaking only results in intervention and lashout</h4><p><strong>Blackwill ’14</strong> (Robert D. Blackwill was deputy national-security adviser for strategic planning and U.S. ambassador to India in the George W. Bush administration, “In Defense of Kissinger”, http://nationalinterest.org/article/defense-kissinger-9642?page=show, January 2, 2014)</p><p>IN HIS BOOK Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger concludes that the United States “faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities.”1 The recent debates about U.S. military options in Libya and Syria reflect the enduring tension between these intertwined, at times competing components of our external relations. No U.S. statesman can ignore this dilemma, and none will find it easy to strike exactly the right balance between the two, especially in times of crisis. All would seek to simultaneously pursue the promotion of the national interest and the protection of human rights. Kissinger, famous for advocating an American foreign policy based on the national interest, has long stressed that values and power are properly understood as mutually supporting. As he argued in a 1973 speech, since “Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements,” a “purely pragmatic policy” would confuse allies and eventually forfeit domestic support. <u><strong>Yet “<mark>when policy becomes</mark> excessively <mark>moralistic it</mark> may <mark>turn quixotic or dangerous</mark>,” <mark>giving way to “ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades</mark>.”2 <mark>The key to a sustainable foreign policy</mark>, in his view, <mark>is</mark> the <mark>avoidance of</mark> either <mark>extreme</mark>: “<mark>A country that demands moral perfection </mark>of itself as a test of its foreign policy <mark>will achieve neither perfection nor security.”</mark>3 </u></strong>This ever-present fusion of American values and national interests was evident in the spring of 1971, as a crisis erupted in South Asia during Kissinger’s tenure as Richard Nixon’s national-security adviser. When the British Raj ended in 1947, a partition of the subcontinent led to the creation of India and Pakistan as separate, estranged sovereign states. Pakistan, envisioned as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, emerged with an unusual bifurcated structure comprising two noncontiguous majority-Muslim areas: “West Pakistan” and “East Pakistan.” While united by a shared faith, they were divided by language, ethnicity and one thousand miles of Indian territory. Over the course of a fraught sequence of events from 1970 to 1972, a party advocating East Pakistani autonomy won a national parliamentary majority, and Pakistan’s two wings split. Amid natural disaster (a cyclone of historic proportions struck the East on the eve of the vote, killing up to half a million people and devastating fields and livestock), constitutional crisis, a sweeping crackdown by West Pakistani forces attempting to hold the East, mass refugee migrations, guerilla conflict and an Indian-Pakistani war, East Pakistan achieved independence as the new state of Bangladesh. By most estimates, the victims of the Bangladeshi independence struggle, which included communal massacres unleashed during the crackdown, numbered in the hundreds of thousands. In his new book, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, Princeton professor Gary Bass, who has written previous books on humanitarian intervention and war-crimes tribunals, portrays the American president and his national-security adviser as the heartless villains of these events. While Bass makes a cursory acknowledgement of the two men’s geopolitical accomplishments, he derides the thinking that informed their actions as the product of a “familiar Cold War chessboard.” His own implicit framework is a deeply heartfelt and contrary view to Kissinger’s, one that places human-rights concerns at the pinnacle of U.S. foreign policy, at least in this crisis. But how persuasive is Bass’s history? Instead of producing a definitive account, he offers an ahistorical and tendentious rendition that, more often than not, lacks a broader context. He reduces a complex series of overlapping South Asian upheavals, Cold War alliances and diplomatic initiatives to “a reminder of what the world can easily look like without any concern for the pain of distant strangers.”4 He faults the United States for not taking a firmer, more public stand on Pakistan’s domestic repression while offering only vague assurances that this U.S. pressure would have brought about an actual improvement in conditions. Moreover, <u><strong>he trivializes the possibility that his <mark>human rights–dominated policy</mark> preferences <mark>could have had profoundly damaging strategic consequences</mark> for the United States.</u></strong> Ironically, in his previous book Freedom’s Battle, Bass sympathizes with precisely the sort of cautionary impulses that animated Kissinger: <u><strong>Even if a president or prime minister has credible information about atrocities . . . <mark>there must still be a cold realpolitik calculation</mark> about the costs of intervening. . . . If <mark>a humanitarian intervention</mark> would <mark>lead to a broader international crisis, or</mark> <mark>plunge the</mark> country—or the <mark>world</mark>—<mark>into</mark> a massive <mark>war</mark>, then <mark>most cabinets will decide</mark> that <mark>it is</mark> just <mark>not worth it. . . . Believing in human rights does not make one suicidal</mark>. In fact, he goes even further, allowing that the “point of <mark>a balance of power”</mark>—</u></strong>Kissinger’s principal preoccupation in 1971, as throughout his career as a statesman<u><strong>—“<mark>is a profound moral goal: it keeps the peace.”</u></strong></mark>5 But in The Blood Telegram, he implies that Nixon and Kissinger should have realized that they could have had it both ways with no risk—achieved their strategic breakthrough with China, with all of its attendant geopolitical benefits, and concurrently put human rights in East Pakistan at the top of their policy agenda. If only life were that simple: as Kissinger observes, “The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable.”6 Thus, at a time of acute crisis, Kissinger judged that if Washington had mounted an all-out private and public human-rights campaign against then president Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and the Pakistan government, which was correctly convinced that the future of the state was at stake, such a campaign would not have fundamentally altered Islamabad’s policy toward East Pakistan, and the White House’s China initiative could well have collapsed. However, as will be demonstrated at length later in this essay, that hardly meant that he ignored the plight of the Bengali Hindus. Kissinger, both while in office and in his subsequent writings, rejected the proposition that circumstances inevitably force a crude either/or choice between national interests and democratic values, and during this crisis no other nation except India did as much as the United States to directly address the human-rights tragedy in East Pakistan. One wishes that the chasm between academic and policy-maker perspectives might have produced a certain modesty in Bass’s treatment of these events. Unfortunately, it doesn’t. Instead The Blood Telegram offers a strident, almost willfully biased attack on the personal motives of policy makers whom Bass condemns—from the comfortable perspective of forty years of hindsight and an American victory in the Cold War—for falling short of bringing about all desirable goals simultaneously. In Bass’s theory, Nixon and Kissinger, motivated by a mixture of “racial animus toward Indians,” indifference to human rights and an obsessive focus on Cold War geopolitics, ignored opportunities to save lives, ensured that “the United States was allied with the killers” and incurred “responsibility for a significant complicity in the slaughter of the Bengalis.”7 To reach his indictment of Nixon and Kissinger, Bass pairs a myopic account of the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China and its long-term objectives with a highly selective rendition of U.S. policy toward the breakup of Pakistan. IT IS IMPORTANT to stress what Nixon and Kissinger were trying to accomplish in U.S.-Chinese relations beginning in the fall of 1970: no less than a fundamental restructuring of the global balance of power and world order in America’s favor. By establishing a strategic understanding with Beijing based on China’s genuine worry that the relentless Soviet military buildup in the Far East could presage an attack on China, they hoped to strengthen America’s global position; meet Beijing’s test that “only an America that was strong in Asia could be taken seriously by the Chinese”8; incentivize Moscow to adopt more reasonable policies toward the United States, including in Europe and on arms control; bring an honorable end to the Vietnam War (a conflict in which half a million Americans were at war at the time of Nixon’s inauguration, but which public and elite opinion increasingly rejected); and reduce tensions throughout Asia. All these crucial objectives—in which success could fairly count as both a strategic and a moral achievement—required a fundamental reorientation of U.S.-Chinese relations. As Kissinger observes in White House Years, “The hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other. The rest could be left to the dynamic of events.”9 Nixon and Kissinger’s decision in October 1970 (before the Pakistani crisis) to reach out to China through the Pakistanis is casually dismissed by Bass as “one of many options” and potentially the worst. He suggests France and, curiously, totalitarian Romania as plausible and more ethical alternatives.10 Yet the United States explored all three, and Beijing unambiguously chose Pakistan. The first explicit indication by China that a personal envoy of Nixon would be welcome in Beijing came in December 1970 by way of the Pakistani channel, with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai stressing, “The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message.”11 On April 27, 1971, after American replies through both Romania and Pakistan, Beijing followed up through Islamabad and invited “direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries,” suggesting that the proper arrangements could “be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan.”12 As Kissinger stresses, Zhou did not “want to risk subordinates’ thwarting of our common design by their haggling over ‘modalities.’ By keeping technical arrangements in the Pakistani channel, he ensured discretion, high-level consideration, and expeditious decisions.”13 Bass, ignoring the evident Chinese insistence on Pakistan, attacks the White House’s use of Yahya Khan as an intermediary as evidence of a gratuitous Nixonian affection for military strongmen. In addition to the strong PRC preference for Pakistan and the advantages of geographic proximity, another explanation is also pertinent: it is difficult to imagine how it could have been arranged for Kissinger to visit Beijing secretly from either Paris (a world capital) or Bucharest (a prime target of Soviet penetration); secrecy was an essential requirement since Nixon could risk neither premature U.S. domestic euphoria nor a public failure in Beijing. Nothing regarding this highly sensitive matter leaked from Pakistan, and Yahya Khan discreetly managed the complex arrangements to get Kissinger secretly from Islamabad to Beijing, as Zhou had suggested. The late great Harvard historian Ernest May once observed, “What a historian chooses to leave out or minimize is often as important and telling as what he decides to include.”14 One must wonder if Bass discounts the clear Chinese preference for Yahya Khan as the intermediary between Beijing and Washington because acknowledging it would undermine one of his core assertions: that Nixon and Kissinger could have openly condemned or even attempted to unseat the Pakistani president without endangering the opening to China. In his book, Bass never directly confronts a series of major questions: If he knew that the opening to China would have faltered, as Nixon and Kissinger feared, because of U.S. pressure on Yahya over the atrocities in East Pakistan, would he nevertheless have forced a showdown with Pakistan over the plight of Hindu Bengalis? Would he have been content to face an outcome in which the China initiative collapsed even as Pakistan rejected American demands as irrelevant? Would the next step have been sanctions against Pakistan, or perhaps American support for the Bengali insurgency—and what other results would these policies have entailed? Statesmen have to make such choices; professors do not. To duck these questions, Bass must implicitly posit an alternative rosy scenario in which Nixon and Kissinger are able to establish an equally effective channel to Beijing while bringing about a swift improvement in Pakistan’s domestic conditions. But what would the Chinese reaction have been if the United States had informed an adversary of two decades at an enormously delicate moment that its watershed invitation to improve relations had been misdirected and that the Yahya Khan channel was unacceptable to Washington? What if those within the Chinese government who had wished to sabotage the possibility of an opening to the United States had used this U.S. switch in channels to delay Kissinger’s visit? Who could have known how long Zhou would be in a sufficiently strong bureaucratic position to pursue a breakthrough with Washington? (In fact, just two years later, he was “struggled against” by ultraleftists and purged.) Who could have been sure that Mao Zedong, always mercurial and then in exceedingly poor health, would not reverse course and seek to solve his Soviet problem through rapprochement with Moscow? And what conclusions might Beijing have drawn regarding American credibility if Nixon and Kissinger, as Bass advises, had dramatically changed course and abandoned a longtime ally during the defining crisis of its independent existence? AS NIXON AND KISSINGER had warned, the crisis in East Pakistan produced escalating Indian-Pakistani tensions, which culminated in war in December 1971. India, backed by a freshly signed Indo-Soviet friendship treaty with military clauses and an active Soviet supply line, crushed Pakistani forces in East Pakistan and recognized Bangladesh as an independent state. Pressing their advantage, top Indian officials considered objectives in West Pakistan including a total destruction of Pakistani military power and (as Bass himself notes) “other ways to crack up West Pakistan itself.”15 This outcome could have inaugurated an ominous precedent in international order—the destruction of a sovereign state by foreign military action—with consequences that would reverberate far beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis. If India succeeded, Kissinger warned during the crisis: The result would be a nation of 100 million people dismembered, their political structure changed by military attack, despite a treaty of alliance with and private assurances by the United States. And all the other countries, on whom we have considered we could rely . . . would know that this has been done by the weight of Soviet arms and with Soviet diplomatic support. What will be the effect in the Middle East, for example—could we tell Israel that she should give up something along a line from A to B, in return for something else, with any plausibility?16 And how would China have reacted if Washington had stood by passively and watched Beijing’s chosen channel to the United States and longtime friend crushed by a combination of Indian military action and Soviet weapons? What then for Mao’s willingness to pursue the opening of U.S.-Chinese relations? Seeking to deter such a destructive outcome, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal (where it was joined by a Soviet naval task force deployed from Vladivostok) and pushed for an immediate UN-backed cease-fire. With military aid to Pakistan frozen, the White House encouraged allies to make shows of force, including a back-channel proposal in which Iran and Jordan would transfer some of their own American-made fighter jets to the West Pakistan front. Bass expresses indignation at this proposal, suggesting that it was undertaken to assist in the repression of civilians in East Pakistan. He fails to explain that the discussion involved transferring jets to West Pakistan during a war in which India was considering a drive for total victory and an all-out destruction of the Pakistani armed forces. In any case, it is not apparent what military role, if any, the planes played in the conflict.17 In Bass’s view, these actions constituted a perverse betrayal of democratic principles by Nixon and Kissinger—American participation in “Kissinger’s secret onslaught” and an “arsenal against democracy” that drove India into the arms of the Soviet Union and “enduringly alienat[ed] not just Indira Gandhi . . . but a whole democratic society.”18 But this insults the sophistication and agency of the main Indian players, in addition to misrepresenting the actual sequence of events. Scholars will long marvel at how the world’s two largest democracies ended up on opposite sides of the Cold War. Yet their rift was growing well before the 1971 Pakistan crisis, and it transcended Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi’s mutual personal dislike. Negotiations over the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty had begun by March 1969, when the Soviet defense minister brought a draft treaty text to New Delhi. A draft text was ready by mid-1970, though by some Indian accounts its signing was postponed pending the Indian election. According to one Indian participant in the negotiations, all that remained to be negotiated at this point was the final wording of the decisive military clause.19 The 1971 crisis did strain U.S.-Indian relations—yet this was largely because Washington and New Delhi had incompatible strategic aspirations. Washington increasingly accepted that East Pakistan would become autonomous or independent, but opposed an outcome in which this was achieved through a regional war or with Soviet arms. India, pursuing a sophisticated blend of humanitarian impulses and Machiavellian calculation, opted almost immediately for a military solution. As Bass himself notes, “On March 2, over three weeks before Yahya launched his slaughter, [Indira] Gandhi ordered her best and brightest . . . to evaluate ‘giving help to Bangla Desh’ and the possibility of recognizing ‘an independent Bangla Desh.’” Bengali partisans, she assessed, would need aircraft for “quick movement inside India around the borders of Bangla Desh” and “arms and ammunition (including L[ight] M[achine] G[un]s, M[edium] M[achine] G[uns] and Mortars”—in other words, Indian military support for a cross-border separatist insurgency.20 At the beginning of April 1971, Indira Gandhi reportedly told her cabinet that “we don’t mind a war” and ordered the Indian army to prepare for an invasion of East Pakistan. According to one high-ranking Indian officer quoted by Bass, she ordered them to “move in” immediately. When the army balked at invading a flood plain on the eve of a monsoon, a compromise solution was reached: Indian conventional forces would prepare to enter East Pakistan around “the fifteenth of November,” and in the meantime India would provide Bengali separatists with “material assistance” and “training in guerilla tactics, to prepare for a long struggle.”21 Bengali guerilla units—organized, trained and armed by India—operated from border sanctuaries throughout the summer and fall, backed up by occasional Indian firepower and at least one cross-border Indian raid.22 The United States—including Kissinger, in his trip to New Delhi in July 1971, and Nixon, during his November summit with Indira Gandhi—pressed India to refrain from provocations on the border and argued that war would be best avoided if all parties committed to a peaceful political track. India, convinced that it had both a moral obligation and a historic strategic opportunity to act, denied its covert assistance to the Bengali insurgency and insisted that the problem was Pakistan’s to solve. Indira Gandhi refused American requests to send U.S. or UN observers to help administer refugee aid (in retrospect, most likely because two ambitious Indian programs were proceeding simultaneously among the refugee population—one humanitarian and the other covert). Each democracy could claim to have achieved a significant portion of its goals. While welcoming and feeding millions of refugees, India succeeded in splitting East and West Pakistan by force and emerging as the midwife of an independent Bangladesh. The United States, after attempting to head off a war through both humanitarian measures and diplomacy, successfully deterred a major Indian campaign against West Pakistan while preserving its course of rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviet Union. COINCIDING WITH these events was a violent internal crisis in Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, after the collapse of compromise talks between East and West Pakistani politicians, Pakistani forces began Operation Searchlight, a systematic plan to eliminate all resistance in East Pakistan through an overwhelming application of force. This occurred just as Nixon and Kissinger were awaiting a definitive reply from China to messages sent that winter through Pakistan and Romania concerning a prospective high-level bilateral meeting in Beijing (a reply that arrived in April through the Pakistani channel). In Bass’s account, an obsessive and unwarranted desire to preserve Pakistan as a conduit for the unfolding U.S.-Chinese rapprochement translated into “a green light for [Yahya Khan’s] killing campaign.”23 In this version of events, the opening to China, while “an epochal event,” was done at the cost of American complicity in genocide, as “the Bengalis became collateral damage for realigning the global balance of power.”24 This incendiary accusation confuses both the order of events and the ability of governments to bring about rapid changes in other states’ internal practices. To blame the White House for failing to secure a peaceful outcome to the winter 1971 East-West Pakistan political impasse, as Bass does—much less to equate this failure with complicity in genocide—sets the bar illogically high. The results of the 1970 election raised fundamental questions about Pakistan’s viability as a unified state. The military—already amply armed and equipped by China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States under Nixon’s predecessors—unsurprisingly declared its refusal to abide an East-West split. Would preemptively “threatening to cut off aid” have moderated the generals in charge of managing the transition to democracy, or reinforced a sense of siege?25 Bass never seriously considers whether, given Pakistan’s existing geographic, ethnic and political divisions, the United States could have prevented its two wings’ slide toward violent dissolution.26 In their widely respected study War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh—based on interviews with Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi participants in these events—scholars Richard Sisson and Leo Rose assessed that the American capacity to shape events within Pakistan at this time was, in fact, limited: The question remains whether Yahya would have responded to a strong public condemnation of the crackdown by moderating his repressive policy in East Pakistan. The general consensus, even among the critics in the government, was probably not. Projected U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan in 1971 was not of a magnitude to provide Washington with much leverage to pressure the leadership in Rawalpindi to change policies in East Pakistan to avoid the loss of aid. . . . By 1971 Washington lacked much clout in Rawalpindi, particularly on issues that, in West Pakistani eyes, struck at the very basis of their national existence.27 On the particular issue of American arms transfers to Pakistan, the total U.S. cutoff of the long-term weapons pipeline (which in any case was exceedingly modest) predictably had no appreciable effect on the ethnic-cleansing actions of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. As we have seen recently with respect to Egypt, such U.S. punishing actions have a poor record of actually influencing foreign governments that believe that they are fighting for the fundamental future of their countries. Even so, Bass has scoured the record for coarse quotations to back his biased and incendiary charges, sidestepping (and seeming purposefully to avoid) ample evidence that Nixon and Kissinger pursued a far more balanced and constructive course—one in which the United States emerged as the leading donor and organizer of East Pakistan’s cyclone relief; provided hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and extensive emergency supplies and financial assistance to prevent a famine in East Pakistan and among refugees in India; attempted through diplomacy and pressure to avert an Indian-Pakistani conflict; and then, when war broke out, pressed for an early UN-sponsored cease-fire to prevent the fighting from encompassing West Pakistan. All this was achieved while carrying out a historic opening to China and ultimately promoting détente with the Soviet Union, which backed India during the conflict. It takes an obsessively strained reading to find in this record, as Bass does, “one of the worst moments of moral blindness in U.S. foreign policy.”28 Much of the force of Bass’s narrative derives from vivid, often-inflammatory quotations from the Nixon tapes, and there is no shortage of those. No crass Nixon statement or sarcastic aside seems to have gone unquoted. Yet presidential vulgarity was hardly a Nixon innovation. Dwight Eisenhower swore like the trooper he was. At a 1953 summit with Winston Churchill, Eisenhower dismissed Churchill’s advice to engage the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, stating (as Churchill’s private secretary recorded) that “Russia was a woman of the streets and whether her dress was new, or just the old one patched, it was certainly the same whore underneath. America intended to drive her off her present ‘beat’ into the back streets.”29 Lyndon Johnson once pressed a point with the Greek ambassador as follows: “F*** your Parliament and your Constitution, America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea.”30 In short, Bass appears to be curiously offended that conversations in the Oval Office are often not the stuff of a church social. FURTHERMORE, BASS'S treatment of some sources suggests that he has privileged outrage over accuracy. For example, he recounts a July 30, 1971, Senior Review Group meeting convened to discuss American policy in South Asia as follows: In a Situation Room meeting, Kissinger defended the president’s man. “We’re not out of gas with Yahya,” he said. “Yahya will be reasonable.” He preferred to be gentle with Yahya, not hectoring or squeezing him. When a State Department official suggested getting the army out of running East Pakistan, Kissinger stood up for Pakistan’s sovereignty: “Why is it our business to tell the Pakistanis how to run their government?”31 Heartless realpolitik? Not quite. No reader of Bass’s account would guess that Kissinger was actually discussing how to resolve a refugee crisis and deliver emergency American food aid to the Bengali population. Responding to the argument that a push for political reconciliation should precede further humanitarian assistance, Kissinger argued that the threat of a famine was too urgent: “We’re not out of gas with Yahya. I think he will do a lot of things that are reasonable if we concentrate on the refugee problem. One thing he will not do is talk to the Awami League, at least not as an institution. He might talk to some League leaders as individuals.”32 The immediate focus, Kissinger insisted, should be on providing food aid: On famine relief, we must get a program started under any and all circumstances. If famine develops, it will generate another major outflow of refugees. This is one thing we can do something about. I think we can get considerable Pakistani cooperation on this. . . . But the famine will start in October. Under the best possible scenario, political accommodation will have barely begun in October.33 As for a colleague’s argument that the United States should “take [the Pakistani army] out of the civil administration” because a civilian presence would encourage refugees to return, Kissinger asked: “We can appropriately ask them for humanitarian behavior, but can we tell them how to run things?”34 The United States, he argued, was better off dealing with an existing government and insisting that it accept American food relief and logistical guidance: If we are faced with a huge famine and a huge new refugee outflow in October and we’re still debating political accommodation, we’ll have a heluva lot to answer for. We need an emergency relief plan and we need to tell Yahya that this is what has to be done to get the supplies delivered. Yahya will be reasonable.35 None of this discussion emerges in the Bass account, which splices out-of-context quotations to recast a discussion of emergency humanitarian assistance into a scene of careless indifference to suffering. Similar misrepresentations recur throughout the book. Bass also glosses over the action points decided upon in the meeting, which included agreement to prepare “a comprehensive relief program for East Pakistan, including what has already been moved and where the bottlenecks are” as well as “a telegram, to be approved by the President, outlining an approach to Yahya telling him what needs to be done on refugees, food relief, etc.”36 Even as delicate diplomacy unfolded, Nixon and Kissinger made repeated appeals to the Pakistani military to moderate its domestic practices and seek political compromise. In May 1971, Nixon wrote to Yahya Khan pressing him to keep the peace with India and honor his pledges of a transition to civilian governance. Nixon warned that this was both a humanitarian matter and a strategic imperative: I have also noted with satisfaction your public declaration of amnesty for the refugees and commitment to transfer power to elected representatives. I am confident that you will turn these statements into reality. I feel sure you will agree with me that the first essential step is to bring an end to the civil strife and restore peaceful conditions in East Pakistan. . . . It is absolutely vital for the maintenance of peace in the Subcontinent to restore conditions in East Pakistan conducive to the return of refugees from Indian territory as quickly as possible.37 The same week, the American ambassador, Joseph Farland (a political appointee who was personally close to Nixon), met with Yahya Khan in Karachi and told him that “the first necessity was to stop the shooting and to start the rebuilding.”38 Citing reports from Dacca of atrocities and attacks on East Pakistan’s Hindu minority, Farland warned that “without the creation of normal conditions in the East, a renewed sense of physical security among the Hindu community, and a patent movement with substance behind it toward a peaceful political accommodation . . . the refugee problem will continue.” A continuation of the present course would produce an “escalation of Indo-Pak tensions” and increasing anti-Pakistani sentiment in the United States. Farland concluded his conversation by urging Khan to state publicly his commitment “to effect political reconciliation.”39 Two weeks later Farland met again with Yahya Khan and reiterated these points in sharper terms. As he cabled back to Washington: I went on to note that the flow of refugees continued and that this flow is symptomatic of the serious situation in East Pakistan. I pointed out that the Embassy continued to receive reports of Hindu villages being attacked by the army, that fear is pervasive, and that until this situation changes the refugees will continue to cross over into India. And I reiterated the U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment]’s concern that at some point the Hindu exodus, if not checked, could lead to a military clash with India. Farland admonished Khan that “a heavy responsibility still rests on Pakistan”: “One could hardly expect the flow to cease until the level of military activity by the army is reduced and repressive measures against the local population, especially the Hindus, was ended.”40 These warnings continued even during Kissinger’s landmark secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. In Rawalpindi, on the eve of his unannounced departure for a country where no American diplomat had been for two decades, Kissinger admonished Pakistan’s foreign secretary that “7 million refugees are an intolerable burden. They overload an already overburdened Indian economy, particularly in eastern India. The Indians see enormous danger of communal riots.” Unless Pakistan could chart a path back to “normal administration” and a peaceful return of refugees, the likely result would be a “military confrontation” which “the Indians feel they would win.”41 Warning that a failure to improve domestic conditions would result in a catastrophic defeat by a historic adversary hardly counts as soft-pedaling the issue. This issue of private U.S. admonitions versus public condemnations of other governments is, of course, familiar. Similar questions have loomed over America’s recent attempts to moderate political upheavals in friendly countries such as Bahrain and Egypt (both with American-trained and -supplied armed forces responding, at times brutally, to what they regarded as existential internal crises). But these are policy dilemmas, not crimes. Under Bass’s definition of “complicity” with atrocities, few practitioners of American foreign policy would escape unindicted. THE FACT that the partition of Pakistan in 1971 involved such catastrophic loss of human life must count among the second half of the twentieth century’s greatest tragedies. But Bass’s policy prescriptions seem likely to have brought about the worst possible outcomes—a delay, if not a rupture, in the U.S. opening to China; no easing of the tragic plight of the Hindu Bengalis; and potentially even the complete disintegration of the Pakistani state itself, sending arms, trained fighters and another round of refugees into already-unstable South Asia and setting a dangerous precedent for other regional conflicts. Fortunately, none of this happened. In White House Years, Kissinger observes, “The character of leaders is tested by their willingness to persevere in the face of uncertainty and to build for a future they can neither demonstrate nor fully discern.”42 <u><strong>Nixon and <mark>Kissinger</mark> surely met that test during the South Asia crisis of 1971. Their <mark>geopolitical approach</mark>, which Bass derides, <mark>produced</mark> an extraordinarily productive Nixon visit to China in February 1972 and the signing of the <mark>Shanghai Communiqué</mark>, which serves as the basic framework for the two countries’ relations to this day; a broad, bipartisan U.S. policy approach to China that has lasted for more than forty years and has promoted peace and stability throughout Asia; major U.S.-Chinese intelligence cooperation against the USSR; and a May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow that saw the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, <mark>the first</mark> Strategic <mark>Arms Limitation Treaty and the U.S.-Soviet incidents-at-sea agreement</mark>, all <mark>hallmarks of a détente that reduced</mark> the risk of superpower <mark>confrontation</mark> even while creating conditions that helped undermine the Soviet Union’s moral and geopolitical claims and bring about its destruction. </u></strong>Bass would have readers believe that all these historic U.S. foreign-policy accomplishments were written in the stars, irrespective of U.S. policy toward Pakistan in 1971—and that only grotesque callousness prevented Nixon and Kissinger from adding an abject capitulation by the Pakistani government and a consequent radical transformation of Islamabad’s human-rights record to their tally of achievements. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote that “man’s most enduring stupidity is forgetting what he is trying to do.” We should be grateful that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not forget what they were trying to do during this crisis regarding China, the Soviet Union, South Asia and the global balance of power.</p>
2NC
Case
2NC AT: Security
429,716
2
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,165
Banking industry impact is small—new clarifications by the gov rule shifts the burden of proving legality to the online site operator, rather than the financial institution - that’s DT 8
null
null
null
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<h4>Banking industry impact is small—new clarifications by the gov rule shifts the burden of proving legality to the online site operator, rather than the financial institution - that’s DT 8</h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Bank Impact
429,715
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,166
High magnitude, low probability scenario planning (like nuclear war) is productive in IR
Junio 13
Timothy Junio 13, cybersecurity postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, and Thomas Mahnken, Naval War College, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations”, September, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395
This introduces political scientists to scenarios future counterfactuals and demonstrates their value across a wide range of research questions scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was? Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios is surprising; the method is popular Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study.¶ This seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.¶ What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? One of the most common uses is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. consider a scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur This reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of information about capabilities the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making The purpose is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR.
scenarios contribute to theory building identifying new hypotheses, analyzing topics, articulating “world views,” setting research agendas, avoiding biases, and teaching counterfactual narratives about the future—are underutilized Scenarios are employed by policymakers This seeks to elevate scenarios by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. scenarios assist with developing testable hypotheses scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy One use is to study high-consequence, low-probability events Perhaps the best example is nuclear war a future event that, while unlikely to occur contains many dimensions of political science theory such stories may improve the study of IR
This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.¶ In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that “social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was?’” (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study.¶ This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.¶ Scenarios in the Discipline¶ What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur:¶ During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region.¶ This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.
6,008
<h4>High magnitude, low probability scenario planning (like nuclear war) is productive in IR</h4><p>Timothy <strong>Junio 13</strong>, cybersecurity postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, and Thomas Mahnken, Naval War College, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations”, September, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395</p><p><u><strong>This</u></strong> article <u><strong>introduces political scientists to scenarios</u></strong>—<u><strong>future counterfactuals</u></strong>—<u><strong>and demonstrates their value</u></strong> in tandem with other methodologies and <u><strong>across a wide range of research questions</u></strong>. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that <u><strong><mark>scenarios contribute to theory building</mark> and development, <mark>identifying new hypotheses, analyzing </mark>data-poor research <mark>topics, articulating “world views,” setting</mark> new <mark>research agendas, avoiding</mark> cognitive <mark>biases, and teaching</u></strong></mark>. The article also establishes <u><strong>the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods</u></strong>. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.¶ In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that “<u><strong>social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was?</u></strong>’” (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. <u><strong>Scenarios—<mark>counterfactual narratives about the future—are</mark> woefully <mark>underutilized</mark> among political scientists</u></strong>. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. <u><strong>The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios</u></strong>—less than 2% of the time—<u><strong>is surprising; the method is popular</u></strong> in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). <u><strong><mark>Scenarios</mark> also <mark>are</mark> a common tool <mark>employed by</mark> the <mark>policymakers</mark> whom political scientists study.¶ <mark>This</u></strong></mark> article <u><strong><mark>seeks to elevate</mark> the status of <mark>scenarios</mark> in political science <mark>by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy.</mark> Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future</u></strong>, as critics might suggest, <u><strong><mark>scenarios assist</mark> scholars <mark>with developing testable hypotheses</u></strong></mark>, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, <u><strong><mark>scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy</u></strong></mark>. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how <u><strong>political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.¶ </u></strong>Scenarios in the Discipline¶ <u><strong>What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like?</u></strong> Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. <u><strong><mark>One</mark> of the most common <mark>use</mark>s</u></strong> of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, <u><strong><mark>is to study</mark> the conditions under which <mark>high-consequence, low-probability events</mark> may occur. <mark>Perhaps the best example</mark> of this <mark>is nuclear war</mark>fare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists.</u></strong> For an introductory illustration, let us <u><strong>consider a</u></strong> very simple <u><strong>scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur</u></strong>:¶ During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region.¶ <u><strong>This</u></strong> short story <u><strong>reflects <mark>a future event that, while unlikely to occur</mark> </u></strong>and far too vague to be used for military planning,<u><strong> <mark>contains many dimensions of political science theory</mark>. These include</u></strong> the following: <u><strong>what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of</u></strong> private <u><strong>information about capabilities</u></strong> and commitment; audience costs in international politics; <u><strong>the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making</u></strong>, among others. <u><strong>The purpose</u></strong> of this article <u><strong>is to explain to scholars how <mark>such stories</mark>, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, <mark>may improve the study of IR</mark>.</u></strong> An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.</p>
2NC
Case
2NC AT: Security
2,268
567
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,167
Our risk assessment critical to transforming the public sphere—leads to democratic decision making
Borraz, 2007 [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]
Borraz, 2007 [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]
risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions Studies of risk suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order.
risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions. Studies of risk suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order
These studies seem to suggest that risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions. This politicization entails, in particular, a widening of the range of stakeholders, a reference to broader political issues and debates, the search for new decision- making processes (either in terms of democratization, or renewed scientific expertise), and the explicit mobilization of non-scientific arguments in these processes. But if this is the case, then it could also be true that risk is simply one way of framing public problems. Studies in the 1990s, in particular, showed that a whole range of social problems (e.g., poverty, housing, unemployment) had been reframed as health issues, with the result that their management was transferred from social workers to health professionals, and in the process was described in neutral, depoliticized terms (Fassin, 1998). Studies of risk, on the contrary, seem to suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized, i.e., taken up by new social movements, producing and using alternative scientific data, calling for more deliberative decision-making procedures, and clearly intended to promote change in the manner in which the state protects the population against various risks (health and environment, but also social and economic). In other words, framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order.
1,616
<h4>Our risk assessment critical to transforming the public sphere—leads to democratic decision making</h4><p><strong>Borraz, 2007<u> [OLIVIER BORRAZ Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, “Risk and Public Problems,” Journal of Risk Research, 10, 7, Oct 2007, 941-957]</p><p></u></strong>These studies seem to suggest that <u><strong><mark>risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions</u></strong>.</mark> This politicization entails, in particular, a widening of the range of stakeholders, a reference to broader political issues and debates, the search for new decision- making processes (either in terms of democratization, or renewed scientific expertise), and the explicit mobilization of non-scientific arguments in these processes. But if this is the case, then it could also be true that risk is simply one way of framing public problems. Studies in the 1990s, in particular, showed that a whole range of social problems (e.g., poverty, housing, unemployment) had been reframed as health issues, with the result that their management was transferred from social workers to health professionals, and in the process was described in neutral, depoliticized terms (Fassin, 1998). <u><strong><mark>Studies of risk</u></strong></mark>, on the contrary, seem to <u><strong><mark>suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized</u></strong></mark>, i.e., taken up by new social movements, producing and using alternative scientific data, calling for more deliberative decision-making procedures, and clearly intended to promote change in the manner in which the state protects the population against various risks (health and environment, but also social and economic). In other words, <u><strong><mark>framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order</mark>.</p></u></strong>
2NC
Case
2NC AT: Security
429,718
3
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,168
Prefer -- their evidence is from 07
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Prefer -- their evidence is from 07</h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Bank Impact
429,717
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,169
Existence precedes the ability to ascribe value [and respect the other]
Wapner 3
Wapner 3 Paul Wapner. 2003. Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1.
Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character a prerequisite of expression is existence preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen as a fundamental good respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman
. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. a prerequisite of expression is existence preserving the nonhuman world must be seen as a fundamental good respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist
All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.
2,412
<h4><strong>Existence precedes the ability to ascribe value [and respect the other]</h4><p>Wapner 3</p><p></strong>Paul Wapner. 2003. Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1.</p><p>All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. <u><strong>Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence</u></strong>. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. <u><strong>We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear<mark>. What doesn't exist can manifest no character</u></strong>.</mark> Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that <u><strong><mark>a prerequisite of expression is existence</u></strong></mark>. This in turn suggests that <u><strong><mark>preserving the nonhuman world</mark>-in all its diverse embodiments-<mark>must be seen</u></strong> </mark>by eco-critics <u><strong><mark>as a fundamental good</u></strong></mark>. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, <u><strong><mark>respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist</u></strong></mark>. In our day and age, <u><strong>this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman</u></strong>. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.</p>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #2 -- VTL =/= OW
18,274
251
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,170
Banks have adapted
Hughes 2013 State of New Jersey Office of the Attorney General Department of Law and Public Safety
Christopher Hughes Chief of Staff, Department of Banking and Insurance, New Jersey State Government, “Re: Internet Gaming - Payment Processing” November 15 2013 State of New Jersey Office of the Attorney General Department of Law and Public Safety
The UIGEA requirement resulted in payment processors, including banks and credit card processors, developing systems that would detect and block "unlawful internet gambling" transactions. These detection systems included developing and implementing payment codes and procedures to ensure compliance with the UIGEA.
UIGEA resulted in and credit card processors, developing systems that would detect and block "unlawful internet gambling" transactions detection systems included developing and implementing payment codes and procedures to ensure compliance with the UIGEA.
The UIGEA requires all payment processors to establish policies and procedures to identify and prevent restricted transactions. 31 U.S.C. § 5364. "Restricted transactions" are defined as any knowing receipt of funds in connection with unlawful internet gambling by a person engaged in the business of betting or wagering. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(7) & 5363. This requirement, put in place before some states had authorized intrastate internet gaming, resulted in payment processors, including banks and credit card processors, developing systems that would detect and block "unlawful internet gambling" transactions. These detection systems included developing and implementing payment codes and procedures to ensure compliance with the UIGEA. As a result, payment processors are now faced with the need to develop new systems that would allow their payment systems to distinguish between lawful and unlawful transactions.
914
<h4>Banks have adapted</h4><p>Christopher <strong>Hughes</strong> Chief of Staff, Department of Banking and Insurance, New Jersey State Government, “Re: Internet Gaming - Payment Processing” November 15 <strong>2013 <u>State of New Jersey Office of the Attorney General Department of Law and Public Safety</p><p>The <mark>UIGEA</u></strong></mark> requires all payment processors to establish policies and procedures to identify and prevent restricted transactions. 31 U.S.C. § 5364. "Restricted transactions" are defined as any knowing receipt of funds in connection with unlawful internet gambling by a person engaged in the business of betting or wagering. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(7) & 5363. This <u><strong>requirement</u></strong>, put in place before some states had authorized intrastate internet gaming, <u><strong><mark>resulted in </mark>payment processors, including banks <mark>and credit card processors, developing systems that would detect and block "unlawful internet gambling" transactions</mark>. These <mark>detection systems included developing and implementing payment codes and procedures to ensure compliance with the UIGEA.</mark> </u></strong>As a result, payment processors are now faced with the need to develop new systems that would allow their payment systems to distinguish between lawful and unlawful transactions.</p>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Bank Impact
429,719
3
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,171
Death must be prevented
Paterson 3
Paterson 3 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, SAGE
it is death that is really the objective evil , death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. concerning willed human actions any intentional rejection of human life cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.
death is the objective evil because it ontologically destroys the current subject death is an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists the change in kind it brings about is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person any intentional rejection of human life cannot be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue the destruction of the present person we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the source of all human possibility
Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. 80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. 81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.
2,168
<h4>Death must be prevented</h4><p><strong>Paterson 3<u></strong> - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, SAGE</p><p></u>Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that <u><strong>it is <mark>death</u></strong></mark> per se <u><strong>that <mark>is</mark> really <mark>the objective evil</u></strong></mark> for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather<u>, <strong>death in itself is an evil to us <mark>because it ontologically destroys the current</mark> existent <mark>subject</mark> — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.</strong> </u>80 The evil of <u><strong><mark>death is</mark> truly <mark>an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists</mark>, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of <mark>the change in kind it brings about</mark>, a change that <mark>is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything</u></strong></mark>, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) <u><strong><mark>that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person</u></strong></mark>. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that <u><strong>death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are</u></strong>. In consequence, <u><strong>death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.</strong> </u>81 In conclusion, <u><strong>concerning willed human actions</u></strong>, it is justifiable to state that<u> <strong><mark>any intentional rejection of human life</u></strong></mark> itself <u><strong><mark>cannot</mark> therefore <mark>be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue</mark> for the subject,</u></strong> namely, <u><strong><mark>the destruction of the present person</mark>; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue</u></strong> (pain, suffering, etc.) <u><strong><mark>we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the</mark> very <mark>source</mark> and condition <mark>of all human possibility</strong></mark>.</p></u>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
32,578
1,478
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,172
Banks already comply with 17 other statutes that do the same thing
Bachus 8
Spencer Bachus 8, House Rep from Alabama, “Proposed UIGEA Regulations: Burden Without Benefit?” Congressional testimony, hearing Before the subcommittee on domestic and international monetary policy, trade, and technology of the committee on financial services u.s. house of representatives one hundred tenth congress second session APRIL 2, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42714/html/CHRG-110hhrg42714.htm ac 9-2
all of these lists would be of illegal gambling operations, many of them offshore. our staff did just a cursory study where in 17 cases, you have done that You didn't have a problem with that. The currency transaction reporting requirements, you assembled it for that. The Bank Secrecy Act, you do it under that. Anti-money laundering statutes, you do it under that. You do it under the terrorist financing, and there is not a problem there. Also, you said that it is not practical for ACH, wire transfer, and check system participants to block restricted transactions except for those by entities that either have a direct relationship with the Internet gambling site or certain international payments. But in fact, in all these statutes, and in about 12 others, you do that I'm mystified you all do it. There are so many cases where you require an institution to do it. They do it. the small banks said they could do this but some of our largest, most sophisticated financial institutions said they couldn't. That strikes me as incredibly odd. saying that you can't do something you're doing in 17 other statutes is unusual
The currency transaction reporting requirements The Bank Secrecy Act Anti-money laundering statutes terrorist financing you said that it is not practical for ACH, wire ¶ transfer, and check system participants to block restricted ¶ transactions except for those by entities that either have a ¶ direct relationship with the Internet gambling site or certain ¶ international payments. But in all these statutes, and ¶ in about 12 others, you do that There are ¶ so many cases where you require an institution to do it. the small banks said they could do this but our ¶ largest, most sophisticated financial institutions said they ¶ couldn't. That strikes me as incredibly odd. saying that you can't do ¶ something you're doing in 17 other statutes is unusual
Mr. Bachus. You know, all of these lists would be of ¶ illegal gambling operations, many of them offshore. What struck ¶ me is that our staff did just a cursory study where in at least ¶ 5, but I think as many as 17 cases, you have done that. I guess ¶ the more recent are the cross-border flow of monetary ¶ instruments, legislation on that. You didn't have a problem ¶ with that. The currency transaction reporting requirements, you ¶ assembled it for that. The Bank Secrecy Act, you do it under ¶ that. Anti-money laundering statutes, you do it under that. You ¶ do it under the terrorist financing, and there is not a problem ¶ there.¶ Also, you said that it is not practical for ACH, wire ¶ transfer, and check system participants to block restricted ¶ transactions except for those by entities that either have a ¶ direct relationship with the Internet gambling site or certain ¶ international payments. But in fact, in all these statutes, and ¶ in about 12 others, you do that. Do you see what I'm saying? ¶ So, I mean, I'm somewhat mystified as to why--do you understand ¶ what I'm saying? I'm just saying that you all do it. There are ¶ so many cases where you require an institution to do it. They ¶ do it. They said they--in fact, and another thing, ¶ Representative Paul Gillmor is dead now, but he pointed out ¶ that the small banks said they could do this but some of our ¶ largest, most sophisticated financial institutions said they ¶ couldn't. That strikes me as incredibly odd. I'm sorry.¶ Ms. Roseman. In looking at the list idea, many commenters ¶ used as analogy the OFAC list. I think the one thing that ¶ really distinguishes the list here from the OFAC list is that ¶ OFAC lists particular entities with whom you shouldn't have ¶ transactions. In this case--¶ Mr. Bachus. And the NCAA has identified 900 of those.¶ Ms. Roseman. Yes. But in this case, it is restricted ¶ activity, not restricted parties. So even gambling operations ¶ may have a combination of payment transactions that would be ¶ restricted under this law and others that would not be.¶ Mr. Bachus. All right. Let me dispute that. We are talking ¶ about illegal Internet gambling enterprises that are not ¶ licensed to do business in the United States. Now how could ¶ they possibly--they are illegal. They are criminal enterprises. ¶ They are not authorized to do business in the United States or ¶ transact business.¶ Ms. Roseman. The companies that have these businesses may ¶ also have other commercial transactions that they conduct that ¶ would be totally unrelated to gambling.¶ Mr. Bachus. Well, I understand that, but--¶ Chairman Gutierrez. The gentleman's time has expired.¶ Mr. Bachus. But if they are doing an illegal enterprise, ¶ you--and other enterprises if they are doing something illegal, ¶ they may do something legal, but you block them in all these ¶ other statutes, because--in fact, you block them because they ¶ do that.¶ Chairman Gutierrez. Ms. Roseman, please answer the ¶ gentleman's question, and then we will proceed.¶ Ms. Roseman. Bottom line, we did get a lot of comments ¶ about the list. It is something that we are looking at as we ¶ develop the final rule. As Ms. Abend mentioned, we haven't come ¶ to any final decisions, but we certainly understand the ¶ interests of both the financial industry and of the ¶ professional sports leagues, to have certainty with respect to ¶ what is lawful and what is unlawful.¶ Mr. Bachus. Yes. And I--¶ Ms. Roseman. But we understand the objective.¶ Mr. Bachus. I guess my point is, saying that you can't do ¶ something you're doing in 17 other statutes is sort of unusual.
3,637
<h4>Banks already comply with 17 other statutes that do the same thing</h4><p>Spencer <strong>Bachus 8</strong>, House Rep from Alabama, “Proposed UIGEA Regulations: Burden Without Benefit?” Congressional testimony, hearing Before the subcommittee on domestic and international monetary policy, trade, and technology of the committee on financial services u.s. house of representatives one hundred tenth congress second session APRIL 2, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42714/html/CHRG-110hhrg42714.htm ac 9-2</p><p> Mr. Bachus. You know, <u><strong>all of these lists would be of </u>¶<u> illegal gambling operations, many of them offshore. </u></strong>What struck ¶ me is that <u><strong>our staff did just a cursory study where in</u></strong> at least ¶ 5, but I think as many as <u><strong>17 cases, you have done that</u></strong>. I guess ¶ the more recent are the cross-border flow of monetary ¶ instruments, legislation on that. <u><strong>You didn't have a problem </u>¶<u> with that. <mark>The currency transaction reporting requirements</mark>, you </u>¶<u> assembled it for that. <mark>The Bank Secrecy Act</mark>, you do it under </u>¶<u> that. <mark>Anti-money laundering statutes</mark>, you do it under that. You </u>¶<u> do it under the <mark>terrorist financing</mark>, and there is not a problem </u>¶<u> there.</u>¶<u> Also, <mark>you said that it is not practical for ACH, wire </u>¶<u> transfer, and check system participants to block restricted </u>¶<u> transactions except for those by entities that either have a </u>¶<u> direct relationship with the Internet gambling site or certain </u>¶<u> international payments. But</mark> in fact, <mark>in all these statutes, and </u>¶<u> in about 12 others, you do that</u></strong></mark>. Do you see what I'm saying? ¶ So, I mean, <u><strong>I'm</u></strong> somewhat <u><strong>mystified</u></strong> as to why--do you understand ¶ what I'm saying? I'm just saying that <u><strong>you all do it. <mark>There are </u>¶<u> so many cases where you require an institution to do it.</mark> They </u>¶<u> do it. </u></strong>They said they--in fact, and another thing, ¶ Representative Paul Gillmor is dead now, but he pointed out ¶ that <u><strong><mark>the small banks said they could do this but</mark> some of <mark>our </u>¶<u> largest, most sophisticated financial institutions said they </u>¶<u> couldn't. That strikes me as incredibly odd.</mark> </u></strong>I'm sorry.<strong>¶<u> </u></strong>Ms. Roseman. In looking at the list idea, many commenters ¶ used as analogy the OFAC list. I think the one thing that ¶ really distinguishes the list here from the OFAC list is that ¶ OFAC lists particular entities with whom you shouldn't have ¶ transactions. In this case--¶ Mr. Bachus. And the NCAA has identified 900 of those.¶ Ms. Roseman. Yes. But in this case, it is restricted ¶ activity, not restricted parties. So even gambling operations ¶ may have a combination of payment transactions that would be ¶ restricted under this law and others that would not be.¶ Mr. Bachus. All right. Let me dispute that. We are talking ¶ about illegal Internet gambling enterprises that are not ¶ licensed to do business in the United States. Now how could ¶ they possibly--they are illegal. They are criminal enterprises. ¶ They are not authorized to do business in the United States or ¶ transact business.¶ Ms. Roseman. The companies that have these businesses may ¶ also have other commercial transactions that they conduct that ¶ would be totally unrelated to gambling.¶ Mr. Bachus. Well, I understand that, but--¶ Chairman Gutierrez. The gentleman's time has expired.¶ Mr. Bachus. But if they are doing an illegal enterprise, ¶ you--and other enterprises if they are doing something illegal, ¶ they may do something legal, but you block them in all these ¶ other statutes, because--in fact, you block them because they ¶ do that.¶ Chairman Gutierrez. Ms. Roseman, please answer the ¶ gentleman's question, and then we will proceed.¶ Ms. Roseman. Bottom line, we did get a lot of comments ¶ about the list. It is something that we are looking at as we ¶ develop the final rule. As Ms. Abend mentioned, we haven't come ¶ to any final decisions, but we certainly understand the ¶ interests of both the financial industry and of the ¶ professional sports leagues, to have certainty with respect to ¶ what is lawful and what is unlawful.¶ Mr. Bachus. Yes. And I--¶ Ms. Roseman. But we understand the objective.¶ Mr. Bachus. I guess my point is, <u><strong><mark>saying that you can't do </u>¶<u> something you're doing in 17 other statutes is</mark> </u></strong>sort of<u><strong> <mark>unusual</u></strong></mark>.</p>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Bank Impact
429,720
4
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,173
A. Legalization of prostitution means government regulation
Jacobson ‘14
Jacobson ‘14
four legal responses to prostitution have arisen: complete criminalization, legalization, complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization Complete criminalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex illegal. Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation Complete decriminalization removes criminal punishment and sanction for the purchase and sale of sex, whereas partial decriminalization continues to make the purchase of sex illegal while decriminalizing the sale of sex
four legal responses to prostitution have arisen complete criminalization legalization complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation.
[Brynn, J.D. Candidate. Seattle University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Political Science, University of Washington, 2010. “Addressing the Tension Between the Dual Identities of the American Prostitute: Criminal and Victim; How Problem-Solving Courts Can Help.” 37 Seattle Univ. L. R. 1023. ETB] Prostitution and its legal status are the subject of a heated global debate. n7 Currently, prostitution is illegal everywhere in the United States except Nevada, where it is legal in several counties. n8 An important consideration of that debate is how prostitution laws affect law enforcement's ability to identify and prosecute sex traffickers, or "pimps" as they are commonly known. n9 To date, there is still no uniform approach to trafficking prosecutions in the United States, and many states continue to criminalize the acts of prostitutes while failing to enforce criminal laws against those who exploit them. n10 As a result of this debate, four legal responses to prostitution have arisen: complete criminalization, legalization, complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization. n11 Complete criminalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex illegal. n12 Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation. n13 Complete decriminalization removes criminal punishment and sanction for the purchase and sale of sex, whereas partial decriminalization continues to make the purchase of sex illegal while decriminalizing the sale of sex. n14 Based on a utilitarian analysis, which recognizes the value of these four theories, this Comment reaches the conclusion that any scheme of legalization or decriminalization is not the optimal solution to the problem of prostitution because it leaves victims in a worse situation than they are currently in and subjects them to further exploitation. This Comment argues for continued criminalization for prostitution in the United States. An appropriate way to deal with women arrested for prostitution is to set up a problem-solving court, similar to a drug court, which would provide a multidisciplinary approach to helping those trapped in prostitution.
2,167
<h4><strong>A. Legalization of prostitution means government regulation</h4><p>Jacobson ‘14</p><p></strong>[Brynn, J.D. Candidate. Seattle University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Political Science, University of Washington, 2010. “Addressing the Tension Between the Dual Identities of the American Prostitute: Criminal and Victim; How Problem-Solving Courts Can Help.” 37 Seattle Univ. L. R. 1023. ETB]</p><p>Prostitution and its legal status are the subject of a heated global debate. n7 Currently, prostitution is illegal everywhere in the United States except Nevada, where it is legal in several counties. n8 An important consideration of that debate is how prostitution laws affect law enforcement's ability to identify and prosecute sex traffickers, or "pimps" as they are commonly known. n9 To date, there is still no uniform approach to trafficking prosecutions in the United States, and many states continue to criminalize the acts of prostitutes while failing to enforce criminal laws against those who exploit them. n10 As a result of this debate, <u><strong><mark>four legal responses to prostitution have arisen</mark>: <mark>complete</mark> <mark>criminalization</mark>, <mark>legalization</mark>, <mark>complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization</u></strong></mark>. n11 <u><strong>Complete criminalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex illegal.</u></strong> n12 <u><strong><mark>Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation</u></strong>.</mark> n13 <u><strong>Complete decriminalization removes criminal punishment and sanction for the purchase and sale of sex, whereas partial decriminalization continues to make the purchase of sex illegal while decriminalizing the sale of sex</u></strong>. n14 Based on a utilitarian analysis, which recognizes the value of these four theories, this Comment reaches the conclusion that any scheme of legalization or decriminalization is not the optimal solution to the problem of prostitution because it leaves victims in a worse situation than they are currently in and subjects them to further exploitation. This Comment argues for continued criminalization for prostitution in the United States. An appropriate way to deal with women arrested for prostitution is to set up a problem-solving court, similar to a drug court, which would provide a multidisciplinary approach to helping those trapped in prostitution.</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,723
7
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,174
****Dollar hegemony is resilient but doesn’t solve war-- Kritzer evidence indicates that investors will always push for US dollar over others because it is stable and will always be able to overcome failures
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>****Dollar hegemony is resilient but doesn’t solve war-- Kritzer evidence indicates that investors will always push for US dollar over others because it is stable and will always be able to overcome failures</h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Dollar Hegemony
429,721
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,175
Death doesn’t key to VTL
Ringmar 96
Erik Ringmar 96, London School of Economics, “On the Ontological Status of the State,” http://www.ringmar.net/writings/Erik%20Ringmar,%20On%20the%20Ontological%20Status%20of%20the%20State.pdf
apocalyptic talk is not evidence of the end of subjectivity the very opposite conclusion could be drawn The end is, after all, what makes the story possible in the first place, and by envisioning this end we make stories make sense There is a fundamental relationship between the end of the stories we tell about ourselves — death — and the meanings we attach to our lives On the one hand, death means the destruction of our selves On the other hand, however, death is also a prerequisite of all stories. The story would not be if it did not end somewhere, and thus we — the subjects who appear in, and through, it — would not be either. This does not mean that death is the meaning of life, but it does mean that death makes a meaningful life possible We constantly need to envision the end of our story since only the end can make sense of, and give legitimacy to, the present This explains why politics needs its Utopias and why intellectuals constantly prophesy the end of this, that or the other
apocalyptic talk is not evidence of the end of subjectivity The end is , what makes the story possible in the first place, and by envisioning this end we make stories make sense There is a fundamental relationship between the end of the stories we tell about ourselves — death — and the meanings we attach to our lives death means the destruction of our selves. death is a prerequisite of all stories. The story would not be if it did not end somewhere, and thus we — the subjects who would not be either death makes a meaningful life possible We constantly need to envision the end of our story since only the end can make sense of, and give legitimacy to, the present. This explains why politics needs its Utopias and why intellectuals constantly prophesy the end of this, that or the other
Such loose apocalyptic talk is, however, not in itself evidence of the end of subjectivity. In fact the very opposite conclusion could be drawn. It should, after all, not surprise us that an ontology based on narratives will be profoundly preoccupied with endings (Kermode, 1966: 93-124). The end is, after all, what makes the story possible in the first place, and by envisioning this end we make stories make sense. This kind of envisioning is, I would argue, precisely what the discussion regarding 'the end of subjectivity' is all about. There is, in other words, a fundamental, yet highly ambiguous relationship between the end of the stories we tell about ourselves — death — and the meanings we attach to our lives. On the one hand, death means the destruction of our selves. When our story is over we will no longer be, and for this reason death constantly threatens to make every moment of the story leading up to it lose its meaning. Death may terrify us for the simple reason that we never will be in a position to tell the story of what it was like to go through it. Death cannot be emasculated through narrative since death is the end of the narrative. On the other hand, however, death is also a prerequisite of all stories. The story would not be if it did not end somewhere, and thus we — the subjects who appear in, and through, it — would not be either. This does not mean that death is the meaning of life, but it does mean that death makes a meaningful life possible. We constantly need to envision the end of our story since only the end can make sense of, and give legitimacy to, the present. This is true not only for our individual but also for our collective selves, and it explains why politics needs its Utopias and why intellectuals constantly prophesy the end of this, that or the other. Will subjectivity, then, ever come to a final end? Will individual and collective selves one day no longer be? Perhaps, perhaps not. What is certain, however, is that while the content that we give to our selves — the plots that we construct about our lives — will change dramatically in the future just as they have changed dramatically in the past, a self will exist as long as stories are told about it. To envision an end to these stories is a crucial part of what it means to understand a story and as such a prerequisite of subjectivity which in fact has very little to do with its eventual demise.
2,421
<h4>Death doesn’t key to VTL </h4><p>Erik <strong>Ringmar 96</strong>, London School of Economics, “On the Ontological Status of the State,” http://www.ringmar.net/writings/Erik%20Ringmar,%20On%20the%20Ontological%20Status%20of%20the%20State.pdf</p><p>Such loose <u><mark>apocalyptic talk is</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>not</u></mark> in itself <u><mark>evidence of the end of subjectivity</u></mark>. In fact <u>the very opposite conclusion could be drawn</u>. It should, after all, not surprise us that an ontology based on narratives will be profoundly preoccupied with endings (Kermode, 1966: 93-124). <u><mark>The end is</mark>, after all<mark>, what makes the story possible in the first place, and by envisioning this end we make stories make sense</u></mark>. This kind of envisioning is, I would argue, precisely what the discussion regarding 'the end of subjectivity' is all about. <u><mark>There is</u></mark>, in other words, <u><mark>a fundamental</u></mark>, yet highly ambiguous <u><mark>relationship between the end of the stories we tell about our<strong>selves — death — and the</strong> meanings we attach to our lives</u></mark>. <u><strong>On the one hand, <mark>death means the destruction of our selves</u></strong>.</mark> When our story is over we will no longer be, and for this reason death constantly threatens to make every moment of the story leading up to it lose its meaning. Death may terrify us for the simple reason that we never will be in a position to tell the story of what it was like to go through it. Death cannot be emasculated through narrative since death is the end of the narrative. <u><strong>On the other hand, however, <mark>death</strong> is</mark> also <mark>a prerequisite of all stories. The story would not be if it did not end somewhere, and thus we — the subjects who</mark> appear in, and through, it — <mark>would not be either</mark>. This does not mean that death is the meaning of life, but it does mean that <mark>death makes a meaningful life possible</u></mark>. <u><mark>We constantly need to envision the end of our story since only the end can make sense of, and give legitimacy to, the present</u>. <u>This</u></mark> is true not only for our individual but also for our collective selves, and it <u><mark>explains why politics needs its Utopias and why intellectuals constantly prophesy the end of this, that or the other</u></mark>. Will subjectivity, then, ever come to a final end? Will individual and collective selves one day no longer be? Perhaps, perhaps not. What is certain, however, is that while the content that we give to our selves — the plots that we construct about our lives — will change dramatically in the future just as they have changed dramatically in the past, a self will exist as long as stories are told about it. To envision an end to these stories is a crucial part of what it means to understand a story and as such a prerequisite of subjectivity which in fact has very little to do with its eventual demise.</p>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
1,569,925
4
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,176
B. the aff doesn’t legalize prostitution -- they only affirm the area of the prostitute
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>B. the aff doesn’t legalize prostitution -- they only affirm the area of the prostitute </h4>
1NC
null
1NC
429,722
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,177
Prefer recency -- Us dollar continues to deliver high returns
Sterling 9-17
PoundSterling live, 9-17-14, HYPERLINK "http://www.poundsterlinglive.com/usd/1560-pound-sterling-euro-tick-along-us-dollar-stronger" Pound Sterling, Euro Tick Along; US Dollar Stronger , http://www.poundsterlinglive.com/usd/1560-calm-start-for-pound-sterling-euro-us-dollar-holding-strong
The US dollar floated around a 14 month trade-weighted high There are increasing signs that the US Dollar is becoming an ‘asset currency’ as the US simply delivers higher expected returns, whether one invests in equities, bonds or real estate.
The US dollar floated around a 14 month trade-weighted high There are increasing signs that the US Dollar is becoming an ‘asset currency’ as the US simply delivers higher expected returns, whether one invests in equities, bonds or real estate.
The US dollar floated around a 14 month trade-weighted high overnight as investors anticipated the busy week ahead. There are increasing signs that the US Dollar is becoming an ‘asset currency’ as the US simply delivers higher expected returns, whether one invests in equities, bonds or real estate. FOMC this week, with the Fed’s monetary policy statement, will headline and investors are looking for any changes to the Fed’s statement. Any hint that rates could begin to rise sooner than previously expected will likely send the US dollar higher. JP Morgan expects the Fed to drop the "considerable time" guidance from its post-meeting statement. It also expects the median forecast for the end-2017 Fed Funds target rate will be close to neutral, around 3.50%-3.75%. "We now expect the Fed to hike rates in June 2015, vs. 3Q15 previously," said JP Morgan.
858
<h4>Prefer recency -- Us dollar continues to deliver high returns</h4><p>Pound<strong>Sterling</strong> live, <strong>9-17</strong>-14, HYPERLINK "http://www.poundsterlinglive.com/usd/1560-pound-sterling-euro-tick-along-us-dollar-stronger" Pound Sterling, Euro Tick Along; US Dollar Stronger , http://www.poundsterlinglive.com/usd/1560-calm-start-for-pound-sterling-euro-us-dollar-holding-strong</p><p><u><strong><mark>The US dollar floated around a 14 month trade-weighted high</u></strong></mark> overnight as investors anticipated the busy week ahead. <u><strong><mark>There are increasing signs that the US Dollar is becoming an ‘asset currency’ as the US simply delivers higher expected returns, whether one invests in equities, bonds or real estate.</u></strong></mark> FOMC this week, with the Fed’s monetary policy statement, will headline and investors are looking for any changes to the Fed’s statement. Any hint that rates could begin to rise sooner than previously expected will likely send the US dollar higher. JP Morgan expects the Fed to drop the "considerable time" guidance from its post-meeting statement. It also expects the median forecast for the end-2017 Fed Funds target rate will be close to neutral, around 3.50%-3.75%. "We now expect the Fed to hike rates in June 2015, vs. 3Q15 previously," said JP Morgan. </p>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Dollar Hegemony
429,725
2
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,178
Fear of death doesn’t cause lashout
Langford 3 (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)
Langford 3 (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)
other perspectives on risk perception can be gained by examining underlying existential anxieties between widely differing risk issues and across very different methodologies capable of transcending the difference between cultures and histories. Whilst the challenges and risks today in a techno-logically advanced society are very different from those faced a thousand years ago in the same geographical locations existential anxieties remain the same, as they are a common property of being human, although coping strategies may change somewhat existential analysis can reflect on the societal challenges posed by ‘modern’ risks as well as the individual adaptations required in order to survive in the 21st century. all are beginning to play on the same field. present a different analysis of risk perception by individuals within social and political systems Existential issues and anxieties, that are common to being human across space and time Only by providing people with a genuine chance to understand, have hope and believe in the possibility of instigating change, can strategies actually communicate about risk because of the complex and profound role that risk perception plays in structuring identities, defining discourses and bringing order and sense to the world. Otherwise, fear of the unknown, alienation, helplessness and reactions to these states of mind will always win the day
risk perception can be gained by examining existential anxieties between widely differing risk issues transcending difference between histories existential analysis can reflect on modern’ risks as well as individual adaptations required to survive Existential issues anxieties are common to being human across space and time Only by providing a genuine chance to understand, have hope and believe in possibility of instigating change, can strategies actually communicate about risk because of profound role risk perception plays in structuring identities, defining discourses and bringing sense to the world. Otherwise, fear of the unknown, alienation, helplessness and reactions to these states of mind will always win the day.
The above case studies show that other perspectives on risk perception can be gained by examining underlying existential anxieties, and existential analysis can provide a link between widely differing risk issues and across very different methodologies. Existential analysis is, of course, only one of a number of theoretical and practical approaches that can be taken towards risks, but it is potentially capable of transcending the difference between cultures and histories. Whilst the challenges and risks posed by living today in a techno-logically advanced society are very different from those faced a thousand years ago in the same geographical locations, the existential anxieties remain the same, as they are a common property of being human, although coping strategies may change somewhat. ‘Millenium anxiety’ in 1999 was not so different from that displayed in 999 AD. Further, existential analysis can reflect on the societal challenges posed by ‘modern’ risks as well as the individual adaptations required in order to survive in the 21st century. Giddens (1991) links existential anxiety to loss of trust, and Beck (1999) comments on how the World Risk Society brings people together as well as separating them though the operation of the global political economy. There are winners and losers, but all are beginning to play on the same field. Although cross-cultural comparisons are not the focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning that from research conducted in the UK, and also in Greece (Kontogianni et al., 2001), it is possible to see the commonalities between at least these two cultures, as well as the differences. With regard to risks, respondents in the UK generally took a more individualistic ‘personal specialness’ approach, for example, in the research on perceptions of climate change, whilst in Greece respondents still held more belief in the divine order of things. Greek respondents often expressed a belief in θεοπρωνια (theo-pronia), which has no direct English translation, but can be interpreted as meaning that ‘if you do the right thing, God will give you luck’. So, for example, if you fish according to ‘natural laws’, God will make sure the fish don’t run out.……....in general, Greeks favoured the ‘ultimate rescuer’ defense. In terms of the World Risk Society, and individual coping mechanisms, it appears that death anxiety is particularly prevalent when people consider their fears of the unknown and unknowable. The unknown is represented by uncertainties over the future, given the current rate of technological change, and conflicting messages received from the scientists, government and the media about a wide range of risk issues. The unknowable is represented by fear of the complexity of scientific knowledge, and its inaccessibility to lay people, as well as the complex and interwoven nature of many environmental and health risks. With many ‘20th century diseases’, such as allergic and immunocompetence conditions, traditional epidemiological methods of finding a single cause for a single disease fail because the 26 causes are multiple and synergistic, and the conditions ill-defined and variable between individuals. Existential isolation anxiety is characterized by feelings of hopelessness and helplessness in the face of the global political economy, and the striving for ‘community’ or ‘togetherness’ is often founded on making joint protests or opting out of conventional lifestyles and discourses. This can sometimes lead to ‘idealistic tribalism’, which replaces ‘geographical tribalism’ via the sharing and reinforcement of common ideas amongst similar thinking people via the ease of modern day travel and information/communication technologies such as email and the internet. Alienation is often a matter of scale, with individuals feeling powerless in the face of world markets and international agreements. However, modern forms of communication and lifestyles and the social structures they support may themselves be alienating in containing little face-to-face human contact or ‘quality time’. Freedom and responsibility are again often framed in terms of not being subjugated by the global political economy or the discourses it promotes – the modern equivalent of Hiedegger’s impersonal ‘They-Self’. Individuals and groups can choose to opt out, give up, try their best, or carry on regardless – but it is always in opposition to or in collusion with political and economic forces seen as being at a scale beyond the individual’s power to change, and individual action is hence usually framed in terms of personal lifestyle choice to reduce risks, protect the environment or promote social equity. Meaninglessness anxiety seems to be a common response in the World Risk Society. Identity and self-esteem are either maintained by small-scale successes, or reliance on being informed and using common sense, but pessimism, crusad-ism, nihilism and vegetativeness are all common responses to technological and environmental risks. Unfortunately, the great increase in information in techno-logical societies has created more confusion and, in the opinion of many people, devalued all information – leading to more reliance on ‘folklore’, lay epidemiology and ‘common sense’ to evaluate uncertain and ill-defined risks. Rebellion against political and institutional structures has often been reduced to stigmatization of particular organizations (such as the privatized water companies, see Langford et al., 1999a; Georgiou et al., 1998) or products (such as GM foods). This atomization of protest increases the sense of meaningless-ness, where one can only hope to achieve something small – and hence potentially meaningless – or else give up hope of things ever being different and merely find a comfortable way to survive the inevitable. In conclusion, this paper has attempted, via theoretical argument, case studies and discussion, to present a different analysis of risk perception by individuals within social and political systems. Existential issues and anxieties, that are common to being human across space and time, have been explored whilst at the same time examining the relationship between humans and risk in contemporary post-industrial society. One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the range of individual and social responses to risk are symptomatic of far more global anxieties about the functioning and future of the world in general. Risk issues and conflicts are therefore not merely a product of a risk society, but an integral part of its operation. Only by providing people with a genuine chance to understand, have hope and believe in the possibility of instigating change, can risk managers provide risk communication strategies that actually communicate about risk. This is because of the complex and profound role that risk perception plays in structuring identities, defining discourses and bringing order and sense to the world. Otherwise, fear of the unknown, alienation, helplessness and reactions to these states of mind will always win the day.
7,080
<h4>Fear of death doesn’t cause lashout </h4><p><strong>Langford 3<mark> (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)</p><p></strong></mark>The above case studies show that <u><strong>other perspectives on <mark>risk perception can be gained by examining</mark> underlying <mark>existential anxieties</u></strong></mark>, and existential analysis can provide a link <u><strong><mark>between widely differing risk issues</mark> and across very different methodologies</u></strong>. Existential analysis is, of course, only one of a number of theoretical and practical approaches that can be taken towards risks, but it is potentially <u><strong>capable of <mark>transcending</mark> the <mark>difference between </mark>cultures and <mark>histories</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Whilst the challenges and risks </u></strong>posed by living <u><strong>today in a techno-logically advanced society are very different from those faced a thousand years ago in the same geographical locations</u></strong>, the <u><strong>existential anxieties remain the same, as they are a common property of being human, although coping strategies may change somewhat</u></strong>. ‘Millenium anxiety’ in 1999 was not so different from that displayed in 999 AD. Further, <u><strong><mark>existential analysis can reflect on</mark> the societal challenges posed by ‘<mark>modern’ risks as well as</mark> the <mark>individual adaptations required</mark> in order <mark>to survive</mark> in the 21st century.</u></strong> Giddens (1991) links existential anxiety to loss of trust, and Beck (1999) comments on how the World Risk Society brings people together as well as separating them though the operation of the global political economy. There are winners and losers, but <u><strong>all are beginning to play on the same field. </u></strong>Although cross-cultural comparisons are not the focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning that from research conducted in the UK, and also in Greece (Kontogianni et al., 2001), it is possible to see the commonalities between at least these two cultures, as well as the differences. With regard to risks, respondents in the UK generally took a more individualistic ‘personal specialness’ approach, for example, in the research on perceptions of climate change, whilst in Greece respondents still held more belief in the divine order of things. Greek respondents often expressed a belief in θεοπρωνια (theo-pronia), which has no direct English translation, but can be interpreted as meaning that ‘if you do the right thing, God will give you luck’. So, for example, if you fish according to ‘natural laws’, God will make sure the fish don’t run out.……....in general, Greeks favoured the ‘ultimate rescuer’ defense. In terms of the World Risk Society, and individual coping mechanisms, it appears that death anxiety is particularly prevalent when people consider their fears of the unknown and unknowable. The unknown is represented by uncertainties over the future, given the current rate of technological change, and conflicting messages received from the scientists, government and the media about a wide range of risk issues. The unknowable is represented by fear of the complexity of scientific knowledge, and its inaccessibility to lay people, as well as the complex and interwoven nature of many environmental and health risks. With many ‘20th century diseases’, such as allergic and immunocompetence conditions, traditional epidemiological methods of finding a single cause for a single disease fail because the 26 causes are multiple and synergistic, and the conditions ill-defined and variable between individuals. Existential isolation anxiety is characterized by feelings of hopelessness and helplessness in the face of the global political economy, and the striving for ‘community’ or ‘togetherness’ is often founded on making joint protests or opting out of conventional lifestyles and discourses. This can sometimes lead to ‘idealistic tribalism’, which replaces ‘geographical tribalism’ via the sharing and reinforcement of common ideas amongst similar thinking people via the ease of modern day travel and information/communication technologies such as email and the internet. Alienation is often a matter of scale, with individuals feeling powerless in the face of world markets and international agreements. However, modern forms of communication and lifestyles and the social structures they support may themselves be alienating in containing little face-to-face human contact or ‘quality time’. Freedom and responsibility are again often framed in terms of not being subjugated by the global political economy or the discourses it promotes – the modern equivalent of Hiedegger’s impersonal ‘They-Self’. Individuals and groups can choose to opt out, give up, try their best, or carry on regardless – but it is always in opposition to or in collusion with political and economic forces seen as being at a scale beyond the individual’s power to change, and individual action is hence usually framed in terms of personal lifestyle choice to reduce risks, protect the environment or promote social equity.<u><strong> </u></strong>Meaninglessness anxiety seems to be a common response in the World Risk Society. Identity and self-esteem are either maintained by small-scale successes, or reliance on being informed and using common sense, but pessimism, crusad-ism, nihilism and vegetativeness are all common responses to technological and environmental risks. Unfortunately, the great increase in information in techno-logical societies has created more confusion and, in the opinion of many people, devalued all information – leading to more reliance on ‘folklore’, lay epidemiology and ‘common sense’ to evaluate uncertain and ill-defined risks. Rebellion against political and institutional structures has often been reduced to stigmatization of particular organizations (such as the privatized water companies, see Langford et al., 1999a; Georgiou et al., 1998) or products (such as GM foods). This atomization of protest increases the sense of meaningless-ness, where one can only hope to achieve something small – and hence potentially meaningless – or else give up hope of things ever being different and merely find a comfortable way to survive the inevitable. In conclusion, this paper has attempted, via theoretical argument, case studies and discussion, to <u><strong>present a different analysis of risk perception by individuals within social and political systems</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Existential issues</mark> and <mark>anxieties</mark>, that <mark>are common to being human across space and time</u></strong></mark>, have been explored whilst at the same time examining the relationship between humans and risk in contemporary post-industrial society. One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the range of individual and social responses to risk are symptomatic of far more global anxieties about the functioning and future of the world in general. Risk issues and conflicts are therefore not merely a product of a risk society, but an integral part of its operation. <u><strong><mark>Only by providing </mark>people with <mark>a genuine chance to understand, have hope and believe in</mark> the <mark>possibility of instigating change, can</mark> </u></strong>risk managers provide risk communication <u><strong><mark>strategies</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>actually communicate about risk</u></strong></mark>. This is <u><strong><mark>because of</mark> the complex and <mark>profound role</mark> that <mark>risk perception plays in structuring identities, defining discourses and bringing</mark> order and <mark>sense to the world. Otherwise, fear of the unknown, alienation, helplessness and reactions to these states of mind will always win the day</u></strong>.</p></mark>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
72,514
19
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,179
C. Voter for multiple reasons
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>C. Voter for multiple reasons </h4>
1NC
null
1NC
429,724
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,180
Ignoring the threat causes panic – worse than fear, stops solvency, turns their state power arguments
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Ignoring the threat causes panic – worse than fear, stops solvency, turns their state power arguments</h4>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
429,726
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,181
****Regulations fail - terrorists aren’t stupid and any regulations would be able to be overcome from terrorist innovation -- any firebreaks on terrorism have always been circumvented
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>****Regulations fail - terrorists aren’t stupid and any regulations would be able to be overcome from terrorist innovation -- any firebreaks on terrorism have always been circumvented</h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Regulations Fail
429,727
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,182
1. Education - It’s a key area of focus and the only way to evaluate implementation
Munro and Giusta ‘8
Munro and Giusta ‘8 [Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta, The Regulation of Prostitution: ¶ Contemporary Contexts and Comparative ¶ Perspectives, in Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution. ETB]
The question of how to how to regulate, prostitution has long been a focus of attention. Diverse agendas have come together in debates on prostitution ¶ policy clashing in complex, unpredictable ways exact parameters of responses raise crucial questions about how these imperatives are being translated, into practice.
The question of how to how to regulate, ¶ prostitution has long been a focus of attention. Diverse agendas have come together in debates on prostitution ¶ policy clashing in complex, unpredictable ways exact parameters of responses raise crucial questions about how these imperatives are being translated, into practice
The question of how to conceptualise, and accordingly of how to regulate, ¶ prostitution has long been a focus of attention. Diverse agendas about gender equality, ¶ the regulation of sexuality, personal self-determination, state protectionism, public ¶ nuisance and socio-economic disparity have come together in debates on prostitution ¶ policy – often fusing and/or clashing with one another in complex, unpredictable ¶ and controversial ways. In addition, particularly in modern times, debates over ¶ prostitution policy have intensified, fuelled by the development of a number of high ¶ profile, and markedly diverse, legal and policy responses at national state level. ¶ These responses range from regulative regimes for legalisation of the sex industry, ¶ to less interventionist models of decriminalisation of sex work, through to proactive ¶ efforts at its eradication through the criminalisation of the purchase of sex. The exact parameters of, and rationales for, these responses raise a number of crucial questions ¶ about our conceptualisation of the sex industry, as well as about how these policy ¶ level imperatives are being translated, or failing to be translated, into practice.
1,197
<h4>1.<strong> Education - It’s a key area of focus and the only way to evaluate implementation</h4><p>Munro and Giusta ‘8</p><p></strong>[Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta, The Regulation of Prostitution: ¶ Contemporary Contexts and Comparative ¶ Perspectives, in Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution. ETB]</p><p><u><strong><mark>The question of how to </u></strong></mark>conceptualise, and accordingly of <u><strong><mark>how to regulate, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> prostitution has long been a focus of attention.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Diverse agendas</u></strong> </mark>about gender equality, ¶ the regulation of sexuality, personal self-determination, state protectionism, public ¶ nuisance and socio-economic disparity <u><strong><mark>have come together in debates on prostitution ¶ policy</u></strong> </mark>– often fusing and/or <u><strong><mark>clashing</u></strong> </mark>with one another <u><strong><mark>in complex, unpredictable</u></strong> </mark>¶ and controversial <u><strong><mark>ways</u></strong></mark>. In addition, particularly in modern times, debates over ¶ prostitution policy have intensified, fuelled by the development of a number of high ¶ profile, and markedly diverse, legal and policy responses at national state level. ¶ These responses range from regulative regimes for legalisation of the sex industry, ¶ to less interventionist models of decriminalisation of sex work, through to proactive ¶ efforts at its eradication through the criminalisation of the purchase of sex. The <u><strong><mark>exact parameters of</u></strong></mark>, and rationales for, these <u><strong><mark>responses raise</u></strong> </mark>a number of <u><strong><mark>crucial questions</u></strong> </mark>¶ about our conceptualisation of the sex industry, as well as <u><strong><mark>about how these</u></strong> </mark>policy ¶ level <u><strong><mark>imperatives are being translated,</u></strong></mark> or failing to be translated, <u><strong><mark>into practice</mark>. </p></u></strong>
1NC
null
1NC
429,729
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,183
Puts them in a double bind -- either terrorists are really smart and can overcome barriers to attack
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Puts them in a double bind -- either terrorists are really smart and can overcome barriers to attack </h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Regulations Fail
429,728
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,184
Sandman 03
null
Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”
Covering up an epidemic is about as bad a communication strategy as we can imagine China actually does face a panic problem, as its people confront not just a raging epidemic but a government that lies to them about it. The West’s “soft cover-up” is much gentler and less dishonest But if SARS does keep getting worse in the West the soft cover-up will also fail ... and may also provoke panic. Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience to squelch the anxiety can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent. Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety, harness it, panic will be likelier and more widespread if the authorities have been minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly
if SARS does keep getting worse in the West, the soft cover-up will fail and provoke panic Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience to squelch the anxiety can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety panic will be likelier if authorities have been minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly
China is universally condemned for covering up SARS and putting the world at risk. Covering up an epidemic is about as bad a communication strategy as we can imagine. Among its outcomes: China actually does face a panic problem, as its people confront not just a raging epidemic but a government that lies to them about it. The West’s “soft cover-up” is much gentler and less dishonest — a cover-up of over-reassurance and minimization rather than of lies. But if SARS does keep getting worse in the West, as it has in China, the soft cover-up will also fail ... and may also provoke panic. Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience. The paradox is that efforts to squelch the anxiety (“allay the public’s fear” is the usual phrase) can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent. Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety, harness it, and steer it instead of trying to prevent it. Of course even superb handling of the public’s fears may not prevent panic if the epidemic gets bad enough. There has often been some panic during the great epidemics of the past. But panic will be likelier and more widespread if the authorities have been minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly and compassionately.
1,277
<h4>Sandman 03</h4><p>Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”</p><p>China is universally condemned for covering up SARS and putting the world at risk. <u><strong>Covering up an epidemic is about as bad a communication strategy as we can imagine</u></strong>. Among its outcomes: <u><strong>China actually does face a panic problem, as its people confront not just a raging epidemic but a government that lies to them about it. The West’s “soft cover-up” is much gentler and less dishonest </u></strong>— a cover-up of over-reassurance and minimization rather than of lies. <u><strong>But <mark>if</mark> <mark>SARS does keep getting worse in the West</u></strong>,</mark> as it has in China, <u><strong><mark>the soft cover-up will</mark> also <mark>fail</mark> ... <mark>and</mark> may also <mark>provoke panic</mark>. <mark>Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience</u></strong></mark>. The paradox is that efforts <u><strong><mark>to</mark> <mark>squelch the anxiety</u></strong></mark> (“allay the public’s fear” is the usual phrase) <u><strong><mark>can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent</mark>. <mark>Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety</mark>, harness it,</u></strong> and steer it instead of trying to prevent it. Of course even superb handling of the public’s fears may not prevent panic if the epidemic gets bad enough. There has often been some panic during the great epidemics of the past. But <u><strong><mark>panic will be likelier</mark> and more widespread <mark>if</mark> the <mark>authorities have been</mark> <mark>minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly</mark> </u></strong>and compassionately. </p>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
107,443
7
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,185
Takes out alt solvency and turns their impacts
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Takes out alt solvency and turns their impacts</h4>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
429,730
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,186
2. Ground- Regulatory flexibility allows the aff to functionally decrim which is key neg ground
Munro and Giusta ‘8
Munro and Giusta ‘8 [Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta, The Regulation of Prostitution: ¶ Contemporary Contexts and Comparative ¶ Perspectives, in Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution. ETB]
decriminalisation offer the added advantage of permitting greater flexibility in working practices the downside of this flexibility remains that a lack of regulation ¶ may permit abuses to go unchecked
decrim offer the added advantage of flexibility in working practices the downside remains that a lack of regulation permit abuses to go unchecked
Some of these shortcomings might, of course, be usefully remedied by a ¶ decriminalisation approach. Indeed, the regulation/legalisation model was explicitly ¶ rejected by New Zealand on the basis that a licensing regime would need extensive ¶ administrative and enforcement resources, and risked the creation of a two-tier ¶ industry, in which the legal side of the market would come under the control of ¶ big business and the illegal side would be populated by sex workers who are most ¶ vulnerable to exploitation. While offering the benefits associated with the reduction ¶ of sex work stigma and the greater visibility of sex workers (which is thought to ¶ render them less vulnerable to abuse), it has been argued that decriminalisation may ¶ offer the added advantage of limiting state intrusion into the private lives of sex ¶ workers, and permitting them greater flexibility in their working practices. As critics ¶ point out, however, the downside of this flexibility remains that a lack of regulation ¶ may permit abuses to go unchecked. In addition, mirroring the critique of legalisation ¶ discussed above, some have argued that the hands-off ethos of decriminalisation ¶ avoids difficult ideological questions about the status of prostitution as a form of ¶ condoned labour only at the cost of selective blindness to the harms that are inherent ¶ in the sale of sex
1,380
<h4>2. Ground- Regulatory flexibility allows the aff to functionally decrim which is key neg<strong> ground</h4><p>Munro and Giusta ‘8</p><p></strong>[Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta, The Regulation of Prostitution: ¶ Contemporary Contexts and Comparative ¶ Perspectives, in Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution. ETB]</p><p>Some of these shortcomings might, of course, be usefully remedied by a ¶ decriminalisation approach. Indeed, the regulation/legalisation model was explicitly ¶ rejected by New Zealand on the basis that a licensing regime would need extensive ¶ administrative and enforcement resources, and risked the creation of a two-tier ¶ industry, in which the legal side of the market would come under the control of ¶ big business and the illegal side would be populated by sex workers who are most ¶ vulnerable to exploitation. While offering the benefits associated with the reduction ¶ of sex work stigma and the greater visibility of sex workers (which is thought to ¶ render them less vulnerable to abuse), it has been argued that <u><strong><mark>decrim</mark>inalisation</u></strong> may ¶ <u><strong><mark>offer the added advantage</u></strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong> </mark>limiting state intrusion into the private lives of sex ¶ workers, and <u><strong>permitting</u></strong> them <u><strong>greater <mark>flexibility</u></strong> <u><strong>in</u></strong> </mark>their <u><strong><mark>working practices</u></strong></mark>. As critics ¶ point out, however, <u><strong><mark>the downside </mark>of this flexibility <mark>remains that a lack of regulation </mark>¶ may <mark>permit abuses to go unchecked</u></strong></mark>. In addition, mirroring the critique of legalisation ¶ discussed above, some have argued that the hands-off ethos of decriminalisation ¶ avoids difficult ideological questions about the status of prostitution as a form of ¶ condoned labour only at the cost of selective blindness to the harms that are inherent ¶ in the sale of sex</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,731
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,187
OR
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>OR </h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Regulations Fail
429,732
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,188
3. Aff conditionality It’s key to best policy comparison and prevents aff conditionality and that’s a voter because it makes it impossible to be neg
Munro and Giusta ‘8
Munro and Giusta ‘8 [Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta, The Regulation of Prostitution: ¶ Contemporary Contexts and Comparative ¶ Perspectives, in Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution. ETB]
the economic model illustrate the choice of policy regimes by policy-makers To choose between policy options an evaluation of ¶ the costs and benefits in welfare terms of different regulatory regimes would have ¶ to be conducted. illustrates the conditions , a ¶ concern about voting or re-election) under which policy-makers may fail to adopt them.
the economic model illustrate the choice of policy regimes by policy-makers To choose between policy options an evaluation of ¶ the costs and benefits in welfare terms of different regulatory regimes would have ¶ to be conducted.
Della Giusta introduces an economic approach to studying prostitution, critically ¶ assessing the current limitations of economists’ contributions to this important ¶ policy debate and illustrating the relative merits of economic modelling for policy ¶ design. Central to her approach is the recognition of the role of social stigma in ¶ determining the configuration of the exchange of paid sex, and the way in which ¶ this is, in turn, both understood and influenced by policy. The discussion begins ¶ with an illustration of the main ideas underpinning the economic model, which is ¶ then enlarged to illustrate the choice of policy regimes by policy-makers. To choose between policy options – if we assume a rational action approach – an evaluation of ¶ the costs and benefits in welfare terms of different regulatory regimes would have ¶ to be conducted. In the absence of such calculations, Della Giusta uses stylised facts ¶ from the sex trade to advocate liberal policies that maximise public welfare by lifting ¶ the stigma associated with the sector, and illustrates the conditions (for example, a ¶ concern about voting or re-election) under which policy-makers may nonetheless ¶ fail to adopt them.
1,210
<h4>3. Aff conditionality It’s key to best policy comparison and prevents aff conditionality and that’s a voter because it makes it impossible to be <strong>neg</h4><p>Munro and Giusta ‘8</p><p></strong>[Vanessa E. Munro and Marina Della Giusta<u><strong>, The Regulation of Prostitution: ¶ Contemporary Contexts and Comparative ¶ Perspectives, in Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the Regulation of Prostitution. ETB]</p><p></u></strong>Della Giusta introduces an economic approach to studying prostitution, critically ¶ assessing the current limitations of economists’ contributions to this important ¶ policy debate and illustrating the relative merits of economic modelling for policy ¶ design. Central to her approach is the recognition of the role of social stigma in ¶ determining the configuration of the exchange of paid sex, and the way in which ¶ this is, in turn, both understood and influenced by policy. The discussion begins ¶ with an illustration of the main ideas underpinning <u><strong><mark>the economic model</u></strong></mark>, which is ¶ then enlarged to <u><strong><mark>illustrate the choice of policy regimes by policy-makers</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>To choose between policy options</u></strong></mark> – if we assume a rational action approach – <u><strong><mark>an evaluation of ¶ the costs and benefits in welfare terms of different regulatory regimes would have ¶ to be conducted.</u></strong></mark> In the absence of such calculations, Della Giusta uses stylised facts ¶ from the sex trade to advocate liberal policies that maximise public welfare by lifting ¶ the stigma associated with the sector, and <u><strong>illustrates the conditions</u></strong> (for example<u><strong>, a ¶ concern about voting or re-election) under which policy-makers may</u></strong> nonetheless ¶ <u><strong>fail to adopt them. </p></u></strong>
1NC
null
1NC
429,733
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,189
Sandman 03
Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”
Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”
Any normal person is going to be more anxious than usual while awaiting a biopsy result, Human emotions tend to match the situation. The same is true of a more widespread threat. fear isn’t just normal in frightening situations; it is functional We won’t get there if terrorism is merely one of many issues people are “concerned” about, along with West Nile Virus and inflation and rap lyrics. Either terrorism is different from most other concerns, or it isn’t. If it is, we need to get used to the idea that people are going to be appropriately frightened, Fear that is paralyzing verges on panic, is obviously not functional. Terror is the goal of terrorism, not the goal of preparedness. But fear is not necessarily terror. This is a conceptual mistake officials routinely make the embedded, preconscious, erroneous assumption that all fear is one short step removed from panic Unduly frightening people is wrong. Duly frightening people is right, the key difference is neither the amount of fear nor the kind of fear, but rather people’s ability to bear the fear. Much is known about how to enhance that ability Give people things to do — action binds anxiety. Give people things to decide — decision-making provides more individual control Encourage appropriate anger Encourage love (and camaraderie Provide candid leadership — we get more frightened when our leaders seem to be misleading us. Show your own fear and show you can bear it treat other people’s fear as legitimate. Fear is likeliest to escalate into terror or panic (or to flip into denial) when it is treated as shameful and wrong Leaders who are contemptuous of people’s fear have a much tougher time explaining the reasons why they needn’t be afraid.
Any normal person is going to be anxious while awaiting a biopsy result, Human emotions tend to match the situation. The same is true of a widespread threa fear is functional terrorism is different people are going to be appropriately frightened Fear that verges on panic, is not functional fear is not terror. This is a mistake officials make the embedded assumption that all fear is one step removed from panic Duly frightening people is right the difference is people’s ability to bear the fear Give people things to do to decide Encourage appropriate anger Provide candid leadership treat other people’s fear as legitimate. Fear is likeliest to escalate into panic or denial when it is treated as wrong
Let’s start with the obvious. Any normal person is going to be more anxious than usual while awaiting a biopsy result, a turbulent airplane landing, or a l8ayoff notice. Human emotions tend to match the situation. The same is true of a more widespread threat. Of course the public at large will be commensurately alarmed when told that a terrorism attack, an epidemic, or a hurricane may be approaching. Moreover, fear isn’t just normal in frightening situations; it is functional. Both the human body and the body politic ultimately benefit from the changes (physiological and sociological ... and inevitably emotional) that accompany preparedness for crisis. Take terrorism as a case in point. Nearly everyone agrees that we need people to be vigilant for indications of terrorist attacks; to prepare themselves and their families to cope with possible attacks; to be supportive of preparedness expenses and tolerant of preparedness inconveniences. And nearly everyone agrees that we need all this to ramp up in an actual attack, so that people put other agendas on hold, follow instructions willingly, and help care for their neighbors. The question is what emotional state, what state of mind, is conducive to this sort of public readiness. We believe the right answer is fear. We won’t get there if terrorism is merely one of many issues people are “concerned” about, along with West Nile Virus and inflation and rap lyrics. Either terrorism is different from most other concerns, or it isn’t. If it is, we need to get used to the idea that people are going to be appropriately frightened, and we need to help them get used to it too. Not all fear is functional. Fear that is paralyzing, fear that verges on panic, is obviously not functional. Terror is the goal of terrorism, not the goal of preparedness. But fear is not necessarily terror. This is a conceptual mistake officials routinely make, a mistake they seem terribly attracted to — the embedded, preconscious, erroneous assumption that all fear is one short step removed from panic. Some fear is. Most fear is not. When officials express their reluctance about “unduly frightening people,” they are literally right. The key word here is “unduly.” Unduly frightening people is wrong. Duly frightening people is right, and important. The problem is telling the two apart. The distinction is partly a matter of degree — “enough” fear versus “excessive” fear. Perhaps in addition there are kinds of fear like the kinds of cholesterol — “good” fear versus “bad” fear. But we suspect the key difference is neither the amount of fear nor the kind of fear, but rather people’s ability to bear the fear. Much is known about how to enhance that ability. Among the things that help: Give people things to do — action binds anxiety. Give people things to decide — decision-making provides more individual control, which makes fear more tolerable. Encourage appropriate anger — the desire to get even often trumps the desire to cower. Encourage love (and camaraderie) — soldiers, for example, fight for their friends and for their country. Provide candid leadership — we get more frightened when our leaders seem to be misleading us. Show your own fear and show you can bear it — apparently fearless leaders are little help to a fearful public. Most importantly, treat other people’s fear as legitimate. Fear is likeliest to escalate into terror or panic (or to flip into denial) when it is treated as shameful and wrong. “It’s natural to be afraid, I’m afraid too” is a much more empathic response to public fear than “there’s nothing to be afraid of.” If we want people to bear their fear, we must assure them that their fear is appropriate. Even fear that is statistically inappropriate can and should be legitimized as normal, understandable, and widespread. Leaders who are contemptuous of people’s fear have a much tougher time explaining the reasons why they needn’t be afraid.
3,944
<h4>Sandman 03</h4><p><u><strong>Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”</p><p></u></strong>Let’s start with the obvious. <u><strong><mark>Any normal person is going to be</mark> more <mark>anxious</mark> than usual <mark>while awaiting a biopsy result,</u></strong></mark> a turbulent airplane landing, or a l8ayoff notice. <u><strong><mark>Human emotions tend to match the situation.</u></strong> <u><strong>The same is true of a</mark> more <mark>widespread threa</mark>t. </u></strong>Of course the public at large will be commensurately alarmed when told that a terrorism attack, an epidemic, or a hurricane may be approaching. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>fear</mark> isn’t just normal in frightening situations; it <mark>is functional</u></strong></mark>. Both the human body and the body politic ultimately benefit from the changes (physiological and sociological ... and inevitably emotional) that accompany preparedness for crisis. Take terrorism as a case in point. Nearly everyone agrees that we need people to be vigilant for indications of terrorist attacks; to prepare themselves and their families to cope with possible attacks; to be supportive of preparedness expenses and tolerant of preparedness inconveniences. And nearly everyone agrees that we need all this to ramp up in an actual attack, so that people put other agendas on hold, follow instructions willingly, and help care for their neighbors. The question is what emotional state, what state of mind, is conducive to this sort of public readiness. We believe the right answer is fear. <u><strong>We won’t get there if terrorism is merely one of many issues people are “concerned” about, along with West Nile Virus and inflation and rap lyrics. Either <mark>terrorism is different</mark> from most other concerns, or it isn’t. If it is, we need to get used to the idea that <mark>people are going to be appropriately frightened</mark>,</u></strong> and we need to help them get used to it too. Not all fear is functional. <u><strong><mark>Fear that </mark>is paralyzing</u></strong>, fear that <u><strong><mark>verges on panic, is</mark> obviously <mark>not functional</mark>. Terror is the goal of terrorism, not the goal of preparedness. But <mark>fear is not</mark> necessarily <mark>terror. This is a</mark> conceptual <mark>mistake officials</mark> routinely <mark>make</u></strong></mark>, a mistake they seem terribly attracted to — <u><strong><mark>the embedded</mark>, preconscious, erroneous <mark>assumption that all fear is one</mark> short <mark>step removed from panic</u></strong></mark>. Some fear is. Most fear is not. When officials express their reluctance about “unduly frightening people,” they are literally right. The key word here is “unduly.” <u><strong>Unduly frightening people is wrong. <mark>Duly frightening people is right</mark>,</u></strong> and important. The problem is telling the two apart. The distinction is partly a matter of degree — “enough” fear versus “excessive” fear. Perhaps in addition there are kinds of fear like the kinds of cholesterol — “good” fear versus “bad” fear. But we suspect <u><strong><mark>the</mark> key <mark>difference</mark> <mark>is</mark> neither the amount of fear nor the kind of fear, but rather <mark>people’s ability to bear the fear</mark>. Much is known about how to enhance that ability</u></strong>. Among the things that help: <u><strong><mark>Give people things to do</mark> — action binds anxiety. Give people things <mark>to decide</mark> — decision-making provides more individual control</u></strong>, which makes fear more tolerable. <u><strong><mark>Encourage appropriate anger</u></strong></mark> — the desire to get even often trumps the desire to cower. <u><strong>Encourage love (and camaraderie</u></strong>) — soldiers, for example, fight for their friends and for their country. <u><strong><mark>Provide candid leadership</mark> — we get more frightened when our leaders seem to be misleading us. Show your own fear and show you can bear it </u></strong>— apparently fearless leaders are little help to a fearful public. Most importantly, <u><strong><mark>treat other people’s fear as legitimate. Fear is likeliest to escalate into</mark> terror or <mark>panic</mark> (<mark>or</mark> to flip into <mark>denial</mark>) <mark>when it is treated as</mark> shameful and <mark>wrong</u></strong></mark>. “It’s natural to be afraid, I’m afraid too” is a much more empathic response to public fear than “there’s nothing to be afraid of.” If we want people to bear their fear, we must assure them that their fear is appropriate. Even fear that is statistically inappropriate can and should be legitimized as normal, understandable, and widespread. <u><strong>Leaders who are contemptuous of people’s fear have a much tougher time explaining the reasons why they needn’t be afraid. </p></u></strong>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
381,485
6
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,190
They can’t and they probably can’t a nuclear detonation to go off if the existence of OG regulations stop their funding
Thackston 14
Thackston 14, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling Using tech undetectable to operators and regulators, House Commerce Committee witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The demonstration showed tech and techniques terror and crime use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the U S enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like 9/11 The threat is real gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
Remote gambling Using tech undetectable to regulators House Commerce Committee witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them to play poker online. The demo showed tech terror and crime use to operate untraceable laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from spread of poker online An established al-Qaida poker network could extract enough untraceable money in six days to fund 9/11 gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling because the website operator never has complete control. Using technology undetectable to website operators and their regulators, it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, House Energy and Commerce Committee staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The Harper demonstration showed the technology and techniques that terror and crime organizations could use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online. One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the United States enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The threat is real. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that gambling regulations in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
2,997
<h4>They can’t and they probably can’t a nuclear detonation to go off if the existence of OG regulations stop their funding </h4><p><strong>Thackston 14</strong>, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols<u> is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317</p><p><mark>Remote gambling</mark> is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling</u> because the website operator never has complete control. <u><mark>Using tech</u></mark>nology <u><mark>undetectable to</u></mark> website <u>operators and</u> their <u><mark>regulators</mark>,</u> it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, <u><mark>House</u></mark> Energy and <u><mark>Commerce Committee</u></mark> staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., <u><mark>witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them</mark> as alias machines <mark>to play poker online. The</u></mark> Harper <u><mark>demo</mark>nstration <mark>showed</u></mark> the <u><mark>tech</u></mark>nology <u>and techniques</u> that <u><mark>terror and crime</u></mark> organizations could <u><mark>use to operate untraceable</mark> money <mark>laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from</mark> the <mark>spread of poker online</u></mark>. One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. <u>A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million </u>as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. <u><mark>An established al-Qaida poker network could extract</mark> from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>enough untraceable money in six days to fund</mark> an operation like </u>the <u><mark>9/11</mark> </u>attack on the World Trade Center. <u>The threat is real</u>. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that <u><mark>gambling regulations</mark> </u>in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey <u><mark>are no match for determined terrorists and criminals</u>,</mark> we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved <u><mark>it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.</p></u></mark>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Regulations Fail
429,685
23
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,191
4. Limits -- they affirm THE PROSTITUTE - NOT PROSTITUTION which is what the resolution mandates -- they do not defend the institution of prostitution, rather an INDIVIDUAL RELATIONSHIP to prostitution which is infinitely regressive because everybody has a different relationship to any of the topic areas
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>4. Limits -- they affirm THE PROSTITUTE - NOT PROSTITUTION which is what the resolution mandates -- they do not defend the institution of prostitution, rather an INDIVIDUAL RELATIONSHIP to prostitution which is infinitely regressive because everybody has a different relationship to any of the topic areas </h4>
1NC
null
1NC
429,734
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,192
Fear of extinction is a legitimate and productive response to the modern condition---working through it by validating our representations is the only way to create an authentic relationship to the world and death
Macy 2K
Macy 2K Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243
We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As fear for the world is expressed and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation they break through into a larger sense of identity the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self
We are confronted by wars, nuclear proliferation, and the destruction of our biosphere I have worked with tens of thousands of people helping them confront and explore what is happening to their world. The purpose is to overcome numbing and powerlessness As fear for the world is expressed and validated as a life-preserving response people break through their futility and isolation into a larger sense of identity their awareness of the suffering of our world collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self fear for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare the distress we feel serves as a trigger to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life the crisis that threatens our planet derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self
The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. ¶ Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self. ¶ It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body. ¶ This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.
2,793
<h4>Fear of extinction is a <u>legitimate</u> and <u>productive</u> response to the modern condition---<u>working through it</u> by <u>validating our representations</u> is the only way to create an authentic relationship to the world and death </h4><p><strong>Macy 2K</strong> </p><p>Joanna Macy, adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies, 2000, Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader, p. 243</p><p>The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. <u><strong><mark>We are confronted by</mark> social breakdown, <mark>wars, nuclear proliferation, and the</mark> progressive <mark>destruction of our biosphere</u></strong></mark>. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. ¶ Over the past twelve years <u><strong>my colleagues and <mark>I have worked with tens of thousands of people</u></strong></mark> in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, <u><strong><mark>helping them confront and explore what</mark> they know and feel about what <mark>is happening to their world. The purpose</mark> of this work</u></strong>, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” <u><strong><mark>is to overcome</mark> the <mark>numbing and powerlessness</mark> that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. <mark>As</u></strong></mark> their grief and <u><strong><mark>fear for the world is</u></strong></mark> allowed to be <u><strong><mark>expressed</u></strong></mark> without apology or argument <u><strong><mark>and validated as a</mark> wholesome, <mark>life-preserving response</mark>, <mark>people break through their</mark> avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of <mark>futility and isolation</u></strong></mark>. Generally what <u><strong>they break through <mark>into</u></strong></mark> is <u><strong><mark>a larger sense of identity</u></strong></mark>. It is as if <u><strong>the pressure of <mark>their </mark>acknowledged <mark>awareness of the suffering of our world</mark> stretches or <mark>collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self</u></strong></mark>. ¶ It becomes clear, for example, that the <u><strong>grief and <mark>fear</mark> experienced <mark>for</mark> <mark>our world and our common future</mark> <mark>are categorically different</mark> <mark>from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare</u></strong></mark>. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” <u><strong>It is <mark>the distress we feel </mark>on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it <mark>serves as a trigger</mark> or getaway <mark>to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life</mark> in which we are as intricately connected</u></strong> as cells in a larger body. ¶ This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For <u><strong><mark>the crisis that threatens our planet</mark>, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, <mark>derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self</u></strong></mark>. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings. </p>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #3 -- FoD Good
99,000
111
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,193
Aff wouldn’t regulate unlicensed sites
Stewart 11
Stewart 11 “Online Gambling Five Years After UIGEA” David O. Stewart ( Ropes & Gray, LLP, His experience in complex litigation includes appellate and Supreme Court litigation, antitrust and commercial disputes, white-collar criminal defense work, health care law, gaming law and a variety of challenges to government regulation and enforcement) AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION WHITE PAPER. 2011. http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/final_online_gambling_white_paper_5-18-11.pdf //CChappell
a nation cannot build a successful online gambling indury unless it effectively excludes unlicensed operators unlicensed operators are able to attract US residents to their websites, those residents will not gain the protection of the regulatory structures U.S. law should clearly prohibit those forms of Internet gambling.
a nation cannot build a successful online gambling indury unless it effectively excludes unlicensed operators unlicensed operators are able to attract US residents to their websites, those residents will not gain the protection of the regulatory structures U.S. law should clearly prohibit those forms of Internet gambling
Experience over the last five years also has taught that a nation cannot build a successful online gambling indury unless it effectively excludes unlicensed operators. To the extent that unlicensed operators are able to attract US residents to their websites, those residents will not gain the protection of the regulatory structures we support, nor will the nation gain the jobs and government revenues that are at stake here. Accordingly. U.S. law should clearly prohibit those forms of Internet gambling.
507
<h4>Aff wouldn’t regulate unlicensed sites </h4><p><strong>Stewart 11 </strong>“Online Gambling Five Years After UIGEA” David O. Stewart ( Ropes & Gray, LLP, His experience in complex litigation includes appellate and Supreme Court litigation, antitrust and commercial disputes, white-collar criminal defense work, health care law, gaming law and a variety of challenges to government regulation and enforcement) AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION WHITE PAPER. 2011. http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/final_online_gambling_white_paper_5-18-11.pdf //CChappell<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>Experience over the last five years also has taught that <u><strong><mark>a nation cannot build a successful online gambling indury unless it effectively excludes unlicensed operators</u></strong></mark>. To the extent that <u><strong><mark>unlicensed operators are able to attract US</mark> <mark>residents to their websites, those residents will not gain the protection of the regulatory structures</u></strong></mark> we support, nor will the nation gain the jobs and government revenues that are at stake here. Accordingly. <u><strong><mark>U.S. law should clearly prohibit those forms of Internet gambling</mark>. </p></u></strong>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC Regulations Fail
429,735
2
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,194
If the sovereign can’t control the dying, it MUST control the living
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>If the sovereign can’t control the dying, it MUST control the living </h4>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #1 -- Suicide =/= Solve
429,736
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,195
Status quo solves internet laundering - Disraeli says that money can be identified and pinpointed in the status quo --- no camouflage is possible
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Status quo solves internet laundering - Disraeli says that money can be identified and pinpointed in the status quo --- no camouflage is possible </h4>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Laundering
429,737
1
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,196
D. Turns the aff - Students analyzing regulatory issues surrounding prostitution are key to solve, Now is an important time and spills over to solving other problems.
Vanderstok ‘10
Vanderstok ‘10 (Sammi Vanderstok “$ex: The Effectiveness of the Legalization of Prostitution in the Netherlands” 3/29/2010 http://nchchonors.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Vanderstok-Sammi-Final-Paper.pdf, TSW)
When studying about the social and political issues going on in the present day, one might feel not only overwhelmed by the amount of issues going on in our world, but by the even larger amounts of opinions and stances people take about those issues. As a student the question arises how to figure out what is the best or most effective solution and how to discern the right ideas from the wrong One might not feel qualified to make such a statement, but the upcoming generation of citizens these problems will soon come into our actual lives. in our present time, the question of prostitution has continued to be approached from very different ends. In America, prostitution has been illegal since its inception, albeit with a few exceptions. America have chosen to criminalize prostitution with the hope of creating both a better protected and regulated industry and a satisfied society. Both sides of the legalization of prostitution issue hope to eradicate human trafficking and other forms of sexual slavery remove sexual abuse and coercion stop the prostitution of minors, give prostitutes more autonomy and end the doorway prostitution has provided for organized crime One side states that that legalizing prostitution will increase the amount of violence yet the opposing side says that legalizing prostitution increases safety Both sides are hoping for the same outcome through completely different means. So the question arises, how can one know who is choosing the right plan of action? Prostitution is a global issue, but each country is on a very different level of dealing with it. Although there is some powerful rationale behind the idea of legalizing prostitution as a way to better protect the prostitutes and the public, there has been no actual substantial evidence that could back-up these opinions. there are numerous pieces of evidence that state the exact opposite. But this then should make one think, how can a government balance strong public opinion for legalized prostitution with a currently ineffective practice? as students this also brings up an important thought to consider As students who will soon be working in the various fields of society, one should consider this issue not an isolated problem but a lesson in understanding the complexities of legal regulation and control. As shown through the Netherlands one should notice the importance of proper evidence and statistical support over public opinion and a good argument when making regulatory decisions. So if in the future you find yourself having to deal with a legalization issue, make sure to take the time to thoroughly investigate the issue before coming to one’s conclusion.
When studying issues one might feel overwhelmed by the large amounts of opinions and stances people take about those issues As a student, the question arises how to figure out what is the best or most effective solution, and how to discern the right ideas from the wrong One might not feel qualified to make such a statement, but these problems will soon come into our lives prostitution has continued to be approached from very different ends Both sides of the legalization of prostitution issue hope to eradicate human trafficking and other forms of sexual slavery remove abuse stop the prostitution of minors and end organized crime Both sides are hoping for the same outcome through completely different means. So the question arises, how can one know who is choosing the right plan of action Prostitution is a global issue, but each country is on a very different level of dealing with it there is powerful rationale behind the idea of legalizing there has been no actual substantial evidence that could back-up these opinions there are numerous pieces of evidence that state the exact opposite As students who will soon be working in the various fields of society, one should consider this issue not an isolated problem but a lesson in understanding the complexities of legal regulation and control As shown through the Netherlands one should notice the importance of proper evidence and statistical support over a good argument when making regulatory decisions So if in the future you find yourself having to deal with a legalization issue, make sure to take the time to thoroughly investigate the issue before coming to one’s conclusion.
When studying about the social and political issues going on in the present day, one might feel not only overwhelmed by the amount of issues going on in our world, but by the even larger amounts of opinions and stances people take about those issues. There seems to be multiple perspectives and at least several purposed solutions to those multiple issues. As a student, the question arises how to figure out what is the best or most effective solution, and how to discern the right ideas from the wrong or even if such a pronouncement can be made. One might not feel qualified to make such a statement, but as the upcoming generation of citizens and leaders, these problems will soon come out of the textbook and into our actual lives. This in mind, I would like to bring up an issue that has been widely disputed and still seems to have no consensus in sight: the legality of prostitution. The idea of selling sexual services for money or other benefits has been around for a very, very long time and different eras and different areas have had very different methods of handling prostitution, ranging from exaltation and praise to death. Even in our present time, the question of handling prostitution has continued to be approached from very different ends. In America, prostitution has been illegal since its inception, albeit with a few exceptions. Other countries like America have also chosen to criminalize prostitution with the hope of creating both a better protected and regulated industry and a satisfied society. However, there are also other countries that have decided to do the exact opposite in order to achieve the same objectives. To more clearly explain the issue, the legalization of prostitution refers to the decriminalization of adult prostitution between two consenting parties. The goal of legalizing prostitution is to separate harmful, violent, and other illegal activities that occur in prostitution from the “normal” forms of prostitution, as stated above. Both sides of the legalization of prostitution issue hope to eradicate human trafficking and other forms of sexual slavery, remove sexual abuse and coercion, stop the prostitution of minors, give prostitutes more autonomy from pimps and brothel-owners, and end the doorway prostitution has provided for organized crime and other illegal activities. One side states that that legalizing prostitution will increase the amount of violence and organized crime for all parties directly or indirectly affected by it, yet the opposing side says that legalizing prostitution increases the safety of the public and of the prostitutes. Both sides are hoping for the same outcome through completely different means. So the question arises, how can one know who is choosing the right plan of action? The aim of this paper is to provide some hard facts and expert opinion about one nation that did choose to legalize prostitution ten years ago: The Netherlands. By choosing to focus on one nation I hope to give a better in-depth understanding of how one well-developed country is addressing this issue. Prostitution is a global issue, but each country is on a very different level of dealing with it. Some nations such as Thailand and other third world countries have much more extreme levels of prostitution and crime-related issues such as human trafficking and organized crime. This paper will specifically address how the Netherlands legalized prostitution in order to provide a consistent model to learn from instead of citing various nations that have completely different policies and aims. I would like to begin with noting how the Netherlands came to the decision to legalize prostitution. The Dutch government took a poll of how the Dutch people viewed the legalization of prostitution and 73% of the population was in favor of legalizing prostitution (Brants 630). The Netherlands has had a long history of being tolerant and accepting of people’s individual choices as long as it didn’t infringe on anyone else’s rights. As seen from the overwhelming majority of Dutch citizens that favored the legalization of prostitution, the people felt that prostitution was socially acceptable and right for their country. It’s also important to note that the Dutch government was under public pressure to legalize prostitution due to the almost uniform stance that the people of the Netherlands held. Keeping this in mind, I would like to move into how effective the Netherlands have been in achieving their objectives through the legalization of prostitution. In October of 2000, the Netherlands officially legalized prostitution and at that time the Ministry of Justice sent out a press release as to why the nation had voted to legalize prostitution and it is paraphrased as follows: 1. Better control and regulate the sex industry 2. Better combat involuntary prostitution, underage prostitution, and human trafficking of illegal aliens for the sex industry 3. Improve the position of prostitutes, specifically in regards to health, well-being, financial independence, and public opinion (Prostitution 1). The first major reason why the Netherlands decided to legalize prostition was that they were trying to better control and regulate the sex industry. The government hoped to regulate the amount of prostitutes and prostitution businesses in the nation, create a certain level of health code, and better combat the illegal activities that tend to be tied in with prostitution such as firearm smuggling and drug trafficking (Cautiously 1). I will address the issue of illegal activities later, but will first begin with the regulations and liscensing as a way to better control the prostitution field. Since its legalization in October of 2000, The Netherlands was able to set up certain regulations and health code standards for brothels, and they became better aware of how many prostitutes the nation had legally (Cautiously 1). But one unforseen consequence was that a large amount of prostitutes were still not affected by the new developments. Since the legalization of prostitution occurred, a huge underworld of prostitutes who could not become legalized has developed (Hesen 1). Some prostitutes voluntarily choose to not become legalized since they valued their anonymity more than the benefits. But of more concern are the even greater amounts of prostitutes who cannot apply to become legal prostitutes since they are illegal aliens and most often trafficked to the Netherlands. They have dropped even father off the radar and away from any form of support or help. Although the prostitute unions and spokespeople have in large supported the legalization of prostitution, many of them have now began to voice some doubts. One of the main spokegroups in the Netherlands called De Rode Draad issued a statement voicing their concern that the legalization had further alienated a large percentage of prostitutes who could not become legally recognized (Hesen 1). They say that the decriminalization of prostitution has made it is harder to reach out to give help or protection to illegal prostitutes. There are well over 25,000 known prostitutes in the Netherlands, and it is believed that the ratio of legalized prostitutes to illegal prostitutes is roughly 1:1 (Kilvington 86). The Netherlands has in effect set up a two-tier system with a legal and illegal sector instead of eliminating the illegal sector. There are literally tens of thousands of prostitutes who have been further removed from accessing the legal rights offered by the country, and this has subjected them to even graver abuses (Kilvington 86). One might logically think that now at least some prostitutes are better protected instead of all of them being compromised. But in the Netherlands the illegal prostitutes had been previously tolerated and had more contact with health officials (Brants 630). Also, one the largest components in the exploitation of prostitutes are the pimps and brothel-owners that “manage” them. “People often don't realize that decriminalization, for example, means decriminalization of the whole sex industry, not just the women. And they haven't thought through the consequences of legalizing pimps as legitimate sex entrepreneurs or third party businessmen” (Raymond “10 Reasons” 1). With the legalization occuring, there has been a transfer of power from the prostitute to the pimps and brothel-owners who can more openly conduct their trade. Illegal prostitutes are more under the power of the pimps and with such a high amount of illegal prostitutes now in the nation, this has in effect created less control of the prostitution industry by the government. Going onto the second major reason why the Netherlands decided to legalize prostitution, the Netherlands wanted to combat involuntary prostituion, underage prostitution, and human trafficking within their country. They hoped that by creating a legal outlet for the more acceptable forms of prostitution, they could better separate the acceptable from the exploitative and illegal forms of prostitution. But in looking at the results the Netherlands achieved since its legalization, their has actually been an increase in the amount of illegal activities connected with prostitution. One of Amsterdam’s counsillors, and former prostitute, Karina Schaapman summed it up very well in a statement to the press: There are people who are really proud of the red light district as a tourist attraction. It's supposed to be such a wonderful, cheery place that shows just what a free city we are. But I think it's a cesspit. There's a lot of serious criminality. There's a lot of exploitation of women, and a lot of social distress. That's nothing to be proud of (Hesen 1). Since the legalization of prostitution occurred, the percentage of native Dutch citizens as prostitutes went to only 20% (Raymond “10 Reasons” 1). Today almost every prostitute in the Netherlands are not nationals and tend to come from third-world countries (Dralen 76). Although not every non-native prostitute is illegal, there are a fair amount of illegal prostitutes within the non-native sector. The Netherlands has been identified as one the worlds hubs for human trafficking and specifically sex trafficking of women and children. The country has developed a “flourishing black market, with exploited workers who lack rights, and wealthy managers whose revenue is invisible to the state” (Kilvington 89). The legalization of prostitution has opened the doors for organized crime and the mafia to have a place where they can conduct their business while being less harassed by the police and other enforcement agencies. The mayor of Amsterdam realized this himself, and since 2007 he and the city of Amsterdam have been shutting down a large part of the redlight district for this very reason. The mayor, Job Cohen, was quoted by the New York Times saying that “we’ve realized this is no longer about small-scale entrepreneurs, but that big crime organizations are involved here in trafficking women, drugs, killings, and other criminal activities” (Simons 2). It is important to note that when things are legalized by the government that the barrier of entry into an activity is lowered not only to the people that you would want to participate in it, but to every person who wants to participate. Amsterdam has historically has a low crime rate but since the legalization of prostitution occurred there has been a spike in organized crime and assassinations. The third main reason why the Netherlands government decided to legalize prostitution was their desire to improve the position of prostitutes, specifically in regards to health, finances, and public opinion. The groups supporting prostitution in the Netherlands wanted to empower the prostitutes by providing opportunities for the prostitute to not have to be tied to a pimp or brothel- owner in order for them to conduct business. The legalization was supposed to give them the opportunity to receive financial advice and support, better access to health clinics and screenings, and an ability to report to the police if they were assaulted or misused in some way. However, one thing that the legalization of prostitution cannot change is that the quality of life for a prostitute almost immediately deteriorates once they enter the sex business. One of the most important, and most overlooked, things to consider when thinking about the repercussions of the legalization of prostitution is that prostitution is an inherently violent trade regardless of how regulated it is. There are high amounts of abuse, non-consensual actions committed against the prostitute, and psychological exploitation that a prostitute is subjected to. One thing that is not commonly mentioned when discussing legalizing prostitution is that prostitutes have a much shorter life span, mostly due to a relatively high murder rate and a reduced quality of life (Farley 1097). On the whole, prostitutes tend to go through pre-mature aging, develop emotional detachment, paranoia, extreme nervousness, traumatic brain injury (TBI), post-traumatic stress disorder (PT SD), cervical cancer, chronic hepatitis, an overall increase in STD’s and HIV /AIDS, and other symptoms that are most commonly found in battered women and torture victims (Farley 1104). In a survey of prostitution in the Netherlands, it was recorded that 60% of prostitutes had suffered physical assaults, 70% had experienced verbal threats of physical assault, 40% had experienced sexual violence, and 40% has been forced into prostitution or sexual abuse by acquaintances (Farley 1095). In the De Rode Draad’s study on the progress and development of prostitution in the Netherlands, they concluded that the well being of the prostitutes was lower in all measured aspects than it was in 2001, and the use of sedatives, and other drugs such as heroin, had increased (Dralen 87). Some members of the Parliament afier observing a few years of the efiects of legalization in their country also released a statement saying that legalization had actually reinforced the oppression of women (Raymond “Prostitution on Demand” 1098). Legalizing such a trade is the same as legalizing torture so that if a victim survives they can go to the hospital to be treated. It is in efi'ect decriminalizing violence against women by saying it’s okay because now some of them may have better access to health care in order to treat the wounds that were legally inflicted upon fliem. So are there other means of achieving an improved society and better-protected citizens besides legalizing prostitution? The prostitution spokes group, De Rode Draad, supporters of legalization, made the clear statement that conceded that it was “not so much the legalization, but the stricter enforcement for punishable forms of prostitution, which has had the most effect” (Dralen 84). If truly seeking for ways to better regulate the sex industry, reduce the amount of involuntary, underage, and human trafficking, and improve the position of prostitutes physically, fiscally, and publicly, one could probably be better ofi' by creating stricter forms of enforcement towards the areas most heinous in the sex industry. Governments could also take the steps to create stronger programs that support women knowing how to leave prostitution if they want. I would also like to mention in parting how one other country has tried to handle the issue of prostitution in their nation. Although this paper has almost entirely focused on the nation of the Netherlands, one of its neighboring countries has approached the issue of prostitution from a very unique perspective. In 1999 Sweden passed legislation that criminalizes the buying of sexual services. The law they enacted does not punish prostitutes, but it instead targets the clients as a way to reduce violence against women, and better control prostitution and the illegal activities that go along with it. Within one year there were positive reports that their has been an increased amount of collaboration and communication between the police and social services, which had resulted in more sensitive treatment of sex workers, who in return are now more willing to report crimes to the police. There had also been a decline in recruitment, particularly of young prostitutes, into the industry. There had also been a tenfold decrease in the amount of women visibly working on the streets (Kilvington 85). This policy has not eradicated prostitution entirely, but one can say that Sweden has at least better regulated its sex industry, has better protected its prostitutes, and has created better access to social services and support for its prostitutes. So this takes us back to the initial issue of whether the legalization or criminalization of prostitution is more effective in creating a safe and responsible prostitution sector. Although there is some powerful rationale behind the idea of legalizing prostitution as a way to better protect the prostitutes and the public, there has been no actual substantial evidence that I could find to back-up these opinions. In fact, there are numerous pieces of evidence that state the exact opposite. But this then should make one think, how can a government balance strong public opinion for legalized prostitution with a currently ineffective practice? In this case, the public will have to wait and see what the Netherlands chooses to do. But as students this also brings up an important thought to consider. As students who will soon be working in the various fields of society, one should consider this issue not an isolated problem but a lesson in understanding the complexities of legal regulation and control. As shown here through the Netherlands, one should notice the importance of proper evidence and statistical support over public opinion and a good argument when making regulatory decisions. So if in the future you find yourself having to deal with a legalization issue, for example legalizing or criminalizing marijuana, make sure to take the time to thoroughly investigate the issue before coming to one’s conclusion.
18,121
<h4>D. Turns the aff - Students analyzing regulatory issues surrounding prostitution are key to solve, Now<strong> is an important time and spills over to solving other problems.</h4><p>Vanderstok ‘10</p><p></strong>(Sammi Vanderstok “$ex: The Effectiveness of the Legalization of Prostitution in the Netherlands” 3/29/2010 http://nchchonors.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Vanderstok-Sammi-Final-Paper.pdf<u><strong>, TSW)</p><p><mark>When studying</mark> about the social and political <mark>issues</mark> going on in the present day, <mark>one might feel</mark> not only <mark>overwhelmed</mark> by the amount of issues going on in our world, but <mark>by the</mark> even <mark>large</mark>r <mark>amounts of opinions and stances people take about those issues</mark>.</u></strong> There seems to be multiple perspectives and at least several purposed solutions to those multiple issues. <u><strong><mark>As a student</u></strong>, <u><strong>the question arises how to figure out what is the best or most effective solution</u></strong>, <u><strong>and how to discern the right ideas from the wrong</mark> </u></strong>or even if such a pronouncement can be made. <u><strong><mark>One</mark> <mark>might not feel</mark> <mark>qualified to make such a statement, but</u></strong></mark> as <u><strong>the upcoming generation of citizens</u></strong> and leaders, <u><strong><mark>these problems will soon</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>come</u></strong></mark> out of the textbook and <u><strong><mark>into our</mark> actual <mark>lives</mark>.</u></strong> This in mind, I would like to bring up an issue that has been widely disputed and still seems to have no consensus in sight: the legality of prostitution. The idea of selling sexual services for money or other benefits has been around for a very, very long time and different eras and different areas have had very different methods of handling prostitution, ranging from exaltation and praise to death. Even <u><strong>in our present time, the question of</u></strong> handling <u><strong><mark>prostitution</u></strong> <u><strong>has continued to be approached from very different ends</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>In America, prostitution has been illegal since its inception, albeit with a few exceptions.</u></strong> Other countries like <u><strong>America have</u></strong> also <u><strong>chosen to criminalize</u></strong> <u><strong>prostitution with the hope of creating both a better protected and regulated industry and a satisfied society. </u></strong>However, there are also other countries that have decided to do the exact opposite in order to achieve the same objectives. To more clearly explain the issue, the legalization of prostitution refers to the decriminalization of adult prostitution between two consenting parties.<u><strong> </u></strong>The goal of legalizing prostitution is to separate harmful, violent, and other illegal activities that occur in prostitution from the “normal” forms of prostitution, as stated above. <u><strong><mark>Both sides of the legalization of prostitution issue hope to eradicate human trafficking</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and other forms of sexual slavery</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>remove</mark> sexual <mark>abuse</mark> and coercion</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>stop the prostitution of minors</mark>, give prostitutes more autonomy</u></strong> from pimps and brothel-owners, <u><strong><mark>and end</mark> the doorway prostitution has provided for <mark>organized crime</u></strong></mark> and other illegal activities. <u><strong>One side states that that legalizing prostitution will increase the amount of violence</u></strong> and organized crime for all parties directly or indirectly affected by it, <u><strong>yet the opposing side says that legalizing prostitution increases </u></strong>the <u><strong>safety</u></strong> of the public and of the prostitutes. <u><strong><mark>Both sides are hoping for the same outcome through completely different means.</u></strong> <u><strong>So the question arises, how can one know who is choosing the right plan of action</mark>?</u></strong> The aim of this paper is to provide some hard facts and expert opinion about one nation that did choose to legalize prostitution ten years ago: The Netherlands. By choosing to focus on one nation I hope to give a better in-depth understanding of how one well-developed country is addressing this issue. <u><strong><mark>Prostitution is a global issue, but each country is on a very different level of dealing with it</mark>.</u></strong> Some nations such as Thailand and other third world countries have much more extreme levels of prostitution and crime-related issues such as human trafficking and organized crime. This paper will specifically address how the Netherlands legalized prostitution in order to provide a consistent model to learn from instead of citing various nations that have completely different policies and aims. I would like to begin with noting how the Netherlands came to the decision to legalize prostitution. The Dutch government took a poll of how the Dutch people viewed the legalization of prostitution and 73% of the population was in favor of legalizing prostitution (Brants 630). The Netherlands has had a long history of being tolerant and accepting of people’s individual choices as long as it didn’t infringe on anyone else’s rights. As seen from the overwhelming majority of Dutch citizens that favored the legalization of prostitution, the people felt that prostitution was socially acceptable and right for their country. It’s also important to note that the Dutch government was under public pressure to legalize prostitution due to the almost uniform stance that the people of the Netherlands held. Keeping this in mind, I would like to move into how effective the Netherlands have been in achieving their objectives through the legalization of prostitution. In October of 2000, the Netherlands officially legalized prostitution and at that time the Ministry of Justice sent out a press release as to why the nation had voted to legalize prostitution and it is paraphrased as follows: 1. Better control and regulate the sex industry 2. Better combat involuntary prostitution, underage prostitution, and human trafficking of illegal aliens for the sex industry 3. Improve the position of prostitutes, specifically in regards to health, well-being, financial independence, and public opinion (Prostitution 1). The first major reason why the Netherlands decided to legalize prostition was that they were trying to better control and regulate the sex industry. The government hoped to regulate the amount of prostitutes and prostitution businesses in the nation, create a certain level of health code, and better combat the illegal activities that tend to be tied in with prostitution such as firearm smuggling and drug trafficking (Cautiously 1). I will address the issue of illegal activities later, but will first begin with the regulations and liscensing as a way to better control the prostitution field. Since its legalization in October of 2000, The Netherlands was able to set up certain regulations and health code standards for brothels, and they became better aware of how many prostitutes the nation had legally (Cautiously 1). But one unforseen consequence was that a large amount of prostitutes were still not affected by the new developments. Since the legalization of prostitution occurred, a huge underworld of prostitutes who could not become legalized has developed (Hesen 1). Some prostitutes voluntarily choose to not become legalized since they valued their anonymity more than the benefits. But of more concern are the even greater amounts of prostitutes who cannot apply to become legal prostitutes since they are illegal aliens and most often trafficked to the Netherlands. They have dropped even father off the radar and away from any form of support or help. Although the prostitute unions and spokespeople have in large supported the legalization of prostitution, many of them have now began to voice some doubts. One of the main spokegroups in the Netherlands called De Rode Draad issued a statement voicing their concern that the legalization had further alienated a large percentage of prostitutes who could not become legally recognized (Hesen 1). They say that the decriminalization of prostitution has made it is harder to reach out to give help or protection to illegal prostitutes. There are well over 25,000 known prostitutes in the Netherlands, and it is believed that the ratio of legalized prostitutes to illegal prostitutes is roughly 1:1 (Kilvington 86). The Netherlands has in effect set up a two-tier system with a legal and illegal sector instead of eliminating the illegal sector. There are literally tens of thousands of prostitutes who have been further removed from accessing the legal rights offered by the country, and this has subjected them to even graver abuses (Kilvington 86). One might logically think that now at least some prostitutes are better protected instead of all of them being compromised. But in the Netherlands the illegal prostitutes had been previously tolerated and had more contact with health officials (Brants 630). Also, one the largest components in the exploitation of prostitutes are the pimps and brothel-owners that “manage” them. “People often don't realize that decriminalization, for example, means decriminalization of the whole sex industry, not just the women. And they haven't thought through the consequences of legalizing pimps as legitimate sex entrepreneurs or third party businessmen” (Raymond “10 Reasons” 1). With the legalization occuring, there has been a transfer of power from the prostitute to the pimps and brothel-owners who can more openly conduct their trade. Illegal prostitutes are more under the power of the pimps and with such a high amount of illegal prostitutes now in the nation, this has in effect created less control of the prostitution industry by the government. Going onto the second major reason why the Netherlands decided to legalize prostitution, the Netherlands wanted to combat involuntary prostituion, underage prostitution, and human trafficking within their country. They hoped that by creating a legal outlet for the more acceptable forms of prostitution, they could better separate the acceptable from the exploitative and illegal forms of prostitution. But in looking at the results the Netherlands achieved since its legalization, their has actually been an increase in the amount of illegal activities connected with prostitution. One of Amsterdam’s counsillors, and former prostitute, Karina Schaapman summed it up very well in a statement to the press: There are people who are really proud of the red light district as a tourist attraction. It's supposed to be such a wonderful, cheery place that shows just what a free city we are. But I think it's a cesspit. There's a lot of serious criminality. There's a lot of exploitation of women, and a lot of social distress. That's nothing to be proud of (Hesen 1). Since the legalization of prostitution occurred, the percentage of native Dutch citizens as prostitutes went to only 20% (Raymond “10 Reasons” 1). Today almost every prostitute in the Netherlands are not nationals and tend to come from third-world countries (Dralen 76). Although not every non-native prostitute is illegal, there are a fair amount of illegal prostitutes within the non-native sector. The Netherlands has been identified as one the worlds hubs for human trafficking and specifically sex trafficking of women and children. The country has developed a “flourishing black market, with exploited workers who lack rights, and wealthy managers whose revenue is invisible to the state” (Kilvington 89). The legalization of prostitution has opened the doors for organized crime and the mafia to have a place where they can conduct their business while being less harassed by the police and other enforcement agencies. The mayor of Amsterdam realized this himself, and since 2007 he and the city of Amsterdam have been shutting down a large part of the redlight district for this very reason. The mayor, Job Cohen, was quoted by the New York Times saying that “we’ve realized this is no longer about small-scale entrepreneurs, but that big crime organizations are involved here in trafficking women, drugs, killings, and other criminal activities” (Simons 2). It is important to note that when things are legalized by the government that the barrier of entry into an activity is lowered not only to the people that you would want to participate in it, but to every person who wants to participate. Amsterdam has historically has a low crime rate but since the legalization of prostitution occurred there has been a spike in organized crime and assassinations. The third main reason why the Netherlands government decided to legalize prostitution was their desire to improve the position of prostitutes, specifically in regards to health, finances, and public opinion. The groups supporting prostitution in the Netherlands wanted to empower the prostitutes by providing opportunities for the prostitute to not have to be tied to a pimp or brothel- owner in order for them to conduct business. The legalization was supposed to give them the opportunity to receive financial advice and support, better access to health clinics and screenings, and an ability to report to the police if they were assaulted or misused in some way. However, one thing that the legalization of prostitution cannot change is that the quality of life for a prostitute almost immediately deteriorates once they enter the sex business. One of the most important, and most overlooked, things to consider when thinking about the repercussions of the legalization of prostitution is that prostitution is an inherently violent trade regardless of how regulated it is. There are high amounts of abuse, non-consensual actions committed against the prostitute, and psychological exploitation that a prostitute is subjected to. One thing that is not commonly mentioned when discussing legalizing prostitution is that prostitutes have a much shorter life span, mostly due to a relatively high murder rate and a reduced quality of life (Farley 1097). On the whole, prostitutes tend to go through pre-mature aging, develop emotional detachment, paranoia, extreme nervousness, traumatic brain injury (TBI), post-traumatic stress disorder (PT SD), cervical cancer, chronic hepatitis, an overall increase in STD’s and HIV /AIDS, and other symptoms that are most commonly found in battered women and torture victims (Farley 1104). In a survey of prostitution in the Netherlands, it was recorded that 60% of prostitutes had suffered physical assaults, 70% had experienced verbal threats of physical assault, 40% had experienced sexual violence, and 40% has been forced into prostitution or sexual abuse by acquaintances (Farley 1095). In the De Rode Draad’s study on the progress and development of prostitution in the Netherlands, they concluded that the well being of the prostitutes was lower in all measured aspects than it was in 2001, and the use of sedatives, and other drugs such as heroin, had increased (Dralen 87). Some members of the Parliament afier observing a few years of the efiects of legalization in their country also released a statement saying that legalization had actually reinforced the oppression of women (Raymond “Prostitution on Demand” 1098). Legalizing such a trade is the same as legalizing torture so that if a victim survives they can go to the hospital to be treated. It is in efi'ect decriminalizing violence against women by saying it’s okay because now some of them may have better access to health care in order to treat the wounds that were legally inflicted upon fliem. So are there other means of achieving an improved society and better-protected citizens besides legalizing prostitution? The prostitution spokes group, De Rode Draad, supporters of legalization, made the clear statement that conceded that it was “not so much the legalization, but the stricter enforcement for punishable forms of prostitution, which has had the most effect” (Dralen 84). If truly seeking for ways to better regulate the sex industry, reduce the amount of involuntary, underage, and human trafficking, and improve the position of prostitutes physically, fiscally, and publicly, one could probably be better ofi' by creating stricter forms of enforcement towards the areas most heinous in the sex industry. Governments could also take the steps to create stronger programs that support women knowing how to leave prostitution if they want. I would also like to mention in parting how one other country has tried to handle the issue of prostitution in their nation. Although this paper has almost entirely focused on the nation of the Netherlands, one of its neighboring countries has approached the issue of prostitution from a very unique perspective. In 1999 Sweden passed legislation that criminalizes the buying of sexual services. The law they enacted does not punish prostitutes, but it instead targets the clients as a way to reduce violence against women, and better control prostitution and the illegal activities that go along with it. Within one year there were positive reports that their has been an increased amount of collaboration and communication between the police and social services, which had resulted in more sensitive treatment of sex workers, who in return are now more willing to report crimes to the police. There had also been a decline in recruitment, particularly of young prostitutes, into the industry. There had also been a tenfold decrease in the amount of women visibly working on the streets (Kilvington 85). This policy has not eradicated prostitution entirely, but one can say that Sweden has at least better regulated its sex industry, has better protected its prostitutes, and has created better access to social services and support for its prostitutes. So this takes us back to the initial issue of whether the legalization or criminalization of prostitution is more effective in creating a safe and responsible prostitution sector. <u><strong>Although <mark>there is </mark>some <mark>powerful rationale behind the idea of legalizing</mark> prostitution as a way to better protect the prostitutes and the public, <mark>there has been no actual substantial evidence that</u></strong></mark> I <u><strong><mark>could</u></strong></mark> find to <u><strong><mark>back-up these opinions</mark>.</u></strong> In fact, <u><strong><mark>there are numerous pieces of evidence that state the exact opposite</mark>. But this then should make one think, how can a government balance strong public opinion for legalized prostitution with a currently ineffective practice? </u></strong>In this case, the public will have to wait and see what the Netherlands chooses to do. But <u><strong>as students this also brings up an important thought to consider</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>As students who will soon be working in the various fields of society, one should consider this issue not an isolated problem but a lesson in understanding the complexities of legal regulation and control</mark>. <mark>As shown</mark> </u></strong>here <u><strong><mark>through the Netherlands</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>one should notice the importance of</mark> <mark>proper evidence and statistical support</mark> <mark>over</mark> public opinion and <mark>a good argument</mark> <mark>when making regulatory decisions</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>So if in the future you find yourself having to deal with a legalization issue,</u></strong></mark> for example legalizing or criminalizing marijuana, <u><strong><mark>make sure to take the time to thoroughly investigate the issue before coming to one’s conclusion.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NC
null
1NC
429,739
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,197
E. Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis - that’s key to decision making
Steinberg & Freeley 8
Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest If everyone is in agreement there is no need for debate the matter can be settled by unanimous consent it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," Controversy is an essential prerequisite Where there is no clash of ideas there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration How many are in the United States? Do they take job Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy controversies must be stated clearly Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007 Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations but without a focus for their discussions they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow But if a precise question is posed then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation Although we now have a general subject It is still too broad What sort of writing are we concerned with What does "effectiveness" mean The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a conflict of interest Where there is no clash there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question Participation in this "debate" is not likely to be productive without focus on a particular question demarcating sides controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions without a focus for discussions, they could agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or solutions. . But if a precise question is posed a more profitable area of discussion is opened up To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by placing limits on the decision the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument a general subject is still too broad The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition debate is best facilitated by focus on a particular point of difference
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
6,342
<h4>E. Debate over a controversial <u>point of action</u> creates argumentative stasis - that’s key to decision making </h4><p><strong>Steinberg & Freeley 8</strong> </p><p>*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, <u>Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making<mark> pp45-</p><p>Debate is a <strong>means of settling differences</strong>,</u> <u>so there <strong>must be a</u></strong></mark> difference of opinion or a <u><strong><mark>conflict of interest</u></strong></mark> before there can be a debate. <u><strong>If everyone is in agreement</u></strong> on a tact or value or policy, <u>there is <strong>no need for debate</u></strong>: <u><strong>the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, <u>it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"</u> because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (<u>Controversy is an essential prerequisite</u> of debate. <u><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas</u>, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <u><strong><mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><mark>debate <strong>cannot produce effective decisions</u></strong> <u>without <strong>clear identification of a question</mark> or questions to be answered</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong>general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration</u></strong>. <u>How many</u> illegal immigrants <u>are in the United States?</u> What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? <u>Do they take job</u>s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? <u>Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration</u> by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? <u>Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?</u> Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? <u>Should we build a wall on the Mexican border</u>, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? <u>Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. <mark>Participation in this "debate"</mark> is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it <mark>is <strong>not likely to be productive</mark> or useful <mark>without focus on a particular question</u></strong></mark> <u>and identification of a line <strong><mark>demarcating sides</mark> in the controversy</u></strong>. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <u><strong><mark>controversies must be stated clearly</u></strong>. <u><strong>Vague understanding</u></strong> <u>results in <strong>unfocused deliberation</strong> and <strong>poor decisions</u></strong></mark>, frustration, and emotional distress, as <u><strong>evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007</u></strong>. <u>Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!</u> They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u>Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations</u>, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, <u><strong>but <mark>without a focus for </mark>their <mark>discussions</u></strong>, <u>they could</mark> easily <mark>agree about the sorry state of education <strong>without finding points of clarity or</mark> potential <mark>solutions.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>A gripe session would follow</u></strong><mark>. <u>But if a <strong>precise question</strong> is posed</u></mark>—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—<u>then <mark>a more <strong>profitable area of discussion</strong> is opened up</u></mark> <u><strong>simply by placing a focus on the search</strong> for a concrete solution step</u>. <u>One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.</u> The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. <u>They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. <mark>To have a <strong>productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making</u></strong> <u>by</u></mark> directing and <u><strong><mark>placing limits on the decision</u></strong></mark> to be made, <u><strong><mark>the basis for argument should be clearly defined</u></strong>. <u>If we merely talk about </mark>"homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "<mark>global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument</u></mark>. For example, <u><strong>the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation</u></strong>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. <u>Although we now have <mark>a <strong>general subject</u></strong></mark>, we have not yet stated a problem. <u><strong>It <mark>is still too broad</u></strong></mark>, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. <u>What sort of writing are we concerned with</u>—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u>What does "effectiveness" mean</u> in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" <u><mark>The basis for argument could be phrased in a <strong>debate proposition</u></strong></mark> such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <u><strong>This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</u></strong> of the controversy by advocates, <u>or</u> <u><strong>that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy</strong>; in fact, <strong>these sorts of debates may be very engaging</strong>. The point is that <mark>debate is best facilitated by </mark>the guidance provided by <strong><mark>focus on a particular point of difference</strong></mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p></u>
1NC
null
1NC
51,689
1,023
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,198
PAS is practiced around fear of a bad death, not an end to survivalism. Addressing the causes of these fears if a necessary prereq to legalizing PAS or inequality and abuse is inevitable
Emanuel 98
Emanuel (M.D., Ph.D. Vice President for Ethics Standards, American Medical Association) 98
It is essential to have a solid grip on the root motivations for calls for assisted death and to respond to the root cause before the overt call is evaluated . Strong data all point to the predominance of psychosocial, contextual suffering or fear of suffering as moti- vators, rather than current, unbearable suffering Most requesters are motivated not by pain but by fear: fear of future suffering, fear of indignity, fear of burden- someness, fear of abandonment, and fear of lost control. the point is that psychosocial suffering should be treated by ameliorating its sources, not by eliminating the victim the current physician-assisted suicide debate is a false debate Without better understanding of the fears that drive these requests, policies will be enacted and acts taken that not only miss the point but risk abuse history's great mistakes have been founded on misconceptions no greater than this failure to examine root causes death denial is only part of the problem societal selfishness and pride of potency have caused failing members of society to be and feel unwelcome, burdensome, abandoned, undignified, and ashamed to be the frail humans that we all are
essential to have a solid grip on the root motivations for calls for assisted death and respond to the root cause data all point to the predominance of psychosocial, contextual suffering or fear of suffering as moti- vators, rather than current, unbearable suffering Most requesters are motivated by fear of future suffering indignity burden- someness abandonment lost control psychosocial suffering should be treated by ameliorating its sources, not eliminating the victim current physician-assisted suicide debate is false Without better understanding policies will be enacted that miss the point death denial is only part of the problem societal selfishness and pride of potency have caused failing members of society to be and feel unwelcome
(Linda L., A Question of Balance in Regulating how we die: the ethical, medical, and legal issues surrounding physician-assisted suicide, Pg. 258-60) Sixth, and perhaps most important of all, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are apparently not the real issues being raised by suffering patients and policymakers, nor the best answer to their concerns. It is essential to have a solid grip on the root motivations for calls for assisted death, whether made by individu- als or the larger society, and to respond to the root cause before the overt call is evaluated on face value. Treatment of the root cause is far more reliable, safe, and effective than treatment of the presenting complaint alone. This is a matter of sound clinical and social policy practice. Strong data all point to the predominance of psychosocial, contextual suffering or fear of suffering as moti- vators, rather than current, unbearable, unrelievable, pathophysi- ological suffering. Most requesters are motivated not by pain but by fear: fear of future suffering, fear of indignity, fear of burden- someness, fear of abandonment, and fear of lost control. The severity of psychOsocial suffering need not be understated to stand by this argument. Rather, the point is that psychosocial suffering should be treated by ameliorating its sources, not by eliminating the victim. Unfortunately, the widely acknowledged difficultyof assessing and lessening psychosocial suffering is a factorthat could ~ake physicians more prone to misuse of physi- cian-assistedsuicide and euthanasia if it were legalized. Sothis is the position to which the reflective process of editing thisvolumehas led me: In a very real sense, the current physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia debate in the United States is a false debate. If society takes the call for legally endorsed physi- cian-assistedsuicide and euthanasia on face value alone, and if themedicalprofession as a whole or physicians in particular take patients' calls for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia on facevalue alone, society, the profession, and physicians will have madea graveerror, Without better understanding of the fears that drive these requests, policies will be enacted and acts taken that not only miss the point but risk abuse. Some of history's great mistakes have been founded on misconceptions no greater than this failure to examine root causes. Positions on whether or not physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are ever justifiable neednot hinder us from reaching a consensus on the need to pursuethis investigation. A responsible society and a responsible professionwould not wish to pursue contentious policy, and a professionalwould not wish to act for reasons that turn out to havebeen beside the point and risky. This is not the place to examine in depth the root causes of requestsfor assisted suicide; I am neither a psychologist nor a sociologist,and no spiritual authority either. Nonetheless, it is relevantto note that society in general, and medical culture too, havebeen in a death-denying era, perhaps since the sClentlfic revolution or at least since biomedical technology became so powerfulin this century. Society sequesters and sanitizes our dyingin hospitals, it pursues youth, control, and potency, and It avoidstalk of normal dying. We do not have a healthy place in societyfor the dying and for rituals surrounding death. Cultural health and personal maturity require a balanced place for the realities of normal dying. Perhaps the physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia debate is evidence that society is beginning to climb out of its death-denying phase. Or perhaps its is evidence of imbalance and irrational denial; the call for physician-assited suicide and euthanasia could be an attempt to be rid of normal dying. Or perhaps death denial is only part of the problem. Per- haps societal selfishness and pride of potency have caused failing members of society to be and feel unwelcome, burdensome, abandoned, undignified, and ashamed to be the frail humans that we all are.
4,066
<h4>PAS is practiced around <u>fear of a bad death</u>, not an end to survivalism. Addressing the causes of these fears if a necessary prereq to legalizing PAS or inequality and abuse is inevitable</h4><p><strong>Emanuel</strong> (M.D., Ph.D. Vice President for Ethics Standards, American Medical Association) <strong>98</p><p></strong>(Linda L., A Question of Balance in Regulating how we die: the ethical, medical, and legal issues surrounding physician-assisted suicide, Pg. 258-60)</p><p>Sixth, and perhaps most important of all, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are apparently not the real issues being raised by suffering patients and policymakers, nor the best answer to their concerns. <u><strong>It is <mark>essential to have a solid grip on the root motivations for calls for assisted death</u></strong></mark>, whether made by individu- als or the larger society, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> to <mark>respond to the root cause</mark> before the overt call is evaluated</u></strong> on face value. Treatment of the root cause is far more reliable, safe, and effective than treatment of the presenting complaint alone. This is a matter of sound clinical and social policy practice<u><strong>. Strong <mark>data all point to the predominance of psychosocial, contextual suffering or fear of suffering as moti- vators, rather than current, unbearable</u></strong></mark>, unrelievable, pathophysi- ological <u><strong><mark>suffering</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Most requesters are motivated</mark> not by pain but <mark>by fear</mark>: fear <mark>of future suffering</mark>, fear of <mark>indignity</mark>, fear of <mark>burden- someness</mark>, fear of <mark>abandonment</mark>, and fear of <mark>lost control</mark>. </u></strong>The severity of psychOsocial suffering need not be understated to stand by this argument. Rather, <u><strong>the point is that <mark>psychosocial suffering should be treated by ameliorating its sources, not</mark> by <mark>eliminating the victim</u></strong></mark>. Unfortunately, the widely acknowledged difficultyof assessing and lessening psychosocial suffering is a factorthat could ~ake physicians more prone to misuse of physi- cian-assistedsuicide and euthanasia if it were legalized. Sothis is the position to which the reflective process of editing thisvolumehas led me: In a very real sense, <u><strong>the <mark>current physician-assisted suicide</u></strong></mark> and euthanasia <u><strong><mark>debate</u></strong></mark> in the United States <u><strong><mark>is</mark> a <mark>false</mark> debate</u></strong>. If society takes the call for legally endorsed physi- cian-assistedsuicide and euthanasia on face value alone, and if themedicalprofession as a whole or physicians in particular take patients' calls for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia on facevalue alone, society, the profession, and physicians will have madea graveerror, <u><strong><mark>Without better understanding</mark> of the fears that drive these requests, <mark>policies will be enacted</mark> and acts taken <mark>that</mark> not only <mark>miss the point</mark> but risk abuse</u></strong>. Some of <u><strong>history's great mistakes have been founded on misconceptions no greater than this failure to examine root causes</u></strong>. Positions on whether or not physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are ever justifiable neednot hinder us from reaching a consensus on the need to pursuethis investigation. A responsible society and a responsible professionwould not wish to pursue contentious policy, and a professionalwould not wish to act for reasons that turn out to havebeen beside the point and risky. This is not the place to examine in depth the root causes of requestsfor assisted suicide; I am neither a psychologist nor a sociologist,and no spiritual authority either. Nonetheless, it is relevantto note that society in general, and medical culture too, havebeen in a death-denying era, perhaps since the sClentlfic revolution or at least since biomedical technology became so powerfulin this century. Society sequesters and sanitizes our dyingin hospitals, it pursues youth, control, and potency, and It avoidstalk of normal dying. We do not have a healthy place in societyfor the dying and for rituals surrounding death. Cultural health and personal maturity require a balanced place for the realities of normal dying. Perhaps the physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia debate is evidence that society is beginning to climb out of its death-denying phase. Or perhaps its is evidence of imbalance and irrational denial; the call for physician-assited suicide and euthanasia could be an attempt to be rid of normal dying. Or perhaps <u><strong><mark>death denial is only part of the problem</u></strong></mark>. Per- haps <u><strong><mark>societal selfishness and pride of potency have caused failing members of society to be and feel unwelcome</mark>, burdensome, abandoned, undignified, and ashamed to be the frail humans that we all are</u></strong>.</p>
2NC
Case
2NC Ext #1 -- Suicide =/= Solve
429,740
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,199
Not susceptible to money laundering and plethora of alternatives to internet gaming even if it is
Banks 14
Banks 14 (James, professor of criminology at Sheffield Hallam University, “Online Gambling and Crime: Causes, Controls and Controversies”, google books)
to date, there appears to be little evidence to support claims that remote gambling is particularly susceptible to money laundering to finance terrorist activities there has only been one known case of laundering through gambling sites which was related to terrorist financing Levi cites the low operational costs suggesting that very small amounts of laundered money may be required in order to successfully carry out terrorist acts. Levi highlights how such sums can be generated through a range of licit and illicit activities so vast as to be almost unmonitorable Thus, e-garning is only one potential source of terrorist finance among many others; and even ¡t it was connected with terrorist plots terrorists would not have found it difficult to find another source of funding or “value transfers”. There is, in fact, little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments e gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of Europol or other European policing organisations. generalised and understandable expressions of concern about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’ This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’. the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst a 2005 report undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded the report suggests that: ‘Internet gaming does not, in and of itself, contribute to money laundering Rather, it is the financial transactions that are used to move money on the Internet that may be susceptible to money laundering’ This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are comparatively modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’
there appears to be little evidence that remote gambling is susceptible to money laundering to finance terrorist activities there has only been one known case of laundering through gambling sites which was related to terrorist financing such sums can be generated through a range of licit and illicit activities , e-garning is only one potential source of terrorist finance among many others terrorists would not have found it difficult to find another source of “value transfers”. expressions of concern about money laundering risks have not been accompanied by evidence the Interactive Gaming Council suggests that: Internet gaming does not contribute to money laundering Rather, it is the financial transactions that may be susceptible This suggests that ‘the risks are modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions
Laundered funds can be the end product of successful criminal enterprise, but can also be employed to fund organised crime, terrorism, smuggling and counterfeiting, and this has led to significant attention from law enforcement agencies and their governments (Government Accountability Office, 2002; RSeconsulting, 2006). Of particular concern is the extent to which online gambling sites can be employed to launder money for terrorist financing. Yet, to date, there appears to be little evidence to support claims that remote gambling is particularly susceptible to money laundering to finance terrorist activities (MHA Consulting, 2009). As Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson (2009) note, there has only been one known case of laundering through gambling sites which was related to terrorist financing. In 2007, suspected terrorist Al-Daour used a stolen credit card to deposit funds at 43 different gambling sites before withdrawing winnings to various Internet bank accounts (MHA Consulting, 2009). Levi (2009) cites the low operational costs of the London and Madrid bombings suggesting that very small amounts of laundered money may be required in order to successfully carry out terrorist acts. Levi (2009: 10) highlights how such sums can be generated through a range of licit and illicit activities so vast as to be almost unmonitorable: Thus, e-garning is only one potential source of terrorist finance among many others; and even ¡t it was connected with terrorist plots (as some newspaper sources have claimed and as ¡s evidenced In one UK case), terrorists would not have found it difficult to find another source of funding or “value transfers”. There is, in fact, little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments. Levi (2009: 4), in his European overview and assessment of the money laundering risks of e-gaming, questions the likelihood of significant sums of money — ‘in the billions of Euros’ — being laundered through such sites, noting that e gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of Europol or other European policing organisations. Moreover, ‘generalised and understandable expressions of concern by Europol and by the other European policing organisations. Moreover, ‘generalised and understandable expressions of concern by Europol and by the Financial Action Task Force about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’ (Levi, 2009: 4, emphasis in original). This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson (2009: 38) who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’. Examining the vulnerability of online gambling to money laundering, the US General Accounting Office (2002) concluded that the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst a 2005 report (NFC Global, 2005) undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council also noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling. With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded by the Internet Crime Complaint Centrer (1C3), the report suggests that: ‘Internet gaming does not, in and of itself, contribute to money laundering. Rather, it is the financial transactions that are used to move money on the Internet that may be susceptible to money laundering’ (NFC Global, 2005: 4). This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are comparatively modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).
3,743
<h4>Not susceptible to money laundering and plethora of alternatives to internet gaming <u>even if</u> it is</h4><p><strong>Banks 14 </strong>(James, professor of criminology at Sheffield Hallam University, “Online Gambling and Crime: Causes, Controls and Controversies”, google books)</p><p>Laundered funds can be the end product of successful criminal enterprise, but can also be employed to fund organised crime, terrorism, smuggling and counterfeiting, and this has led to significant attention from law enforcement agencies and their governments (Government Accountability Office, 2002; RSeconsulting, 2006). Of particular concern is the extent to which online gambling sites can be employed to launder money for terrorist financing. Yet, <u><strong>to date, <mark>there appears to be little</mark> <mark>evidence</mark> to support claims <mark>that remote gambling is</mark> particularly <mark>susceptible to money laundering to finance terrorist activities</u></strong></mark> (MHA Consulting, 2009). As Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson (2009) note, <u><strong><mark>there has only been</mark> <mark>one known case of laundering through gambling sites which was related to terrorist financing</u></strong></mark>. In 2007, suspected terrorist Al-Daour used a stolen credit card to deposit funds at 43 different gambling sites before withdrawing winnings to various Internet bank accounts (MHA Consulting, 2009). <u><strong>Levi</u></strong> (2009) <u><strong>cites the low operational costs</u></strong> of the London and Madrid bombings <u><strong>suggesting that very small amounts of laundered money may be required in order to successfully carry out terrorist acts.</u></strong> <u><strong>Levi</u></strong> (2009: 10) <u><strong>highlights how <mark>such sums can be generated</mark> <mark>through a range of licit and illicit activities</mark> so vast as to be almost unmonitorable</u></strong>: <u><strong>Thus<mark>, e-garning is only one potential source</u></strong> <u><strong>of terrorist finance among many others</mark>; and even ¡t it was connected with terrorist plots</u></strong> (as some newspaper sources have claimed and as ¡s evidenced In one UK case), <u><strong><mark>terrorists would not have found it difficult to find another source of</mark> funding or <mark>“value transfers”.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>There is, in fact, little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments</u></strong>. Levi (2009: 4), in his European overview and assessment of the money laundering risks of e-gaming, questions the likelihood of significant sums of money — ‘in the billions of Euros’ — being laundered through such sites, noting that <u><strong>e gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of Europol or other European policing organisations.</u></strong> Moreover, ‘generalised and understandable expressions of concern by Europol and by the other European policing organisations. Moreover, ‘<u><strong>generalised and understandable <mark>expressions</mark> <mark>of concern</u></strong></mark> by Europol and by the Financial Action Task Force <u><strong><mark>about money laundering risks</mark> posed by the Internet <mark>have not been accompanied by evidence</mark> of significant laundering via e-gaming’</u></strong> (Levi, 2009: 4, emphasis in original). <u><strong>This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson</u></strong> (2009: 38) <u><strong>who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’.</u></strong> Examining the vulnerability of online gambling to money laundering, the US General Accounting Office (2002) concluded that <u><strong>the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst a 2005 report</u></strong> (NFC Global, 2005) <u><strong>undertaken on behalf of <mark>the Interactive Gaming Council</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong>noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling</u></strong>. <u><strong>With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded</u></strong> by the Internet Crime Complaint Centrer (1C3), <u><strong>the report <mark>suggests that:</mark> ‘<mark>Internet gaming does not</mark>, in and of itself, <mark>contribute to money laundering</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Rather, it is the financial</mark> <mark>transactions</mark> that are used to move money on the Internet <mark>that may be susceptible</mark> to money laundering’</u></strong> (NFC Global, 2005: 4). <u><strong><mark>This suggests that ‘the risks </mark>associated with the sector <mark>are</mark> comparatively <mark>modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions</mark> and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’</u></strong> (Levi, 2009: 4).</p>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Laundering
429,741
21
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,200
Extend the Blake 10/17 card, democrats have made smarter investments and have been playing the long game which will pay off on November 4th – ignore snapshots, our evidence is predictive
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Extend the Blake 10/17 card, democrats have made smarter investments and have been playing the long game which will pay off on November 4th – ignore snapshots, our evidence is predictive </h4>
1NR
Case
1NR – Uniqueness Wall
429,738
1
16,968
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,691
N
UNLV
Quarters
Texas KS
Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis
1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,201
F. They make the debate into an echo-chamber – turns the aff
Talisse 5
Talisse 5
The deliberativist view involved some degree of epistemic modesty. On this the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, as a way of testing her views against the objections her present view is open to reasonable critique politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable for the activist discussion with those who disagree need not be involved According to the activist, there is no room for reasoned objection. the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, Activists must engage in deliberation Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists Group polarization has ‘been found all over the world in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ the polarization is even more pronounced he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth
the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons as a way of testing her views against the objections politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable for the activist discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist there is no room for reasoned objection. the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether Activists must engage in deliberation . Group polarization has ‘been found all over the world in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions the polarization is even more pronounced he may decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees we do not engage opposing views our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth
Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431 The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched hold that reasonableness involved some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.
4,303
<h4>F. They make the debate into an echo-chamber – turns the <strong>aff</h4><p>Talisse 5</p><p></strong>Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431</p><p>The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. <u><strong>The deliberativist view </u></strong>I have sketched hold that reasonableness <u><strong>involved some degree of </u></strong>what we may call <u><strong>epistemic modesty. On this </u></strong>view, <u><strong><mark>the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons</mark>,</u></strong> and so she enters into public discourse <u><strong><mark>as a way of testing her views against the objections</mark> </u></strong>and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that <u><strong>her present view is open to reasonable critique</u></strong> and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of <u><strong><mark>politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable</u></strong></mark>. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness <u><strong><mark>for the activist</mark> </u></strong>consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; <u><strong><mark>discussion with those who disagree need not be involved</u></strong>. <u><strong>According to the activist</mark>, </u></strong>there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which <u><strong><mark>there is no room for reasoned objection.</mark> </u></strong>Under such conditions, <u><strong><mark>the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice</mark>; it is therefore irrational</u></strong>. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political <u><strong><mark>activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether</mark>; they often engage in rallies,</u></strong> demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. <u><strong><mark>Activists</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>must engage in deliberation</u></strong></mark> among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. <u><strong>Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>Group polarization</u></strong></mark> is a well-documented phenomenon that <u><strong><mark>has ‘been found all over the world</u></strong></mark> and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, <u><strong><mark>in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions</mark>’</u></strong> over time, <u><strong><mark>the polarization is even more pronounced</u></strong></mark> (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that <u><strong><mark>he may</mark> reasonably <mark>decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees</u></strong></mark> in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. <u><strong>For even if we have the truth, if <mark>we do not engage opposing views</mark>,</u></strong> but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree,<u><strong> <mark>our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth</u></strong></mark> ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.</p>
1NC
null
1NC
74,322
499
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,202
Online gambling is terrible for money laundering – it’s a non-cash business, high costs, it’s too small.
Stadbrooke 13 http://calvinayre.com/2013/04/06/business/experts-online-poker-by-no-means-relevant-for-money-laundering/
Steven Stadbrooke 13, EXPERTS: ONLINE POKER “BY NO MEANS RELEVANT FOR MONEY LAUNDERING”, 4/6/2013http://calvinayre.com/2013/04/06/business/experts-online-poker-by-no-means-relevant-for-money-laundering/
an economist presented evidence that all gambling – land-based and online – accounted for a mere 0.5% of total money laundering activity in no small part due to the high transaction costs. Schneider quoted a study that concluded that even if the entire online poker market was utilized solely for money laundering purposes the total amount processed would represent just 3.2% of the total sum generated by all criminal activity his research had led him to conclude that online poker was “by no means relevant for money laundering.” since online gambling is a non-cash business, most of the money that flows into the site has already been handled (and presumably vetted) by the banking system prepaid cards can only be loaded with minimal sums, usually a maximum of €100 to €150, and the use of these cards requires players to log in via their individual accounts, making them easily identifiable.
an economist presented evidence that all gambling accounted for a mere 0.5% of total money laundering activity in no small part due to the high transaction costs. Schneider quoted a study that concluded that even if the entire online poker market was utilized solely for money laundering the total amount would represent just 3.2% of the total sum generated by all criminal activity online poker was “by no means relevant for money laundering since online gambling is a non-cash business, most of the money that flows into the site has already been vetted) by the banking system prepaid cards can only be loaded with minimal sums and the use of these cards requires players to log in via their individual accounts, making them easily identifiable.
The arguments voiced by online gambling opponents traditionally take one of two tacks: it’s either a moral scourge designed to lure impressionable youth into a life of degradation and depravity or a money laundering tool utilized by mafia types or digitally-savvy jihadis looking to fund their next terror plot. Just this December,infamous anti-gambling campaigner John W. Kindt (the ‘W’ is for ‘wack’) claimed the online poker bill cooked up by Senate majority leader Harry Reid would make it “easier for mobsters and even terrorists to launder money.” (Kindt also claimed that online gambling would bring down the global economy.) Such hyperbolic views are easy to dismiss when they come from nutters like Kindt, but it’s less of a joke when politicians holding the reins of power start accepting Kindt’s kind of blarney as gospel truth. Last year, European Union politicians were told that online gambling was the “perfect tool” for money laundering. This February, the European Commission proposed putting further restrictions on online gambling to monitor transactions for suspicious activities, with penalties of up to €5m for companies that failed to comply with these directives. With all due respect to the EU and the Financial Action Task Force, this is a solution in search of a problem. Members of the European Parliament (MEP) attended a workshop in Brussels last month at which Professor Friedrich Georg Schneider, an economist at the Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria, presented evidence that all gambling – land-based and online – accounted for a mere 0.5% of total money laundering activity. Schneider singled out online poker as a particularly ineffective method of laundering money, in no small part due to the high transaction costs. Schneider quoted a study of the German gambling market by consultancy Goldmedia that concluded that even if the entire online poker market was utilized solely for money laundering purposes, the total amount processed would represent just 3.2% of the estimated total sum generated by all criminal activity in Germany. Schneider said his research had led him to conclude that online poker was “by no means relevant for money laundering.” At the same meeting, Sven Stiel, Director Northern Europe for PokerStars’ parent company Rational Group, stated that the relatively small sums involved in online poker transactions “have no relevance with regard to money laundering.” Stiel also noted that since online gambling is a non-cash business, most of the money that flows into the site has already been handled (and presumably vetted) by the banking system. When MEP Jürgen Creutzmann tried to throw Stiel by asking him about anonymous payment methods, Stiel noted that prepaid cards can only be loaded with minimal sums, usually a maximum of €100 to €150, and the use of these cards requires players to log in via their individual accounts, making them easily identifiable.
2,933
<h4><strong>Online gambling is terrible for money laundering – it’s a non-cash business, high costs, it’s too small.</h4><p></strong>Steven <strong>Stadbrooke 13</strong>, EXPERTS: ONLINE POKER “BY NO MEANS RELEVANT FOR MONEY LAUNDERING”, 4/6/2013<u><strong>http://calvinayre.com/2013/04/06/business/experts-online-poker-by-no-means-relevant-for-money-laundering/</p><p></u></strong>The arguments voiced by online gambling opponents traditionally take one of two tacks: it’s either a moral scourge designed to lure impressionable youth into a life of degradation and depravity or a money laundering tool utilized by mafia types or digitally-savvy jihadis looking to fund their next terror plot. Just this December,infamous anti-gambling campaigner John W. Kindt (the ‘W’ is for ‘wack’) claimed the online poker bill cooked up by Senate majority leader Harry Reid would make it “easier for mobsters and even terrorists to launder money.” (Kindt also claimed that online gambling would bring down the global economy.) Such hyperbolic views are easy to dismiss when they come from nutters like Kindt, but it’s less of a joke when politicians holding the reins of power start accepting Kindt’s kind of blarney as gospel truth. Last year, European Union politicians were told that online gambling was the “perfect tool” for money laundering. This February, the European Commission proposed putting further restrictions on online gambling to monitor transactions for suspicious activities, with penalties of up to €5m for companies that failed to comply with these directives. With all due respect to the EU and the Financial Action Task Force, this is a solution in search of a problem. Members of the European Parliament (MEP) attended a workshop in Brussels last month at which Professor Friedrich Georg Schneider, <u><strong><mark>an economist</u></strong></mark> at the Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria, <u><strong><mark>presented evidence that all gambling</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>– land-based and online –</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>accounted for a mere 0.5% of total money laundering activity</u></strong></mark>. Schneider singled out online poker as a particularly ineffective method of laundering money, <u><strong><mark>in no small part due to the high transaction costs. Schneider quoted a study</u></strong></mark> of the German gambling market by consultancy Goldmedia <u><strong><mark>that concluded that</u></strong> <u><strong>even if the entire online poker market was utilized solely for money laundering</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>purposes</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>the total amount</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>processed</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>would represent just 3.2% of the</u></strong></mark> estimated <u><strong><mark>total sum generated by all criminal activity</u></strong></mark> in Germany. Schneider said <u><strong>his research had led him to conclude that <mark>online poker was “by no means relevant for money laundering</mark>.”</u></strong> At the same meeting, Sven Stiel, Director Northern Europe for PokerStars’ parent company Rational Group, stated that the relatively small sums involved in online poker transactions “have no relevance with regard to money laundering.” Stiel also noted that <u><strong><mark>since online gambling is a non-cash business, most of the money that flows into the site has already been</mark> handled (and presumably</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>vetted) by the banking system</u></strong></mark>. When MEP Jürgen Creutzmann tried to throw Stiel by asking him about anonymous payment methods, Stiel noted that <u><strong><mark>prepaid cards can only be loaded with minimal sums</mark>, usually a maximum of €100 to €150, <mark>and the use of these cards requires players to log in via their individual accounts, making them easily identifiable.</p></u></strong></mark>
2NC
2NC Case -- Regulations
2NC No Laundering
429,743
33
16,965
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
564,694
N
Wake
3
Michigan KK
Logan Gramzinski
1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,203
Scenario 1 is Mexico Relations –
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4><strong>Scenario 1 is Mexico Relations – </h4></strong>
1AC
null
Diplomacy
429,742
1
16,978
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round1.docx
564,677
A
UMKC
1
ASU BW
Eric Robinsoin
1AC Policy MJ LA AF 1NC States Federalism Midterms (Turnout) Cartels DA 2NC States Federalism 1NR Midterms Case 2NR States Federalism
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round1.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,204
G. Research-based knowledge production about prostitution impacts policy implementation – public debate affects the likelihood of social intervention
Skilbrei and Holstrom ‘11
Skilbrei and Holstrom ‘11 [May-Len Skilbrei and Charlotta Holmstrom. May-Len Skilbrei is senior researcher at the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo. Charlotta Holmstrom is senior lecturer at the Fakulten for Halsa och Samhalle, Malmo Hogskola, Malmo, Sweden. 40 Crime & Just. 479. ETB]
Producing knowledge about prostitution through research has consequences for what type of knowledge is developed. Biases affecting what parts of the prostitution market and what actors are made visible can have serious consequences for policy debates and implementation. Prostitution less visible in public debate. are less likely to be taken into consideration in the development of legal measures and social interventions. Prostitution is constructed as a certain type of problem complexities may be ignored
Producing knowledge about prostitution through research has consequences for what type of knowledge is developed. Biases affecting what parts of the prostitution market and what actors are made visible can have serious consequences for policy implementation Prostitution less visible in public debate. are less likely to be taken into consideration in the development of legal measures and social interventions. Prostitution is constructed as a certain type of problem complexities may be ignored
Producing knowledge about prostitution through social work and [*498] social scientific research has consequences for what type of knowledge is developed. Biases affecting what parts of the prostitution market and what actors are made visible can have serious consequences for policy debates and implementation. Prostitution taking place off-street, men selling sex, and Nordic women involved in prostitution are much less visible in knowledge production and public debate. These groups are less likely to be taken into consideration in the development of legal measures and social interventions. Prostitution is constructed as primarily or only a certain type of social problem: the phenomenon's complexities and variations may be ignored (Pettersson and Tiby 2003). Particularly in Sweden, knowledge was for a long time developed almost exclusively through social work research directed at Swedish women selling sex on the street. The Danish approaches to social work and knowledge production seem to be quite different and have produced much knowledge about indoor prostitution (see, e.g., Pedersen and Heindorf 2000; Haansbaek 2001; Christensen and Barlach 2004).
1,169
<h4>G. <strong>Research-based knowledge production about prostitution impacts policy implementation – public debate affects the likelihood of social intervention</h4><p>Skilbrei and Holstrom ‘11</p><p></strong>[May-Len Skilbrei and Charlotta Holmstrom. May-Len Skilbrei is senior researcher at the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo. Charlotta Holmstrom is senior lecturer at the Fakulten for Halsa och Samhalle, Malmo Hogskola, Malmo, Sweden. 40 Crime & Just. 479. ETB]</p><p><u><strong><mark>Producing knowledge about prostitution through</u></strong> </mark>social work and [*498] social scientific <u><strong><mark>research</u></strong> <u><strong>has consequences for what type of knowledge is developed.</u></strong> <u><strong>Biases affecting what parts of the prostitution market and what actors are made visible can have serious consequences for policy </mark>debates and <mark>implementation</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Prostitution</u></strong> </mark>taking place off-street, men selling sex, and Nordic women involved in prostitution are much <u><strong><mark>less visible in</u></strong> </mark>knowledge production and <u><strong><mark>public debate.</u></strong> </mark>These groups <u><strong><mark>are less likely to be taken into consideration in the development of legal measures and social interventions.</u></strong> <u><strong>Prostitution is constructed as</u></strong> </mark>primarily or only <u><strong><mark>a certain type of</u></strong> </mark>social <u><strong><mark>problem</u></strong></mark>: the phenomenon's <u><strong><mark>complexities</u></strong> </mark>and variations <u><strong><mark>may be ignored</u></strong> </mark>(Pettersson and Tiby 2003). Particularly in Sweden, knowledge was for a long time developed almost exclusively through social work research directed at Swedish women selling sex on the street. The Danish approaches to social work and knowledge production seem to be quite different and have produced much knowledge about indoor prostitution (see, e.g., Pedersen and Heindorf 2000; Haansbaek 2001; Christensen and Barlach 2004).</p>
1NC
null
1NC
429,744
1
16,974
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
564,682
N
UMKC
7
Stanford GL
Claire McKinney
1AC - Affirm the Prostitute 1NC - T-FW Cap K Ballot K 2NC - Cap 1NR - FW 2NR - FW
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2