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740,505 | Legalization requires specifying how drugs are made legally available | Haden 2 | Mark Haden 2, Adjunct Professor of the UBC School of Population and Public Health, “Illicit IV Drugs: A Public Health Approach,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH VOLUME 93, NO. 6, http://journal.cpha.ca/index.php/cjph/article/download/390/390 | With “decrimalization”, criminal prosecution is not an option This term is often confused with the term “legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available “decriminalization” is limited in its utility, as it only states what will not be done and does not explain what legal options are available | “decrimalization is often confused with legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available decriminalization” is limited in its utility, as it only states what will not be done and not what legal options are available | The existing laws could be changed to remove legal sanctions. With “decrimalization”, criminal prosecution is not an option for dealing with drugs. This term is often confused with the term “legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available. The term “decriminalization” is limited in its utility, as it only states what will not be done and does not explain what legal options are available. Proponents of “decriminalization” usually distinguish between personal use, and trafficking and smuggling. Those who profit from the black market would still be subject to criminal charges but personal use would not be subject to legal sanctions. Decriminalization, or benign neglect, means ignoring the problem and results in unregulated access to drugs of unknown purity and potency. | 793 | <h4>Legalization requires <u>specifying</u> how drugs are made legally available</h4><p>Mark <u><strong>Haden 2</u></strong>, Adjunct Professor of the UBC School of Population and Public Health, “Illicit IV Drugs: A Public Health Approach,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH VOLUME 93, NO. 6, http://journal.cpha.ca/index.php/cjph/article/download/390/390</p><p>The existing laws could be changed to remove legal sanctions. <u>With <mark>“decrimalization</mark>”, criminal prosecution is <strong>not an option</u></strong> for dealing with drugs. <u>This term <mark>is often confused with</mark> the term “<mark>legalization” which <strong>specifies how drugs can be legally available</u></strong></mark>. The term <u>“<mark>decriminalization” is <strong>limited in its utility</strong>, as it <strong>only states what will not be done</strong> and <strong></mark>does <mark>not </mark>explain <mark>what legal options are available</u></strong></mark>. Proponents of “decriminalization” usually distinguish between personal use, and trafficking and smuggling. Those who profit from the black market would still be subject to criminal charges but personal use would not be subject to legal sanctions. Decriminalization, or benign neglect, means ignoring the problem and results in unregulated access to drugs of unknown purity and potency.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,883 | 30 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
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2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,506 | Multiple Violations | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Multiple Violations</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,881 | 1 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,507 | 1. Without details, “legalize” isn’t a policy – | Kleiman and Ziskind 2014 | Kleiman, professor of public policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, and Ziskind, crime and drug policy analyst with BOTEC Analysis, May 2014
(Mark and Jeremy, “Lawful Access to Cannabis: Gains, Losses and Design Criteria,” Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, http://botecanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Lawful-Access-to-Cannabis.Gains-Losses-and-Design-Criteria_Effects-of-Prohibition-Enforcement-and-Interdiction-on-Drug-Use_Ending-the-Drug-Wars.Report-of-the-LSE-Expert-Group-on-the-Econ-of-Drug_Jonathan-Caulkins_Mark-Kleiman_Jeremy-Ziskind_May-2014.pdf) | Policy Details The actual outcomes of any scheme of legal access would depend strongly on details rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-and-con discussion of whether to legalise A central decision is whether to allow private enterprises or restrict licit activity to Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises Some variety of state monopoly If the private enterprise model is chosen an additional choice must be made about whether to limit market concentration or allow oligopolistic competition as in the markets for cigarettes and beer label information consumer information point of sale taxation sales training decisions have to be made about marketing | actual outcomes of any scheme depend strongly on details central is whether to allow private enterprises to produce and sell Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises Some variety of state monopoly label information consumer information point of sale taxation training decisions have to be made about marketing | Policy Details The actual outcomes of any scheme of legal access would depend strongly on details rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-and-con discussion of whether to legalise. The risk of a large increase in damaging forms of consumption would be greater at a lower price; the need for enforcement against illicit production and sale, or tax evasion by licensed producers and sellers, would be higher. Another central decision is whether to allow private for-profit enterprises to produce and sell cannabis, or instead to restrict licit activity to: (1) Production for personal use and free distribution only. (2) Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises such as consumer-owned cooperatives like the Spanish ‘cannabis clubs’ (3) Some variety of state monopoly, perhaps of retail sales only, leaving production to private enterprise. If the private enterprise model is chosen, an additional choice must be made about whether to limit market concentration to ensure the existence of a variety of competing firms (thus perhaps limiting the marketing and political power of the industry as a whole and – again perhaps – increasing the rate of product innovation and the range of products easily available) or instead to allow the likely development of oligopolistic competition, as in the markets for cigarettes and beer. A potential advantage of legalisation would be the provision of consumer information superior to that available on the illicit market. The corresponding disadvantage might be the application of powerful marketing techniques to making excessive consumption seem desirable and fashionable. Cannabis is a more complex product than beer, with at least two and perhaps dozens of significantly psychoactive chemicals and, to date, only limited scientific knowledge about their actions and interactions. Requiring accurate label information about chemical content seems a sensible approach, but not all consumers will be able to make good use of a collection of chemical names and percentages. Industry participants could be given the responsibility of providing sound consumer information, including due warnings about the risks of habituation, at the point of sale or via websites, or that responsibility could be assigned to NGOs or public agencies, perhaps financed by cannabis taxation. It seems at least arguable that cannabis sales personnel should have extensive training both about the pharmacology of the drug and about offering good advice to consumers, making their role closer to that of a pharmacist or nutritionist than of a mere sales clerk or bartender. By the same token, decisions would have to be made and executed about whether and how to limit marketing efforts. To some eyes at least, the alcohol industry provides a warning by example of what could go wrong. In the United States, the doctrine of ‘commercial free speech’ might gravely impair the capacity of the state to allow private enterprise but restrain promotion. | 2,966 | <h4>1. Without details, “legalize” isn’t a policy –</h4><p><u><strong>Kleiman</u></strong>, professor of public policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, <u><strong>and Ziskind</u></strong>, crime and drug policy analyst with BOTEC Analysis, May <u><strong>2014</p><p></u></strong>(Mark and Jeremy, “Lawful Access to Cannabis: Gains, Losses and Design Criteria,” Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, http://botecanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Lawful-Access-to-Cannabis.Gains-Losses-and-Design-Criteria_Effects-of-Prohibition-Enforcement-and-Interdiction-on-Drug-Use_Ending-the-Drug-Wars.Report-of-the-LSE-Expert-Group-on-the-Econ-of-Drug_Jonathan-Caulkins_Mark-Kleiman_Jeremy-Ziskind_May-2014.pdf)</p><p><u>Policy Details<strong> </strong>The <strong><mark>actual outcomes</strong></mark> <mark>of <strong>any</strong></mark> <mark>scheme</mark> of legal access would <strong><mark>depend strongly on details</mark> rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-and-con discussion of whether to legalise</u></strong>. The risk of a large increase in damaging forms of consumption would be greater at a lower price; the need for enforcement against illicit production and sale, or tax evasion by licensed producers and sellers, would be higher. <u>A</u>nother <u><mark>central</mark> decision <mark>is whether to allow private</u></mark> for-profit <u><mark>enterprises</u></mark> <mark>to produce</mark> <mark>and sell</mark> cannabis, <u>or</u> instead to <u>restrict licit activity to</u>: (1) Production for personal use and free distribution only. (2) <u><mark>Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises</u></mark> such as consumer-owned cooperatives like the Spanish ‘cannabis clubs’ (3) <u><mark>Some variety of state monopoly</u></mark>, perhaps of retail sales only, leaving production to private enterprise. <u>If the private enterprise model is chosen</u>, <u>an additional choice must be made about whether to limit market concentration</u> to ensure the existence of a variety of competing firms (thus perhaps limiting the marketing and political power of the industry as a whole and – again perhaps – increasing the rate of product innovation and the range of products easily available) <u>or</u> instead to <u>allow</u> the likely development of <u>oligopolistic competition</u>, <u>as in the markets for cigarettes and beer</u>. A potential advantage of legalisation would be the provision of consumer information superior to that available on the illicit market. The corresponding disadvantage might be the application of powerful marketing techniques to making excessive consumption seem desirable and fashionable. Cannabis is a more complex product than beer, with at least two and perhaps dozens of significantly psychoactive chemicals and, to date, only limited scientific knowledge about their actions and interactions. Requiring accurate <u><mark>label information</u></mark> about chemical content seems a sensible approach, but not all consumers will be able to make good use of a collection of chemical names and percentages. Industry participants could be given the responsibility of providing sound <u><mark>consumer information</u></mark>, including due warnings about the risks of habituation, at the <u><mark>point of sale</u></mark> or via websites, or that responsibility could be assigned to NGOs or public agencies, perhaps financed by cannabis <u><mark>taxation</u></mark>. It seems at least arguable that cannabis <u>sales</u> personnel should have extensive <u><mark>training</u></mark> both about the pharmacology of the drug and about offering good advice to consumers, making their role closer to that of a pharmacist or nutritionist than of a mere sales clerk or bartender. By the same token, <u><mark>decisions</u></mark> would <u><mark>have to be made</u></mark> and executed <u><mark>about</u></mark> whether and how to limit <u><mark>marketing</u></mark> efforts. To some eyes at least, the alcohol industry provides a warning by example of what could go wrong. In the United States, the doctrine of ‘commercial free speech’ might gravely impair the capacity of the state to allow private enterprise but restrain promotion.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 430,159 | 9 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
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2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,508 | 2. Didn’t say who does the plan – | Garvey 12 | Garvey 12 – legislative attorney | Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and void Courts, however, have not viewed the relationship between state and federal marijuana laws in such a manner the relationship between the federal ban on marijuana and state exemptions must be considered in the context of two distinct sovereigns, each enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other state and federal marijuana laws may be “logically inconsistent,” a decision to expressly decriminalize conduct within one sphere does nothing to alter the legality in the other sphere | the relationship between the federal ban on marijuana and state xemptions must be considered in the context of two distinct sovereigns each enacting separate and independent regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms | Todd, “The Supremacy Clause, Federalism, and the Interplay Between State and Federal Laws” [http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf] November 9 //
At first glance, it would appear that a state law that permits an activity expressly prohibited by federal law would necessarily create a legal “conflict” between state and federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and therefore At first glance, it would appear that a state law that permits an activity expressly prohibited by federal law would necessarily create a legal “conflict” between state and federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and therefore void. 50 Courts, however, have not viewed the relationship between state and federal marijuana laws in such a manner, nor did Congress intend that the CSA displace all state laws associated with controlled substances. 51 Instead, the relationship between the federal ban on marijuana and state medical marijuana exemptions must be considered in the context of two distinct sovereigns, each enacting separate and independent criminal regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other. Although state and federal marijuana laws may be “logically inconsistent,” a decision not to criminalize—or even to expressly decriminalize—conduct for purposes of the law within one sphere does nothing to alter the legality of that same conduct in the other sphere. | 1,577 | <h4>2. Didn’t say who does the plan –</h4><p><u><strong>Garvey 12</u></strong> – legislative attorney </p><p>Todd, “The Supremacy Clause, Federalism, and the Interplay Between State and Federal Laws” [http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf] November 9 //</p><p>At first glance, it would appear that a state law that permits an activity expressly prohibited by federal law would necessarily create a legal “conflict” between state and federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and therefore At first glance, it would appear that a state law that permits an activity expressly prohibited by federal law would necessarily create a legal “conflict” between state and federal law. <u>Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and</u> therefore <u>void</u>. 50 <u>Courts, however, have not viewed the relationship between state and federal marijuana laws in such a manner</u>, nor did Congress intend that the CSA displace all state laws associated with controlled substances. 51 Instead, <u><strong><mark>the relationship between the federal ban on marijuana and state</u></strong></mark> medical marijuana <u><strong>e<mark>xemptions must be considered in the context of two distinct sovereigns</strong></mark>, <mark>each enacting separate and independent</mark> criminal <mark>regimes with separate and independent enforcement mechanisms</mark>, in which certain conduct may be prohibited under one sovereign and not the other</u>. Although <u>state and federal</u> <u>marijuana laws may be “logically inconsistent,” a</u> <u>decision</u> not to criminalize—or even <u>to expressly</u> <u>decriminalize</u>—<u>conduct</u> for purposes of the law <u>within one sphere does nothing to alter the legality</u> of that same conduct <u>in the other sphere</u>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,884 | 4 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
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2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,509 | (C) Vote neg: Education and ground – | Vitiello 2012 | Vitiello, professor of law at University of the Pacific, 2012 | The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of the culture wars the partisans are not going to give ground the potential to tax marijuana may give legalization efforts the final push questions about what we want a post-legalization world to look like are far more interesting than the old pro and con debate My hope is a more sensible debate about how not whether to legalize and regulate marijuana | The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of the culture wars the partisans are not going to give ground questions about what we want a post-legalization world to look like are far more interesting than the old pro and con debate a more sensible debate about how, not whether, to legalize and regulate marijuana | (Michael, “Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215,” 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, Lexis)
The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of debates surrounding the culture wars. Armed with enough plausible evidence to support their sides, the partisans are not going to give ground. n250 Rather than weighing in on that never-ending story, I have focused on a different point. [*90] Marijuana is big business, largely untaxed, and remarkably resistant to eradication efforts. n251 We are shortsighted not to tax a business worth billions of dollars. And viewed objectively, the potential to tax marijuana may give legalization efforts the final push. n252 As a result, questions about what we want a post-legalization world to look like are far more interesting than the old pro and con debate. My hope is the policymakers will begin that conversation in earnest sooner rather than later. As I suggested above, an advantage of the legislative process over the initiative process is that the legislative process can involve greater transparency and can accommodate legitimate objections of opponents. n253 I would urge law enforcement and other traditional prohibitionists to come to the table to voice their legitimate concerns. We ended up with Proposition 215 - our version of the Trojan horse - because of then-Governor Wilson's reflexive tough-on-crime stance and his resulting veto of AB 1529. n254 Similarly, hard-line local law enforcement efforts have hindered reasonable regulation of medical marijuana. n255 Members of law enforcement do raise legitimate concerns. For example, what about crime in neighborhoods where dispensaries have opened? n256 What about drug-impaired drivers? n257 Cooperation between law enforcement and medical marijuana providers has reduced or eliminated the parade of horribles raised by marijuana opponents, like rampant crime in neighborhoods with dispensaries. n258 My hope is that this symposium can be part of a more sensible debate about how, not whether, to legalize and regulate marijuana. | 2,086 | <h4>(C) Vote neg: <u>Education</u> and <u>ground</u> –</h4><p><u><strong>Vitiello</u></strong>, professor of law at University of the Pacific, <u><strong>2012</p><p></u></strong>(Michael, “Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215,” 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, Lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of</u></mark> debates surrounding <u><mark>the culture wars</u></mark>. Armed with enough plausible evidence to support their sides, <u><mark>the partisans are not going to give ground</u></mark>. n250 Rather than weighing in on that never-ending story, I have focused on a different point. [*90] Marijuana is big business, largely untaxed, and remarkably resistant to eradication efforts. n251 We are shortsighted not to tax a business worth billions of dollars. And viewed objectively, <u>the potential to tax marijuana may give legalization efforts the final push</u>. n252 As a result, <u><mark>questions about what we want</mark> <mark>a post-legalization world to look like are <strong>far more interesting than the old pro and con debate</u></strong></mark>. My hope is the policymakers will begin that conversation in earnest sooner rather than later. As I suggested above, an advantage of the legislative process over the initiative process is that the legislative process can involve greater transparency and can accommodate legitimate objections of opponents. n253 I would urge law enforcement and other traditional prohibitionists to come to the table to voice their legitimate concerns. We ended up with Proposition 215 - our version of the Trojan horse - because of then-Governor Wilson's reflexive tough-on-crime stance and his resulting veto of AB 1529. n254 Similarly, hard-line local law enforcement efforts have hindered reasonable regulation of medical marijuana. n255 Members of law enforcement do raise legitimate concerns. For example, what about crime in neighborhoods where dispensaries have opened? n256 What about drug-impaired drivers? n257 Cooperation between law enforcement and medical marijuana providers has reduced or eliminated the parade of horribles raised by marijuana opponents, like rampant crime in neighborhoods with dispensaries. n258 <u>My hope is</u> that this symposium can be part of <u><mark>a more sensible debate <strong>about how</u></strong>, <u><strong>not whether</u></strong>, <u>to legalize and regulate marijuana</u></mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 445,767 | 4 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
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2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,510 | Discourse of the Mexican narco-state under siege by cartels instantiates waves of racialized colonialism by positioning Mexico as culturally inferior and in need of development – these representations undergird violent neoliberal apparatuses which makes structural violence and Mexican instability inevitable | Carlos 14 | Carlos 14 (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz | Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Clinton described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency The Los Angeles Times suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination
The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful
Foucault argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it Said says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.
Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth.
Dominant discourses, meta-narratives and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites Western powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions
Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism
imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations
non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North and scholars from the South and even between white and nonwhite scholars Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003).
It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives.
The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when Mexicans were depicted as an “uncivilized species—dirty, unkempt, immoral, diseased, lazy, unambitious and despised for being peons This discourse set the stage for the creation of a “culture of empire,” in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests This narrative depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it continues to dominate U.S. understandings of Mexico The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. Mexico is suffering much more from extreme economic inequality, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), than from drug-related violence While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact.
Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal
The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.” The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations
it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports
it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos
Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention
the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors
there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico
Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state
while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period
there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US
Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified
The importance of the drug-related violence story lies in its masking the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s social and economic problems It perpetuates a relationship of imperialism between the United States and Mexico that manifests itself in NAFTA, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, and direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and military assistance to help bring order to Mexico free trade has led only to the enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates NAFTA is just one of the most recent examples of U.S. domination over Mexico and how it continues to misdevelop and tear apart the socioeconomic integrity of that society They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico this means continuing Mexico’s long history as a U.S. economic colony, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers
The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State investment in agriculture was reduced by 95.5 percent and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for Mexican national agricultural producers. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent
One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands NAFTA has resulted in the “complete inability of the Mexican nation to produce the food required to feed its own people
free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital
Poverty in rural areas has risen significantly from 37 percent in 1992 to 52.4 percent in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration
The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people we can only call this imperialism.
the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico.
economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism
Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary
NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people. | The L A Times suggested Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels Drug-related violence is not Mexico’s foremost problem, and it obscures economic and social problems it masks their origin in U.S. policy while providing justification for domination
It is linked to discourses surrounding colonization the white man’s burden extermination of the native population Manifest Destiny racial segregation and prejudice against immigrants
discourse serves to make possible interventions power produces discourse that justifies and increases it literature elaborates empire
representations have precise political consequences narrative separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism Discourses they become “regimes of truth put into circulation representations
Dominant discourses construct “realities” that are acted upon dominant narratives validate norms deemed intersubjectively legitimate Western powers maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized Through repetition, a racialized “other” is constructed
literature describes Latin America as “backward” development literature becomes the justification for underdevelopment
non-Western scholarship is not regarded as legitimate There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North and South
It is important to deconstruct discourses expose power relationships and examine counterhegemonic alternatives
Mexicans were depicted as uncivilized dirty diseased and despised This narrative continues to dominate Mexico is suffering much more from economic inequality than from drug violence
Representing Mexico as a “failing state” provides justification for economic paternalism
the U S contrasted its liberty with barbaric brutality
there were 23 million crimes of violence in the U S statistics do not justify that the U S is a “failing state.” Yet jumps to that conclusion about Mexico
Mexico is far from an outlier
more people kill themselves in the U S Mexico’s violence has remained constant over 25 years
drug violence does not make Mexico a “failing state.”
the drug story perpetuates imperialism that manifests in NAFTA and military assistance free trade has led to enrichment of monopolistic corporations NAFTA continues to misdevelop and tear apart socioeconomic integrity continuing Mexico’s history as a U.S. economic colony
The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater investment was reduced by 95.5 percent The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for agricultural producers
NAFTA resulted in the “complete inability to feed its own people
Poverty has risen from 37 percent to 52.4 percent
discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for military intervention
NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a violent Mexico needing development to solve its social problems, when it is capital that has caused those problems Focusing on drugs obscures this | According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (quoted in Dibble, 2010) described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. The Los Angeles Times (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces. More important, it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination.
The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story. In that regard discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful.
Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses
Michel Foucault (1972–1977: 120) argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth.” Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power. This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” In essence, power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it. Similarly, Edward Said (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. He says that literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” (Said, 1994: xiii). They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.
Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance (36). Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action. For Said, there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge.” They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth.
Dominant discourses, meta-narratives (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites. Western1 powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies (Dunn, 2003). Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” Consequently, dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions, particularly economic ones.
Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism.
Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations.
This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North (the United States) and scholars from the South (Latin America, Africa, et al.) and even between white and nonwhite (American Latino) scholars. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003).
It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal, as Lynch (1999) points out, is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives.
The U.S. Discourse on Mexico
The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when Mexicans were depicted as an “uncivilized species—dirty, unkempt, immoral, diseased, lazy, unambitious and despised for being peons” (Gonzalez, 2004: 8). This discourse set the stage for the creation of what Gonzalez calls a “culture of empire,” in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests (2004: 6). This narrative depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it continues to dominate U.S. understandings of Mexico. Sometimes this is done with the help of Mexican politicians themselves, as in President Felipe Calderón’s extension of the hegemonic discourse of the “war on drugs.” The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. Mexico is suffering much more from extreme economic inequality, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), than from drug-related violence. The great migration that has occurred since 1994 has been the result of a decimated economy. While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families. The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact.
Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has dedicated a web site to the series “Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep.” It has reported, among other things, that President Calderón deployed 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to 18 states (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2010) and that there were 10,031 deaths from drug-related violence between January 1, 2007, and June 5, 2009 (Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2012). (One may question the reliability of these figures, given that on February 3, 2010, the paper had reported 9,903 such deaths since January 2007 and that on August 18 of that year it had reported a total of 28,228.) As far back as 1997, M. Delal Baer (1997: 138), the director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, suggested that “skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico.” He asserted that “drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, leaping from 338 in 1991, to 515 in 1996, and 538 during the first eight months of 1997 alone” (138). This was 16 years ago; one can only imagine what the numbers are today as the drug problem in Mexico is depicted more and more as a U.S. national security problem.
The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico (Gomez, 2010). The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.” Within days of the outbreak Mexico was under pressure from the world community and especially the United States to close down schools and heavily populated areas in order to avert the spread of the flu. The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations that Gonzalez discusses. Lost on the majority of the U.S. media and, consequently, on average Americans, however, was the fact that the outbreak originated in a town where the Smithfield Corporation, an American company with massive hog-raising operations known to improperly handle its waste, had a factory farm (Morales, 2009). The CDCP (2010) reported that only around 11,000 people died of the H1N1 virus between April through December of 2009, in comparison with the average of 36,000 people dying in the United States each year of the “regular” seasonal flu. If the H1N1 flu was such an epidemic, why was no one reporting on the deaths from the regular seasonal flu in the United States, which were clearly more numerous?
A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35):
The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.
Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999).
Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s.
Deconstructing the Dominant Discourse
Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others” (Said, 1994). This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it.
In 2010 there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico.
In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state.”
Furthermore, while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period.
The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs.
There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence.
Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination.
Implications of the Dominant Discourse
The importance of the drug-related violence story lies in its masking the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s social and economic problems. It perpetuates a relationship of imperialism between the United States and Mexico that manifests itself in NAFTA, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, and direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and military assistance to help bring order to Mexico. Mexican politicians have bought the story and have been willing collaborators with economic development to “help” Mexico. Former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his Institutional Revolutionary Party vigorously pursued NAFTA as a mechanism for injecting foreign capital into Mexico’s ailing economy (Castañeda, 1993). Jaime Serra, a former secretary of trade, and J. Enrique Espinoza, an economist formerly on the council of economic advisers to the president of Mexico, have fervently proclaimed NAFTA a resounding success (Serra and Espinoza, 2002a), pointing to increased foreign direct investment as evidence. However, free trade has led only to the enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates (Robledo, 2006). Gilbert Gonzalez and Raul Fernandez (2003: 54) argue that “NAFTA is just one of the most recent examples of U.S. domination over Mexico and how it continues to misdevelop and tear apart the socioeconomic integrity of that society.” They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico.” In effect this means continuing Mexico’s long history as a U.S. economic colony, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 55). This process was supposed to lead to an opening for investment, economic growth, and access to diversified export markets for Mexico.
The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State investment in agriculture was reduced by 95.5 percent and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent (Quintana, 2004: 251). Disinvestment in Mexican agriculture has meant that agricultural enterprises are unable to compete with subsidized U.S. commodities. The United States maintains domestic subsidies that allow it to export corn at 30 percent below the cost of production, wheat at 40 percent below, and cotton at 57 percent below—a practice known as “asymmetrical trading” and “dumping” and deemed illegal in world commerce (Fernandez and Whitesell, 2008). Serra and Espinoza (2002b) suggest that this is a nonissue because of NAFTA’s tariff-rate quota system, which charges tariffs for exceeding the import quotas. However, Cavanaugh and Anderson (2002) point out that under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for Mexican national agricultural producers. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent (Quintana, 2004: 256). Despite these figures the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR, 2006) points to the growth of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States by US$5.6 billion during the past 12 years as proof of the success of NAFTA. However, producers continue to abandon agricultural endeavors en masse, vacating 1.6 million previously cultivated hectares (3.95 million acres) in the first eight years of NAFTA (Quintana, 2004: 256). Peter Goodman (2007) tells the story of Ruben Rivera,
who sat on a bench in a forlorn plaza, rather than working on his seven-acre farm. He used to grow tomatoes and onions, hiring 150 workers to help at harvest. Now he doesn’t even bother to plant. He can buy onions in the supermarket more cheaply than he can grow them. A crop of tomatoes yields less than the taxes. He lives off the $800 sent home monthly by his three sons, who run a yard work business in Macon, Ga.
Stories like this have become all too common. As Quintana (2004: 256) puts it, “One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands.” Mexico now imports 95 percent of its edible oils, 40 percent of its beef, pork, and other meat products, 30 percent of its corn, and 50 percent of its rice. NAFTA has resulted in the “complete inability of the Mexican nation to produce the food required to feed its own people” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 57).
In the end, “free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital. It was promoted by huge U.S. multinational corporations as benevolent economic development to allow them to integrate themselves into the Mexican market without having to deal with that country’s requirements and legislative issues. Mark Weisbrot (2004) of the Center of Economic Policy Research in Washington suggests that, had Mexico’s economy
grown at the same pace from 1980 to the present as it did in the period from 1960 to 1980, today it would have the same standard of living as Spain. . . . To have 25 years of this rotten economic performance, you’d have to conclude something is wrong. . . . It is hard to make the case that Mexico’s aggregate economic performance would have been even worse without NAFTA.
Not only has NAFTA not accomplished the growth propulsion its supporters promised in Mexico but it has had devastating social costs for Mexican society. Poverty in rural areas has risen significantly from 37 percent in 1992 to 52.4 percent in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty (Quintana, 2004: 257). NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration (Dickerson, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Since 1994 an average of 600 peasants a day (at least 1.78 million people) have migrated from rural areas, many to northern cities along the U.S.-Mexican border and others into the United States (Quintana, 2004: 258). Migration means family disintegration and the destruction of the social fabric of Mexico. Many of these jobless displaced workers will try their luck at crossing a militarized border into the United States. Peter Goodman (2007), interviewing Luz Maria Vazquez, a tomato picker from Jalisco, reports that six of her brothers and sisters are in the United States, most of them without papers. More than 11 million Mexicans (a conservative estimate) now live in the United States without documents, and 7 million of them immigrated after NAFTA, between 1994 and 2005 (Passel, 2006).4 Clearly the politics in Mexico are much more complex than the drug story in the United States makes them out to be.
Conclusion
The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones (O’Reilly, 2013), and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people. Even at its most basic level, we can only call this imperialism.
While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico.
The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism.
For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary.
The irony of it all is that NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest. In the end, the way Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people. This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent. | 41,133 | <h4>Discourse of the Mexican narco-state under siege by cartels instantiates waves of racialized colonialism by positioning Mexico as culturally inferior and in need of development – these representations undergird violent neoliberal apparatuses which makes structural violence and Mexican instability inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Carlos 14</u></strong> (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz</p><p>According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, <u>Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.”</u> Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary <u>Clinton</u> (quoted in Dibble, 2010) <u>described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency</u>” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. <u><mark>The L</mark>os <mark>A</mark>ngeles <mark>Times</u></mark> (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it <u><mark>suggested</mark> that <mark>Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels</u></mark>. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” <u>A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. <mark>Drug-related violence is not</mark>, however, <mark>Mexico’s foremost problem, and</mark> the reporting on <mark>it <strong>obscures</mark> the more serious and immediate <mark>economic and social problems</strong></mark> it faces</u>. More important, <u><mark>it <strong>masks their origin in U.S.</mark> economic foreign <mark>policy</strong> while providing justification for</mark> continued and future <strong>U.S. paternalism and <mark>domination</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. <mark>It is linked to discourses surrounding</mark> the <strong><mark>colonization</mark> of the Americas, <mark>the white man’s burden</mark>, the <mark>extermination of the native population</mark>, <mark>Manifest Destiny</mark>, the Mexican-American War, <mark>racial segregation</mark> in the United States, <mark>and prejudice against immigrants</u></strong></mark>. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the <u>current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story</u>. In that regard <u>discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful</u>.</p><p>Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses</p><p>Michel <u>Foucault</u> (1972–1977: 120) <u>argues that “<strong><mark>discourse serves to make possible</mark> a whole series of <mark>interventions</mark>, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth</u></strong>.” <u>Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power</u>. <u>This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth</u>” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “<u>what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse</u>.” In essence, <u><mark>power produces discourse that justifies</mark>, legitimates, <mark>and increases it</u></mark>. Similarly, Edward <u>Said</u> (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, <u>says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics.</u> He says that <u><mark>literature</mark> <strong>supports, <mark>elaborates</mark>, and consolidates the practices of <mark>empire</strong></mark>. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, <strong>creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them”</u></strong> (Said, 1994: xiii). <u>They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.</p><p>Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons</u>. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, <u><mark>representations have</mark> <strong>very <mark>precise political consequences</strong></mark>.</u> <u>They either legitimize or delegitimize power</u>, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). <u>Said asserts that a <mark>narrative</mark> emerges that <mark>separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a <strong>justification for imperialism</strong></mark> and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance</u> (36). <u><mark>Discourses</mark> are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action</u>. For Said, <u>there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful</u>. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, <u>through repetition <strong><mark>they become “regimes of truth</mark> and knowledge</u></strong>.” <u>They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which <mark>put into circulation representations</mark> that are taken as truth.</p><p><mark>Dominant discourses</mark>, meta-narratives</u> (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), <u>and cultural representations are important because they <strong><mark>construct “realities” that are</mark> taken seriously and <mark>acted upon</u></strong></mark>. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “<u><mark>dominant narratives</mark> do ‘work’ <strong>even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence</strong>, to the degree that their conceptual foundations <strong>call upon or <mark>validate norms</strong></mark> that are <mark>deemed intersubjectively legitimate</mark>.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be <strong>constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed</strong> by actual people</u> (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that <u>the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites</u>. <u><mark>Western</u></mark>1 <u><mark>powers</mark>, including the United States, have <mark>maintained hegemony by <strong>establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized</strong></mark> are identities that have provided <strong>justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism</u></strong> (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). <u>The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies</u> (Dunn, 2003). <u><mark>Through</mark> constant <mark>repetition, a racialized </mark>identity of the non-American, barbaric <mark>“other” is constructed</mark>, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.”</u> Consequently, <u>dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide <strong>a veil for “imperial encounters</strong>,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control</u> (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that <u>dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions</u>, particularly economic ones.</p><p><u>Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly <mark>literature</mark> that <strong><mark>describes Latin America as</mark> a <mark>“backward”</strong></mark> region that “irrationally” resists modernization</u>. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, <u>the discourse created by the modernization and <mark>development literature</mark> focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and <mark>becomes the</mark> West’s <strong><mark>justification for</mark> the continued <mark>underdevelopment</mark> of the region</strong>.</u> These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. <u><strong>They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism</u></strong>.</p><p>Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of <u>imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations</u>.</p><p>This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which <u><strong><mark>non-Western scholarship is</mark> excluded</strong> because it is <mark>not regarded as legitimate</u></mark>. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. <u><mark>There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North</u></mark> (the United States) <u><mark>and</mark> scholars from the <mark>South</u></mark> (Latin America, Africa, et al.) <u>and even between white and nonwhite</u> (American Latino) <u>scholars</u>. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly <u>Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003).</p><p><mark>It is important</mark>, then, <strong><mark>to</mark> understand and <mark>deconstruct discourses</strong></mark>, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal</u>, as Lynch (1999) points out, <u>is to <strong><mark>expose</mark> the material and ideological <mark>power relationships</strong></mark> that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—<mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>examine counterhegemonic alternatives</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>The U.S. Discourse on Mexico</p><p><u>The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when <mark>Mexicans were depicted as</mark> an “<strong><mark>uncivilized</mark> species—<mark>dirty</mark>, unkempt, immoral, <mark>diseased</mark>, lazy, unambitious <mark>and despised</mark> for being peons</u></strong>” (Gonzalez, 2004: 8). <u>This discourse set the stage for the creation of </u>what Gonzalez calls<u> <strong>a “culture of empire,”</strong> in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and <strong>subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests</u></strong> (2004: 6). <u><mark>This narrative</mark> depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it <strong><mark>continues to dominate</mark> U.S. understandings of Mexico</u></strong>. Sometimes this is done with the help of Mexican politicians themselves, as in President Felipe Calderón’s extension of the hegemonic discourse of the “war on drugs.” <u>The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. <mark>Mexico is suffering <strong>much more from</mark> extreme <mark>economic inequality</strong></mark>, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), <mark>than from drug</mark>-related <mark>violence</u></mark>. The great migration that has occurred since 1994 has been the result of a decimated economy. <u>While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families</u>. <u>The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact.</p><p>Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past</u>. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has dedicated a web site to the series “Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep.” It has reported, among other things, that President Calderón deployed 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to 18 states (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2010) and that there were 10,031 deaths from drug-related violence between January 1, 2007, and June 5, 2009 (Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2012). (One may question the reliability of these figures, given that on February 3, 2010, the paper had reported 9,903 such deaths since January 2007 and that on August 18 of that year it had reported a total of 28,228.) As far back as 1997, M. Delal Baer (1997: 138), the director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, suggested that “<u>skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico</u>.” He asserted that “<u>drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal</u>, leaping from 338 in 1991, to 515 in 1996, and 538 during the first eight months of 1997 alone” (138). This was 16 years ago; one can only imagine what the numbers are today as the drug problem in Mexico is depicted more and more as a U.S. national security problem.</p><p><u>The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico</u> (Gomez, 2010). <u>The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.”</u> Within days of the outbreak Mexico was under pressure from the world community and especially the United States to close down schools and heavily populated areas in order to avert the spread of the flu. <u>The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations</u> that Gonzalez discusses. Lost on the majority of the U.S. media and, consequently, on average Americans, however, was the fact that the outbreak originated in a town where the Smithfield Corporation, an American company with massive hog-raising operations known to improperly handle its waste, had a factory farm (Morales, 2009). The CDCP (2010) reported that only around 11,000 people died of the H1N1 virus between April through December of 2009, in comparison with the average of 36,000 people dying in the United States each year of the “regular” seasonal flu. If the H1N1 flu was such an epidemic, why was no one reporting on the deaths from the regular seasonal flu in the United States, which were clearly more numerous?</p><p>A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but <u>it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports</u>. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35):</p><p>The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.</p><p>Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, <u>it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels</u>. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that <u>the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions</u>. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. <u>The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos</u>.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999).</p><p><u><strong><mark>Representing Mexico as a</mark> potential <mark>“failing state”</strong></mark> in the midst of violent anarchy <mark>provides</mark> the U.S. <mark>justification for</mark> continued <mark>economic paternalism</mark>. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus <strong>manufacturing consent</strong> as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further <strong>neoliberal economic development or military intervention</u></strong>. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s.</p><p>Deconstructing the Dominant Discourse</p><p>Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has <mark>contrasted its</mark> supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, <mark>liberty</mark>, and self-determination <mark>with </mark>the <strong><mark>barbaric brutality </mark>of the “others</u></strong>” (Said, 1994). <u>This American exceptionalism has been used to <strong>legitimate its domination</strong> over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors</u>. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it.</p><p>In 2010 <u><mark>there were</mark> an estimated <mark>23 million</mark> reported <mark>crimes of violence</mark> and/or theft <mark>in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these <u><mark>statistics</mark> clearly <mark>do not justify</mark> any assertion <mark>that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is a “failing state.” Yet </mark>such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that <mark>jumps to that conclusion about Mexico</u></mark>.</p><p>In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, <u><mark>Mexico is far from</mark> being <mark>an</mark> extreme <mark>outlier</u></mark>. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the <u>United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state</u>.”</p><p>Furthermore, <u>while more people are killed in Mexico, <mark>more people kill themselves in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, <u><mark>Mexico’s violence</mark> problem <mark>has remained</mark> relatively <mark>constant over</mark> the course of the past <mark>25 years</mark>, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period</u>.</p><p>The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, <u>there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives</u>. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “<u>the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse</u> . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that <u>Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US</u>.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs.</p><p>There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence.</p><p><u>Is there <mark>drug violence</mark> in Mexico? Yes, but this <strong><mark>does not make Mexico a “failing state.”</u></strong></mark> While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. <u>Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified</u>. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination.</p><p>Implications of the Dominant Discourse</p><p><u>The importance of <mark>the drug</mark>-related violence <mark>story</mark> lies in its <strong>masking the nature of U.S. involvement</strong> in Mexico’s social and economic problems</u>. <u>It <mark>perpetuates</mark> a <strong>relationship of <mark>imperialism</strong></mark> between the United States and Mexico <mark>that manifests</mark> itself <mark>in <strong>NAFTA</strong></mark>, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, <mark>and</mark> direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and <mark>military assistance</mark> to help bring order to Mexico</u>. Mexican politicians have bought the story and have been willing collaborators with economic development to “help” Mexico. Former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his Institutional Revolutionary Party vigorously pursued NAFTA as a mechanism for injecting foreign capital into Mexico’s ailing economy (Castañeda, 1993). Jaime Serra, a former secretary of trade, and J. Enrique Espinoza, an economist formerly on the council of economic advisers to the president of Mexico, have fervently proclaimed NAFTA a resounding success (Serra and Espinoza, 2002a), pointing to increased foreign direct investment as evidence. However, <u><mark>free trade has led</mark> only <mark>to</mark> the <strong><mark>enrichment of</mark> a few <mark>monopolistic corporations</strong></mark> in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates</u> (Robledo, 2006). Gilbert Gonzalez and Raul Fernandez (2003: 54) argue that “<u><mark>NAFTA</mark> is just one of the most recent examples of <strong>U.S. domination over Mexico </strong>and how it <mark>continues to misdevelop and <strong>tear apart</mark> the <mark>socioeconomic integrity</mark> of that society</u></strong>.” <u>They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “<strong>guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises</strong> willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico</u>.” In effect <u>this means <mark>continuing Mexico’s</mark> long <mark>history as <strong>a U.S. economic colony</strong></mark>, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers</u>” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 55). This process was supposed to lead to an opening for investment, economic growth, and access to diversified export markets for Mexico.</p><p><u><mark>The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater</mark> because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State <mark>investment</mark> in agriculture <mark>was <strong>reduced by 95.5 percent</strong></mark> and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent</u> (Quintana, 2004: 251). Disinvestment in Mexican agriculture has meant that agricultural enterprises are unable to compete with subsidized U.S. commodities. The United States maintains domestic subsidies that allow it to export corn at 30 percent below the cost of production, wheat at 40 percent below, and cotton at 57 percent below—a practice known as “asymmetrical trading” and “dumping” and deemed illegal in world commerce (Fernandez and Whitesell, 2008). Serra and Espinoza (2002b) suggest that this is a nonissue because of NAFTA’s tariff-rate quota system, which charges tariffs for exceeding the import quotas. However, Cavanaugh and Anderson (2002) point out that <u>under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. <mark>The outcome has been the <strong>disappearance of profitability for</mark> Mexican national <mark>agricultural producers</strong></mark>. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent</u> (Quintana, 2004: 256). Despite these figures the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR, 2006) points to the growth of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States by US$5.6 billion during the past 12 years as proof of the success of NAFTA. However, producers continue to abandon agricultural endeavors en masse, vacating 1.6 million previously cultivated hectares (3.95 million acres) in the first eight years of NAFTA (Quintana, 2004: 256). Peter Goodman (2007) tells the story of Ruben Rivera,</p><p>who sat on a bench in a forlorn plaza, rather than working on his seven-acre farm. He used to grow tomatoes and onions, hiring 150 workers to help at harvest. Now he doesn’t even bother to plant. He can buy onions in the supermarket more cheaply than he can grow them. A crop of tomatoes yields less than the taxes. He lives off the $800 sent home monthly by his three sons, who run a yard work business in Macon, Ga.</p><p>Stories like this have become all too common. As Quintana (2004: 256) puts it, “<u>One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands</u>.” Mexico now imports 95 percent of its edible oils, 40 percent of its beef, pork, and other meat products, 30 percent of its corn, and 50 percent of its rice. <u><mark>NAFTA</mark> has <mark>resulted in the “<strong>complete inability</mark> of the Mexican nation to produce the food required <mark>to feed its own people</u></strong></mark>” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 57).</p><p>In the end, “<u>free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of <strong>deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital</u></strong>. It was promoted by huge U.S. multinational corporations as benevolent economic development to allow them to integrate themselves into the Mexican market without having to deal with that country’s requirements and legislative issues. Mark Weisbrot (2004) of the Center of Economic Policy Research in Washington suggests that, had Mexico’s economy</p><p>grown at the same pace from 1980 to the present as it did in the period from 1960 to 1980, today it would have the same standard of living as Spain. . . . To have 25 years of this rotten economic performance, you’d have to conclude something is wrong. . . . It is hard to make the case that Mexico’s aggregate economic performance would have been even worse without NAFTA.</p><p>Not only has NAFTA not accomplished the growth propulsion its supporters promised in Mexico but it has had devastating social costs for Mexican society. <u><mark>Poverty</mark> in rural areas <mark>has risen </mark>significantly <mark>from 37 percent</mark> in 1992 <mark>to 52.4 percent</mark> in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty</u> (Quintana, 2004: 257). <u>NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration</u> (Dickerson, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Since 1994 an average of 600 peasants a day (at least 1.78 million people) have migrated from rural areas, many to northern cities along the U.S.-Mexican border and others into the United States (Quintana, 2004: 258). Migration means family disintegration and the destruction of the social fabric of Mexico. Many of these jobless displaced workers will try their luck at crossing a militarized border into the United States. Peter Goodman (2007), interviewing Luz Maria Vazquez, a tomato picker from Jalisco, reports that six of her brothers and sisters are in the United States, most of them without papers. More than 11 million Mexicans (a conservative estimate) now live in the United States without documents, and 7 million of them immigrated after NAFTA, between 1994 and 2005 (Passel, 2006).4 Clearly the politics in Mexico are much more complex than the drug story in the United States makes them out to be.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. <u>The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south</u> (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). <u>It employs a foreign policy that advances its <strong>imperialist interests</strong>. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a <mark>discourse of a <strong>“chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” </strong>has provided justification for</mark> direct U.S. <mark>military intervention</mark>, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones</u> (O’Reilly, 2013), <u>and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people</u>. Even at its most basic level, <u><strong>we can only call this imperialism</strong>.</p><p></u>While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But <u>the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about <strong>“othering” Mexico</strong>.</p><p></u>The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its <u>economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has <strong>stunted Mexican economic growth</strong> and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity</u>. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since <u>the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism</u>.</p><p>For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. <u>Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to <strong>evade responsibility</strong> for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary</u>.</p><p>The irony of it all is that <u><mark>NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a</mark> chaotic and <mark>violent Mexico needing</mark> economic programs of <mark>development to solve its social problems, when</mark> in fact <mark>it is</mark> the penetration of <strong>U.S. <mark>capital that has caused</mark> many of <mark>those problems</strong></mark>. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the <strong>veil for this “imperial encounter”</strong> to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest</u>. In the end, the way <u>Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is <strong>a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism</strong> in Mexico.</u> Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. <u><strong><mark>Focusing on drugs</mark> and violence <mark>obscures this</u></strong></mark>. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. <u>Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people.</u> This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 22,683 | 31 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
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740,511 | Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements | Coward 14 | Coward 14 (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz | What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’ The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism In Feinberg and Willer’s study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism where economy assumes the role of reality everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital Klein describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself | environmental apocalypse’ says Either the status quo must change, or humanity will end although awareness of environmental issues is very high, they continue to be low priority the result is perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation apocalyptic rhetoric disengages the public from environmental activism In Willer’s study, individuals primed with just-world statements, followed by dire messages reported higher levels of skepticism participants were less likely to change their lifestyle it is acknowledged that natural limits exist. Despite this production and consumption continue capitalist social relations are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and Earth’s environment It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental narratives are populist, resisting a proper political framing This results in the insistence that the threat is a technical problem a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral such as privatization of the school system in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the framing of catastrophe implies devastation is to be managed within current institutions the solutions are foreclosed by co-option by capitalist institutions | What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism.¶ First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative in environmental literature is political. It is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level. The technique recognizes the fact that although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets.¶ From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option ¶ It is important, however, to state that although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality. Ultimately, the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize. Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism.¶ The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism. In Feinberg and Willer’s (2011) study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism (ibid, 36). These participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism.¶ Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth.¶ What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism.¶ As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world - we cosset and succor to the economy; our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2009), where economy assumes the role of reality. In capitalist realism, everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system1.¶ Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions.¶ A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense (ibid., 11,13). This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge. Of course, a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral. Therefore any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital (ibid., 13). Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine (2008) describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident.¶ Additionally, the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions.¶ Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporation2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3 | 10,359 | <h4>Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements</h4><p><u><strong>Coward 14</u></strong> (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz</p><p><u>What, then, is the function of the ‘<mark>environmental apocalypse’</u></mark>, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism.¶ First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. <u>The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone</u> adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function <u><mark>says</mark> implicitly or explicitly: <mark>Either the status quo must change, or humanity</mark> and nature <mark>will end</u></mark>. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, <u>the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative</u> in environmental literature is political. It <u>is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level</u>. The technique recognizes the fact that <u><mark>although awareness of environmental issues is</mark> <strong>now <mark>very high</strong>, they continue to be <strong>low priority</strong></mark> for many</u> (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets.¶ From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option ¶ It is important, however, to state that <u>although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, <strong>this is not necessarily translated into reality</u></strong>. Ultimately, <u>the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner <strong>do not always materialize</u></strong>. <u>Instead, <mark>the result is</mark> not that of transformation, but of a <strong><mark>perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation</strong></mark>, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite</u>. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism.¶ The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, <u>empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that <mark>apocalyptic rhetoric</mark> can <strong><mark>disengages the </mark>wider <mark>public from</mark> partaking in <mark>environmental activism</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>In </mark>Feinberg and <mark>Willer’s</u></mark> (2011) <u><mark>study, individuals</mark> who were <mark>primed with just-world statements, followed by</mark> exposure to <mark>dire messages</mark> of the severity of global warming, <mark>reported <strong>higher levels of </mark>climate change <mark>skepticism</u></strong></mark> (ibid, 36). These <u><mark>participants were</mark> also <strong><mark>less likely to change their lifestyle</strong></mark> to reduce their carbon footprint</u>. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism.¶ Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, <u>ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities</u>. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that <u>a prophetic ecology <strong>cannot espouse radical change</strong> because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview</u>. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather <u>the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth</u>.¶ What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that <u><mark>it is acknowledged that natural limits</mark> and environmental tipping points <mark>exist. Despite this</mark> knowledge, <mark>production and consumption continue</mark> at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted</u>. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. <u>It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism</u>.¶ As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, <u><strong>the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world</u></strong> - we cosset and succor to the economy; <u>our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism</u>’ (Fisher 2009), <u>where <strong>economy assumes the role of reality</u></strong>. In capitalist realism, <u>everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute</u>.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) <u>It is the failure to see <mark>capitalist social relations</mark> as what they truly <mark>are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and</mark> ultimately to <mark>Earth’s environment</mark>al system</u>1.¶ Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: <u><strong><mark>It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism</u></strong></mark>. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions.¶ A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that <u>environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic <mark>environmental narratives</mark> that stem from this, <mark>are populist, resisting a proper political framing</mark> in the traditional left-right sense</u> (ibid., 11,13). <u><mark>This results in the insistence that the </mark>fear-inducing <mark>threat is</mark> <strong>merely <mark>a technical problem</strong></mark>, requiring techno-managers to take charge</u>. Of course, <u><strong><mark>a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral</u></strong></mark>. Therefore <u>any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital</u> (ibid., 13). Naomi <u>Klein</u>’s Shock Doctrine (2008) <u>describes numerous examples of this tendency, <mark>such as</mark> the mass <mark>privatization of the</mark> public <mark>school system</mark> in New Orleans, <mark>in the wake of Hurricane Katrina</u></mark>: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, <u>the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident</u>.¶ Additionally, <u><mark>the framing of catastrophe</mark> as crisis <mark>implies</mark> that total (environmental) <mark>devastation is</mark> something <mark>to be managed within current</mark> social, political and economic <mark>institutions</u></mark>: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, <u>crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention</u>. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that <u>using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather <mark>the solutions </mark>it intends <mark>are <strong>foreclosed by </mark>the <mark>co-option </mark>of the narrative <mark>by capitalist institutions</u></strong></mark>.¶ Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, <u>Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio</u>n2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “<u>we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation</u>[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, <u>the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself</u>. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 83,814 | 22 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
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2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,512 | Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political | Spanos 8 | Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified) | We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas | We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition | On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana. | 8,036 | <h4>Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 112,192 | 50 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,513 | CP: The United States should legalize nearly all cannabis. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>CP: The United States should legalize nearly all cannabis.</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,887 | 1 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,514 | Academia is a pollution of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death | Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 ) [m leap] | Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286) [m leap] | here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us Each day passes in this way, the administration out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. We form teams, schools ideologies, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead. | the university manages our social death, translating what we once knew into acceptable forms of social conflict. the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where meaning is ripped from action to perpetually deliberate when we push the boundaries they reconfigure themselves to contain us the administration out to shape student discourse It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes meaning the university is a graveyard a factory of meaning which reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students discourse designed to make our moments together into a set of legible and fruitless demands Totally managed death. A machine for administering death each which seek to absorb more of our energy they perpetuate the inertia of meaning detached from social context these discourses and research programs play their role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits precautionary lectures A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us the university’s ghosts are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs We form teams, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot . Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead. | Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. It is November 2009. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. We are an antagonistic dead. | 11,993 | <h4>Academia is a pollution of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9</u></strong> (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286<u><strong>) [m leap]</p><p></u></strong>Yes, very much a cemetery. Only <u>here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like <mark>the university </mark>just like the state just like the economy <strong><mark>manages our social death</strong>, translating what we once knew</mark> from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, <mark>into acceptable forms of social conflict.</mark> Who knew that behind so much civic life</u> <u>(electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam)</u> <u>was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. </u>When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. <u>He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, <mark>the <strong>release valve</strong> of the university plunges us into an abyss where</mark> ideas are wisps of ether—that is, <strong><mark>meaning is ripped from action</strong></mark>. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: <mark>to <strong>perpetually deliberate</strong></mark>, the endless fleshing-out-of—<mark>when we push the boundaries</mark> of this form <mark>they </mark>are quick <strong>to <mark>reconfigure themselves to contain us</u></strong></mark>: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension.<u> Each day passes in this way, <mark>the administration</mark> </u>on the look<u> <mark>out to shape student discourse</mark>—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. <mark>It becomes <strong>banal, thoughtless</u></strong></mark>. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. <u><mark>The university</mark> steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also <strong><mark>steals and homogenizes meaning</strong></mark>. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. <strong>Social death is</strong>, of course, simply the power source, <strong>the generator, of civic life</strong> with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death</u>: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, <u><strong><mark>the university is a graveyard</strong></mark>, but it is also a factory: <strong><mark>a factory of meaning</strong> </mark>which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; <mark>which </mark>everywhere <mark>reproduces the <strong>empty reactionary behavior of students</strong> </mark>based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property).</u> Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. <u>Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, <strong><mark>discourse designed to make our </mark>very <mark>moments </mark>here <mark>together into a set of legible and fruitless demands</strong></mark>. <mark>Totally managed death. A machine for administering death</u></mark>, for the proliferation of technologies of death. <u>As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, <strong>it matters little what face one puts on the university</u></strong>—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—<u><mark>each </mark>one the product of some exploitation—<mark>which seek to absorb more of our </mark>work, more tuition, more <mark>energy</mark>.</u> The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place.<u> With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, <mark>they perpetuate the </u></mark>blind <u><strong><mark>inertia of meaning</strong></mark> ostensibly <strong><mark>detached from</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>social context</strong></mark>. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, <mark>these discourses and research programs play their</mark> own <mark>role, <strong>co-opting and containing radical potential</u></strong></mark>. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. <u><mark>The university gladly permits</mark> the <strong><mark>precautionary lectures</strong></mark> on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. <strong><mark>A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us</strong></mark> against any confrontational radicalism.</u> And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. <u>Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to <strong><mark>the university’s ghosts</strong></mark>, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They <mark>are<strong> summoned forth and banished</strong> by a few well-meaning <strong>phrases and research programs</strong></mark>, given their book titles, their <strong>citations</strong>. <strong>This is our gothic</strong>—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us.</u> Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. <u><mark>We form teams,</u></mark> clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, <u>schools</u>, unions, <u>ideologies, <mark>identities</u></mark>, and subcultures—and thankfully <u><strong><mark>each group gets its own designated burial plot</u></strong></mark>. <u>Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination<mark>.</mark> </u>We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others.<u> It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never <strong>feel terrible</strong> to <strong>diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital</strong> as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this <strong>same dream of domination.</strong> After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are <strong>convinced, owned, broken.</u></strong> We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. <u>The values create popular images and ideals</u> <u>(healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education)</u> <u>while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. <strong>They sell the practice through the image</strong>. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice.</u> In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. <u>Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just <strong>how dead we are willing to play</strong>, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. </u>Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts.<u> Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. <strong><mark>Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. </mark>It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact</strong>.</u> <u>It’s the particular nature of being owned. <strong>Social rupture</strong> is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a <strong>function of war</strong>. War contains the ability to create a <strong>new frame</strong>, to build a <strong>new tension</strong> for the agents at play, <strong>new dynamics</strong> in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.</u> It is November 2009. <u><mark>For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures </u></mark>and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. <u><strong><mark>We are an antagonistic dead.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NC | null | Off | 1,058 | 366 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,515 | The aff is curriculum – the 1AC’s strategy is premised upon utilizing knowledge as a telos which runs parallel to settler colonialism – they mystify the structuring foundation for the modern university: the walling off of indigenous bodies from civil society | Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez ’13. | Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez ’13. (Eve Tuck – professor of educational foundations and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, and RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity,” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, p. 72-89) | the White settler-becoming-Indian resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of curriculum studies Here, the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy and the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization. curriculum and its history in the U S has invested in settler colonialism, and the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state the settler colonial curricular project of replacement aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing the bodies out to the margins interventions have tried to dislodge the aims of replacement but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity | the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization curriculum has invested in settler colonialism the settler colonial curricular project of replacement aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other, perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum absorbing the knowledge displacing the bodies out to the margins but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity | Natty Bumppo, not savage, and no longer European, is positioned to claim “native status,” symbolically taking the place of “the last of the mohicans” and of all the other vanishing tribes. The figure of the frontiers man who is one with nature saturates the U.S. cultural imaginary, from the Adirondack backwoodsman and the Order of the Arrow of the Boy Scouts of America (Alonso Recarte, 2010), to Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves and the most recent expression of the White settler-becoming-Indian, Johnny Depp’s characterization of Tonto. Natty Bumppo also resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of progressive fields such as curriculum studies. Here, the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy, and the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization. This article does the simultaneously blunt and delicate work of exhuming the ways in which curriculum and its history in the United States has invested in settler colonialism, and the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state. In particular, we will describe the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, which aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous. To do this, we employ the story of Natty Bumppo, as an extended allegory to understand the ways in which the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other, perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood. As we discuss in this article, even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream, like the knowledge gained by Natty Bumppo, only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics. White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum, such as multiculturalism and critical race theory, absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing the bodies out to the margins. Thus, we will discuss how various interventions have tried to dislodge the aims of replacement, including multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning, but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity. | 2,516 | <h4>The aff is <u>curriculum</u> – the 1AC’s strategy is premised upon utilizing knowledge as a telos which runs parallel to settler colonialism – they mystify the structuring foundation for the modern university: the walling off of indigenous bodies from civil society</h4><p><u><strong>Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez ’13.</u></strong> (Eve Tuck – professor of educational foundations and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, and RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity,” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, p. 72-89) </p><p>Natty Bumppo, not savage, and no longer European, is positioned to claim “native status,” symbolically taking the place of “the last of the mohicans” and of all the other vanishing tribes. The figure of the frontiers man who is one with nature saturates the U.S. cultural imaginary, from the Adirondack backwoodsman and the Order of the Arrow of the Boy Scouts of America (Alonso Recarte, 2010), to Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves and the most recent expression of <u>the White settler-becoming-Indian</u>, Johnny Depp’s characterization of Tonto. Natty Bumppo also <u>resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of</u> progressive fields such as <u>curriculum studies</u>. <u>Here,</u> <u><strong><mark>the future of the settler is ensured</u></strong> <u>by the</u> <u><strong>absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy</u></strong></mark>, <u>and <mark>the <strong>replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization</mark>.</u></strong> This article does the simultaneously blunt and delicate work of exhuming the ways in which <u><strong><mark>curriculum</mark> and its history in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><mark>has invested in settler colonialism</mark>, and</u> <u><strong>the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state</u></strong>. In particular, we will describe <u><mark>the settler colonial curricular project of replacement</u></mark>, which <u><mark>aims to</u> <u><strong>vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers</strong></mark>, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous</u>. To do this, we employ the story of Natty Bumppo, as an extended allegory to understand the ways in which <u><mark>the field of curriculum has continued to</u> <u><strong>absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other</u></strong>, <u><strong>perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood</u></strong></mark>. As we discuss in this article, <u>even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, <mark>these responses become</u> <u><strong>refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream</u></strong></mark>, like the knowledge gained by Natty Bumppo, <u>only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics</u>. <u><strong><mark>White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces”</u></strong> <u>opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum</u></mark>, such as multiculturalism and critical race theory, <u><strong><mark>absorbing the knowledge</mark>, but once again <mark>displacing the bodies out to the margins</u></strong></mark>. Thus, we will discuss how various <u>interventions have <strong>tried to dislodge</strong> the aims of replacement</u>, including multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning, <u><strong><mark>but</strong> have been</u> <u><strong>sidelined</u></strong> <u><strong>and reappropriated</u></strong> <u>in ways that</u> <u><strong>reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 74,295 | 51 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,516 | The term “marihuana” is historically racist – CP solves | Leafly 14 | Leafly 14 | The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture Many organizations publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of cannabis why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used in Between the years of 1910 and 1920 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression hit the United States, Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants in the South Americans began to treat cannabis and the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger testified Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon | The word “marijuana” gained publicity as a racist term Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist cannabis” was used 1920 Mexicans immigrated After The Depression Americans were searching for someone to blame Americans began to treat cannabis and Blacks and immigrants who consumed it as a foreign substance used to corrupt individuals Anslinger used the term “marijuana adding to the herb’s new “foreign” identity Though the word marijuana is common its history is deeply steeped in race the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction | http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB
The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon. | 5,661 | <h4><u><strong>The term “marihuana” is historically racist – CP solves</h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></u></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><mark>The word “marijuana” </mark>plays a controversial role in cannabis culture</u>. <u>Many</u> well-known <u>organizations</u> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u>publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of</u> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u>cannabis</u>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u>why has the word <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word in American culture. Rather, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u>in</u> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u>Between the years of 1910 and <mark>1920</u></mark>, over <u>890,000 <mark>Mexicans</mark> legally <mark>immigrated </mark>into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war.</u> <u>Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption</u>. <u>The idea of smoking cannabis entered</u> <u>mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. </u>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><mark>After</mark>math</u> <u>1930s: <mark>The </mark>Great <mark>Depression</u></mark> had just <u>hit the United States,</u> and <u><mark>Americans were <strong>searching for someone to blame</strong></mark>. Due to the influx of immigrants</u> (particularly <u>in the South</u>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><mark>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></mark> (<u><mark>and</u></mark>, arguably, <u><strong>the <mark>Blacks and </mark>Mexican <mark>immigrants who consumed it</mark>) <mark>as a foreign substance used to corrupt</mark> the minds and bodies of low-class <mark>individuals</mark>. </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u>Anslinger</u> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u>. In one documented incident, <u>Anslinger</u> <u>testified</u> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u>In another statement, <u>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the <strong>term “marijuana</mark>”</strong> when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <strong><mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</strong></mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,593 | 6 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,517 | We must exhaust the 1ac through a parasitic act which dooms the system to crumble under its own weight – otherwise, logics of incorporation ensures the recuperation of juridical domination | Bifo 11 | Bifo 11
Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108 | Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. | Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism energy is running out, and desire is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The proliferation of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies to permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death So hostages are taken the hostage is the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may become confused in the same sacrificial ac The West has become suicidal exhaustion could become withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt passivity radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity We have been working too much is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, | Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. | 9,709 | <h4><u><strong>We must exhaust the 1ac through a parasitic act which dooms the system to crumble under its own weight – otherwise, logics of incorporation ensures the recuperation of juridical domination</h4><p>Bifo 11</p><p></u></strong>Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u>pg. 104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong></mark>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> </mark>which has given soul to modern social dynamics <mark>is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>proliferation of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche <mark>to <strong>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only </mark>way of <mark>escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. <strong><mark>The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does</u></strong></mark> when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</strong> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death </mark>and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out <strong><mark>the hostage is the</mark> substitute, the <mark>alter-ego of the terrorist</strong>, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may </mark>thereafter <mark>become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u>No need</u>, then, <u>for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism, and</u> <u><strong>adopt </mark>the mode of <mark>passivity</u></strong></mark>. <u>A <strong><mark>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity </mark>that neoliberal politics has imposed</u>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u><mark>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out the law of economic growth</u>. <u>The self-organization of the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 174,846 | 274 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,518 | No impact—threat overestimated and global warming is solved by adaptation and mitigation. | Mendelsohn 9 | Mendelsohn 9, | debate about climate change comes from warnings that climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences The severe impacts by alarmists require a century of no mitigation or little adaptation. the net impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and people will adapt | warnings that climate change is an immediate threat to society are alarmist and misleading society’s vior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences impacts by alarmists require a century of no mitigation or adaptation the impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfol | (Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf
The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. the net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses. | 2,126 | <h4>No impact—threat overestimated and global warming is solved by adaptation and mitigation.</h4><p><u><strong>Mendelsohn 9</u></strong>, </p><p>(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf</p><p>The heart of the <u>debate about climate change comes from</u> a number of <u><mark>warnings</u></mark> from scientists and others that give the impression <u><mark>that</u></mark> human induced <u><mark>climate change is an immediate threat to society</u></mark> (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). <u>These statements <mark>are</u></mark> largely <u><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u><mark>society’s</mark> immediate beha<mark>vior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences</u></mark>. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear <u>that <mark>emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences</u></mark>. <u>The severe <mark>impacts</u></mark> predicted <u><mark>by alarmists require a century</u></mark> (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) <u><mark>of no mitigation</u></mark>. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no <u><mark>or</mark> little <mark>adaptation</mark>. <mark>the</mark> net</u> economic <u><mark>impacts</u></mark> from climate change over the next 50 years <u><mark>will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfol</mark>d</u> <u>and</u> many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because <u>people will adapt</u>. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses. </p> | 1NC | null | Hemp | 45,412 | 381 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,519 | 6 degree warming’s inevitable | AP 9 | AP 9 | Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions China alone adds 2 degrees to the projections Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050 the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century Global warming is speeding up that means top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago seas should rise a foot every 20 years | Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees even if every country cuts emissions projections take into account 80 percent cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050 developing nations aren't cutting their emissions China alone adds 2 degrees Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050 the world is still facing a 3-degree increase Global warming is speeding up that means projections from 2007 are overly optimistic | (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)
Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years. | 3,002 | <h4>6 degree warming’s inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>AP 9</u></strong> </p><p>(Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)</p><p><u><mark>Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees</mark> between now and the end of the century <mark>even if every country cuts</mark> greenhouse gas <mark>emissions</u></mark> as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. <u>The <mark>projections take into account 80 percent</mark> emission <mark>cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050</mark>, which are not sure things</u>. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. <u>Much of projected rise in temperature is because of <mark>developing nations</mark>, which <mark>aren't</mark> talking much about <mark>cutting their emissions</u></mark>, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. <u><mark>China alone adds</u></mark> nearly <u><mark>2 degrees</mark> to the projections</u>. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. <u><mark>Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050</u></mark>, as some experts propose, <u><mark>the world is still facing a 3-degree increase</mark> by the end of the century</u>, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. <u><mark>Global warming is speeding up</u></mark>, especially in the Arctic, and <u><mark>that means</u></mark> that some <u>top-level science <mark>projections from 2007 are</mark> already out of date and <mark>overly optimistic</u></mark>. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." <u>Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought</u>, it looks like the <u>seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago</u>, Corell said. He said <u>seas should rise</u> about <u>a foot every 20</u> to 25 <u>years</u>.</p> | 1NC | null | Hemp | 32,001 | 31 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,520 | We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must refuse interpellation and take back what belongs to the undercommons | Moten and Harney ‘13 , pg. 26-28) [m leap] | Moten and Harney ‘13 (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke, “The University and the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 26-28) [m leap] | The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong teaching would be performing the work of the university Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it it is teaching that brings us in teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university But what would it mean if the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act it is at the same time, the only possible act . To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood. | The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal one can sneak into the university and steal what one can. abuse its hospitality spite its mission join its refugee colony the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings She disappears into the Undercommons where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted Teaching is a profession an operation of the auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas And what of those minorities who refuse as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes into the Undercommons this will be regarded as theft a criminal act the only possible act To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and fugitive the criminal, matricidal, queer on the stroll of the stolen life the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others a radical passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood | The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One. “To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood. | 6,752 | <h4>We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must refuse interpellation and take back what belongs to the undercommons</h4><p><u><strong>Moten and Harney ‘13</u></strong> (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke, “The University and the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study<u><strong>, pg. 26-28) [m leap]</p><p></strong><mark>The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One</u></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal</u></strong></mark>,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. <u>This is the only possible relationship to the American university today.</u> This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But <u>certainly, this much is true in the United States:</u> <u>it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment</u>. In the face of these conditions <u><mark>one can </mark>only <strong><mark>sneak into the university</strong> and <strong>steal what one can</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>To <mark>abuse its hospitality</strong></mark>, to <strong><mark>spite its mission</strong></mark>, to <strong><mark>join its refugee colony</strong></mark>, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university</u>. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, <u><mark>the subversive intellectual <strong>came under false pretenses</strong>, with <strong>bad documents</strong>, <strong>out of love</u></strong></mark>. <u>Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome</u>. <u><strong><mark>The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings</u></strong></mark>. And on top of all that, she disappears. <u><mark>She disappears </mark>into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, <mark>into the <strong>Undercommons</strong></mark> of Enlightenment, <mark>where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted</mark>, where the revolution is <strong>still black, still strong</u></strong>. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say <u>teaching</u>, one <u>would be performing the work of the university</u>. <u><strong><mark>Teaching</strong> is</mark> merely <mark>a <strong>profession</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>an operation</strong> of</mark> what Jacques Derrida calls<mark> <strong>the</mark> </strong>onto-<strong>/<mark>auto-encyclopedic circle</strong> of the Universitas</u></mark>. But <u>it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters</u>. <u>The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby <strong>erased by it</u></strong>. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But <u>it is teaching that brings us in</u>. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and<u> teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university</u>. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” <u>But what would it mean if</u> teaching or rather what we might call “<u>the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance</u>? <u><mark>And what of those minorities who refuse</mark>, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), <mark>as if <strong>they will not be subjects</strong>, as if <strong>they want to think as objects</strong></mark>, as <strong>minority</u></strong>? Certainly, <u>the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste</u>. But <u>their collective labor will always call into question <strong>who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment</u></strong>. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps <u>the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must</u>. But <u>even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional</u>. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But <u><strong><mark>if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes</strong></mark> with hands full into the underground of the university, <strong><mark>into the Undercommons</strong></mark>—<mark>this will be <strong>regarded as theft</strong></mark>, as <mark>a <strong>criminal act</u></strong></mark>. And <u>it is at the same time, <strong><mark>the only possible act</u></strong></mark>. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research<u>. <mark>To enter this space is to <strong>inhabit the ruptural</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> enraptured disclosure of the commons that <strong><mark>fugitive</strong></mark> enlightenment enacts, <strong><mark>the criminal</strong>, <strong>matricidal</strong>, <strong>queer</strong></mark>, in the cistern, <strong><mark>on the stroll of the stolen life</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back</strong></mark>, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons</u>. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; <u><mark>it’s about <strong>allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>a radical</strong></mark> passion and <strong><mark>passivity</strong></mark> <mark>such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood</mark>, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an <strong>unsafe neighborhood</strong>.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 1,240,567 | 424 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,521 | The aff is a sentimental politics which utilizes spectacles of trauma in order to form political coalitions – those communities run parallel to nation-building which means those communities devolve into gatekeeping | Strick 14 | Strick 14 [Simon, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin, American Dolorologies, 2014, p. 132-6] | The concluding argument concerns late modern figurations of the body in pain. Spectacles of pain have proliferated in many forms in the contemporary American public sphere if indeed pain hasn't become its primary and all-pervading obsession Confessional TV shows exchange narratives of personal trauma and hurt for public intelligibility spectacles of suffering news reports narrate national-scale catastrophes There is also a proliferation of political discourse disclosing the injuries caused by contemporary forms of governing critical discourses continue to shed light on the structural violence of regimes of power identitarian movements expand public recognition of social and political injury, changing the scope of intelligibility These diverse affective readily distinguishable in neoliberal regimes Brown or Ahmed have pointed out the coopting of identitarian politics in contemporary governmental regimes These critical voices urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out' within radical politics can be separated from self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance Obama's ongoing focus on a "politics of empathy" recognition of suffering to democratic progress Academic debates have matched this capitalization on pain and compassion as necessary ingredients to the development of politics, ethics, or community making various diagnoses of America as trauma culture describe a highly disparate tension-laden field of affective discourse rather than a unified fixation on pain in contemporary Western societies Berlant has argued that these politics of affect dictate the continuous envelopment of the political in sentimental rhetoric Sentimentalism holds up the promise that subjectivity is granted in the recognition of pain Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer They] imagine a nonhierarchical social world that is . . . 'at heart' democratic because good intentions and love flourish in it" Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere assembled around pain bonded by feeling with what is unspeakable: a commonality of passionate and compassionate bodily subjects a "fantasy of generality through emotional likeness the emancipatory project of democracy relies on pain suffering, and a unified politics This is true for American culture and its foundational ideas The cultural sites participate in this public sphere where oppressive hurtings and social injuries are "counted in" toward a better politics of integration, understanding, and recognition The sentimental linkage indicates a larger genealogy that dominates American culture traced back to America's emancipatory foundation as a nation freed from colonial injury and informed by a national history of successful incorporations of marginalized subjects into the national project American dolorologies has related this discourse to an apparatus of cultural technologies such as compassion and affect and pain and the materializations of race and gender they covertly enact sentimentality has long been a popular rhetorical means by which pain is advanced This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has led to the public sphere becoming a site of intimate "affect" exchange This transformation is visible in the proliferation of mediatized forms of confession and other articulations of traumatized selfhood We can also see a . . . collusion between liberal, capitalist forms of mass entertainment and individualist therapies, and the feminist importance of the personal the articulation of trauma is furthermore supplemented by mainstream political discourse becoming compassionate and revolving primarily around the recognition of bodies in pain | Spectacles of pain have proliferated in the public sphere—if pain hasn't become its primary obsession shows exchange narratives of trauma spectacles of suffering There is political discourse disclosing injuries caused by governing critical discourses shed light on structural violence movements expand public recognition changing the scope of intelligibility diverse affective coopt identitarian politics in contemporary regimes These urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out' within radical politics can be separated from self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance Obama's ongoing focus on a "politics of empathy" Academic debates have matched this capitalization on pain as necessary to politics, ethics, or community making diagnoses of America as trauma culture describe affective discourse these politics of affect dictate the envelopment of the political in sentimental rhetoric Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer They] imagine a nonhierarchical social 'at heart' democratic because good intentions flourish in it Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere assembled around pain bonded by feeling what is unspeakable fantasy through emotional likeness This is true for American culture in this public sphere, where oppressive hurtings are "counted in" toward a better politics dolorologies has related this discourse to cultural tech such as compassion and affect This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has led to the public sphere becoming a site of intimate "affect" exchange We can see a . . . collusion between liberal, capitalist entertainment and individualist therapies trauma is supplemented by political discourse becoming compassionate and revolving around bodies in pain | The concluding argument concerns late modern figurations of the body in pain. Spectacles of pain have proliferated in many forms in the contemporary American public sphere—if indeed pain hasn't become its primary and all-pervading obsession. Confessional TV shows exchange narratives of personal trauma and hurt for public intelligibility; cinematic spectacles of suffering, from The Passion of the Christ (2004) to torture-porn favorite Hostel (2005), exhibit the body in pain for profit, thrill, and public outrage; news reports narrate national-scale catastrophes through individual testimonials of pain; reality game shows such as Survivor measure their contestants' bodily pain capacities against their resistance to (or aggressiveness in) traumatizing and abusive group dynamics. There is also a proliferation of political discourse disclosing the injuries caused by contemporary forms of governing: public movements raise consciousness for excluded and abjected forms of living, feeling, and aching in Western democracies; critical discourses continue to shed light on the structural violence of regimes of power; the interventions of identitarian movements and groups successfully expand public recognition of social and political injury, changing the scope of intelligibility in the process.¶ These diverse affective phenomena are not always readily distinguishable in neoliberal regimes. Scholars such as Wendy Brown or Sara Ahmed have pointed out the coopting of identitarian politics in contemporary governmental regimes. These critical voices urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out' and 'making visible' within so-called radical politics can be separated from the conventions of self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance" (Ahmed and Stacey 2001, 4). Bill Clinton's infamous tagline "I feel your pain" or Barack Obama's ongoing focus on a "politics of empathy"1 are only the presidential cases in point for an ongoing politics of pain that links recognition of suffering to democratic progress. Academic debates have matched this capitalization on pain and compassion as necessary ingredients to the development of politics, ethics, or community making, such as in Rosi Braidotti's call for the unification of feminist, gay, lesbian, and transgender identity politics under the label of a "community of the suffering."2 The various diagnoses of America as "wound culture" (Seltzer 1998) or "trauma culture" (Kaplan 2005), in this view, describe a highly disparate, tension-laden, and ambivalent field of affective discourse, rather than a unified or unifying fixation on pain in contemporary Western societies.¶ Lauren Berlant has argued that these politics of affect dictate the continuous envelopment of the political in sentimental rhetoric. Sentimentalism holds up the promise that subjectivity is granted in the recognition of pain and that democracy is realized as the participation in an ideal of common suffering and compassion. Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer and romantic conventions of individual historical acts of compassion and transcendence. [They] imagine a nonhierarchical social world that is . . . 'at heart' democratic because good intentions and love flourish in it" (2008, 6). Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere assembled around pain bonded by feeling with what is unspeakable: a commonality of passionate and compassionate bodily subjects, or a "fantasy of generality through emotional likeness in the domain of pain" (Berlant 2008, 6).¶ These arguments suggest a fundamental link between the sentimental evocation of pain and the discourses imagined as "at heart democratic." Indeed, the emancipatory project of democracy relies on articulations of pain, the recognition of those suffering, and a unified politics as remedy of this suffering. This is certainly true for American culture and its foundational ideas of promise and exceptionalism. The cultural sites I have pointed to participate in this evocation of a public sphere, where oppressive hurtings and social injuries are "counted in" toward a better politics of integration, understanding, and recognition. The sentimental linkage of emancipation through the circulation of pain and compassion as politics indicates a larger genealogy that dominates American culture and that this book has tried to elucidate. This genealogy was traced back to America's emancipatory foundation as a nation freed from colonial injury, and informed by a national history of successful incorporations of marginalized subjects into the national project (suffrage, abolitionism). American dolorologies has related this discourse to an apparatus of cultural technologies such as compassion, testimony to oppression, and articulations of affect and pain, and the materializations of race and gender they covertly enact. My analysis concurs with Berlant's observation that the various claims to pain as identity disarticulate their marginalizing effects in a rhetoric of universalization:¶ In the liberal tradition of the United States [testimony of pain] is not simply a mode of particularizing and puncturing self-description by minorities, but a rhetoric of universality located, not in abstract categories, but in what was thought to be, simultaneously, particular and universal experience. Indeed, it would not be exaggerating to say that sentimentality has long been a popular rhetorical means by which pain is advanced, in the United States, as the true core of personhood and citizenship. (2000, 34)¶ This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has, on the one hand, led to the public sphere becoming more and more a site of intimate "affect" exchange. This transformation is visible in the proliferation of mediatized forms of confession, testimony, and other articulations of traumatized selfhood, such as reality TV or the culture of therapeutic discourse. These governmental forms of achieving public subjectivity through speaking pain imitate and appropriate the critical formulations of differential experience from identitarian movements, at times becoming indistinguishable from them: "We can also see a . . . collusion between liberal, capitalist forms of mass entertainment and individualist therapies, and the feminist importance of the personal" (Ahmed 2000, 12). The achievement of public visibility through the articulation of trauma and pain is furthermore supplemented by mainstream political discourse becoming compassionate and revolving primarily around the recognition of bodies in pain.3¶ | 6,583 | <h4>The aff is a sentimental politics which utilizes spectacles of trauma in order to form political coalitions – those communities run parallel to nation-building which means those communities devolve into gatekeeping</h4><p><u><strong>Strick 14</u></strong> [Simon, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin, American Dolorologies, 2014, p. 132-6]</p><p><u>The concluding argument concerns late modern figurations of the body in pain. <strong><mark>Spectacles of pain</strong> have proliferated in</mark> many forms in <mark>the</mark> contemporary American <mark>public sphere</u>—<u>if</mark> indeed <mark>pain hasn't become its <strong>primary</strong></mark> and <strong>all-pervading</strong> <mark>obsession</u></mark>. <u>Confessional TV <mark>shows exchange narratives of</mark> personal <mark>trauma</mark> and hurt for public intelligibility</u>; cinematic <u><mark>spectacles of suffering</u></mark>, from The Passion of the Christ (2004) to torture-porn favorite Hostel (2005), exhibit the body in pain for profit, thrill, and public outrage; <u>news reports narrate national-scale catastrophes</u> through individual testimonials of pain; reality game shows such as Survivor measure their contestants' bodily pain capacities against their resistance to (or aggressiveness in) traumatizing and abusive group dynamics. <u><mark>There is</mark> also a proliferation of <mark>political discourse disclosing</mark> the <mark>injuries caused by</mark> contemporary forms of <mark>governing</u></mark>: public movements raise consciousness for excluded and abjected forms of living, feeling, and aching in Western democracies; <u><strong><mark>critical discourses</strong></mark> continue to <strong><mark>shed light</strong> on</mark> the <strong><mark>structural violence</strong></mark> of regimes of power</u>; the interventions of <u>identitarian <mark>movements</u></mark> and groups successfully <u><strong><mark>expand public recognition</strong></mark> of social and political injury, <mark>changing the scope of intelligibility</u></mark> in the process.¶ <u>These <strong><mark>diverse affective </u></strong></mark>phenomena are not always <u><strong>readily distinguishable</strong> in neoliberal regimes</u>. Scholars such as Wendy <u>Brown or</u> Sara <u>Ahmed have pointed out the <strong><mark>coopt</mark>ing of <mark>identitarian politics</strong> in <strong>contemporary</strong></mark> governmental <strong><mark>regimes</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>These </mark>critical voices <mark>urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out'</u></mark> and 'making visible' <u><mark>within</u></mark> so-called <u><mark>radical politics can be separated from</u></mark> the conventions of <u><mark>self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance</u></mark>" (Ahmed and Stacey 2001, 4). Bill Clinton's infamous tagline "I feel your pain" or Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama's ongoing focus</strong> on a "<strong>politics of empathy</strong>"</u></mark>1 are only the presidential cases in point for an ongoing politics of pain that links <u>recognition of suffering to democratic progress</u>. <u><strong><mark>Academic debates</u></strong> <u>have matched this <strong>capitalization</strong> on pain</mark> and compassion <mark>as <strong>necessary</mark> ingredients</strong> <mark>to</mark> the development of <strong><mark>politics</strong>, <strong>ethics</strong>, or <strong>community making</u></strong></mark>, such as in Rosi Braidotti's call for the unification of feminist, gay, lesbian, and transgender identity politics under the label of a "community of the suffering."2 The <u>various <mark>diagnoses of America as</u></mark> "wound culture" (Seltzer 1998) or "<u><mark>trauma culture</u></mark>" (Kaplan 2005), in this view, <u><mark>describe</mark> a highly disparate</u>, <u>tension-laden</u>, and ambivalent <u>field of <strong><mark>affective discourse</u></strong></mark>, <u>rather than a unified</u> or unifying <u>fixation on pain in contemporary Western societies</u>.¶ Lauren <u>Berlant has argued that <mark>these <strong>politics of affect</strong> dictate the</mark> continuous <mark>envelopment of</mark> <mark>the <strong>political</strong> in <strong>sentimental rhetoric</u></strong></mark>. <u>Sentimentalism holds up the promise that subjectivity is granted in the recognition of pain</u> and that democracy is realized as the participation in an ideal of common suffering and compassion. <u><mark>Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer</u></mark> and romantic conventions of individual historical acts of compassion and transcendence. [<u><mark>They] imagine a nonhierarchical social</mark> world that is . . . <mark>'at heart' democratic because good intentions</mark> and love <mark>flourish in it</mark>"</u> (2008, 6). <u><mark>Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere</mark> <mark>assembled around pain bonded by feeling</mark> with <strong><mark>what is unspeakable</strong></mark>: a commonality of passionate and compassionate bodily subjects</u>, or <u>a "<mark>fantasy</mark> of generality <mark>through emotional likeness</u></mark> in the domain of pain" (Berlant 2008, 6).¶ These arguments suggest a fundamental link between the sentimental evocation of pain and the discourses imagined as "at heart democratic." Indeed, <u>the emancipatory project of democracy relies on</u> articulations of <u>pain</u>, the recognition of those <u>suffering, and a unified politics</u> as remedy of this suffering. <u><mark>This is</u></mark> certainly <u><mark>true for American culture</mark> and its foundational ideas</u> of promise and exceptionalism. <u>The cultural sites</u> I have pointed to <u>participate <mark>in this</u></mark> evocation of a <u><strong><mark>public sphere</u></strong>, <u>where oppressive hurtings</mark> and social injuries <mark>are "counted in" toward a better politics</mark> of integration, understanding, and recognition</u>. <u>The <strong>sentimental linkage</u></strong> of emancipation through the circulation of pain and compassion as politics <u>indicates a larger genealogy that dominates American culture</u> and that this book has tried to elucidate. This genealogy was <u>traced back to America's emancipatory foundation as a nation freed from colonial injury</u>, <u>and informed by a national history of successful incorporations of marginalized subjects into the national project</u> (suffrage, abolitionism). <u>American <mark>dolorologies has related this discourse to</mark> an apparatus of <mark>cultural tech</mark>nologies <mark>such as compassion</u></mark>, testimony to oppression, <u><mark>and</u></mark> articulations of <u><mark>affect</mark> and pain</u>, <u>and the materializations of race and gender they covertly enact</u>. My analysis concurs with Berlant's observation that the various claims to pain as identity disarticulate their marginalizing effects in a rhetoric of universalization:¶ In the liberal tradition of the United States [testimony of pain] is not simply a mode of particularizing and puncturing self-description by minorities, but a rhetoric of universality located, not in abstract categories, but in what was thought to be, simultaneously, particular and universal experience. Indeed, it would not be exaggerating to say that <u><strong>sentimentality</u></strong> <u>has long been a popular rhetorical means by which pain is advanced</u>, in the United States, as the true core of personhood and citizenship. (2000, 34)¶ <u><mark>This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has</u></mark>, on the one hand, <u><mark>led to the public sphere becoming</u></mark> more and more <u><mark>a site of <strong>intimate "affect" exchange</u></strong></mark>. <u>This transformation is visible in the proliferation of mediatized forms of confession</u>, testimony, <u>and other articulations of traumatized selfhood</u>, such as reality TV or the culture of therapeutic discourse. These governmental forms of achieving public subjectivity through speaking pain imitate and appropriate the critical formulations of differential experience from identitarian movements, at times becoming indistinguishable from them: "<u><mark>We can</mark> also <mark>see a . . . collusion between</mark> <strong><mark>liberal, capitalist</strong></mark> forms of mass <mark>entertainment and individualist therapies</mark>, and the feminist importance of the personal</u>" (Ahmed 2000, 12). The achievement of public visibility through <u>the articulation of <mark>trauma</u></mark> and pain <u><mark>is</mark> furthermore <mark>supplemented by</mark> mainstream <mark>political discourse <strong>becoming compassionate</strong></mark> <mark>and revolving</mark> primarily <mark>around</mark> the recognition of <strong><mark>bodies in pain</u></strong></mark>.3¶ </p> | 1NC | null | Off | 98,587 | 104 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,522 | Border violence doesn’t spill over – deterred by squo law enforcement | Valdez ‘12 | Valdez ‘12
(Diana Washington Valdez “Border report: No 'spillover' violence from Mexican drug-cartel wars” 04/20/2012 12:00:00 AM MDT http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_20439268/border-report-no-spillover-violence-from-mexican-drug-cartel-wars, TSW) | Mexican drug-cartel wars have not led to significant "spillover" violence on the U.S. side of the border, according to a new national the Washington Office on Latin America While Mexico has suffered this violence is not spilling over the border the report based on a yearlong investigation on both sides of the border The FBI's Southwestern offices identified 62 cartel-related kidnapping cases on U.S. soil that involved cartels or undocumented immigrants in 2009. The count fell to 25 in 2010 and 10 as of July 2011, according to the report. statistics show that crime along the U.S. border generally is lower than statewide averages. four border states are becoming rapidly safer they are likely to be repelled by U.S. federal and local law enforcement and by the U.S. military, which has already deployed resources to help in counternarcotics missions. | Mexican drug-cartel wars have not led to significant "spillover" violence on the U.S. side of the border, according to a new national While Mexico has suffered this violence is not spilling over the border the report based on a yearlong investigation on both sides of the border statistics show that crime along the U.S. border generally is lower than statewide averages. four border states are becoming rapidly safer they are likely to be repelled by U.S. federal and local law enforcement and by the U.S. military, which has already deployed resources to help in counternarcotics missions. | The Mexican drug-cartel wars that fueled soaring homicide rates south of the border have not led to significant "spillover" violence on the U.S. side of the border, according to a new national report released Thursday. The report, "Beyond the Border Buildup," was produced by the Washington Office on Latin America, a think tank that advises U.S. policymakers, and Mexico's Colegio de la Frontera Norte, a prominent research college with branches in Tijuana and Juárez. "While Mexico has suffered over 50,000 organized-crime- related murders since 2007, this violence is not spilling over the border," said the report based on a yearlong investigation on both sides of the border. However, cartel-related kidnappings did take place in the United States, although less is known about them because victims fearing reprisals are reluctant to report them. "Beyond homicide, Mexican organized crime groups do hold kidnapped migrants and smuggled drugs in safe houses throughout the border region," the report said. It added that statistics show the abductions appear to be on the decline. The FBI's Southwestern offices identified 62 cartel-related kidnapping cases on U.S. soil that involved cartels or undocumented immigrants in 2009. The count fell to 25 in 2010 and 10 as of July 2011, according to the report. The 83-page report also said that despite record investment by the U.S. government in border security, U.S. law enforcement agencies lack a coordinated border security plan, and drugs continue to flow into the United States through understaffed international bridges. Last week, Mexican presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto told the Reuters news service that if elected he would work to create a 40,000-strong paramilitary force with police powers, or gendarmerie, to battle cartels. He also said his priority is to curtail the violence. George Grayson, author of several books on Mexican drug organizations, said Peña Nieto's proposal would require broad political support that he's not sure exists in Mexico right now. "Politicians don't want a strong police force in Mexico," Grayson said. "Half the governors are probably linked to the cartels or turn a blind to them." He said the dynamics in the drug-cartel wars change rapidly, and they will change again before a new president is elected. For example, he said, reports that Joa quin "Cha po" Guzman has issued a challenge to Los Zetas could, if true, result in more violence. Los Zetas operate along the eastern coast of Mexico, up to South Texas. Guzman's cartel operates in Central and Western Mexico. Last month, forces claiming to represent Guzman killed and dismembered alleged Zetas and wrote a message on a "narco banner" aimed at the Zetas. "Things could get thicker and more toxic," said Grayson, a professor at William & Mary College who has a book on the Zetas coming out soon. Guzman is still fighting the Carrillo Fuentes drug cartel in the state of Chihuahua, a conflict that has killed more than 9,400 people in Juárez. Rumors of a cease-fire have surfaced at times, but the killings continue. El Paso lawyer Carlos Spector, who has represented U.S. asylum petitions by Mexican citizens, views the paramilitary proposal as bad for Mexico. "The only thing that differentiated Mexico from Colombia in the drug-trade issue was the creation of a paramilitary force," Spector said. "This is the worst thing that Mexico could do. It would perpetuate the violence and abuses with less accountability. "This would be like setting loose a military on steroids, and like in Colombia, I fear that the right-wing elements would take advantage of a paramilitary." Robert Bunker, a national security expert in California, said he supports Peña Nieto's paramilitary proposal, assuming it's carried out correctly. "Such a paramilitary force would have to be national in scope and utilize both top-down (centralized) and bottom-up (networked) organizational attributes," Bunker said. "Further, such a force would need to draw upon both military and policing capabilities. For example, it would have to be able to utilize both military and criminal intelligence protocols. "This would allow it to effectively operate in the 'blurring of crime and war operational environment' in which the criminal insurgencies are taking place in Mexico," said Bunker. He added that the drug-cartel landscape may be narrowing. "In Mexico, I think we are seeing both increasing centralization and decentralization of the narco wars," he said. "We appear to now have a two-cartel conflict between the Zetas and Sinaloa alliances, while at the same time numerous baby cartels, or cartel factions, have also emerged. "The old landscape of half a dozen or so middle-size cartels based on the 'plaza' system, which dates back to the late 1980s, is no more." According to the "Border Buildup" report, "The threat of the horrors in Mexico reaching U.S. soil is a regular theme of speeches and declarations from legislators, governor and state officials in Texas and Arizona, local political and law-enforcement leaders from counties near -- but not on -- the U.S.-Mexico border, and some ranches in remote border zones." But statistics show that crime along the U.S. border generally is lower than statewide averages. "The four (U.S.) border states themselves are becoming rapidly safer. (FBI) statistics show all violent crime dropping by 11 percent, and homicides dropping by 19 percent, between 2005 and 2010 in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas," the report said. The report said U.S. sources speculate that drug cartels follow an unwritten understanding to keep wholesale violence from crossing the border. Otherwise, they are likely to be repelled by U.S. federal and local law enforcement, and by the U.S. military, which has already deployed resources to help in counternarcotics missions. | 5,851 | <h4>Border violence doesn’t spill over – deterred by squo<u><strong> law enforcement</h4><p>Valdez ‘12</p><p></u></strong>(Diana Washington Valdez “Border report: No 'spillover' violence from Mexican drug-cartel wars” 04/20/2012 12:00:00 AM MDT http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_20439268/border-report-no-spillover-violence-from-mexican-drug-cartel-wars<u><strong>, TSW)</p><p></u></strong>The <u><mark>Mexican drug-cartel wars</u></mark> that fueled soaring homicide rates south of the border <u><mark>have not led to significant "spillover" violence on the U.S. side of the border, according to a new national</u></mark> report released Thursday. The report, "Beyond the Border Buildup," was produced by <u>the Washington Office on Latin America</u>, a think tank that advises U.S. policymakers, and Mexico's Colegio de la Frontera Norte, a prominent research college with branches in Tijuana and Juárez. "<u><mark>While Mexico has suffered</u></mark> over 50,000 organized-crime- related murders since 2007, <u><mark>this violence is not spilling over the border</u></mark>," said <u><mark>the report based on a yearlong investigation</u></mark> <u><mark>on both sides of the border</u></mark>. However, cartel-related kidnappings did take place in the United States, although less is known about them because victims fearing reprisals are reluctant to report them. "Beyond homicide, Mexican organized crime groups do hold kidnapped migrants and smuggled drugs in safe houses throughout the border region," the report said. It added that statistics show the abductions appear to be on the decline. <u>The FBI's Southwestern offices identified 62 cartel-related kidnapping cases on U.S. soil that involved cartels or undocumented immigrants in 2009. The count fell to 25 in 2010 and 10 as of July 2011, according to the report. </u>The 83-page report also said that despite record investment by the U.S. government in border security, U.S. law enforcement agencies lack a coordinated border security plan, and drugs continue to flow into the United States through understaffed international bridges. Last week, Mexican presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto told the Reuters news service that if elected he would work to create a 40,000-strong paramilitary force with police powers, or gendarmerie, to battle cartels. He also said his priority is to curtail the violence. George Grayson, author of several books on Mexican drug organizations, said Peña Nieto's proposal would require broad political support that he's not sure exists in Mexico right now. "Politicians don't want a strong police force in Mexico," Grayson said. "Half the governors are probably linked to the cartels or turn a blind to them." He said the dynamics in the drug-cartel wars change rapidly, and they will change again before a new president is elected. For example, he said, reports that Joa quin "Cha po" Guzman has issued a challenge to Los Zetas could, if true, result in more violence. Los Zetas operate along the eastern coast of Mexico, up to South Texas. Guzman's cartel operates in Central and Western Mexico. Last month, forces claiming to represent Guzman killed and dismembered alleged Zetas and wrote a message on a "narco banner" aimed at the Zetas. "Things could get thicker and more toxic," said Grayson, a professor at William & Mary College who has a book on the Zetas coming out soon. Guzman is still fighting the Carrillo Fuentes drug cartel in the state of Chihuahua, a conflict that has killed more than 9,400 people in Juárez. Rumors of a cease-fire have surfaced at times, but the killings continue. El Paso lawyer Carlos Spector, who has represented U.S. asylum petitions by Mexican citizens, views the paramilitary proposal as bad for Mexico. "The only thing that differentiated Mexico from Colombia in the drug-trade issue was the creation of a paramilitary force," Spector said. "This is the worst thing that Mexico could do. It would perpetuate the violence and abuses with less accountability. "This would be like setting loose a military on steroids, and like in Colombia, I fear that the right-wing elements would take advantage of a paramilitary." Robert Bunker, a national security expert in California, said he supports Peña Nieto's paramilitary proposal, assuming it's carried out correctly. "Such a paramilitary force would have to be national in scope and utilize both top-down (centralized) and bottom-up (networked) organizational attributes," Bunker said. "Further, such a force would need to draw upon both military and policing capabilities. For example, it would have to be able to utilize both military and criminal intelligence protocols. "This would allow it to effectively operate in the 'blurring of crime and war operational environment' in which the criminal insurgencies are taking place in Mexico," said Bunker. He added that the drug-cartel landscape may be narrowing. "In Mexico, I think we are seeing both increasing centralization and decentralization of the narco wars," he said. "We appear to now have a two-cartel conflict between the Zetas and Sinaloa alliances, while at the same time numerous baby cartels, or cartel factions, have also emerged. "The old landscape of half a dozen or so middle-size cartels based on the 'plaza' system, which dates back to the late 1980s, is no more." According to the "Border Buildup" report, "The threat of the horrors in Mexico reaching U.S. soil is a regular theme of speeches and declarations from legislators, governor and state officials in Texas and Arizona, local political and law-enforcement leaders from counties near -- but not on -- the U.S.-Mexico border, and some ranches in remote border zones." But <u><mark>statistics show that crime along the U.S. border generally is lower than statewide averages.</mark> </u>"The <u><mark>four</u></mark> (U.S.) <u><mark>border states</u></mark> themselves <u><mark>are becoming rapidly safer</u></mark>. (FBI) statistics show all violent crime dropping by 11 percent, and homicides dropping by 19 percent, between 2005 and 2010 in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas," the report said. The report said U.S. sources speculate that drug cartels follow an unwritten understanding to keep wholesale violence from crossing the border. Otherwise, <u><mark>they are likely to be repelled by U.S. federal and local law enforcement</u></mark>, <u><mark>and by the U.S. military, which has already deployed resources to help in counternarcotics missions.</p></u></mark> | 1NC | null | Cartels | 429,888 | 2 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,523 | No nuclear terror- lack of resources, expertise, facilities, and certainty | Stalcup ‘12 | Stalcup ‘12
[Travis C. Stalcup is a George and Barbara Bush Fellow at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. http://journal.georgetown.edu/2012/09/11/a-better-plan-for-port-security-by-travis-stalcup/ ETB] | the most competent and well-financed terrorists groups would face difficulty in mustering the resources, expertise and facilities to enrich nuclear material in meaningful quantities Even if a group were to obtain nuclear material or a weapon, it is unlikely that it would expend the vast resources required to deliver it on such an uncertain operation | terrorists groups would face difficulty in mustering the resources, expertise and facilities to enrich nuclear material Even if a group were to obtain nuclear material or a weapon, it is unlikely that it would expend the vast resources required to deliver it on such an uncertain operation | However, the most competent and well-financed terrorists groups would face difficulty in mustering the resources, expertise and facilities to enrich nuclear material in meaningful quantities. Randomized spot checks would create doubt that an attack using shipping containers would succeed. Even if a terrorist group were to obtain nuclear material or a weapon, it is unlikely that it would expend the vast resources required to deliver it on such an uncertain operation. The uncertainty created by spot checks in addition to the enormous technical and financial obstacles a terrorist group faces would serve to deter. | 618 | <h4><u><strong>No nuclear terror- lack of resources, expertise, facilities, and certainty</h4><p>Stalcup ‘12</p><p></u></strong>[Travis C. Stalcup is a George and Barbara Bush Fellow at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. http://journal.georgetown.edu/2012/09/11/a-better-plan-for-port-security-by-travis-stalcup/ ETB]</p><p>However, <u>the most competent and well-financed <mark>terrorists groups would face difficulty in mustering the resources, expertise and facilities to enrich nuclear material</mark> in meaningful quantities</u>. Randomized spot checks would create doubt that an attack using shipping containers would succeed. <u><mark>Even if a</u> </mark>terrorist <u><mark>group were to obtain nuclear material or a weapon, it is unlikely that it would expend the vast resources required to deliver it on such an uncertain operation</u></mark>. The uncertainty created by spot checks in addition to the enormous technical and financial obstacles a terrorist group faces would serve to deter.</p> | 1NC | null | Cartels | 429,889 | 3 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,524 | The 1ac’s strategy of narration assumes a notion of animacy and coherency which excludes nonhuman bodies – instead you should queer the notion of the human | Chen 12. | Chen 12. Mel Y. Chen, professor of linguistics and women’s studies at UC Berkeley, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect, Duke U Press, pg. 10 | political interest stokes public alarm toward “toxins We must understand the ways in which toxicity has been so enthusiastically taken up during times of economic instability and panic about transnational flow Animacies demonstrates that interests in toxicity are particularly (if sometimes stealthily) raced and queered toxins participate vividly in the racial mattering of locations, human and nonhuman bodies, living and inert entities, and events such as disease threats Animacies not only takes into account the broadening field of nonhuman life as a proper object, but even more sensitively, the animateness or inanimateness of entities that are considered either “live” or “dead. Considering differential animacies becomes a particularly critical matter when “life” versus “death” binary oppositions fail to capture the affectively embodied ways that racializations of specific groups are differentially rendered the affective state of being ‘animated’ seems to imply the most basic or minimal of all affective conditions: that of being, in one way or another, ‘moved But we see how the seemingly neutral state of ‘being moved’ becomes twisted into the image of the overemotional racialized subject the constant interabsorption of animate and inanimate bodies in the case of airborne pollution must account for the physical nonintegrity of individual bodies and the merging of forms of “life” and “nonlife.” This book seeks to trouble this binary of life and nonlife as it offers a different way to conceive of relationality and intersubjective exchange this book focuses critically on an interest in the animal that hides in animacy, particularly in the interest of its attachment to things like sex, race, class, and dirt my purpose is not to reinvest certain materialities with life, but to remap live and dead zones away from those very terms, leveraging animacy toward a consideration of affect in its queered and raced formations my core sense of “queer” refers to exceptions to the conventional ordering of sex, reproduction, and intimacy, though it at times also refers to animacy’s veering-away from dominant ontologies and the normativities they promulgate queering is immanent to animate transgressions, violating proper intimacies (including between humans and nonhuman things). I define affect without necessary restriction affect is something not necessarily corporeal and that it potentially engages many bodies at once, rather than (only) being contained as an emotion within a single body the entry of an exterior object not only influences the further affectivity of an intoxicated human body, but “emotions” that body: it lends it particular emotions or feelings as against others emotions involve subjects and objects, but without residing positively within them If affect includes affectivity then affect becomes a study of the governmentality of animate hierarchies, an examination of how acts seem to operate with, or against, the order of things Queer theory has been at the forefront of recalibrating many categories of difference, and it has further rewritten how we understand affect, especially with regard to trauma, death, mourning, shame, loss, impossibility, and intimacy | interests in toxicity are stealthily) raced and queered toxins participate vividly in the racial mattering of human and nonhuman bodies, living and inert entities disease threats Animacies take into account nonhuman life the animateness of entities considered live” or “dead particularly critical when binary oppositions fail to capture affectively embodied racializations the affective state of being ‘animated’ seems to imply the minimal affective condition that of being moved the constant interabsorption of animate and inanimate bodies must account physical nonintegrity uble this binary of life and nonlife offer a different way to conceive of relationality and intersubjective exchange focus critically on the animal that hides in animacy its attachment to sex, race, class, and dirt remap live and dead zones affect queer refers to exceptions to the conventional ordering of sex, reproduction though also animacy’s veering-away from dominant ontologies queering is immanent to animate transgression affect is not necessarily corporeal and engages many bodies at once affect becomes a study of the governmentality of animate hierarchies how acts operate with, or against the order of things Queer theory has been recalibrating categories of difference | Furthermore, political interest stokes public alarm toward “toxins.” We must therefore understand the ways in which toxicity has been so enthusiastically taken up during times of economic instability and panic about transnational flow. Animacies demonstrates that interests in toxicity are particularly (if sometimes stealthily) raced and queered. Indeed, toxins participate vividly in the racial mattering of locations, human and nonhuman bodies, living and inert entities, and events such as disease threats. This book aims to offer ways of mapping and diagnosing the mutual imbrications of race, sexuality, ability, environ¬ment, and sovereign concern.¶ In addition, animal and science studies have offered tools through which we can rethink the significance of molecular, cellular, animal, vegetable, or nonhuman life.22 Animacies not only takes into account the broadening field of nonhuman life as a proper object, but even more sensitively, the animateness or inanimateness of entities that are considered either “live” or “dead.” Considering differential animacies becomes a particularly critical matter when “life” versus “death” binary oppositions fail to capture the affectively embodied ways that racializations of specific groups are differentially rendered. Sianne Ngai explores the affective meanings of the term animatedness, focusing on its manifestation as a property of Asianness and of blackness: “the affective state of being ‘animated’ seems to imply the most basic or minimal of all affective conditions: that of being, in one way or another, ‘moved.’ But, as we press harder on the affective meanings of animatedness, we shall see how the seemingly neutral state of ‘being moved’ becomes twisted into the image of the overemotional racialized subject.”23 Animacy has consequences for both able-bodiedness and ability, especially since a consideration of “inanimate life” imbues the discourses around environmental illness and toxicity. For instance, the constant interabsorption of animate and inanimate bodies in the case of airborne pollution must account for the physical nonintegrity of individual bodies and the merging of forms of “life” and “nonlife.” This book seeks to trouble this binary of life and nonlife as it offers a different way to conceive of relationality and intersubjective exchange.¶ I detail an animacy that is in indirect conversation with historical vitalisms as well as Bennett’s “vital materiality.”24 Yet this book focuses critically on an interest in the animal that hides in animacy, particularly in the interest of its attachment to things like sex, race, class, and dirt. That is, my purpose is not to reinvest certain materialities with life, but to remap live and dead zones away from those very terms, leveraging animacy toward a consideration of affect in its queered and raced formations. Throughout the book, my core sense of “queer” refers, as might be expected, to exceptions to the conventional ordering of sex, reproduction, and intimacy, though it at times also refers to animacy’s veering-away from dominant ontologies and the normativities they promulgate. That is, I suggest that queering is immanent to animate transgressions, violating proper intimacies (including between humans and nonhuman things).¶ For the purposes of this book, I define affect without necessary restriction, that is, I include the notion that affect is something not necessarily corporeal and that it potentially engages many bodies at once, rather than (only) being contained as an emotion within a single body. Affect inheres in the capacity to affect and be affected. Yet I am also interested in the relatively subjective, individually held “emotion” or “feeling.” While I prioritize the former, I also attend to the latter (with cautions about its true possessibility) precisely because, in the case of environmental illness or multiple chemical sensitivity, the entry of an exterior object not only influences the further affectivity of an intoxicated human body, but “emotions” that body: it lends it particular emotions or feelings as against others. I take my cue from Sara Ahmed’s notion of “affective economies,” in which specific emo¬tions play roles in binding subjects and objects. She writes, “emotions involve subjects and objects, but without residing positively within them. Indeed, emotions may seem like a force of residence as an effect of a certain history, a history that may operate by concealing its own traces.”25 The traces I examine in this book are those of animate hierarchies. If affect includes affectivity — how one body affects another— then affect, in this book, becomes a study of the governmentality of animate hierarchies, an examination of how acts seem to operate with, or against, the order of things (to appropriate Foucault’s phrasing for different purposes).26¶ Queer theory, building upon feminism’s critique of gender difference, has been at the forefront of recalibrating many categories of difference, and it has further rewritten how we understand affect, especially with regard to trauma, death, mourning, shame, loss, impossibility, and intimacy (not least because of the impact of the hiv/ aids crisis); key thinkers here include Ann Cvetkovich, Lauren Ber- lant, Heather Love, and Lee Edelman, among others.27 As will be dem¬onstrated, these are all terms that intersect in productive ways with animacy. | 5,401 | <h4>The 1ac’s strategy of narration assumes a notion of animacy and coherency which excludes nonhuman bodies – instead you should queer the notion of the human</h4><p><u><strong>Chen 12.</u></strong> Mel Y. Chen, professor of linguistics and women’s studies at UC Berkeley, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect, Duke U Press, pg. 10</p><p>Furthermore, <u>political interest stokes public alarm toward “toxins</u>.” <u>We must</u> therefore <u>understand the ways in which <strong>toxicity</strong> has been so <strong>enthusiastically taken up</strong> during times of <strong>economic instability</strong> and <strong>panic about transnational flow</u></strong>. <u>Animacies demonstrates that <strong><mark>interests in toxicity</strong> are</mark> <strong>particularly</strong> (if sometimes <strong><mark>stealthily</strong>) <strong>raced</strong> and <strong>queered</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>toxins</strong> participate <strong>vividly</strong> in the <strong>racial mattering</strong> of</mark> <strong>locations</strong>, <strong><mark>human</strong> and <strong>nonhuman</strong> <strong>bodies</strong>, <strong>living</strong> and <strong>inert entities</strong></mark>, and events such as <strong><mark>disease threats</u></strong></mark>. This book aims to offer ways of mapping and diagnosing the mutual imbrications of race, sexuality, ability, environ¬ment, and sovereign concern.¶ In addition, animal and science studies have offered tools through which we can rethink the significance of molecular, cellular, animal, vegetable, or nonhuman life.22 <u><mark>Animacies</mark> not only <mark>take</mark>s <mark>into account</mark> the <strong>broadening field of <mark>nonhuman life</strong></mark> as a <strong>proper object</strong>, but even more sensitively, <mark>the <strong>animateness</mark> or inanimateness</strong> <mark>of entities</mark> that are <mark>considered</mark> either “<strong><mark>live</strong>” or “<strong>dead</strong></mark>.</u>” <u><strong>Considering differential animacies</strong> becomes a <mark>particularly <strong>critical</strong></mark> matter <mark>when</mark> “<strong>life” versus “death</strong>” <mark>binary oppositions <strong>fail</strong> to capture</mark> the <strong><mark>affectively embodied</strong></mark> ways that <strong><mark>racializations</strong></mark> of specific groups are differentially rendered</u>. Sianne Ngai explores the affective meanings of the term animatedness, focusing on its manifestation as a property of Asianness and of blackness: “<u><mark>the <strong>affective state of being ‘animated’</strong> seems to imply</mark> <mark>the</mark> most <strong>basic</strong> or <strong><mark>minimal</strong></mark> of all <mark>affective</mark> <mark>condition</mark>s: <mark>that of being</mark>, in one way or another, ‘<mark>moved</u></mark>.’ <u>But</u>, as we press harder on the affective meanings of animatedness, <u>we</u> shall <u>see how the seemingly neutral state of ‘being moved’ becomes twisted into the image of the overemotional racialized subject</u>.”23 Animacy has consequences for both able-bodiedness and ability, especially since a consideration of “inanimate life” imbues the discourses around environmental illness and toxicity. For instance, <u><mark>the <strong>constant interabsorption</strong> of animate and inanimate bodies</mark> in the case of airborne pollution <mark>must account</mark> for the <strong><mark>physical nonintegrity</strong></mark> of individual bodies and the merging of forms of “<strong>life” and “nonlife</strong>.” This book seeks to <strong>tro<mark>uble</strong> this <strong>binary of life and nonlife</strong></mark> as it <mark>offer</mark>s <mark>a different way to <strong>conceive</strong> of <strong>relationality</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>intersubjective exchange</u></strong></mark>.¶ I detail an animacy that is in indirect conversation with historical vitalisms as well as Bennett’s “vital materiality.”24 Yet <u>this book <strong><mark>focus</mark>es <mark>critically</strong></mark> <mark>on</mark> an interest in <strong><mark>the animal</strong> that hides in animacy</mark>, particularly in the interest of <mark>its <strong>attachment</strong> to</mark> things like <strong><mark>sex</strong>, <strong>race</strong>, <strong>class</strong>, and <strong>dirt</u></strong></mark>. That is, <u>my purpose is not to <strong>reinvest</strong> certain <strong>materialities with life</strong>, but to <strong><mark>remap live</strong> and <strong>dead zones</strong></mark> away from <strong>those very terms</strong>, leveraging animacy toward a <strong>consideration</strong> of <strong><mark>affect</strong></mark> in its <strong>queered</strong> and <strong>raced</strong> formations</u>. Throughout the book, <u>my core sense of “<mark>queer</mark>” <mark>refers</u></mark>, as might be expected, <u><mark>to <strong>exceptions</strong> to the <strong>conventional ordering of sex</strong>, <strong>reproduction</strong></mark>, and <strong>intimacy</strong>, <mark>though</mark> it at times <mark>also</mark> refers to <strong><mark>animacy’s veering-away</strong> from <strong>dominant ontologies</strong></mark> and the <strong>normativities</strong> they promulgate</u>. That is, I suggest that <u><mark>queering is <strong>immanent</strong> to <strong>animate transgression</mark>s</strong>, <strong>violating proper intimacies</strong> (including between humans and nonhuman things).</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>For the purposes of this book, <u>I define affect without necessary restriction</u>, that is, I include the notion that <u><strong><mark>affect</strong></mark> <mark>is</mark> something <strong><mark>not necessarily corporeal</strong> and</mark> that it potentially <strong><mark>engages many bodies at once</strong></mark>, rather than <strong>(only) being contained</strong> as an emotion within a single body</u>. Affect inheres in the capacity to affect and be affected. Yet I am also interested in the relatively subjective, individually held “emotion” or “feeling.” While I prioritize the former, I also attend to the latter (with cautions about its true possessibility) precisely because, in the case of environmental illness or multiple chemical sensitivity, <u>the entry of an exterior object not only influences the further affectivity of an intoxicated human body, but “emotions” that body: it lends it particular emotions or feelings as against others</u>. I take my cue from Sara Ahmed’s notion of “affective economies,” in which specific emo¬tions play roles in binding subjects and objects. She writes, “<u>emotions involve subjects and objects, but <strong>without residing positively</strong> within them</u>. Indeed, emotions may seem like a force of residence as an effect of a certain history, a history that may operate by concealing its own traces.”25 The traces I examine in this book are those of animate hierarchies. <u>If <strong>affect includes affectivity</u></strong> — how one body affects another— <u>then <strong><mark>affect</u></strong></mark>, in this book, <u><mark>becomes <strong>a study of the governmentality</strong> of <strong>animate hierarchies</strong></mark>, an <strong>examination</strong> of <mark>how acts</mark> seem to <strong><mark>operate with, or against</strong></mark>, <mark>the <strong>order of things</u></strong></mark> (to appropriate Foucault’s phrasing for different purposes).26¶ <u><mark>Queer theory</u></mark>, building upon feminism’s critique of gender difference, <u><mark>has been</mark> at the forefront of <strong><mark>recalibrating</strong></mark> many <strong><mark>categories of difference</strong></mark>, and it has further rewritten how we understand affect, especially with regard to trauma, death, mourning, shame, loss, impossibility, and intimacy</u> (not least because of the impact of the hiv/ aids crisis); key thinkers here include Ann Cvetkovich, Lauren Ber- lant, Heather Love, and Lee Edelman, among others.27 As will be dem¬onstrated, these are all terms that intersect in productive ways with animacy. </p> | 1NC | null | Off | 39,681 | 24 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,525 | The object position is the only means of freedom. They deny this possibility through an emphasis on ability, utility, and work work work. Dare to be stupid, dare to be object. | Baudrillard 1985 | Baudrillard 1985 (Simulacra and Simulation, 83-86) | there is a paradox in this inextricable conjunction of the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed [informe] or informed [informée] masses, or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? The media carry meaning and countermeaning, they manipulate in all directions at once, nothing can control this process, they are the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and the simulation that destroys the system, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic - and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind - exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject [she or] he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy. in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning - precisely The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game - a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and of the spoken word - or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. | there is a paradox in the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed masses or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? The media manipulate in all directions at once they are the simulation that destroys the system We are exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects and to constitute themselves as submissive The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being a subject [she or] he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance childishness, passivity, idiocy. in the political sphere only freedom emancipation and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning - precisely the practices of the masses do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves voting, producing, deciding, speaking playing the game the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation of the word based on "consciousness raising," do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech | Evidently, there is a paradox in this inextricable conjunction of the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed [informe] or informed [informée] masses, or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? Sometime ago, in "Requiem for the Media," I analyzed and condemned the media as the institution of an irreversible model of communication without a response. But today? This absence of a response can no longer be understood at all as a strategy of power, but as a counterstrategy of the masses themselves when they encounter power. What then? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence perpetrated on meaning, and in fascination? Is it the media that induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses who direct the media into the spectacle? Mogadishu-Stammheim: the media make themselves into the vehicle of the moral condemnation of terrorism and of the exploitation of fear for political ends, but simultaneously, in the most complete ambiguity, they propagate the brutal charm of the terrorist act, they are themselves terrorists, insofar as they themselves march to the tune of seduction (cf. Umberto Eco on this eternal moral dilemma: how can one not speak of terrorism, how can one find a good use of the media - there is none). The media carry meaning and countermeaning, they manipulate in all directions at once, nothing can control this process, they are the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and the simulation that destroys the system, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic - and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. With one caution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind - exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject [she or] he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy. Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive - just as in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning - precisely the practices of the masses - that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity. The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game - a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and of the spoken word - or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails. To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, of the word based on "consciousness raising," indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech. | 5,145 | <h4>The object position is the only means of freedom. They deny this possibility through an emphasis on ability, utility, and work work work. Dare to be stupid, dare to be object.</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard 1985</u></strong> (Simulacra and Simulation, 83-86)</p><p>Evidently<strong>, <u></strong><mark>there is a paradox in</mark> this inextricable conjunction of <mark>the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed</mark> [informe] or informed [informée] <mark>masses</mark>, <mark>or is it the masses</mark> <mark>who victoriously resist the media</mark> <mark>by</mark> directing or <mark>absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them?</mark> </u>Sometime ago, in "Requiem for the Media," I analyzed and condemned the media as the institution of an irreversible model of communication without a response. But today? This absence of a response can no longer be understood at all as a strategy of power, but as a counterstrategy of the masses themselves when they encounter power. What then? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence perpetrated on meaning, and in fascination? Is it the media that induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses who direct the media into the spectacle? Mogadishu-Stammheim: the media make themselves into the vehicle of the moral condemnation of terrorism and of the exploitation of fear for political ends, but simultaneously, in the most complete ambiguity, they propagate the brutal charm of the terrorist act, they are themselves terrorists, insofar as they themselves march to the tune of seduction (cf. Umberto Eco on this eternal moral dilemma: how can one not speak of terrorism, how can one find a good use of the media - there is none). <u><mark>The media</mark> carry meaning and countermeaning, they <mark>manipulate in all directions at once</mark>, nothing can control this process, <mark>they are</mark> the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and <mark>the simulation that destroys the system</mark>, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic - and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution.</u> With one caution. <u><mark>We are</mark> face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind - <mark>exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world.</mark> Children are <mark>simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects</mark>, responsible, free and conscious, <mark>and to constitute themselves as submissive</mark>, inert, obedient, conforming objects. <mark>The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand</mark> he <mark>responds</mark> <mark>with a double strategy.</mark> To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. <mark>To the demand of being a subject [she or] he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance</mark>, that is to say, exactly the opposite: <mark>childishness, </mark>hyperconformism, total dependence, <mark>passivity, idiocy.</u></mark> Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive - just <strong>as <u></strong><mark>in the political sphere only </mark>the practices of <mark>freedom</mark>, <mark>emancipation</mark>, expression, <mark>and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable</mark> and subversive. <mark>But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning - precisely</u> the practices of the masses</mark> - that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity<strong>. <u></strong>The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they <mark>do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves</mark>, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of <mark>voting, producing,</mark> <mark>deciding, speaking</mark>, participating, <mark>playing the game</mark> - a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood</u>. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: <u><mark>the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning</mark> and of the spoken word - or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. <mark>It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it.</u><strong></mark> </strong>This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails. To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All <mark>the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation</mark>, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, <mark>of the word based on "consciousness raising,"</mark> indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, <mark>do not see that they are going in the <strong>direction</strong> <strong>of the system</strong>, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech</mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 4,018 | 304 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
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740,526 | Their description of the terrorist justifies endless war | Jackson 9 | Jackson 9
Richard Jackson 9, Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence, 2009, “Knowledge, power and politics in the study of political terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 70-77 | these frequent narratives within the literature construct widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat these narratives construct knowledge’ which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures to defeat which cannot be dealt with using negotiation the ‘war on terror’ is based on defining narratives the notion that responding to terrorism requires war and torture has come to assume a form of widely accepted ‘knowledge’. assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices make up much of the widely accepted body of terrorism ‘knowledge’, This ‘knowledge’ is reproduced with little deviation from the central assumptions continuously in literally thousands of publications every year by academics and think tanks. most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is highly debatable and unstable this ‘knowledge’ functions ideologically in society to reify existing power structures and advance particular political projects employing the same social scientific modes of analysis and empirical categories employed within terrorism studies it can be argued virtually all the narratives and assumptions are contestable and subject to doubt The assumption that terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is highly questionable and complex terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through discursive practices which make it a contingent ‘reality’ terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it the threat of terrorism to international security is vastly over-exaggerated much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is of dubious provenance a major review of the field, has described it as a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ This critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and pursue alternative intellectual and political projects | narratives which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures to defeat which cannot be dealt with using negotiation the ‘war on terror’ is based on narratives the notion responding to terrorism requires war has come to assume widely accepted ‘knowledge’ assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices make up the body of terrorism ‘knowledge’ knowledge’ is reproduced, with little deviation from central assumptions in thousands of publications by academics and think tanks knowledge’ in terrorism studies functions ideologically to reify power structures The assumption terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is highly questionable terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon ‘terrorism’ is constituted by discursive practices terrorism does not exist outside the definitions and practices which enclose it what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is of dubious provenance a major review described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths critical destabilisation is useful for opening up space to ask new questions and pursue alternative intellectual and political projects | In sum, these frequent narratives within the literature construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat to the international community and to democratic societies in particular, in part because their inherent freedoms make them more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and attack. Moreover, these narratives construct a common sense and widely, though not totally, accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is a new and deadlier form of terrorism than any encountered previously, one which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures to defeat and which cannot be dealt with using negotiation and dialogue, methods which have been previously successful in dealing with the ‘old’ ideological and nationalist terrorism.¶ The origins and causes of terrorism6¶ A surprising number of terrorism studies texts promote the view that the roots and causes of terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality, and religious or ideological extremism engendered through processes of ‘radicalisation’. Although theories of individual psychopathology among terrorists have fallen out of favour among most leading scholars in recent years, the notion that terrorist behaviour is rooted in the personality defects of individuals remains close to the surface of most texts, not least in the notion that weak-minded, uneducated, or emotionally vulnerable young Muslims fall prey to indoctrination and brainwashing – so-called ‘radicalisation’ – by terrorist recruiters operating through madrasahs, radical mosques, or extremist internet sites (see Haqqani, 2002). Related to this, it is not uncommon to find texts which argue that ‘Islamic’ suicide bombers are primarily young men driven by sexual frustration and impotence. In a much-cited text on contemporary ‘religious terrorism’ for example, Mark Juergensmeyer states that ‘the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement .. . expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 201). In any case, such narratives construct the accepted knowledge that terrorists are different and abnormal and, more importantly, that their actions are rooted in their personalities rather than other factors related to their political situation, strategic calculation or experiences of oppression and humiliation.¶ During the cold war, many terrorism studies texts suggested that the roots and causes of terrorism lay within communist ideology and the direct involvement of the Soviet Union (see Raphael, this volume). Claire Sterling’s (1981) popular book, The Terror Network, for example, posited the existence of a global terrorist network sponsored by the Soviets that was behind many of the revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. As Sam Raphael illustrates in this volume, a great many of the leading terrorism studies scholars at the time subscribed to the ‘Soviet network theory’ of terrorism.¶ In many ways, the cold war focus on left-wing ideology was replaced by what is now a vast and growing literature on the religious origins of terrorism, particularly as it relates to Islam (see Jackson, 2007a). Based on David Rapoport’s (1984) initial formulation of ‘religious terrorism’, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ argues that the roots and causes of much of the al-Qaeda-related terrorism today can be found in ‘Islamic extremism’. Walter Laqueur for example, suggests that while there is ‘no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism . . . the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking’ (Laqueur, 1999: 129). Similarly, a prominent counterterrorism think tank publication argues that ‘in the Islamic world one cannot differentiate between the political violence of Islamic groups and their popular support derived from religion . . . the present terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature’ (Paz, 1998, emphasis added). Marc Sageman argues in relation to al-Qaeda: ‘Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics’ (Sageman, 2004: 1). In sum, and similar to narratives of individual deviance, these narratives construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is primarily rooted in and caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and not in rational calculation or other political, cultural, and sociological factors.¶ Responding to terrorism¶ A final set of assumptions and narratives within the broader literature relates to questions about how to respond to terrorism. Following the logic of the preceding notions of the existential threat posed by the ‘new terrorism’, as well as the fanatical nature and origins of religiously-inspired terrorism, it is frequently argued in the literature that ‘new’ methods of counterterrorism are required for its control, and that there are justifiable reasons to employ any means necessary, including torture, targeted killings, and restrictions on human rights, to deal with the threat (see Jackson, 2007d). Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson, and Daniel Byman, all major figures in the field, for example, have openly condoned the extra-judicial assassination of terrorist leaders as a potentially effective method of counterterrorism (see Gunaratna, 2003: 233–235; Wilkinson, 2002: 68; Byman, 2006, 2007). At the very least, it is commonly accepted that coercive instruments, including sanctions, pre-emption and military force, are both legal and effective forms of counterterrorism (see for example, Shultz and Vogt, 2003; Byman, 2003). Often unstated, but appearing as a subtext, it is implicitly assumed that non-violent responses to terrorism such as dialogue and political reform are simply bound to fail in the current context (see Toros, forthcoming).¶ More specifically, as I have shown elsewhere (Jackson, 2005), the global counterterrorism campaign known as the ‘war on terror’ is based on a particular series of defining narratives. The most important narrative at the heart of the war on terror is the notion that the attacks of 11 September 2001 amounted to an ‘act of war’. This narrative in turn, logically implies that a war-based counterterrorism strategy is both necessary to counter the threat and legal under international law. Consequently, a great many terrorism studies texts take it as axiomatic or common sense that the war on terror, and force-based counterterrorism in general, is both legitimate and efficacious. In this way, the notion that responding to terrorism requires force and counter-violence, and sometimes even war and torture, has come to assume a form of widely accepted ‘knowledge’. In short, the assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices I have described above, and quite a few more besides, collectively make up much of the widely accepted body of terrorism ‘knowledge’, or, the discourse of terrorism studies. This ‘knowledge’ is reproduced, often with little deviation from the central assumptions and narratives, continuously in the field’s journals, conferences, and in literally thousands of publications every year by academics and think tanks. Furthermore, as Michael Stohl has recently illustrated, many of these core narratives or ‘myths’, as he terms them, have proved to be extremely durable over several decades (see Stohl, 1979, 2008).¶ A critical analysis of the terrorism studies discourse¶ Having briefly outlined some of its main characteristics, the purpose of this section is to provide a critical analysis of the broader terrorism studies discourse employing a first and second order critique. The main argument I wish to advance here is that most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable. More importantly, this ‘knowledge’ functions ideologically in society to reify existing power structures and advance particular political projects.¶ First order critique¶ As explained earlier, a first order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientific modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead suffice to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives.¶ In the first instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial definition within the field and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002).¶ The assumption that terrorism can be objectively defined and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identifiable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field.¶ Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the field, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects. | 17,295 | <h4><u><strong>Their description of the terrorist justifies endless war</h4><p>Jackson 9</p><p></u></strong>Richard Jackson 9, Reader in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, and a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence, 2009, “Knowledge, power and politics in the study of political terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 70-77</p><p>In sum, <u>these frequent <mark>narratives </mark>within the literature construct</u> the <u>widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat</u> to the international community and to democratic societies in particular, in part because their inherent freedoms make them more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and attack. Moreover, <u>these narratives construct</u> a common sense and widely, though not totally, accepted ‘<u>knowledge’</u> that contemporary terrorism is a new and deadlier form of terrorism than any encountered previously, one <u><mark>which creates an</u> <u><strong>exceptional state of emergency</u></strong> <u>requiring ‘new’ counterterrorism measures</u></mark> <u><mark>to defeat</u></mark> and <u><mark>which</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>cannot be dealt with using negotiation</u></strong></mark> and dialogue, methods which have been previously successful in dealing with the ‘old’ ideological and nationalist terrorism.¶ The origins and causes of terrorism6¶ A surprising number of terrorism studies texts promote the view that the roots and causes of terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality, and religious or ideological extremism engendered through processes of ‘radicalisation’. Although theories of individual psychopathology among terrorists have fallen out of favour among most leading scholars in recent years, the notion that terrorist behaviour is rooted in the personality defects of individuals remains close to the surface of most texts, not least in the notion that weak-minded, uneducated, or emotionally vulnerable young Muslims fall prey to indoctrination and brainwashing – so-called ‘radicalisation’ – by terrorist recruiters operating through madrasahs, radical mosques, or extremist internet sites (see Haqqani, 2002). Related to this, it is not uncommon to find texts which argue that ‘Islamic’ suicide bombers are primarily young men driven by sexual frustration and impotence. In a much-cited text on contemporary ‘religious terrorism’ for example, Mark Juergensmeyer states that ‘the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement .. . expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 201). In any case, such narratives construct the accepted knowledge that terrorists are different and abnormal and, more importantly, that their actions are rooted in their personalities rather than other factors related to their political situation, strategic calculation or experiences of oppression and humiliation.¶ During the cold war, many terrorism studies texts suggested that the roots and causes of terrorism lay within communist ideology and the direct involvement of the Soviet Union (see Raphael, this volume). Claire Sterling’s (1981) popular book, The Terror Network, for example, posited the existence of a global terrorist network sponsored by the Soviets that was behind many of the revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. As Sam Raphael illustrates in this volume, a great many of the leading terrorism studies scholars at the time subscribed to the ‘Soviet network theory’ of terrorism.¶ In many ways, the cold war focus on left-wing ideology was replaced by what is now a vast and growing literature on the religious origins of terrorism, particularly as it relates to Islam (see Jackson, 2007a). Based on David Rapoport’s (1984) initial formulation of ‘religious terrorism’, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ argues that the roots and causes of much of the al-Qaeda-related terrorism today can be found in ‘Islamic extremism’. Walter Laqueur for example, suggests that while there is ‘no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism . . . the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking’ (Laqueur, 1999: 129). Similarly, a prominent counterterrorism think tank publication argues that ‘in the Islamic world one cannot differentiate between the political violence of Islamic groups and their popular support derived from religion . . . the present terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature’ (Paz, 1998, emphasis added). Marc Sageman argues in relation to al-Qaeda: ‘Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics’ (Sageman, 2004: 1). In sum, and similar to narratives of individual deviance, these narratives construct the widely accepted ‘knowledge’ that contemporary terrorism is primarily rooted in and caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and not in rational calculation or other political, cultural, and sociological factors.¶ Responding to terrorism¶ A final set of assumptions and narratives within the broader literature relates to questions about how to respond to terrorism. Following the logic of the preceding notions of the existential threat posed by the ‘new terrorism’, as well as the fanatical nature and origins of religiously-inspired terrorism, it is frequently argued in the literature that ‘new’ methods of counterterrorism are required for its control, and that there are justifiable reasons to employ any means necessary, including torture, targeted killings, and restrictions on human rights, to deal with the threat (see Jackson, 2007d). Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson, and Daniel Byman, all major figures in the field, for example, have openly condoned the extra-judicial assassination of terrorist leaders as a potentially effective method of counterterrorism (see Gunaratna, 2003: 233–235; Wilkinson, 2002: 68; Byman, 2006, 2007). At the very least, it is commonly accepted that coercive instruments, including sanctions, pre-emption and military force, are both legal and effective forms of counterterrorism (see for example, Shultz and Vogt, 2003; Byman, 2003). Often unstated, but appearing as a subtext, it is implicitly assumed that non-violent responses to terrorism such as dialogue and political reform are simply bound to fail in the current context (see Toros, forthcoming).¶ More specifically, as I have shown elsewhere (Jackson, 2005), the global counterterrorism campaign known as <u><mark>the ‘war on terror’ is based on</u></mark> a particular series of <u>defining <mark>narratives</u></mark>. The most important narrative at the heart of the war on terror is the notion that the attacks of 11 September 2001 amounted to an ‘act of war’. This narrative in turn, logically implies that a war-based counterterrorism strategy is both necessary to counter the threat and legal under international law. Consequently, a great many terrorism studies texts take it as axiomatic or common sense that the war on terror, and force-based counterterrorism in general, is both legitimate and efficacious. In this way, <u><mark>the notion</mark> that</u> <u><strong><mark>responding to terrorism requires</u></strong></mark> force and counter-violence, and sometimes even <u><strong><mark>war</mark> and torture</u></strong>, <u><mark>has come to assume</mark> a form of <mark>widely accepted ‘knowledge’</mark>.</u> In short, the <u><mark>assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices</u></mark> I have described above, and quite a few more besides, collectively <u><mark>make up</mark> much of <mark>the</mark> widely accepted <mark>body of terrorism ‘knowledge’</mark>,</u> or, the discourse of terrorism studies. <u>This</u> <u><strong>‘<mark>knowledge’ is reproduced</u></strong>,</mark> often <u><mark>with little deviation from</mark> the <mark>central assumptions</u></mark> and narratives, <u>continuously <mark>in</u></mark> the field’s journals, conferences, and in <u><strong>literally <mark>thousands of publications</mark> every year</u></strong> <u><mark>by academics and think tanks</mark>.</u> Furthermore, as Michael Stohl has recently illustrated, many of these core narratives or ‘myths’, as he terms them, have proved to be extremely durable over several decades (see Stohl, 1979, 2008).¶ A critical analysis of the terrorism studies discourse¶ Having briefly outlined some of its main characteristics, the purpose of this section is to provide a critical analysis of the broader terrorism studies discourse employing a first and second order critique. The main argument I wish to advance here is that <u>most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘<mark>knowledge’ in terrorism studies</mark> is</u>, in fact, <u><strong>highly debatable and unstable</u></strong>. More importantly, <u>this ‘knowledge’</u> <u><strong><mark>functions ideologically</u></strong></mark> <u>in society <mark>to reify</mark> existing <mark>power structures</mark> and advance</u> <u>particular political projects</u>.¶ First order critique¶ As explained earlier, a first order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and <u>employing the same social scientific modes of analysis</u>, terminology, <u>and empirical</u> and analytical <u>categories employed within terrorism studies</u>, as well as many of its own texts and authors, <u>it can be argued</u> that <u><strong>virtually all the narratives and assumptions</u></strong> described in the previous section <u>are</u> <u><strong>contestable and subject to doubt</u></strong>. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead suffice to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives.¶ In the first instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial definition within the field and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002).¶ <u><mark>The assumption</mark> that</u> <u><strong><mark>terrorism can be objectively defined and studied</u></strong> <u>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>highly questionable</mark> and</u> far more <u>complex</u> than this. It can be argued that <u><strong><mark>terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon</u></strong></mark> <u>which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself</u> (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, <u><mark>‘terrorism’ is constituted by</mark> and through</u> an identifiable set of <u><mark>discursive practices</u></mark> – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law – <u>which</u> thus <u>make it a contingent ‘reality’</u> for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, <u><strong><mark>terrorism does not exist outside</mark> of <mark>the definitions and practices which</mark> seek to <mark>enclose it</u></strong></mark>, including those of the terrorism studies field.¶ Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that <u>the threat of terrorism to</u> Western or <u>international security is</u> <u><strong>vastly over-exaggerated</u></strong> (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, <u>much of <mark>what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is</u></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>of dubious provenance</u></strong></mark>. In <u><mark>a</mark> <mark>major review</mark> of the field,</u> Andrew Silke <u>has <mark>described it as</u> ‘<u><strong>a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths</u></strong></mark> <u>whose reach extends</u> <u>even to the most learned and experienced’</u> (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. <u>This</u> kind of <u><mark>critical destabilisation is useful for</u> <u>opening up</mark> the <mark>space</mark> needed <mark>to ask new</mark> kinds of analytical and normative <mark>questions and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>pursue alternative intellectual and political projects</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | Cartels | 91,513 | 11 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,527 | Counteradvocacy: The United States should legalize the sale of human organs. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Counteradvocacy: The United States should legalize the sale of human organs.</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,890 | 1 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,528 | Hegemony isn’t key to peace | Fettweis, 11 | Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO | there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between U.S. activism and international stability the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true During the 90s the U S cut back on its defense spending . By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990 if trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict is plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U S military none took any action that would suggest such a belief No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending . If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should pose a problem the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending the rest of the world can operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. | there is no evidence to support a relationship between U.S. activism and stability During the 90s the U S cut defense The verdict is plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered No militaries enhanced no security dilemmas or arms races no regional balancing occurred incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the U S cut its military the only evidence regarding systemic reaction to a restrained U S suggests peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. global policeman. | It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. | 4,559 | <h4>Hegemony isn’t key to peace</h4><p><u><strong>Fettweis, 11</u></strong> Christopher J. Fettweis<u>, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO</p><p></u>It is perhaps worth noting that <u><mark>there is <strong>no evidence</strong> to support a</mark> direct <mark>relationship between</u></mark> the relative level of <u><mark>U.S. activism and <strong></mark>international <mark>stability</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u>the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true</u>. <u><mark>During the</u></mark> 19<u><mark>90s</u></mark>, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>cut</u></mark> <u>back on its <mark>defense</mark> spending</u> fairly substantially<u>. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990</u>.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, <u>if</u> the pacific <u>trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but</u> <u>a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. <mark>The verdict</u></mark> from the past two decades <u><mark>is</u></mark> fairly <u><mark>plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U</u><strong></mark>nited <u></strong><mark>S</u><strong></mark>tates <u></strong><mark>cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered</mark> by a less-capable U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>military</u>, or at least <u>none took any action that would suggest</u> <u>such a belief</u>. <u><strong><mark>No militaries</mark> were <mark>enhanced</strong></mark> to address power vacuums, <strong><mark>no security dilemmas</mark> drove insecurity <mark>or arms races</strong></mark>, and <strong><mark>no regional balancing occurred</strong></mark> once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished</u>. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. <u>The <strong><mark>incidence and magnitude</mark> <mark>of global conflict declined</strong> while the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates <mark>cut its military</mark> spending</u> under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled<u>. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should</u> at least <u>pose a problem</u>. As it stands, <u><mark>the only evidence</mark> we have <mark>regarding</mark> the likely <mark>systemic reaction to a</mark> more <mark>restrained U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>suggests</mark> that the current <mark>peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S.</mark> military spending</u>. Evidently <u>the rest of the world can operate</u> quite <u>effectively without the presence of a <mark>global policeman.</mark> Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Cartels | 42,650 | 583 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
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2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,529 | Solves the aff better than they do | Fry-Revere ‘14 | Fry-Revere ‘14
Sigrid Fry-Revere. The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2014. 93-94. 100-101. | some of the factors that helped guarantee long-term satisfaction on both sides of the transplant equation donors and recipients we interviewed in Iran believed it was better if their relationship was just economic with no long-term ties. Donors wanted to put their current crisis behind them that meant not maintaining a relationship that would be a reminder of their failings. For recipients They saw a mutually agreed-upon financial transaction as having a finality that would prevent the interminable feeling of indebtedness they feared would result if the donor became a friend endless indebtedness came up several times in our interviews reciprocal gifting of money in exchange for a kidney must be legally enforceable the recipient must be legally forced to pay the monetary gift promised the donor While a gift in Western thought implies an absence of legal obligations altruism implies a lack of self-interest), under Sharia law a promise of reciprocal gifting is legally enforceable “I donated my kidney and you donate a predetermined amount of money and if I don’t receive the promised payment, I can take you to court.” This may seem like a commercial transaction to Westerners Another reason to make a promised gift to donors a matter of law is to prevent indefinite indebtedness. Some gifts, like the gift of a kidney, are so great that they can never be repaid. So to mediate the fear that acceptance of a kidney will cause an unbearable burden on the recipient, the law creates a system whereby the donor can agree to a finite reward thereby relieving the recipient of any further obligation. Thus payment can be the full extent of their relationship In the U S the immeasurable debt is described as “tyranny of the gift.” we often heard Iranian recipients tell us the reason they used a paid donor instead of an altruistic relative was to avoid the potential burden of feeling permanently indebted. Asad received his first kidney from his brother, but he said he would never get a kidney from a relative again My brother has done a saving and kind act for me. But every time I see him – there’s a psychological and spiritual issue involved. I have to be appreciative of my brother for donating his kidney I will be indebted to him indefinitely: always appreciative, always saying thank you. If a person gets paid five million, then the relationship is over I would be grateful but my debt is paid, and I could move on with my life | donors and recipients in Iran believed it was better if their relationship was just economic that meant not maintaining a relationship financial transaction as having a finality that would prevent indebtedness reciprocal gifting of money in exchang must be legally enforceable Some gifts are so great that they can never be repaid. to mediate the fear that acceptance of a kidney will cause an unbearable burden law creates a system whereby the donor can agree to a finite reward relieving further obligation described as “tyranny of the gift.” , I would be grateful but my debt is paid, and I could move on with my life. | It is important to point out that I found fewer donors and recipients who were satisfied with their foundation in Tehran than elsewhere in Iran. It was only in retrospect, after having traveled to Isfahan, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Kermanshah, that I started to piece together some of the factors that helped guarantee long-term satisfaction on both sides of the transplant equation.¶ Half of the donors and recipients we interviewed in Iran believed it was better if their relationship was just an economic one with no long-term ties. Donors clearly wanted to put their current crisis behind them, and for some that meant not maintaining a relationship that would be a reminder of their failings. For recipients, it could be that some were influenced by the horrible incident in 1987 where a donor came to a recipient’s house and attacked his family, stabbing several of the recipient’s children to death. But most recipients had a more mundane reason for not wanting a long-term relationship with their donor: They saw a mutually agreed-upon financial transaction as having a finality that would prevent the interminable feeling of indebtedness they feared would result if the donor became a friend. This latter concept of endless indebtedness came up several times in our interviews with recipients and was explained in depth by the Ayatollah Mohaghegh Damad in my discussion with him toward the end of our stay in Tehran.¶ [Continues]¶ The final issue the ayatollah addressed was that it is one thing to allow gifts of thanks for an altruistic act, but it is quite another to require them. The reciprocal gifting of money in exchange for a kidney, Mohaghegh Damad said, must be legally enforceable. The donor must either give back the money or donate. And the recipient, who can’t give back a kidney, must be legally forced to pay the monetary gift promised the donor. This point was made by several of the donors we interviewed. For example, Sasan, whom we interviewed later at Alzahra Hospital in Isfahan, said he had heard rumors that donors could get 15 or even 20 million tomans for a kidney if they did it illegally without the Anjoman’s assistance, but he had looked into it and didn’t see how he could be sure to get his money without the Anjoman. With the Anjoman’s oversight, Sasan would get the six million he was promised, and he knew the deal included the recipient paying for his lab work and other benefits, none of which could be guaranteed outside the legally sanctioned system.¶ While the notion of a gift in Western thought implies an absence of legal obligations (like the notion of altruism implies a lack of self-interest), under Sharia law a promise of reciprocal gifting is legally enforceable. Under Sharia law the result is not a commercial contract but a binding decision to provide each other with a gift – in the one instance a kidney, in the other a predetermined amount of money or another gift. There is no commercial contract in the Western sense of money or another gift. There is no commercial contract in the Western sense but an implied promise which, as with gifting a Qur’an, Iranian law has decided to enforce: “I donated my kidney to you unconditionally, and you donate a predetermined amount of money to me unconditionally, and if I don’t receive the promised payment, I can take you to court.” This may seem like a commercial transaction to Westerners, but the Iranian attitude toward this type of reciprocal gifting is clearly something more than a mere buying and selling – such transactions entail an altruistic element not required in the usual course of business.¶ Another reason to make a promised gift to donors a matter of law is to prevent indefinite indebtedness. Some gifts, like the gift of a kidney, are so great that they can never be repaid. So to mediate the fear that acceptance of a kidney will cause an unbearable burden on the recipient, the law creates a system whereby the donor can agree to a finite reward for his or her gift, thereby relieving the recipient of any further obligation. Thus, if the parties wish, payment can be the full extent of their relationship.¶ In the United States the concept of immeasurable debt is described as “tyranny of the gift.” Interestingly, we often heard Iranian recipients tell us the reason they used a paid donor instead of an altruistic relative or friend was to avoid the potential burden of feeling permanently indebted. Asad, a recipient we interviewed at Labafinejad Clinic, received his first kidney from his brother, but he said he would never get a kidney from a relative or friend again.¶ My brother has done a saving and kind act for me. But every time I see him – there’s a psychological and spiritual issue involved. I have to be appreciative of my brother for donating his kidney, right? Yes, it is true that his donation has worked to my benefit, but I will be indebted to him indefinitely: always appreciative, always saying thank you. If a person gets paid five or ten million, then the relationship is over. In that situation, I would be grateful but my debt is paid, and I could move on with my life. | 5,123 | <h4>Solves the aff<u><strong> better than they do</h4><p>Fry-Revere ‘14</p><p></u></strong>Sigrid Fry-Revere. The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2014. 93-94. 100-101.</p><p>It is important to point out that I found fewer donors and recipients who were satisfied with their foundation in Tehran than elsewhere in Iran. It was only in retrospect, after having traveled to Isfahan, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Kermanshah, that I started to piece together <u>some of the factors that helped guarantee long-term satisfaction on both sides of the transplant equation</u>.¶ Half of the <u><mark>donors and recipients</mark> we interviewed <mark>in Iran believed it was better if their relationship was just</u></mark> an <u><mark>economic</u></mark> one <u>with no long-term ties. Donors</u> clearly <u>wanted to put their current crisis behind them</u>, and for some <u><mark>that meant <strong>not maintaining a relationship</strong></mark> that would be a reminder of their failings. For recipients</u>, it could be that some were influenced by the horrible incident in 1987 where a donor came to a recipient’s house and attacked his family, stabbing several of the recipient’s children to death. But most recipients had a more mundane reason for not wanting a long-term relationship with their donor: <u>They saw a mutually agreed-upon <mark>financial transaction as having a finality that would prevent</mark> the interminable feeling of <mark>indebtedness</mark> they feared would result if the donor became a friend</u>. This latter concept of <u>endless indebtedness came up several times in our interviews</u> with recipients and was explained in depth by the Ayatollah Mohaghegh Damad in my discussion with him toward the end of our stay in Tehran.¶ [Continues]¶ The final issue the ayatollah addressed was that it is one thing to allow gifts of thanks for an altruistic act, but it is quite another to require them. The <u><mark>reciprocal</u> <u>gifting of money in exchang</mark>e for a kidney</u>, Mohaghegh Damad said, <u><strong><mark>must be legally enforceable</u></strong></mark>. The donor must either give back the money or donate. And <u>the recipient</u>, who can’t give back a kidney, <u>must be legally forced to pay the monetary gift promised the donor</u>. This point was made by several of the donors we interviewed. For example, Sasan, whom we interviewed later at Alzahra Hospital in Isfahan, said he had heard rumors that donors could get 15 or even 20 million tomans for a kidney if they did it illegally without the Anjoman’s assistance, but he had looked into it and didn’t see how he could be sure to get his money without the Anjoman. With the Anjoman’s oversight, Sasan would get the six million he was promised, and he knew the deal included the recipient paying for his lab work and other benefits, none of which could be guaranteed outside the legally sanctioned system.¶ <u>While</u> the notion of <u>a gift in Western thought implies an absence of legal obligations</u> (like the notion of <u>altruism implies a lack of self-interest), under Sharia law a promise of reciprocal gifting is legally enforceable</u>. Under Sharia law the result is not a commercial contract but a binding decision to provide each other with a gift – in the one instance a kidney, in the other a predetermined amount of money or another gift. There is no commercial contract in the Western sense of money or another gift. There is no commercial contract in the Western sense but an implied promise which, as with gifting a Qur’an, Iranian law has decided to enforce: <u>“I donated my kidney</u> to you unconditionally, <u>and you donate a predetermined amount of money</u> to me unconditionally, <u>and if I don’t receive the promised payment, I can take you to court.” This may seem like a commercial transaction to Westerners</u>, but the Iranian attitude toward this type of reciprocal gifting is clearly something more than a mere buying and selling – such transactions entail an altruistic element not required in the usual course of business.¶ <u>Another reason to make a promised gift to donors a matter of law is to prevent indefinite indebtedness. <mark>Some gifts</mark>, like the gift of a kidney, <mark>are so great that they can never be repaid.</mark> So <mark>to mediate the fear that acceptance of a kidney will cause an unbearable burden </mark>on the recipient, the <mark>law creates a system whereby the donor can agree to a finite reward</u></mark> for his or her gift, <u>thereby <mark>relieving</mark> the recipient of any <mark>further</mark> <mark>obligation</mark>. Thus</u>, if the parties wish, <u>payment can be the full extent of their relationship</u>.¶ <u>In the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>the</u> concept of <u>immeasurable debt is <mark>described as “tyranny of the gift.”</u></mark> Interestingly, <u>we often heard Iranian recipients tell us the reason they used a paid donor instead of an altruistic relative</u> or friend <u>was to avoid the potential burden of feeling permanently indebted. Asad</u>, a recipient we interviewed at Labafinejad Clinic, <u>received his first kidney from his brother, but he said he would never get a kidney from a relative</u> or friend <u>again</u>.¶ <u>My brother has done a saving and kind act for me. But every time I see him – there’s a psychological and spiritual issue involved. I have to be appreciative of my brother for donating his kidney</u>, right? Yes, it is true that his donation has worked to my benefit, but <u>I will be indebted to him indefinitely: always appreciative, always saying thank you. If a person gets paid five</u> or ten <u>million, then the relationship is over</u>. In that situation<mark>, <u>I would be grateful but my debt is paid, and I could move on with my life</u>.</p></mark> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,891 | 1 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,530 | Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence | Gulli 13 | Gulli 13 Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5 | we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in Gaza or France from once again trying its luck in Africa though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007 the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony this killing, just like Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift. | sovereign power and authority rest on violence and terror struggle for dominance is impaired and made brutal by lack of heg U S heg has vanished drive for domination has to show raw violence traditional justifications democracy and freedom have now become weak because the contempt the (the US show toward morality punishment remains a limit Not so for dominant nations: who will stop the U S from striking anywhere these nations are aware of their structural, ontological historical, weakness they rely on a military machine drones and diplomacy, is an outpost for military operations and global policing incarnated by Africom Domination without hegemony’ captures the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty in the light of the bifurcation of financial and military power with the catastrophic war against Iraq US hegemony entered terminal crisis.” the U S relationship to the world is best described ‘domination without heg ’ What can the US do ? Not much, short of brutal dominance you can kill the bin Ladens without gaining heg Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of al-Awlaki, who many have compared to Trayvon Martin the ill-concealed fury for loss of heg becomes visible power as care is what should replace hegemony | I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony.¶ ‘Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” He continues:¶ Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift. | 5,034 | <h4>Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence</h4><p><u><strong>Gulli 13</u></strong> Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5</p><p>I think that <u>we have now an understanding of what the situation is: <strong>The <mark>sovereign </mark>everywhere</strong>, be it the political or financial elite, <strong>fakes the legitimacy</strong> on which its <mark>power and authority </mark>supposedly rest</u>. <u>In truth, they <strong><mark>rest on violence and terror</strong></mark>, or the threat thereof</u>. <u>This is an <strong>obvious and essential aspect</strong> of the singularity of the present crisis</u>. In this sense, <u>the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the <mark>struggle for dominance is </mark>at one and the same time <mark>impaired and made </mark>more <mark>brutal by <strong></mark>the <mark>lack of heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. This is true in general, but <u>it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, <strong>the <mark>U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates</strong>, whose <mark>heg</mark>emony <mark>has</mark> <strong>diminished or <mark>vanished</strong></mark>.</u> <u>It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard</u>. <u>Lacking hegemony, the <strong>sheer <mark>drive for domination</strong> has to show</mark> <strong>its true face</strong>, its <strong><mark>raw violence</u></strong></mark>. <u>The usual, <mark>traditional <strong></mark>ideological <mark>justifications </mark>for dominance</strong> (such as bringing <mark>democracy and freedom</mark> here and there) <mark>have now become <strong></mark>very <mark>weak</strong> because </u></mark>of <u><strong><mark>the contempt</strong> </mark>that <mark>the </mark>dominant nations <mark>(the US </mark>and its most powerful allies) <strong>regularly <mark>show</strong> toward </mark>legality, <mark>morality</mark>, and humanity</u>. Of course, <u>the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of <mark>punishment</mark>, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the <strong>I</strong>nternational <strong>C</strong>riminal <strong>C</strong>ourt, <mark>remains a </u></mark>clear<u><mark> limit</mark>, a possibility.</u> <u><strong><mark>Not so for </mark>the <mark>dominant nations</u></strong>: <u>who will stop the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> from striking anywhere </mark>at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in</u> the <u>Gaza</u> Strip, <u>or</u> envious <u>France from once again trying its luck in Africa</u>? Yet, <u>though still dominant, <mark>these nations are </mark>painfully <mark>aware of their <strong>structural, ontological </mark>and <mark>historical, weakness</u></strong></mark>. <u>All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) <strong>only heighten the brutality</strong> in the exertion of <strong>what remains of their dominance</u></strong>. <u>Although <mark>they rely on a <strong></mark>highly sophisticated <mark>military machine</strong></mark> (the technology of <mark>drones</mark> is a clear instance of this) <mark>and </mark>on an equally sophisticated <mark>diplomacy, </mark>which has <strong>traditionally</strong> been and <strong>increasingly</strong> <mark>is an outpost for <strong>military operations and global policing</strong></mark> (now excellently <strong><mark>incarnated by Africom</strong></mark>), <strong>they know that they have lost their hegemony</u></strong>.¶ ‘<u><strong><mark>Domination without hegemony’</u></strong></mark> <u>is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007</u>). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), <u>the phrase <mark>captures the </mark>singularity of the <mark>global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty</mark>, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future</u>” (1994/2010: 221). <u>It acquires particular meaning <mark>in the light of</mark> Arrighi’s notion of <strong><mark>the bifurcation of financial and military power</mark>.</u></strong> Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, <u>early in the twenty-first century, and certainly <mark>with the </mark>ill-advised and <mark>catastrophic war against Iraq</mark>, “the US belle époque came to an end and <mark>US </mark>world <mark>hegemony entered <strong></mark>what in all likelihood is its <mark>terminal crisis.”</u></strong></mark> He continues:¶ <u>Although <mark>the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its <mark>relationship to </mark>the rest of <mark>the world is </mark>now <mark>best described </mark>as one of <strong><mark>‘domination without heg</mark>emony<mark>’</u></strong></mark> (1994/2010: 384). <u><mark>What can the US do </mark>next<mark>? <strong>Not much, short of brutal dominance</u></strong></mark>. In the last few years, <u>we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too</u> (Noam Chomsky has often noted that <u>bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime</u>), <u>it is certain that <mark>you can kill <strong></mark>all <mark>the bin Ladens </mark>of the world <mark>without gaining </mark>back a bit of <mark>heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. In fact, <u>this killing, just like</u> G. W. <u>Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a <strong>Mafia-style</strong> regolamento di conti more than any other thing</u>. Barack <u><mark>Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of</mark> 16-year-old</u> Abdulrahman <u><mark>al-Awlaki, who</mark>se fate <mark>many have <strong></mark>correctly <mark>compared</strong> to <strong></mark>that of</strong> 17-year-old <mark>Trayvon Martin</u></mark> (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), <u>but it is precisely in cases like this one that <strong>the weakness at the heart of empire</strong>, <mark>the ill-concealed</mark> and uncontrolled <strong><mark>fury for</mark> the <mark>loss of heg</mark>emony</strong>, <mark>becomes visible</u></mark>. <u>The frenzy denies the possibility of <strong><mark>power as care</strong></mark>, which <mark>is <strong>what should replace hegemony</strong></mark>, let alone domination</u>. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about <u>the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence</u>. <u>What is needed is rather <strong>a radical alternative</strong> in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, <strong>a poetic rather than military and financial shift.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | Cartels | 112,328 | 37 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,531 | Commodification is better than their politics of sentimentality – they are the sign of a sacrifice made by the Other, a gift of life the recipient can never repay. This reproduces the tyranny of the gift | Siminoff and Chillag `99 | Siminoff and Chillag `99
Laura A. Siminoff and Kata Chillag. “The Fallacy of the Gift of Life.” The Hastings Center Report 29.6 (November-December 1999): 34-41. 35-36. | patterns of gift-giving created relationships of obligation and reciprocity that perpetuated social systems Even if one is not required to pay with money "up front," debt is creat- ed and there is always the expectation that debt will be redressed
a pure gift is a contradiction."8 If the debt is not ac- knowledged or no possibility exists for its repayment, the consequences are formidable for both individu- als involved in the trans- action and for the society as a whole. A debt that cannot be repaid is fundamentally threatening to the social order and must be recategorized to fit reciprocity
Mauss's conclusions map well onto organ donation because the ex- change of money does not take place organ transplantation is re- lated to the dynamics of gift ex- change, as monetary reimbursement for organs is outlawed though no money is involved, the "gift" of an organ is not freely made prospective donors are subject to pressures to make the gift the recipient are obligated to "re- ceive" the gift
the debt cannot be repaid to the giver The greater the magnitude of the gift and the "need" of the recipi- ent, the less "free" the gift becomes. The families of organ donors and recipients are caught in a complex web within which there exists "obligation to give, obligation to re- ceive, and obligation to repay
There is no act or commodity that would be commensurate to what has been given. This does not elimi- nate the impulse to repay it may magnify this propensity This sense of obligation to make amends exists in the community as a whole and is taken on by individual members the pres- sure comes from within as well as from without, from both self and other
This psychological and moral burden is especially onerous because the gift the recipient has received is so ex- traordinary It has no equivalent | patterns of gift-giving created relationships of obligation and reciprocity that perpetuated social systems
a pure gift is a contradiction If no possibility exists for its repayment, the consequences are formidable for individu- als and society
organ transplantation is re- lated to the dynamics of gift ex- change monetary reimbursement for organs is outlawed
the debt cannot be repaid donors and recipients are caught in a complex web in which there exists "obligation to give, re- ceive repay
the pres- sure comes from within as well as from without, from both self and other | In discussions of the gift of life, nu- merous scholars have invoked gift exchange theory based on the work of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In The Gift, Mauss outlines the central features of gift exchange in "techno- logically simple" societies. Through systematic comparison of cultures in the American Northwest, Melanesia, and Polynesia, Mauss identified com- mon principles governing the opera- tion of these "money-less" econo- mies.7 Mauss paid particular atten- tion to the ways in which patterns of gift-giving created relationships of obligation and reciprocity that struc- tured and perpetuated the social systems of such cultures. Even if one is not required to pay with money "up front," Mauss contends, debt is creat- ed and there is always the expectation that debt will be redressed, directly or indirectly, at some future time.
As Mary Douglas writes, Mauss recognized an overriding social truth, that "the idea of a pure gift is a contradiction."8 If the debt is not ac- knowledged or no possibility exists for its repayment, the consequences are formidable for both the individu- als immediately involved in the trans- action and for the society as a whole. A debt that by its nature cannot be repaid is fundamentally threatening to the social order and (most relevant to our discussion of transplantation) must somehow be recategorized to fit into existing models of reciprocity.
Those who have drawn on Mauss's analysis identify several key aspects of gift exchange theory that are particu- larly relevant to organ transplanta- tion. Mauss's conclusions seemingly map well onto the practice of organ donation because, at present, the ex- change of money does not take place in this context. Thus Sque and Payne suggest that "organ transplantation is sociologically and psychologically re- lated to the dynamics of gift ex- change, as monetary reimbursement for organs is outlawed in developed countries."9 Yet though no money is involved, the "gift" of an organ is not freely made. Renee Fox and Judith Swazey write, "even though the American organ donation system has been organized around the cardinal societal principles of voluntarism and freedom of choice, in the type of sit- uations where transplants are per- formed, prospective donors and their families are subject to strong inner and outer pressures to make the gift."'0 Moreover, the recipient and his or her family are obligated to "re- ceive" the gift of the organ and all it entails.
The metaphor of the gift suggests that the donor gives the organ to the recipient.11 That is not the case. The donor is dead. And although he or she may have signed an organ donor card, or expressed his or her wishes to the family, in reality the donor partic- ipates in the actual gift exchange not as knowing giver, but as gift object. Yet the dead donor (more properly, source) is still largely identified as the giver, that is, the individual to whom the person on the other end of the ex- change owes a debt of reciprocity.
Clearly, the debt cannot be repaid to the deceased, the ostensible giver. Nor can a gift of such magnitude-of life itself-be adequately repaid to a proxy. The greater the magnitude of the gift and the "need" of the recipi- ent, the less "free" the gift becomes. The families of organ donors and transplant candidates, recipients, and their families are thus caught in a complex web within which, as Ver- nale and Packard assert, there exists "obligation to give, obligation to re- ceive, and obligation to repay."
Critical to any discussion of organ as gift is an acknowledgment of the magnitude of that gift. There is no act or commodity that would be commensurate to what has been given. This does not, however, elimi- nate the impulse to repay (in fact, it may magnify this propensity, albeit in unexpected and/or indirect ways). This sense of obligation to make amends exists in the community as a whole and is taken on by individual members. In other words, the pres- sure comes from within as well as from without, from both self and other. In combination with the extra- ordinary practical and emotional de- mands on members of donor fami- lies, transplant patients, and their families, this is bound to have pro- found consequences. This is what Fox and Swazey identify as "the tyranny of the gift." They write:
As Marcel Mauss could have fore- told, what recipients believe they owe to donors and the sense of obligation they feel about repaying "their" donors weigh heavily on them. This psychological and moral burden is especially onerous because the gift the recipient has received from the donor is so ex- traordinary that it is inherently It has no physical or unreciprocal. symbolic equivalent. As a conse- quence, the giver, the receiver, and their families may find themselves locked into a creditor-debtor vise that binds them to one another in a mutually fettering way. | 4,892 | <h4>Commodification is better than their politics of sentimentality – they are the sign of a sacrifice made by the Other<u><strong>, a gift of life the recipient can never repay. This reproduces the tyranny of the gift</h4><p>Siminoff and Chillag `99</p><p></u></strong>Laura A. Siminoff and Kata Chillag. “The Fallacy of the Gift of Life.” The Hastings Center Report 29.6 (November-December 1999): 34-41. 35-36.</p><p>In discussions of the gift of life, nu- merous scholars have invoked gift exchange theory based on the work of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In The Gift, Mauss outlines the central features of gift exchange in "techno- logically simple" societies. Through systematic comparison of cultures in the American Northwest, Melanesia, and Polynesia, Mauss identified com- mon principles governing the opera- tion of these "money-less" econo- mies.7 Mauss paid particular atten- tion to the ways in which <u><mark>patterns of gift-giving created relationships of obligation and reciprocity that</u></mark> struc- tured and <u><mark>perpetuated</u></mark> the <u><mark>social systems</u></mark> of such cultures. <u>Even if one is not required to pay with money "up front,"</u> Mauss contends, <u>debt is creat- ed and there is always the expectation that debt will be redressed</u>, directly or indirectly, at some future time.</p><p>As Mary Douglas writes, Mauss recognized an overriding social truth, that "the idea of <u><strong><mark>a pure gift is a contradiction</strong></mark>."8 <mark>If</mark> the debt is not ac- knowledged or <mark>no possibility exists for its repayment, the consequences are formidable for</mark> both</u> the <u><mark>individu- als</u></mark> immediately <u>involved in the trans- action <mark>and</mark> for the <mark>society</mark> as a whole. A debt that</u> by its nature <u>cannot be repaid is fundamentally threatening to the social order and</u> (most relevant to our discussion of transplantation) <u>must</u> somehow <u>be recategorized to fit</u> into existing models of <u>reciprocity</u>.</p><p>Those who have drawn on Mauss's analysis identify several key aspects of gift exchange theory that are particu- larly relevant to organ transplanta- tion. <u>Mauss's conclusions</u> seemingly <u>map well onto</u> the practice of <u>organ donation because</u>, at present, <u>the ex- change of money does not take place</u> in this context. Thus Sque and Payne suggest that "<u><mark>organ transplantation is</u></mark> sociologically and psychologically <u><mark>re- lated to the dynamics of gift ex- change</mark>, as <mark>monetary reimbursement for organs is outlawed</u></mark> in developed countries."9 Yet <u>though no money is involved, the "gift" of an organ is not freely made</u>. Renee Fox and Judith Swazey write, "even though the American organ donation system has been organized around the cardinal societal principles of voluntarism and freedom of choice, in the type of sit- uations where transplants are per- formed, <u>prospective donors</u> and their families <u>are subject to</u> strong inner and outer <u>pressures to make the gift</u>."'0 Moreover, <u>the recipient</u> and his or her family <u>are obligated to "re- ceive" the gift</u> of the organ and all it entails.</p><p>The metaphor of the gift suggests that the donor gives the organ to the recipient.11 That is not the case. The donor is dead. And although he or she may have signed an organ donor card, or expressed his or her wishes to the family, in reality the donor partic- ipates in the actual gift exchange not as knowing giver, but as gift object. Yet the dead donor (more properly, source) is still largely identified as the giver, that is, the individual to whom the person on the other end of the ex- change owes a debt of reciprocity.</p><p>Clearly, <u><strong><mark>the debt cannot be repaid</strong></mark> to the</u> deceased, the ostensible <u>giver</u>. Nor can a gift of such magnitude-of life itself-be adequately repaid to a proxy. <u>The greater the magnitude of the gift and the "need" of the recipi- ent, the less "free" the gift becomes. The families of organ <mark>donors and</u></mark> transplant candidates, <u><mark>recipients</u></mark>, and their families <u><mark>are</u></mark> thus <u><mark>caught in a complex web</mark> with<mark>in which</u></mark>, as Ver- nale and Packard assert, <u><mark>there exists "obligation to give,</mark> obligation to <mark>re- ceive</mark>, and obligation to <mark>repay</u></mark>."</p><p>Critical to any discussion of organ as gift is an acknowledgment of the magnitude of that gift. <u>There is no act or commodity that would be commensurate to what has been given. This does not</u>, however, <u>elimi- nate the impulse to repay</u> (in fact, <u>it may magnify this propensity</u>, albeit in unexpected and/or indirect ways). <u>This sense of obligation to make amends exists in the community as a whole and is taken on by individual members</u>. In other words, <u><mark>the pres- sure comes from within as well as from without, from both self and other</u></mark>. In combination with the extra- ordinary practical and emotional de- mands on members of donor fami- lies, transplant patients, and their families, this is bound to have pro- found consequences. This is what Fox and Swazey identify as "the tyranny of the gift." They write:</p><p>As Marcel Mauss could have fore- told, what recipients believe they owe to donors and the sense of obligation they feel about repaying "their" donors weigh heavily on them. <u>This psychological and moral burden is especially onerous because the gift the recipient has received</u> from the donor <u>is so ex- traordinary</u> that it is inherently <u>It has no</u> physical or unreciprocal. symbolic <u>equivalent</u>. As a conse- quence, the giver, the receiver, and their families may find themselves locked into a creditor-debtor vise that binds them to one another in a mutually fettering way.</p> | 1NC | null | Case | 429,892 | 1 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,532 | No impact to econ decline | Miller 2k | Miller 2k | After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis they concluded economic crisis bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or, to an outbreak of violence | After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis they concluded economic crisis - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes or an outbreak of violence | (Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another). | 1,784 | <h4><u><strong>No impact to econ decline</h4><p>Miller 2k</p><p></u></strong>(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)</p><p>The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. <u><mark>After studying <strong>ninety-three</strong> episodes of economic crisis</u> </mark>in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War <u><mark>they<strong></mark> </strong><mark>concluded</u> </mark>that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of <u><mark>economic crisis</u> </mark>- as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth <mark>- <u>bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes </mark>... </u>(<u><mark>or</mark>,</u> in democratic states, rarely) <u><strong>to </strong><mark>an outbreak of violence</u> </mark>... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).</p> | 1NC | null | State Budgets | 97,449 | 112 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,533 | No food wars | Chang ‘11 | Chang ‘11
Gordon G Chang, Graduated Cornell Law School “Global Food Wars” http://blogs.forbes.com/gordonchang/2011/02/21/global-food-wars/ | humankind does not go to war over bad harvests This is not the first time in human history that food shortages looked like they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing agronomic advances, , have consistently proved pessimists wrong. it’s important to remember the power of innovation and the efficiency markets. | humankind does not go to war over bad harvests agronomic advances have consistently proved pessimists wrong it’s important to remember the power of innovation and the efficiency markets | In any event, food-price increases have apparently been factors in the unrest now sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The poor spend up to half their disposable income on edibles, making rapid food inflation a cause of concern for dictators, strongmen, and assorted autocrats everywhere. So even if humankind does not go to war over bad harvests, Paskal may be right when she contends that climate change may end up altering the global map. This is not the first time in human history that food shortages looked like they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing agronomic advances, especially Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution in the middle of the 20th century, have consistently proved the pessimists wrong. In these days when capitalism is being blamed for most everything, it’s important to remember the power of human innovation in free societies—and the efficiency of free markets. | 916 | <h4><u><strong>No food wars</h4><p>Chang ‘11</p><p></u></strong>Gordon G Chang, Graduated Cornell Law School “Global Food Wars” http://blogs.forbes.com/gordonchang/2011/02/21/global-food-wars/<u> </p><p></u>In any event, food-price increases have apparently been factors in the unrest now sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The poor spend up to half their disposable income on edibles, making rapid food inflation a cause of concern for dictators, strongmen, and assorted autocrats everywhere. So even if <u><mark>humankind does not go to war over bad harvests</u></mark>, Paskal may be right when she contends that climate change may end up altering the global map. <u>This is not the first time in human history that food shortages looked like they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing <mark>agronomic advances</mark>, </u>especially Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution in the middle of the 20th century<u>, <mark>have consistently proved </u></mark>the<u> <mark>pessimists wrong</mark>. </u>In these days when capitalism is being blamed for most everything,<u> <mark>it’s important to remember the power of </u></mark>human<u> <mark>innovation </u></mark>in free societies—<u><mark>and the efficiency </u></mark>of free<u> <mark>markets</mark>. </p></u> | 1NC | null | State Budgets | 112,932 | 41 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,534 | Rumors of illegal organ sales are rooted in fear of chaos and desire for purity. | Scheper-Hughes `96 | Scheper-Hughes `96
Nancy Scheper-Hughes. “Theft of Life: Globalization of the Organ Stealing Rumors.” Anthropology Today 12.3 (June 1996). 3-11. 4. | Allegations of `baby farms` and `fattening houses` in Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Brazil were investigated by various authorities and roundly denied Why is it that the `baby parts story just won't die a lot of people around the world tell variants of the same bizarre and unlikely story the rumors indicate a global mass hysteria reflecting anxieties and post-modern malaise. The rumors may be taken as the emergence of a global new religion in which medieval images of Satan and vampires are now cloaked in the guise of a ghoulish cyborg medical technology. Underlying the rumors is a New Age spirituality that focuses on the body and the vulnerability of organs in the face of everyday threats to personal security in urban violence, anarchy, theft, and assault. The world's cities have never been so dangerous, so violent continuities link anti-semitic `blood libel` rumors of the Middle Ages with the baby and body part rumors of the late 20th century | Allegations of `baby farms` and `fattening houses were investigated and denied Why is it that the story won't die rumors indicate a global mass hysteria reflecting anxieties and post-modern malaise rumors may be taken as the emergence of a global new religion in which medieval images of Satan are cloaked in cyborg medical technology is a New Age spirituality that focuses on the body and vulnerability of organs in the face of everyday threats to personal security | Needless to say, perhaps, verifying actual cases of kidnapped children exported for organ transplants has not been easy. Allegations of `baby farms` and `fattening houses` in Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Brazil where newborns were said to be housed awaiting transport to the United States (sometimes via Paraguay) for use as organ donors were investigated by various authorities and roundly denied. The International Children Rights Monitor published a report raising the obvious questions: where would the operations take place? How could the murder of the child donors be concealed? Wouldn't the cost and difficulty of an illegal and criminal trade far surpass the advantage of contravening normal procedures? In the US every organ made available to patients awaiting a transplant is strictly monitored by computer through UNOS, the United Network for Organ Sharing. And, of course, organs must be carefully matched to recipients to avoid rejection. Why is it, then, that the `baby parts story just won't die despite the appointment of a USIA disinformation specialist, Todd Leventhal, who has led a long and expensive US government campaign to kill it?¶ Making sense of rumors¶ What does it mean when a lot of people around the world tell variants of the same bizarre and unlikely story? One current explanation is that the rumors indicate a kind of global mass hysteria – a sort of transnational St. Vitus`s dance reflecting predictable fin de siécle anxieties and post-modern malaise. The rumors may be taken as the emergence of a global new religion or a world cult in which medieval images of Satan and vampires are now cloaked in the guise of a ghoulish cyborg medical technology. Underlying the rumors is a New Age spirituality that focuses on the body and on the vulnerability of organs in the face of everyday threats to personal security in urban violence, anarchy, theft, and assault. The world's cities have never been so dangerous, so violent.¶ Oral historians and folklorists prefer to see the body parts rumor as constituting a genre, an oral literary form: the urban legend. The stories are circulated and repeated, at least in part, because they are `good to think` and `good to tell`; they entertain by fright just like good old-fashioned ghost stories. Folklorists, like Dundes, tend to note the continuities over space and time linking the anti-semitic `blood libel` rumors of the Middle Ages with the baby and body part rumors of the late 20th century, both presumably founded in universal structures of the subconscious. | 2,548 | <h4>Rumors of illeg<u><strong>al organ sales are rooted in fear of chaos and desire for purity.</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes `96</p><p></u></strong>Nancy Scheper-Hughes. “Theft of Life: Globalization of the Organ Stealing Rumors.” Anthropology Today 12.3 (June 1996). 3-11. 4.</p><p>Needless to say, perhaps, verifying actual cases of kidnapped children exported for organ transplants has not been easy. <u><mark>Allegations of `baby farms` and `fattening houses</mark>` in Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Brazil</u> where newborns were said to be housed awaiting transport to the United States (sometimes via Paraguay) for use as organ donors <u><mark>were investigated</mark> by various authorities <mark>and</mark> roundly <mark>denied</u></mark>. The International Children Rights Monitor published a report raising the obvious questions: where would the operations take place? How could the murder of the child donors be concealed? Wouldn't the cost and difficulty of an illegal and criminal trade far surpass the advantage of contravening normal procedures? In the US every organ made available to patients awaiting a transplant is strictly monitored by computer through UNOS, the United Network for Organ Sharing. And, of course, organs must be carefully matched to recipients to avoid rejection. <u><mark>Why is it</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>that the</mark> `baby parts <mark>story</mark> just <mark>won't die</u></mark> despite the appointment of a USIA disinformation specialist, Todd Leventhal, who has led a long and expensive US government campaign to kill it?¶ Making sense of rumors¶ What does it mean when <u>a lot of people around the world tell variants of the same bizarre and unlikely story</u>? One current explanation is that <u>the <mark>rumors indicate a</u></mark> kind of <u><strong><mark>global mass hysteria</u></strong></mark> – a sort of transnational St. Vitus`s dance <u><mark>reflecting</u></mark> predictable fin de siécle <u><mark>anxieties and post-modern malaise</mark>. The <mark>rumors may be taken as the emergence of a global new religion</u></mark> or a world cult <u><mark>in which medieval images of Satan</mark> and vampires <mark>are</mark> now <mark>cloaked in</mark> the guise of a ghoulish <mark>cyborg medical technology</mark>. Underlying the rumors <mark>is a New Age spirituality that focuses on the body and</u></mark> on <u>the <mark>vulnerability of organs in the face of everyday threats to personal security</mark> in urban violence, anarchy, theft, and assault. The world's cities have never been so dangerous, so violent</u>.¶ Oral historians and folklorists prefer to see the body parts rumor as constituting a genre, an oral literary form: the urban legend. The stories are circulated and repeated, at least in part, because they are `good to think` and `good to tell`; they entertain by fright just like good old-fashioned ghost stories. Folklorists, like Dundes, tend to note the <u>continuities</u> over space and time <u>link</u>ing the <u>anti-semitic `blood libel` rumors of the Middle Ages with the baby and body part rumors of the late 20th century</u>, both presumably founded in universal structures of the subconscious.</p> | 1NC | null | Case | 429,893 | 4 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,535 | They essentialize life by surveying it in purely biological terms. | Colebrook 2004 | Colebrook 2004 (Claire, Department of English Literature at University of Edinburgh, "The Sense of Space: On the Specificity of Affect in Deleuze and Guattari" MUSE) | Deleuze remains committed to the notion of life: the disciplines of evolutionary science, linguistics, and even a form of psychoanalysis which explain the relations or strata that produce terms or points or relative stability. Thinking life radically, however, involves freeing the movements that produce any single series of relations, or any plateau, from any single term Thus, neither biology, nor geology, nor linguistics, nor sociology, can account for life as such life is just that which unfolds in all these distinct series. one can see each of these series or plateaus as a problem, as one of many ways in which the striving of life creates, produces, expands, and expresses itself The problem with modern power in its capitalist form is just the reduction of all these series to the single plane Deleuze allows for the thought of life, the problem of life, to open up a new space, a virtual space or a space of sense. | Deleuze remains committed to the notion of life: Thinking life radically, involves freeing the movements that produce any single series of relations, from any single term Thus, neither biology, nor geology, nor linguistics, nor sociology, can account for life as such. life is just that which unfolds in all distinct series one can see each of these series as a problem, as one of many ways in which the striving of life creates and expresses itself The problem with modern power is just the reduction of all these series to the single plane Deleuze allows for the thought of life to open up a new space, of sense. | Deleuze offers a similar account of the genesis of the subject and humanity, but differs from Foucault in two crucial respects. First, Deleuze remains committed to the notion of life: the disciplines of evolutionary science, linguistics, and even a form of psychoanalysis which explain the relations or strata that produce terms or points or relative stability. Thinking life radically, however, involves freeing the movements that produce any single series of relations, or any plateau, from any single term. Thus, neither biology, nor geology, nor linguistics, nor sociology, can account for life as such. Indeed, life is just that which unfolds in all these distinct series. Second, one can see each of these series or plateaus as a problem, as one of many ways in which the striving of life creates, produces, expands, and expresses itself. The problem with modern power in its capitalist form is just the reduction of all these series to the single plane of capital, all these forms of stratification to the space of man. Here, Deleuze is in accord with Foucault's genealogy but allows for the thought of life, the problem of life, to open up a new space, a virtual space or a space of sense. | 1,197 | <h4>They essentialize life by surveying it in purely biological terms.</h4><p><u><strong>Colebrook 2004</u></strong> (Claire, Department of English Literature at University of Edinburgh, "The Sense of Space: On the Specificity of Affect in Deleuze and Guattari<u>" MUSE)</p><p></u>Deleuze offers a similar account of the genesis of the subject and humanity, but differs from Foucault in two crucial respects. First, <u><mark>Deleuze remains committed to the notion of life:</mark> the disciplines of evolutionary science, linguistics, and even a form of psychoanalysis which explain the relations or strata that produce terms or points or relative stability. <mark>Thinking life radically,</mark> however, <mark>involves freeing the movements that produce any single series of relations,</mark> or any plateau, <mark>from any single term</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Thus, neither biology, nor geology, nor linguistics, nor sociology, can account for life as such</u></strong>.</mark> Indeed, <u><mark>life is just that which unfolds in all</mark> these <mark>distinct series</mark>. </u>Second, <u><mark>one can see each of these series</mark> or plateaus <mark>as a problem, as one of many ways in which the striving of life creates</mark>, produces, expands, <mark>and expresses itself</u></mark>. <u><mark>The problem with modern power</mark> in its capitalist form <mark>is just the reduction of all these series to the single plane</u></mark> of capital, all these forms of stratification to the space of man. Here, <u><mark>Deleuze</u></mark> is in accord with Foucault's genealogy but <u><mark>allows for the thought of life</mark>, the problem of life, <mark>to open up a new space,</mark> a virtual space or a space <mark>of sense.</mark> </p></u> | 1NC | null | Case | 429,894 | 1 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,536 | Countries will cooperate | Burger et al. 10 | Burger et al. 10
*Kees Burger Development Economics, Corresponding author, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg **Jeroen Warner AND Eefje Derix Disaster Studies, Wageningen Universit “Governance of the world food system and crisis prevention” http://www.stuurgroepta.nl/rapporten/Foodshock-web.pdf | Food security is no longer a prime objective of food and agricultural policy. There is no credible threat to the availability of the basic ingredients of human nutrition from domestic and foreign sources If there is a food security threat The main response is co-ordination Europe feels rather sure and does not worry about a potential food crisis. forms of cooperation are tried that leave member-state sovereignty intact, such as pooling of resources. | If there is a food security threat The main response is co-ordination forms of cooperation are tried that leave member-state sovereignty intact, such as pooling of resources | Both European water and agricultural policies are based on the belief that there will always be cheap food aplenty on the world market. A recent British report 23 reflects this optimism. Although production is now more prone to world market price shocks, their effects on farm incomes are softened by extensive income supports (van Eickhout et al. 2007). Earlier, in a 2003 report, a European group of agricultural economists wrote: Food security is no longer a prime objective of European food and agricultural policy. There is no credible threat to the availability of the basic ingredients of human nutrition from domestic and foreign sources. If there is a food security threat it is the possible disruption of supplies by natural disasters or catastrophic terrorist action. The main response necessary for such possibilities is the appropriate contingency planning and co-ordination between the Commission and Member States (Anania et al. 2003). Europe, it appears, feels rather sure of itself, and does not worry about a potential food crisis. We are also not aware of any special measures on standby. Nevertheless a fledgling European internal security has been called into being that can be deployed should (food) crises strike. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) created a quasi-decision-making platform to respond to transboundary threats. Since 9/11 the definition of what constitutes a threat has been broadened and the protection capacity reinforced. In the Solidarity Declaration of 2003 member states promised to stand by each other in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster or human-made calamity (the European Security Strategy of 2003). Experimental forms of cooperation are tried that leave member-state sovereignty intact, such as pooling of resources. The EU co-operates in the area of health and food safety but its mechanisms remain decentrslised by dint of the principle of subsidiarity. The silo mentality between the European directorates is also unhelpful, leading to Babylonian confusion. Thus, in the context of forest fires and floods the Environment DG refers to ‘civil protection’. The European Security and Defence Policy( ESDP) of 2006, which is hoped to build a bridge between internal and external security policy, on the other hand refers to ‘crisis management’, while the ‘security’ concept mainly pertains to pandemics (Rhinard et al. 2008: 512, Boin et al. 2008: 406). | 2,413 | <h4>Countries will cooperate </h4><p><u><strong>Burger et al. 10</u></strong> </p><p>*Kees Burger Development Economics, Corresponding author, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg **Jeroen Warner AND Eefje Derix Disaster Studies, Wageningen Universit “Governance of the world food system and crisis prevention” http://www.stuurgroepta.nl/rapporten/Foodshock-web.pdf </p><p>Both European water and agricultural policies are based on the belief that there will always be cheap food aplenty on the world market. A recent British report 23 reflects this optimism. Although production is now more prone to world market price shocks, their effects on farm incomes are softened by extensive income supports (van Eickhout et al. 2007). Earlier, in a 2003 report, a European group of agricultural economists wrote: <u>Food security is no longer a prime objective of</u> European <u>food and agricultural policy. There is no credible threat to the availability of the basic ingredients of human nutrition from domestic and foreign sources</u>. <u><mark>If there is a food security threat </u></mark>it is the possible disruption of supplies by natural disasters or catastrophic terrorist action. <u><mark>The main response </u></mark>necessary for such possibilities<u> <mark>is </u></mark>the appropriate contingency planning and<u> <mark>co-ordination </u></mark>between the Commission and Member States (Anania et al. 2003). <u>Europe</u>, it appears, <u>feels rather sure</u> of itself, <u>and does not worry about a potential food crisis.</u> We are also not aware of any special measures on standby. Nevertheless a fledgling European internal security has been called into being that can be deployed should (food) crises strike. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) created a quasi-decision-making platform to respond to transboundary threats. Since 9/11 the definition of what constitutes a threat has been broadened and the protection capacity reinforced. In the Solidarity Declaration of 2003 member states promised to stand by each other in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster or human-made calamity (the European Security Strategy of 2003). Experimental<u> <mark>forms of cooperation are tried that leave member-state sovereignty intact, such as pooling of resources</mark>. </u>The EU co-operates in the area of health and food safety but its mechanisms remain decentrslised by dint of the principle of subsidiarity. The silo mentality between the European directorates is also unhelpful, leading to Babylonian confusion. Thus, in the context of forest fires and floods the Environment DG refers to ‘civil protection’. The European Security and Defence Policy( ESDP) of 2006, which is hoped to build a bridge between internal and external security policy, on the other hand refers to ‘crisis management’, while the ‘security’ concept mainly pertains to pandemics (Rhinard et al. 2008: 512, Boin et al. 2008: 406). </p> | 1NC | null | State Budgets | 195,475 | 10 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,537 | Apocalyptic claims of resource depletion backfire because it is not credible in the eyes of the public | Doremus 2000 | Doremus 2000 (Holly, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse,” Winter 2000, Washington and Lee Law Review, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=wlulr | the material discourse are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers Reluctant to concede losses, tellers highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible than the 1970s. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if future includes fewer species, it will hold people ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This redundancy means a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating collapse But it is difficult to translate these insights into convincing arguments against any one of the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global warming or biodiversity loss." It is difficult to identify the specific straw that will break the camel's back. no unilateral action can solve these global problems. Local decisionmakers may feel [frozen] by the scope of the problems, or may conclude that any sacrifices they might make will go unrewarded if others do not restrain their actions. material discourse provides little reason to save nature. Short of the ultimate catastrophe, the material benefits of destructive decisions frequently will exceed their identifiable material cost. | Reluctant to concede losses, tellers highlight catastrophe and how little we know the apocalyptic vision is less credible Homo sapiens is adaptable Even if future includes fewer it will hold people ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This redundancy means species can be lost without collapse It is difficult to identify the specific straw no unilateral action can solve decisionmakers feel frozen] by the scope or conclude sacrifices they make will go unrewarded material discourse provides little reason material benefits of destructive decisions frequently exceed identifiable cost | Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fingible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree.212 Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions,213 the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely.214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people.215 One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees.2 6 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.217 Another response drops the horrific ending and returns to a more measured discourse of the many material benefits nature provides humanity. Even these more plausible tales, though, suffer from an important limitation. They call for nature protection only at a high level of generality. For example, human-induced increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels may cause rapid changes in global temperatures in the near future, with drastic consequences for sea levels, weather patterns, and ecosystem services.21 Similarly, the loss of large numbers of species undoubtedly reduces the genetic library from which we might in the future draw useful resources.219 But it is difficult to translate these insights into convincing arguments against any one of the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global warming or biodiversity loss." ° It is easy to argue that the material impact of any individual decision to increase carbon emissions slightly or to destroy a small amount of habitat will be small. It is difficult to identify the specific straw that will break the camel's back. Furthermore, no unilateral action at the local or even national level can solve these global problems. Local decisionmakers may feel paralyzed [frozen] by the scope of the problems, or may conclude that any sacrifices they might make will go unrewarded if others do not restrain their actions. In sum, at the local level at which most decisions affecting nature are made, the material discourse provides little reason to save nature. Short of the ultimate catastrophe, the material benefits of destructive decisions frequently will exceed their identifiable material cost. | 3,369 | <h4>Apocalyptic claims of resource depletion backfire because it is not credible in the eyes of the public </h4><p><u><strong>Doremus 2000</u></strong> (Holly, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse,” Winter 2000, Washington and Lee Law Review, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=wlulr</p><p>Notwithstanding its attractions, <u>the material discourse</u> in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, <u>are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers</u>. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fingible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree.212 <u><mark>Reluctant to concede</u></mark> such <u><mark>losses, tellers</u></mark> of the ecological horror story <u><mark>highlight</mark> how close a <mark>catastrophe</mark> might be, <mark>and how little we know</mark> about what actions might trigger one. But <mark>the apocalyptic vision is less credible</u></mark> today <u>than</u> it seemed in <u>the 1970s.</u> Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions,213 the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely.214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. <u><mark>Homo sapiens is adaptable</mark> to nearly any environment. <mark>Even if</u></mark> the world of the <u><mark>future includes</u></mark> far <u><mark>fewer</mark> species, <mark>it</u></mark> likely <u><mark>will hold people</u></mark>.215 One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees.2 6 But this too may be overstating the case. Most <u><mark>ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This</u></mark> functional <u><mark>redundancy means</u></mark> that <u>a high proportion of <mark>species can be lost without</mark> precipitating</u> a <u><mark>collapse</u></mark>.217 Another response drops the horrific ending and returns to a more measured discourse of the many material benefits nature provides humanity. Even these more plausible tales, though, suffer from an important limitation. They call for nature protection only at a high level of generality. For example, human-induced increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels may cause rapid changes in global temperatures in the near future, with drastic consequences for sea levels, weather patterns, and ecosystem services.21 Similarly, the loss of large numbers of species undoubtedly reduces the genetic library from which we might in the future draw useful resources.219 <u>But it is difficult to translate these insights into convincing arguments against any one of the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global warming or biodiversity loss."</u> ° It is easy to argue that the material impact of any individual decision to increase carbon emissions slightly or to destroy a small amount of habitat will be small. <u><mark>It is difficult to identify the specific straw</mark> that will break the camel's back.</u> Furthermore, <u><mark>no unilateral action</u></mark> at the local or even national level <u><mark>can solve</mark> these global problems. Local <mark>decisionmakers</mark> may <mark>feel</mark> </u>paralyzed<u> [<mark>frozen] by the scope</mark> of the problems, <mark>or</mark> may <mark>conclude</mark> that any <mark>sacrifices they</mark> might <mark>make will go unrewarded</mark> if others do not restrain their actions.</u> In sum, at the local level at which most decisions affecting nature are made, the <u><mark>material discourse provides little reason</mark> to save nature. Short of the ultimate catastrophe, the <mark>material benefits of destructive decisions frequently</mark> will <mark>exceed</mark> their <mark>identifiable </mark>material <mark>cost</mark>.</p></u> | 1NC | null | State Budgets | 91,384 | 102 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,538 | brokenness | Halberstam 13 | Halberstam 13 (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study,” pp 5-9) gz | If we do not seek to fix what has been broken, then what? How do we resolve to live with brokenness, with being broke, which is also what Moten and Harney call “debt Can debt “become a principle of elaboration”?
what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable. It can’t be repaired. The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new The undercommons do not come to pay their debts, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone.
If you want to know what the undercommons wants, what black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people want it is this – we cannot be satisfied with the recognition and acknowledgement generated by the very system that denies a) that anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to be the broken part; so we refuse to ask for recognition and instead we want to take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls. We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with yet, because once we have torn shit down, we will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of wanting and being and becoming
In the melancholic and visionary 2009 film version of Maurice Sandak’s Where The Wild Things Are Max’s power is that he is small while they are big; he promises the beasts that he has no plans to eat them and this is more than anyone has ever promised them. He promises that he will find ways through and around and will “slip through cracks” and re-crack the cracks if they fill up That Max fails to make the wild things happy or to save them or to make a world with them is less important than the fact that he found them and he recognized in them the end of something and potentially the path to an alternative to his world The wild things were not the utopian creatures of fairy tales, they were the rejected and lost subjects of the world he sees what is included and what is left out and he is now able to set sail for another place, a place that is neither the home he left nor the home to which he wants to return
Moten and Harney want to gesture to another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is ongoing and exists in the present and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. What’s more, the call is always a call to dis-order and this disorder or wildness shows up in many places: in jazz, in improvisation, in noise Listening to cacophony and noise tells us that there is a wild beyond to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us
when we are called to this other place, the wild beyond, “beyond the beyond we have to give ourselves over to a certain kind of craziness even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy Fanon knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he knew that it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild
Fanon wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order to bring colonialism to an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism blackness is the willingness to be in the space that has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule, by order he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not
The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with the right to refuse what has been refused to you it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals the refusal of the choices as offered when you arrive at the ballot box, pen in hand, you only get to check “yes” or “no” And so, you must refuse the choice as offered.
Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to refuse what they term “the call to order.” to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation and the reinstantiation of the law. When we refuse we create dissonance and more importantly, we allow dissonance to continue – when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue, dissonant study perhaps, disorganized study, but study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left the room we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument when we refuse the call to order – the teacher picking up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth.
the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.” | we do not seek to fix what has been broken we resolve to live with brokenness
what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new.” The undercommons do not come to pay their debts
black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people cannot be satisfied with recognition generated by the very system that denies that anything was ever broken and that we deserved to be broken we refuse to ask for recognition We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with because once we have torn shit down, we will see more and feel a new sense of becoming
In Where The Wild Things Are That Max fails to make the wild things happy or save them is less important than that he recognized in them the end of something they were the rejected and lost subjects of the world he is able to set sail for another place
Moten and Harney want to gesture to a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness a call to dis-order in jazz, in improvisation, in noise
when we are called to this beyond the beyond we have to give ourselves to a certain craziness Fanon knew it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild
to bring colonialism to an end one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other who has been rendered a nonentity blackness is to be in the space abandoned by colonialism
The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal at the ballot box you only get to check “yes” or “no you must refuse the choice as offered
to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation we allow dissonance to continue when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left
the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique The undercommons is always here. Our goal is not to end the troubles but to end the world refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, refuse to shape noise into “music.” | If we do not seek to fix what has been broken, then what? How do we resolve to live with brokenness, with being broke, which is also what Moten and Harney call “debt.” Well, given that debt is sometimes a history of giving, at other times a history of taking, at all times a history of capitalism and given that debt also signifies a promise of ownership but never delivers on that promise, we have to understand that debt is something that cannot be paid off. Debt, as Harney puts it, presumes a kind of individualized relation to a naturalized economy that is predicated upon exploitation. Can we have, he asks, another sense of what is owed that does not presume a nexus of activities like recognition and acknowledgement, payment and gratitude. Can debt “become a principle of elaboration”?
Moten links economic debt to the brokenness of being in the interview with Stevphen Shukaitis; he acknowledges that some debts should be paid, and that much is owed especially to black people by white people, and yet, he says: “I also know that what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable. It can’t be repaired. The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new.” The undercommons do not come to pay their debts, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone.
If you want to know what the undercommons wants, what Moten and Harney want, what black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people want, what we (the “we” who cohabit in the space of the undercommons) want, it is this – we cannot be satisfied with the recognition and acknowledgement generated by the very system that denies a) that anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to be the broken part; so we refuse to ask for recognition and instead we want to take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls. We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with yet, because once we have torn shit down, we will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of wanting and being and becoming. What we want after “the break” will be different from what we think we want before the break and both are necessarily different from the desire that issues from being in the break.
Let’s come at this by another path. In the melancholic and visionary 2009 film version of Maurice Sandak’s Where The Wild Things Are (1963), Max, the small seeker who leaves his room, his home, his family to find the wild beyond, finds a world of lost and lonely beasts and they promptly make him their king. Max is the first king the wild things have had whom they did not eat and who did not, in turn, try to eat them; and the beasts are the first grown things that Max has met who want his opinion, his judgment, his rule. Max’s power is that he is small while they are big; he promises the beasts that he has no plans to eat them and this is more than anyone has ever promised them. He promises that he will find ways through and around and will “slip through cracks” and re-crack the cracks if they fill up. He promises to keep sadness at bay and to make a world with the wild creatures that “roared their terrible roars and gnashed their terrible teeth and rolled their terrible eyes and showed their terrible claws.” That Max fails to make the wild things happy or to save them or to make a world with them is less important than the fact that he found them and he recognized in them the end of something and potentially the path to an alternative to his world. The wild things were not the utopian creatures of fairy tales, they were the rejected and lost subjects of the world Max had left behind and, because he shuttles between the Oedipal land where his mother rules and the ruined world of the wild, he knows the parameters of the real – he sees what is included and what is left out and he is now able to set sail for another place, a place that is neither the home he left nor the home to which he wants to return.
Moten and Harney want to gesture to another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness. The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is ongoing and exists in the present and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself.” While describing the London Riots of 2011, Harney suggests that the riots and insurrections do not separate out “the request, the demand and the call” – rather, they enact the one in the other: “I think the call, in the way I would understand it, the call, as in the call and response, the response is already there before the call goes out. You’re already in something.” You are already in it. For Moten too, you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. What’s more, the call is always a call to dis-order and this disorder or wildness shows up in many places: in jazz, in improvisation, in noise. The disordered sounds that we refer to as cacophony will always be cast as “extra-musical,” as Moten puts it, precisely because we hear something in them that reminds us that our desire for harmony is arbitrary and in another world, harmony would sound incomprehensible. Listening to cacophony and noise tells us that there is a wild beyond to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us.
And when we are called to this other place, the wild beyond, “beyond the beyond” in Moten and Harney’s apt terminology, we have to give ourselves over to a certain kind of craziness. Moten reminds us that even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy” but, Fanon, as a psychiatrist, also knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he knew that it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild.
MARKED
Fanon, according to Moten, wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order to bring colonialism to an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a nonentity by colonialism. Indeed, blackness, for Moten and Harney by way of Fanon, is the willingness to be in the space that has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule, by order. Moten takes us there, saying of Fanon finally: “Eventually, I believe, he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not (as John Donne would say).”
The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal. In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with the right to refuse what has been refused to you. Citing Gayatri Spivak, Moten and Harney call this refusal the “first right” and it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals the refusal of the choices as offered. We can understand this refusal in terms that Chandan Reddy lays out in Freedom With Violence (2011) – for Reddy, gay marriage is the option that cannot be opposed in the ballot box. While we can circulate multiple critiques of gay marriage in terms of its institutionalization of intimacy, when you arrive at the ballot box, pen in hand, you only get to check “yes” or “no” and the no, in this case, could be more damning than the yes. And so, you must refuse the choice as offered.
Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to refuse what they term “the call to order.” And what would it mean, furthermore, to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation and the reinstantiation of the law. When we refuse, Moten and Harney suggest, we create dissonance and more importantly, we allow dissonance to continue – when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue, dissonant study perhaps, disorganized study, but study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left the room. Or, when we listen to music, we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument; music is also the anticipation of the performance and the noises of appreciation it generates and the speaking that happens through and around it, making it and loving it, being in it while listening. And so, when we refuse the call to order – the teacher picking up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth.
These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.” | 9,683 | <h4>brokenness</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 13</u></strong> (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study,” pp 5-9) gz</p><p><u>If <mark>we <strong>do not seek to fix what has been broken</strong></mark>, then what? How do <mark>we resolve to <strong>live with brokenness</strong></mark>, with being broke, which is also what Moten and Harney call “debt</u>.” Well, given that debt is sometimes a history of giving, at other times a history of taking, at all times a history of capitalism and given that debt also signifies a promise of ownership but never delivers on that promise, we have to understand that debt is something that cannot be paid off. Debt, as Harney puts it, presumes a kind of individualized relation to a naturalized economy that is predicated upon exploitation. Can we have, he asks, another sense of what is owed that does not presume a nexus of activities like recognition and acknowledgement, payment and gratitude. <u>Can debt “become a principle of elaboration”?</p><p></u>Moten links economic debt to the brokenness of being in the interview with Stevphen Shukaitis; he acknowledges that some debts should be paid, and that much is owed especially to black people by white people, and yet, he says: “I also know that <u><mark>what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable</mark>. <strong>It can’t be repaired</strong>. <mark>The only thing we can do is <strong>tear this shit down completely and build something new</u></strong>.” <u>The undercommons do <strong>not come to pay their debts</mark>, to repair what has been broken, to fix what has come undone</strong>.</p><p>If you want to know what the undercommons wants, what</u> Moten and Harney want, what <u><mark>black people, indigenous peoples, queers and poor people</mark> want</u>, what we (the “we” who cohabit in the space of the undercommons) want, <u>it is this – we <strong><mark>cannot be satisfied with</mark> the <mark>recognition</mark> and acknowledgement <mark>generated by the very system</strong> that denies</mark> a) <mark>that anything was ever broken and</mark> b) <mark>that we deserved to be</mark> the <mark>broken</mark> part; so <mark>we <strong>refuse to ask for recognition</strong></mark> and instead we want to <strong>take apart, dismantle, tear down the structure</strong> that, right now, limits our ability to find each other, to see beyond it and to access the places that we know lie outside its walls. <strong><mark>We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with</strong></mark> yet, <mark>because once we have torn shit down, we will</mark> inevitably <strong><mark>see more and </mark>see differently</strong> and <mark>feel a new sense of</mark> wanting and being and <mark>becoming</u></mark>. What we want after “the break” will be different from what we think we want before the break and both are necessarily different from the desire that issues from being in the break.</p><p>Let’s come at this by another path. <u><mark>In</mark> the melancholic and visionary 2009 film version of Maurice Sandak’s <mark>Where The Wild Things Are</u></mark> (1963), Max, the small seeker who leaves his room, his home, his family to find the wild beyond, finds a world of lost and lonely beasts and they promptly make him their king. Max is the first king the wild things have had whom they did not eat and who did not, in turn, try to eat them; and the beasts are the first grown things that Max has met who want his opinion, his judgment, his rule. <u>Max’s power is that he is small while they are big; he promises the beasts that he has no plans to eat them and this is more than anyone has ever promised them. He promises that he will find ways through and around and will “slip through cracks” and re-crack the cracks if they fill up</u>. He promises to keep sadness at bay and to make a world with the wild creatures that “roared their terrible roars and gnashed their terrible teeth and rolled their terrible eyes and showed their terrible claws.” <u><mark>That Max fails to make the wild things happy or</mark> to <mark>save them</mark> or to make a world with them <strong><mark>is less important</strong> than</mark> the fact <mark>that</mark> <strong>he found them and <mark>he recognized in them the end of something</mark> and potentially the path to an alternative to his world</u></strong>. <u>The wild things were not the utopian creatures of fairy tales, <mark>they were the <strong>rejected and lost subjects of the world</u></strong></mark> Max had left behind and, because he shuttles between the Oedipal land where his mother rules and the ruined world of the wild, he knows the parameters of the real – <u>he sees what is included and what is left out and <mark>he is</mark> now <mark>able to <strong>set sail for another place</strong></mark>, a place that is neither the home he left nor the home to which he wants to return</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Moten and Harney want to gesture to</mark> another place, a wild place that is not simply the left over space that limns real and regulated zones of polite society; rather, it is <strong><mark>a wild place that continuously produces its own unregulated wildness</u></strong></mark>. <u>The zone we enter through Moten and Harney is <strong>ongoing and exists in the present</strong> and, as Harney puts it, “some kind of <strong>demand was already being enacted, fulfilled in the call itself</u></strong>.” While describing the London Riots of 2011, Harney suggests that the riots and insurrections do not separate out “the request, the demand and the call” – rather, they enact the one in the other: “I think the call, in the way I would understand it, the call, as in the call and response, the response is already there before the call goes out. You’re already in something.” You are already in it. For Moten too, <u>you are always already in the thing that you call for and that calls you. What’s more, the call is always <strong><mark>a call to dis-order</strong></mark> and this disorder or wildness shows up in many places: <strong><mark>in jazz, in improvisation, in noise</u></strong></mark>. The disordered sounds that we refer to as cacophony will always be cast as “extra-musical,” as Moten puts it, precisely because we hear something in them that reminds us that our desire for harmony is arbitrary and in another world, harmony would sound incomprehensible. <u>Listening to cacophony and noise tells us that <strong>there is a wild beyond</strong> to the structures we inhabit and that inhabit us</u>.</p><p>And <u><mark>when we are called to this</mark> other place, <strong>the wild beyond, “<mark>beyond the beyond</u></strong></mark>” in Moten and Harney’s apt terminology, <u><mark>we have to give ourselves</mark> over <mark>to a <strong>certain</mark> kind of <mark>craziness</u></strong></mark>. Moten reminds us that <u>even as Fanon took an anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy</u>” but, <u><mark>Fanon</u></mark>, as a psychiatrist, also <u>knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy and he <mark>knew</mark> that <mark>it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world that had <strong>assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>MARKED</p><p> <u>Fanon</u>, according to Moten, <u>wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the standpoint from which colonialism makes sense. In order <mark>to bring colonialism to an end</mark> then, <mark>one <strong>does not speak truth to power</strong>, <strong>one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other</strong></mark>, the other <mark>who has been <strong>rendered a nonentity</mark> by colonialism</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><mark>blackness</u></mark>, for Moten and Harney by way of Fanon, <u><mark>is</mark> the willingness <mark>to be in the space</mark> <strong>that has been <mark>abandoned by colonialism</mark>, by rule, by order</u></strong>. Moten takes us there, saying of Fanon finally: “Eventually, I believe, <u>he comes to believe in the world, which is to say the other world, where we inhabit and maybe even cultivate this absence, this place which shows up here and now, in the sovereign’s space and time, as absence, darkness, death, things which are not</u> (as John Donne would say).”</p><p><u><mark>The path to the wild beyond is <strong>paved with refusal</u></strong></mark>. <u>In The Undercommons if we begin anywhere, we begin with <strong>the right to refuse what has been refused to you</u></strong>. Citing Gayatri Spivak, Moten and Harney call this refusal the “first right” and <u>it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals <strong>the refusal of the choices as offered</u></strong>. We can understand this refusal in terms that Chandan Reddy lays out in Freedom With Violence (2011) – for Reddy, gay marriage is the option that cannot be opposed in the ballot box. While we can circulate multiple critiques of gay marriage in terms of its institutionalization of intimacy, <u>when you arrive <mark>at the ballot box</mark>, pen in hand, <mark>you only get to check “yes” or “no</mark>”</u> and the no, in this case, could be more damning than the yes. <u>And so, <strong><mark>you must refuse the choice as offered</mark>.</p><p></strong>Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to <strong>refuse what they term “the call to order.”</u></strong> And what would it mean, furthermore, <u><strong><mark>to refuse to call others to order</strong>, to <strong>refuse interpellation</strong></mark> and the reinstantiation of the law. When we refuse</u>, Moten and Harney suggest, <u>we create dissonance and more importantly, <strong><mark>we allow dissonance to continue</strong></mark> – <mark>when we <strong>enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order</strong>, we are <strong>allowing study to continue</strong></mark>, dissonant study perhaps, disorganized study, but <mark>study that precedes our call and <strong>will continue after we have left</mark> the room</u></strong>. Or, when we listen to music, <u>we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument</u>; music is also the anticipation of the performance and the noises of appreciation it generates and the speaking that happens through and around it, making it and loving it, being in it while listening. And so, <u>when we refuse the call to order – the teacher picking up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – <strong>we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth.</p><p></u></strong>These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – <u><mark>the undercommons is <strong>not a realm where we rebel and we create critique</strong></mark>; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” <mark>The undercommons is</mark> a space and time which is <strong><mark>always here</u></strong>. <u>Our goal</mark> – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – <mark>is not to end the troubles but to <strong>end the world</mark> that created those particular troubles</strong> as the ones that must be opposed</u>. Moten and Harney <u><strong><mark>refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity,</strong></mark> as the <strong>absence of a plan</strong> and as a mode of stalling real politics</u>. Moten and Harney tell us to <u>listen to the noise we make and to <strong><mark>refuse</mark> the offers we receive <mark>to shape </mark>that <mark>noise into “music.”</p></u></strong></mark> | 2NC | University | Alt | 1,240,569 | 173 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,539 | Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange | Zupancic ‘3 | Zupancic ‘3 (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry] | A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent | A very good example of doubleness would be the play scene the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play two are enough,” further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not mean truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent | A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play. . . .Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.” | 2,486 | <h4>Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange</h4><p><u><strong>Zupancic ‘3</u></strong> (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]</p><p><u><mark>A very good example of</mark> this kind of <mark>doubleness would be the</mark> famous “<mark>play scene</u></mark>” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. <u>Obviously, <mark>the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as</mark> it would have, for instance, as <mark>a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play</u></mark>. . . .<u>Not only is it the case that “<mark>two are enough,”</mark> but <mark>further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to</mark> an entirely different configuration—<strong>that of <mark>an endless metonymic illusion</u></strong></mark>. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. <u><mark>The logic of the “two”</mark> that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, <mark>implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth</u></mark>. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. <u><mark>The fact that the truth has its temporality does not </mark>simply <mark>mean </mark>that <mark>truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent</u></mark>. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”</p> | 2NC | University | Perm | 421,930 | 14 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,540 | No internal to state budget -- just a drop in the bucket | Gleckman 12 | Gleckman 12
Howard, 12-6-2012, "Dude, Would Legalizing And Taxing Weed Solve Our Budget Woes?," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/12/06/dude-would-legalizing-and-taxing-weed-solve-states-budget-woes/, AB | Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets The answer is yes, but it wouldn’t help much legalizing pot would both reduce spending and raise tax revenue by about 0.5 percent the revenue estimates from an excise tax are much less certain revenues could be much lower current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream people would smoke more pot But some users might also reduce their intake of booze that substitution of one drug for another might also reduce the net increase in tax revenue. how about supply suppliers would no longer incur the costs of prohibition On the other, they would face new regulatory costs lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs. taxing dope would increase revenues by 9 billion which isn’t very much money Legalizing certainly won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff | Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets it wouldn’t help much revenue estimates are much less certain. current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream users might also reduce their intake of booze that substitution might also reduce the net increase in tax revenue. suppliers would face new regulatory costs lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs. Legalizing won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff | Starting today, it is legal to smoke marijuana in Washington State. That got me thinking: Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets? The answer is yes, but it wouldn’t help much. One 2010 study, done for the libertarian CATO Institute, figures legalizing and taxing weed would increase state tax revenues by about $9 billion a year and reduce spending on enforcement by about the same amount. Overall, legalizing pot would both reduce spending and raise tax revenue by about 0.5 percent, according to the authors, Jeffrey Miron and Katherine Waldock. The RAND Corporation, in its own 2010 report, concludes the revenue estimates from an excise tax on dope are much less certain. California officials estimated a state pot tax of $50 an ounce could generate as much as $1.4 billion but RAND concluded revenues could be much lower or even somewhat higher. Btw, the $50 tax is not pulled out of a hat—or, um, a bong. It is roughly equal to the tax on cigarettes. As with any excise tax, the amount of revenue a weed tax could generate is a function of four big things: The tax rate, supply, demand, and price. Each, of course, affects the other three. And, with marijuana, this gets pretty interesting—at least for a tax wonk. Besides, it gives a whole new meaning to the phrase Tea Party. How much would legalization boost demand? Well, economists can only guess. RAND reports there is good research on the response of cocaine use to changes in price, but not much when it comes to pot. Don’t ask. Stoners probably wouldn’t change behavior much. They seem to be getting as high as they want, even with illegal weed. Some current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream, and thus boring. Economists call this the “forbidden fruit” effect. Still, it is reasonable to expect legalization would increase demand overall–in part because casual users who won’t buy illicit marijuana might purchase once it is legal. On net, people would smoke more pot. But some users might also reduce their intake of booze. If so, that substitution of one drug for another might also reduce the net increase in tax revenue. And how about supply? Well, the two-handed economists strike again. On one hand, suppliers would no longer incur the costs of prohibition (such as, say, arrest). On the other, they would face new regulatory costs—and those pesky taxes. C’mon dude. Why can’t I get a straight answer? By comparing prices in the Netherlands, where grass was de facto legal, with prices in the U.S., Miron and Waldock figure the price of dope would fall by as much as half if the drug were legalized in the U.S. The RAND authors conclude it would decline even more, so legal weed (including tax) would cost only one-quarter to one-third as much as illicit marijuana. A brief word on spending. Both studies suggest that net costs to state and local governments would fall if pot is legalized. However lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs. All this seems to suggest two results. First, given an excuse (and some funding), economists will research almost anything. Second, legalizing dope will trim spending and generate some new taxes. Nationally, Miron and Waldock estimate that taxing dope would increase revenues by about $9 billion which, in the scheme of things, isn’t very much money. Legalizing dope and making it widely available certainly won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff. On the other hand, maybe we won’t care as much. | 3,512 | <h4><u><strong>No internal to state budget -- just a drop in the bucket</h4><p>Gleckman 12</p><p></u></strong>Howard, 12-6-2012, "Dude, Would Legalizing And Taxing Weed Solve Our Budget Woes?," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/12/06/dude-would-legalizing-and-taxing-weed-solve-states-budget-woes/, AB</p><p>Starting today, it is legal to smoke marijuana in Washington State. That got me thinking: <u><strong><mark>Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets</u></strong></mark>? <u>The answer is yes, but <strong><mark>it wouldn’t help much</u></strong></mark>. One 2010 study, done for the libertarian CATO Institute, figures legalizing and taxing weed would increase state tax revenues by about $9 billion a year and reduce spending on enforcement by about the same amount. Overall, <u><strong>legalizing pot would both reduce spending and raise tax revenue by about 0.5 percent</u></strong>, according to the authors, Jeffrey Miron and Katherine Waldock. The RAND Corporation, in its own 2010 report, concludes <u>the <mark>revenue estimates</mark> from an excise tax</u> on dope <u><strong><mark>are much less certain</u></strong>.</mark> California officials estimated a state pot tax of $50 an ounce could generate as much as $1.4 billion but RAND concluded <u><strong>revenues could be much lower </u></strong>or even somewhat higher. Btw, the $50 tax is not pulled out of a hat—or, um, a bong. It is roughly equal to the tax on cigarettes. As with any excise tax, the amount of revenue a weed tax could generate is a function of four big things: The tax rate, supply, demand, and price. Each, of course, affects the other three. And, with marijuana, this gets pretty interesting—at least for a tax wonk. Besides, it gives a whole new meaning to the phrase Tea Party. How much would legalization boost demand? Well, economists can only guess. RAND reports there is good research on the response of cocaine use to changes in price, but not much when it comes to pot. Don’t ask. Stoners probably wouldn’t change behavior much. They seem to be getting as high as they want, even with illegal weed. Some <u><strong><mark>current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream</u></strong></mark>, and thus boring. Economists call this the “forbidden fruit” effect. Still, it is reasonable to expect legalization would increase demand overall–in part because casual users who won’t buy illicit marijuana might purchase once it is legal. On net, <u>people would smoke more pot</u>. <u>But some <strong><mark>users might also reduce their intake of booze</u></strong></mark>. If so, <u><strong><mark>that substitution</strong></mark> of one drug for another <mark>might also <strong>reduce the net increase in tax revenue.</mark> </u></strong>And <u>how about supply</u>? Well, the two-handed economists strike again. On one hand, <u><mark>suppliers</mark> would no longer incur the costs of prohibition</u> (such as, say, arrest). <u>On the other, <strong>they <mark>would face new regulatory costs</u></strong></mark>—and those pesky taxes. C’mon dude. Why can’t I get a straight answer? By comparing prices in the Netherlands, where grass was de facto legal, with prices in the U.S., Miron and Waldock figure the price of dope would fall by as much as half if the drug were legalized in the U.S. The RAND authors conclude it would decline even more, so legal weed (including tax) would cost only one-quarter to one-third as much as illicit marijuana. A brief word on spending. Both studies suggest that net costs to state and local governments would fall if pot is legalized. However <u><strong><mark>lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs.</mark> </u></strong>All this seems to suggest two results. First, given an excuse (and some funding), economists will research almost anything. Second, legalizing dope will trim spending and generate some new taxes. Nationally, Miron and Waldock estimate that <u>taxing dope would increase revenues</u> <u>by</u> about $<u>9 billion</u> <u>which</u>, in the scheme of things, <u><strong>isn’t very much money</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Legalizing</u></strong></mark> dope and making it widely available <u><strong>certainly <mark>won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff</u></strong></mark>. On the other hand, maybe we won’t care as much.</p> | 1NC | null | State Budgets | 429,895 | 6 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,541 | They have been infected with the tyranny of the self – a fate matched by no other | Baudrillard '93 | Baudrillard '93 (Jean, The transparency of evil : essays on extreme phenomena / Jean Baudrillard ; translated by James Benedict. London : New York : Verso, 1993. P. 167-168) | At all events, it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself.
In this sense the entire movement for liberation and emancipation, inasmuch as it is predicated on a demand for greater autonomy – or, in other words, on a more complete introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom – is a regression. Whatever it may be that comes to us from elsewhere, even the worst exploitation, the very fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive. This is why alienation has its advantages, even though it is so often denounced as the dispossession of the self, with the other treated in consequence as an age-old enemy holding the alienated part of us captive. The inverse theory, that of disalienation, is equally simplistic, holding as it does that the subject merely has to reappropriate his alienated will and his alienated desire. From this perspective everything that befalls the subject as a result of his own efforts is good, because it is authentic; while everything that comes from outside the subject is dubbed inauthentic, merely because it does not fall within the sphere of his freedom.
Exactly the opposite position is the one that has to be stressed, while at the same time broadening the paradox. For just as it is better to be controlled by someone else rather than by oneself, it is likewise always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else rather than by oneself. It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me – including my own existence. I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one. The source of all interplay, of everything that is in play, of all passion, of all seduction, is that which is completely foreign to us, yet has power over us. That which is Other, that which we have to seduce | it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself.
the movement for liberation is predicated on introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom Whatever it may even the worst exploitation, the fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive.
just as it is better to be controlled by someone else it is always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one | At all events, it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself.
In this sense the entire movement for liberation and emancipation, inasmuch as it is predicated on a demand for greater autonomy – or, in other words, on a more complete introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom – is a regression. Whatever it may be that comes to us from elsewhere, even the worst exploitation, the very fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive. This is why alienation has its advantages, even though it is so often denounced as the dispossession of the self, with the other treated in consequence as an age-old enemy holding the alienated part of us captive. The inverse theory, that of disalienation, is equally simplistic, holding as it does that the subject merely has to reappropriate his alienated will and his alienated desire. From this perspective everything that befalls the subject as a result of his own efforts is good, because it is authentic; while everything that comes from outside the subject is dubbed inauthentic, merely because it does not fall within the sphere of his freedom.
Exactly the opposite position is the one that has to be stressed, while at the same time broadening the paradox. For just as it is better to be controlled by someone else rather than by oneself, it is likewise always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else rather than by oneself. It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me – including my own existence. I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one. The source of all interplay, of everything that is in play, of all passion, of all seduction, is that which is completely foreign to us, yet has power over us. That which is Other, that which we have to seduce. | 2,091 | <h4>They have been infected with the tyranny of the self – a fate matched by no other</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard '93</u></strong> (Jean, The transparency of evil : essays on extreme phenomena / Jean Baudrillard ; translated by James Benedict. London : New York : Verso, 1993. P. 167-168)</p><p><u>At all events, <mark>it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself.</p><p></u></mark> <u>In this sense <mark>the</mark> entire <mark>movement for liberation </mark>and emancipation, inasmuch as it <mark>is predicated on</mark> a demand for greater autonomy – or, in other words, on a more complete <mark>introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom </mark>– is a regression. <mark>Whatever it may </mark>be that comes to us from elsewhere, <mark>even the worst exploitation, the</mark> very <mark>fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive. </mark>This is why alienation has its advantages, even though it is so often denounced as the dispossession of the self, with the other treated in consequence as an age-old enemy holding the alienated part of us captive. The inverse theory, that of disalienation, is equally simplistic, holding as it does that the subject merely has to reappropriate his alienated will and his alienated desire. From this perspective everything that befalls the subject as a result of his own efforts is good, because it is authentic; while everything that comes from outside the subject is dubbed inauthentic, merely because it does not fall within the sphere of his freedom. </p><p></u> <u>Exactly the opposite position is the one that has to be stressed, while at the same time broadening the paradox. For <mark>just as it is better to be controlled by someone else</mark> rather than by oneself, <mark>it is</mark> likewise <mark>always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else</mark> rather than by oneself. <mark>It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me </mark>– including my own existence. <mark>I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one</mark>. The source of all interplay, of everything that is in play, of all passion, of all seduction, is that which is completely foreign to us, yet has power over us. That which is Other, that which we have to seduce</u>. </p> | 2NC | Case | Tyranny of the Gift | 4,087 | 6 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,542 | be skeptical of their truth claims because high magnitude impacts have colonized the minds of the debate community – it crowds out systemic violence because we only consider what affects us in our privileged position – in this debate, you should flip that calculus | Mignolo ‘7 | Mignolo ‘7 (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online) | The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5 | rhetoric of modernity occluded—under its rhetoric of salvation and the good life the dispensability of human lives not all massive killings have been recorded with the same value and visibility. The criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign of imperial politics the enunciator becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have institutional power to rank according to a racist classification | The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5 | 1,322 | <h4>be<u> skeptical of their truth claims because high magnitude impacts have colonized the minds of the debate community – it crowds out systemic violence because we only consider what affects us in our privileged position – in this debate, you should flip that calculus</h4><p><strong>Mignolo ‘7</strong> (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)</p><p>The <mark>rhetoric of modernity</mark> (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) <mark>occluded—under its </mark>triumphant <mark>rhetoric of salvation and the good life</mark> for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and <mark>the <strong>dispensability of human lives</mark> </strong>from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, <mark>not all </mark>the <mark>massive killings have been recorded with the same value and</mark> the same <mark>visibility. The </mark>unspoken <mark>criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign</mark> (from a de-colonial interpretation) <mark>of </mark>the hidden <mark>imperial </mark>identity <mark>politics</mark>: that is, <mark>the </mark>value of human lives to which the life of the <mark>enunciator </mark>belongs <mark>becomes the <strong>measuring stick</strong> to evaluate other human lives who do not have </mark>the intellectual option and <mark>institutional power to</mark> tell the story and to classify events according to a <mark>rank</mark>ing of human lives; that is, <mark>according to a racist classification</mark>.5</p></u> | 2NC | K | OV | 5,117 | 160 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,543 | The attempt to include a rejection and problematization of liberalism and still endorse the AFF reaffirms a belief in a responsible agent that reduces politics to morality and still relies on a venomous and imperial compassion. We must reject liberalism writ large if we are to avoid its ability to co-opt criticism and reduce it to a footnote. | Abbas 2010 | Abbas 2010 | Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 38-39/
when touchy liberals desire better attention to the fact of human pain and suffering, they manage to talk about cruelty where, ironically, cruel actions are derivatives of cruel agents and the victim’s suffering is just fallout inability to dispel the primacy of the agent and the perpetrator in favor of the sufferer of pain, the current status of cruelty betrays a fetish of the active agent. It is no accident that the terms “good” and “evil” require a focus on cruelty and its infliction, leaving untouched the suffering of cruelty. Moral psychology ends up being the psychology of cruelty, which is a moral question, and hence of those who cause it. suffering is never a moral, let alone political or legal, question unless a moral agent with a conscience has caused it. All sufferers automatically become victims in the eyes of politics and law when “recognized.” Suffering is thus relevant as a political question only after it is a moral one, when it is embodied and located in a certain way, when it surpasses arbitrary thresholds. It is one thing to claim that liberalism cannot overcome its subject-centeredness even in its moments of empathy for the “victim.” It is another to understand the stubborn constitution of the agent at the helm of liberal justice and ask what makes it so incurable and headstrong and what the temperament of this stubbornness might be: pathetic, squishy, helplessly compassionate, humble, philanthropic, imperialist, venomous, neurotic Not figuring out this pathos is bound to reduce all interaction with liberal assertions to one or another act of editing or “correcting” them. all protests to liberalism tread a limited, predictable path and will be, at some point, incorporated within it. Liberalism’s singular gall and violence is accessed every time a resistance to it is accommodated by liberalism. Think not only of how often liberals affirm their clumsiness and mediocrity in speaking for the other’s suffering but also of how quickly its antagonists “make space” for the voice of others without challenging the (liberal, colonizing) structures that determine and distribute the suffering and speaking self, and the suffering and speaking other, to begin with. This protest leaves unquestioned what it means to speak for one’s own, or others’, suffering and whether there are other ways of speaking suffering that problematize these as the only options. | when touchy liberals desire better attention to suffering, they talk about cruelty where, ironically, cruel actions are derivatives of cruel agents the current status of cruelty betrays a fetish of the active agent. suffering is never a moral political or legal, question unless a moral agent caused it. All sufferers automatically become victims when “recognized.” It is one thing to claim that liberalism cannot overcome its subject-centeredness It is another to understand the stubborn constitution of the agent and ask what makes it so incurable bound to reduce all interaction to editing or “correcting” them. all protests to liberalism will be incorporated Liberalism’s violence is accessed every time a resistance is accommodated liberal colonizing structures determine and distribute the suffering | /Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 38-39/
The dizzying back and forth between professed Kantians and Humeans blurs the fact that, regardless of whether morality is anchored interior to the acting subject or determined by the effects of the actions of the subject as they play out in the outside world, the unit of analysis is quite the same. Thus, when touchy liberals desire better attention to the fact of human pain and suffering, they manage to talk about cruelty where, ironically, cruel actions are derivatives of cruel agents and the victim’s suffering is just fallout. Besides this shared inability to dispel the primacy of the agent and the perpetrator in favor of the sufferer of pain, the rift between Kant and Hume is deceptive in another way. In terms of historical evolution, the current status of cruelty betrays a fetish of the active agent. It is no accident that the terms “good” and “evil” require a focus on cruelty and its infliction, leaving untouched the suffering of cruelty. Moral psychology ends up being the psychology of cruelty, which is a moral question, and hence of those who cause it. In the same frame, suffering is never a moral, let alone political or legal, question unless a moral agent with a conscience has caused it. All sufferers automatically become victims in the eyes of politics and law when “recognized.” Suffering is thus relevant as a political question only after it is a moral one, when it is embodied and located in a certain way, when it surpasses arbitrary thresholds. It is one thing to claim that liberalism, whether empiricist or idealist, cannot overcome its subject-centeredness even in its moments of empathy for the “victim.” It is another to understand the stubborn constitution of the agent at the helm of liberal justice and ask what makes it so incurable and headstrong and what the temperament of this stubbornness might be: is it pathetic, squishy, helplessly compassionate, humble, philanthropic, imperialist, venomous, neurotic, all of the above, or none of these? Not figuring out this pathos is bound to reduce all interaction with liberal assertions to one or another act of editing or “correcting” them. Inadvertently, all protests to liberalism tread a limited, predictable path and will be, at some point, incorporated within it. Liberalism’s singular gall and violence is accessed every time a resistance to it is accommodated by liberalism. Think, for instance, not only of how often liberals affirm their clumsiness and mediocrity in speaking for the other’s suffering but also of how quickly its antagonists—purveyors of many a righteous anti-representational politics—“make space” for the voice of others without challenging the (liberal, colonizing) structures that determine and distribute the suffering and speaking self, and the suffering and speaking other, to begin with. This protest leaves unquestioned what it means to speak for one’s own, or others’, suffering and whether there are other ways of speaking suffering that problematize these as the only options. | 3,313 | <h4>The attempt to include a rejection and problematization<u><strong> of liberalism and still endorse the AFF reaffirms a belief in a responsible agent that reduces politics to morality and still relies on a venomous and imperial compassion. We must reject liberalism writ large if we are to avoid its ability to co-opt criticism and reduce it to a footnote.</h4><p>Abbas 2010</p><p></u></strong>/Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, <u>Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 38-39/</p><p></u>The dizzying back and forth between professed Kantians and Humeans blurs the fact that, regardless of whether morality is anchored interior to the acting subject or determined by the effects of the actions of the subject as they play out in the outside world, the unit of analysis is quite the same. Thus, <u><mark>when touchy liberals desire better attention to</mark> the fact of human pain and <mark>suffering, they</mark> manage to <mark>talk about cruelty where, ironically, cruel actions are derivatives of cruel agents</mark> and the victim’s suffering is just fallout</u>. Besides this shared <u>inability to dispel the primacy of the agent and the perpetrator in favor of the sufferer of pain,</u> the rift between Kant and Hume is deceptive in another way. In terms of historical evolution, <u><mark>the current status of cruelty betrays a fetish of the active agent.</mark> It is no accident that the terms “good” and “evil” require a focus on cruelty and its infliction, leaving untouched the suffering of cruelty. Moral psychology ends up being the psychology of cruelty, which is a moral question, and hence of those who cause it.</u> In the same frame, <u><mark>suffering is never a moral</mark>, let alone <mark>political or legal, question unless a moral agent</mark> with a conscience has <mark>caused it. All sufferers automatically become victims</mark> in the eyes of politics and law <mark>when “recognized.”</mark> Suffering is thus relevant as a political question only after it is a moral one, when it is embodied and located in a certain way, when it surpasses arbitrary thresholds. <mark>It is one thing to claim that liberalism</u></mark>, whether empiricist or idealist, <u><mark>cannot overcome its subject-centeredness</mark> even in its moments of empathy for the “victim.” <mark>It is another to understand the stubborn constitution of the agent</mark> at the helm of liberal justice <mark>and ask what makes it so incurable</mark> and headstrong and what the temperament of this stubbornness might be:</u> is it <u>pathetic, squishy, helplessly compassionate, humble, philanthropic, imperialist, venomous, neurotic</u>, all of the above, or none of these? <u>Not figuring out this pathos is <mark>bound to reduce all interaction</mark> with liberal assertions <mark>to </mark>one or another act of <mark>editing or “correcting” them.</u></mark> Inadvertently, <u><mark>all protests to liberalism</mark> tread a limited, predictable path and <mark>will be</mark>, at some point, <mark>incorporated</mark> within it. <mark>Liberalism’s</mark> singular gall and <mark>violence is accessed every time a resistance </mark>to it <mark>is accommodated</mark> by liberalism. Think</u>, for instance, <u>not only of how often liberals affirm their clumsiness and mediocrity in speaking for the other’s suffering but also of how quickly its antagonists</u>—purveyors of many a righteous anti-representational politics—<u>“make space” for the voice of others without challenging the (<mark>liberal</mark>, <mark>colonizing</mark>) <mark>structures</mark> that <mark>determine and distribute the suffering</mark> and speaking self, and the suffering and speaking other, to begin with. This protest leaves unquestioned what it means to speak for one’s own, or others’, suffering and whether there are other ways of speaking suffering that problematize these as the only options.</p></u> | 1NR | Liberalism | 1NR Turns Case | 157,661 | 15 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,544 | Makes ecological collapse inevitable | Collins 10/1 | Collins 10/1 (Sheila Collins, professor emerita at William Paterson University, 10-1-14, “War and Climate Change: Time to Connect the Dots,” http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/26505-war-and-climate-change-time-to-connect-the-dots) gz | In the decade between 2001 and 2011, global military spending increased by an estimated 92 percent At the same time almost 10 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent has been released into the atmosphere Could there be some connection between rising military expenditures and rising carbon emissions?
Not only is the Pentagon the single largest industrial consumer of fossil fuels, but fighter jets, destroyers, tanks and other weapons systems emit highly toxic, carbon-intensive emissions, not to mention the greenhouse gases (GHG) that are released from the detonation of bombs | global military spending increased 92 percent At the same time 10 gigatons of carbon dioxide has been released into the atmosphere Could there be some connection
Not only is the Pentagon the single largest industrial consumer of fossil fuels, but jets, destroyers, tanks and other weapons emit highly toxic, carbon-intensive emissions, not to mention GHG released from bombs | In the decade between 2001 and 2011, global military spending increased by an estimated 92 percent, according to Stockholm International Peace Research, although it fell by 1.9 percent in real terms in 2013 to $1,747 billion. At the same time, according to the draft of a new study from the International Peace Bureau (1), almost 10 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent has been released into the atmosphere. According to the Global Carbon Project, 2014 emissions are set to reach a record high. Could there be some connection between rising military expenditures and rising carbon emissions?
The United States and its allies have spent trillions financing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but while the terrible social, cultural and economic costs are publicly discussed, little is said about the environmental costs. Not only is the Pentagon the single largest industrial consumer of fossil fuels, but fighter jets, destroyers, tanks and other weapons systems emit highly toxic, carbon-intensive emissions, not to mention the greenhouse gases (GHG) that are released from the detonation of bombs. How quickly the world forgot the toxic legacy of Saddam Hussein's oil fires! | 1,173 | <h4>Makes ecological collapse inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Collins 10/1</u></strong> (Sheila Collins, professor emerita at William Paterson University, 10-1-14, “War and Climate Change: Time to Connect the Dots,” http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/26505-war-and-climate-change-time-to-connect-the-dots) <u>gz</p><p>In the decade between 2001 and 2011, <mark>global military spending increased</mark> by an estimated <mark>92 percent</u></mark>, according to Stockholm International Peace Research, although it fell by 1.9 percent in real terms in 2013 to $1,747 billion. <u><mark>At the same time</u></mark>, according to the draft of a new study from the International Peace Bureau (1), <u>almost <mark>10 gigatons of carbon dioxide</mark> equivalent <mark>has been released into the atmosphere</u></mark>. According to the Global Carbon Project, 2014 emissions are set to reach a record high. <u><mark>Could there be some connection </mark>between rising military expenditures and rising carbon emissions?</p><p></u>The United States and its allies have spent trillions financing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but while the terrible social, cultural and economic costs are publicly discussed, little is said about the environmental costs. <u><mark>Not only is the Pentagon the <strong>single largest industrial consumer of fossil fuels,</strong> but</mark> fighter <mark>jets, destroyers, tanks and other weapons</mark> systems <strong><mark>emit highly toxic, carbon-intensive emissions</strong>, not to mention</mark> the greenhouse gases (<mark>GHG</mark>) that are <mark>released from</mark> the detonation of <mark>bombs</u></mark>. How quickly the world forgot the toxic legacy of Saddam Hussein's oil fires!</p> | 2NC | K | OV | 429,896 | 5 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,545 | The alternative is mutually exclusive – we must abandon a politics of the organic sphere to engage in effective forms of becoming | Dema 2007 | Dema 2007 (Leslie, ""Inorganic, Yet Alive": How Can Deleuze and Guattari Deal With the Accusation of Vitalism?" Rhizomes 15) | Deleuze and Guattari are interested in the question of what life might be if it is not confined to the organic sphere the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic. life can be articulated in all things. Oblivious to the organism's wisdom and limits, the inorganic life of things can assume a frightful power This streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse traversing it the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs Deleuze and Guattari have chosen the oxymoronic term 'inorganic life' because the deliberate juxtaposition of contradictory terms calls attention to how their theory of life directly challenges the idea of organic life that we find in contemporary biology. The best way to understand inorganic life is through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the assemblage the "minimum real unit" of inorganic life "is not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier, but the assemblage. Assemblages are the symbiotic or sympathetic co-functioning of heterogeneous elements. They are formed through a rapport between partial objects that enter into monstrous couplings, experimental alliances, unnatural participations, and rhizomatic structures. | Deleuze and Guattari are interested in the question of what life might be if it is not confined to the organic sphere the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic Oblivious to the organism's wisdom and limits, the inorganic life of things can assume a frightful power: This streaming line of variation liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined a body that is all the more alive for having no organs the "minimum real unit" of inorganic life "is the assemblage the symbiotic co-functioning of heterogeneous elements through a rapport between partial objects that enter into monstrous couplings, experimental alliances, and rhizomatic structures | Deleuze and Guattari are interested in the question of what life might be if it is not confined to the organic sphere. In A Thousand Plateaus they claim that "the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic."[1] It is not so much that organisms are not alive, but that life can be articulated in all things. Oblivious to the organism's wisdom and limits, the inorganic life of things can assume a frightful power: This streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse traversing it. If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs.[2] This is not the easiest concept to digest. How can something be: "inorganic, yet alive, and all the more alive for being inorganic"?[3] In the course of this paper I aim to defend the legitimacy of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of inorganic life from one of the strongest objections to it: that inorganic life is nothing more than a naive neovitalism or an empty emergentist theory of life. This is an accusation that is spearheaded by Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou. I will attempt to demonstrate that Deleuze and Guattari do not succumb to the characteristic weaknesses of vitalist philosophical positions; on the contrary, their concept of inorganic life thrives as a compelling and defensible reimagining of life.[2] I will begin with a brief overview of how Deleuze and Guattari characterize inorganic life. Deleuze and Guattari have chosen the oxymoronic term 'inorganic life' because the deliberate juxtaposition of contradictory terms calls attention to how their theory of life directly challenges the idea of organic life that we find in contemporary biology. [3] The best way to understand inorganic life is through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the assemblage. This concept is most thoroughly explained in the "Geology of Morals" chapter of A Thousand Plateaus.[4] For them the "minimum real unit" of inorganic life "is not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier, but the assemblage."[5] Assemblages are the symbiotic or sympathetic co-functioning of heterogeneous elements. They are formed through a rapport between partial objects that enter into monstrous couplings, experimental alliances, unnatural participations, and rhizomatic structures. | 2,743 | <h4>The alternative is mutually exclusive – we must abandon a politics of the organic sphere to engage in effective forms of becoming</h4><p><u><strong>Dema 2007</u></strong> (Leslie, ""Inorganic, Yet Alive": How Can Deleuze and Guattari Deal With the Accusation of Vitalism<u>?" Rhizomes 15)</p><p><mark>Deleuze and Guattari are interested in the question of what life might be if it is not confined to the organic sphere</u></mark>. In A Thousand Plateaus they claim that "<u><mark>the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic</mark>.</u>"[1] It is not so much that organisms are not alive, but that <u>life can be articulated in all things. <mark>Oblivious to the organism's wisdom and limits, the inorganic life of things can assume a frightful power</u>: <u>This streaming</mark>, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish <mark>line of variation liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined</mark>, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse traversing it</u>. If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short <u><strong>the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, <mark>a body that is all the more alive for having no organs</u></strong></mark>.[2] This is not the easiest concept to digest. How can something be: "inorganic, yet alive, and all the more alive for being inorganic"?[3] In the course of this paper I aim to defend the legitimacy of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of inorganic life from one of the strongest objections to it: that inorganic life is nothing more than a naive neovitalism or an empty emergentist theory of life. This is an accusation that is spearheaded by Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou. I will attempt to demonstrate that Deleuze and Guattari do not succumb to the characteristic weaknesses of vitalist philosophical positions; on the contrary, their concept of inorganic life thrives as a compelling and defensible reimagining of life.[2] I will begin with a brief overview of how Deleuze and Guattari characterize inorganic life. <u>Deleuze and Guattari have chosen the oxymoronic term 'inorganic life' because the deliberate juxtaposition of contradictory terms calls attention to how their theory of life directly challenges the idea of organic life that we find in contemporary biology. </u>[3] <u>The best way to understand inorganic life is through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the assemblage</u>. This concept is most thoroughly explained in the "Geology of Morals" chapter of A Thousand Plateaus.[4] For them <u><mark>the "minimum real unit" of inorganic life "is</mark> not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier, but <mark>the assemblage</mark>.</u>"[5] <u>Assemblages are <mark>the symbiotic</mark> or sympathetic <mark>co-functioning of heterogeneous elements</mark>. They are formed <mark>through a rapport between partial objects that enter into monstrous couplings, experimental alliances,</mark> unnatural participations, <mark>and rhizomatic structures</mark>.</p></u> | 1NR | Liberalism | 1NR Perm | 429,897 | 1 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,546 | they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence | Kappeler 95 | Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11) | 'We are the war, I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere . I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords or upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon political disillusionment. our insight that indeed we are not responsible tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions we participate in 'organized irresponsibility' we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the president, the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. | I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make war possible universal responsibility becomes universal acquittal Decisions to unleash war are taken at particular levels of power focusing on the stage where major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our own competence leading to 'powerlessness' and disillusionment. it seems to absolve us from having to see any relation between our actions and events we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, 'What would I do if I were the president we regard mega spheres as the only worthwhile ones we shape 'our values' according war and violence. | War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. | 6,053 | <h4>they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence</h4><p><u><strong>Kappeler 95</u></strong> (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs<u> 9-11)</p><p></u>War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.<u> 'We are the war,</u>' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': <u><mark>I do not know what war is</u></mark>, I want to tell my friend, <u><mark>but I see it everywhere</mark> . </u>It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And <u>I am afraid that <mark>we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make</mark> this <mark>war possible</mark> , we permit it to happen</u>. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. '<u>We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords </u>and politicians and profiteers<u> or</u>, as Ulrich Beck says, <u>upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and</u> where the conception of<u> <mark>universal responsibility becomes</mark> the equivalent of a <mark>universal acquittal</u></mark>. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations.<u> <mark>Decisions to unleash</mark> a <mark>war are</mark> indeed <mark>taken at particular levels of power</mark> by those in a position to make them </u>and to command such collective action. <u>We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of <mark>focusing on the stage where</mark> the <mark>major dramas of power take place</mark> <mark>tends to obscure our</mark> sight in relation to our <mark>own</mark> sphere of <mark>competence</mark>, our own power and our own responsibility - <mark>leading to</mark> the </u>well- known<u> illusion of our </u>apparent<u> <mark>'powerlessness' and</mark> its accompanying phenomenon </u>- our so-called<u> political <mark>disillusionment.</mark> </u>Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet<u> our insight that indeed we are not responsible</u> for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president <u>tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action</u>. In particular, <u><mark>it seems to absolve us from having to</mark> try to <mark>see any relation between our</mark> own <mark>actions and</mark> those <mark>events</mark>, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions</u>. It not only shows that <u>we participate in</u> what Beck calls <u>'organized irresponsibility'</u>, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For<u> we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything</u> , say, <u>about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because <mark>we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why</mark> many of <mark>those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics,</mark> in the style of <mark>'What would I do if I were the</mark> general, </u>the prime minister,<u> the <mark>president</mark>, </u>the foreign minister or<u> the minister of defence?' Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega spheres</mark> of action <mark>as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, </u>and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. <u>We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way <mark>we shape 'our</mark> feelings, our relationships, our <mark>values' according</mark> to the structures and the values of <mark>war and violence.</p></u></mark> | 2NC | K | Framework | 1,240,688 | 53 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,547 | Abandoning the humanism of the 1AC is a necessary precondition to authentic politics | Seem 83 | Seem 83 (Mark, Intro to Anti-Oedipus, Murray) | Deleuze and Guattari encourage mankind to take a journey, the journey through ego-loss. They urge mankind to strip itself of all anthropomorphic and anthropological armoring, all myth and tragedy, and all existentialism, in order to perceive what is nonhuman in man, his will and his forces, his transformations and mutations. The human and social sciences have accustomed us to see the figure of Man behind every social event Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself. They talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects | Deleuze and Guattari encourage a journey through ego-loss They urge mankind to strip itself of all anthropomorphic and anthropological armoring, in order to perceive what is nonhuman in man, his will and his forces, his transformations and mutations. The human and social sciences have accustomed us to see the figure of Man behind every social event, Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself. They talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects | While Deleuze and Guattari use many authors and concepts, this is never done in an academic fashion aimed at persuading the reader. Rather, they use these names and ideas as effects that traverse their analyses, generating ever new effects, as points of reference indeed, but also as points of intensity and signs pointing a way out: points-signs that offer a multiplicity of solutions and a variety of directions for a new style of politics. Such an approach carries much along with it, in the course of its flow, but it also leaves much behind. Chunks of Marx and Freud that cannot keep up with the fast current will be left behind, buried or forgotten, while everything in Marx and Freud that has to do with how things and people and desires actually flow will be kept, and added to the infernal machine evoked above. This political analysis of desire, this schizoanalysis, becomes a mighty tool where schizophrenia as a process-the schiz-serves as a point of departure as well as a point of destination. Like Laing, they encourage mankind to take a journey, the journey through ego-loss. They go much further than Laing on this point, however. They urge mankind to strip itself of all anthropomorphic and anthropological armoring, all myth and tragedy, and all existentialism, in order to perceive what is nonhuman in man, his will and his forces, his transformations and mutations. The human and social sciences have accustomed us to see the figure of Man behind every social event, just as Christianity taught us to see the Eye of the Lord looking down upon us. Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself. They talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects. | 1,917 | <h4>Abandoning the humanism of the 1AC is a necessary precondition to authentic politics</h4><p><u><strong><mark>Seem 83</u></strong></mark> (Mark, Intro to Anti-Oedipus, Murray)</p><p>While <u><mark>Deleuze and Guattari</u></mark> use many authors and concepts, this is never done in an academic fashion aimed at persuading the reader. Rather, they use these names and ideas as effects that traverse their analyses, generating ever new effects, as points of reference indeed, but also as points of intensity and signs pointing a way out: points-signs that offer a multiplicity of solutions and a variety of directions for a new style of politics. Such an approach carries much along with it, in the course of its flow, but it also leaves much behind. Chunks of Marx and Freud that cannot keep up with the fast current will be left behind, buried or forgotten, while everything in Marx and Freud that has to do with how things and people and desires actually flow will be kept, and added to the infernal machine evoked above. This political analysis of desire, this schizoanalysis, becomes a mighty tool where schizophrenia as a process-the schiz-serves as a point of departure as well as a point of destination. Like Laing, they <u><mark>encourage</mark> mankind to take <mark>a journey</mark>, the journey <mark>through ego-loss</mark>.</u> They go much further than Laing on this point, however. <u><mark>They urge mankind to strip itself of all anthropomorphic and anthropological armoring,</mark> all myth and tragedy, and all existentialism, <mark>in order to perceive what is nonhuman in man, his will and his forces, his transformations and mutations. The human and social sciences have accustomed us to see the figure of Man behind every social event</u>,</mark> just as Christianity taught us to see the Eye of the Lord looking down upon us. <u><mark>Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself. They talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects</u></mark>.</p> | 1NR | Liberalism | 1NR Perm | 429,898 | 1 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,548 | Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico ensures economic instability, mass social injustice, and enlarged cartel profits which turns the case | Mercille 14 | Mercille 14 (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz | neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70 the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?” | NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry to find work out of desperation Whereas before reforms the economy grew at 3.5 percent this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases average wage decreased from 4.50 to 3.70 manufacturing has added 500,000 jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of 2.3 million in agriculture because of cheaper corn from U.S. agrobusinesses many had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking as low-level dealers, to make ends meet neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering enlarging the market | Since the 1980s, neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 (annual per capita rate), this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70. Since NAFTA went into effect, the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?” | 2,307 | <h4>Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico ensures economic instability, mass social injustice, and enlarged cartel profits which turns the case</h4><p><u><strong>Mercille 14</u></strong> (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) <u>gz</p><p></u>Since the 1980s, <u>neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry</u> (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, <u>reforms such as <mark>NAFTA <strong>pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry</strong></mark>, both <mark>to find work</mark> and <mark>out of desperation</mark>. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. <mark>Whereas before reforms</mark> were implemented <mark>the economy grew at</mark> a rate of <mark>3.5 percent</mark> between 1960 and 1979</u> (annual per capita rate), <u><mark>this dropped to <strong>a meager 0.1 percent</strong> </mark>in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. <strong><mark>NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases</strong></mark>: for example, in Juárez, the <mark>average wage decreased <strong>from</mark> US$<mark>4.50</mark> a day <mark>to</mark> US$<mark>3.70</u></strong></mark>. Since NAFTA went into effect, <u>the <mark>manufacturing</mark> sector <mark>has added</mark> some <mark>500,000</mark> to 600,000 net <mark>jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of</mark> around <strong><mark>2.3 million</mark> jobs <mark>in agriculture </strong>because of cheaper corn</mark> imports <mark>from</mark> subsidized <mark>U.S. agrobusinesses</mark>. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures</u> (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, <u><mark>many</mark> Mexicans <mark>had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking</mark>, often <mark>as low-level dealers, to make ends meet</u></mark>. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. <u>Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by <mark>neoliberal reforms has <strong>increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering</strong></mark>, thereby <mark>enlarging the market</u></mark>. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “<u>Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”</p></u> | 2NC | K | Link – Mexico | 429,899 | 5 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,549 | Causes extinction through global civil war | Duffield 8 | Duffield 8 (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies Volume 21 Issue 2) | you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.
The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics | you cannot have development without containing underdeveloped life this nexus can be traced to the division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant
security interconnects containment of migration with measures to integrate migrant communities within consumer society to improve the self-reliance of underdeveloped life in situ It marks a terrain of a global civil war fought on and between the modalities of life itself global civil war connects livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats in the North the need for social cohesion at home while urging intervention abroad this disastrous formula will be defended to the death we are all involved in this war since it mobilizes societies as a whole | This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.
The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement. | 4,009 | <h4>Causes extinction through global civil war</h4><p><u><strong>Duffield 8</u></strong> (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies<u> Volume 21 Issue 2)</p><p></u>This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that <u><mark>you cannot have development </mark>or security <mark>without containing</mark> the <strong>circulation of <mark>underdeveloped life</u></strong></mark>. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, <u>the origins of <mark>this nexus can be traced to </mark>decolonization</u>. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, <u>decolonization publicly signalled <mark>the</mark> generic <mark>division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life</mark>, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, <mark>with an <strong>underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant</u></strong></mark>. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, <u>decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally</u>. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, <u>containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration</u>. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. <u>Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.</p><p>The international <mark>security </mark>architecture that emerged with decolonization <mark>interconnects</mark> the <mark>containment of </mark>irregular <mark>migration with measures to integrate migrant communities</mark> already settled <mark>within consumer society</mark> and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives <mark>to improve the self-reliance</mark> and stasis <mark>of underdeveloped life in situ</mark>. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. <mark>It marks</mark> out <mark>a terrain of a <strong>global civil war</strong></mark>, or rather tableau of wars, which is being <strong><mark>fought on and between the modalities of life itself</u></strong></mark>. <u>Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—<strong><mark>global civil war connects </mark>the <mark>livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats</mark> to critical infrastructure <mark>in the North</u></strong></mark>. Since the end of the Cold War, <u>the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on <mark>the need for social cohesion at home while</mark>, at the same time, <mark>urging</mark> a <strong>fresh wave of <mark>intervention abroad</strong></mark> to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means</u>. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, <u>there is a real possibility that <strong><mark>this disastrous formula</mark> for sharing the world with others <mark>will be defended to the death</u></strong></mark>. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. <u>Reflected within the <strong>globalization of containment</strong>, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become <strong>increasingly violent and coercive</strong>.</u> In one way or another, <u><strong><mark>we are all involved in this war</strong></mark>; it cannot be escaped <mark>since it mobilizes societies as a whole</mark>, including policy makers and academics</u>. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.</p> | 2NC | K | Link – Mexico | 429,900 | 5 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,550 | Their empathetic witnessing is liberalism par excellence where debate is converted into a factory where subjectivity is produced and shipped out to the dispossessed other in sardine cans | Berlant 1999 & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54) | Berlant 1999 (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54) | ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the U S seeks to compete signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose conditions are most optimal the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action Yet even as the image of the traumatized proliferates even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is the American Dream exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas do not induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead It is a beautiful experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance mourning can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it are ghosted for a good cause The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the U S is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. I mean to challenge belief in the positive workings of national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is propled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of denied citizenship as their pain Theoretically Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change Yet, since these very sources of protection have buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject from feeling and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field. | ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace Yet even as the image of the traumatized proliferates it competes with a normative/utopian image of U.S. citizens who remains unmarked It takes place over a distance: even if the object is neither dead nor at any great distance mourning an act of social deathmaking . survival can only be achieved by a citizenry that uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres the pressure produces a cry for a double therapy— victim and viewer. sentimentality promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form organized around labor and antiracist struggles the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. propled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced as the true core of national collectivity. Theoretically Identification with pain leads to change Yet, since these very sources of protection have buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests weaknesses the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in social negation counterhegemonic deployments of pain actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed body tactical use of trauma overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality of collective life serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field. | Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the United States seeks desperately to compete “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose labor conditions are most optimal for profit? In the United States the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals of the proliferating sweatshop networks “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action.3 Yet even as the image of the traumatized worker proliferates, even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: the American Dream.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas of workers in ongoing extreme conditions do not generally induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond. Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead, I am mourning. It is a beautiful, not sublime, experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance from where you are? In other words, mourning can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it, one might say, are ghosted for a good cause.6 The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism (The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the United States, is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, I mean to challenge a powerful popular belief in the positive workings of something I call national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics generally promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is propled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain. Theoretically, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. Yet, since these very sources of protection—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—have traditionally buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject I citizens from feeling their culture} and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics. For one thing, it may be that the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain implicitly mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation; this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality, for example, can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms. It is also possible that counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. Finally, it might be that the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions: for instance, the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.9 | 10,022 | <h4>Their empathetic witnessing is liberalism par excellence<strong> where debate is converted into a factory where subjectivity is produced and shipped out to the dispossessed other in sardine cans </h4><p><u>Berlant 1999 </u></strong>(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in <u>Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law</u> ed. Sarat<u><strong> & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54)</p><p></u></strong>Ravaged wages and <u><mark>ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace</mark> in which the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>seeks </u>desperately <u>to compete</u> “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, <u>signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose</u> labor <u>conditions are most optimal</u> for profit? In the United States <u>the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals</u> of the proliferating sweatshop networks <u>“at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action</u>.3 <u><mark>Yet even as the image of the traumatized</u></mark> worker <u><mark>proliferates</u></mark>, <u>even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, <strong><mark>it competes with a normative/utopian image of</mark> the <mark>U.S. citizens who remains unmarked</strong></mark>, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project</u> <u>which is</u> sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: <u>the American Dream</u>.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, <u>exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality.</u> <u>The exposed traumas</u> of workers in ongoing extreme conditions <u>do not</u> generally <u>induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond</u>. <u>Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you).</u> <u>Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead</u>, I am mourning. <u>It is a beautiful</u>, not sublime, <u>experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. <mark>It takes place over a distance: even if the object</mark> who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness <mark>is neither dead nor at any great distance</u></mark> from where you are? In other words, <u><mark>mourning</mark> can also be <mark>an act of </mark>aggression, of <mark>social deathmaking</mark>: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it</u>, one might say, <u>are ghosted for a good cause</u>.6<u> The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism</u> (<u>The Trans-Nationale) can be heard<mark>.</mark> Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but <strong><mark>survival</mark>, which <mark>can only be achieved by a citizenry that</mark> eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and <mark>uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres</mark> </strong>while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice</u>8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, <u><mark>the pressure </mark>of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political <strong><mark>produces a cry for a double therapy—</mark>to the <mark>victim and</mark> the <mark>viewer.</strong></mark> But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning</u> (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), <u>we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling.</u> The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, <u>I mean to challenge</u> a powerful popular <u>belief in the positive workings of </u>something I call <u><strong>national <mark>sentimentality</strong></mark>, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics</u> generally <u><strong><mark>promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form</strong></mark>, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage.</u> But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, <u>each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially <strong><mark>organized around labor</mark>, feminist, <mark>and antiracist struggles</strong></mark> of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of <strong><mark>the nation is imagined as the index of collective life.</strong></mark> This nation is <mark>propled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy</mark> and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. <mark>Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced</mark>, in the dominant public sphere, <strong><mark>as the true core of national collectivity.</u></strong></mark> <u>It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of</u> flawed or <u>denied citizenship as their pain</u>. <u><mark>Theoretically</u></mark>, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. <u><mark>Identification with pain</mark>, a universal true feeling, then <mark>leads to</mark> structural social <mark>change</u></mark>. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. <u><mark>Yet, since these very sources of protection</u></mark>—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—<u><mark>have</u></mark> traditionally <u><mark>buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy</u></mark>, <u>and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject</u> I citizens <u>from feeling</u> their culture} <u>and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, <mark>the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests</mark> some <mark>weaknesses</mark>, or misrecognitions, in these tactics</u>. For one thing, it may be that <u><mark>the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain</u></mark> implicitly <u><mark>mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in</mark> the experience of <mark>social negation</u></mark>; <u>this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality</u>, for example, <u>can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms</u>. It is also possible that <u><mark>counterhegemonic deployments of pain</mark> as the measure of structural injustice <mark>actually <strong>sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed</mark> or healthy <mark>body</strong></mark> in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones.</u> Finally, it might be that <u>the <strong><mark>tactical use of trauma</strong> </mark>to describe the effects of social inequality so <strong><mark>overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice </strong></mark>that it enables various confusions</u>: for instance, <u>the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change</u>. <u><mark>Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and <strong>empathy to the vitality</strong></mark> and viability <strong><mark>of collective life</mark>.</u></strong> <u>This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently <mark>serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.</u></mark>9</p> | 1NR | Liberalism | 1NR Links | 34,308 | 89 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,551 | Maybe we have an alt, maybe we don’t. You’ll never know. | Baudrillard, 1990 | Baudrillard, 1990 (Jean, Fatal Strategies, 1990) | the object is ingenious the object is fatal At the heart of banal strategies is the fiery desire of fatal strategies Nothing can guarantee us a fatality even less a strategy how could there be fatality if there is strategy? the enigma is that fatality is at the heart of every strategy It peeks through banal strategies the object mocks the laws we attach to it it would rather figure in our calculations as a sarcastic variable and leave it to the equations to verify themselves. But the rules of its game, the conditions according to which it accepts playing? No one knows them, and they can change without notice the object is taken in the very game that we wanted to make it play doubling the ante escalating the bidding on the strategic limits it will tolerate installing thereby a strategy that doesn’t have its own ends a “playful” strategy that stills the play of the subject a fatal strategy in that the subject thereby succumbs to the surpassing of its own objectives We invent these strategies in the hope of having them result in the unexpected event The real we invent wholly in the hope of seeing it result in a prodigious artifice From strategy we expect control Seduction is fatal Fatality is seductive a hidden rule of the game is dazzling, and compensates us for the cruelest losses Likewise with the joke If I look for a fatal connection in language I fall on the joke which is itself the denouement of language immanent to language Everything must unfold in a fatal and ingenious way just as everything was caught from the start in an original subversion Even predestination is a form of ironic subversion of fatality Chance is one the irony of fatality is greater than the irony of chance a fatal strategy must itself be fatal no longer a moral stasis but a moral ecstasy all critical radicality has become useless, negativity seems resolved in a world that pretends to realize itself what remains but to bring things back to their enigmatic ground zero? it’s man that poses to the Sphinx the inhuman the question of the inhuman of the fatal of the indifference of the world toward our affairs The object the Sphinx subtler than man, hardly answers What remains but to side with this enigma? Everything can be summed up in this: let’s believe for a single instant the hypothesis that there is a fatal and enigmatic bias in the order of things. There’s something stupid in the current forms of truth and objectivity that a superior irony could spare us. Truth only complicates things And if the Last Judgement consists, as everyone knows, for each of us, in saving and eternalizing a moment of our lives, and one only, with whom do we share this ironic end? | the object is ingenious the object is fatal Nothing can guarantee us a fatality even less a strategy the enigma is that fatality is at the heart of every strategy the object mocks the laws we attach to it; it would rather figure in our calculations as a sarcastic variable, and leave it to the equations to verify themselves But the rules of its game, the conditions according to which it accepts playing? No one knows them, and they can change without notice. the object is taken in the very game that we wanted to make it play — doubling the ante installing a strategy that doesn’t have its own ends: a “playful” strategy that stills the play of the subject the subject thereby succumbs to the surpassing of its own objectives a hidden rule of the game is dazzling, and compensates us for the cruelest losses Likewise with the joke. If I look for a fatal connection in language, I fall on the joke, which is itself the denouement of language immanent to language a fatal strategy must itself be fatal no longer a moral stasis, but a moral ecstasy now that all critical radicality has become useless, now that all negativity seems resolved in a world that pretends to realize itself what remains but to bring things back to their enigmatic ground zero? What remains but to side with this enigma? Everything can be summed up in this: let’s believe for a single instant the hypothesis that there is a fatal and enigmatic bias in the order of things There’s something stupid in the current forms of truth and objectivity that a superior irony could spare us. Truth only complicates things And if the Last Judgement consists for each of us, in saving and eternalizing a moment of our lives with whom do we share this ironic end? | At the end of all that, if the object is ingenious, if the object is fatal, what can we do about it? After the art of survival, the ironic art of disappearance? The subject has always dreamed of this, a dream inverse to its dream of totalization, and the one has never been able to erase the other. Quite the contrary. Its failure today awakens passions that are much more subtle. At the heart of banal strategies is the fiery desire of fatal strategies. Nothing can guarantee us a fatality, even less a strategy. What is more, the conjunction of these two terms is paradoxical: how could there be fatality if there is strategy? That’s just the point: the enigma is that fatality is at the heart of every strategy. It’s what peeks through the heart of more banal strategies. It’s the object, whose fatality would be a strategy —something like the rule of another game. Basically, the object mocks the laws we attach to it; it would rather figure in our calculations as a sarcastic variable, and leave it to the equations to verify themselves. But the rules of its game, the conditions according to which it accepts playing? No one knows them, and they can change without notice. No one knows what a strategy is. There are not enough means in the world for us to be able to dispose of ends. And, therefore, no one is capable of articulating a final process. God himself is forced to employ a trial-and-error method. The interesting thing about this is the inexorable logical process that is visible here, by which the object is taken in the very game that we wanted to make it play — doubling the ante somehow, escalating the bidding on the strategic limits it will tolerate, installing thereby a strategy that doesn’t have its own ends: a “playful” strategy that stills the play of the subject, a fatal strategy in that the subject thereby succumbs to the surpassing of its own objectives. We are accomplices in this excess of finality that is there in the object (this can be the excess of meaning, and therefore the impossibility of deciphering a word that plays the game of meaning all too well). We invent all these strategies in the hope of having them result in the unexpected event. The real we invent wholly in the hope of seeing it result in a prodigious artifice. From any object we hope for a blind response that hampers our projects. From strategy we expect control. From seduction we look for surprise. Seduction is fatal. It’s the effect of a sovereign object that recreates in you an original confusion and seeks to surprise you. Fatality, in turn, is seductive, like the discovery of a hidden rule. The discovery of a hidden rule of the game is dazzling, and compensates us in advance for the cruelest losses. Likewise with the joke. If I look for a fatal connection in language, I fall on the joke, which is itself the denouement of language immanent to language (that is the fatal: the same sign presiding over a life’s crystallization and its resolution, at the knotting of the intrigue and its denouement). In language become pure object, irony (of the Witz*) is the objective form of this denouement. Everywhere, as in the Witz, redoubling and escalating the stakes are spirited forms of denouement. Everything must unfold in a fatal and ingenious way, just as everything was caught from the start in an original subversion. Even predestination is a form of ironic subversion of fatality. Chance is also one. What’s the use of trying to establish chance as an objective process, if it is an ironic one? Of course it exists, but against all science, in the irony of the aleatory, and even at the molecular level. And of course fatality exists too, simultaneously — there’s no paradox involved in this. The difference is that the irony of fatality is greater than the irony of chance, which just makes it more tragic and more seductive. It’s true that this is a difficult and obscure route: to side with the object, to take up the cause of the object. To find another rule, another axiom: nothing mystical in this, nothing of the otherworldly delirium of a subjectivity trapped and escaping headlong into a paroxysmal inventory. But simply to delineate this other logic, unravel those other strategies, leave the field open to objective irony. That also is a challenge — eventually it threatens absurdity, and runs the risk of what it describes — but the risk is to be taken. The hypothesis of a fatal strategy must itself be fatal, too. If there be a morality, it too must be engaged in the eccentric cycle of its effects, must itself be hyper-moral, like the real is hyper-real, must be no longer a moral stasis, but a moral ecstasy, must itself be a special effect. Levi-Strauss claimed that the symbolic order had left us, yielding to history. Today, says Canetti, history itself has withdrawn. What remains but to pass on the side of the object, and on the side of its eccentric and precious effects, of its fatal effects (fatality is only the absolute liberty of effects )? Semiorrhage. Today, now that all critical radicality has become useless, now that all negativity seems resolved in a world that pretends to realize itself, and now that the critical spirit has found its summer home in socialism, and the effects of desire are largely depleted — what remains but to bring things back to their enigmatic ground zero? Now the enigma is inverted: once it was the Sphinx that posed men the question of man, the question Oedipus thought he answered, that we all thought we answered. Today it’s man that poses to the Sphinx — the inhuman — the question of the inhuman, of the fatal, of the indifference of the world toward our affairs, of its fickleness toward objective laws. The object (the Sphinx), subtler than man, hardly answers. But it’s certain nevertheless that in disobeying laws, in unravelling desire, it answers secretly to some enigma. What remains but to side with this enigma? Everything can be summed up in this: let’s believe for a single instant the hypothesis that there is a fatal and enigmatic bias in the order of things. In any case, there is something stupid about our current situation. There’s something stupid in the raw event, to which destiny, if it exists, could not be insensible. There’s something stupid in the current forms of truth and objectivity that a superior irony could spare us. Everything is expiated in one way or another. Everything is headed somewhere. Truth only complicates things. And if the Last Judgement consists, as everyone knows, for each of us, in saving and eternalizing a moment of our lives, and one only, with whom do we share this ironic end? | 6,629 | <h4>Maybe we have an alt, maybe we don’t. You’ll never know.</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard, 1990</strong> (Jean, Fatal Strategies, 1990)</p><p></u>At the end of all that, if <u><mark>the object is ingenious</u></mark>, if <u><mark>the object is fatal</u></mark>, what can we do about it? After the art of survival, the ironic art of disappearance? The subject has always dreamed of this, a dream inverse to its dream of totalization, and the one has never been able to erase the other. Quite the contrary. Its failure today awakens passions that are much more subtle. <u>At the heart of banal strategies is the fiery desire of fatal strategies</u>. <u><mark>Nothing can guarantee us a fatality</u></mark>, <u><mark>even less a strategy</u></mark>. What is more, the conjunction of these two terms is paradoxical: <u>how could there be fatality if there is strategy?</u> That’s just the point: <u><mark>the enigma is that fatality is at the heart of every strategy</u></mark>. <u>It</u>’s what <u>peeks through</u> the heart of more <u>banal strategies</u>. It’s the object, whose fatality would be a strategy —something like the rule of another game. Basically, <u><mark>the object mocks the laws we attach to it</u>; <u>it would rather figure in our calculations as a sarcastic variable</u>,</mark> <u><mark>and leave it to the equations to verify themselves</mark>. <mark>But the rules of its game, the conditions according to which it accepts playing? No one knows them, and they can change without notice</u>.</mark> No one knows what a strategy is. There are not enough means in the world for us to be able to dispose of ends. And, therefore, no one is capable of articulating a final process. God himself is forced to employ a trial-and-error method. The interesting thing about this is the inexorable logical process that is visible here, by which <u><mark>the object is taken in the very game that we wanted to make it play </u>— <u>doubling the ante</u></mark> somehow, <u>escalating the bidding on the strategic limits it will tolerate</u>, <u><mark>installing</mark> thereby <mark>a strategy that doesn’t have its own ends</u>: <u>a “playful” strategy that stills the play of the subject</u></mark>, <u>a fatal strategy in that <mark>the subject thereby succumbs to the surpassing of its own objectives</u></mark>. We are accomplices in this excess of finality that is there in the object (this can be the excess of meaning, and therefore the impossibility of deciphering a word that plays the game of meaning all too well). <u>We invent</u> all <u>these strategies in the hope of having them result in the unexpected event</u>. <u>The real we invent wholly in the hope of seeing it result in a prodigious artifice</u>. From any object we hope for a blind response that hampers our projects. <u>From strategy we expect control</u>. From seduction we look for surprise. <u>Seduction is fatal</u>. It’s the effect of a sovereign object that recreates in you an original confusion and seeks to surprise you. <u>Fatality</u>, in turn, <u>is seductive</u>, like the discovery of a hidden rule. The discovery of <u><mark>a hidden rule of the game is dazzling, and compensates us</u></mark> in advance <u><mark>for</u> <u>the cruelest losses</u></mark>. <u><mark>Likewise with the joke</u>. <u>If I look for a fatal connection in language</u>, <u>I fall on the joke</u>, <u>which is itself the denouement of language immanent to language</u></mark> (that is the fatal: the same sign presiding over a life’s crystallization and its resolution, at the knotting of the intrigue and its denouement). In language become pure object, irony (of the Witz*) is the objective form of this denouement. Everywhere, as in the Witz, redoubling and escalating the stakes are spirited forms of denouement. <u>Everything must unfold in a fatal and ingenious way</u>, <u>just as everything was caught from the start in an original subversion</u>. <u>Even predestination is a form of ironic subversion of fatality</u>. <u>Chance</u> <u>is</u> also <u>one</u>. What’s the use of trying to establish chance as an objective process, if it is an ironic one? Of course it exists, but against all science, in the irony of the aleatory, and even at the molecular level. And of course fatality exists too, simultaneously — there’s no paradox involved in this. The difference is that <u>the irony of fatality is greater than the irony of chance</u>, which just makes it more tragic and more seductive. It’s true that this is a difficult and obscure route: to side with the object, to take up the cause of the object. To find another rule, another axiom: nothing mystical in this, nothing of the otherworldly delirium of a subjectivity trapped and escaping headlong into a paroxysmal inventory. But simply to delineate this other logic, unravel those other strategies, leave the field open to objective irony. That also is a challenge — eventually it threatens absurdity, and runs the risk of what it describes — but the risk is to be taken. The hypothesis of <u><mark>a fatal strategy must itself be fatal</u></mark>, too. If there be a morality, it too must be engaged in the eccentric cycle of its effects, must itself be hyper-moral, like the real is hyper-real, must be <u><mark>no longer a moral stasis</u>, <u>but a moral ecstasy</u></mark>, must itself be a special effect. Levi-Strauss claimed that the symbolic order had left us, yielding to history. Today, says Canetti, history itself has withdrawn. What remains but to pass on the side of the object, and on the side of its eccentric and precious effects, of its fatal effects (fatality is only the absolute liberty of effects )? Semiorrhage. Today, <mark>now that <u>all critical radicality has become useless,</u></mark> <mark>now that all <u>negativity seems resolved in a world that pretends to realize itself</u></mark>, and now that the critical spirit has found its summer home in socialism, and the effects of desire are largely depleted — <u><mark>what remains but to bring things back to their enigmatic ground zero?</u></mark> Now the enigma is inverted: once it was the Sphinx that posed men the question of man, the question Oedipus thought he answered, that we all thought we answered. Today <u>it’s man that poses to the Sphinx</u> — <u>the inhuman</u> — <u>the question of the inhuman</u>, <u>of the fatal</u>, <u>of the indifference of the world toward our affairs</u>, of its fickleness toward objective laws. <u>The object</u> (<u>the Sphinx</u>), <u>subtler than man, hardly answers</u>. But it’s certain nevertheless that in disobeying laws, in unravelling desire, it answers secretly to some enigma. <u><mark>What remains but to side with this enigma?</mark> <mark>Everything can be summed up in this: let’s believe for a single instant the hypothesis that there is a fatal and enigmatic bias in the order of things</mark>.</u> In any case, there is something stupid about our current situation. There’s something stupid in the raw event, to which destiny, if it exists, could not be insensible. <u><mark>There’s something stupid in the current forms of truth and objectivity that a superior irony could spare us.</u></mark> Everything is expiated in one way or another. Everything is headed somewhere. <u><mark>Truth only complicates things</u></mark>. <u><mark>And if the Last Judgement consists</mark>, as everyone knows, <mark>for each of us, in saving and eternalizing a moment of our lives</mark>, and one only, <mark>with whom do we share this ironic end?</p></u></mark> | 1NR | Liberalism | 1NR Alt | 429,901 | 2 | 16,982 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | 564,728 | N | Districts | 4 | WSU MO | Stroud | 1AC Tyranny of the Gift
1NC University K Liberalism K Legalize Organ Sales CP
2NR Liberalism K | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Districts-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,552 | Vast scholarship proves our argument | Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 14 | Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 14 – co-founders of The Breakthrough Institute a think tank specializing in environmental policy (TED NORDHAUS and MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER APRIL 8, 2014 “Global Warming Scare Tactics”http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/opinion/global-warming-scare-tactics.html?_r=0) | — IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods. efforts to raise public concern about climate change by linking it to natural disasters will backfire. More than a decade’s worth of research suggests that fear-based appeals about climate change inspire denial, fatalism and polarization. Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth, contributed to public backlash and division. Since 2006, the number of Americans telling Gallup that the media was exaggerating global warming grew to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, the gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether global warming is caused by humans rose to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at the Frameworks Institute studied public attitudes for its report “How to Talk About Global Warming.” Messages focused on extreme weather events, they found, made many Americans more likely to view climate change as an act of God something to be weathered, not prevented. people are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” , rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. A frequently cited 2009 study in the journal Science Communication summed up “Although shocking, catastrophic, and large-scale representations of the impacts of climate change may well act as an initial hook for people’s attention and concern, they clearly do not motivate a sense of personal engagement with the issue and indeed may act to trigger barriers to engagement such as denial.” In a controlled laboratory experiment published in Psychological Science in 2010, researchers were able to use “dire messages to increase skepticism , turning down the rhetoric better serve efforts to slow global warming | efforts to raise concern about climate change by linking it to disasters will backfire a decade’s worth of research suggests fear-based appeals inspire denial, fatalism and polarization Gore’s documentary contributed to backlash Americans telling Gallup the media was exaggerating grew the gap between Dem s and Republicans rose according to Pew Research Center the Frameworks Institute studied attitudes for its report Messages on extreme events, they found, made Americans likely to view climate change as an act of God to be weathered, not prevented A study in the journal Science Communication summed up “Although large-scale repr s of climate change may act as a hook for attention they do not motivate engagement and act to trigger denial.” In a lab experiment published in Psychological Science researchers use “dire messages to increase skepticism | OAKLAND, Calif. — IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than the forthcoming nine-part series on climate change and natural disasters, starting this Sunday on Showtime. A trailer for “Years of Living Dangerously” is terrifying, replete with images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods. “I don’t think scary is the right word,” intones one voice. “Dangerous, definitely.” Showtime’s producers undoubtedly have the best of intentions. There are serious long-term risks associated with rising greenhouse gas emissions, ranging from ocean acidification to sea-level rise to decreasing agricultural output. But there is every reason to believe that efforts to raise public concern about climate change by linking it to natural disasters will backfire. More than a decade’s worth of research suggests that fear-based appeals about climate change inspire denial, fatalism and polarization. For instance, Al Gore’s 2006 documentary, “An Inconvenient Truth,” popularized the idea that today’s natural disasters are increasing in severity and frequency because of human-caused global warming. It also contributed to public backlash and division. Since 2006, the number of Americans telling Gallup that the media was exaggerating global warming grew to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, the gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether global warming is caused by humans rose to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. Other factors contributed. Some conservatives and fossil-fuel interests questioned the link between carbon emissions and global warming. And beginning in 2007, as the country was falling into recession, public support for environmental protection declined. Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at the Frameworks Institute studied public attitudes for its report “How to Talk About Global Warming.” Messages focused on extreme weather events, they found, made many Americans more likely to view climate change as an act of God — something to be weathered, not prevented. Some people, the report noted, “are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” for example, rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. Since then, evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. A frequently cited 2009 study in the journal Science Communication summed up the scholarly consensus. “Although shocking, catastrophic, and large-scale representations of the impacts of climate change may well act as an initial hook for people’s attention and concern,” the researchers wrote, “they clearly do not motivate a sense of personal engagement with the issue and indeed may act to trigger barriers to engagement such as denial.” In a controlled laboratory experiment published in Psychological Science in 2010, researchers were able to use “dire messages” about global warming to increase skepticism about the problem. Many climate advocates ignore these findings, arguing that they have an obligation to convey the alarming facts. But claims linking the latest blizzard, drought or hurricane to global warming simply can’t be supported by the science. Our warming world is, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, increasing heat waves and intense precipitation in some places, and is likely to bring more extreme weather in the future. But the panel also said there is little evidence that this warming is increasing the loss of life or the economic costs of natural disasters. “Economic growth, including greater concentrations of people and wealth in periled areas and rising insurance penetration,” the climate panel noted, “is the most important driver of increasing losses.” Claims that current disasters are connected to climate change do seem to motivate many liberals to support action. But they alienate conservatives in roughly equal measure. What works, say environmental pollsters and researchers, is focusing on popular solutions. Climate advocates often do this, arguing that solar and wind can reduce emissions while strengthening the economy. But when renewable energy technologies are offered as solutions to the exclusion of other low-carbon alternatives, they polarize rather than unite. One recent study, published by Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project, found that conservatives become less skeptical about global warming if they first read articles suggesting nuclear energy or geoengineering as solutions. Another study, in the journal Nature Climate Change in 2012, concluded that “communication should focus on how mitigation efforts can promote a better society” rather than “on the reality of climate change and averting its risks.” Nonetheless, virtually every major national environmental organization continues to reject nuclear energy, even after four leading climate scientists wrote them an open letter last fall, imploring them to embrace the technology as a key climate solution. Together with catastrophic rhetoric, the rejection of technologies like nuclear and natural gas by environmental groups is most likely feeding the perception among many that climate change is being exaggerated. After all, if climate change is a planetary emergency, why take nuclear and natural gas off the table? While the urgency that motivates exaggerated claims is understandable, turning down the rhetoric and embracing solutions like nuclear energy will better serve efforts to slow global warming. | 5,659 | <h4>Vast scholarship proves our argument</h4><p><u><strong>Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 14</u></strong> – co-founders of The Breakthrough Institute a think tank specializing in environmental policy (TED NORDHAUS and MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER APRIL 8, 2014 “Global Warming Scare Tactics”http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/opinion/global-warming-scare-tactics.html?_r=0)</p><p>OAKLAND, Calif. <u>— IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than </u>the forthcoming nine-part series on climate change and natural disasters, starting this Sunday on Showtime. A trailer for “Years of Living Dangerously” is terrifying, replete with <u>images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods.</u> “I don’t think scary is the right word,” intones one voice. “Dangerous, definitely.” Showtime’s producers undoubtedly have the best of intentions. There are serious long-term risks associated with rising greenhouse gas emissions, ranging from ocean acidification to sea-level rise to decreasing agricultural output. But there is every reason to believe that <u><mark>efforts to raise </mark>public <mark>concern about climate change by linking it to</mark> natural <mark>disasters will backfire</mark>. <strong>More than <mark>a decade’s worth of research suggests </mark>that <mark>fear-based appeals</mark> about climate change <mark>inspire denial, fatalism and polarization</strong></mark>. </u>For instance, Al <u><mark>Gore’s</mark> </u>2006 <u><mark>documentary</u></mark>, “<u>An Inconvenient Truth,</u>” popularized the idea that today’s natural disasters are increasing in severity and frequency because of human-caused global warming. It also <u><mark>contributed to</mark> public <mark>backlash</mark> and division. Since 2006, the number of <mark>Americans telling Gallup</mark> that <mark>the media was exaggerating</mark> global warming <mark>grew</mark> to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, <mark>the gap between Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s and Republicans </mark>on whether global warming is caused by humans <mark>rose</mark> to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, <mark>according to</mark> the <mark>Pew Research Center</mark>.</u> Other factors contributed. Some conservatives and fossil-fuel interests questioned the link between carbon emissions and global warming. And beginning in 2007, as the country was falling into recession, public support for environmental protection declined. <u>Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at <mark>the Frameworks Institute studied</mark> public <mark>attitudes for its report</mark> “How to Talk About Global Warming.” <mark>Messages</mark> focused <mark>on extreme</mark> weather <mark>events, they found, made</mark> many <mark>Americans </mark>more <mark>likely to view climate change as an act of God</u></mark> — <u>something <mark>to be weathered, not prevented</mark>. </u>Some <u>people</u>, the report noted, “<u>are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” </u>for example<u>, rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. </u>Since then, <u>evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. <mark>A</mark> frequently cited 2009 <mark>study in the journal Science Communication summed up</u></mark> the scholarly consensus. <u><mark>“Although</mark> shocking, catastrophic, and <mark>large-scale repr</mark>esentation<mark>s of</mark> the impacts of <mark>climate change may</mark> well <mark>act as a</mark>n initial <mark>hook for</mark> people’s <mark>attention</mark> and concern,</u>” the researchers wrote, “<u><mark>they </mark>clearly <mark>do not motivate</mark> a sense of personal <mark>engagement</mark> with the issue <mark>and</mark> indeed may <mark>act to trigger </mark>barriers to engagement such as <mark>denial.” In a </mark>controlled <mark>lab</mark>oratory <mark>experiment published in Psychological Science</mark> in 2010, <mark>researchers </mark>were able to <mark>use “dire messages</u></mark>” about global warming<u> <mark>to increase skepticism</u></mark> about the problem. Many climate advocates ignore these findings, arguing that they have an obligation to convey the alarming facts. But claims linking the latest blizzard, drought or hurricane to global warming simply can’t be supported by the science. Our warming world is, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, increasing heat waves and intense precipitation in some places, and is likely to bring more extreme weather in the future. But the panel also said there is little evidence that this warming is increasing the loss of life or the economic costs of natural disasters. “Economic growth, including greater concentrations of people and wealth in periled areas and rising insurance penetration,” the climate panel noted, “is the most important driver of increasing losses.” Claims that current disasters are connected to climate change do seem to motivate many liberals to support action. But they alienate conservatives in roughly equal measure. What works, say environmental pollsters and researchers, is focusing on popular solutions. Climate advocates often do this, arguing that solar and wind can reduce emissions while strengthening the economy. But when renewable energy technologies are offered as solutions to the exclusion of other low-carbon alternatives, they polarize rather than unite. One recent study, published by Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project, found that conservatives become less skeptical about global warming if they first read articles suggesting nuclear energy or geoengineering as solutions. Another study, in the journal Nature Climate Change in 2012, concluded that “communication should focus on how mitigation efforts can promote a better society” rather than “on the reality of climate change and averting its risks.” Nonetheless, virtually every major national environmental organization continues to reject nuclear energy, even after four leading climate scientists wrote them an open letter last fall, imploring them to embrace the technology as a key climate solution. Together with catastrophic rhetoric, the rejection of technologies like nuclear and natural gas by environmental groups is most likely feeding the perception among many that climate change is being exaggerated. After all, if climate change is a planetary emergency, why take nuclear and natural gas off the table? While the urgency that motivates exaggerated claims is understandable<u>, turning down the rhetoric </u>and embracing solutions like nuclear energy will <u>better serve efforts to slow global warming</u>.</p> | 2NC | K | Link – Warming | 232,934 | 15 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,553 | The impact is extinction | Ahmed 14 | Ahmed 14 - Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, and taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex (2014, Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, The Guardian, “Scientists vindicate 'Limits to Growth' – urge investment in 'circular economy'”, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/04/scientists-limits-to-growth-vindicated-investment-transition-circular-economy // SM) | According to a new peer-reviewed scientific report, industrial civilisation is likely to deplete its low-cost mineral resources within the next century, with debilitating impacts for the global economy and key infrastructure within the coming decade. in 1972 Limits to Growth warned that limited availability of natural resources relative to rising costs would undermine continued economic growth Although widely ridiculed, recent scientific reviews confirm that the original report's projections in its 'base scenario' remain robust. , Australia's federal government scientific research agency CSIRO concluded global ecological and economic collapse coming up in the middle of the 21st Century" due to convergence of "peak oil, climate change, and food and water security", is "on-track." the model results are almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008 We are not aware of any model made by economists that is as accurate over such a long time span. mineral depletion, associated radioactive and heavy metal pollution, and the accumulation of greenhouse gases is leaving our descendants the "heavy legacy" of a virtually terraformed world: Hansen warns that a continuation of 'business as usual' exploitation of the world's fossil fuels could potentially trigger runaway global warming that permanently destroy the planet's capacity to host life. the report argues that "collapse" of civilisation, nor the "extinction" of the human species are unavoidable. A fundamental reorganisation of the way societies produce, manage and consume resources could support a new civilisation this circular economy" premised on wide-scale practices of recycling application of agro-ecological methods to food production, and , very different types of social structures. Limits to economic growth do not need to imply an end to prosperity, but rather require a conscious decision by societies to lower their environmental impacts, reduce wasteful consumption, and increase efficiency changes which could increase quality of life while lowering inequality. , a detailed scientific study by Anglia Ruskin University's Global Sustainability Institute found "overwhelming" evidence for resource constraints: Resource constraints will trigger a long term decline in the global economy and civil unrest." dwindling resources raise the possibility of a limit to economic growth in the medium term." we still have time to manage the transition. And we need to do that before is too late, that is before the energy return on investment of fossil fuels has declined so much that we have nothing left to invest." | industrial civilisation is likely to deplete mineral resources within the century, with debilitating impacts for the global economy within the decade. rising costs undermine continued growth scientific reviews confirm global ecological and economic collapse in the middle of the Century due to peak oil, climate change, and food and water security accumulation of greenhouse gases is leaving the "heavy legacy" of a terraformed world continuation of exploitation of fossil fuels could trigger runaway warming that permanently destroy the planet's capacity to host life. fundamental reorganisation of societies could support a new civilisation premised on recycling agro-ecological methods and , very different social structures Resource constraints will trigger a long term decline in the global economy and civil unrest we still have time to manage the transition And we need to do that before is too late before the energy return on investment has declined so much that we have nothing left | According to a new peer-reviewed scientific report, industrial civilisation is likely to deplete its low-cost mineral resources within the next century, with debilitating impacts for the global economy and key infrastructures within the coming decade. The study, the 33rd report to the Club of Rome, is authored by Prof Ugo Bardi of the University of Florence's Earth Sciences Department, and includes contributions from a wide range of senior scientists across relevant disciplines. The Club of Rome is a Swiss-based global think tank consisting of current and former heads of state, UN bureaucrats, government officials, diplomats, scientists, economists and business leaders. Its first report in 1972, The Limits to Growth, was conducted by a scientific team at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT), and warned that limited availability of natural resources relative to rising costs would undermine continued economic growth by around the second decade of the 21st century. Although widely ridiculed, recent scientific reviews confirm that the original report's projections in its 'base scenario' remain robust. In 2008, Australia's federal government scientific research agency CSIRO concluded that The Limits to Growth forecast of potential "global ecological and economic collapse coming up in the middle of the 21st Century" due to convergence of "peak oil, climate change, and food and water security", is "on-track." Actual current trends in these areas "resonate strongly with the overshoot and collapse displayed in the book's 'business-as-usual scenario.'" In 2009, American Scientist published similar findings by other scientists. That review, by leading systems ecologists Prof Charles Hall of State University of New York and Prof John W Day of Louisiana State University, concluded that while the limits-to-growth model's "predictions of extreme pollution and population decline have not come true", the model results are: "... almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008 (with a few appropriate assumptions)... it is important to recognise that its predictions have not been invalidated and in fact seem quite on target. We are not aware of any model made by economists that is as accurate over such a long time span." The new Club of Rome report says that: "The phase of mining by humans is a spectacular but very brief episode in the geological history of the planet… The limits to mineral extraction are not limits of quantity; they are limits of energy. Extracting minerals takes energy, and the more dispersed the minerals are, the more energy is needed… Only conventional ores can be profitably mined with the amounts of energy we can produce today." The combination of mineral depletion, associated radioactive and heavy metal pollution, and the accumulation of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel exploitation is leaving our descendants the "heavy legacy" of a virtually terraformed world: "The Earth will never be the same; it is being transformed into a new and different planet." Drawing on the work of leading climate scientists including James Hansen, the former head of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, the report warns that a continuation of 'business as usual' exploitation of the world's fossil fuels could potentially trigger runaway global warming that, in several centuries or thousands of years, permanently destroy the planet's capacity to host life. Despite this verdict, the report argues that neither a "collapse" of the current structure of civilisation, nor the "extinction" of the human species are unavoidable. A fundamental reorganisation of the way societies produce, manage and consume resources could support a new high-technology civilisation, but this would entail a new "circular economy" premised on wide-scale practices of recycling across production and consumption chains, a wholesale shift to renewable energy, application of agro-ecological methods to food production, and with all that, very different types of social structures. In the absence of a major technological breakthrough in clean energy production such as nuclear fusion – which so far seems improbable - recycling, conservation and efficiency in the management of the planet's remaining accessible mineral resources will need to be undertaken carefully and cooperatively, with the assistance of cutting-edge science. Limits to economic growth, or even "degrowth", the report says, do not need to imply an end to prosperity, but rather require a conscious decision by societies to lower their environmental impacts, reduce wasteful consumption, and increase efficiency – changes which could in fact increase quality of life while lowering inequality. These findings of the new Club of Rome report have been confirmed by other major research projects. In January last year, a detailed scientific study by Anglia Ruskin University's Global Sustainability Institute commissioned by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, found "overwhelming" evidence for resource constraints: "... across a range of resources over the short (years) and medium (decades) term… Resource constraints will, at best, increase energy and commodity prices over the next century and, at worse, trigger a long term decline in the global economy and civil unrest." The good news, though is that "If governments and economic agents anticipate resource constraints and act in a constructive manner, many of the worst affects can be avoided." According to Dr Aled Jones, lead author of the study and head of the Global Sustainability Institute: "Resource constraints will, at best, steadily increase energy and commodity prices over the next century and, at worst, could represent financial disaster, with the assets of pension schemes effectively wiped out and pensions reduced to negligible levels." It is imperative to recognise that "dwindling resources raise the possibility of a limit to economic growth in the medium term." In his 2014 report to the Club of Rome, Prof Bardi takes a long-term view of the prospects for humanity, noting that the many technological achievements of industrial societies mean there is still a chance now to ensure the survival and prosperity of a future post-industrial civilization: "It is not easy to imagine the details of the society that will emerge on an Earth stripped of its mineral ores but still maintaining a high technological level. We can say, however, that most of the crucial technologies for our society can function without rare minerals or with very small amounts of them, although with modifications and at lower efficiency." Although expensive and environmentally intrusive industrial structures "like highways and plane travel" would become obsolete, technologies like "the Internet, computers, robotics, long-range communications, public transportation, comfortable homes, food security, and more" could remain attainable with the right approach - even if societies undergo disastrous crises in the short-run. Bardi is surprisingly matter-of-fact about the import of his study. "I am not a doomster," he told me. "Unfortunately, depletion is a fact of life, not unlike death and taxes. We cannot ignore depletion - just like it is not a good idea to ignore death and taxes… "If we insist in investing most of what remains for fossil fuels; then we are truly doomed. Yet I think that we still have time to manage the transition. To counter depletion, we must invest a substantial amount of the remaining resources in renewable energy and efficient recycling technologies - things which are not subjected to depletion. And we need to do that before is too late, that is before the energy return on investment of fossil fuels has declined so much that we have nothing left to invest." | 7,763 | <h4>The impact is extinction</h4><p><u><strong>Ahmed 14</u></strong> - Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, and taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex (2014, Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, The Guardian, “Scientists vindicate 'Limits to Growth' – urge investment in 'circular economy'”, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/04/scientists-limits-to-growth-vindicated-investment-transition-circular-economy <u>// SM)</p><p>According to a new peer-reviewed scientific report, <mark>industrial civilisation is likely to deplete</mark> its low-cost <mark>mineral resources within the</mark> next <mark>century, with debilitating impacts for the global economy</mark> and key infrastructure</u>s <u><mark>within the</mark> coming <mark>decade.</mark> </u>The study, the 33rd report to the Club of Rome, is authored by Prof Ugo Bardi of the University of Florence's Earth Sciences Department, and includes contributions from a wide range of senior scientists across relevant disciplines. The Club of Rome is a Swiss-based global think tank consisting of current and former heads of state, UN bureaucrats, government officials, diplomats, scientists, economists and business leaders. Its first report <u>in 1972</u>, The <u>Limits to Growth</u>, was conducted by a scientific team at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT), and <u>warned that limited availability of natural resources relative to <mark>rising costs</mark> would <mark>undermine continued</mark> economic <mark>growth</u></mark> by around the second decade of the 21st century. <u>Although widely ridiculed, recent <mark>scientific reviews confirm</mark> that the original report's projections in its 'base scenario' remain robust.</u> In 2008<u>,</u> <u>Australia's federal government scientific research agency CSIRO concluded</u> that The Limits to Growth forecast of potential "<u><mark>global ecological and economic collapse</mark> coming up <mark>in the middle of the</mark> 21st <mark>Century</mark>" <mark>due to</mark> convergence of "<mark>peak oil, climate change, and food and water security</mark>", is "on-track."</u> Actual current trends in these areas "resonate strongly with the overshoot and collapse displayed in the book's 'business-as-usual scenario.'" In 2009, American Scientist published similar findings by other scientists. That review, by leading systems ecologists Prof Charles Hall of State University of New York and Prof John W Day of Louisiana State University, concluded that while the limits-to-growth model's "predictions of extreme pollution and population decline have not come true", <u>the model results are</u>: "... <u>almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008</u> (with a few appropriate assumptions)... it is important to recognise that its predictions have not been invalidated and in fact seem quite on target. <u>We are not aware of any model made by economists that is as accurate over such a long time span.</u>" The new Club of Rome report says that: "The phase of mining by humans is a spectacular but very brief episode in the geological history of the planet… The limits to mineral extraction are not limits of quantity; they are limits of energy. Extracting minerals takes energy, and the more dispersed the minerals are, the more energy is needed… Only conventional ores can be profitably mined with the amounts of energy we can produce today." The combination of <u>mineral depletion, associated radioactive and heavy metal pollution, and the <mark>accumulation of greenhouse gases</u></mark> from fossil fuel exploitation <u><mark>is leaving</mark> our descendants <mark>the "heavy legacy" of a</mark> virtually <mark>terraformed world</mark>: </u>"The Earth will never be the same; it is being transformed into a new and different planet." Drawing on the work of leading climate scientists including James <u>Hansen</u>, the former head of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, the report <u>warns that a <mark>continuation of</mark> 'business as usual' <mark>exploitation of</mark> the world's <mark>fossil fuels could</mark> potentially <mark>trigger runaway</mark> global <mark>warming that</u></mark>, in several centuries or thousands of years, <u><mark>permanently destroy the planet's capacity to host life.</mark> </u>Despite this verdict, <u>the report argues that</u> neither a <u>"collapse" of</u> the current structure of <u>civilisation, nor the "extinction" of the human species are unavoidable.</u> <u>A <mark>fundamental reorganisation of</mark> the way <mark>societies</mark> produce, manage and consume resources <mark>could support a new</mark> </u>high-technology <u><mark>civilisation</u></mark>, but <u>this</u> would entail a new "<u>circular economy" <mark>premised on</mark> wide-scale practices of <mark>recycling</u></mark> across production and consumption chains, a wholesale shift to renewable energy, <u>application of <mark>agro-ecological methods</mark> to food production, <mark>and</u></mark> with all that<u><mark>, very different</mark> types of <mark>social structures</mark>. </u>In the absence of a major technological breakthrough in clean energy production such as nuclear fusion – which so far seems improbable - recycling, conservation and efficiency in the management of the planet's remaining accessible mineral resources will need to be undertaken carefully and cooperatively, with the assistance of cutting-edge science. <u>Limits to economic growth</u>, or even "degrowth", the report says, <u>do not need to imply an end to prosperity, but rather require a conscious decision by societies to lower their environmental impacts, reduce wasteful consumption, and increase efficiency</u> – <u>changes which could </u>in fact <u>increase quality of life while lowering inequality. </u>These findings of the new Club of Rome report have been confirmed by other major research projects. In January last year<u>, a detailed scientific study by Anglia Ruskin University's Global Sustainability Institute</u> commissioned by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, <u>found "overwhelming" evidence for resource constraints: </u>"... across a range of resources over the short (years) and medium (decades) term… <u><mark>Resource constraints will</u></mark>, at best, increase energy and commodity prices over the next century and, at worse, <u><mark>trigger a long term decline in the global economy and civil unrest</mark>."</u> The good news, though is that "If governments and economic agents anticipate resource constraints and act in a constructive manner, many of the worst affects can be avoided." According to Dr Aled Jones, lead author of the study and head of the Global Sustainability Institute: "Resource constraints will, at best, steadily increase energy and commodity prices over the next century and, at worst, could represent financial disaster, with the assets of pension schemes effectively wiped out and pensions reduced to negligible levels." It is imperative to recognise that "<u>dwindling resources raise the possibility of a limit to economic growth in the medium term." </u>In his 2014 report to the Club of Rome, Prof Bardi takes a long-term view of the prospects for humanity, noting that the many technological achievements of industrial societies mean there is still a chance now to ensure the survival and prosperity of a future post-industrial civilization: "It is not easy to imagine the details of the society that will emerge on an Earth stripped of its mineral ores but still maintaining a high technological level. We can say, however, that most of the crucial technologies for our society can function without rare minerals or with very small amounts of them, although with modifications and at lower efficiency." Although expensive and environmentally intrusive industrial structures "like highways and plane travel" would become obsolete, technologies like "the Internet, computers, robotics, long-range communications, public transportation, comfortable homes, food security, and more" could remain attainable with the right approach - even if societies undergo disastrous crises in the short-run. Bardi is surprisingly matter-of-fact about the import of his study. "I am not a doomster," he told me. "Unfortunately, depletion is a fact of life, not unlike death and taxes. We cannot ignore depletion - just like it is not a good idea to ignore death and taxes… "If we insist in investing most of what remains for fossil fuels; then we are truly doomed. Yet I think that <u><mark>we still have time to manage the transition</mark>.</u> To counter depletion, we must invest a substantial amount of the remaining resources in renewable energy and efficient recycling technologies - things which are not subjected to depletion. <u><mark>And we need to do that before is too late</mark>, that is <mark>before the energy return on investment</mark> of fossil fuels <mark>has declined so much that we have nothing left</mark> to invest."</p></u> | 2NC | K | Link – Warming | 111,020 | 42 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,554 | causes north south war and extinction | Brzoska 8 , Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008) | Brzoska 8 (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008) | when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ as well as to a shift in security experts’ Methods associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could cause the richer countries in the North to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the South It could also be used as a justification for improving their military preparedness leading to arms races. | Securitization leads to ‘exceptionalism’ arms, force and violence – will gain in importance the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the annihilation of humankind Climate change could meet a similar fate. A political problem might be perceived as intractable necessitating the build-up of military forces portrayal could cause richer countries to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the South leading to arms races | In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races. | 1,945 | <h4>causes north south war and extinction</h4><p><u><strong>Brzoska 8</u></strong> (Michael Brzoska<u><strong>, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)</p><p></u></strong>In the literature on securitization it is implied that <u>when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem</u> (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). <u><mark>Securitization </mark>regularly <mark>leads to </mark>all-round <mark>‘exceptionalism’</u></mark> in dealing with the issue <u>as well as to a shift in</u> institutional localization towards ‘<u>security experts’</u> (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. <u>Methods</u> and instruments <u>associated with these security organizations – such as more <strong>use of <mark>arms, force and violence – will gain in importance </mark>in the</strong> discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War</u> (Guzzini 2004 ). <u>Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies</u>, in the late 1940s, <u><mark>the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict </mark>that was <mark>overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the </mark>potential <mark>annihilation of humankind</mark>. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were</u>, throughout most of the Cold War, <u>secondary to improving military capabilities. <strong><mark>Climate change could meet a similar fate</strong>.</u> <u>A</mark>n essentially <mark>political problem</mark> concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation</u> and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment <u><mark>might <strong>be perceived as intractable</mark>, thus <mark>necessitating</strong> the <strong>build-up of military</mark> and police <mark>forces</strong></mark> to prevent it from becoming a major security problem</u>. <u>The <mark>portrayal</mark> of climate change as a security problem <mark>could</u></mark>, in particular, <u><mark>cause</mark> the <mark>richer countries</mark> in the</u> global <u>North</u>, which are less affected by it, <u><strong><mark>to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them</mark> from</strong> the spillover of violent conflict</u> <u><mark>from</u></mark> the poorer countries in <u><mark>the</u></mark> global <u><mark>South</u></mark> that will be most affected by climate change. <u>It could also be used </u>by major powers <u>as a justification for improving their military preparedness</u> against the other major powers, thus <u><strong><mark>leading to arms races</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 2NC | K | Link – Warming | 202,415 | 35 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,555 | Problematizing the construction of hegemonic narconarratives is capable of crafting a world contra cartel violence | Zavala 14 | Zavala 14 (Oswaldo, Associate Professor of contemporary Latin American literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and at the College of Staten Island, “Imagining the U.S.-Mexico Drug War: The Critical Limits of Narconarratives” Comparative Literature 66:3, p. 357) | As the drug business expands ubiquitously, corroding all dimensions of the social tissue of both Mexico and the U.S., it is understandable that narconarratives analogously struggle to provide sometimes desperate explanations of the situation accounts present a country that is being taken over by dark ahistorical forces that can only be expressed in mythic and archetypical terms: spontaneous, exotic, senseless, and random violence; unstoppable corruption; the inevitable triumph of evil With their romantic focus on death as an ontological destiny and their emphasis on an imagined narcocultura that makes victims of the official institutions of justice, most narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy that the Mexican state relies upon in order to legitimize its actions in the drug war most of the narconarratives written during the last decade in Mexico reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through the articulation of deliberately political counternarratives can light be shed on drug trafficking as one of the many dimensions of official power in both countries. critical narconarratives must abandon the exhausted myths of drug lords and their fantastic kingdoms and stop objectifying drug trafficking as a problem external to official power in Mexico and the U.S. and instead propose a careful historical revision of its place inside that power: drug trafficking as power itself. | narconarratives present a country taken over by dark ahistorical forces expressed in mythic and archetypical terms spontaneous, exotic, senseless violence; corruption; the triumph of evil. With their focus on death as an ontological destiny narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy to legitimize the drug war narconarratives reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through deliberately political counternarratives can light be shed on drug trafficking critical narconarratives must abandon myths of drug lords and their kingdoms and instead propose a careful historical revision of its place inside that power | In Julio Cortázar’s celebrated short story “Casa tomada” (“House Taken Over”), two siblings are gradually expelled from their home as invisible forces take over each room. Since the nature of these forces is never accounted for, the text invites virtually endless explanations and interpretations of their exile. As the drug business expands ubiquitously, corroding all dimensions of the social tissue of both Mexico and the U.S., it is understandable that narconarratives analogously struggle to provide sometimes desperate explanations of the situation. Thus, such accounts present a country that is being taken over by dark ahistorical forces that can only be expressed in mythic and archetypical terms: spontaneous, exotic, senseless, and random violence; unstoppable corruption; the inevitable triumph of evil. With their romantic focus on death as an ontological destiny and their emphasis on an imagined narcocultura that makes victims of the official institutions of justice, most narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy that the Mexican state relies upon in order to legitimize its actions in the drug war. In short, most of the narconarratives written during the last decade in Mexico reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through the articulation of deliberately political counternarratives can light be shed on drug trafficking as one of the many dimensions of official power in both countries. To achieve this, critical narconarratives must abandon the exhausted myths of drug lords and their fantastic kingdoms and stop objectifying drug trafficking as a problem external to official power in Mexico and the U.S. and instead propose a careful historical revision of its place inside that power: drug trafficking as power itself. | 1,779 | <h4>Problematizing the construction of hegemonic narconarratives is capable of crafting a world contra cartel violence</h4><p><u><strong>Zavala 14</u></strong> (Oswaldo, Associate Professor of contemporary Latin American literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and at the College of Staten Island, “Imagining the U.S.-Mexico Drug War: The Critical Limits of Narconarratives<u>” Comparative Literature 66:3, p. 357) </p><p></u>In Julio Cortázar’s celebrated short story “Casa tomada” (“House Taken Over”), two siblings are gradually expelled from their home as invisible forces take over each room. Since the nature of these forces is never accounted for, the text invites virtually endless explanations and interpretations of their exile. <u>As the drug business expands ubiquitously, corroding all dimensions of the social tissue of both Mexico and the U.S., it is understandable that <mark>narconarratives</mark> analogously struggle to provide sometimes desperate explanations of the situation</u>. Thus, such <u>accounts <mark>present a country</mark> that is being <strong><mark>taken over by dark ahistorical forces</strong></mark> that can only be <mark>expressed in mythic and archetypical terms</mark>: <strong><mark>spontaneous, exotic, senseless</mark>, and random <mark>violence; </mark>unstoppable <mark>corruption; the </mark>inevitable <mark>triumph of evil</u></strong>. <u>With their</mark> romantic <mark>focus on death as an ontological destiny</mark> and their emphasis on an imagined narcocultura that makes victims of the official institutions of justice, most <strong><mark>narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy</strong></mark> that the Mexican state relies upon in order <mark>to legitimize</mark> its actions in <mark>the drug war</u></mark>. In short, <u>most of the <mark>narconarratives</mark> written during the last decade in Mexico <mark>reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through</mark> the articulation of <strong><mark>deliberately political counternarratives</strong> can light be shed on drug trafficking</mark> as one of the many dimensions of official power in both countries.</u> To achieve this, <u><mark>critical narconarratives must <strong>abandon</mark> the exhausted <mark>myths of drug lords and their</mark> fantastic <mark>kingdoms</strong></mark> and stop objectifying drug trafficking as a problem external to official power in Mexico and the U.S. <mark>and instead propose a <strong>careful historical revision of its place inside that power</strong></mark>: drug trafficking as power itself.</p></u> | 2NC | K | Alt | 429,902 | 2 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,556 | Impossible and causes war | Burke, 7 | Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse) | the causes of war based on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities or interests are important but flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. ontological certainty takes the form of existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects their militaristic force embody and reinforce a norm of war and because they enact an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force . The epistemology of violence foreign policy doctrine claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order technique quickly passes into ontology First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined being implies action, the action that is war 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time | causes of war based on insecurities over a bedrock of reason they mobilise knowledge and power They are truth-systems which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained ontological certainty amounts to a drive for ideational hegemony that limits debate within the boundaries of a closed system of logic an epistemology of violence joined to an ontology of violence each quicken the resort to war and its escalation militaristic force reinforce a norm of war they enact an 'enframing' which humans are merely instruments for use and destruction foreign policy doctrine use force to achieve a desired end supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which admits no questioning. 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon being implies war | This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. | 10,773 | <h4>Impossible and causes war</h4><p><u><strong>Burke, 7</u></strong> (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)</p><p>This essay develops a theory about <u>the <mark>causes of war</u></mark> -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses <u><mark>based</u></mark> either <u><mark>on</mark> a given sequence of events, threats, <mark>insecurities</u></mark> and political manipulation, <u>or</u> the play of institutional, economic or political<u> interests</u> (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors <u>are important</u> to be sure, and should not be discounted, <u>but</u> they <u>flow <mark>over a</mark> deeper <mark>bedrock of </mark>modern <mark>reason</u></mark> that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly <u><mark>they mobilise</mark> forms of <mark>knowledge and power</mark> together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale</u>. But they run deeper than that. <u><mark>They are truth-systems</mark> of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being <mark>which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained</mark> as it is.</u> I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for <u><mark>ontological certainty</u></mark> and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it <u>takes the form of</u> the <u>existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it <mark>amounts to</u></mark> a hard and exclusivist claim: <u><mark>a drive for ideational hegemony</mark> and closure <mark>that limits debate</mark> and questioning, that confines it <mark>within the boundaries of a</mark> particular, <mark>closed system of logic</u></mark>, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here <u>we are witness to <mark>an epistemology of violence</mark> (strategy) <mark>joined to an ontology of violence</mark> (the national security state</u>). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because <u><mark>each</mark> alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to <mark>quicken the resort to war and</mark> to lead to <mark>its escalation</mark> either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects</u>. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of <u>their <mark>militaristic force</u></mark> -- they <u>embody and <mark>reinforce a norm of war</u></mark> -- <u>and because <mark>they enact</u></mark> what Martin Heidegger calls <u><mark>an 'enframing' </mark>image of technology and being in <mark>which humans are merely</mark> utilitarian <mark>instruments for use</mark>, control <mark>and destruction</mark>, and force</u> -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action<u><strong>. </strong>The epistemology of violence</u> I describe here (strategic science and <u><mark>foreign policy doctrine</u></mark>) <u>claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which <mark>use force</mark> and coercion <mark>to achieve a desired end</mark>, an end that is <mark>supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order</u></mark>. However in practice, <u>technique quickly passes into ontology</u>. This it does in two ways. <u>First, instrumental <mark>violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which</mark> itself <mark>admits no questioning. </mark>The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation</u>. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, <u><mark>'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon</mark>, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined</u>. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, <u><mark>being implies</mark> action, the action that is <mark>war</u></mark>. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that <u>'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state</u>. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that <u>obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth</u>. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- <u>tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made</u> The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: <u>if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have</u>, as Heidegger suggests, <u>come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them?</u> Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. <u>The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time</u>, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.</p> | 2NC | K | A2: rumelli | 74,766 | 131 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,557 | The affirmative is a politics of Oedipal transference which parallels a patriarchal mother-to-daughter educational praxis – this dynamic is racialized and heteronormative – rather than reclaiming “womanhood”, we need a feminism of refusal, failure, and implosion – we’ll start by destroying the mother | Halberstam 11 | Halberstam 11 (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 124-7) gz | Beginning with the injunction “Lose your mother” and building toward a conclusion that will advocate a complete dismantling of self, I explore a feminist politics that issues not from a doing but from an undoing, not from a being or becoming women but from a refusal to be or to become woman as she has been defined and imagined within Western philosophy. This feminism, a feminism grounded in negation, refusal, passivity, absence, and silence, offers spaces and modes of unknowing, failing, and forgetting as part of an alternative feminist project, a shadow feminism which has nestled in more positivist accounts and unraveled their logics from within. This shadow feminism speaks in the language of self- destruction, masochism, an antisocial femininity, and a refusal of the essential bond of mother and daughter that ensures that the daughter inhabits the legacy of the mother and in doing so reproduces her relationship to patriarchal forms of power
The Oedipal frame has stifled all kinds of other models for thinking about the evolution of feminist and queer politics. From women’s studies professors who think of their students as “daughters” to next wave feminists who see earlier activists as dowdy and antiquated mothers, Oedipal dynamics and their familial metaphors snuff out the potential future of new knowledge formations In some of these departments the Oedipal dynamics are also racialized and sexualized, and so an older generation of mostly white women might be simultaneously hiring and holding at bay a younger generation of (often queer) women of color. The whole model of “passing down” knowledge from mother to daughter is quite clearly invested in white, gendered, and hetero normativity; indeed the system inevitably stalls in the face of these racialized and heterosexualized scenes of difference The pervasive model of women’s studies as a mother- daughter dynamic ironically resembles patriarchal systems in that it casts the mother as the place of history, tradition, and memory and the daughter as the inheritor of a static system which she must either accept without changing or reject completely.
We think back through our mothers if we are women,” has been widely interpreted as the founding statement of a new aesthetic lineage that passes through the mother and not the father, the crucial point of the formulation is the conditional phrase In fact “if we are women” implies that if we do not think back through our mothers, then we are not women, and this broken line of thinking and unbeing of the woman unexpectedly offers a way out of the reproduction of woman as the other to man from one generation to the next lose the mother, abuse the mother, love, hate, and destroy the mother, and in the process produce a theoretical and imaginative space that is “not woman” or that can be occupied only by unbecoming women.
femininity defined as a failed masculinity, then that failure to be masculine must surely harbor its own productive potential. how has the desire to be a woman come to be associated definitively with masochism, sacrifice, self- subjugation, and unbecoming?
I chart the genealogy of an antisocial, anti- Oedipal, antihumanist, and counterintuitive feminism that arises out of queer, postcolonial, and black feminisms and that thinks in terms of the negation of the subject rather than her formation, the disruption of lineage rather than its continuation, the undoing of self rather than its activation we might find the narratives of this version of feminism in Toni Morrison’s ghosts or among Jamaica Kincaid’s antiheroines, and we must track it through territories of silence, stubbornness, self- abnegation, and sacrifice. Ultimately we find no feminist subject but only subjects who cannot speak, who refuse to speak; subjects who unravel, who refuse to cohere; subjects who refuse “being” where being has already been defined in terms of a self-activating, self- knowing, liberal subject. If we refuse to become women, we might ask, what happens to feminism? Can we find feminist frameworks capable of recognizing the political project articulated in the form of refusal? The politics of refusal emerges in its most potent form from anticolonial and antiracist texts and challenges colonial authority by absolutely rejecting the role of the colonized within a coloniality of power
prescriptive Western feminist theories of agency and power, freedom and resistance tend to be and have proposed alternative ways of thinking about self and action that emerge from contexts often rejected outright by feminism Spivak uses the example of nineteenth- century bride suicide to demonstrate a mode of being woman that was incomprehensible within a normative feminist framework a concept of woman that does not presume the universality of desires for freedom and autonomy and for whom resistance to patriarchal tradi- tions may not be the goal At the center of Spivak’s essay is a notion of womanhood that exceeds the Western feminist formulation of female life Both theorists use patently antifeminist acts and activities to point to the limits of a feminist theory that already presumes the form that agency must take | Beginning with the injunction “Lose your mother” and building toward a complete dismantling of self, I explore a feminist politics that issues not from becoming women but a refusal to become woman This feminism grounded in negation, refusal, passivity, absence, and silence, offers modes of unknowing, failing, and forgetting as part of a shadow feminism a refusal of the bond of mother and daughter that reproduces patriarchal forms of power
Oedipal dynamics are racialized and sexualized passing down” knowledge is invested in white, gendered, and hetero normativity The dynamic resembles patriarchal systems in that it casts the mother as history and the daughter as inheritor
We think back through our mothers if we are women implies that if we do not we are not women, and this offers a way out of the reproduction of woman lose the mother, abuse the mother, love, hate, and destroy the mother
femininity as a failed masculinity must harbor its own potential
I chart an antisocial, anti- Oedipal, antihumanist feminism out of queer, postcolonial, and black feminisms that thinks in terms of disruption of lineage the undoing of self we find no feminist subject but only subjects who cannot speak refuse to speak unravel refuse to cohere refuse “being” where being has been defined in terms of a self-activating, self- knowing, liberal subject
nineteenth- century bride suicide was incomprehensible within a feminist framework a concept of woman that does not presume the universality of freedom womanhood that exceeds the Western feminist formulation | Beginning with the injunction “Lose your mother” and building toward a conclusion that will advocate a complete dismantling of self, I explore a feminist politics that issues not from a doing but from an undoing, not from a being or becoming women but from a refusal to be or to become woman as she has been defined and imagined within Western philosophy. I will trace broken mother- daughter bonds toward an anti- Oedipal feminism that is nonetheless not a Deleuzean body without organs. This feminism, a feminism grounded in negation, refusal, passivity, absence, and silence, offers spaces and modes of unknowing, failing, and forgetting as part of an alternative feminist project, a shadow feminism which has nestled in more positivist accounts and unraveled their logics from within. This shadow feminism speaks in the language of self- destruction, masochism, an antisocial femininity, and a refusal of the essential bond of mother and daughter that ensures that the daughter inhabits the legacy of the mother and in doing so reproduces her relationship to patriarchal forms of power.
The tension between memory and forgetting as explored in chapter 3 tends to be distinctly Oedipal, familial, and generational. Are there other models of generation, temporality, and politics available to queer culture and feminism? The Oedipal frame has stifled all kinds of other models for thinking about the evolution of feminist and queer politics. From women’s studies professors who think of their students as “daughters” to next wave feminists who see earlier activists as dowdy and antiquated mothers, Oedipal dynamics and their familial metaphors snuff out the potential future of new knowledge formations. Many women’s studies departments around the country currently struggle with the messy and even ugly legacy of Oedipal models of generationality. In some of these departments the Oedipal dynamics are also racialized and sexualized, and so an older generation of mostly white women might be simultaneously hiring and holding at bay a younger generation of (often queer) women of color. The whole model of “passing down” knowledge from mother to daughter is quite clearly invested in white, gendered, and hetero normativity; indeed the system inevitably stalls in the face of these racialized and heterosexualized scenes of difference. And while the “mothers” become frustrated with the apparent unwillingness of the women they have hired to continue their line of inquiry, the “daughters” struggle to make the older women see that regulatory systems are embedded in the paradigms they so insistently want to pass on. The pervasive model of women’s studies as a mother- daughter dynamic ironically resembles patriarchal systems in that it casts the mother as the place of history, tradition, and memory and the daughter as the inheritor of a static system which she must either accept without changing or reject completely.
While Virginia Woolf’s famous line about women from A Room of One’s Own, “We think back through our mothers if we are women,” has been widely interpreted as the founding statement of a new aesthetic lineage that passes through the mother and not the father, the crucial point of the formulation is the conditional phrase (1929: 87). In fact “if we are women” implies that if we do not think back through our mothers, then we are not women, and this broken line of thinking and unbeing of the woman unexpectedly offers a way out of the reproduction of woman as the other to man from one generation to the next. The texts that I examine in this chapter refuse to think back through the mother; they actively and passively lose the mother, abuse the mother, love, hate, and destroy the mother, and in the process they produce a theoretical and imaginative space that is “not woman” or that can be occupied only by unbecoming women.
Psychoanalysis situates the figure of the woman as an incomprehensible, irrational, and even impossible identity. Freud’s famous question “What do women want?” is not simply evidence that, as Simone de Beauvoir famously commented, “Freud never showed much interest in the destiny of women” (1989: 39); rather it asks of women why they would want to occupy the place of castration, lack, and otherness from one generation to the next (Jones 1957: 421). Answering the question of what men might want is quite simple in a system that favors male masculinity; what women want and get from the same system is a much more complex question. If, as Freud asserts, the little girl must reconcile herself to the fate of a femininity defined as a failed masculinity, then that failure to be masculine must surely harbor its own productive potential. What do women want? Moreover, how has the desire to be a woman come to be associated definitively with masochism, sacrifice, self- subjugation, and unbecoming? How might we read these avenues of desire and selfhood as something other than failed masculinity and the end of desire?
In this chapter I chart the genealogy of an antisocial, anti- Oedipal, antihumanist, and counterintuitive feminism that arises out of queer, postcolonial, and black feminisms and that thinks in terms of the negation of the subject rather than her formation, the disruption of lineage rather than its continuation, the undoing of self rather than its activation. In this queer feminist genealogy, which could be said to stretch from Spivak’s meditations on female suicide in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988) to Saidiya Hartman’s idea of a politics that exceeds the social conditions of its enunciation in Scenes of Subjection (1997), we might find the narratives of this version of feminism in Toni Morrison’s ghosts or among Jamaica Kincaid’s antiheroines, and we must track it through territories of silence, stubbornness, self- abnegation, and sacrifice. Ultimately we find no feminist subject but only subjects who cannot speak, who refuse to speak; subjects who unravel, who refuse to cohere; subjects who refuse “being” where being has already been defined in terms of a self-activating, self- knowing, liberal subject. If we refuse to become women, we might ask, what happens to feminism? Or, to pose the question another way: Can we find feminist frameworks capable of recognizing the political project articulated in the form of refusal? The politics of refusal emerges in its most potent form from anticolonial and antiracist texts and challenges colonial authority by absolutely rejecting the role of the colonized within what Walter Mignolo, citing Anibal Quijano, has called “a coloniality of power” (2005: 6).
Postcolonial feminists from Spivak to Saba Mahmood have shown how prescriptive Western feminist theories of agency and power, freedom and resistance tend to be and have proposed alternative ways of thinking about self and action that emerge from contexts often rejected outright by feminism. While Mahmood focuses on Islamic women engaged in religious practices in the women’s mosque movement in Egypt to flesh out a critique of feminist theories of agency, in her famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak uses the example of nineteenth- century bride suicide (after the death of the husband) to demonstrate a mode of being woman that was incomprehensible within a normative feminist framework. Both theorists argue in terms of a “grammar of concepts,” to use Mahmood’s term, and both consider speech to be something other than the conventional feminist trope of breaking silence. At the heart of Mahmood’s book, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject is a concept of woman that does not presume the universality of desires for freedom and autonomy and for whom resistance to patriarchal tradi- tions may not be the goal (2005: 180). At the center of Spivak’s essay is a notion of womanhood that exceeds the Western feminist formulation of female life. Spivak ends her essay on the perils of intellectual attempts to represent oppressed peoples with an extended meditation on suttee, and Mahmood ends her book with an exploration of the meaning of feminine piety within Islam. Both theorists use patently antifeminist acts and activities to point to the limits of a feminist theory that already presumes the form that agency must take. | 8,271 | <h4>The affirmative is a politics of Oedipal transference which parallels a patriarchal mother-to-daughter educational praxis – this dynamic is racialized and heteronormative – rather than reclaiming “womanhood”, we need a feminism of refusal, failure, and implosion – we’ll start by destroying the mother</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 11</u></strong> (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 124-7) gz</p><p><u><mark>Beginning with the injunction <strong>“Lose your mother”</strong> and building toward</mark> a conclusion that will advocate <mark>a <strong>complete dismantling of self</strong>, I explore a feminist politics that issues</mark> not from a doing but from an undoing, <mark>not from</mark> a being or <mark>becoming women but</mark> from <mark>a <strong>refusal to</mark> be or to <mark>become woman</strong></mark> as she has been defined and imagined within Western philosophy.</u> I will trace broken mother- daughter bonds toward an anti- Oedipal feminism that is nonetheless not a Deleuzean body without organs. <u><mark>This feminism</mark>, a feminism <mark>grounded in <strong>negation</strong>, <strong>refusal</strong>, <strong>passivity</strong>, <strong>absence</strong>, and <strong>silence</strong>, offers</mark> spaces and <mark>modes of <strong>unknowing</strong>, <strong>failing</strong>, and <strong>forgetting</strong> as part of</mark> an alternative feminist project, <mark>a <strong>shadow feminism</strong></mark> which has nestled in more positivist accounts and unraveled their logics from within. This shadow feminism speaks in the language of <strong>self- destruction</strong>, <strong>masochism</strong>, an <strong>antisocial femininity</strong>, and <mark>a <strong>refusal of the</mark> essential <mark>bond of mother and daughter</strong> that</mark> ensures that the daughter inhabits the legacy of the mother and in doing so <mark>reproduces</mark> her relationship to <mark>patriarchal forms of power</u></mark>.</p><p>The tension between memory and forgetting as explored in chapter 3 tends to be distinctly Oedipal, familial, and generational. Are there other models of generation, temporality, and politics available to queer culture and feminism? <u>The <strong>Oedipal frame</strong> has stifled all kinds of other models for thinking about the evolution of feminist and queer politics. From women’s studies professors who think of their students as “daughters” to next wave feminists who see earlier activists as dowdy and antiquated mothers, Oedipal dynamics and their familial metaphors <strong>snuff out the potential future of new knowledge formations</u></strong>. Many women’s studies departments around the country currently struggle with the messy and even ugly legacy of Oedipal models of generationality. <u>In some of these departments the <mark>Oedipal dynamics are</mark> also <strong><mark>racialized and sexualized</strong></mark>, and so an older generation of mostly white women might be simultaneously hiring and holding at bay a younger generation of (often queer) women of color. The whole model of “<strong><mark>passing down” knowledge</strong></mark> from mother to daughter <mark>is</mark> quite clearly <mark>invested in <strong>white, gendered, and hetero normativity</strong></mark>; indeed the system inevitably stalls in the face of these racialized and heterosexualized scenes of difference</u>. And while the “mothers” become frustrated with the apparent unwillingness of the women they have hired to continue their line of inquiry, the “daughters” struggle to make the older women see that regulatory systems are embedded in the paradigms they so insistently want to pass on. <u><mark>The</mark> pervasive model of women’s studies as a mother- daughter <mark>dynamic</mark> ironically <strong><mark>resembles patriarchal systems</strong> in that it casts the mother as </mark>the place of <mark>history</mark>, tradition, and memory <mark>and the daughter as </mark>the <mark>inheritor</mark> of a static system which she must either accept without changing or reject completely.</p><p></u>While Virginia Woolf’s famous line about women from A Room of One’s Own, “<u><mark>We think back through our mothers if we are women</mark>,” has been widely interpreted as the founding statement of a new aesthetic lineage that passes through the mother and not the father, the crucial point of the formulation is the conditional phrase</u> (1929: 87). <u>In fact “if we are women” <mark>implies that if we do not</mark> think back through our mothers, then <mark>we are not women, and this</mark> broken line of thinking and unbeing of the woman unexpectedly <mark>offers <strong>a way out of the reproduction of woman</strong></mark> as the other to man from one generation to the next</u>. The texts that I examine in this chapter refuse to think back through the mother; they actively and passively <u><strong><mark>lose the mother</strong>, <strong>abuse the mother</strong>, <strong>love, hate, and destroy the mother</strong></mark>, and in the process</u> they <u>produce a theoretical and <strong>imaginative space</strong> that is “not woman” or that can be occupied only by <strong>unbecoming women</strong>.</p><p></u>Psychoanalysis situates the figure of the woman as an incomprehensible, irrational, and even impossible identity. Freud’s famous question “What do women want?” is not simply evidence that, as Simone de Beauvoir famously commented, “Freud never showed much interest in the destiny of women” (1989: 39); rather it asks of women why they would want to occupy the place of castration, lack, and otherness from one generation to the next (Jones 1957: 421). Answering the question of what men might want is quite simple in a system that favors male masculinity; what women want and get from the same system is a much more complex question. If, as Freud asserts, the little girl must reconcile herself to the fate of a <u><mark>femininity</mark> defined <mark>as a <strong>failed masculinity</strong></mark>, then that failure to be masculine <mark>must</mark> surely <strong><mark>harbor its own</mark> productive <mark>potential</strong></mark>.</u> What do women want? Moreover, <u>how has the desire to be a woman come to be associated definitively with masochism, sacrifice, self- subjugation, and unbecoming?</u> How might we read these avenues of desire and selfhood as something other than failed masculinity and the end of desire?</p><p>In this chapter <u><mark>I chart</mark> the genealogy of <mark>an <strong>antisocial</strong>, <strong>anti- Oedipal</strong>, <strong>antihumanist</strong></mark>, and counterintuitive <mark>feminism</mark> that arises <mark>out of <strong>queer, postcolonial, and black feminisms</strong></mark> and <mark>that thinks in terms of</mark> the negation of the subject rather than her formation, the <strong><mark>disruption of lineage</strong> </mark>rather than its continuation, <mark>the <strong>undoing of self</strong> </mark>rather than its activation</u>. In this queer feminist genealogy, which could be said to stretch from Spivak’s meditations on female suicide in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988) to Saidiya Hartman’s idea of a politics that exceeds the social conditions of its enunciation in Scenes of Subjection (1997), <u>we might find the narratives of this version of feminism in Toni Morrison’s ghosts or among Jamaica Kincaid’s antiheroines, and we must track it through territories of silence, stubbornness, self- abnegation, and sacrifice. Ultimately <mark>we find no feminist subject but only subjects who <strong>cannot speak</strong></mark>, who <strong><mark>refuse to speak</strong></mark>; subjects who <strong><mark>unravel</strong></mark>, who <strong><mark>refuse to cohere</strong></mark>; subjects who <strong><mark>refuse “being”</strong> where being has</mark> already <mark>been defined in terms of a <strong>self-activating, self- knowing, liberal subject</strong></mark>. If we <strong>refuse to become women</strong>, we might ask, what happens to feminism?</u> Or, to pose the question another way: <u>Can we find feminist frameworks capable of recognizing the political project articulated in the form of refusal? The politics of refusal emerges in its most potent form from <strong>anticolonial and antiracist</strong> texts and challenges colonial authority by absolutely <strong>rejecting the role of the colonized</strong> within</u> what Walter Mignolo, citing Anibal Quijano, has called “<u>a coloniality of power</u>” (2005: 6).</p><p>Postcolonial feminists from Spivak to Saba Mahmood have shown how <u>prescriptive Western feminist theories of agency and power, freedom and resistance tend to be and have proposed alternative ways of thinking about self and action that emerge from contexts often rejected outright by feminism</u>. While Mahmood focuses on Islamic women engaged in religious practices in the women’s mosque movement in Egypt to flesh out a critique of feminist theories of agency, in her famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” <u>Spivak uses the example of <mark>nineteenth- century bride suicide</u></mark> (after the death of the husband) <u>to demonstrate a mode of being woman that <mark>was <strong>incomprehensible within a</mark> normative <mark>feminist framework</u></strong></mark>. Both theorists argue in terms of a “grammar of concepts,” to use Mahmood’s term, and both consider speech to be something other than the conventional feminist trope of breaking silence. At the heart of Mahmood’s book, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject is <u><mark>a concept of woman that <strong>does not presume the universality of</mark> desires for <mark>freedom</mark> and autonomy</strong> and for whom resistance to patriarchal tradi- tions may not be the goal</u> (2005: 180). <u>At the center of Spivak’s essay is a notion of <mark>womanhood that <strong>exceeds the Western feminist formulation</mark> of female life</u></strong>. Spivak ends her essay on the perils of intellectual attempts to represent oppressed peoples with an extended meditation on suttee, and Mahmood ends her book with an exploration of the meaning of feminine piety within Islam. <u>Both theorists use patently antifeminist acts and activities to point to the <strong>limits of a feminist theory</strong> that already <strong>presumes the form that agency must take</u></strong>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 651,718 | 6 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
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740,558 | Footnoting DA | Der Derian 95 | Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374) | A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes | A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the contested' nature of realism with a footnote and then business as usual This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to commit worse epistemological crimes | But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations. | 954 | <h4>Footnoting DA</h4><p><u><strong>Der Derian 95</u></strong> (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)</p><p>But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? <u><mark>A stop-gap solution is to supplement the</u></mark> definitional <u><mark>gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist</u></mark>, mindful of a creeping pluralism, <u><mark>will note the</mark> 'essentially <mark>contested' nature of realism</mark> - duly backed up <mark>with a footnote</u></mark> to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - <u><mark>and then</mark> get down to <mark>business as usual</u></mark>, that is, <u>using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. <mark>This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere</mark>: in exchange for not contesting</u> the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, <u><mark>the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to</mark> then turn around and <mark>commit worse epistemological crimes</u></mark>. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.</p> | 2NC | K | Perm | 224,576 | 30 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
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740,559 | Enunciation is heroic individualism – intellectual advocacy for an oppressed, feminine other colludes with a colonial feminism which universalizes ethical values in order to make colonization appear benevolent and self appear sovereign | Halberstam 11 | Halberstam 11 (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 127-8) gz | Spivak explores the British attempt in 1829 to abolish Hindu widow burning in relation to the self- representation of colonialism as benevolent intervention and places this argument against the claim advanced by nativist Indians that sati must be respected as a practice because these women who lost their husbands actually wanted to die. She uses sati to illustrate her claim that colonialism articulates itself as “white men saving brown women from brown men,” but also to mark the complicity of Western feminism in this formulation Does the category of resistance impose a teleology of progressive politics on the analytics of power—a teleology that makes it hard for us to see and understand forms of being and action that are not necessarily encapsulated by the narrative of subversion and reinscription of norms
“Can the Subaltern Speak?” sets up a contradiction between different modes of representation within which an intellectual proposes to speak for an oppressed other Spivak accuses Western feminism of sneaking a heroic individualism in the back door of discursive critique For Spivak, intellectuals, like poststructuralist feminist theorists by imagining themselves to be a transparent vector for the exposure of ideological contradictions, cannot account for their own impact on the processes of domination and instead always imagine themselves in the heroic place of the individual who knows better than the oppressed masses about whom they theorize. The very notion of representation, Spivak claims, in terms of both a theory of economic exploitation and an ideological function, depends upon the production of “heroes, paternal proxies and agents of power and harbors “the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the self’s shadow” (280).
This idea, that intellectuals construct an otherness to “save” in order to fortify a sovereign notion of self, applies also to liberal feminism. In the context of the Hindu widow’s suicide, for example, the Western feminist can see only the workings of extraordinary patriarchy, and she also believes in a benevolent British colonialism that steps in to stop a brutal and archaic ritual feminism is complicit in the project of constructing the subaltern subject it wants to represent and then heroically casting itself as the subaltern’s salvation. What if, Spivak seems to ask in her enigmatic final sentence, feminism was actually able to attend to the nativist claim that women who commit suttee actually want to die? Spivak is calling for a feminism that can claim not to speak for the subaltern or to demand that the subaltern speak in the active voice of Western feminism; instead she imagines a feminism born of a dynamic intellectual struggle with the fact that some women may desire their own destruction for really good political reasons, even if those politics and those reasons lie beyond the purview of the version of feminism for which we have settled Spivak’s call for a “female intellectual” who does not disown another version of womanhood, femininity, and feminism, indeed for any kind of intellectual who can learn how not to know the other, how not to sacrifice the other on behalf of his or her own sovereignty, is a call that has largely gone unanswered. It is this version of feminism that I seek to inhabit, a feminism that fails to save others or to replicate itself, a feminism that finds purpose in its own failure. | Spivak explores the British attempt to abolish Hindu widow burning in relation to the self- representation of colonialism as benevolent intervention She uses sati to claim that colonialism articulates itself as “white men saving brown women from brown men,” but also to mark the complicity of feminism in this formulation resistance makes it hard to see forms of being not encapsulated by subversion of norms
“Can the Subaltern Speak?” sets up contradiction between modes of representation within which an intellectual proposes to speak for an oppressed other feminist theorists by imagining themselves a transparent vector cannot account for their own impact on domination and imagine themselves in the heroic place who knows better than the oppressed representation depends upon the production of “heroes and harbors “ that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the self’s shadow
intellectuals construct an otherness to “save” to fortify a sovereign notion of self In the Hindu widow’s suicide the Western feminist can see patriarchy, and believes in a benevolent colonialism that steps in to stop a brutal ritual What if feminism was able to attend to the claim that women who commit suttee actually want to die? a “female intellectual” who does not disown another version of womanhood a feminism that fails to save others that finds purpose in its own failure | Spivak explores the British attempt in 1829 to abolish Hindu widow burning in relation to the self- representation of colonialism as benevolent intervention and places this argument against the claim advanced by nativist Indians that sati must be respected as a practice because these women who lost their husbands actually wanted to die. She uses sati to illustrate her claim that colonialism articulates itself as “white men saving brown women from brown men,” but also to mark the complicity of Western feminism in this formulation. In a move that echoes Spivak’s counterintuitive break from even poststructuralist feminisms, Mahmood explores women in the mosque movement and their commitment to piety in order to ask, “Does the category of resistance impose a teleology of progressive politics on the analytics of power—a teleology that makes it hard for us to see and understand forms of being and action that are not necessarily encapsulated by the narrative of subversion and reinscription of norms?” (2005: 9).
“Can the Subaltern Speak?” sets up a contradiction between different modes of representation within which an intellectual proposes to speak for an oppressed other. Spivak accuses Foucault and Deleuze as well as Western feminism of sneaking a heroic individualism in the back door of discursive critique. “Neither Deleuze nor Foucault,” she writes, “seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor” (1988: 275). For Spivak, intellectuals, like poststructuralist feminist theorists for Mahmood, by imagining themselves to be a transparent vector for the exposure of ideological contradictions, cannot account for their own impact on the processes of domination and instead always imagine themselves in the heroic place of the individual who knows better than the oppressed masses about whom they theorize. The very notion of representation, Spivak claims, in terms of both a theory of economic exploitation and an ideological function, depends upon the production of “heroes, paternal proxies and agents of power” (279) and harbors “the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the self’s shadow” (280).
This idea, that intellectuals construct an otherness to “save” in order to fortify a sovereign notion of self, applies also to liberal feminism. In the context of the Hindu widow’s suicide, for example, the Western feminist can see only the workings of extraordinary patriarchy, and she also believes in a benevolent British colonialism that steps in to stop a brutal and archaic ritual. For Spivak, feminism is complicit in the project of constructing the subaltern subject it wants to represent and then heroically casting itself as the subaltern’s salvation. What if, Spivak seems to ask in her enigmatic final sentence, feminism was actually able to attend to the nativist claim that women who commit suttee actually want to die? She writes, “The female intellectual as an intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish” (308). Leaving aside the ambiguity of the double negative here (“must not disown”), the meaning of “female,” “intellectual,” and “circumscribed task” are all up for grabs, especially since Spivak has already contended that suttee makes an essential link between unbeing and femininity. This question clearly informs and influences Mahmood’s question about whether we have become willfully blind to forms of agency that do not take the form of resistance. In her Derridean deconstructivist mode, Spivak is calling for a feminism that can claim not to speak for the subaltern or to demand that the subaltern speak in the active voice of Western feminism; instead she imagines a feminism born of a dynamic intellectual struggle with the fact that some women may desire their own destruction for really good political reasons, even if those politics and those reasons lie beyond the purview of the version of feminism for which we have settled. Spivak’s call for a “female intellectual” who does not disown another version of womanhood, femininity, and feminism, indeed for any kind of intellectual who can learn how not to know the other, how not to sacrifice the other on behalf of his or her own sovereignty, is a call that has largely gone unanswered. It is this version of feminism that I seek to inhabit, a feminism that fails to save others or to replicate itself, a feminism that finds purpose in its own failure. | 4,552 | <h4>Enunciation is heroic individualism – intellectual advocacy for an oppressed, feminine other colludes with a colonial feminism which universalizes ethical values in order to make colonization appear benevolent and self appear sovereign</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 11</u></strong> (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 127-8) gz</p><p><u><mark>Spivak explores the British attempt</mark> in 1829 <mark>to abolish Hindu widow burning in relation to the <strong>self- representation of colonialism as benevolent intervention</strong></mark> and places this argument against the claim advanced by nativist Indians that sati must be respected as a practice because these women who lost their husbands actually wanted to die. <mark>She uses sati to </mark>illustrate her <mark>claim that <strong>colonialism articulates itself as “white men saving brown women from brown men,”</strong> but also to mark the <strong>complicity of</mark> Western <mark>feminism</strong> in this formulation</u></mark>. In a move that echoes Spivak’s counterintuitive break from even poststructuralist feminisms, Mahmood explores women in the mosque movement and their commitment to piety in order to ask, “<u>Does the category of <mark>resistance</mark> impose a teleology of progressive politics on the analytics of power—a teleology that <mark>makes it hard</mark> for us <mark>to see</mark> and understand <strong><mark>forms of being</mark> and action</strong> that are <strong><mark>not</mark> necessarily <mark>encapsulated by</mark> the narrative of <mark>subversion</mark> and reinscription <mark>of norms</u></strong></mark>?” (2005: 9).</p><p><u><strong><mark>“Can the Subaltern Speak?”</strong> sets up</mark> a <mark>contradiction between</mark> different <mark>modes of representation within which an intellectual proposes to <strong>speak for an oppressed other</u></strong></mark>. <u>Spivak accuses</u> Foucault and Deleuze as well as <u>Western feminism of sneaking a <strong>heroic individualism</strong> in the back door of discursive critique</u>. “Neither Deleuze nor Foucault,” she writes, “seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor” (1988: 275). <u>For Spivak, intellectuals, like poststructuralist <mark>feminist theorists</u></mark> for Mahmood, <u><mark>by imagining themselves</mark> to be <mark>a transparent vector</mark> for the exposure of ideological contradictions, <mark>cannot account for <strong>their own impact on</mark> the processes of <mark>domination</strong> and</mark> instead always <strong><mark>imagine themselves in the heroic place</mark> of the individual <mark>who knows better than the oppressed</strong></mark> masses about whom they theorize. The very notion of <mark>representation</mark>, Spivak claims, in terms of both a theory of economic exploitation and an ideological function, <strong><mark>depends upon the production of “heroes</mark>, paternal proxies and agents of power</u></strong>” (279) <u><mark>and harbors “</mark>the possibility <mark>that the <strong>intellectual is complicit</strong> in the <strong>persistent constitution of the Other as the self’s shadow</mark>” (280).</p><p></strong>This idea, that <mark>intellectuals construct an otherness to “save”</mark> in order <mark>to <strong>fortify a sovereign notion of self</strong></mark>, applies also to liberal feminism. <mark>In</mark> the context of <mark>the Hindu widow’s suicide</mark>, for example, <mark>the Western feminist <strong>can see</mark> only the workings of extraordinary <mark>patriarchy</strong>, and</mark> she also <strong><mark>believes in a benevolent</mark> British <mark>colonialism</strong></mark> <mark>that steps in to stop a brutal</mark> and archaic <mark>ritual</u></mark>. For Spivak, <u>feminism is complicit in the project of constructing the subaltern subject it wants to represent and then heroically <strong>casting itself as the subaltern’s salvation</strong>. <mark>What if</mark>, Spivak seems to ask in her enigmatic final sentence, <mark>feminism was</mark> actually <mark>able to attend to the</mark> nativist <mark>claim that <strong>women who commit suttee actually want to die?</u></strong></mark> She writes, “The female intellectual as an intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish” (308). Leaving aside the ambiguity of the double negative here (“must not disown”), the meaning of “female,” “intellectual,” and “circumscribed task” are all up for grabs, especially since Spivak has already contended that suttee makes an essential link between unbeing and femininity. This question clearly informs and influences Mahmood’s question about whether we have become willfully blind to forms of agency that do not take the form of resistance. In her Derridean deconstructivist mode, <u>Spivak is calling for a feminism that can claim not to speak for the subaltern or to demand that the subaltern speak in the active voice of Western feminism; instead she imagines a feminism born of a dynamic intellectual struggle with the fact that <strong>some women may desire their own destruction</strong> for really good political reasons, even if those politics and those reasons lie <strong>beyond the purview of the version of feminism for which we have settled</u></strong>. <u>Spivak’s call for <mark>a “female intellectual” <strong>who does not disown another version</strong> of womanhood</mark>, femininity, and feminism, indeed for any kind of intellectual who can learn how not to know the other, how not to sacrifice the other on behalf of his or her own sovereignty, is a call that has largely gone unanswered. It is this version of feminism that I seek to inhabit, <mark>a feminism that <strong>fails to save others</strong></mark> or to replicate itself, a feminism <mark>that <strong>finds purpose in its own failure</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | Off | 132,404 | 8 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
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2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,560 | Empirics and studies prove | Mauroni | Mauroni ‘12 | (Al, senior policy analyst with the Air Force. A former Army officer, he has over twenty-five years experience in military chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) defense policy and program development. He is a graduate of Carnegie-Mellon University and has a master’s of science in administration from Central Michigan University. He is the author of six books and more than two-dozen articles on the topic. His latest book is Where Are the WMDs? (Naval Press Institute, 2006), Volume VIII, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?” http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9)
The source of the threat is important more so than the specific nature of the threat By merely stating their intent to obtain “weapons of mass destruction” and their presence in Pakistan al Qaeda has caused the USG to attribute the group with nearly apocalyptic power to successfully attack the United States with a nuclear weapon . We are mostly concerned about those foreign violent extremist groups who aspire to transnational activities.¶ The popular assumption is that terrorists are actively working with “rogue nations” to exploit WMD materials and technology, or bidding for materials and technology on some nebulous global black market. They might be buying access to scientists and engineers who used to work on state WMD programs. The historical record doesn’t demonstrate that An examination of any of the past annual reports reveals that the basic modus operandi of terrorists and insurgents is to use conventional military weapons, easily acquired commercial (or improvised) explosives, and knives and machetes. Conventional weapons have known weapon effects and minimal challenges in handling and storing. Terrorists get their material and technology where they can They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic .¶ Military chemical/biological (CB) warfare agents, radiological material, and nuclear weapons are not easily obtained, outside of government laboratories. Nation states invest large amounts of people and funds to develop and test specific unconventional weapon if they were to give or sell these weapons to terrorists, one of two things could happen — either the weapons would be traced back to them, or the weapons might be used someplace where the nation-state really didn’t want those weapons used scientists recruited by sub-state groups could develop small quantities of military CB warfare agents, but the lack of access to fissile material would frustrate any ambitious engineer trying to build an improvised nuclear device , despite the available information about nuclear weapons, these groups haven’t developed the expertise, skills, or experience to design a nuclear weapon. It takes time, resources, and a secure facility to successfully develop such a weapon, and international efforts to combat terrorism may have been successful in stopping such efforts. the scientists and engineers who are attracted to sub-state groups are not capable of designing weapons It is a particularly challenging task to take a particularly hazardous material, developed in a laboratory, and turn it into a reliable military weapon of mass destruction. ¶ terrorists don’t have the expertise to produce the specialized military warfare agents, they don’t have any training in handling or storing them, and they don’t understand how to deliver the agents to their targets with any degree of effectiven | The assumption is that terrorists are working to exploit WMD materials and tec or bidding on some black market The historical record doesn’t demonstrate that terrorists use conventional weapons They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic radiological material, and nuclear weapons are not easily obtained if they were to give weapons to terrorists either the weapons would be traced back or the weapons might be used where the state didn’t want those weapons used lack of access to fissile material would frustrate trying to build an improvised device groups haven’t developed the expertise, skills, or experience to design a nuc terrorists don’t don’t have training in handling or storing them and they don’t understand how to deliver the agents | (Al, senior policy analyst with the Air Force. A former Army officer, he has over twenty-five years experience in military chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) defense policy and program development. He is a graduate of Carnegie-Mellon University and has a master’s of science in administration from Central Michigan University. He is the author of six books and more than two-dozen articles on the topic. His latest book is Where Are the WMDs? (Naval Press Institute, 2006), Volume VIII, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?” http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9)
The source of the threat is important to this discussion, even more so than the specific nature of the threat. By merely stating their intent to obtain “weapons of mass destruction” and their presence in Pakistan, a nuclear weapon-owning state, al Qaeda has caused the USG to attribute the group with nearly apocalyptic power to successfully attack the United States with a nuclear weapon. HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);" 7Most USG literature on the topic of WMD terrorism does not talk about al Qaeda specifically; rather, the general term “terrorist groups” or even more generic term “non-state actors” is used. I prefer the term “sub-state groups” to describe these organizations. The phrase “non-state actor” can apply to a large cast of characters, including private security firms, paramilitary units, criminal organizations, drug cartels, “lone gunmen,” and vigilantes, as well as terrorists and insurgents — basically anyone who is using violence as a method of persuasion outside of the government’s authority. We are mostly concerned about those foreign violent extremist groups who aspire to transnational activities.¶ The popular assumption is that terrorists are actively working with “rogue nations” to exploit WMD materials and technology, or bidding for materials and technology on some nebulous global black market. They might be buying access to scientists and engineers who used to work on state WMD programs. The historical record doesn’t demonstrate that. An examination of any of the past annual reports of the National Counterterrorism Center reveals that the basic modus operandi of terrorists and insurgents is to use conventional military weapons, easily acquired commercial (or improvised) explosives, and knives and machetes. HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);" 8 It is relatively easy to train laypersons to use military firearms, such as the AK-47 automatic rifle and the RPG-7 rocket launcher. These groups have technical experts who develop improvised explosive devices using available and accessible materials from the local economy. Conventional weapons have known weapon effects and minimal challenges in handling and storing. Terrorists get their material and technology where they can. They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic. It’s what we see, over and over again.¶ Military chemical/biological (CB) warfare agents, radiological material, and nuclear weapons are not easily obtained, outside of government laboratories. Nation states invest large amounts of people and funds to develop and test specific unconventional weapons, and if they were to give or sell these weapons to terrorists, one of two things could happen — either the weapons would be traced back to them, or the weapons might be used someplace where the nation-state really didn’t want those weapons used. In theory, scientists recruited by sub-state groups could develop small quantities of military CB warfare agents, but the lack of access to fissile material would frustrate any ambitious engineer trying to build an improvised nuclear device.¶ There are other hypotheses as to why sub-state groups have been unable to obtain nuclear weapons and/or fissile material on the “global market.” It could be that, despite the available information about nuclear weapons, these groups haven’t developed the expertise, skills, or experience to design a nuclear weapon. It takes time, resources, and a secure facility to successfully develop such a weapon, and international efforts to combat terrorism may have been successful in stopping such efforts. It could be that the scientists and engineers who are attracted to sub-state groups are not capable of designing weapons. It is a particularly challenging task to take a particularly hazardous material, developed in a laboratory, and turn it into a reliable military weapon of mass destruction. Last, it could be that sub-state groups have been frustrated by the numerous black-market scams and intelligence sting operations, in which fraudulent persons claimed to have nuclear material. HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);" 9¶ Sub-state groups are interested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards, however, because senior political leaders and military leaders publicly state, over and over again, how dangerous a release of these materials would be to the American public. So of course terrorists are interested in CBRN hazards, but they don’t have the expertise to produce the specialized military warfare agents, they don’t have any training in handling or storing them, and they don’t understand how to deliver the agents to their targets with any degree of effectiveness. So one might see some attempts to steal chlorine gas cylinders from water treatment sites, some occasional attempts to produce ricin toxin from castor beans, stories about a few grams of radioactive material stolen from a facility — these are not materials that cause mass casualty events. But the fear persists, and so government leaders spend billions every year to reduce the already minute possibility that some sub-state group does develop or steal a nuclear weapon for the purposes of employing it against the United States. This leads to our public policy discussion: to understand how effectively the USG is performing in this case. | 5,896 | <h4><u><strong>Empirics and studies prove</h4><p>Mauroni</strong> ‘12 </p><p><strong>(Al, senior policy analyst with the Air Force. A former Army officer, he has over twenty-five years experience in military chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) defense policy and program development. He is a graduate of Carnegie-Mellon University and has a master’s of science in administration from Central Michigan University. He is the author of six books and more than two-dozen articles on the topic. His latest book is Where Are the WMDs? (Naval Press Institute, 2006), Volume VIII, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?” http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9)</p><p></strong>The source of the threat is important</u> to this discussion, even <u>more so than the specific nature of the threat</u>. <u>By merely stating their intent to obtain “weapons of mass destruction” and their presence in Pakistan</u>, a nuclear weapon-owning state, <u>al Qaeda has caused the USG to attribute the group with nearly apocalyptic power to successfully attack the United States with a nuclear weapon</u>. HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);" 7Most USG literature on the topic of WMD terrorism does not talk about al Qaeda specifically; rather, the general term “terrorist groups” or even more generic term “non-state actors” is used. I prefer the term “sub-state groups” to describe these organizations. The phrase “non-state actor” can apply to a large cast of characters, including private security firms, paramilitary units, criminal organizations, drug cartels, “lone gunmen,” and vigilantes, as well as terrorists and insurgents — basically anyone who is using violence as a method of persuasion outside of the government’s authority<u>. We are mostly concerned about those foreign violent extremist groups who aspire to transnational activities.¶ <mark>The </mark>popular <mark>assumption is that terrorists are </mark>actively <mark>working </mark>with “rogue nations” <mark>to exploit WMD materials and tec</mark>hnology, <mark>or bidding </mark>for materials and technology <mark>on some </mark>nebulous global <mark>black market</mark>. They might be buying access to scientists and engineers who used to work on state WMD programs. <mark>The <strong>historical record doesn’t demonstrate that</u></strong></mark>. <u>An examination of any of the past annual reports</u> of the National Counterterrorism Center <u>reveals that the basic modus operandi of <mark>terrorists </mark>and insurgents is to <mark>use conventional </mark>military <mark>weapons</mark>, easily acquired commercial (or improvised) explosives, and knives and machetes.</u> HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);" 8 It is relatively easy to train laypersons to use military firearms, such as the AK-47 automatic rifle and the RPG-7 rocket launcher. These groups have technical experts who develop improvised explosive devices using available and accessible materials from the local economy. <u>Conventional weapons have known weapon effects and minimal challenges in handling and storing. Terrorists get their material and technology where they can</u>. <u><strong><mark>They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic</u></strong></mark>. It’s what we see, over and over again<u>.¶ Military chemical/biological (CB) warfare agents, <mark>radiological material, and nuclear weapons are not easily obtained</mark>, outside of government laboratories. Nation states invest large amounts of people and funds to develop and test specific unconventional weapon</u>s, and <u><mark>if they were to give</mark> or sell these <mark>weapons to terrorists</mark>, one of two things could happen — <mark>either the weapons would be traced back </mark>to them, <mark>or the weapons might be used </mark>someplace <mark>where the </mark>nation-<mark>state </mark>really <mark>didn’t want those weapons used</u></mark>. In theory, <u>scientists recruited by sub-state groups could develop small quantities of military CB warfare agents, but the <mark>lack of access to fissile material would frustrate </mark>any ambitious engineer <mark>trying to build an improvised </mark>nuclear <mark>device</u></mark>.¶ There are other hypotheses as to why sub-state groups have been unable to obtain nuclear weapons and/or fissile material on the “global market.” It could be that<u>, despite the available information about nuclear weapons, these <mark>groups haven’t developed the expertise, skills, or experience to design a nuc</mark>lear weapon. It takes time, resources, and a secure facility to successfully develop such a weapon, and international efforts to combat terrorism may have been successful in stopping such efforts. </u>It could be that <u>the scientists and engineers who are attracted to sub-state groups are not capable of designing weapons</u>. <u>It is a particularly challenging task to take a particularly hazardous material, developed in a laboratory, and turn it into a reliable military weapon of mass destruction.</u> Last, it could be that sub-state groups have been frustrated by the numerous black-market scams and intelligence sting operations, in which fraudulent persons claimed to have nuclear material. HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);" 9<u>¶ </u>Sub-state groups are interested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards, however, because senior political leaders and military leaders publicly state, over and over again, how dangerous a release of these materials would be to the American public. So of course<u> <mark>terrorists </u></mark>are interested in CBRN hazards, but<u> </u>they<u> <mark>don’t </mark>have the expertise to produce the specialized military warfare agents, they <mark>don’t have </mark>any <mark>training in handling or storing them</mark>, <mark>and they don’t understand how to deliver the agents </mark>to their targets with any degree of effectiven</u>ess. So one might see some attempts to steal chlorine gas cylinders from water treatment sites, some occasional attempts to produce ricin toxin from castor beans, stories about a few grams of radioactive material stolen from a facility — these are not materials that cause mass casualty events. But the fear persists, and so government leaders spend billions every year to reduce the already minute possibility that some sub-state group does develop or steal a nuclear weapon for the purposes of employing it against the United States. This leads to our public policy discussion: to understand how effectively the USG is performing in this case.</p> | 1NR | Cartels | A2: Terror | 118,232 | 19 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,561 | This is a sentimental politics which utilizes spectacles of trauma in order to form political coalitions – those communities create affective connections which run parallel to nation-building, ensuring violent gatekeeping | Strick 14 | Strick 14 [Simon, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin, American Dolorologies, 2014, p. 132-6] | The concluding argument concerns late modern figurations of the body in pain. Spectacles of pain have proliferated in many forms in the contemporary American public sphere if indeed pain hasn't become its primary and all-pervading obsession Confessional TV shows exchange narratives of personal trauma and hurt for public intelligibility spectacles of suffering news reports narrate national-scale catastrophes There is also a proliferation of political discourse disclosing the injuries caused by contemporary forms of governing critical discourses continue to shed light on the structural violence of regimes of power identitarian movements expand public recognition of social and political injury, changing the scope of intelligibility These diverse affective phenomena readily distinguishable in neoliberal regimes Brown or Ahmed have pointed out the coopting of identitarian politics in contemporary governmental regimes These critical voices urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out' within radical politics can be separated from self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance Obama's ongoing focus on a "politics of empathy" recognition of suffering to democratic progress Academic debates have matched this capitalization on pain and compassion as necessary ingredients to the development of politics, ethics, or community making various diagnoses of America as trauma culture describe a highly disparate tension-laden field of affective discourse rather than a unified fixation on pain in contemporary Western societies Berlant has argued that these politics of affect dictate the continuous envelopment of the political in sentimental rhetoric Sentimentalism holds up the promise that subjectivity is granted in the recognition of pain Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer They] imagine a nonhierarchical social world that is . . . 'at heart' democratic because good intentions and love flourish in it" Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere assembled around pain bonded by feeling with what is unspeakable: a commonality of passionate and compassionate bodily subjects a "fantasy of generality through emotional likeness the emancipatory project of democracy relies on pain suffering, and a unified politics This is true for American culture and its foundational ideas The cultural sites participate in this public sphere where oppressive hurtings and social injuries are "counted in" toward a better politics of integration, understanding, and recognition The sentimental linkage indicates a larger genealogy that dominates American culture traced back to America's emancipatory foundation as a nation freed from colonial injury and informed by a national history of successful incorporations of marginalized subjects into the national project American dolorologies has related this discourse to an apparatus of cultural technologies such as compassion and affect and pain and the materializations of race and gender they covertly enact sentimentality has long been a popular rhetorical means by which pain is advanced This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has led to the public sphere becoming a site of intimate "affect" exchange This transformation is visible in the proliferation of mediatized forms of confession and other articulations of traumatized selfhood We can also see a . . . collusion between liberal, capitalist forms of mass entertainment and individualist therapies, and the feminist importance of the personal the articulation of trauma is furthermore supplemented by mainstream political discourse becoming compassionate and revolving primarily around the recognition of bodies in pain | Spectacles of pain have proliferated in the public sphere shows exchange narratives of trauma spectacles of suffering There is political discourse disclosing injuries caused by governing critical discourses shed light on structural violence movements expand public recognition changing the scope of intelligibility diverse affective phenomena coopt identitarian politics These urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out' within radical politics can be separated from self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance Academic debates have matched this capitalization on pain as necessary to politics, ethics, or community making diagnoses of America as trauma culture describe affective discourse Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer They] imagine a nonhierarchical social 'at heart' democratic because good intentions flourish in it Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere assembled around pain bonded by feeling fantasy through emotional likeness This is true for American culture in this public sphere, where oppressive hurtings are "counted in" toward a better politics dolorologies has related this discourse to cultural tech such as compassion and affect This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has led to the public sphere becoming a site of intimate "affect" exchange We can see a . . . collusion between liberal, capitalist entertainment and individualist therapies | The concluding argument concerns late modern figurations of the body in pain. Spectacles of pain have proliferated in many forms in the contemporary American public sphere—if indeed pain hasn't become its primary and all-pervading obsession. Confessional TV shows exchange narratives of personal trauma and hurt for public intelligibility; cinematic spectacles of suffering, from The Passion of the Christ (2004) to torture-porn favorite Hostel (2005), exhibit the body in pain for profit, thrill, and public outrage; news reports narrate national-scale catastrophes through individual testimonials of pain; reality game shows such as Survivor measure their contestants' bodily pain capacities against their resistance to (or aggressiveness in) traumatizing and abusive group dynamics. There is also a proliferation of political discourse disclosing the injuries caused by contemporary forms of governing: public movements raise consciousness for excluded and abjected forms of living, feeling, and aching in Western democracies; critical discourses continue to shed light on the structural violence of regimes of power; the interventions of identitarian movements and groups successfully expand public recognition of social and political injury, changing the scope of intelligibility in the process.¶ These diverse affective phenomena are not always readily distinguishable in neoliberal regimes. Scholars such as Wendy Brown or Sara Ahmed have pointed out the coopting of identitarian politics in contemporary governmental regimes. These critical voices urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out' and 'making visible' within so-called radical politics can be separated from the conventions of self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance" (Ahmed and Stacey 2001, 4). Bill Clinton's infamous tagline "I feel your pain" or Barack Obama's ongoing focus on a "politics of empathy"1 are only the presidential cases in point for an ongoing politics of pain that links recognition of suffering to democratic progress. Academic debates have matched this capitalization on pain and compassion as necessary ingredients to the development of politics, ethics, or community making, such as in Rosi Braidotti's call for the unification of feminist, gay, lesbian, and transgender identity politics under the label of a "community of the suffering."2 The various diagnoses of America as "wound culture" (Seltzer 1998) or "trauma culture" (Kaplan 2005), in this view, describe a highly disparate, tension-laden, and ambivalent field of affective discourse, rather than a unified or unifying fixation on pain in contemporary Western societies.¶ Lauren Berlant has argued that these politics of affect dictate the continuous envelopment of the political in sentimental rhetoric. Sentimentalism holds up the promise that subjectivity is granted in the recognition of pain and that democracy is realized as the participation in an ideal of common suffering and compassion. Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer and romantic conventions of individual historical acts of compassion and transcendence. [They] imagine a nonhierarchical social world that is . . . 'at heart' democratic because good intentions and love flourish in it" (2008, 6). Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere assembled around pain bonded by feeling with what is unspeakable: a commonality of passionate and compassionate bodily subjects, or a "fantasy of generality through emotional likeness in the domain of pain" (Berlant 2008, 6).¶ These arguments suggest a fundamental link between the sentimental evocation of pain and the discourses imagined as "at heart democratic." Indeed, the emancipatory project of democracy relies on articulations of pain, the recognition of those suffering, and a unified politics as remedy of this suffering. This is certainly true for American culture and its foundational ideas of promise and exceptionalism. The cultural sites I have pointed to participate in this evocation of a public sphere, where oppressive hurtings and social injuries are "counted in" toward a better politics of integration, understanding, and recognition. The sentimental linkage of emancipation through the circulation of pain and compassion as politics indicates a larger genealogy that dominates American culture and that this book has tried to elucidate. This genealogy was traced back to America's emancipatory foundation as a nation freed from colonial injury, and informed by a national history of successful incorporations of marginalized subjects into the national project (suffrage, abolitionism). American dolorologies has related this discourse to an apparatus of cultural technologies such as compassion, testimony to oppression, and articulations of affect and pain, and the materializations of race and gender they covertly enact. My analysis concurs with Berlant's observation that the various claims to pain as identity disarticulate their marginalizing effects in a rhetoric of universalization:¶ In the liberal tradition of the United States [testimony of pain] is not simply a mode of particularizing and puncturing self-description by minorities, but a rhetoric of universality located, not in abstract categories, but in what was thought to be, simultaneously, particular and universal experience. Indeed, it would not be exaggerating to say that sentimentality has long been a popular rhetorical means by which pain is advanced, in the United States, as the true core of personhood and citizenship. (2000, 34)¶ This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has, on the one hand, led to the public sphere becoming more and more a site of intimate "affect" exchange. This transformation is visible in the proliferation of mediatized forms of confession, testimony, and other articulations of traumatized selfhood, such as reality TV or the culture of therapeutic discourse. These governmental forms of achieving public subjectivity through speaking pain imitate and appropriate the critical formulations of differential experience from identitarian movements, at times becoming indistinguishable from them: "We can also see a . . . collusion between liberal, capitalist forms of mass entertainment and individualist therapies, and the feminist importance of the personal" (Ahmed 2000, 12). The achievement of public visibility through the articulation of trauma and pain is furthermore supplemented by mainstream political discourse becoming compassionate and revolving primarily around the recognition of bodies in pain.3¶ | 6,583 | <h4>This is a sentimental politics which utilizes spectacles of trauma in order to form political coalitions – those communities create affective connections which run parallel to nation-building, ensuring violent gatekeeping</h4><p><u><strong>Strick 14</u></strong> [Simon, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin, American Dolorologies, 2014, p. 132-6]</p><p><u>The concluding argument concerns late modern figurations of the body in pain. <strong><mark>Spectacles of pain</strong> have proliferated in</mark> many forms in <mark>the</mark> contemporary American <mark>public sphere</u></mark>—<u>if indeed pain hasn't become its <strong>primary</strong> and <strong>all-pervading</strong> obsession</u>. <u>Confessional TV <mark>shows exchange narratives of</mark> personal <mark>trauma</mark> and hurt for public intelligibility</u>; cinematic <u><mark>spectacles of suffering</u></mark>, from The Passion of the Christ (2004) to torture-porn favorite Hostel (2005), exhibit the body in pain for profit, thrill, and public outrage; <u>news reports narrate national-scale catastrophes</u> through individual testimonials of pain; reality game shows such as Survivor measure their contestants' bodily pain capacities against their resistance to (or aggressiveness in) traumatizing and abusive group dynamics. <u><mark>There is</mark> also a proliferation of <mark>political discourse disclosing</mark> the <mark>injuries caused by</mark> contemporary forms of <mark>governing</u></mark>: public movements raise consciousness for excluded and abjected forms of living, feeling, and aching in Western democracies; <u><strong><mark>critical discourses</strong></mark> continue to <strong><mark>shed light</strong> on</mark> the <strong><mark>structural violence</strong></mark> of regimes of power</u>; the interventions of <u>identitarian <mark>movements</u></mark> and groups successfully <u><strong><mark>expand public recognition</strong></mark> of social and political injury, <mark>changing the scope of intelligibility</u></mark> in the process.¶ <u>These <strong><mark>diverse affective phenomena</u></strong></mark> are not always <u><strong>readily distinguishable</strong> in neoliberal regimes</u>. Scholars such as Wendy <u>Brown or</u> Sara <u>Ahmed have pointed out the <strong><mark>coopt</mark>ing of <mark>identitarian politics</strong> </mark>in <strong>contemporary</strong> governmental <strong>regimes</u></strong>. <u><mark>These </mark>critical voices <mark>urge "[c]aution . . . against the assumption that 'speaking out'</u></mark> and 'making visible' <u><mark>within</u></mark> so-called <u><mark>radical politics can be separated from</u></mark> the conventions of <u><mark>self-expression in neoliberal forms of governance</u></mark>" (Ahmed and Stacey 2001, 4). Bill Clinton's infamous tagline "I feel your pain" or Barack <u><strong>Obama's ongoing focus</strong> on a "<strong>politics of empathy</strong>"</u>1 are only the presidential cases in point for an ongoing politics of pain that links <u>recognition of suffering to democratic progress</u>. <u><strong><mark>Academic debates</u></strong> <u>have matched this <strong>capitalization</strong> on pain</mark> and compassion <mark>as <strong>necessary</mark> ingredients</strong> <mark>to</mark> the development of <strong><mark>politics</strong>, <strong>ethics</strong>, or <strong>community making</u></strong></mark>, such as in Rosi Braidotti's call for the unification of feminist, gay, lesbian, and transgender identity politics under the label of a "community of the suffering."2 The <u>various <mark>diagnoses of America as</u></mark> "wound culture" (Seltzer 1998) or "<u><mark>trauma culture</u></mark>" (Kaplan 2005), in this view, <u><mark>describe</mark> a highly disparate</u>, <u>tension-laden</u>, and ambivalent <u>field of <strong><mark>affective discourse</u></strong></mark>, <u>rather than a unified</u> or unifying <u>fixation on pain in contemporary Western societies</u>.¶ Lauren <u>Berlant has argued that these <strong>politics of affect</strong> dictate the continuous envelopment of the <strong>political</strong> in <strong>sentimental rhetoric</u></strong>. <u>Sentimentalism holds up the promise that subjectivity is granted in the recognition of pain</u> and that democracy is realized as the participation in an ideal of common suffering and compassion. <u><mark>Sentimental discourses "locate the human in a universal capacity to suffer</u></mark> and romantic conventions of individual historical acts of compassion and transcendence. [<u><mark>They] imagine a nonhierarchical social</mark> world that is . . . <mark>'at heart' democratic because good intentions</mark> and love <mark>flourish in it</mark>"</u> (2008, 6). <u><mark>Sentimental rhetoric produces a public sphere</mark> <mark>assembled around pain bonded by feeling</mark> with <strong>what is unspeakable</strong>: a commonality of passionate and compassionate bodily subjects</u>, or <u>a "<mark>fantasy</mark> of generality <mark>through emotional likeness</u></mark> in the domain of pain" (Berlant 2008, 6).¶ These arguments suggest a fundamental link between the sentimental evocation of pain and the discourses imagined as "at heart democratic." Indeed, <u>the emancipatory project of democracy relies on</u> articulations of <u>pain</u>, the recognition of those <u>suffering, and a unified politics</u> as remedy of this suffering. <u><mark>This is</u></mark> certainly <u><mark>true for American culture</mark> and its foundational ideas</u> of promise and exceptionalism. <u>The cultural sites</u> I have pointed to <u>participate <mark>in this</u></mark> evocation of a <u><strong><mark>public sphere</u></strong>, <u>where oppressive hurtings</mark> and social injuries <mark>are "counted in" toward a better politics</mark> of integration, understanding, and recognition</u>. <u>The <strong>sentimental linkage</u></strong> of emancipation through the circulation of pain and compassion as politics <u>indicates a larger genealogy that dominates American culture</u> and that this book has tried to elucidate. This genealogy was <u>traced back to America's emancipatory foundation as a nation freed from colonial injury</u>, <u>and informed by a national history of successful incorporations of marginalized subjects into the national project</u> (suffrage, abolitionism). <u>American <mark>dolorologies has related this discourse to</mark> an apparatus of <mark>cultural tech</mark>nologies <mark>such as compassion</u></mark>, testimony to oppression, <u><mark>and</u></mark> articulations of <u><mark>affect</mark> and pain</u>, <u>and the materializations of race and gender they covertly enact</u>. My analysis concurs with Berlant's observation that the various claims to pain as identity disarticulate their marginalizing effects in a rhetoric of universalization:¶ In the liberal tradition of the United States [testimony of pain] is not simply a mode of particularizing and puncturing self-description by minorities, but a rhetoric of universality located, not in abstract categories, but in what was thought to be, simultaneously, particular and universal experience. Indeed, it would not be exaggerating to say that <u><strong>sentimentality</u></strong> <u>has long been a popular rhetorical means by which pain is advanced</u>, in the United States, as the true core of personhood and citizenship. (2000, 34)¶ <u><mark>This connection of pain, nation, and subjectivity has</u></mark>, on the one hand, <u><mark>led to the public sphere becoming</u></mark> more and more <u><mark>a site of <strong>intimate "affect" exchange</u></strong></mark>. <u>This transformation is visible in the proliferation of mediatized forms of confession</u>, testimony, <u>and other articulations of traumatized selfhood</u>, such as reality TV or the culture of therapeutic discourse. These governmental forms of achieving public subjectivity through speaking pain imitate and appropriate the critical formulations of differential experience from identitarian movements, at times becoming indistinguishable from them: "<u><mark>We can</mark> also <mark>see a . . . collusion between</mark> <strong><mark>liberal, capitalist</strong></mark> forms of mass <mark>entertainment and individualist therapies</mark>, and the feminist importance of the personal</u>" (Ahmed 2000, 12). The achievement of public visibility through <u>the articulation of trauma</u> and pain <u>is furthermore supplemented by mainstream political discourse <strong>becoming compassionate</strong> and revolving primarily around the recognition of <strong>bodies in pain</u></strong>.3¶ </p> | 1NC | null | Off | 98,587 | 104 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,562 | Public won’t demand retaliation | Smith and Herron 5 | Smith and Herron 5, | our data show that support for using military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action panelists preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs while United States public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs. | support for using military force to retaliate against terrorists did not reach a high level of demand for military action panelists preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability be established before action results are inconsistent with the contention will result in volatile responses even in a serious attack the overall public response was quite measured while public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs. | *Professor, University of Oklahoma, * University of Oklahoma Norman Campus, (Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., and Kerry G., "United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?" Review of Policy Research 22.5 (2005): 599-623, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hjsmith)
Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that support for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year. Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents— hardly the expected source of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11 change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information (the richest, best educated), and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that while United States public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs. | 2,924 | <h4>Public won’t demand retaliation</h4><p><u><strong>Smith and Herron 5</u></strong>, </p><p>*Professor, University of Oklahoma, * University of Oklahoma Norman Campus, (Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., and Kerry G., "United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?" Review of Policy Research 22.5 (2005): 599-623, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hjsmith) </p><p>Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here <u>our data show that <mark>support for using</u></mark> conventional United States <u><mark>military force to retaliate against terrorists</mark> initially averaged above midscale, but <mark>did not reach a high level of demand for military action</u></mark>. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, <u><mark>panelists</u></mark> both in 2001 and 2002 <u><mark>preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability</u></mark> (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) <u><mark>be established before </mark>taking military <mark>action</mark>. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion</u>. Overall, <u>these <mark>results are inconsistent with the contention </mark>that highly charged events <mark>will result in volatile</mark> and unstructured <mark>responses</mark> among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes.</u> The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But <u><mark>even in</mark> the highly charged context of such <mark>a serious attack</mark> on the American homeland, <mark>the overall public response was quite measured</mark>. </u>On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial<u> willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly</u> over the following year. Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents— hardly the expected source of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11 change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, <u>those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information</u> (the richest, best educated), <u>and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs</u>. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that <u><mark>while</mark> United States <mark>public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.</p></u></mark> | 1NR | Cartels | A2: Terror | 142,393 | 41 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,563 | What does it mean for a body defined by captivity to strive for freedom? Feminist narration only re-assembles liberal subjectivity, rendering enslaved bodies bound to a system of terror that can only will their destruction – prefer an anti-social feminism grounded in evacuation and stealing away | Halberstam 11 | Halberstam 11 (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 128-130) gz | We either die free chickens, or we die trying “Are those the only choices?” I am proposing that feminists refuse the choices as offered—freedom in liberal terms or death—in order to think about a shadow archive of resistance, one that does not speak in the language of action and momentum but instead articulates itself in terms of evacuation, refusal, passivity, unbecoming, unbeing This could be called an antisocial feminism, a form of feminism preoccupied with negativity and negation Negation not only points to the conditions of exploitation. It denotes the circumstances for critique and alternatives as well Building on the work of Hortense Spillers, Ferguson is trying to circumvent an “American” political grammar that insists upon placing liberation struggles within the same logic as the normative regimes against which they struggle. A different, anarchistic type of struggle requires a new grammar, possibly a new voice, potentially the passive voice.
When feminist freedoms require a humanistic investment in both the female subject and the fantasy of an active, autonomous, and self-activating individualism, we have to ask who the subjects and objects of feminism might be, and we need to remember that, as Spivak puts it, to speak on behalf of someone is also to “restore the sovereign subject within the theory that seems most to question it If speaking for a subject of feminism offers up choices that we are bound to question and refuse, then maybe a homeopathic refusal to speak serves the project of feminism better “liberty” as defined by the white racial state enacts new modes of imprisonment, but also that the very definitions of freedom and humanity within which abolitionists operated severely limited the ability of the former slaves to think social transformation in terms outside of the structure of racial terror The longstanding and intimate affiliation of liberty and bondage made it impossible to envision freedom independent of constraint or personhood and autonomy separate from the sanctity of property and proprietal notions of self Accordingly where freedom was offered in terms of being propertied, placed, and productive, the former slave might choose “moving about” or roaming in order to experience the meaning of freedom: “As a practice, moving about accumulated nothing and it did not effect any reversals of power but indefatigably held onto the unrealizable—being free—by temporarily eluding the constraints of order. . . . Like stealing away, it was more symbolically redolent than materially transformative queer histories and subjectivities are better described in terms of masochism, pain, and failure than in terms of mastery, pleasure, and heroic liberation Like Hartman’s model of a freedom which imagines itself in terms of a not yet realized social order, so the maps of desire that render the subject incoherent, disorganized, and passive provide a better escape route than those that lead inexorably to fulfillment, recognition, and achievement. | We either die free chickens, or we die trying “Are those the only choices?” I am proposing that feminists refuse the choices as offered to think about a shadow archive of resistance that articulates itself in terms of evacuation, refusal, passivity, unbecoming, unbeing an antisocial feminism political grammar insists upon placing liberation struggles within the same logic as the normative regimes against which they struggle. A different struggle requires a new grammar
If speaking offers choices that we are bound to refuse, then maybe a homeopathic refusal to speak serves feminism better “liberty” enacts new modes of imprisonment the very definitions of freedom and humanity limited the ability of to think social transformation in terms outside of racial terror The intimate affiliation of liberty and bondage made it impossible to envision freedom independent of constraint the former slave might choose “moving about” to experience freedom moving about accumulated nothing but held onto the unrealizable by temporarily eluding constraints Like stealing away, it was more symbolically redolent than materially transformative maps of desire that render the subject incoherent provide a better escape route | A more accessible text makes the very same point. In one of my favorite feminist texts of all time, the epic animated drama Chicken Run, the politically active and explicitly feminist bird Ginger is opposed in her struggle to inspire the birds to rise up by two other “feminist subjects.” One is the cynic, Bunty, a hard- nosed fighter who rejects utopian dreams out of hand, and the other is Babs, voiced by Jane Horrocks, who sometimes gives voice to feminine naïveté and sometimes points to the absurdity of the political terrain as it has been outlined by the activist Ginger. Ginger says, for example, “We either die free chickens, or we die trying.” Babs asks naïvely, “Are those the only choices?” Like Babs, and indeed like Spivak and Mahmood, I am proposing that feminists refuse the choices as offered—freedom in liberal terms or death—in order to think about a shadow archive of resistance, one that does not speak in the language of action and momentum but instead articulates itself in terms of evacuation, refusal, passivity, unbecoming, unbeing. This could be called an antisocial feminism, a form of feminism preoccupied with negativity and negation. As Roderick Ferguson puts it in a chapter titled “The Negations of Black Lesbian Feminism” in Aberrations in Black, “Negation not only points to the conditions of exploitation. It denotes the circumstances for critique and alternatives as well” (2005: 136–37). Building on the work of Hortense Spillers, Ferguson is trying to circumvent an “American” political grammar that insists upon placing liberation struggles within the same logic as the normative regimes against which they struggle. A different, anarchistic type of struggle requires a new grammar, possibly a new voice, potentially the passive voice.
When feminist freedoms, as Mahmood shows, require a humanistic investment in both the female subject and the fantasy of an active, autonomous, and self-activating individualism, we have to ask who the subjects and objects of feminism might be, and we need to remember that, as Spivak puts it, to speak on behalf of someone is also to “restore the sovereign subject within the theory that seems most to question it” (1988: 278). If speaking for a subject of feminism offers up choices that we, like Babs, are bound to question and refuse, then maybe a homeopathic refusal to speak serves the project of feminism better. Babs’s sense that there must be more ways of thinking about political action or nonaction than doing or dying finds full theoretical confirmation in the work of theorists like Saidiya Hartman. Her investigations in Scenes of Subjection into the contradictions of emancipation for the newly freed slaves proposes not only that “liberty” as defined by the white racial state enacts new modes of imprisonment, but also that the very definitions of freedom and humanity within which abolitionists operated severely limited the ability of the former slaves to think social transformation in terms outside of the structure of racial terror. Hartman notes, “The longstanding and intimate affiliation of liberty and bondage made it impossible to envision freedom independent of constraint or personhood and autonomy separate from the sanctity of property and proprietal notions of self ” (1997: 115). Accordingly where freedom was offered in terms of being propertied, placed, and productive, the former slave might choose “moving about” or roaming in order to experience the meaning of freedom: “As a practice, moving about accumulated nothing and it did not effect any reversals of power but indefatigably held onto the unrealizable—being free—by temporarily eluding the constraints of order. . . . Like stealing away, it was more symbolically redolent than materially transformative” (128). There are no simple comparisons to be made between former slaves and sexual minorities, but I want to join Hartman’s deft revelations about the continuation of slavery by other means to Leo Bersani’s, Lynda Hart’s, and Heather Love’s formulations of queer histories and subjectivities that are better described in terms of masochism, pain, and failure than in terms of mastery, pleasure, and heroic liberation.1 Like Hartman’s model of a freedom which imagines itself in terms of a not yet realized social order, so the maps of desire that render the subject incoherent, disorganized, and passive provide a better escape route than those that lead inexorably to fulfillment, recognition, and achievement. | 4,487 | <h4>What does it mean for a body defined by captivity to strive for freedom? Feminist narration only re-assembles liberal subjectivity, rendering enslaved bodies bound to a system of terror that can only will their destruction – prefer an anti-social feminism grounded in evacuation and stealing away</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 11</u></strong> (<u>Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 128-130) gz</p><p></u>A more accessible text makes the very same point. In one of my favorite feminist texts of all time, the epic animated drama Chicken Run, the politically active and explicitly feminist bird Ginger is opposed in her struggle to inspire the birds to rise up by two other “feminist subjects.” One is the cynic, Bunty, a hard- nosed fighter who rejects utopian dreams out of hand, and the other is Babs, voiced by Jane Horrocks, who sometimes gives voice to feminine naïveté and sometimes points to the absurdity of the political terrain as it has been outlined by the activist Ginger. Ginger says, for example, “<u><mark>We either die free chickens, or we die trying</u></mark>.” Babs asks naïvely, <u><strong><mark>“Are those the only choices?”</u></strong></mark> Like Babs, and indeed like Spivak and Mahmood, <u><mark>I am proposing that feminists <strong>refuse the choices as offered</strong></mark>—freedom in liberal terms or death—in order <mark>to think about a shadow archive of resistance</mark>, one <mark>that</mark> does not speak in the language of action and momentum but instead <mark>articulates itself in terms of <strong>evacuation</strong>, <strong>refusal</strong>, <strong>passivity</strong>, <strong>unbecoming</strong>, <strong>unbeing</u></strong></mark>. <u>This could be called <mark>an <strong>antisocial feminism</strong></mark>, a form of feminism preoccupied with <strong>negativity and negation</u></strong>. As Roderick Ferguson puts it in a chapter titled “The Negations of Black Lesbian Feminism” in Aberrations in Black, “<u>Negation not only points to the conditions of exploitation. It denotes the <strong>circumstances for critique and alternatives</strong> as well</u>” (2005: 136–37). <u>Building on the work of Hortense Spillers, Ferguson is trying to circumvent an “American” <mark>political grammar</mark> that <mark>insists upon placing liberation struggles <strong>within the same logic as the normative regimes</strong> against which they struggle. A different</mark>, anarchistic type of <mark>struggle requires <strong>a new grammar</strong></mark>, possibly a new voice, potentially the passive voice.</p><p>When feminist freedoms</u>, as Mahmood shows, <u>require a humanistic investment in both the female subject and the fantasy of an <strong>active, autonomous, and self-activating individualism</strong>, we have to ask who the subjects and objects of feminism might be, and we need to remember that, as Spivak puts it, to speak on behalf of someone is also to “<strong>restore the sovereign subject within the theory that seems most to question it</u></strong>” (1988: 278). <u><mark>If speaking </mark>for a subject of feminism <mark>offers</mark> up <mark>choices that we</u></mark>, like Babs, <u><mark>are bound to</mark> question and <mark>refuse, then maybe a <strong>homeopathic refusal to speak</strong> serves</mark> the project of <mark>feminism better</u></mark>. Babs’s sense that there must be more ways of thinking about political action or nonaction than doing or dying finds full theoretical confirmation in the work of theorists like Saidiya Hartman. Her investigations in Scenes of Subjection into the contradictions of emancipation for the newly freed slaves proposes not only that <u><strong><mark>“liberty”</mark> as defined by the white racial state</strong> <mark>enacts <strong>new modes of imprisonment</strong></mark>, but also that <mark>the very definitions of freedom and humanity</mark> within which abolitionists operated severely <mark>limited the ability of</mark> the former slaves <mark>to think social transformation in terms <strong>outside of</mark> the structure of <mark>racial terror</u></strong></mark>. Hartman notes, “<u><mark>The</mark> longstanding and <strong><mark>intimate affiliation of liberty and bondage</strong> made it <strong>impossible to envision freedom independent of constraint</strong></mark> or personhood and autonomy separate from the sanctity of property and proprietal notions of self</u> ” (1997: 115). <u>Accordingly where freedom was offered in terms of being propertied, placed, and productive, <mark>the former slave might choose “<strong>moving about”</mark> or roaming</strong> in order <mark>to experience</mark> the meaning of <mark>freedom</mark>: “As a practice, <mark>moving about accumulated nothing </mark>and it did not effect any reversals of power <mark>but</mark> indefatigably <mark>held onto the unrealizable</mark>—being free—<mark>by <strong>temporarily eluding</mark> the <mark>constraints</mark> of order</strong>. . . . <mark>Like <strong>stealing away</strong>, it was <strong>more symbolically redolent than materially transformative</u></strong></mark>” (128). There are no simple comparisons to be made between former slaves and sexual minorities, but I want to join Hartman’s deft revelations about the continuation of slavery by other means to Leo Bersani’s, Lynda Hart’s, and Heather Love’s formulations of <u>queer histories and subjectivities</u> that <u>are better described in terms of <strong>masochism</strong>, <strong>pain</strong>, and <strong>failure</strong> than in terms of mastery, pleasure, and heroic liberation</u>.1 <u>Like Hartman’s model of a freedom which imagines itself in terms of a <strong>not yet realized social order</strong>, so the <mark>maps of desire that <strong>render the subject incoherent</mark>, disorganized, and passive</strong> <mark>provide a better escape route</mark> than those that lead inexorably to fulfillment, recognition, and achievement.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 132,404 | 8 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,564 | Terrorist can’t cross the border through cartel routes and the status quo solves | Powell 11 | Powell 11 – Houston Chronicle writer (Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”, 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from-2341185.php>) | Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly." | experts say Iranian factions are not crossing the border. organizations want to be unobtrusive as possible The number apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal No credible terrorist threat has been identified DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the border and responds accordingly | Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly." | 1,822 | <h4>Terrorist can’t cross the border through cartel routes and the status quo solves</h4><p><u><strong>Powell 11</u> </strong>– Houston Chronicle writer (Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”,<u> 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from-2341185.php>)</p><p></u>Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. <u><strong>Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - <mark>experts say</mark> such <mark>Iranian</mark>-financed <mark>factions are not crossing the</mark> southwest <mark>border.</mark> </u></strong>They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "<u><strong>The last thing these <mark>organizations</mark> want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention</u></strong>," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "<u><strong>They <mark>want to be</mark> as <mark>unobtrusive as possible</mark>." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody,</u></strong> a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. <u><strong>No credible cases <mark>The number</mark> of Iranians <mark>apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal</mark>," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "<mark>No credible terrorist threat has been identified</mark>, however <mark>DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the</mark> Southwest <mark>border and responds accordingly</mark>."</p></u></strong> | 1NR | Cartels | A2: Terror | 296,348 | 3 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,565 | The alternative is an anti-social, shadow feminism – a masochistic implosion of the feminine subject and a radical passivity which takes cues from Yoko Ono and J.A. Nicholls | Halberstam 11 | Halberstam 11 (Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 138-42) gz | In a brilliant analysis of “Cut Piece” Julia Bryan Wilson acknowledges the reading of Ono’s performance within a meditation on female masochism, but, she proposes, most often these readings fix Ono’s mute and still female body within a closed system of female submission and male aggression. There is little possibility in these interpretations that the invitation Ono proffers might be positive—no space for “Cut Piece” to be a gift, a gesture of reparation, or a ritual of remembrance Locating Ono’s peformative offering of her clothes, her body, and her silence against the backdrop of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Wilson places the piece within a global imaginary Calling it a “reciprocal ballet” in terms of its gesture of generosity and a “tense pantomime” in terms of the way Ono stages her own vulnerability and brings her flesh close to strangers wielding scissors, Wilson refuses to sever Ono’s remarkable performance from either postwar Japanese art or the rest of her oeuvre. Nor is Wilson content to rescue the piece from its own self- destruction or consign it to what she calls “solipsistic masochism I also want to return to the ambivalent model of female selfhood that the performance inhabits.
there is always the possibility, indeed the probability that the fragments of the whole will never be reunited. I would emphasize this commitment to the fragment over any fantasy of future wholeness, and I want to locate the smashing gestures and the cutting gestures in Ono’s work in relation to this other antisocial feminism that refuses conventional modes of femininity by refusing to remake, rebuild, or reproduce and that dedicates itself completely and ferociously to the destruction of self and other
the female masochist’s performance is far more complex and offers a critique of the very ground of the human Kathy O’Dell writes about masochistic performance art of the 1970s as a performed refusal of wholeness and a demonstration of Deleuze’s claim that “the masochist’s apparent obedience conceals a criticism and a provocation there is a problem with trying to bind masochistic critiques of the subject to humanistic renegotiations with selfhood Performances like “Cut Piece” and Rhythm 0 do not necessarily want to rescue the woman; rather they hang her out to dry as woman
Obviously none of these performances immediately suggests a “feminist” act, but they instead make feminism into an ongoing commentary on fragmentariness, submission, and sacrifice. Ono’s dismantling performance presses us to ask about the kind of self that comes undone for an audience in nine minutes Can we think about this refusal of self as an anti-liberal act, a revolutionary statement of pure opposition that does not rely upon the liberal gesture of defiance but accesses another lexicon of power and speaks another language of refusal In a liberal realm where the pursuit of happiness, as Jamaica Kincaid might say, is both desirable and mandatory and where certain formulations of self (as active, voluntaristic, choosing, propulsive) dominate the political sphere, radical passivity may signal another kind of refusal: the refusal quite simply to be we might cast female masochism as the willing giving over of the self to the other, to power; in a performance of radical passivity we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatize unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body Indeed radical passivity could describe certain versions of lesbian femininity
In fact if one form of phallic queerness has been defined by the representation of the body as hybrid and assembled, then another takes as its object the dis-appearance of the body altogether
In new work Nicholls turns to landscapes, emptying the landscape of figures altogether, turning from gender variance as assemblage to queer femininity as startling absence here figuration is absence, dis-appearance, and illegibility These new paintings attempt to represent femininity as a blurring of the female form with the natural landscape and as a violent cutting out of the figure altogether The surreal and often hyperartificial landscapes represent queer femininity as a refusal of conventional womanhood and a disidentification with the logic of gender variance as the other of normativity. | “Cut Piece” Ono’s performance might be positive a gesture of reparation a ritual of remembrance against the backdrop of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Ono stages her own vulnerability
the fragments will never be reunited. I would emphasize this commitment to the fragment over wholeness I want to locate the smashing and cutting gestures in relation to antisocial feminism that refuses to remake, rebuild, or reproduce and dedicates itself to the destruction of self and other
female masochist’s performance offers a critique of the very ground of the human a performed refusal of wholeness Performances like “Cut Piece” do not rescue the woman; rather they hang her out to dry as woman
these performances make feminism into an ongoing commentary on fragmentariness, submission, and sacrifice. Ono’s dismantling performance presses us to ask about the kind of self that comes undone for an audience in nine minutes this refusal of self accesses another lexicon of power and speaks another language of refusal In a liberal realm where the pursuit of happiness is both desirable and mandatory and where formulations of self (as active, voluntaristic, choosing, propulsive) dominate the political sphere, radical passivity may signal another kind of refusal: the refusal quite simply to be the willing giving over of the self to the other
if one form of phallic queerness has been defined by the representation of the body as assembled, then another takes as its object the dis-appearance of the body altogether
Nicholls turns to landscapes, emptying the landscape of figures altogether, turning from gender variance as assemblage to queer femininity as startling absence These paintings represent femininity as a blurring of the female form with the natural landscape a violent cutting out of the figure altogether | In a brilliant analysis of “Cut Piece” Julia Bryan Wilson acknowledges the reading of Ono’s performance within a meditation on female masochism, but, she proposes, most often these readings fix Ono’s mute and still female body within a closed system of female submission and male aggression. As she puts it, “There is little possibility in these interpretations that the invitation Ono proffers might be positive—no space for “Cut Piece” to be a gift, a gesture of reparation, or a ritual of remembrance” (2003: 103). Locating Ono’s peformative offering of her clothes, her body, and her silence against the backdrop of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Wilson places the piece within a global imaginary. Calling it a “reciprocal ballet” in terms of its gesture of generosity and a “tense pantomime” in terms of the way Ono stages her own vulnerability and brings her flesh close to strangers wielding scissors, Wilson refuses to sever Ono’s remarkable performance from either postwar Japanese art or the rest of her oeuvre. Nor is Wilson content to rescue the piece from its own self- destruction or consign it to what she calls “solipsistic masochism” (116). Instead she situates the work firmly within the activity of witnessing and casts Ono as a master of the art of sacrifice. I am absolutely convinced by Wilson’s reading of “Cut Piece,” and I see this reading as definitive on many levels. And yet, while I want to build upon the situating of Ono’s work within the context of photographs of torn clothing taken after the atomic blasts in Japan in 1945, I also want to return to the ambivalent model of female selfhood that the performance inhabits.
Wilson notes the strange temporality of “Cut Piece” and the ambivalent optimism in the gesture of allowing people to cut off pieces of one’s clothing as souvenirs; in this performance and in Ono’s “Promise Piece” (1992), where a vase is smashed and its shards handed out, Wilson points out, there is always the possibility, indeed the probability that the fragments of the whole will never be reunited. I would emphasize this commitment to the fragment over any fantasy of future wholeness, and I want to locate the smashing gestures and the cutting gestures in Ono’s work in relation to this other antisocial feminism that refuses conventional modes of femininity by refusing to remake, rebuild, or reproduce and that dedicates itself completely and ferociously to the destruction of self and other.
Wilson notes the tendency to pair “Cut Piece” with Marina Abramvić’s Rhythm 0 (1974) and Chris Burden’s Shoot (1971), but she quickly dismisses Abramović’s performance as unscripted and marked by “complete surrender” and is similarly critical of Burden’s work, which she sees as an attempt to “manage and engineer aggression” and as “a far cry from the peaceful wishes of Ono and Lennon” (117). Male masochism certainly stakes out a territory very different from female performances of unraveling. While the male masochist inhabits a kind of heroic antiheroism by refusing social privilege and offering himself up Christ- like as a martyr for the cause, the female masochist’s performance is far more complex and offers a critique of the very ground of the human. A remarkable amount of performance art—feminist and otherwise—from the experimental scene of the 1960s and 1970s explored this fertile ground of masochistic collapse. Kathy O’Dell (1998) writes about masochistic performance art of the 1970s as a performed refusal of wholeness and a demonstration of Deleuze’s claim that “the masochist’s apparent obedience conceals a criticism and a provocation” (Deleuze 1971: 77). O’Dell’s psychoanalytic account of masochism provides a nice summary of the genre and places pieces by Burden, Cathy Opie, and others into interesting conversation with one another, but ultimately she wants to make masochism into something from which we can learn, through which we can recognize the invisible contracts we make with violence, and with which we can negotiate relations with others. But there is a problem with trying to bind masochistic critiques of the subject to humanistic renegotiations with selfhood. In many ways this reconfiguring of masochism as a way of grappling with and coming to terms with violence rewrites the dilemma I identified at the start of this chapter in terms of a feminism that needs to rescue other “women” from their own destructive tendencies. Performances like “Cut Piece” and Rhythm 0 but also like Faith Wilding’s Waiting (1972) do not necessarily want to rescue the woman; rather they hang her out to dry as woman.
Obviously none of these performances immediately suggests a “feminist” act, but they instead make feminism into an ongoing commentary on fragmentariness, submission, and sacrifice. Ono’s dismantling performance presses us to ask about the kind of self that comes undone for an audience in nine minutes. Is such an act, and such a model of self, feminist? Can we think about this refusal of self as an anti-liberal act, a revolutionary statement of pure opposition that does not rely upon the liberal gesture of defiance but accesses another lexicon of power and speaks another language of refusal? If we understand radical passivity as an antisocial mode with some connection to the anti- authorial statements made within postcolonial women’s theory and fiction, we can begin to glimpse its politics. In a liberal realm where the pursuit of happiness, as Jamaica Kincaid might say, is both desirable and mandatory and where certain formulations of self (as active, voluntaristic, choosing, propulsive) dominate the political sphere, radical passivity may signal another kind of refusal: the refusal quite simply to be. While many feminists, from Simone de Beauvoir to Monique Wittig to Jamaica Kincaid, have cast the project of “becoming woman” as one in which the woman can only be complicit in a patriarchal order, feminist theorists in general have not turned to masochism and passivity as potential alternatives to liberal formulations of womanhood. Carol Clover (1993) famously cast male masochism as one explanation for the popularity of horror films among teenage boys, and we might similarly cast female masochism as the willing giving over of the self to the other, to power; in a performance of radical passivity we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatize unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body. Here Joseph Roach’s (1996) formulation of culture as a combination of projection, substitution, and effigy making comes into play. Indeed radical passivity could describe certain versions of lesbian femininity. Queer theory under the influence of Judith Butler’s work on the “lesbian phallus” argues for the recognition of the potentiality of masculine power in a female form, but this still leaves the feminine lesbian unexplained and lost to an anti-phallic modality.
In fact if one form of phallic queerness has been defined by the representation of the body as hybrid and assembled, then another takes as its object the dis-appearance of the body altogether. In an explicitly queer use of the collage, that tension between the rebellious energy of gender variance and the quiet revolt of queer femininity comes to the fore. J. A. Nicholls’s work has mostly involved figuration and has evolved around the production of work in stages, the building of an aesthetic environment through representational strata that become progressively more flat and progressively more painterly at the same time. This movement works precisely against the three-dimensional aspirations of collage which build up from the canvas and transform the dialogue between paint and canvas into a multivocal discourse through the importation of “external” materials. In her process Nicholls first creates, Frankenstein- like, a small collage of myriad parts and materials of the figure she wants to paint. Next she paints a version of the collage onto large canvases, trying to capture the quality of the pieced- together materials in an assemblage of moving and static parts, anatomically correct limbs and cartoon- like stumps, motion and stillness, identity and facelessness. Some of her figures recline like classical nudes, but many of them, gender- ambiguous figures all, are suspended in time, space, water, or paint. They are glued together, the sum of their parts, and they twist and turn in and out of wholeness, legibility, and sense.
In new work Nicholls turns to landscapes, emptying the landscape of figures altogether, turning from gender variance as assemblage to queer femininity as startling absence. What had been a backdrop becomes a stage; what was ground becomes figure; what had been secondary becomes primary. The landscape emptied of figures, when considered in relation to her paintings of figures, still does speak about figuration. Only here figuration, as in Kara Walker’s art, is absence, dis-appearance, and illegibility. In Here and Now the landscape is graphic and dramatic, vivid and emotional (see plate 10). The figure’s psyche is spread horizontally across the meeting of ocean and land rather than encased vertically in an upright body, and the relationships between inside and outside, the primary drama staged by the collage, are cast here as sky and land, vegetation and waves, blue and green, with a barely transparent fence marking the nonboundary between the two. Time and space themselves collide at this boundary, here and now, and the immediacy and presence of the emotional landscape announce themselves in the startlingly dynamic waves in the middle ground. In Higher Ground and New Story the canvases are marked more by stillness and fixity, and the landscape becomes much more of a backdrop waiting for a figure (see plates 11 and 12). These new paintings attempt to represent femininity as a blurring of the female form with the natural landscape and as a violent cutting out of the figure altogether. The surreal and often hyperartificial landscapes represent queer femininity as a refusal of conventional womanhood and a disidentification with the logic of gender variance as the other of normativity. | 10,251 | <h4>The alternative is an anti-social, shadow feminism – a masochistic implosion of the feminine subject and a radical passivity which takes cues from Yoko Ono and J.A. Nicholls</h4><p><u><strong>Halberstam 11</u></strong> (<u>Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” pp 138-42) gz</p><p>In a brilliant analysis of <mark>“Cut Piece”</mark> Julia Bryan Wilson acknowledges the reading of <mark>Ono’s performance</mark> within a meditation on female masochism, but, she proposes, most often these readings fix Ono’s mute and still female body within a closed system of female submission and male aggression.</u> As she puts it, “<u>There is little possibility in these interpretations that the invitation Ono proffers <mark>might be positive</mark>—no space for “Cut Piece” to be a gift, <strong><mark>a gesture of reparation</strong></mark>, or <strong><mark>a ritual of remembrance</u></strong></mark>” (2003: 103). <u>Locating Ono’s peformative offering of her clothes, her body, and her silence <strong><mark>against the backdrop of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki</strong></mark>, Wilson places the piece within a global imaginary</u>. <u>Calling it a “reciprocal ballet” in terms of its gesture of generosity and a “tense pantomime” in terms of the way <mark>Ono <strong>stages her own vulnerability</strong> </mark>and brings her flesh close to strangers wielding scissors, Wilson refuses to sever Ono’s remarkable performance from either postwar Japanese art or the rest of her oeuvre. Nor is Wilson content to <strong>rescue the piece from its own self- destruction</strong> or <strong>consign it to what she calls “solipsistic masochism</u></strong>” (116). Instead she situates the work firmly within the activity of witnessing and casts Ono as a master of the art of sacrifice. I am absolutely convinced by Wilson’s reading of “Cut Piece,” and I see this reading as definitive on many levels. And yet, while I want to build upon the situating of Ono’s work within the context of photographs of torn clothing taken after the atomic blasts in Japan in 1945, <u>I also want to return to the ambivalent model of female selfhood that the performance inhabits.</p><p></u>Wilson notes the strange temporality of “Cut Piece” and the ambivalent optimism in the gesture of allowing people to cut off pieces of one’s clothing as souvenirs; in this performance and in Ono’s “Promise Piece” (1992), where a vase is smashed and its shards handed out, Wilson points out, <u>there is always the possibility, indeed the probability that <mark>the fragments</mark> of the whole <mark>will <strong>never be reunited</strong>. I would emphasize this commitment to the <strong>fragment over</mark> any fantasy of future <mark>wholeness</strong></mark>, and <mark>I want to locate the smashing </mark>gestures <mark>and</mark> the <mark>cutting gestures</mark> in Ono’s work <mark>in relation to</mark> this other <mark>antisocial feminism that refuses</mark> conventional modes of femininity by <strong>refusing <mark>to remake, rebuild, or reproduce</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> that <mark>dedicates itself</mark> completely and ferociously <mark>to the <strong>destruction of self and other</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Wilson notes the tendency to pair “Cut Piece” with Marina Abramvić’s Rhythm 0 (1974) and Chris Burden’s Shoot (1971), but she quickly dismisses Abramović’s performance as unscripted and marked by “complete surrender” and is similarly critical of Burden’s work, which she sees as an attempt to “manage and engineer aggression” and as “a far cry from the peaceful wishes of Ono and Lennon” (117). Male masochism certainly stakes out a territory very different from female performances of unraveling. While the male masochist inhabits a kind of heroic antiheroism by refusing social privilege and offering himself up Christ- like as a martyr for the cause, <u>the <mark>female masochist’s performance</mark> is far more complex and <mark>offers a critique of the <strong>very ground of the human</u></strong></mark>. A remarkable amount of performance art—feminist and otherwise—from the experimental scene of the 1960s and 1970s explored this fertile ground of masochistic collapse. <u>Kathy O’Dell</u> (1998) <u>writes about masochistic performance art of the 1970s as <mark>a performed <strong>refusal of wholeness</strong></mark> and a demonstration of Deleuze’s claim that “the masochist’s apparent obedience <strong>conceals a criticism and a provocation</u></strong>” (Deleuze 1971: 77). O’Dell’s psychoanalytic account of masochism provides a nice summary of the genre and places pieces by Burden, Cathy Opie, and others into interesting conversation with one another, but ultimately she wants to make masochism into something from which we can learn, through which we can recognize the invisible contracts we make with violence, and with which we can negotiate relations with others. But <u>there is a problem with trying to bind masochistic critiques of the subject to humanistic renegotiations with selfhood</u>. In many ways this reconfiguring of masochism as a way of grappling with and coming to terms with violence rewrites the dilemma I identified at the start of this chapter in terms of a feminism that needs to rescue other “women” from their own destructive tendencies. <u><mark>Performances like “Cut Piece”</mark> and Rhythm 0</u> but also like Faith Wilding’s Waiting (1972) <u><mark>do not</mark> necessarily want to <mark>rescue the woman; rather they <strong>hang her out to dry as woman</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Obviously none of <mark>these performances</mark> immediately suggests a “feminist” act, but they instead <mark>make feminism into an ongoing commentary on <strong>fragmentariness, submission, and sacrifice</strong>.</u> <u>Ono’s dismantling performance presses us to ask about the kind of self that <strong>comes undone for an audience in nine minutes</u></strong></mark>. Is such an act, and such a model of self, feminist? <u>Can we think about <mark>this <strong>refusal of self</strong></mark> as an anti-liberal act, a revolutionary statement of pure opposition that does not rely upon the liberal gesture of defiance but <mark>accesses <strong>another lexicon of power and speaks another language of refusal</u></strong></mark>? If we understand radical passivity as an antisocial mode with some connection to the anti- authorial statements made within postcolonial women’s theory and fiction, we can begin to glimpse its politics. <u><mark>In a liberal realm where the pursuit of happiness</mark>, as Jamaica Kincaid might say, <mark>is both <strong>desirable and mandatory</strong> and where</mark> certain <mark>formulations of self (<strong>as active, voluntaristic, choosing, propulsive</strong>) dominate the political sphere, <strong>radical passivity may signal another kind of refusal: the refusal quite simply to be</u></strong></mark>. While many feminists, from Simone de Beauvoir to Monique Wittig to Jamaica Kincaid, have cast the project of “becoming woman” as one in which the woman can only be complicit in a patriarchal order, feminist theorists in general have not turned to masochism and passivity as potential alternatives to liberal formulations of womanhood. Carol Clover (1993) famously cast male masochism as one explanation for the popularity of horror films among teenage boys, and <u>we might</u> similarly <u>cast female masochism as <mark>the <strong>willing giving over of the self to the other</strong></mark>, to power; in a performance of radical passivity we witness the <strong>willingness of the subject to actually come undone</strong>, to dramatize <strong>unbecoming for the other</strong> so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body</u>. Here Joseph Roach’s (1996) formulation of culture as a combination of projection, substitution, and effigy making comes into play. <u>Indeed radical passivity could describe certain versions of lesbian femininity</u>. Queer theory under the influence of Judith Butler’s work on the “lesbian phallus” argues for the recognition of the potentiality of masculine power in a female form, but this still leaves the feminine lesbian unexplained and lost to an anti-phallic modality.</p><p><u>In fact <mark>if one form of phallic queerness has been defined by the representation of the body as</mark> hybrid and <mark>assembled, <strong>then another takes as its object the dis-appearance of the body altogether</u></strong></mark>. In an explicitly queer use of the collage, that tension between the rebellious energy of gender variance and the quiet revolt of queer femininity comes to the fore. J. A. Nicholls’s work has mostly involved figuration and has evolved around the production of work in stages, the building of an aesthetic environment through representational strata that become progressively more flat and progressively more painterly at the same time. This movement works precisely against the three-dimensional aspirations of collage which build up from the canvas and transform the dialogue between paint and canvas into a multivocal discourse through the importation of “external” materials. In her process Nicholls first creates, Frankenstein- like, a small collage of myriad parts and materials of the figure she wants to paint. Next she paints a version of the collage onto large canvases, trying to capture the quality of the pieced- together materials in an assemblage of moving and static parts, anatomically correct limbs and cartoon- like stumps, motion and stillness, identity and facelessness. Some of her figures recline like classical nudes, but many of them, gender- ambiguous figures all, are suspended in time, space, water, or paint. They are glued together, the sum of their parts, and they twist and turn in and out of wholeness, legibility, and sense.</p><p><u>In <strong>new work</strong> <mark>Nicholls turns to landscapes, <strong>emptying the landscape of figures altogether</strong>, turning <strong>from gender variance as assemblage to queer femininity as startling absence</u></strong></mark>. What had been a backdrop becomes a stage; what was ground becomes figure; what had been secondary becomes primary. The landscape emptied of figures, when considered in relation to her paintings of figures, still does speak about figuration. Only <u>here figuration</u>, as in Kara Walker’s art, <u>is <strong>absence, dis-appearance, and illegibility</u></strong>. In Here and Now the landscape is graphic and dramatic, vivid and emotional (see plate 10). The figure’s psyche is spread horizontally across the meeting of ocean and land rather than encased vertically in an upright body, and the relationships between inside and outside, the primary drama staged by the collage, are cast here as sky and land, vegetation and waves, blue and green, with a barely transparent fence marking the nonboundary between the two. Time and space themselves collide at this boundary, here and now, and the immediacy and presence of the emotional landscape announce themselves in the startlingly dynamic waves in the middle ground. In Higher Ground and New Story the canvases are marked more by stillness and fixity, and the landscape becomes much more of a backdrop waiting for a figure (see plates 11 and 12). <u><mark>These</mark> new <mark>paintings</mark> attempt to <mark>represent femininity as a <strong>blurring of the female form with the natural landscape</strong></mark> and as <mark>a <strong>violent cutting out of the figure altogether</u></strong></mark>. <u>The surreal and often hyperartificial landscapes represent queer femininity as a <strong>refusal of conventional womanhood</strong> and a disidentification with the logic of gender variance as the other of normativity.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,903 | 1 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,566 | No impact to failed states | Patrick 11 | Patrick 11
Patrick, senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ CFR, 4/15/’11¶ (Stewart M, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689) | failed states are irrelevant to national security. risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers an index of state weakness ranked 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength I've examined whether rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in global threats: terrorism prolif crime and disease.¶ The findings are clear. greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries nowhere near failed states.¶ The link between failed states and terrorism is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are absent in most failed states he notion of haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in Somalia. operatives bemoaned difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and access to financial infrastructure. Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries not because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch operations as the organization evolves to a diffuse movement it is as likely to find haven in Paris as Pakistani valleys.¶ failed states and w m d fears are misplaced. the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries corrupt and poorly policed nations failed states have little or no connection with transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting Criminal networks prefer functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes.
South Africa presents advantages. The developing world accounts for low tax revenue, overstretched services, high levels of corruption and land and sea borders failing states cannot compete.¶ weakest states health challenges are endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While officials obsess over Ebola and Marburg outbreaks are rare and self-contained.¶ poor performance in preventing disease is shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than decisions by unaccountable regimes. Such inaction has occurred in stronger developing countries, even in democracies. Nigeria's response to polio China's lack of candor about SARS Indonesia's attitude to bird flu misperceptions about dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies. preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis. security officials would be better served if they turned their strategic lens | failed states are irrelevant an index ranked developing nations I've examined whether rankings reveal anything about role in global threats: terrorism is tenuous. Al-Qaeda operatives bemoaned difficulties of working under chaos, given need for security and financial infrastructure. a diffuse movement is as likely to find haven in Paris weakest states pose minimal prolif risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile material Criminal networks prefer baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They accept higher risks to work in nations straddling commercial routes.
weakest states health challenges are diseases with local effects outbreaks are rare and self-contained. disease inaction occurred in stronger countries preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis. | In truth, while failed states may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them are irrelevant to U.S. national security. The risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources.¶ In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on an index of state weakness in developing countries. The study ranked all 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, I've examined whether these rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in major global threats: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and infectious disease.¶ The findings are startlingly clear. Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states.¶ The link between failed states and transnational terrorism, for instance, is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly absent in most failed states, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, the notion of finding haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic Somalia. In intercepted cables, operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial and communications infrastructure. Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.¶ Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries for terrorism not only because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch sustained counterterrorism operations against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles.¶ Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But as the organization evolves from a centrally directed network to a diffuse movement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, it is as likely to find haven in the banlieues of Paris or high-rises of Minneapolis as in remote Pakistani valleys.¶ What about failed states and weapons of mass destruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials.¶ These fears are misplaced. With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile or other WMD material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, corrupt nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals and poorly policed nations (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons.¶ When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet failed states have little or no connection with other categories of transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering, intellectual property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting of manufactured goods.¶ Criminal networks typically prefer operating in functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They also accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes.
MARKED
Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. South Africa presents its own advantages. It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . The developing world accounts for the low tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of corruption throughout the administration, and 7,600 kilometers of land and sea borders that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and failing African states, such as Niger, simply cannot compete.¶ Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS, avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly.¶ Certainly, the world's weakest states — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa — suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal health challenges are endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While U.S. national security officials and Hollywood screenwriters obsess over the gruesome Ebola and Marburg viruses, outbreaks of these hemorrhagic fevers are rare and self-contained.¶ I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But poor performance by developing countries in preventing, detecting and responding to infectious disease is often shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than by conscious decisions by unaccountable or unresponsive regimes. Such deliberate inaction has occurred not only in the world's weakest states but also in stronger developing countries, even in promising democracies. The list is long. It includes Nigeria's feckless response to a 2003-05 polio epidemic, China's lack of candor about the 2003 SARS outbreak, Indonesia's obstructionist attitude to addressing bird flu in 2008 and South Africa's denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS.¶ Unfortunately, misperceptions about the dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies. U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease.¶ Yet such preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis. U.S. national security officials would be better served — and would serve all of us better — if they turned their strategic lens toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate. | 8,429 | <h4>No impact to failed states</h4><p><u><strong>Patrick 11</p><p></u></strong>Patrick, senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ CFR, 4/15/’11¶ (Stewart M, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689) </p><p>In truth, while <u><strong><mark>failed states</u></strong></mark> may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them <u><strong><mark>are irrelevant</mark> to</u></strong> U.S. <u><strong>national security. </u></strong>The <u>risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers</u> seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources.¶ In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on <u><mark>an index</mark> of state weakness</u> in developing countries. The study <u><mark>ranked</u></mark> all <u>141 <mark>developing nations</mark> on 20 indicators of state strength</u>, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, <u><mark>I've examined whether</u></mark> these <u><mark>rankings reveal anything about</mark> each nation's <mark>role in</u></mark> major <u><mark>global threats:</u></mark> transnational <u>terrorism</u>, <u>prolif</u>eration of weapons of mass destruction, international <u>crime and</u> infectious <u>disease.<strong>¶</strong> <strong>The findings are</u></strong> startlingly <u><strong>clear.</u></strong> Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far <u>greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries</u> that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come <u>nowhere near</u> qualifying as <u>failed states.<strong>¶</strong> The link between failed states and</u> transnational <u><mark>terrorism</u></mark>, for instance, <u><mark>is tenuous.</mark> Al-Qaeda franchises are</u> concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly <u>absent in most failed states</u>, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, t<u>he notion of</u> finding <u>haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. <mark>Al-Qaeda</mark> discovered this in</u> the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic <u>Somalia.</u> In intercepted cables, <u><mark>operatives bemoaned</u></mark> the insuperable <u><mark>difficulties of working under chaos, given</mark> their <mark>need for security and</u></mark> for <u>access to</u> the global <u><mark>financial</u></mark> and communications <u><mark>infrastructure.</u></mark> Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.¶ <u>Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries</u> for terrorism <u>not</u> only <u>because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch</u> sustained counterterrorism <u>operations</u> against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles.¶ Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But <u>as the organization evolves</u> from a centrally directed network <u>to <mark>a diffuse movement</u></mark> with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, <u>it <mark>is as likely to find haven in</u></mark> the banlieues of <u><mark>Paris</u></mark> or high-rises of Minneapolis <u>as</u> in remote <u>Pakistani valleys.<strong>¶</strong> </u>What about <u>failed states and w</u>eapons of <u>m</u>ass <u>d</u>estruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials.¶ These <u>fears are misplaced.</u> With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — <u>the world's <mark>weakest states pose minimal prolif</mark>eration <mark>risks,</mark> <mark>since they have limited stocks of fissile</u></mark> or other WMD <u><mark>material</mark> and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries</u> (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, <u>corrupt</u> nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals <u>and poorly policed nations</u> (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons.¶ When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet <u>failed states have little or no connection with</u> other categories of <u>transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering</u>, intellectual <u>property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting</u> of manufactured goods.¶ <u><mark>Criminal networks</u></mark> typically <u><mark>prefer</u></mark> operating in <u>functional countries that provide <mark>baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities.</mark> <mark>They</u></mark> also <u><mark>accept higher risks to work in nations straddling</mark> major <mark>commercial routes.</u></mark> </p><p>MARKED</p><p>Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. <u>South Africa presents</u> its own <u>advantages.</u> It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . <u>The developing world accounts for</u> the <u>low tax revenue, overstretched</u> social <u>services, high levels of corruption</u> throughout the administration, <u>and</u> 7,600 kilometers of <u>land and sea borders</u> that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and <u>failing</u> African <u>states</u>, such as Niger, simply <u><strong>cannot compete.¶ </u></strong>Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS, avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly.¶ Certainly, the world's <u><mark>weakest states</u></mark> — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa — suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal <u><mark>health challenges are</mark> endemic <mark>diseases with local effects</mark>, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While</u> U.S. national security <u>officials</u> and Hollywood screenwriters <u>obsess over</u> the gruesome <u>Ebola and Marburg</u> viruses, <u><mark>outbreaks</u></mark> of these hemorrhagic fevers <u><mark>are rare and self-contained.<strong></mark>¶</strong> </u>I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But <u>poor performance</u> by developing countries <u>in preventing</u>, detecting and responding to infectious <u><mark>disease</mark> is</u> often <u>shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than</u> by conscious <u>decisions by unaccountable</u> or unresponsive <u>regimes. Such</u> deliberate <u><mark>inaction</mark> has <mark>occurred</u></mark> not only in the world's weakest states but also <u><mark>in stronger</mark> developing <mark>countries</mark>, even in</u> promising <u>democracies.</u> The list is long. It includes <u>Nigeria's</u> feckless <u>response to</u> a 2003-05 <u>polio</u> epidemic, <u>China's lack of candor about</u> the 2003 <u>SARS</u> outbreak, <u>Indonesia's</u> obstructionist <u>attitude to</u> addressing <u>bird flu</u> in 2008 and South Africa's denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS.¶ Unfortunately, <u>misperceptions about</u> the <u>dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies.</u> U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease.¶ Yet such <u><strong><mark>preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis.</u></strong></mark> U.S. national <u>security officials would be better served</u> — and would serve all of us better — <u>if they turned their strategic lens</u> toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate.</p> | 1NR | Cartels | A2: failed states | 20,698 | 103 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,567 | Changes in squo can’t solve and emissions are exported. | Marshall ‘12 | Marshall ‘12
(Michael Marshall¶ “Lowest US carbon emissions won't slow climate change” 17:30 20 August 2012 accessed online August 24, 2012 at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22196-lowest-us-carbon-emissions-wont-slow-climate-change.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=energy-fuels) | It looks like good news, but it's not The US has recorded a sharp fall in its emissions Thanks to natural gas The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported the US is exporting the coal emissions "If we want even an outside chance of [limiting global warming to] 2 °C, there is no emission space for gas," Anderson says. In order to hit the 2 °C target, global emissions need to peak by 2020 before dropping again, which means making a rapid transition to low-carbon energy. | It looks like good news, but it's not. The US has recorded a sharp fall in its emissions Thanks to natural gas The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported the US is exporting the coal emissions | It looks like good news, but it's not. The US has recorded a sharp fall in its greenhouse gas emissions from energy use. Thanks to a rise in the use of natural gas, emissions are at their lowest since 1992. The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported.¶ According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), energy-related CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two decades. Emissions are normally high between January and March because people use more heating in the winter, but last winter was mild in the US.¶ The EIA says that an increase in gas-fired power generation, and a corresponding decline in coal-fired, contributed to the fall in emissions. Burning natural gas produces fewer emissions than burning coal, and natural gas is currently unusually cheap in the US thanks to a glut of shale gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing or "fracking".¶ If gas companies continue to expand their shale gas operations, the US could generate even more electricity from gas, and its emissions could fall for several years, says Kevin Anderson of the University of Manchester, UK.¶ However, this will not slow down climate change. US coal consumption has fallen, but production is holding steady and the surplus is being sold to Asia. As a result, the US is effectively exporting the coal-related emissions.¶ "Gas is less bad than burning the coal, but only if you keep the coal in the ground," Anderson says.¶ Proponents of natural gas argue that it is a "transition fuel" that we can burn for a few years while we install low-carbon infrastructure such as wind farms and nuclear power stations.¶ That viewpoint looks increasingly untenable. "If we want even an outside chance of [limiting global warming to] 2 °C, there is no emission space for gas," Anderson says. In order to hit the 2 °C target, global emissions need to peak by 2020 before dropping again, which means making a rapid transition to low-carbon energy. | 2,003 | <h4>Changes in squo<u><strong> can’t solve and emissions are exported.</h4><p>Marshall ‘12</p><p></strong>(Michael Marshall¶ “Lowest US carbon emissions won't slow climate change” 17:30 20 August 2012 accessed online August 24, 2012 at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22196-lowest-us-carbon-emissions-wont-slow-climate-change.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=energy-fuels)</p><p><mark>It looks like good news, but it's not</u>. <u>The US has recorded a sharp fall in its</u></mark> greenhouse gas <u><mark>emissions</u></mark> from energy use. <u><mark>Thanks to</u></mark> a rise in the use of <u><mark>natural gas</u></mark>, emissions are at their lowest since 1992. <u><mark>The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported</u></mark>.¶ According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), energy-related CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two decades. Emissions are normally high between January and March because people use more heating in the winter, but last winter was mild in the US.¶ The EIA says that an increase in gas-fired power generation, and a corresponding decline in coal-fired, contributed to the fall in emissions. Burning natural gas produces fewer emissions than burning coal, and natural gas is currently unusually cheap in the US thanks to a glut of shale gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing or "fracking".¶ If gas companies continue to expand their shale gas operations, the US could generate even more electricity from gas, and its emissions could fall for several years, says Kevin Anderson of the University of Manchester, UK.¶ However, this will not slow down climate change. US coal consumption has fallen, but production is holding steady and the surplus is being sold to Asia. As a result, <u><mark>the US is</u></mark> effectively <u><mark>exporting the coal</u></mark>-related <u><mark>emissions</u></mark>.¶ "Gas is less bad than burning the coal, but only if you keep the coal in the ground," Anderson says.¶ Proponents of natural gas argue that it is a "transition fuel" that we can burn for a few years while we install low-carbon infrastructure such as wind farms and nuclear power stations.¶ That viewpoint looks increasingly untenable. <u>"<strong>If we want even an outside chance of [limiting global warming to] 2 °C, there is no emission space for gas," Anderson says. In order to hit the 2 °C target, global emissions need to peak by 2020 before dropping again, which means making a rapid transition to low-carbon energy.</p></u></strong> | 1NR | Hemp | A2: warming | 429,904 | 1 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,568 | Academia is a distortion of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death | Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 ) [m leap] | Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286) [m leap] | here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us Each day passes in this way, the administration out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. We form teams, schools ideologies, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead. | the university manages our social death, translating what we once knew into acceptable forms of social conflict. the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where meaning is ripped from action to perpetually deliberate when we push the boundaries they reconfigure themselves to contain us the administration out to shape student discourse It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes meaning the university is a graveyard a factory of meaning which reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students discourse designed to make our moments together into a set of legible and fruitless demands Totally managed death. A machine for administering death each which seek to absorb more of our energy they perpetuate the inertia of meaning detached from social context these discourses and research programs play their role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits precautionary lectures A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us the university’s ghosts are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs We form teams, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot . Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead. | Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. It is November 2009. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. We are an antagonistic dead. | 11,993 | <h4>Academia is a distortion of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9</u></strong> (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286<u><strong>) [m leap]</p><p></u></strong>Yes, very much a cemetery. Only <u>here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like <mark>the university </mark>just like the state just like the economy <strong><mark>manages our social death</strong>, translating what we once knew</mark> from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, <mark>into acceptable forms of social conflict.</mark> Who knew that behind so much civic life</u> <u>(electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam)</u> <u>was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. </u>When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. <u>He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, <mark>the <strong>release valve</strong> of the university plunges us into an abyss where</mark> ideas are wisps of ether—that is, <strong><mark>meaning is ripped from action</strong></mark>. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: <mark>to <strong>perpetually deliberate</strong></mark>, the endless fleshing-out-of—<mark>when we push the boundaries</mark> of this form <mark>they </mark>are quick <strong>to <mark>reconfigure themselves to contain us</u></strong></mark>: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension.<u> Each day passes in this way, <mark>the administration</mark> </u>on the look<u> <mark>out to shape student discourse</mark>—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. <mark>It becomes <strong>banal, thoughtless</u></strong></mark>. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. <u><mark>The university</mark> steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also <strong><mark>steals and homogenizes meaning</strong></mark>. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. <strong>Social death is</strong>, of course, simply the power source, <strong>the generator, of civic life</strong> with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death</u>: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, <u><strong><mark>the university is a graveyard</strong></mark>, but it is also a factory: <strong><mark>a factory of meaning</strong> </mark>which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; <mark>which </mark>everywhere <mark>reproduces the <strong>empty reactionary behavior of students</strong> </mark>based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property).</u> Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. <u>Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, <strong><mark>discourse designed to make our </mark>very <mark>moments </mark>here <mark>together into a set of legible and fruitless demands</strong></mark>. <mark>Totally managed death. A machine for administering death</u></mark>, for the proliferation of technologies of death. <u>As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, <strong>it matters little what face one puts on the university</u></strong>—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—<u><mark>each </mark>one the product of some exploitation—<mark>which seek to absorb more of our </mark>work, more tuition, more <mark>energy</mark>.</u> The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place.<u> With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, <mark>they perpetuate the </u></mark>blind <u><strong><mark>inertia of meaning</strong></mark> ostensibly <strong><mark>detached from</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>social context</strong></mark>. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, <mark>these discourses and research programs play their</mark> own <mark>role, <strong>co-opting and containing radical potential</u></strong></mark>. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. <u><mark>The university gladly permits</mark> the <strong><mark>precautionary lectures</strong></mark> on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. <strong><mark>A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us</strong></mark> against any confrontational radicalism.</u> And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. <u>Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to <strong><mark>the university’s ghosts</strong></mark>, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They <mark>are<strong> summoned forth and banished</strong> by a few well-meaning <strong>phrases and research programs</strong></mark>, given their book titles, their <strong>citations</strong>. <strong>This is our gothic</strong>—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us.</u> Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. <u><mark>We form teams,</u></mark> clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, <u>schools</u>, unions, <u>ideologies, <mark>identities</u></mark>, and subcultures—and thankfully <u><strong><mark>each group gets its own designated burial plot</u></strong></mark>. <u>Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination<mark>.</mark> </u>We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others.<u> It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never <strong>feel terrible</strong> to <strong>diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital</strong> as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this <strong>same dream of domination.</strong> After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are <strong>convinced, owned, broken.</u></strong> We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. <u>The values create popular images and ideals</u> <u>(healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education)</u> <u>while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. <strong>They sell the practice through the image</strong>. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice.</u> In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. <u>Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just <strong>how dead we are willing to play</strong>, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. </u>Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts.<u> Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. <strong><mark>Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. </mark>It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact</strong>.</u> <u>It’s the particular nature of being owned. <strong>Social rupture</strong> is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a <strong>function of war</strong>. War contains the ability to create a <strong>new frame</strong>, to build a <strong>new tension</strong> for the agents at play, <strong>new dynamics</strong> in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.</u> It is November 2009. <u><mark>For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures </u></mark>and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. <u><strong><mark>We are an antagonistic dead.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NC | null | Off | 1,058 | 366 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,569 | Bringing outlaw discourse into the open gaze of the academy straight turns the aff – we should leave it to the underground, not bring them into the public – before you vote aff, ask yourself: “what does debate and the ballot actually do to help the Aff’s method?” – you can vote negative on presumption and allow critical outlaw discourses to stay hidden – opacity is necessary for emancipation, the Affimative’s transparency must be rejected unyieldingly | Phillips ’99 | Phillips ’99 (Professor; Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Studies. Communication and Rhetorical Studies, syracuse) | The suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom for treating it more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic Or that members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation Academic discourse is not transparent Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center? the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest that incorporating the struggle into an impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy As Foucault illustrate practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification | The suggestion that out-law communities need the academic critic contradicts the disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses fail to offer an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom treating it as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy Hidden out-law discourses have good reasons to stay hidden. Academic discourse is not transparent. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse logics Are out-law discourses tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center? In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these discourses will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? incorporating the struggle into an impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy may endow institutions of confinement and objectification | Kendall “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono” Philosophy and Rhetoric, \oi.i2, tio. 1,1999
Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses. Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd view, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divo-gent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical conmninity, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further probleoiatize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Wamick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "render[ing] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Wamick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law discourse because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unrefiexively. | 7,460 | <h4>Bringing outlaw discourse into the open gaze of the academy straight turns the aff – we should leave it to the underground, not bring them into the public – before you vote aff, ask yourself: “what does debate and the ballot actually do to help the Aff’s method?” – you can vote negative on presumption and allow critical outlaw discourses to stay hidden – opacity is necessary for emancipation, the Affimative’s transparency must be rejected unyieldingly</h4><p><u><strong>Phillips ’99</u></strong> (Professor; Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Studies. Communication and Rhetorical Studies, syracuse)</p><p>Kendall “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono” Philosophy and Rhetoric, \oi.i2, tio. 1,1999</p><p>Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses. Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd view, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. <u><mark>The</u></mark>ir <u><mark>suggestion that out-law communities</mark> are in <mark>need</mark> of <mark>the academic critic contradicts</u></mark> <u>not only <mark>the</mark> already <mark>disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses</u></mark> (the grounds for using out-law discourse), <u>but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse</u> (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. <u>What Sloop and Ono <mark>fail to offer</mark> is <mark>an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom</u></mark>, <u>for <mark>treating it</u></mark> less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and <u>more <mark>as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy</u></mark>. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) <u><mark>Hidden out-law discourses</mark> may <mark>have good reasons to stay hidden</u>.</mark> Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But <u>are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic</u>? <u>Or</u>, indeed, <u>that</u> the <u>members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation</u>? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) <u><mark>Academic</u></mark> critical <u><mark>discourse is not transparent</u>.</mark> Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. <u><mark>Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse</u></mark>/divergent <u><mark>logics</mark>?</u> <u><mark>Are out-law discourses</mark> merely <mark>tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center?</u></mark> (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, <u>the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive</u>. <u><mark>In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a</u> <u>cathexis for these</mark> out-law <mark>discourses</u></mark>. <u>It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities</u> (see Fraser 1997). But, <u><mark>will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities?</u> <u></mark>I mean to suggest</u>, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather <u>that <mark>incorporating the struggle into an</u></mark> (admittedly) <u><mark>impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative</u></mark> The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divo-gent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical conmninity, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further probleoiatize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Wamick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "render[ing] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Wamick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. <u><strong><mark>Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy</u></strong></mark>. <u>As</u> the works of Michel <u>Foucault</u> (especially 1979, 1980) aptly <u>illustrate</u>, <u>practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity <mark>may endow institutions of confinement and objectification</u></mark>. Any justification for studying out-law discourse because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unrefiexively.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 4,251 | 444 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,570 | Can’t solve- Eight other reasons not addressed. | Weston ‘12 | Weston ‘12
(DR Del Weston did her PhD on the political economy of global warming at Curtin University in Western Australia.¶ She has a Visiting Scholar position at the University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, South Africa, and has just started an Honorary Research Associate position at the University of Tasmania in the School of Geography and Environmental Science.¶ She moved to Tasmania about eight months ago and is now living at Mountain River. “Carbon tax far from a cure-all” Hobart Mercury (Australia) July 7, 2012 Saturday, accessed online July 29, 2012, Lexis) | we are well into the critical decade to take effective action if we are to prevent major climate disruption institutions and individuals acknowledge, the science is unequivocal: as a result of human activity, the global ecosystem is approaching a planetary-scale transition.¶ If this global warming tipping point is breached, the planet will embark on an unstoppable trajectory to a new geological era unsuitable for human life.¶ U N estimates 300,000 people die prematurely each year as a result of global warming These numbers are projected to grow exponentially. as a result of global warming would be 500 times greater in Africa than in Europe those least responsible suffer worst Australian coal is going to find a ready market.''¶ There is a complete disjuncture between the Government's climate policy and the growth in coal mining and export. international research on carbon trading concludes that it is ineffective, inequitable, inefficient and unjust with the potential to exacerbate the problem and delay real action. scientists at the Stockholm Resilience Centre have identified nine planetary boundaries threaten human survival In addition to climate change, these include freshwater use, biological diversity, ocean acidification, nitrogen and phosphorus inputs into the biosphere and oceans, aerosol loading and chemical pollution. These are interconnected and for three of them climate change, biological diversity and nitrogen input to the biosphere the boundaries have been crossed, thus threatening the ability of the other indicators to stay within their boundaries. Within a short space of time we are facing not only the possibility of breaching global warming tipping points, but a range of indicators predict the Earth's biosphere will be degraded to a point where it is incapable of supporting human life.¶ By treating climate change as a silo issue, we miss the real story. Our economic practices of growing production and consumption are not sustainable | we are well into the critical decade to take effective action if we are to prevent major climate disruption Australian coal is going to find a ready market.''¶ There is a complete disjuncture between the Government's climate policy and the growth in coal mining and export scientists at the Stockholm Resilience Centre have identified nine planetary boundaries threaten human survival include freshwater use biological diversity, ocean acidification nitrogen and phosphorus inputs aerosol loading and chemical pollution three of them have been crossed thus threatening the ability of the other indicators to stay within their boundaries By treating climate change as a silo issue, we miss the real story. Our economic practices of growing production and consumption are not sustainabl | Australia's carbon tax won't save the world from catastrophic climate change, writes academic Del Weston¶ THE new carbon tax is upon us and the din of the political debate surrounding it is deafening.¶ What gets lost in all of this is that there is a major disjuncture between the objectives of the tax and the continuing support by Government (and Opposition) for the coal industry. Yet we are well into the critical decade to take effective action if we are to prevent major climate disruption.¶ The Government's strategy is at best inconsistent and at worst in tatters. It has poured $2.5 billion into carbon capture and storage a technology plagued by problems and unlikely to help in solving the problem of coal-fired power emissions (for reasons of cost, geological formations, the eons of years the captured gas would have to be securely contained, etc).¶ The Government also provides billions in subsidies to the industry.¶ As most reputable institutions and individuals acknowledge, the science is unequivocal: as a result of human activity, the global ecosystem is approaching a planetary-scale transition.¶ If this global warming tipping point is breached, the planet will embark on an unstoppable trajectory to a new geological era unsuitable for human life.¶ The United Nations estimates that 300,000 people die prematurely each year as a result of global warming. These numbers are projected to grow exponentially.¶ The Lancet medical journal predicted that the loss of healthy life years as a result of global warming would be 500 times greater in Africa than in Europe those least responsible suffer worst and first.¶ Yet in Australia we seem anaesthetised from the realities of serious climate disruption.¶ The Climate Commission, the pre-eminent body in Australia charged with informing us about climate change, talks on its webpage not only of the ``impacts'' but the ``opportunities''!¶ The Government's major selling point of the carbon tax is how much better off ordinary Australian working families will be. At the same time, Government ministers revel in the wealth created by the mining industry, including the worst climate change culprit, coal.¶ The Government fails to tell us that the coal industry's continuing expansion will make any savings in carbon emissions brought about by the tax pale into insignificance.¶ Guy Pearse, research fellow at the Global Change Institute at the University of Queensland, warns us that coal and coal-seam gas are projected to do 11 times as much damage as the carbon emissions savings resulting from the Gillard Government's Clean Energy Future package.¶ Meanwhile, Treasurer Wayne Swan, Minerals and Energy Minister Martin Ferguson and Climate Commissioner Professor Tim Flannery are reassuring the coal industry that its future is secure.¶ Flannery, at the NSW Minerals Council in November, said: ``[We] will have a healthy coal export industry in this country for some decades to come . . . perhaps for the next 25 years, Australian coal is going to find a ready market.''¶ There is a complete disjuncture between the Government's climate policy and the growth in coal mining and export.¶ There are also questions over the mechanism Australia is using to tackle carbon emissions the carbon tax as a precursor to an emissions trading scheme by 2015.¶ The European Union's Emissions trading scheme, launched in 2005 and the largest cap-and-trade scheme to date, resulted in carbon savings amounting to less than a third of 1 per cent of emissions over the first five years of its life to 2010.¶ At the outset, the EU permit allocations were based largely on estimates prepared by the corporations themselves, resulting in allocations that, in some industries, exceeded existing carbon emissions by nearly 50 per cent.¶ After this became public knowledge, the price of permission to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide collapsed from 33 euros to 0.20 euros!¶ Emissions trading schemes are market mechanisms that tie the future of the planet into the financial sector which has shown itself to be unstable throughout the global financial crisis. It is alarming that speculators trading in derivatives do the most carbon trading, a trend that will continue as carbon markets grow.¶ Carbon trading is built on the premise that we need to keep the fossil fuel industry going for as long as possible. Much international research on carbon trading concludes that it is ineffective, inequitable, inefficient and unjust with the potential to exacerbate the problem and delay real action.¶ Furthermore, scientists at the Stockholm Resilience Centre have identified nine planetary boundaries which, if transgressed, threaten human survival. In addition to climate change, these include freshwater use, biological diversity, ocean acidification, nitrogen and phosphorus inputs into the biosphere and oceans, aerosol loading and chemical pollution. These are interconnected and for three of them climate change, biological diversity and nitrogen input to the biosphere the boundaries have been crossed, thus threatening the ability of the other indicators to stay within their boundaries.¶ Within a short space of time we are facing not only the possibility of breaching global warming tipping points, but a range of indicators predict the Earth's biosphere will be degraded to a point where it is incapable of supporting human life.¶ By treating climate change as a silo issue, we miss the real story. Our economic practices of growing production and consumption are not sustainable. We must look at alternative ways of organising society.¶ What the science is telling us is not a good news story, and the political spin that tells us we can live even better, and with more, is false.¶ Humanity desperately needs political leaders with the integrity and vision to see past the next election, and a populace that cares for future generations.¶ We need to build societies based on custodianship of the shared ecological commons, instead of maintaining a society in which the market is the dominant driving force.¶ We need to cease the ``bigger house, bigger car, bigger TV and more overseas holidays'' mantra.¶ We need to build a society with less material values, based on inclusion, equity and co-operation, and one that is restorative of the biosphere.¶ Citizens must take responsibility for becoming informed.¶ We have reached a point in human history where more, bigger and better can only lead us like lemmings over the cliff.¶ | 6,482 | <h4><u><strong>Can’t solve- Eight other reasons not addressed.</h4><p>Weston ‘12</p><p></u></strong>(DR Del Weston did her PhD on the political economy of global warming at Curtin University in Western Australia.¶ She has a Visiting Scholar position at the University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, South Africa, and has just started an Honorary Research Associate position at the University of Tasmania in the School of Geography and Environmental Science.¶ She moved to Tasmania about eight months ago and is now living at Mountain River. “Carbon tax far from a cure-all” Hobart Mercury (Australia) July 7, 2012 Saturday, accessed online July 29, 2012, Lexis)</p><p>Australia's carbon tax won't save the world from catastrophic climate change, writes academic Del Weston¶ THE new carbon tax is upon us and the din of the political debate surrounding it is deafening.¶ What gets lost in all of this is that there is a major disjuncture between the objectives of the tax and the continuing support by Government (and Opposition) for the coal industry. Yet <u><mark>we are well into the critical decade to take effective action if we are to prevent major climate disruption</u></mark>.¶ The Government's strategy is at best inconsistent and at worst in tatters. It has poured $2.5 billion into carbon capture and storage a technology plagued by problems and unlikely to help in solving the problem of coal-fired power emissions (for reasons of cost, geological formations, the eons of years the captured gas would have to be securely contained, etc).¶ The Government also provides billions in subsidies to the industry.¶ As most reputable <u>institutions and individuals acknowledge, the science is unequivocal: as a result of human activity, the global ecosystem is approaching a planetary-scale transition.¶ If this global warming tipping point is breached, the planet will embark on an unstoppable trajectory to a new geological era unsuitable for human life.¶</u> The <u>U</u>nited <u>N</u>ations <u>estimates</u> that <u>300,000 people die prematurely</u> <u>each year as a result of global warming</u>. <u>These numbers are projected to grow exponentially.</u>¶ The Lancet medical journal predicted that the loss of healthy life years <u>as a result of global warming would be 500 times greater in Africa than in Europe those least responsible suffer worst </u>and first.¶ Yet in Australia we seem anaesthetised from the realities of serious climate disruption.¶ The Climate Commission, the pre-eminent body in Australia charged with informing us about climate change, talks on its webpage not only of the ``impacts'' but the ``opportunities''!¶ The Government's major selling point of the carbon tax is how much better off ordinary Australian working families will be. At the same time, Government ministers revel in the wealth created by the mining industry, including the worst climate change culprit, coal.¶ The Government fails to tell us that the coal industry's continuing expansion will make any savings in carbon emissions brought about by the tax pale into insignificance.¶ Guy Pearse, research fellow at the Global Change Institute at the University of Queensland, warns us that coal and coal-seam gas are projected to do 11 times as much damage as the carbon emissions savings resulting from the Gillard Government's Clean Energy Future package.¶ Meanwhile, Treasurer Wayne Swan, Minerals and Energy Minister Martin Ferguson and Climate Commissioner Professor Tim Flannery are reassuring the coal industry that its future is secure.¶ Flannery, at the NSW Minerals Council in November, said: ``[We] will have a healthy coal export industry in this country for some decades to come . . . perhaps for the next 25 years, <u><mark>Australian coal is going to find a ready market.''¶ There is a complete disjuncture between the Government's climate policy and the growth in coal mining and export</mark>.</u>¶ There are also questions over the mechanism Australia is using to tackle carbon emissions the carbon tax as a precursor to an emissions trading scheme by 2015.¶ The European Union's Emissions trading scheme, launched in 2005 and the largest cap-and-trade scheme to date, resulted in carbon savings amounting to less than a third of 1 per cent of emissions over the first five years of its life to 2010.¶ At the outset, the EU permit allocations were based largely on estimates prepared by the corporations themselves, resulting in allocations that, in some industries, exceeded existing carbon emissions by nearly 50 per cent.¶ After this became public knowledge, the price of permission to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide collapsed from 33 euros to 0.20 euros!¶ Emissions trading schemes are market mechanisms that tie the future of the planet into the financial sector which has shown itself to be unstable throughout the global financial crisis. It is alarming that speculators trading in derivatives do the most carbon trading, a trend that will continue as carbon markets grow.¶ Carbon trading is built on the premise that we need to keep the fossil fuel industry going for as long as possible. Much <u>international research on carbon trading concludes that it is ineffective, inequitable, inefficient and unjust with the potential to exacerbate the problem and delay real action.</u>¶ Furthermore, <u><mark>scientists at the Stockholm Resilience Centre have identified nine planetary boundaries</u></mark> which, if transgressed, <u><mark>threaten human survival</u></mark>. <u>In addition to climate change, these <mark>include freshwater use</mark>, <mark>biological diversity,</mark> <mark>ocean acidification</mark>, <mark>nitrogen and phosphorus inputs</mark> into the biosphere and oceans, <mark>aerosol loading</mark> <mark>and chemical pollution</mark>. These are interconnected and for <mark>three of them</mark> climate change, biological diversity and nitrogen input to the biosphere the boundaries <mark>have been crossed</mark>, <mark>thus threatening the ability of the other indicators to stay within their boundaries</mark>.</u>¶ <u>Within a short space of time we are facing not only the possibility of breaching global warming tipping points, but a range of indicators predict the Earth's biosphere will be degraded to a point where it is incapable of supporting human life.¶</u> <u><mark>By treating climate change as a silo issue, we miss the real story. Our economic practices of growing production and consumption are not sustainabl</mark>e</u>. We must look at alternative ways of organising society.¶ What the science is telling us is not a good news story, and the political spin that tells us we can live even better, and with more, is false.¶ Humanity desperately needs political leaders with the integrity and vision to see past the next election, and a populace that cares for future generations.¶ We need to build societies based on custodianship of the shared ecological commons, instead of maintaining a society in which the market is the dominant driving force.¶ We need to cease the ``bigger house, bigger car, bigger TV and more overseas holidays'' mantra.¶ We need to build a society with less material values, based on inclusion, equity and co-operation, and one that is restorative of the biosphere.¶ Citizens must take responsibility for becoming informed.¶ We have reached a point in human history where more, bigger and better can only lead us like lemmings over the cliff.¶ </p> | 1NR | Hemp | A2: warming | 429,905 | 1 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,571 | The aff is curriculum – the 1AC’s strategy is premised upon utilizing knowledge as a telos which runs parallel to settler colonialism – they mystify the structuring foundation for the modern university: the walling off of indigenous bodies from civil society | Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez ’13. | Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez ’13. (Eve Tuck – professor of educational foundations and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, and RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity,” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, p. 72-89) | the White settler-becoming-Indian resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of curriculum studies Here, the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy and the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization. curriculum and its history in the U S has invested in settler colonialism, and the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state the settler colonial curricular project of replacement aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing the bodies out to the margins interventions have tried to dislodge the aims of replacement but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity | the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization curriculum has invested in settler colonialism the settler colonial curricular project of replacement aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other, perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum absorbing the knowledge displacing the bodies out to the margins but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity | Natty Bumppo, not savage, and no longer European, is positioned to claim “native status,” symbolically taking the place of “the last of the mohicans” and of all the other vanishing tribes. The figure of the frontiers man who is one with nature saturates the U.S. cultural imaginary, from the Adirondack backwoodsman and the Order of the Arrow of the Boy Scouts of America (Alonso Recarte, 2010), to Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves and the most recent expression of the White settler-becoming-Indian, Johnny Depp’s characterization of Tonto. Natty Bumppo also resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of progressive fields such as curriculum studies. Here, the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy, and the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization. This article does the simultaneously blunt and delicate work of exhuming the ways in which curriculum and its history in the United States has invested in settler colonialism, and the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state. In particular, we will describe the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, which aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous. To do this, we employ the story of Natty Bumppo, as an extended allegory to understand the ways in which the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other, perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood. As we discuss in this article, even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream, like the knowledge gained by Natty Bumppo, only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics. White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces” opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum, such as multiculturalism and critical race theory, absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing the bodies out to the margins. Thus, we will discuss how various interventions have tried to dislodge the aims of replacement, including multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning, but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity. | 2,516 | <h4>The aff is <u>curriculum</u> – the 1AC’s strategy is premised upon utilizing knowledge as a telos which runs parallel to settler colonialism – they mystify the structuring foundation for the modern university: the walling off of indigenous bodies from civil society</h4><p><u><strong>Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez ’13.</u></strong> (Eve Tuck – professor of educational foundations and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, and RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity,” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, p. 72-89) </p><p>Natty Bumppo, not savage, and no longer European, is positioned to claim “native status,” symbolically taking the place of “the last of the mohicans” and of all the other vanishing tribes. The figure of the frontiers man who is one with nature saturates the U.S. cultural imaginary, from the Adirondack backwoodsman and the Order of the Arrow of the Boy Scouts of America (Alonso Recarte, 2010), to Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves and the most recent expression of <u>the White settler-becoming-Indian</u>, Johnny Depp’s characterization of Tonto. Natty Bumppo also <u>resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of</u> progressive fields such as <u>curriculum studies</u>. <u>Here,</u> <u><strong><mark>the future of the settler is ensured</u></strong> <u>by the</u> <u><strong>absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy</u></strong></mark>, <u>and <mark>the <strong>replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization</mark>.</u></strong> This article does the simultaneously blunt and delicate work of exhuming the ways in which <u><strong><mark>curriculum</mark> and its history in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><mark>has invested in settler colonialism</mark>, and</u> <u><strong>the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state</u></strong>. In particular, we will describe <u><mark>the settler colonial curricular project of replacement</u></mark>, which <u><mark>aims to</u> <u><strong>vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers</strong></mark>, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous</u>. To do this, we employ the story of Natty Bumppo, as an extended allegory to understand the ways in which <u><mark>the field of curriculum has continued to</u> <u><strong>absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other</u></strong>, <u><strong>perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood</u></strong></mark>. As we discuss in this article, <u>even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, <mark>these responses become</u> <u><strong>refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream</u></strong></mark>, like the knowledge gained by Natty Bumppo, <u>only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics</u>. <u><strong><mark>White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces”</u></strong> <u>opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum</u></mark>, such as multiculturalism and critical race theory, <u><strong><mark>absorbing the knowledge</mark>, but once again <mark>displacing the bodies out to the margins</u></strong></mark>. Thus, we will discuss how various <u>interventions have <strong>tried to dislodge</strong> the aims of replacement</u>, including multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning, <u><strong><mark>but</strong> have been</u> <u><strong>sidelined</u></strong> <u><strong>and reappropriated</u></strong> <u>in ways that</u> <u><strong>reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 74,295 | 51 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
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740,572 | Warming won’t cause extinction | Barrett 7 | Barrett 7
Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7¶ (Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction) | climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons It will alter critical ecosystems this is also happening now for reasons unrelated to climate change Catastrophic” climate change is not certain. large changes such as sea level rise will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. abrupt climate change is unlikely to be ruinous. Even in a worse case scenario climate change is not the equivalent of the mega-asteroid. if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. | climate change does not threaten survival of human species biodiversity depleted now due to other reasons Catastrophic” climate change is not certain changes will take centuries to unfold, giving time to adjust. abrupt climate change is unlikely to be ruinous | First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now. | 1,405 | <h4><u><strong>Warming won’t cause extinction</h4><p>Barrett 7</p><p></u></strong>Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7¶ (Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)</p><p>First, <u><strong><mark>climate change does not threaten</mark> the <mark>survival of</mark> the <mark>human species</u></strong></mark>.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though <u><mark>biodiversity</mark> is being <mark>depleted now due to other reasons</u></mark>). <u>It will alter critical ecosystems</u> (though <u>this is also happening now</u>, and <u>for reasons unrelated to climate change</u>). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “<u><mark>Catastrophic” climate change is</u></mark> possible, but <u><mark>not certain</mark>.</u> Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, <u>large <mark>changes</u></mark> (<u>such as sea level rise</u> of, say, ten meters) <u><strong><mark>will</mark> likely <mark>take centuries to unfold, giving</mark> societies <mark>time to adjust.</u></strong></mark> “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, <u><strong><mark>abrupt climate change</u></strong></mark> (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, <u><strong><mark>is unlikely to be ruinous</mark>.</u></strong> Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. <u><strong>Even in a worse case scenario</u></strong>, however, global <u><strong>climate change is not the equivalent of the</u></strong> Earth being hit by <u><strong>mega-asteroid.</u></strong> Indeed, <u>if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful</u>, then <u>our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming.</u> The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now. </p> | 1NR | Hemp | A2: warming | 97,875 | 126 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
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740,573 | Experts agree | Hsu 10 | Hsu 10 | most experts don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the U C Boulder Broecker, a renowned climate scientist at Columbia University remained skeptical The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity | most experts worst-case scenarios don't foresee extinction. scenarios that the mainstream community are advancing are not end-of-humanity said Pielke a renowned climate scientist remained skeptical rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many | (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html)
His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain." | 1,861 | <h4><u><strong>Experts agree</h4><p>Hsu 10 </p><p></u></strong>(Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html<strong>)</p><p></strong>His views deviate sharply from those of <u><strong><mark>most experts</u></strong></mark>, who <u>don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the <mark>worst-case scenarios</mark> </u>discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <u><mark>don't foresee</mark> human <mark>extinction.</mark> "The <mark>scenarios that the <strong>mainstream</mark> climate <mark>community</strong> are advancing are not end-of-humanity</mark>, catastrophic scenarios," <mark>said</mark> Roger <mark>Pielke</mark> Jr., a climate policy analyst at the U</u>niversity of <u>C</u>olorado at <u>Boulder</u>. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace <u>Broecker, <mark>a</mark> </u>geochemist and <u><strong><mark>renowned climate scientist</strong></mark> at Columbia University</u>'s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker <u><mark>remained skeptical</u></mark> that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "<u><strong>The <mark>rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many</mark> people, and it's not going to kill humanity</u></strong>," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain." </p> | 1NR | Hemp | A2: warming | 164,276 | 103 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,574 | We must exhaust the 1ac through a parasitic act which dooms the system to crumble under its own weight – otherwise, logics of incorporation ensures the recuperation of juridical domination | Bifo 11 | Bifo 11
Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108 | Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does The system must itself commit suicide
MARKED
in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. | Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism energy is running out, and desire is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The proliferation of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies to permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does The system must itself commit suicide
in response to the challenge of death So hostages are taken the hostage is the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may become confused in the same sacrificial ac The West has become suicidal exhaustion could become withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt passivity radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity We have been working too much is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, | Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide
MARKED
in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. | 9,716 | <h4><u><strong>We must exhaust the 1ac through a parasitic act which dooms the system to crumble under its own weight – otherwise, logics of incorporation ensures the recuperation of juridical domination</h4><p>Bifo 11</p><p></u></strong>Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u><strong><mark>pg. 104-108</p><p></strong></mark>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong></mark>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> </mark>which has given soul to modern social dynamics <mark>is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>proliferation of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche <mark>to <strong>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only </mark>way of <mark>escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. <strong><mark>The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does</u></strong></mark> when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</p><p></strong></mark>MARKED</p><p><mark> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death </mark>and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out <strong><mark>the hostage is the</mark> substitute, the <mark>alter-ego of the terrorist</strong>, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may </mark>thereafter <mark>become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u>No need</u>, then, <u>for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism, and</u> <u><strong>adopt </mark>the mode of <mark>passivity</u></strong></mark>. <u>A <strong><mark>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity </mark>that neoliberal politics has imposed</u>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u><mark>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.</u>¶<u> </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out the law of economic growth</u>. <u>The self-organization of the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 174,846 | 274 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,575 | Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact | Singer 11 | Singer 11
Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11¶ (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change) | Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century | Research reveal elevated temperatures during the Medieval Warm Period real-world data do not support the IPCC‘s claim abrupt warming pushed temperatures above peak warmth | Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999). | 1,301 | <h4><u><strong>Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact</h4><p>Singer 11</p><p></u></strong>Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11¶ (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)</p><p><u><mark>Research</mark> from locations around the world <mark>reveal</mark> a significant period of <mark>elevated</u></mark> air <u><mark>temperatures</mark> that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, <mark>during</mark> a time that has come to be known as <mark>the</mark> Little <mark>Medieval Warm Period</mark>.</u> A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but <u>we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of <mark>real-world data</mark> that <mark>do not support the IPCC‘s claim</mark> that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia</u>. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. <u>This <mark>abrupt</mark> and anomalous <mark>warming pushed</mark> the air <mark>temperatures</mark> of these two records considerably <mark>above</mark> their representations of the <mark>peak warmth</mark> of the twentieth century</u>, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999).</p> | 1NR | Hemp | A2: warming | 185,826 | 8 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,576 | We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must refuse interpellation and take back what belongs to the undercommons | Moten and Harney ‘13 [m leap] | Moten and Harney ‘13 (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke, “The University and the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 26-28) [m leap] | The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong teaching would be performing the work of the university Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it it is teaching that brings us in teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university But what would it mean if the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act it is at the same time, the only possible act . To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood. | The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal one can sneak into the university and steal what one can. abuse its hospitality spite its mission join its refugee colony the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings She disappears into the Undercommons where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted Teaching is a profession an operation of the auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas And what of those minorities who refuse as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes into the Undercommons this will be regarded as theft a criminal act the only possible act To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and fugitive the criminal, matricidal, queer on the stroll of the stolen life the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others a radical passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood | The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One. “To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood. | 6,752 | <h4>We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must refuse interpellation and take back what belongs to the undercommons</h4><p><u><strong>Moten and Harney ‘13</u></strong> (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke, “The University and the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 26-28)<u><strong> [m leap]</p><p></strong><mark>The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One</u></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal</u></strong></mark>,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. <u>This is the only possible relationship to the American university today.</u> This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But <u>certainly, this much is true in the United States:</u> <u>it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment</u>. In the face of these conditions <u><mark>one can </mark>only <strong><mark>sneak into the university</strong> and <strong>steal what one can</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>To <mark>abuse its hospitality</strong></mark>, to <strong><mark>spite its mission</strong></mark>, to <strong><mark>join its refugee colony</strong></mark>, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university</u>. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, <u><mark>the subversive intellectual <strong>came under false pretenses</strong>, with <strong>bad documents</strong>, <strong>out of love</u></strong></mark>. <u>Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome</u>. <u><strong><mark>The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings</u></strong></mark>. And on top of all that, she disappears. <u><mark>She disappears </mark>into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, <mark>into the <strong>Undercommons</strong></mark> of Enlightenment, <mark>where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted</mark>, where the revolution is <strong>still black, still strong</u></strong>. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say <u>teaching</u>, one <u>would be performing the work of the university</u>. <u><strong><mark>Teaching</strong> is</mark> merely <mark>a <strong>profession</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>an operation</strong> of</mark> what Jacques Derrida calls<mark> <strong>the</mark> </strong>onto-<strong>/<mark>auto-encyclopedic circle</strong> of the Universitas</u></mark>. But <u>it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters</u>. <u>The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby <strong>erased by it</u></strong>. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But <u>it is teaching that brings us in</u>. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and<u> teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university</u>. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” <u>But what would it mean if</u> teaching or rather what we might call “<u>the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance</u>? <u><mark>And what of those minorities who refuse</mark>, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), <mark>as if <strong>they will not be subjects</strong>, as if <strong>they want to think as objects</strong></mark>, as <strong>minority</u></strong>? Certainly, <u>the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste</u>. But <u>their collective labor will always call into question <strong>who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment</u></strong>. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps <u>the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must</u>. But <u>even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional</u>. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But <u><strong><mark>if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes</strong></mark> with hands full into the underground of the university, <strong><mark>into the Undercommons</strong></mark>—<mark>this will be <strong>regarded as theft</strong></mark>, as <mark>a <strong>criminal act</u></strong></mark>. And <u>it is at the same time, <strong><mark>the only possible act</u></strong></mark>. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research<u>. <mark>To enter this space is to <strong>inhabit the ruptural</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> enraptured disclosure of the commons that <strong><mark>fugitive</strong></mark> enlightenment enacts, <strong><mark>the criminal</strong>, <strong>matricidal</strong>, <strong>queer</strong></mark>, in the cistern, <strong><mark>on the stroll of the stolen life</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back</strong></mark>, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons</u>. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; <u><mark>it’s about <strong>allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>a radical</strong></mark> passion and <strong><mark>passivity</strong></mark> <mark>such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood</mark>, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an <strong>unsafe neighborhood</strong>.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 1,240,567 | 424 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,577 | The 1ac assumes that abandonment is the foundation for power – this ignores the necropolitical system which functions not by letting die but by making death | Mbembe 3 Volume 15 Issue 1) gz | Mbembe 3 (Achilles Mbembe, Ph.D in History at the Sorbonne in Paris, research professor in history and politics at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture Volume 15 Issue 1) gz | If the relations between life and death, the politics of cruelty, and the symbolics of profanity are blurred in the plantation system, it is notably in the colony and under the apartheid regime that there comes into being a peculiar terror formation The most original feature of this terror formation is its concatenation of biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege. Crucial to this concatenation is, once again, race the selection of races, the prohibition of mixed marriages, forced sterilization, even the extermination of vanquished peoples are to find their first testing ground
in the colonial world. Here we see the first syntheses between massacre and bureaucracy, that incarnation of Western rationality the colonial conquest revealed a potential for violence previously unknown. What one witnesses in World War II is the extension to the “civilized” peoples of Europe of the methods previously reserved for the “savages.” in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law and where “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end.” to kill or to conclude peace was recognized as one of the preeminent functions of any state no state could make claims to rule outside of its borders the state, for its part, undertook to “civilize” the ways of killing and to attribute rational objectives to the very act of killing the Jus publicum rapidly assumed the form of a distinction between, on the one hand, those parts of the globe available for colonial appropriation and, on the other, Europe itself This distinction, as we will see, is crucial in terms of assessing the efficacy of the colony as a terror formation Under Jus publicum, a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another or, more precisely, a war between “civilized” states. The centrality of the state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and a moral sign. colonies are similar to the frontiers. They are inhabited by “savages.” The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world colonies are zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization.” That colonies might be ruled over in absolute lawlessness stems from the racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native. In the eyes of the conqueror, savage life is just another form of animal life, a horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave like a part of nature, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. The savages are, as it were, “natural” human beings who lack the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, “so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder For all the above reasons, the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner. Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity the distinction between war and peace does not avail Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy All manifestations of war and hostility that had been marginalized by a European legal imaginary find a place to reemerge in the colonies. Here, the fiction of a distinction between “the ends of war” and the “means of war” collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to pure slaughter without risk or instrumental justification | If life and death are blurred in the plantation it is in the colony that there comes into being a peculiar terror formation Crucial to this concatenation is race the selection of races prohibition of mixed marriages forced sterilization extermination of vanquished peoples find their testing ground
in the colonial world the colony represents the exercise of a power outside the law and where “peace” is more likely to take on a “war without end.” the state undertook to “civilize” ways of killing and attribute rational objectives to killing a distinction between parts of the globe available for colonial appropriation and Europe colonies are similar to the frontiers colonies are zones in which war and disorder alternate where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization.” absolute lawlessness stems from the racial denial of any bond between conqueror and native. In the eyes of the conqueror, savage life is just another form of animal life something alien beyond comprehension “natural” human beings who lack human character so when European men massacred them they were not aware they had committed murder the sovereign right to kill is not subject to rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time an absolute hostility that sets conqueror against an absolute enemy All manifestations of war and hostility marginalized by a legal imaginary reemerge in the colonies pure slaughter without instrumental justification | If the relations between life and death, the politics of cruelty, and the symbolics of profanity are blurred in the plantation system, it is notably in the colony and under the apartheid regime that there comes into being a peculiar terror formation I will now turn to.37 The most original feature of this terror formation is its concatenation of biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege. Crucial to this concatenation is, once again, race.38 In fact, in most instances, the selection of races, the prohibition of mixed marriages, forced sterilization, even the extermination of vanquished peoples are to find their first testing ground
MARKED
in the colonial world. Here we see the first syntheses between massacre and bureaucracy, that incarnation of Western rationality.39 Arendt develops the thesis that there is a link between national-socialism and traditional imperialism. According to her, the colonial conquest revealed a potential for violence previously unknown. What one witnesses in World War II is the extension to the “civilized” peoples of Europe of the methods previously reserved for the “savages.” That the technologies which ended up producing Nazism should have originated in the plantation or in the colony or that, on the contrary—Foucault’s thesis—Nazism and Stalinism did no more than amplify a series of mechanisms that already existed in Western European social and political formations (subjugation of the body, health regulations, social Darwinism, eugenics, medico-legal theories on heredity, degeneration, and race) is, in the end, irrelevant. A fact remains, though: in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law (ab legibus solutus) and where “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end.” Indeed, such a view corresponds to Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely, the power to decide on the state of exception. To properly assess the efficacy of the colony as a formation of terror, we need to take a detour into the European imaginary itself as it relates to the critical issue of the domestication of war and the creation of a European juridical order (Jus publicum Europaeum). At the basis of this order were two key principles. The first postulated the juridical equality of all states. This equality was notably applied to the right to wage war (the taking of life). The right to war meant two things. On the one hand, to kill or to conclude peace was recognized as one of the preeminent functions of any state. It went hand in hand with the recognition of the fact that no state could make claims to rule outside of its borders. But conversely, the state could recognize no authority above it within its own borders. On the other hand, the state, for its part, undertook to “civilize” the ways of killing and to attribute rational objectives to the very act of killing. The second principle related to the territorialization of the sovereign state, that is, to the determination of its frontiers within the context of a newly imposed global order. In this context, the Jus publicum rapidly assumed the form of a distinction between, on the one hand, those parts of the globe available for colonial appropriation and, on the other, Europe itself (where the Jus publicum was to hold sway).40 This distinction, as we will see, is crucial in terms of assessing the efficacy of the colony as a terror formation. Under Jus publicum, a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another or, more precisely, a war between “civilized” states. The centrality of the state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and a moral sign. In the same context, colonies are similar to the frontiers. They are inhabited by “savages.” The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world. Their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their wars are not wars between regular armies. They do not imply the mobilization of sovereign subjects (citizens) who respect each other as enemies. They do not establish a distinction between combatants and noncombatants, or again between an “enemy” and a “criminal.”41 It is thus impossible to conclude peace with them. In sum, colonies are zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other. As such, the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization.” That colonies might be ruled over in absolute lawlessness stems from the racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native. In the eyes of the conqueror, savage life is just another form of animal life, a horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension. In fact, according to Arendt, what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave like a part of nature, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. The savages are, as it were, “natural” human beings who lack the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, “so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder.”42 For all the above reasons, the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner. Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real.43 Peace is not necessarily the natural outcome of a colonial war. In fact, the distinction between war and peace does not avail. Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy.44 All manifestations of war and hostility that had been marginalized by a European legal imaginary find a place to reemerge in the colonies. Here, the fiction of a distinction between “the ends of war” and the “means of war” collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to pure slaughter without risk or instrumental justification. It becomes futile, therefore, to attempt to resolve one of the intractable paradoxes of war well captured by Alexandre Kojève in his reinterpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit: its simultaneous idealism and apparent inhumanity.45 | 7,088 | <h4>The 1ac assumes that abandonment is the foundation for power – this ignores the <u>necropolitical</u> system which functions not by letting die but by making death</h4><p><u><strong>Mbembe 3</u></strong> (Achilles Mbembe, Ph.D in History at the Sorbonne in Paris, research professor in history and politics at the University of the Witwatersrand, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture<u><strong><mark> Volume 15 Issue 1) gz</p><p></strong>If</mark> the relations between <mark>life and death</mark>, the politics of cruelty, and the symbolics of profanity <mark>are <strong>blurred in the plantation</strong></mark> system, <mark>it is</mark> notably <strong><mark>in the colony</strong></mark> and under the apartheid regime <mark>that there comes into being a <strong>peculiar terror formation</u></strong></mark> I will now turn to.37 <u>The most original feature of this terror formation is its <strong>concatenation of biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege</strong>. <mark>Crucial to this concatenation is</mark>, once again, <strong><mark>race</u></strong></mark>.38 In fact, in most instances, <u><mark>the <strong>selection of races</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>prohibition of mixed marriages</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>forced sterilization</strong></mark>, even the <strong><mark>extermination of vanquished peoples</strong></mark> are to <mark>find their</mark> first <strong><mark>testing ground</p><p></u></strong></mark>MARKED</p><p><u><strong><mark> in the colonial world</strong></mark>. Here we see the first syntheses between <strong>massacre and bureaucracy</strong>, that incarnation of Western rationality</u>.39 Arendt develops the thesis that there is a link between national-socialism and traditional imperialism. According to her, <u>the colonial conquest revealed a potential for violence previously unknown. What one witnesses in World War II is the extension to the “civilized” peoples of Europe of the methods previously <strong>reserved for the “savages.” </u></strong>That the technologies which ended up producing Nazism should have originated in the plantation or in the colony or that, on the contrary—Foucault’s thesis—Nazism and Stalinism did no more than amplify a series of mechanisms that already existed in Western European social and political formations (subjugation of the body, health regulations, social Darwinism, eugenics, medico-legal theories on heredity, degeneration, and race) is, in the end, irrelevant. A fact remains, though: <u>in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, <strong><mark>the colony</strong> represents</mark> the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in <mark>the <strong>exercise of a power outside the law</u></strong></mark> (ab legibus solutus) <u><mark>and where “peace” is more likely to take on </mark>the face of <mark>a <strong>“war without end.”</u></strong></mark> Indeed, such a view corresponds to Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely, the power to decide on the state of exception. To properly assess the efficacy of the colony as a formation of terror, we need to take a detour into the European imaginary itself as it relates to the critical issue of the domestication of war and the creation of a European juridical order (Jus publicum Europaeum). At the basis of this order were two key principles. The first postulated the juridical equality of all states. This equality was notably applied to the right to wage war (the taking of life). The right to war meant two things. On the one hand, <u>to kill or to conclude peace was recognized as one of the preeminent functions of any state</u>. It went hand in hand with the recognition of the fact that <u>no state could make claims to rule outside of its borders</u>. But conversely, the state could recognize no authority above it within its own borders. On the other hand, <u><mark>the state</mark>, for its part, <mark>undertook to <strong>“civilize”</mark> the <mark>ways of killing</strong> and</mark> to <strong><mark>attribute rational objectives to</mark> the very act of <mark>killing</u></strong></mark>. The second principle related to the territorialization of the sovereign state, that is, to the determination of its frontiers within the context of a newly imposed global order. In this context, <u>the Jus publicum rapidly assumed the form of <mark>a distinction between</mark>, on the one hand, those <mark>parts of the globe <strong>available for colonial appropriation</strong> and</mark>, on the other, <mark>Europe</mark> itself</u> (where the Jus publicum was to hold sway).40 <u>This distinction, as we will see, is crucial in terms of assessing the efficacy of <strong>the colony as a terror formation</u></strong>. <u>Under Jus publicum, a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another or, more precisely, a war <strong>between “civilized” states</strong>. The centrality of the state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and a moral sign. </u>In the same context, <u><strong><mark>colonies are similar to the frontiers</strong></mark>. They are inhabited by <strong>“savages.”</u></strong> <u>The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world</u>. Their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their wars are not wars between regular armies. They do not imply the mobilization of sovereign subjects (citizens) who respect each other as enemies. They do not establish a distinction between combatants and noncombatants, or again between an “enemy” and a “criminal.”41 It is thus impossible to conclude peace with them. In sum, <u><mark>colonies are zones in which <strong>war and disorder</strong></mark>, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or <mark>alternate</mark> with each other</u>. As such, <u>the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order <strong>can be suspended</strong>—the zone <mark>where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to <strong>operate in the service of “civilization.”</mark> </strong>That colonies might be ruled over in <strong><mark>absolute lawlessness</strong> stems from the <strong>racial denial</strong> of any</mark> common <mark>bond between</mark> the <mark>conqueror and</mark> the <mark>native. In the eyes of the conqueror, <strong>savage life is just another form of animal life</strong></mark>, a horrifying experience, <strong><mark>something alien beyond </mark>imagination or <mark>comprehension</u></strong></mark>. In fact, according to Arendt, <u>what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave <strong>like a part of nature</strong>, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be <strong>phantoms</strong>, <strong>unreal</strong> and <strong>ghostlike</strong>. The savages are, as it were, <mark>“natural” human beings who <strong>lack</mark> the specifically <mark>human character</strong></mark>, the specifically human reality, “<mark>so</mark> that <mark>when European men massacred them they</mark> somehow <mark>were <strong>not aware</mark> that <mark>they had committed murder</u></strong></mark>.”42 <u>For all the above reasons, <strong><mark>the sovereign right to kill is not subject to</mark> any <mark>rule in the colonies</strong>. In the colonies, the sovereign might <strong>kill at any time </mark>or in any manner</strong>. Colonial warfare is <strong>not subject to legal and institutional rules</strong>. It is not a legally codified activity</u>. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real.43 Peace is not necessarily the natural outcome of a colonial war. In fact, <u>the <strong>distinction between war and peace does not avail</u></strong>. <u>Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of <mark>an <strong>absolute hostility</strong> that sets</mark> the <mark>conqueror against an <strong>absolute enemy</u></strong></mark>.44 <u><strong><mark>All manifestations of war and hostility</strong></mark> that had been <mark>marginalized by a</mark> European <mark>legal imaginary</mark> find a place to <strong><mark>reemerge in the colonies</strong></mark>. Here, the fiction of a distinction between “the ends of war” and the “means of war” collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to <strong><mark>pure slaughter without </mark>risk or <mark>instrumental justification</u></strong></mark>. It becomes futile, therefore, to attempt to resolve one of the intractable paradoxes of war well captured by Alexandre Kojève in his reinterpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit: its simultaneous idealism and apparent inhumanity.45</p> | 1NC | null | Case | 832,050 | 18 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,578 | Their appeals to scientific consensus shut down democratic deliberation and reinforce technocracy—proven by someone like Hansen who is a hack scientist but is in NASA so we trust him | McKitrick 11 | McKitrick 11
Professor of economics – University of Guelph, 11/22/‘11 | )
attempts to encourage debate on global warming science or policy have run into the obstacle that the IPCC has issued definitive statements therefore—the reasoning goes debate is over. The IPCC is made up of top scientists, it has rigorous review and oversight ensures balance These claims about the IPCC are not true Laframboise shows that the IPCC has evolved into an activist organization bearing little resemblance to the picture of scientific probity painted by its promoters and activist allies.¶ thousands of new Climategate emails add to concerns about the IPCC My study is about the policies, procedures and administrative structures in the IPCC. Most people would not consider themselves sufficiently well-trained to adjudicate conflicting claims on the science of global warming. you don’t have to be a scientist to be capable of understanding when an investigative procedure is biased. The IPCC process has material defects sufficiently serious to put into question the soundness of its claims. IPCC report-writing teams are cherry-picked in an opaque process by a secretive bureau in Geneva, with no effective requirements to ensure representation of diverse viewpoints. Environmentalist campaign groups are heavily overrepresented in author lists. Conflicts of interest abound select authors are asked to review their own work and their critics concluding in their own favour. The expert review process has become little more than elegant stagecraft
MARKED
concealing the reality of unchecked author bias. Unlike regular peer review IPCC authors are allowed to overrule reviewers, and even to rewrite the text after the close of the peer review process.¶ case studies trace key sections of past IPCC reports through the drafting, review and publication stages, showing how evidence was manipulated or changed after peer review. the IPCC plenary panel indifference allowed the IPCC leadership to gut reforms before they were ever implemented.¶ Monday saw the release of 5,000 fresh emails of climate scientists connected with the U.K. Climate Research Unit. the ones that pertain to the IPCC process fully support the contentions in my report.¶ IPCC authors are able to recruit CAs in an opaque process that does not ensure a diversity of views. resulting uniformity is obvious Jones goes through lists of possible CAs with his coauthor Trenberth, declaring Getting people we know and trust is vital.” He categorizes recommendations based on whether the person is “on the right side” This kind of cronyism is shown by the emails to be rampant in the IPCC. | debate on warming run into obstacle that IPCC issued definitive statements the IPCC has evolved into an activist organization thousands of Climategate emails IPCC report-writing teams are cherry-picked in an opaque process with no requirements to ensure diverse viewpoints Environmentalist groups overrepresented Conflicts of interest abound review process has become elegant stagecraft
concealing unchecked author bias IPCC authors are allowed to overrule reviewers and rewrite after the close of peer review evidence was manipulated after peer review authors recruit CAs in an opaque process that does not ensure a diversity of views uniformity is obvious | (Ross, “Fix it or fold it,” Financial Post, http://opinion.financialpost.com/2011/11/22/fix-it-or-fold-it/)
For many years, attempts to encourage debate on global warming science or policy have run into the obstacle that the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has issued definitive statements, and therefore—the reasoning goes—the era of debate is over. The IPCC is made up of thousands of the world’s top scientists, it has one of the most rigorous and exhaustive review processes in the history of science, and the oversight by 195 member governments ensures balance, transparency and accountability. Or so we are told.¶ These claims about the IPCC are not true, but until relatively recently few were willing to question what they were told. Things began to change in 2009 with the leak of the Climategate emails, which prompted some observers to begin questioning their assumptions about the IPCC. Then this fall, Canadian investigative journalist Donna Laframboise released her book The Delinquent Teenager Who Was Mistaken for the World’s Top Climate Expert, a superb exposé of the IPCC that shows convincingly that the IPCC has evolved into an activist organization bearing little resemblance to the picture of scientific probity painted by its promoters and activist allies.¶ On Monday, news emerged of another release of thousands of new Climategate emails, with early indications that some of them add to concerns about the IPCC that arose from the 2009 disclosures.¶ I am pleased to announce the publication of a report I have written that provides systematic detail on the procedures of the IPCC and makes the case for reforming them. My study, called What is Wrong With the IPCC? A Proposal for Radical Reform, was published by the Global Warming Policy Foundation in the U.K., and includes a foreword by the Hon. John Howard, former prime minister of Australia.¶ The first thing to note about this report is that it is not about science. It is about the policies, procedures and administrative structures in the IPCC. A third of the report consists simply of explanations of how the IPCC works. The more people learn such details, the more they will see that the IPCC does not come close to living up to the hype.¶ Most people would not consider themselves sufficiently well-trained to adjudicate conflicting claims on the science of global warming. But you don’t have to be a scientist to be capable of understanding when an investigative procedure is biased. The IPCC assessment process has material defects, which are sufficiently serious and numerous to put into question the soundness of some of its most heavily promoted claims.¶ What are some of the flaws? IPCC report-writing teams are cherry-picked in an opaque process by a secretive bureau in Geneva, with no effective requirements to ensure representation of diverse viewpoints. Environmentalist campaign groups are heavily overrepresented in the resulting author lists. Conflicts of interest abound throughout the report-writing process, whereby select authors are asked to review their own work and that of their critics, inevitably concluding in their own favour. The expert review process has become little more than elegant stagecraft
MARKED
, creating an illusion of adversarial cross-examination while concealing the reality of unchecked author bias. Unlike in regular academic peer review procedures, IPCC authors are allowed to overrule reviewers, and even to rewrite the text after the close of the peer review process.¶ In my report I provide case studies that trace key sections of past IPCC reports through the drafting, review and publication stages, showing how evidence was manipulated or changed after the close of peer review. Some of these incidents had already been documented, but some of them can only now be fully explained because of the disclosure of email traffic among IPCC authors in both the Climategate archives and in files obtained under recent U.K. freedom of information rulings.¶ I also look at the review of IPCC procedures undertaken last year by the Inter-Academy Council (IAC). The IAC report picked up on some of the major problems I also identify, but the task of devising and implementing reforms fell to the IPCC plenary panel, an unwieldy and passive assembly of delegates from 195 member states, whose manifest indifference allowed the IPCC leadership to gut the reforms before they were ever implemented.¶ My report presents a set of reform proposals that are based on the simple notion that the IPCC assessment process should be made as rigorous as an ordinary academic journal. The surprise for many readers will be how radical the required changes would be.¶ In a surprise, and fast-breaking development, Monday morning saw the release of more than 5,000 fresh emails of climate scientists connected with the U.K. Climate Research Unit. They will be examined over the next few days with intense interest. Having read several hundred so far, most are simply the usual traffic among active scholars. But the ones that pertain to the IPCC process fully support the contentions in my report.¶ For instance, I discuss the problem that IPCC chapter authors are able to recruit contributing authors (CAs) in an opaque process that does not ensure a diversity of views. The resulting uniformity is obvious simply from looking at the list of authors, but we can now see the confirmatory evidence in the email traffic. In a pair of emails (nos. 0714 and 3205), IPCC lead author Phil Jones goes through lists of possible CAs with his IPCC coauthor Kevin Trenberth, declaring “Getting people we know and trust is vital.” He then categorizes his recommendations based, not on whether the person is the most qualified but on whether the person is “on the right side” (namely agrees with him), or whether he “trusts” him or not. At one point he dismisses a particular expert who “has done a lot but I don’t trust him.” This kind of cronyism is shown by the emails to be rampant in the IPCC. | 6,017 | <h4><u><strong>Their appeals to scientific consensus shut down democratic deliberation and reinforce technocracy—proven by someone like Hansen who is a hack scientist but is in NASA so we trust him</h4><p>McKitrick 11</p><p></u></strong>Professor of economics – University of Guelph, 11/22/‘11</p><p>(Ross, “Fix it or fold it,” Financial Post, http://opinion.financialpost.com/2011/11/22/fix-it-or-fold-it/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>For many years, <u>attempts to encourage <mark>debate on</mark> global <mark>warming</mark> science or policy have <mark>run into</mark> the <mark>obstacle that</mark> the</u> UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (<u><mark>IPCC</u></mark>) <u>has <mark>issued definitive statements</u></mark>, and <u><strong>therefore—the reasoning goes</u></strong>—the era of <u><strong>debate is over.</u></strong> <u>The IPCC is made up of</u> thousands of the world’s <u>top scientists, it has</u> one of the most <u>rigorous</u> and exhaustive <u>review</u> processes in the history of science, <u>and</u> the <u>oversight</u> by 195 member governments <u>ensures balance</u>, transparency and accountability. Or so we are told.¶ <u><strong>These claims about the IPCC are not true</u></strong>, but until relatively recently few were willing to question what they were told. Things began to change in 2009 with the leak of the Climategate emails, which prompted some observers to begin questioning their assumptions about the IPCC. Then this fall, Canadian investigative journalist Donna <u>Laframboise</u> released her book The Delinquent Teenager Who Was Mistaken for the World’s Top Climate Expert, a superb exposé of the IPCC that <u>shows</u> convincingly <u>that <mark>the IPCC has evolved into an activist organization</mark> bearing little resemblance to the picture of scientific probity painted by its promoters and activist allies.¶ </u>On Monday, news emerged of another release of <u><mark>thousands of</mark> new <mark>Climategate emails</u></mark>, with early indications that some of them <u>add to concerns about the IPCC</u> that arose from the 2009 disclosures.¶ I am pleased to announce the publication of a report I have written that provides systematic detail on the procedures of the IPCC and makes the case for reforming them. <u>My study</u>, called What is Wrong With the IPCC? A Proposal for Radical Reform, was published by the Global Warming Policy Foundation in the U.K., and includes a foreword by the Hon. John Howard, former prime minister of Australia.¶ The first thing to note about this report is that it is not about science. It <u>is about the policies, procedures and administrative structures in the IPCC.</u> A third of the report consists simply of explanations of how the IPCC works. The more people learn such details, the more they will see that the IPCC does not come close to living up to the hype.¶ <u>Most people would not consider themselves sufficiently well-trained to adjudicate conflicting claims on the science of global warming.</u> But <u><strong>you don’t have to be a scientist to be capable of understanding when an investigative procedure is biased.</u></strong> <u>The IPCC</u> assessment <u>process has material defects</u>, which are <u><strong>sufficiently serious </u></strong>and numerous <u><strong>to put into question the soundness of</u></strong> some of <u><strong>its</u></strong> most heavily promoted <u><strong>claims.</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>What are some of the flaws? <u><mark>IPCC report-writing teams are cherry-picked in an opaque process</mark> by a secretive bureau in Geneva, <mark>with no </mark>effective <mark>requirements to ensure</mark> representation of <mark>diverse viewpoints</mark>. <mark>Environmentalist</mark> campaign <mark>groups</mark> are heavily <mark>overrepresented</mark> in</u> the resulting <u>author lists. <mark>Conflicts of interest abound</u></mark> throughout the report-writing process, whereby <u>select authors are asked to review their own work and</u> that of <u>their critics</u>, inevitably <u>concluding in their own favour.</u> <u><strong>The expert <mark>review process has become</mark> little more than <mark>elegant stagecraft</p><p></mark>MARKED</p><p></u></strong>, creating an illusion of adversarial cross-examination while <u><mark>concealing</mark> the reality of <strong><mark>unchecked author bias</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Unlike</u> in <u>regular</u> academic <u>peer review</u> procedures, <u><mark>IPCC authors are allowed to overrule reviewers</mark>, <mark>and</mark> even to <mark>rewrite</mark> the text <mark>after the close of</mark> the <mark>peer review</mark> process.¶ </u>In my report I provide <u>case studies</u> that <u>trace key sections of past IPCC reports through the drafting, review and publication stages, showing how <mark>evidence was manipulated</mark> or changed <mark>after</u></mark> the close of <u><mark>peer review</mark>.</u> Some of these incidents had already been documented, but some of them can only now be fully explained because of the disclosure of email traffic among IPCC authors in both the Climategate archives and in files obtained under recent U.K. freedom of information rulings.¶ I also look at the review of IPCC procedures undertaken last year by the Inter-Academy Council (IAC). The IAC report picked up on some of the major problems I also identify, but the task of devising and implementing reforms fell to <u>the IPCC plenary panel</u>, an unwieldy and passive assembly of delegates from 195 member states, whose manifest <u>indifference</u> <u>allowed the IPCC leadership to gut</u> the <u>reforms before they were ever implemented.¶ </u>My report presents a set of reform proposals that are based on the simple notion that the IPCC assessment process should be made as rigorous as an ordinary academic journal. The surprise for many readers will be how radical the required changes would be.¶ In a surprise, and fast-breaking development, <u>Monday</u> morning <u>saw the release of</u> more than <u>5,000 fresh emails of climate scientists connected with the U.K. Climate Research Unit.</u> They will be examined over the next few days with intense interest. Having read several hundred so far, most are simply the usual traffic among active scholars. But <u>the ones that pertain to the IPCC process fully support the contentions in my report.¶ </u>For instance, I discuss the problem that <u>IPCC</u> chapter <u><mark>authors</mark> are able to <mark>recruit</u></mark> contributing authors (<u><mark>CAs</u></mark>) <u><mark>in an opaque process that does not ensure a diversity of views</mark>.</u> The <u><strong>resulting <mark>uniformity is obvious</u></strong></mark> simply from looking at the list of authors, but we can now see the confirmatory evidence in the email traffic. In a pair of emails (nos. 0714 and 3205), IPCC lead author Phil <u>Jones goes through lists of possible CAs with his</u> IPCC <u>coauthor</u> Kevin <u>Trenberth, declaring</u> “<u><strong>Getting people we know and trust is vital.”</u></strong> <u>He</u> then <u>categorizes</u> his <u>recommendations based</u>, not on whether the person is the most qualified but <u>on whether the person is “on the right side”</u> (namely agrees with him), or whether he “trusts” him or not. At one point he dismisses a particular expert who “has done a lot but I don’t trust him.” <u><strong>This kind of cronyism is shown by the emails to be rampant in the IPCC.</p></u></strong> | 1NR | Hemp | A2: warming | 429,906 | 1 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,579 | Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange | Zupancic ‘3 | Zupancic ‘3 (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry] | A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent | A very good example of doubleness would be the play scene the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play two are enough,” further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not mean truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent | A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play. . . .Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.” | 2,486 | <h4>Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange</h4><p><u><strong>Zupancic ‘3</u></strong> (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]</p><p><u><mark>A very good example of</mark> this kind of <mark>doubleness would be the</mark> famous “<mark>play scene</u></mark>” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. <u>Obviously, <mark>the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as</mark> it would have, for instance, as <mark>a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play</u></mark>. . . .<u>Not only is it the case that “<mark>two are enough,”</mark> but <mark>further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to</mark> an entirely different configuration—<strong>that of <mark>an endless metonymic illusion</u></strong></mark>. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. <u><mark>The logic of the “two”</mark> that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, <mark>implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth</u></mark>. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. <u><mark>The fact that the truth has its temporality does not </mark>simply <mark>mean </mark>that <mark>truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent</u></mark>. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”</p> | 2NC | University K | Perm | 421,930 | 14 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,580 | Food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies | Allouche 11 | Allouche 11
Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January) | debates on whether scarcity of food or water will lead to conflict comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between resources and population growth most empirical studies do not support these arguments. Tech and capital have dramatically increased productivity the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. alarmist scenarios linked use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. In the Middle East foreign ministers have used this bellicose rhetoric. The evidence seems quite weak. none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited to governmental rhetoric more than two-thirds of 1800 water events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale organized political bodies signed more than 3600 water-related treaties There is no correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Water rich countries have been involved in disputes with other water rich countries perceptions of the amount of available water drives co-operation among riparians the threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the recent historical record. debates over climate change popularised water wars. Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin | empirical studies do not support these arguments Tech and capital have increased productivity humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. alarmist scenarios linked water and food insecurity with wars. In the Mid East foreign ministers used this rhetoric. None of the various and extensive databases on causes of war show water 80% of incidents were limited to rhetoric two-thirds fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale perceptions of water drives co-operation threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the historical record | The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008). | 6,259 | <h4>Food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies</h4><p><u><strong>Allouche 11</p><p></u></strong>Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)</p><p>The question of resource scarcity has led to many <u>debates on whether scarcity</u> (whether <u>of food or water</u>) <u>will lead to conflict</u> and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between</u> the economic availability of natural <u>resources and population growth</u> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most <mark>empirical studies do not support</u></strong></mark> any of <u><strong><mark>these</u></strong></mark> neo-Malthusian <u><strong><mark>arguments</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>Tech</u></mark>nological change <u><mark>and</u></mark> greater inputs of <u><mark>capital have</mark> dramatically <mark>increased</u></mark> labour <u><mark>productivity</u></mark> in agriculture. More generally, <u>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because</u> during the last two centuries <u><mark>humankind has breached</u></mark> many <u><mark>resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.</u></mark>¶<u> </u>Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <u><strong><mark>alarmist scenarios</u></strong></mark> have <u><mark>linked</u></mark> the increasing <u>use of <mark>water</mark> resources <mark>and food insecurity with wars.</u></mark> The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ <u><strong><mark>In the Mid</mark>dle <mark>East</u></strong></mark>, presidents, prime ministers and <u><mark>foreign ministers</mark> have</u> also <u><mark>used this</mark> bellicose <mark>rhetoric.</u></mark> Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u>The evidence seems quite weak.</u> Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u>none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.</u>¶<u> </u>The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ <u><mark>None of the <strong>various and extensive databases</strong> on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water</mark> as a casus belli.</u> Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, <u>Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause</u> for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about <u><mark>80% of</mark> the <mark>incidents</mark> relating to water <mark>were limited</u></mark> purely <u><mark>to</mark> governmental <mark>rhetoric</u></mark> intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u>more than <mark>two-thirds</mark> of</u> over <u>1800 water</u>-related ‘<u>events’ <mark>fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></mark> (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u>organized political bodies signed</u> between the year 805 and 1984 <u>more than 3600 water-related treaties</u>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <u><strong>There is</u></strong> however <u><strong>no</u></strong> direct <u><strong>correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. </u></strong>Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). <u>Water rich countries have been involved in</u> a number of <u>disputes with other</u> relatively <u>water rich countries</u> (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, <u><mark>perceptions of</mark> the amount of available <mark>water</u></mark> shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity <u><mark>drives</u></mark> the process of <u><mark>co-operation</mark> among riparians</u> (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, <u><strong>the <mark>threat of water wars</u></strong></mark> due to increasing scarcity <u><strong><mark>does not make</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>sense in the light of the</mark> recent <mark>historical record</mark>.</u></strong> Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The <u>debates over</u> the likely impacts of <u>climate change</u> have again <u>popularised</u> the idea of <u>water wars.</u> The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u> ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).</p> | 1NR | Budgets | A2: food | 28,932 | 766 | 16,981 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | 564,706 | N | Kentucky | 4 | Kentucky HR | Michael Hester | 1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets
1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security
2nc was the k
1nr was case
2nr was the k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,581 | Continuing Mbembe | in the colonial world massacre and bureaucracy reserved for the “savages.” the colony exercise of a power outside the law “war without end.” “civilize” the ways of killing attribute rational objectives to the very act of killing available for colonial appropriation the colony as a terror formation between “civilized” states colonies are similar to the frontiers “savages.” war and disorder can be suspended operate in the service of “civilization.” absolute lawlessness racial denial savage life is just another form of animal life something alien beyond imagination or comprehension | in the colonial world. Here we see the first syntheses between massacre and bureaucracy, that incarnation of Western rationality.39 Arendt develops the thesis that there is a link between national-socialism and traditional imperialism. According to her, the colonial conquest revealed a potential for violence previously unknown. What one witnesses in World War II is the extension to the “civilized” peoples of Europe of the methods previously reserved for the “savages.” That the technologies which ended up producing Nazism should have originated in the plantation or in the colony or that, on the contrary—Foucault’s thesis—Nazism and Stalinism did no more than amplify a series of mechanisms that already existed in Western European social and political formations (subjugation of the body, health regulations, social Darwinism, eugenics, medico-legal theories on heredity, degeneration, and race) is, in the end, irrelevant. A fact remains, though: in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law (ab legibus solutus) and where “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end.” Indeed, such a view corresponds to Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely, the power to decide on the state of exception. To properly assess the efficacy of the colony as a formation of terror, we need to take a detour into the European imaginary itself as it relates to the critical issue of the domestication of war and the creation of a European juridical order (Jus publicum Europaeum). At the basis of this order were two key principles. The first postulated the juridical equality of all states. This equality was notably applied to the right to wage war (the taking of life). The right to war meant two things. On the one hand, to kill or to conclude peace was recognized as one of the preeminent functions of any state. It went hand in hand with the recognition of the fact that no state could make claims to rule outside of its borders. But conversely, the state could recognize no authority above it within its own borders. On the other hand, the state, for its part, undertook to “civilize” the ways of killing and to attribute rational objectives to the very act of killing. The second principle related to the territorialization of the sovereign state, that is, to the determination of its frontiers within the context of a newly imposed global order. In this context, the Jus publicum rapidly assumed the form of a distinction between, on the one hand, those parts of the globe available for colonial appropriation and, on the other, Europe itself (where the Jus publicum was to hold sway).40 This distinction, as we will see, is crucial in terms of assessing the efficacy of the colony as a terror formation. Under Jus publicum, a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another or, more precisely, a war between “civilized” states. The centrality of the state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and a moral sign. In the same context, colonies are similar to the frontiers. They are inhabited by “savages.” The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world. Their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their wars are not wars between regular armies. They do not imply the mobilization of sovereign subjects (citizens) who respect each other as enemies. They do not establish a distinction between combatants and noncombatants, or again between an “enemy” and a “criminal.”41 It is thus impossible to conclude peace with them. In sum, colonies are zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other. As such, the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization.” That colonies might be ruled over in absolute lawlessness stems from the racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native. In the eyes of the conqueror, savage life is just another form of animal life, a horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension. | what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave like a part of nature, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. The savages are, as it were, “natural” human beings who lack the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, “so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder For all the above reasons, the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner. Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity the distinction between war and peace does not avail Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy All manifestations of war and hostility that had been marginalized by a European legal imaginary find a place to reemerge in the colonies. Here, the fiction of a distinction between “the ends of war” and the “means of war” collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to pure slaughter without risk or instrumental justification. It becomes futile, therefore, to attempt to resolve one of the intractable paradoxes of war well captured by Alexandre Kojève in his reinterpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit: its simultaneous idealism and apparent inhumanity.45 | “natural” human beings who lack human character so when European men massacred them they were not aware they had committed murder the sovereign right to kill is not subject to rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time an absolute hostility that sets conqueror against an absolute enemy All manifestations of war and hostility marginalized by a legal imaginary reemerge in the colonies pure slaughter without instrumental justification | MARKED
In fact, according to Arendt, what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave like a part of nature, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. The savages are, as it were, “natural” human beings who lack the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, “so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder.”42 For all the above reasons, the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner. Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real.43 Peace is not necessarily the natural outcome of a colonial war. In fact, the distinction between war and peace does not avail. Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy.44 All manifestations of war and hostility that had been marginalized by a European legal imaginary find a place to reemerge in the colonies. Here, the fiction of a distinction between “the ends of war” and the “means of war” collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to pure slaughter without risk or instrumental justification. It becomes futile, therefore, to attempt to resolve one of the intractable paradoxes of war well captured by Alexandre Kojève in his reinterpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit: its simultaneous idealism and apparent inhumanity.45 | 1,899 | <h4>Continuing Mbembe</h4><p><u><strong><mark>in the colonial world</strong></mark>. Here we see the first syntheses between <strong>massacre and bureaucracy</strong>, that incarnation of Western rationality</u>.39 Arendt develops the thesis that there is a link between national-socialism and traditional imperialism. According to her, <u>the colonial conquest revealed a potential for violence previously unknown. What one witnesses in World War II is the extension to the “civilized” peoples of Europe of the methods previously <strong>reserved for the “savages.” </u></strong>That the technologies which ended up producing Nazism should have originated in the plantation or in the colony or that, on the contrary—Foucault’s thesis—Nazism and Stalinism did no more than amplify a series of mechanisms that already existed in Western European social and political formations (subjugation of the body, health regulations, social Darwinism, eugenics, medico-legal theories on heredity, degeneration, and race) is, in the end, irrelevant. A fact remains, though: <u>in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, <strong><mark>the colony</strong> represents</mark> the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in <mark>the <strong>exercise of a power outside the law</u></strong></mark> (ab legibus solutus) <u><mark>and where “peace” is more likely to take on </mark>the face of <mark>a <strong>“war without end.”</u></strong></mark> Indeed, such a view corresponds to Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely, the power to decide on the state of exception. To properly assess the efficacy of the colony as a formation of terror, we need to take a detour into the European imaginary itself as it relates to the critical issue of the domestication of war and the creation of a European juridical order (Jus publicum Europaeum). At the basis of this order were two key principles. The first postulated the juridical equality of all states. This equality was notably applied to the right to wage war (the taking of life). The right to war meant two things. On the one hand, <u>to kill or to conclude peace was recognized as one of the preeminent functions of any state</u>. It went hand in hand with the recognition of the fact that <u>no state could make claims to rule outside of its borders</u>. But conversely, the state could recognize no authority above it within its own borders. On the other hand, <u><mark>the state</mark>, for its part, <mark>undertook to <strong>“civilize”</mark> the <mark>ways of killing</strong> and</mark> to <strong><mark>attribute rational objectives to</mark> the very act of <mark>killing</u></strong></mark>. The second principle related to the territorialization of the sovereign state, that is, to the determination of its frontiers within the context of a newly imposed global order. In this context, <u>the Jus publicum rapidly assumed the form of <mark>a distinction between</mark>, on the one hand, those <mark>parts of the globe <strong>available for colonial appropriation</strong> and</mark>, on the other, <mark>Europe</mark> itself</u> (where the Jus publicum was to hold sway).40 <u>This distinction, as we will see, is crucial in terms of assessing the efficacy of <strong>the colony as a terror formation</u></strong>. <u>Under Jus publicum, a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another or, more precisely, a war <strong>between “civilized” states</strong>. The centrality of the state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and a moral sign. </u>In the same context, <u><strong><mark>colonies are similar to the frontiers</strong></mark>. They are inhabited by <strong>“savages.”</u></strong> <u>The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world</u>. Their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their wars are not wars between regular armies. They do not imply the mobilization of sovereign subjects (citizens) who respect each other as enemies. They do not establish a distinction between combatants and noncombatants, or again between an “enemy” and a “criminal.”41 It is thus impossible to conclude peace with them. In sum, <u><mark>colonies are zones in which <strong>war and disorder</strong></mark>, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or <mark>alternate</mark> with each other</u>. As such, <u>the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order <strong>can be suspended</strong>—the zone <mark>where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to <strong>operate in the service of “civilization.”</mark> </strong>That colonies might be ruled over in <strong><mark>absolute lawlessness</strong> stems from the <strong>racial denial</strong> of any</mark> common <mark>bond between</mark> the <mark>conqueror and</mark> the <mark>native. In the eyes of the conqueror, <strong>savage life is just another form of animal life</strong></mark>, a horrifying experience, <strong><mark>something alien beyond </mark>imagination or <mark>comprehension</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>MARKED</p><p> In fact, according to Arendt, <u>what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave <strong>like a part of nature</strong>, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be <strong>phantoms</strong>, <strong>unreal</strong> and <strong>ghostlike</strong>. The savages are, as it were, <mark>“natural” human beings who <strong>lack</mark> the specifically <mark>human character</strong></mark>, the specifically human reality, “<mark>so</mark> that <mark>when European men massacred them they</mark> somehow <mark>were <strong>not aware</mark> that <mark>they had committed murder</u></strong></mark>.”42 <u>For all the above reasons, <strong><mark>the sovereign right to kill is not subject to</mark> any <mark>rule in the colonies</strong>. In the colonies, the sovereign might <strong>kill at any time </mark>or in any manner</strong>. Colonial warfare is <strong>not subject to legal and institutional rules</strong>. It is not a legally codified activity</u>. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real.43 Peace is not necessarily the natural outcome of a colonial war. In fact, <u>the <strong>distinction between war and peace does not avail</u></strong>. <u>Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of <mark>an <strong>absolute hostility</strong> that sets</mark> the <mark>conqueror against an <strong>absolute enemy</u></strong></mark>.44 <u><strong><mark>All manifestations of war and hostility</strong></mark> that had been <mark>marginalized by a</mark> European <mark>legal imaginary</mark> find a place to <strong><mark>reemerge in the colonies</strong></mark>. Here, the fiction of a distinction between “the ends of war” and the “means of war” collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to <strong><mark>pure slaughter without </mark>risk or <mark>instrumental justification</mark>. It becomes futile, therefore, to attempt to resolve one of the intractable paradoxes of war well captured by Alexandre Kojève in his reinterpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit: its simultaneous idealism and apparent inhumanity.45</p></u></strong> | 2NC | Case | Necropolitics | 832,050 | 18 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,582 | Survival | Wrenn 13 | Corey Lee Wrenn 13, adjunct professor of Sociology with Dabney S. Lancaster Community College and an adjunct professor of Social Psychology with the Rocky Mountain College of Art and Design, The Neoliberalism Behind Sexy Veganism: Individuals, Structures, and “Choice”, veganfeministnetwork.com/tag/individualism/ | There is no “choice.” This isn’t about the individual. This is about systems of oppression and social structures that shape our behavior and limit what choices are available to us based on our social identity.
choice” is often thrown around as a means of deflecting critical thought at systems of oppression If it’s all about your individual choice, only you are responsible, only you are to blame. Anyone who has a problem with that must be judging you as a person So often our advocacy is framed as personal choice, an individual expression This is a co-optation of anti-oppression social activism in a neo-liberal structure of exploitation.
Neoliberalism is all about “freedom”: Freedom from government,freedom from regulation, freedom to buy, freedom to sell, freedom to reach your full potential, It’s about individuals out for themselves This is how capitalism thrives freedom comes at a cost to those who will inevitably be exploited to pay for that “freedom The ideology of neoliberalism and individualism works to benefit the privileged when individuals can attribute their success to their own individual hard work (when in reality they had extensive help from their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.). It also works to blame those less fortunate for their failure. We call them lazy, stupid, leeches (when in reality they had extensive barriers placed upon them according to their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.).
When we soak in this neoliberal poison and start to view social movements–inherently
MARKED
designed to challenge unequal power structures–as something done by the individual, for the individual, we’ve lost the fight right off the bat. | choice” is thrown around as a means of deflecting critical thought at systems of oppression. If it’s all about your individual choice, only you are responsible, only you are to blame. Anyone who has a problem with that must be judging you as a person our advocacy is framed as individual expression This is a co-optation of activism in neo-liberal exploitation
Neoliberalism is all about “freedom”: Freedom from government from regulation to buy, to sell It’s about individuals out for themselves. This is how capitalism thrives .” The ideology of neoliberalism and individualism works to benefit the privileged when individuals can attribute their success to their own individual hard work (when in reality they had extensive help from their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.). It also works to blame those less fortunate for their failure. We call them lazy, stupid, leeches (when in reality they had extensive barriers placed upon them according to their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.).
When we view social movements–
designed to challenge power structures–as something done by the individual, for the individual, we’ve lost the fight | I’m going to make a radical claim, well, actually it’s pretty widely accepted in the social sciences: There is no “choice.” This isn’t about the individual. This is about systems of oppression and social structures that shape our behavior and limit what choices are available to us based on our social identity. If you are a young, thin, white woman advocating for Nonhuman Animals in a pornified, hyper-sexualized society, one choice stands out loud and clear: Get naked. It’s supposed to be empowering, and we think maybe it helps animals.
First, I’m not really sure why one has to feel sexually empowered when one is advocating against the torture and death of Nonhuman Animals. Why our movement is keen on making violence a turn on is a little disturbing. It probably speaks something to our tendency to juxtapose women with violence. The sexualization of violence against women and other feminized social groups like Nonhuman Animals is evidence to the rape culture we inhabit.
Aside that, however, “choice” is often thrown around as a means of deflecting critical thought at systems of oppression. If it’s all about your individual choice, only you are responsible, only you are to blame. Anyone who has a problem with that must be judging you as a person. So often our advocacy is framed as personal choice, an individual expression. If you aren’t vegan, that’s your “choice.” If you want to have sex with vegetables and have it filmed by PETA, that’s your “choice.” This is a co-optation of anti-oppression social activism in a neo-liberal structure of exploitation.
Neoliberalism is all about “freedom”: Freedom from government,freedom from regulation, freedom to buy, freedom to sell, freedom to reach your full potential, etc. It’s about individuals out for themselves. This is how capitalism thrives: many are free to do whatever they want in the name of open markets, but ultimately, that freedom comes at a cost to those who will inevitably be exploited to pay for that “freedom.” The ideology of neoliberalism and individualism works to benefit the privileged when individuals can attribute their success to their own individual hard work (when in reality they had extensive help from their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.). It also works to blame those less fortunate for their failure. We call them lazy, stupid, leeches (when in reality they had extensive barriers placed upon them according to their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.).
This myth of freedom and meritocracy is actually pretty toxic for social movements. If we fail to recognize how structural barriers impede some, while structural privileges benefit others, we will find it difficult to come together as a political collective. When we soak in this neoliberal poison and start to view social movements–inherently collective endeavors
MARKED
designed to challenge unequal power structures–as something done by the individual, for the individual, we’ve lost the fight right off the bat. | 2,995 | <h4>Survival</h4><p>Corey Lee <u><strong>Wrenn 13</u></strong>, adjunct professor of Sociology with Dabney S. Lancaster Community College and an adjunct professor of Social Psychology with the Rocky Mountain College of Art and Design, The Neoliberalism Behind Sexy Veganism: Individuals, Structures, and “Choice”, veganfeministnetwork.com/tag/individualism/</p><p>I’m going to make a radical claim, well, actually it’s pretty widely accepted in the social sciences: <u>There is no “choice.” This isn’t about the individual. This is about systems of oppression and social structures that shape our behavior and limit what choices are available to us based on our social identity.</u> If you are a young, thin, white woman advocating for Nonhuman Animals in a pornified, hyper-sexualized society, one choice stands out loud and clear: Get naked. It’s supposed to be empowering, and we think maybe it helps animals.</p><p> First, I’m not really sure why one has to feel sexually empowered when one is advocating against the torture and death of Nonhuman Animals. Why our movement is keen on making violence a turn on is a little disturbing. It probably speaks something to our tendency to juxtapose women with violence. The sexualization of violence against women and other feminized social groups like Nonhuman Animals is evidence to the rape culture we inhabit.</p><p> Aside that, however, “<u><strong><mark>choice” is</mark> often <mark>thrown around as a means of deflecting critical thought at systems of oppression</u></strong>. <u>If it’s all about your individual choice, only you are responsible, only you are to blame. Anyone who has a problem with that must be <strong>judging you as a person</u></strong></mark>. <u>So often <mark>our advocacy is framed</mark> <mark>as</mark> personal choice, an <mark>individual expression</u></mark>. If you aren’t vegan, that’s your “choice.” If you want to have sex with vegetables and have it filmed by PETA, that’s your “choice.” <u><strong><mark>This is a co-optation of</mark> anti-oppression social <mark>activism in </mark>a <mark>neo-liberal </mark>structure of <mark>exploitation</strong></mark>.</p><p></u> <u><mark>Neoliberalism is all about “freedom”: <strong>Freedom from government</strong></mark>,freedom <mark>from regulation</mark>, freedom <mark>to buy, </mark>freedom <mark>to sell</mark>, freedom to reach your full potential,</u> etc. <u><mark>It’s about individuals out for themselves</u>. <u>This is how capitalism thrives</u></mark>: many are free to do whatever they want in the name of open markets, but ultimately, that <u>freedom comes at a cost to those who will inevitably be exploited to pay for that “freedom</u><mark>.”<u> The ideology of neoliberalism and individualism works to benefit the privileged when individuals can attribute their success to their own individual hard work (when in reality they had extensive help from their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.). It also works to blame those less fortunate for their failure. We call them lazy, stupid, leeches (when in reality they had extensive barriers placed upon them according to their race, gender, class, physical ability, etc.).</p><p></u></mark> This myth of freedom and meritocracy is actually pretty toxic for social movements. If we fail to recognize how structural barriers impede some, while structural privileges benefit others, we will find it difficult to come together as a political collective. <u><mark>When we </mark>soak in this neoliberal poison and start to<mark> view social movements–</mark>inherently </u>collective endeavors</p><p><u>MARKED</p><p><mark> designed to challenge</mark> unequal <mark>power structures–as something done by the individual, <strong>for the individual</strong>, we’ve lost the fight</mark> right off the bat.</p></u> | 2NC | Case | A2: Survival Strategies | 87,574 | 30 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
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740,583 | This turns the case - they set up the indigenous subject as a privileged analyst who cuts through the dross the nonspeaking subaltern can’t. This is comparatively worse than color-blind racism. | Spivak 1990 | Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “The Intervention Interview.” The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, and Dialogues. Ed. Sarah Harasym. London: Routledge (1990). 113-132. 121-122. | at the conference I saw such a clear opposition being set up, unwittingly, between the subjects of investigation – the people who were speaking at the conference – and the objects of investigation the subject of race and the subject of the racist that opposition had to be deconstructed and the way for me was If you talk about the class struggle as the final determinant, or if you speak about women's oppression as the final determinant, you take a stand, distinguishing yourself from capitalists, racists, men, and also, of course, from the people of the other races, you are making yourself as the subject of investigation, transparent You're not just invisible but transparent, which is much worse. Through you one can see the problem without any interference, and this is a serious questioning of the sovereignty of the subject, it's not just breast-beating the sort of breast-beating which stops the possibility of social change is to say, "I'm only a white male and cannot speak as a feminist," or, "I'm only a white male, I cannot speak for the blacks. “Oh, there was no voice of the other because there were no black anthropologists here,” we are asking that the holders of hegemonic discourse should de-hegemonize their position rather than simply say, "O.K., sorry, we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the blacks." That's the kind of breast-beating that is left behind at the threshold and then business goes on as usual one of my projects is not to allow myself to occupy the place of the marginal because then that allows you to feel that you have an other to speak to Negative metaphysics leads not to paralysis on the part of people who are privileged enough to repudiate essentialism It leads to irresponsibility, self-congratulation, and fun for some people | at the conference I saw a clear opposition between the subjects of investigation – the people speaking and the objects of investigation race and the racist that opposition had to be deconstructed if you speak about women's oppression as the final determinant, you take a stand, distinguishing yourself from racists, men you are making yourself as the subject of investigation, transparent You're not just invisible but transparent, which is much worse. Through you one can see the problem without any interference the sort of breast-beating which stops the possibility of social change is to say, "I'm only a white male and cannot speak as a feminist," or, "I'm only a white male, I cannot speak for the blacks." “Oh, there was no voice of the other because there were no black anthropologists here,” the holders of hegemonic discourse should de-hegemonize their position one of my projects is not to allow myself to occupy the place of the marginal because then that allows you to feel that you have an other to speak to Negative metaphysics leads not to paralysis on the part of people who are privileged enough to repudiate essentialism It leads to irresponsibility, self-congratulation, and fun for some people | Well, there's a great deal to say here but, pour faire vite, I will mention the part of deconstruction that I found useful for the talk at the conference, since I saw such a clear opposition being set up, unwittingly, between the subjects of investigation – the people who were speaking at the conference – and the two objects of investigation, that is to say, the subject of race and the subject of the racist. I felt that that opposition had to be deconstructed in some way, and the way for me was – a way which is crucial; everything I've said so far in fact has related to that – to fix on that one presupposition of deconstruction which problematizes the positionality of the subject of investigation. If you talk about the class struggle – the mode of production narrative – as the final determinant, or if you speak about women's oppression as the final determinant, you take a stand, distinguishing yourself from capitalists, racists, men, and also, of course, from the people of the other races, you are, to an extent, making yourself as the subject of investigation, transparent, and deconstruction will not allow this. You're not just invisible but transparent, which is much worse. Through you one can see the problem without any interference, and this is a very serious claim. It is a serious questioning of the sovereignty of the subject, it's not just breast-beating. As I said in my talk, the sort of breast-beating which stops the possibility of social change is to say, "I'm only a white male and cannot speak as a feminist," or, "I'm only a white male, I cannot speak for the blacks." You know that whole thing about “Oh, there was no voice of the other because there were no black anthropologists here,” et cetera. What we are asking for is that the hegemonic discourses, the holders of hegemonic discourse should de-hegemonize their position of the other rather than simply say, "O.K., sorry, we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the blacks." That's the kind of breast-beating that is left behind at the threshold and then business goes on as usual. The deconstructive problematization of the positionality of the subject of investigation has stood me in very good stead. That is what was reflected when I refused marginalization when there were questions from the floor about my practice and so on. One of the things I said was that one of my projects is not to allow myself to occupy the place of the marginal that you would like to see me in, because then that allows you to feel that you have an other to speak to. That comes from that deconstructive move. In this sense, to go back to my first answer, deconstruction gives a certain critical edge to all possible totalizations of the kind. The structure of complicity, which we should be there, why they should be here, what is getting lost – those are the kinds of things that deconstructive investigation of this area allows you to look at: the ways in which you are complicit with what you are so carefully and cleanly opposing. That leads to much better practice in my view. It seems to me that the understanding of deconstruction as leading to paralysis is to see it merely as a negative metaphysics which would like to be completely anti-essentialist (as if that were possible). Negative metaphysics leads not to paralysis on the part of people who are privileged enough to repudiate essentialism, et cetera. It leads, to use a very old-fashioned word, to irresponsibility, self-congratulation, and fun for some people. The view of deconstruction that I'm proposing here keeps it very clear from (excuse me for fabulating historically) the massive reaction to the failure of 1848 in Europe which brought with it a certain kind of negative metaphysics. | 3,762 | <h4>This turns the case - they set up the indigenous subject as a privileged analyst who cuts through the dross the nonspeaking subaltern can’t. This is comparatively worse than color-blind racism.</h4><p><u><strong>Spivak</u></strong>, Gayatri Chakravorty. “The Intervention Interview.” The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, and Dialogues. Ed. Sarah Harasym. London: Routledge (<u><strong>1990</u></strong>). 113-132. 121-122.</p><p>Well, there's a great deal to say here but, pour faire vite, I will mention the part of deconstruction that I found useful for the talk <u><mark>at the conference</u></mark>, since <u><mark>I saw</mark> such <mark>a clear opposition</mark> being set up, unwittingly, <mark>between the subjects of investigation – the people</mark> who were <mark>speaking</mark> at the conference – <mark>and the</u></mark> two <u><mark>objects of investigation</u></mark>, that is to say, <u>the subject of <mark>race and</mark> the subject of <mark>the racist</u></mark>. I felt that <u><mark>that opposition had to be deconstructed</u></mark> in some way, <u>and the way for me was</u> – a way which is crucial; everything I've said so far in fact has related to that – to fix on that one presupposition of deconstruction which problematizes the positionality of the subject of investigation. <u>If you talk about the class struggle</u> – the mode of production narrative – <u>as the final determinant, or <mark>if you speak about women's oppression as the final determinant, you take a stand, distinguishing yourself from</mark> capitalists, <mark>racists, men</mark>, and also, of course, from the people of the other races, <mark>you are</u></mark>, to an extent, <u><mark>making yourself as the subject of investigation, transparent</u></mark>, and deconstruction will not allow this. <u><mark>You're not just invisible but transparent, which is much worse. Through you one can see the problem without any interference</mark>, and this</u> is a very serious claim. It <u>is a serious questioning of the sovereignty of the subject, it's not just breast-beating</u>. As I said in my talk, <u><mark>the sort of breast-beating which stops the possibility of social change is to say, "I'm only a white male and cannot speak as a feminist," or, "I'm only a white male, I cannot speak for the blacks.</u>"</mark> You know that whole thing about <u><mark>“Oh, there was no voice of the other because there were no black anthropologists here,”</u></mark> et cetera. What <u>we are asking</u> for is <u>that</u> the hegemonic discourses, <u><mark>the holders of hegemonic discourse should de-hegemonize their position</u></mark> of the other <u>rather than simply say, "O.K., sorry, we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the blacks." That's the kind of breast-beating that is left behind at the threshold and then business goes on as usual</u>. The deconstructive problematization of the positionality of the subject of investigation has stood me in very good stead. That is what was reflected when I refused marginalization when there were questions from the floor about my practice and so on. One of the things I said was that <u><mark>one of my projects is not to allow myself to occupy the place of the marginal</u></mark> that you would like to see me in, <u><mark>because then that allows you to feel that you have an other to speak to</u></mark>. That comes from that deconstructive move. In this sense, to go back to my first answer, deconstruction gives a certain critical edge to all possible totalizations of the kind. The structure of complicity, which we should be there, why they should be here, what is getting lost – those are the kinds of things that deconstructive investigation of this area allows you to look at: the ways in which you are complicit with what you are so carefully and cleanly opposing. That leads to much better practice in my view. It seems to me that the understanding of deconstruction as leading to paralysis is to see it merely as a negative metaphysics which would like to be completely anti-essentialist (as if that were possible). <u><mark>Negative metaphysics leads not to paralysis on the part of people who are privileged enough to repudiate essentialism</u></mark>, et cetera. <u><mark>It leads</u></mark>, to use a very old-fashioned word, <u><mark>to irresponsibility, self-congratulation, and fun for some people</u></mark>. The view of deconstruction that I'm proposing here keeps it very clear from (excuse me for fabulating historically) the massive reaction to the failure of 1848 in Europe which brought with it a certain kind of negative metaphysics.</p> | 1NR | Shadow Feminism | Enunciation | 291,251 | 2 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,584 | Their imposition of this transference as a “productive” form of indigenous discussion enforces an understanding of education which frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered through civilizing practices. This form of dispassionate subject construction dooms millions to suffer and turns the case | Mourad 01 | Mourad 01 | The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower – a follower of the social order, both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent This situation reflects that the logic of formal education and the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” One must be an “active learner” or else Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect The modern idea that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. these major problems are symptoms of something more basic It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice. | The belief is that the human being must be made into something better than it was absent a formal education good citizen, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person the subject before education is viewed to be before civilization something in need of being made competent We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky the practical role of reason should be used to understand being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents The perpetuation of the given social order in education is about retaining power It is about cultural politics and marginalization of various groups and about class and socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law these major problems are symptoms of something basic It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself millions live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its escalating incidence of disregard for suffering despite “progress.” The problem calls for a proper response that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice | (Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is the author of Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized education and its relation to the social good, “Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility” Teachers College Record Volume 103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759)
EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower – a follower of the social order, both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? This situation simply reflects that the basic logic of organized formal education and, more generally, the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world” and that children and adults must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One must be an “active learner” or else. Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. Yet under the analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response—one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice. | 10,916 | <h4>Their imposition of this transference as a “productive” form of indigenous discussion enforces an understanding of education which frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered through civilizing practices. This form of dispassionate subject construction dooms millions to suffer<u><strong> and turns the case</h4><p>Mourad 01 </p><p></u></strong>(Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is the author of Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized education and its relation to the social good, “Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility” Teachers College Record Volume 103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759)</p><p>EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? <u><mark>The <strong></mark>tacit, unchallenged <mark>belief</strong> is that</mark> through education, <mark>the human being must be <strong>made into something better</strong> than it was</mark> or would be <mark>absent a <strong>formal education</strong></mark>.</u> <u>There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become</u>: potential achiever, <u><strong>qualified professional, <mark>good citizen, </mark>“leader,” independent actor, <mark>critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person</strong></mark>. In all cases, <mark>the subject before education is viewed to be</mark>, like the subject <strong><mark>before civilization</strong></mark>, <mark>something in need of being <strong>made competent</strong></mark>—and safe—in the mind of the educator</u>. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. <u>It must be <strong>resolved</strong>, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a <strong>rule follower</strong> – a follower of the social order, both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade.</u> <u>The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” <strong>it means competing, and it means obeying the law</u></strong>. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and <u>the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent</u>. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? <u>This situation </u>simply <u>reflects</u> <u>that the </u>basic <u>logic of </u>organized <u>formal education and</u>, more generally, <u>the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people.</u> If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? <u><mark>We talk about <strong>equipping</strong> children and adults to <strong>“solve problems.”</mark> </strong><mark>Yet, <strong>problems do not fall from the sky</strong></mark>; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name</u>. <u>In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that <mark>the practical role of reason should be used to understand </mark>the human <mark>being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents</mark>.</u> <u>That is</u> <u><strong>very different</strong> from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order</u>. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet <u>it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world</u>” and that children and adults <u>must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.”</u> The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. <u><strong>One must be an “active learner” or else</u></strong>. <u>Why?</u> <u>The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a <strong>stake in the perpetuation of the given social order</strong>.</u> Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. <u>This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect</u>. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? <u>The modern idea</u>, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, <u>that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is <strong>responsible for being wholly rational</strong>, as that word is understood according to the social order. <mark>The perpetuation of the given social order in education</mark> as elsewhere <mark>is about</mark> gaining advantage and <mark>retaining power</u></mark>. <u><mark>It is about cultural politics and</mark> about <mark>marginalization of various groups and about class and</mark> about <mark>socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law</mark>.</u> Yet under the analysis that I have made here, <u><mark>these major problems are symptoms of something</mark> more <strong><mark>basic</u></strong></mark>. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. <u><mark>It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are <strong>not at all concerned with their well-being</strong></mark> in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural</u>. <u>It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated.</u> Moreover, “<u>community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member</u>— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that <u><mark>this ethos of betterment through competency will <strong>inevitably fail</strong> </mark>to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries.</u> <u><mark>It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be</mark> <strong><mark>equipped with skills and knowledge </strong>in order to improve itself</mark>. This failure is not only because there are <strong><mark>millions</strong></mark> of children and adults that <strong><mark>live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history</strong></mark>. It is because <mark>the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the <strong>same state</strong> that advances and maintains the <strong>ethos of civility as betterment</strong>, rather than civility as <strong>caring for people</strong> because they are subject to suffering.</u></mark> <u><mark>The alternative</u></mark> that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It <u><mark>is intended to address an <strong>unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization</strong>, namely, its</mark> repetitive and even <mark>escalating incidence of disregard for suffering</mark> and harm in many forms, <strong><mark>despite</strong> </mark>intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological <strong><mark>“progress.”</strong></mark> We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them</u>. <u><mark>The problem</mark> of the individual <mark>calls for a</mark> new formulation and for a <mark>proper response</u></mark>—<u>one <mark>that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent</mark>. <strong><mark>The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice</strong></mark>.</p></u> | 1NR | Shadow Feminism | Generationality | 134,537 | 27 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,585 | In CX she explains the judge’s affirmation of the aff as a thumbs up to her survival strategy – either a) she doesn’t need you in which case there’s no impact to the aff or b) it’s an affective exchange which replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion | Chow 1993 | Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993 | While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? | The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper | (Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17)
While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense? | 5,388 | <h4>In CX she explains the judge’s affirmation of the aff as a thumbs up to her survival strategy – either a) she doesn’t need you in which case there’s no impact to the aff or b) it’s an affective exchange which<strong> replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p><u>Chow</u> </strong>– Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown -<strong> <u>1993</p><p></u></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u>to haunt us.</u> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p> | 1NR | Shadow Feminism | Salvation | 323,208 | 67 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,586 | Legalize means regulation by the government – the 1AC decriminalizes | Polak 2k | Polak 2k
Frederick Polak Canada: Wire: Federal Gov't Won't Appeal Marijuana Ruling Dutch: The Failure of US Drug Policy ME: Drug War Unwinnable Without Legalization Canada: Pot ruling won't be appealed Canada: First medical marijuana crop harvested DND: US MA: Editorial: Reefer Madness DND: US OR: PUB LTE: Bulletin Changes Stance DND: US ME: Judge Amends Bail To OK Marijuana Use DND: US VA: Ky. Pot Growers Lacing Va. Lands DND: US NE: State Patrol On Prowl For Marijuana Harvesters Re: L.A.P.D. neat stuff sort of bad strategy? Hemp candidate fairness REGULATION vs LEGALIZATION Sun, 1 Oct 2000 Volume 1 : Number 631 http://thc-foundation.com/restore/631.txt | Prisons are populated by unimaginable numbers of blacks and latinos, who would not have to go to prison if drugs were not illegal drug prohibition may have been initiated with good intentions, but it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health, leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption If there is one area where lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy. Take the expression 'fighting drugs'. What is called 'fighting drugs' is in reality straightforward promotion of unsafe forms of drug use and of the illegal drugs trade". My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems all of them better than the present situation ‘Legalization' is sometimes used as an invective but in reality legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market by Government' Governmental policies should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved." | prohibition may have good intentions but it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption If one area lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems all of them better than the present situation Legalization' is sometimes used as an invective but in reality legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market by Government' Governmental policies should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved." | In South and Central American countries there is much resistance against American policies towards Colombia. Developments in Canada in this field are also particularly interesting. Opposition against American prohibitionism has now reached proportions that can - to my mind - not much longer remain without political consequences. The important Canadian newspaper 'Ottawa Citizen' has this month published a series of thirteen articles by Dan Gardner about the failure of the 'war on drugs'. These articles were serialized in local newspapers all over Canada. Dan Gardner refers to Netherlands' policies with approval and respect, like, for that matter, is the case in most serious publications on this subject. Gardner gives a cool and clear description of the terrible damages caused by the war on drugs. Many Canadians have now for the first time read about the racist effects of this war. Prisons are populated by unimaginable numbers of blacks and latinos, who would not have to go to prison if drugs were not illegal. The 'inner circle' of the drugwarriors must by now have serious worries about its future. These developments are probably the reason why the U.S. - who no doubt would prefer to leave it to European countries to criticize the drug policies of its loyal ally Holland - started, in the last two years, to launch violent attacks themselves against the Dutch, via their highest drugs-official ex-general McCaffrey and via the DEA, both through the U.S. embassy in The Hague and from Washington. What is Bill Kok going to say to Bill Clinton today? Suppose he had three minutes time for this item on the agenda of the talks. I do not expect him to do it, but what he should of course say is something like this: "Dear Bill, drug prohibition may have been initiated with good intentions, but it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health, leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption. If there is one area where lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy. Take the expression 'fighting drugs'. What is called 'fighting drugs' is in reality straightforward promotion of unsafe forms of drug use and of the illegal drugs trade". What Kok should also say: "In many countries complaints become loud that rational developments in drug policy can not be implemented, because this is supposed to be contrary to the UN drug conventions, which prohibit such action. Yet the experience gained with the existence of 'coffeeshops' in the Netherlands as well as developments in cannabis use show clearly, that some basic suppositions underlying drug prohibition are wrong. We, in Holland, with our liberal policies do not have more, but fewer addicts, as our former minister of foreign affairs Van Mierlo - in his capacity as vice prime minister, so also in my name - stated clearly in his address to the UNGASS, the UN drug-summit in 1998 in New York. But we never hear you about such facts!" "Would that be because our data indicate that we need not worry so much about what would happen after legalization? Anyhow, you do attack us ever more fiercely about production of XTC in the Netherlands. As if the drug trade can be blamed exclusively on the country where production takes place. The truth is really very simple. As long as there is a strong demand for drugs, there will be production and criminalization will only make the trade more lucrative. It does not matter whether drugs come from one country or another. The point is that they should never have been made illegal." And then Wim Kok could sum up with the following remarks: "My criticism of your American approach is not just coming from my country, but can be heard - if you want to listen - in many capitals. An example: just as during the Vietnam war, resistance to your policies is now growing in countries like Canada. Have you taken note of the articles published this month in the 'Ottawa Citizen'? That paper draws a devastating picture of American drug policy. If your advisors have not drawn your attention to these articles by Dan Gardner, I would suggest you fire them immediately." "Of course there is not just one way of dealing with the drugs issue, only one way to regulate this market. My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems, all of them better than the present situation of leaving organization of this market to criminal forces. ‘Legalization' is sometimes used as an invective here, but in reality legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market by Responsible Government'. Use and abuse of drugs will increase only marginally, or even decrease. Just like now, mainly cultural trends and social developments will determine preferences for specific substances and levels of use. Governmental policies can only marginally influence these trends and preferences and should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved." | 4,945 | <h4><u><strong>Legalize means regulation by the government – the 1AC decriminalizes</h4><p>Polak 2k</p><p></u></strong>Frederick Polak Canada: Wire: Federal Gov't Won't Appeal Marijuana Ruling Dutch: The Failure of US Drug Policy ME: Drug War Unwinnable Without Legalization Canada: Pot ruling won't be appealed Canada: First medical marijuana crop harvested DND: US MA: Editorial: Reefer Madness DND: US OR: PUB LTE: Bulletin Changes Stance DND: US ME: Judge Amends Bail To OK Marijuana Use DND: US VA: Ky. Pot Growers Lacing Va. Lands DND: US NE: State Patrol On Prowl For Marijuana Harvesters Re: L.A.P.D. neat stuff sort of bad strategy? Hemp candidate fairness REGULATION vs LEGALIZATION Sun, 1 Oct 2000 Volume 1 : Number 631 <u>http://thc-foundation.com/restore/631.txt</p><p></u>In South and Central American countries there is much resistance against American policies towards Colombia. Developments in Canada in this field are also particularly interesting. Opposition against American prohibitionism has now reached proportions that can - to my mind - not much longer remain without political consequences. The important Canadian newspaper 'Ottawa Citizen' has this month published a series of thirteen articles by Dan Gardner about the failure of the 'war on drugs'. These articles were serialized in local newspapers all over Canada. Dan Gardner refers to Netherlands' policies with approval and respect, like, for that matter, is the case in most serious publications on this subject. Gardner gives a cool and clear description of the terrible damages caused by the war on drugs. Many Canadians have now for the first time read about the racist effects of this war. <u>Prisons are populated by unimaginable numbers of blacks and latinos, who would not have to go to prison if drugs were not illegal</u>. The 'inner circle' of the drugwarriors must by now have serious worries about its future. These developments are probably the reason why the U.S. - who no doubt would prefer to leave it to European countries to criticize the drug policies of its loyal ally Holland - started, in the last two years, to launch violent attacks themselves against the Dutch, via their highest drugs-official ex-general McCaffrey and via the DEA, both through the U.S. embassy in The Hague and from Washington. What is Bill Kok going to say to Bill Clinton today? Suppose he had three minutes time for this item on the agenda of the talks. I do not expect him to do it, but what he should of course say is something like this: "Dear Bill, <u>drug <mark>prohibition may have</mark> been initiated with <mark>good intentions</mark>, <strong><mark>but</strong></mark> <mark>it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health</mark>, <mark>leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption</u></mark>. <u><mark>If</mark> there is <mark>one area</mark> where <mark>lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy</mark>. Take the expression 'fighting drugs'. What is called 'fighting drugs' is in reality straightforward promotion of unsafe forms of drug use and of the illegal drugs trade". </u>What Kok should also say: "In many countries complaints become loud that rational developments in drug policy can not be implemented, because this is supposed to be contrary to the UN drug conventions, which prohibit such action. Yet the experience gained with the existence of 'coffeeshops' in the Netherlands as well as developments in cannabis use show clearly, that some basic suppositions underlying drug prohibition are wrong. We, in Holland, with our liberal policies do not have more, but fewer addicts, as our former minister of foreign affairs Van Mierlo - in his capacity as vice prime minister, so also in my name - stated clearly in his address to the UNGASS, the UN drug-summit in 1998 in New York. But we never hear you about such facts!" "Would that be because our data indicate that we need not worry so much about what would happen after legalization? Anyhow, you do attack us ever more fiercely about production of XTC in the Netherlands. As if the drug trade can be blamed exclusively on the country where production takes place. The truth is really very simple. As long as there is a strong demand for drugs, there will be production and criminalization will only make the trade more lucrative. It does not matter whether drugs come from one country or another. The point is that they should never have been made illegal." And then Wim Kok could sum up with the following remarks: "My criticism of your American approach is not just coming from my country, but can be heard - if you want to listen - in many capitals. An example: just as during the Vietnam war, resistance to your policies is now growing in countries like Canada. Have you taken note of the articles published this month in the 'Ottawa Citizen'? That paper draws a devastating picture of American drug policy. If your advisors have not drawn your attention to these articles by Dan Gardner, I would suggest you fire them immediately." "Of course there is not just one way of dealing with the drugs issue, only one way to regulate this market. <u><strong><mark>My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>all of them better than the present situation</u></strong></mark> of leaving organization of this market to criminal forces. <u>‘<mark>Legalization' is</mark> <mark>sometimes used as an invective</u></mark> here, <u><strong><mark>but in reality</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market</strong> <strong>by</u></strong></mark> Responsible <u><strong><mark>Government'</u></strong></mark>. Use and abuse of drugs will increase only marginally, or even decrease. Just like now, mainly cultural trends and social developments will determine preferences for specific substances and levels of use. <u><mark>Governmental policies</u></mark> can only marginally influence these trends and preferences and <u><mark>should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved."</p></u></mark> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,768 | 4 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,587 | The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process destroys the agency of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped | Spivak 88 | Spivak 88 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp) | SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity Let us now move to consider the margins the silent, silenced center the lowest strata According to Foucault and Deleuze the oppressed, if given the chance can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . . | radical criticism coming out of the West is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject inaugurates a Subject This subject sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the Power and Desire that would inhabit the subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could occupy its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow The clearest example is the remotely orchestrated heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is the obliteration of the trace of that Other We must now confront the following question can the subaltern speak? | SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . . | 4,106 | <h4>The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process destroys the agency of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped</h4><p><u><strong>Spivak 88</u></strong> (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp)</p><p><u>SOME OF THE most <mark>radical criticism coming out of the West</mark> today <mark>is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while</mark> often <mark>providing a cover for this subject of knowledge</u></mark>. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, <u><mark>this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The</u></mark> much publicized <u><mark>critique of the sovereign subject</mark> thus actually <mark>inaugurates a Subject</mark>. . . . <mark>This</mark> S/<mark>subject</mark>, curiously <mark>sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side</mark> of the international division of labor. <mark>It is impossible for contemporary</u></mark> French <u><mark>intellectuals to imagine the</mark> kind of <mark>Power and Desire that would inhabit the</mark> unnamed <mark>subject of the Other</u></mark> of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, <u><mark>in the constitution of that Other</mark> of Europe, <mark>great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could</mark> cathect, could <mark>occupy</mark> (invest?) <mark>its itinerary</u></mark> — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that <u><mark>the intellectual is complicit in the</mark> persistent <mark>constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow</mark>, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. <mark>The clearest</mark> available <mark>example </mark>of such epistemic violence <mark>is the remotely orchestrated</mark>, fareflung, and <mark>heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other</u></mark>. <u><mark>This project is</mark> also <mark>the</mark> asymetrical <mark>obliteration of the trace of that Other</mark> in its precarious Subjectivity</u>. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . <u>Let us now move to consider the margins</u> (one can just as well say <u>the silent, silenced center</u>) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, <u>the lowest strata</u> of the urban subproletariat. <u>According to Foucault and Deleuze</u> (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) <u>the oppressed, if given the chance</u> (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) <u>can speak and know their conditions. <mark>We must now confront the following question</mark>: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, <mark>can the subaltern speak?</mark> . . . </p></u> | 1NR | Shadow Feminism | Sentimentality | 199,199 | 19 | 16,983 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | 564,731 | N | NDT | 5 | Wyoming MM | Paul Johnson, Eric Robinson, Michael Eisenstadt | 1ac was remapping
1nc was university k shadow feminism and case
2nc was university k and case
1nr was shadow feminism
2nr was shadow feminism | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round5.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,588 | Vote Negative our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making meaningful debate impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Vote Negative our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making meaningful debate impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,907 | 1 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,589 | We affirm the 1ac's critical analysis in relation to marihuana's connection to racial discrimination without their focus on legalization | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>We affirm the 1ac's critical analysis in relation to marihuana's connection to racial discrimination without their focus on legalization</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,908 | 1 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,590 | It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,909 | 1 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,591 | No internal link between the plan text and the solvency | Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis) | Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis) | normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect. | normative legal thought will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it doesn't seem concerned with worldly questions about effectiveness of its own discourse It just goes along and proposes prescribes and resolves despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects legal thought remains unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics persons who are never in a position to put any of its advice into effect. | In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect. | 1,125 | <h4>No internal link between the plan text and the solvency</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 90</u> <u>(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)</p><p></u></strong>In fact, <u><mark>normative legal thought </mark>is so much in a hurry that it <mark>will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it</mark>.</u> For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? <u>Normative legal thought <mark>doesn't seem</mark> overly <mark>concerned with</mark> such <mark>worldly</mark> <mark>questions</mark> <mark>about</mark> the character and the <mark>effectiveness of its own discourse</mark>. <mark>It just goes along and proposes</mark>, recommends, <mark>prescribes</mark>, solves, <mark>and resolves</mark>. Yet <mark>despite its</mark> <mark>obvious</mark> <mark>desire</mark> <mark>to have worldly effects</mark>, worldly consequences, normative <mark>legal thought remains</mark> seemingly <mark>unconcerned that for all practical purposes,</mark> <mark>its only consumers are legal academics</u></mark> and perhaps a few law students -- <u><mark>persons who are</mark> virtually <mark>never in a position to put any of its</mark> wonderful normative <mark>advice into effect.</p></u></mark> | 1NC | null | Off | 131,345 | 83 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,592 | The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act | Delgado 91 | Delgado 91 (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april) | Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Schlag, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. Normativity enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. | Are we better off for engaging in normative talk Schlag described normativity as a vacuous, self-referential system form and no substance meaning nothing Normativity enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world to redefine what would make a claim on us | But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all [*954] form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. n82 This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest [*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims. | 2,162 | <h4>The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act</h4><p><u><strong>Delgado 91</u></strong> (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april)</p><p>But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? <u><mark>Are we better off for engaging in normative talk</mark>, either as speakers or listeners?</u><strong> </strong>Pierre<strong> <u></strong><mark>Schlag</mark>, </u>for example,<u> has <mark>described</mark> <mark>normativity</mark> as a zero -- <mark>as</mark> <mark>a vacuous, self-referential system</mark> of talk, all </u>[*954] <u><mark>form</mark> <mark>and no substance</mark>, <mark>meaning nothing</mark>, and about itself. </u>n82 <u>This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.</u> 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that <u>intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. </u>n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. <u><mark>Normativity</u></mark> thus <u><mark>enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world</mark>, <mark>to</mark> tune out or <mark>redefine what would</mark> otherwise <mark>make a claim on</mark> <mark>us</mark>.</u> In the legal system, the clearest [*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,910 | 11 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,593 | The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis | Schlag 90 | Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis) | normative legal thought takes place in a field of pain and death normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have to the field of pain and death. normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices | normative legal thought takes place in a field of pain and death playing language games utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays uninterested in considering its own normative thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing pain What is missing is any serious questioning of the routine of normative thought have to the field of pain and death the pattern of the bureaucratic distribution of pain and the death the normative appeal turns us away from recognizing that thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate normative legal thought rather than assisting stands in the way. | All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.
It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives. | 3,522 | <h4>The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 90</u> </strong>(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)</p><p>All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this <u><mark>normative legal thought</u></mark>, as Robert Cover explained,<u> <mark>takes place in a field of pain and death</u></mark>. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, <u>normative legal thought is <mark>playing language games</mark> -- <mark>utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays</mark>, and thus, utterly <mark>uninterested in considering its own</mark> rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death.</u> <u>To be sure, <mark>normative</mark> legal <mark>thinkers are often genuinely concerned with</mark> <mark>reducing</mark> the <mark>pain</mark> and the death</u>. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. <u><mark>What is missing</mark> in normative legal thought <mark>is any serious questioning</mark>, let alone tracing, <mark>of</mark> the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, <mark>the routine of normative </mark>legal <mark>thought have</u></mark> (or do not have) <u><mark>to the field of pain and death</mark>.</u> And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that <u>normative legal thought is <mark>the pattern</mark>, is the operation <mark>of the bureaucratic distribution</mark> and the institutional allocation <mark>of</mark> the <mark>pain</mark> <mark>and the death</mark>.</u> n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that <u><mark>the normative appeal </mark>of normative legal thought systematically <mark>turns us away from recognizing that</mark> normative legal <mark>thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate</mark>. The problem for us is that <mark>normative legal thought</mark>, <mark>rather than assisting</mark> in the understanding of present political and moral situations, <mark>stands in the way.</mark> It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. </u>n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation,<strong> <u></strong>it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices</u><strong> -- academic and otherwise.</p><p>It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.</p></strong> | 1NC | null | Off | 194,419 | 36 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,594 | Next off is the politics of pain | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Next off is the politics of pain</h4> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,911 | 1 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,595 | The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process rips out the vocal chords of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped | Spivak 88 | Spivak 88 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp) | SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity Let us now move to consider the margins the silent, silenced center the lowest strata According to Foucault and Deleuze the oppressed, if given the chance can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . . | radical criticism coming out of the West is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject inaugurates a Subject This subject sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the Power and Desire that would inhabit the subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could occupy its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow The clearest example is the remotely orchestrated heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is the obliteration of the trace of that Other We must now confront the following question can the subaltern speak? | SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . . | 4,106 | <h4>The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process rips out the vocal chords of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped</h4><p><u><strong>Spivak 88</u></strong> (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp)</p><p><u>SOME OF THE most <mark>radical criticism coming out of the West</mark> today <mark>is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. </mark>The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge</u>. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, <u><mark>this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The</u></mark> much publicized <u><mark>critique of the sovereign subject</mark> thus actually <mark>inaugurates a Subject</mark>. . . . <mark>This</mark> S/<mark>subject</mark>, curiously <mark>sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side</mark> of the international division of labor. <mark>It is impossible for contemporary</u></mark> French <u><mark>intellectuals to imagine the</mark> kind of <mark>Power and Desire that would inhabit the</mark> unnamed <mark>subject of the Other</u></mark> of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, <u><mark>in the constitution of that Other</mark> of Europe, <mark>great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could</mark> cathect, could <mark>occupy</mark> (invest?) <mark>its itinerary</u></mark> — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that <u><mark>the intellectual is complicit in the</mark> persistent <mark>constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow</mark>, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. <mark>The clearest</mark> available <mark>example </mark>of such epistemic violence <mark>is the remotely orchestrated</mark>, fareflung, and <mark>heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other</u></mark>. <u><mark>This project is</mark> also <mark>the</mark> asymetrical <mark>obliteration of the trace of that Other</mark> in its precarious Subjectivity</u>. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . <u>Let us now move to consider the margins</u> (one can just as well say <u>the silent, silenced center</u>) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, <u>the lowest strata</u> of the urban subproletariat. <u>According to Foucault and Deleuze</u> (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) <u>the oppressed, if given the chance</u> (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) <u>can speak and know their conditions. <mark>We must now confront the following question</mark>: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, <mark>can the subaltern speak?</mark> . . . </p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 199,199 | 19 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,596 | This damage-centered research produces an affective economy of paternalism that creates a model of personhood for the subaltern where to be human, they must be in pain and they dare not resist or suffer the consequences – such a colonial subjectivity re-inscribes the primacy of state power | Tuck and Yang 14. //MD | Tuck and Yang 14. (Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) //MD
Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and¶ much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage,¶ or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered¶ researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which¶ harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that¶ reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional¶ resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political,¶ and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both¶ colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce¶ and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position¶ themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change¶ (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality,¶ and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that¶ they are broken. | at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated¶ fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both¶ for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be¶ a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” is not just a rare historical¶ occurrence in anthropology and related fields. much of the¶ work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. many individual scholars have chosen¶ to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their¶ disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch¶ pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody¶ what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the¶ theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent¶ in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the¶ academy is about.
No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am¶ still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk.
social science¶ research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a¶ recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by¶ telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to¶ untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and¶ forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell¶ their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that¶ is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain”
The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been¶ critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars Hartman discusses how recognizing¶ the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning¶ class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively¶ by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits¶ of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity¶ require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the¶ socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider¶ violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the¶ legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of¶ punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of¶ subjugation and pained existence?” | at the center is the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s fascination with retelling pain is troubling, both¶ for its voyeurism and consumptive implacability. . pain narratives are what the¶ academy is about.
No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk.
the forces say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak your pain”
The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider¶ violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the¶ legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. | Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated¶ fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both¶ for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be¶ a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”¶ (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical¶ occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the¶ work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At¶ first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that¶ refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent¶ decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen¶ to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their¶ disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch¶ pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody¶ what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the¶ theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent¶ in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the¶ academy is about.
In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990)¶ portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus:¶ No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am¶ still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk. (p. 343)
Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science¶ research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a¶ recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage¶ describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by¶ telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to¶ untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and¶ forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell¶ their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that¶ is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain”¶ (hooks, 1990, p. 343).
The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been¶ critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007;¶ Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing¶ the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning¶ class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively¶ by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits¶ of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”¶ (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity¶ require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the¶ socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55).¶ Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how¶ the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider¶ violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the¶ legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks,¶ “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of¶ punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of¶ subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55). | 4,768 | <h4><u>This damage-centered research produces an affective economy of paternalism that creates a model of personhood for the subaltern where to be human, they must be in pain and they dare not resist or suffer the consequences – such a colonial subjectivity re-inscribes the primacy of state power</h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14. </u></strong>(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf)<u><strong> //MD</p><p></u></strong>Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that <u><mark>educational </mark>research <mark>and</mark>¶ much of <mark>social science research has been concerned with documenting damage,¶ or empirically substantiating the </mark>oppression and <mark>pain of</mark> Native communities, urban communities, and other <mark>disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered¶ researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which¶ harm must be recorded</mark> or proven <mark>in order to convince an <strong>outside adjudicator</strong> that¶ reparations are deserved. These </mark>reparations presumably <mark>take the form of</mark> additional¶ resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, <mark>political,¶ and sovereign adjustments. </mark>Eve has described this theory of change1 as both¶ colonial and flawed, because it <mark>relies upon <strong>Western notions of power as scarce¶ and concentrated</strong>, and </mark>because it <mark>requires disenfranchised communities to <strong>position¶ themselves</strong> as</mark> both singularly defective and <mark>powerless to make change</u></mark>¶ (2010). Finally, <u>Eve has observed that “won” <mark>reparations rarely become reality,¶ and</mark> that</u> in many cases, <u><mark>communities are left with a narrative that <strong></mark>tells them that¶ they are broken.</p><p></u></strong>Similarly, <u><mark>at the center </mark>of the analysis in this chapter <mark>is </mark>a concern with <mark>the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in <strong>eliciting pain stories</strong> from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s </mark>demonstrated¶ <mark>fascination with <strong></mark>telling and <mark>retelling</strong> </mark>narratives of <mark>pain is troubling, both¶ for its <strong>voyeurism</strong> and </mark>for its <strong><mark>consumptive implacability.</strong> </mark>Imagining “itself to be¶ a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”</u>¶ (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) <u>is not just a rare historical¶ occurrence in anthropology and related fields.</u> We observe that <u>much of the¶ work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice<mark>.</u></mark> At¶ first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that¶ refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent¶ decades. However, it is our view that while <u>many individual scholars have chosen¶ to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their¶ disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch¶ pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody¶ what it means to do social science. The collection of <mark>pain narratives </mark>and the¶ theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent¶ in the social sciences that one might surmise that they <mark>are </mark>indeed <strong><mark>what the¶ academy is about.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990)¶ portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus:¶ <u><mark>No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself.</mark> <strong>No need to hear your voice.</strong> <strong><mark>Only tell me about your pain.</strong> I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. </mark>Tell it back to you <mark>in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. </mark>Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am¶ still author, authority. <mark>I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk.</mark> </u>(p. 343)</p><p>Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of <u>social science¶ research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a¶ recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain.</u> Further, this passage¶ describes the ways in which <u>the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by <strong>the voices on the margins.</u></strong> <u>The researcher-self is made anew by¶ telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to¶ untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and¶ forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell¶ their stories. Yet <mark>the forces </mark>that invite those on the margins to speak also <mark>say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. </mark>Only speak from that space in the margin that¶ is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. <strong><mark>Only speak your pain”</u></strong></mark>¶ (hooks, 1990, p. 343).</p><p><u>The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been¶ critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars</u> (Hartman, 1997, 2007;¶ Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya <u>Hartman</u> (1997) <u>discusses how recognizing¶ the personhood of slaves <strong>enhanced the power</strong> of the Southern slaveowning¶ class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively¶ by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits¶ of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human</u> (Hartman, 2007). In response, <u>new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury”</u> (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), <u>while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. <mark>The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”</u></mark>¶ (p. 55). <u><mark>Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. <strong>You are in pain, therefore you are.</u></strong> <u></mark>“[T]he recognition of humanity¶ require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the¶ socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person”</u> (p. 55).¶ Furthermore, Hartman describes how <u><strong><mark>slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal.</u></strong></mark> Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how¶ the <u><mark>agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as <strong>outsider¶ violence</strong> that humane society must <strong>reject</strong> while simultaneously upholding the¶ <strong>legitimated violence</strong> of the state to punish such outsider violence.</u></mark> Hartman asks,¶ <u>“Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of¶ punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of¶ subjugation and pained existence?”</u> (p. 55).</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 20,541 | 516 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,597 | That means debate becomes a training ground for coloniality – the affirmative upholds the logics of settler colonialism which ensures mass genocide – our response must be the refusal of research | Tuck and Yang 14. | Tuck and Yang 14. (Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies at State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) //MD
Our thinking and writing in this essay is informed by our readings of postcolonial¶ literatures and critical literatures on settler colonialism. We locate much of¶ our analysis inside/in relation to the discourse of settler colonialism, the particular¶ shape of colonial domination in the United States and elsewhere, including¶ Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Settler colonialism can be differentiated¶ from what one might call exogenous colonialism in that the colonizers arrive at a¶ place (“discovering” it) and make it a permanent home (claiming it). The permanence¶ of settler colonialism makes it a structure, not just an event (Wolfe, 1999).¶ The settler colonial nation-state is dependent on destroying and erasing¶ Indigenous inhabitants in order to clear them from valuable land. The settler¶ colonial structure also requires the enslavement and labor of bodies that have¶ been stolen from their homelands and transported in order to labor the land stolen¶ from Indigenous people. Settler colonialism refers to a triad relationship, between¶ the White settler (who is valued for his leadership and innovative mind), the disappeared¶ Indigenous peoples (whose land is valued, so they and their claims to it¶ must be extinguished), and the chattel slaves (whose bodies are valuable but¶ ownable, abusable, and murderable). We believe that this triad is the basis of the¶ formation of Whiteness in settler colonial nation-states, and that the interplay of¶ erasure, bodies, land, and violence is characteristic of the permanence of settler¶ colonial structures. | Descartes’ formulation (“I think, therefore¶ I am”) transforms into (“I conquer, therefore I am”; Maldonado-Torres expounds on this relationship of the conqueror’s sense-of-self to his¶ knowledge-of-others (“I know her, therefore I am me”). Knowledge of self/Others¶ became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies and territories,¶ and the rule over them. Thus the right to conquer is intimately connected to¶ the right to know (“I know, therefore I conquer, therefore I am”). the self/Other knowledge paradigm¶ is the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a science (pp. 3–4).
Settler colonial knowledge is premised on frontiers; conquest, then, is an exercise¶ of the felt entitlement to transgress these limits. Refusal, and stances of refusal in¶ research, are attempts to place limits on conquest and the colonization of knowledge¶ by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion, what is¶ sacred, and what can’t be known. To speak of limits in such a way makes some liberal thinkers uncomfortable, and seem dangerous. By forwarding a framework of refusal within (and to) research we¶ are not simply prescribing limits to social science research. We are making visible¶ invisibilized limits, containments, and seizures that research already stakes out.
One major colonial task of social science research that has emerged is to pose¶ as voicebox, ventriloquist, interpreter of subaltern voice. Spivak’s important¶ monograph, Can the Subaltern Speak? is a foundational text in postcolonial¶ studies, prompting a variety of scholarly responses, spin-offs, and¶ counterquestions, including does the subaltern speak? Can the colonizer/settler¶ listen? Can the subaltern be heard? Can the subaltern act? can the subaltern speak in/to the academy? What does the academy do? What does¶ social science research do? emphasize the usefulness of engaging these questions pedagogically; | (“I conquer, therefore I am”; Knowledge became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies and territories,¶ and the rule over them. the right to conquer is intimately connected to¶ the right to know the self/Other knowledge paradigm¶ is the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a science
Refusal in¶ research, are attempts to place limits on the colonization of knowledge¶ by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion, what is¶ sacred, and what can’t be known. By forwarding refusal within (and to) research we¶ are not simply prescribing limits to social science research. We are making visible¶ invisibilized limits
One major colonial task of social science research that has emerged is to pose¶ as voicebox, ventriloquist, interpreter of subaltern voice. Spivak’s Can the Subaltern Speak? is a foundational text prompting counterquestions, including can the subaltern speak in/to the academy? | Under coloniality, Descartes’ formulation, cognito ergo sum (“I think, therefore¶ I am”) transforms into ego conquiro (“I conquer, therefore I am”; Dussel, 1985;¶ Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlvou-Gatsheni, 2011). Nelson Maldonado-Torres¶ (2009) expounds on this relationship of the conqueror’s sense-of-self to his¶ knowledge-of-others (“I know her, therefore I am me”). Knowledge of self/Others¶ became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies and territories,¶ and the rule over them. Thus the right to conquer is intimately connected to¶ the right to know (“I know, therefore I conquer, therefore I am”). Maldonado-¶ Torres (2009) explains that for Levi Strauss, the self/Other knowledge paradigm¶ is the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a science (pp. 3–4).
Settler colonial knowledge is premised on frontiers; conquest, then, is an exercise¶ of the felt entitlement to transgress these limits. Refusal, and stances of refusal in¶ research, are attempts to place limits on conquest and the colonization of knowledge¶ by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion, what is¶ sacred, and what can’t be known. To speak of limits in such a way makes some liberal thinkers uncomfortable, and¶ may, to them, seem dangerous. When access to information, to knowledge, to the¶ intellectual commons is controlled by the people who generate that information¶ [participants in a research study], it can be seen as a violation of shared standards of¶ justice and truth. (Simpson, 2007, p. 74) By forwarding a framework of refusal within (and to) research in this chapter, we¶ are not simply prescribing limits to social science research. We are making visible¶ invisibilized limits, containments, and seizures that research already stakes out.
One major colonial task of social science research that has emerged is to pose¶ as voicebox, ventriloquist, interpreter of subaltern voice. Gayatri Spivak’s important¶ monograph, Can the Subaltern Speak? (2010), is a foundational text in postcolonial¶ studies, prompting a variety of scholarly responses, spin-offs, and¶ counterquestions, including does the subaltern speak? Can the colonizer/settler¶ listen? Can the subaltern be heard? Can the subaltern act? In our view, Spivak’s¶ question in the monograph, said more transparently, is can the subaltern speak in/to the academy? Our reading of the essay prompts our own duet of questions,¶ which we move in and out of in this essay: What does the academy do? What does¶ social science research do? Though one might approach these questions empirically,¶ we emphasize the usefulness of engaging these questions pedagogically; that¶ is, posing the question not just to determine the answer, but because the rich conversations¶ that will lead to an answer are meaningful. The question—What does¶ or can research do?—is not a cynical question, but one that tries to understand¶ more about research as a human activity. The question is similar to questions we¶ might ask of other human activities, such as, why do we work? Why do we dance?¶ Why do we do ceremony? At first, the responses might be very pragmatic, but they¶ give way to more philosophical reflections. | 3,208 | <h4><u>That means debate becomes a training ground for coloniality – the affirmative upholds the logics of settler colonialism which ensures mass genocide – our response must be the refusal of research</h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14. </u></strong>(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies at State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf)<u> //MD</p><p></u>Our thinking and writing in this essay is informed by our readings of postcolonial¶ literatures and critical literatures on settler colonialism. <u>We locate</u> much of¶ <u>our analysis</u> inside/<u>in relation to the discourse of settler colonialism, the particular¶ shape of colonial domination in the United States</u> and elsewhere, including¶ Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. <u>Settler colonialism can be differentiated¶ from</u> what one might call <u>exogenous colonialism in that the colonizers arrive at a¶ place (“discovering” it) and make it a permanent home (claiming it). <mark>The permanence¶ of settler colonialism makes it a structure, not just an event</u></mark> (Wolfe, 1999).¶ <u><strong><mark>The settler colonial nation-state is dependent on destroying and erasing¶ Indigenous inhabitants</strong> </mark>in order to clear them from valuable land. <strong><mark>The settler¶ colonial structure</strong></mark> also <strong><mark>requires the enslavement and labor of bodies that have¶ been stolen</strong></mark> from their homelands and transported in order to labor the land stolen¶ from Indigenous people. Settler colonialism refers to a triad relationship, between¶ the White settler (who is valued for his leadership and innovative mind), the disappeared¶ Indigenous peoples (whose land is valued, so they and their claims to it¶ must be extinguished), and the chattel slaves (whose bodies are valuable but¶ ownable, abusable, and murderable).</u> We believe that <u>this triad is the basis of the¶ formation of Whiteness in settler colonial nation-states, and that the interplay of¶ erasure, bodies, land, and violence is characteristic of the permanence of settler¶ colonial structures.</p><p></u>Under coloniality, <u>Descartes’ formulation</u>, cognito ergo sum <u>(“I think, therefore¶ I am”) transforms into</u> ego conquiro <u><mark>(“I conquer, therefore I am”;</u></mark> Dussel, 1985;¶ Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlvou-Gatsheni, 2011). Nelson <u>Maldonado-Torres</u>¶ (2009) <u>expounds on this relationship of the conqueror’s sense-of-self to his¶ knowledge-of-others (“I know her, therefore I am me”). <mark>Knowledge </mark>of self/Others¶ <mark>became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies and territories,¶ and the rule over them.</mark> Thus</u> <u><strong><mark>the right to conquer is intimately connected to¶ the right to know</strong></mark> (“I know, therefore I conquer, therefore I am”).</u> Maldonado-¶ Torres (2009) explains that for Levi Strauss, <u><mark>the self/Other knowledge paradigm¶ is the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a science</mark> (pp. 3–4).</p><p>Settler colonial knowledge is premised on frontiers; conquest, then, is an exercise¶ of the felt entitlement to transgress these limits. <mark>Refusal</mark>, and stances of refusal <mark>in¶ research, are attempts to place limits on </mark>conquest and <mark>the colonization of knowledge¶ by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion, what is¶ sacred, and what can’t be known.</mark> To speak of limits in such a way makes some liberal thinkers uncomfortable, and</u>¶ may, to them, <u>seem dangerous.</u> When access to information, to knowledge, to the¶ intellectual commons is controlled by the people who generate that information¶ [participants in a research study], it can be seen as a violation of shared standards of¶ justice and truth. (Simpson, 2007, p. 74) <u><mark>By forwarding</mark> a framework of <mark>refusal within (and to) research</u></mark> in this chapter, <u><mark>we¶ are not simply prescribing limits to social science research. We are making visible¶ invisibilized limits</mark>, containments, and seizures that research already stakes out.</p><p><mark>One major colonial task of social science research that has emerged is to pose¶ as voicebox, ventriloquist, interpreter of subaltern voice.</u></mark> Gayatri <u><mark>Spivak’s</mark> important¶ monograph, <mark>Can the Subaltern Speak?</u></mark> (2010), <u><mark>is a foundational text</mark> in postcolonial¶ studies, <mark>prompting</mark> a variety of scholarly responses, spin-offs, and¶ <mark>counterquestions, including</mark> does the subaltern speak? Can the colonizer/settler¶ listen? Can the subaltern be heard? Can the subaltern act?</u> In our view, Spivak’s¶ question in the monograph, said more transparently, is <u><strong><mark>can the subaltern speak in/to the academy?</u></strong></mark> Our reading of the essay prompts our own duet of questions,¶ which we move in and out of in this essay: <u>What does the academy do? What does¶ social science research do?</u> Though one might approach these questions empirically,¶ we <u>emphasize the usefulness of engaging these questions pedagogically;</u> that¶ is, posing the question not just to determine the answer, but because the rich conversations¶ that will lead to an answer are meaningful. The question—What does¶ or can research do?—is not a cynical question, but one that tries to understand¶ more about research as a human activity. The question is similar to questions we¶ might ask of other human activities, such as, why do we work? Why do we dance?¶ Why do we do ceremony? At first, the responses might be very pragmatic, but they¶ give way to more philosophical reflections.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 20,541 | 516 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,598 | Furthermore, this politics of production will always be utilized to promote regimes of social death and military domination | Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010 | Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) | Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything | Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything | Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.¶ Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50]¶ In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice:¶ ¶ "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56] | 7,659 | <h4>Furthermore, this politics of production will always be utilized to promote regimes of social death and military domination</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010</u></strong> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620<u><mark>) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <strong><mark>military and corporate research</strong></mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <strong><mark>social conditioning</strong></mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <strong><mark>concentration of privilege</strong></mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u>a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the <strong>intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world</u></strong>. <u>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that <strong>they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</strong></mark> waged on a daily basis</u>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death</strong> is</mark> our <strong><mark>banal acceptance</strong> of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <strong><mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u>The cemetery no longer exists because <strong><mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function</strong>: they <mark>are <strong>ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in</u> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong>a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>.¶ Yet <u>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <strong>an absolute fixation with zombies</strong>.</u> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is <strong>counter-offensive</strong></mark> and comes from a strange source: in <strong>every system</strong> at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it <strong>reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <strong><mark>generated its own antithesis</strong></mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</strong></mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, <strong>the silent majorities</strong> that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the <strong>ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</strong></mark> to the socia</u>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><mark>a system is abolished only by <strong>pushing it into hyperlogic</strong></mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u>.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</strong></mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <strong><mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><mark>they are insistent on <strong>saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’</strong>, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been <strong>stripped of all that makes life worth living</strong></mark>, when it is as good as social death</u>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u>human survivors act so repugnantly that <strong>we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50]¶ In reality, “<u><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because <strong>they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><mark>seeking to <strong>consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "<u><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <strong><mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: <strong>the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the <strong>messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></mark> might suffice:¶ ¶ "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that <strong>cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <strong><mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 3,953 | 266 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,599 | We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix | Bifo 11. | Bifo 11. Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108 | Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act
MARKED
Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. | Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The prolif of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken , from which every moral consideration victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac
No need for a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects The West has become suicidal exhaustion is seen as the inability body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: exhaustion could become a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much , and outrageously too much during the last thirty years is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out economic growth the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth | Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act.
MARKED
(Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. | 9,716 | <h4>We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix</h4><p><u><strong>Bifo 11.</u></strong> Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108</p><p><u>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective</mark> subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> which has given soul to modern social dynamics is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>prolif</mark>eration <mark>of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche to <strong><mark>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only way of escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains</u>. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</strong> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane<mark>, from which every moral consideration</mark> of the innocence of the <mark>victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute</mark>, the alter-ego of the terrorist, <mark>the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may thereafter become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. </p><p><u>MARKED</p><p></u>(Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u><mark>No need</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u>A <strong>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></mark>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><mark>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong></mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u><mark>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></mark>. <u>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u> | 1NC | null | Off | 174,846 | 274 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,600 | Our alternative to exhaust systems of exchange by stealing away from the university – we must abuse the university’s openness to give power back to the undercommons
Moten and Harney 04. Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons, SEVEN THESES Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press“To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. | Moten and Harney 04. To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal sneak into the university steal what one can To abuse its hospitality Call out to it as it calls to you subversive intellectual came under false pretenses bad documents out of love Teaching profession an operation the /auto-encyclopedic erased by it beyond of teaching they will not be subjects they want to think as objects minority who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment regarded as theft criminal act the only possible act inhabit the ruptural the criminal matricidal queer on the stroll of the stolen life stolen back allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Our alternative to exhaust systems of exchange by stealing away from the university – we must abuse the university’s openness to give power back to the undercommons</h4><p><u><strong>Moten and Harney 04.</u></strong> Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons, SEVEN THESES Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press“<u><strong><mark>To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal</u></strong></mark>,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. <u>This is the only possible relationship to the American university today.</u> This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: <u>it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment</u>. In the face of these conditions <u><mark>one can only <strong>sneak into the university</strong> and <strong>steal what one can</u></strong>. <u><strong>To abuse its hospitality</strong></mark>, to <mark>spite its mission</mark>, to <mark>join its refugee colony</mark>, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university</u>. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. <u><strong>Call out to it as it calls to you</u></strong>. <u>But for the <strong>subversive intellectual</strong>, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men</u>. After all, <u><mark>the subversive intellectual <strong>came under false pretenses</strong>, with <strong>bad documents</strong>, <strong>out of love</u></strong></mark>. <u>Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome</u>. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. <u><mark>She disappears into the underground</mark>, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, <mark>into the Undercommons</mark> of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong</u>. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say <u>teaching</u>, one <u>would be performing the work of the university</u>. <u><strong><mark>Teaching</strong> is</mark> merely <mark>a <strong>profession</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>an operation</strong></mark> of <mark>what</mark> Jacques <mark>Derrida calls <strong>the</mark> </strong>onto-<strong>/<mark>auto-encyclopedic</strong> circle of the Universitas</u></mark>. But <u>it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters</u>. <u>The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby <strong>erased by it</u></strong>. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But <u><mark>it is teaching that brings us in</u></mark>. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. <u>The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food</u>. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But <u>if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university</u>. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” <u>But <mark>what would it mean if</u></mark> teaching or rather what we might call “<u><mark>the <strong>beyond of teaching</strong>” is</mark> precisely <mark>what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance</u></mark>? <u><mark>And what of those minorities who refuse</mark>, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), <mark>as if <strong>they will not be subjects</strong>, as if <strong>they want to think as objects</strong>, as <strong>minority</u></strong></mark>? Certainly, <u>the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste</u>. But <u><mark>their collective labor will always call into question <strong>who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment</u></strong></mark>. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps <u>the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must</u>. But <u>even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional</u>. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But <u><mark>if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes</mark> with hands full into the underground of the university, <mark>into the Undercommons</mark>—<mark>this will be <strong>regarded as theft</strong>, as a <strong>criminal act</u></strong></mark>. And <u><mark>it is</mark> at the same time, <strong><mark>the only possible act</u></strong></mark>. <u>In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. <mark>To enter this space is to <strong>inhabit the ruptural</strong></mark> and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, <strong><mark>the criminal</strong>, <strong>matricidal</strong>, <strong>queer</strong></mark>, in the cistern, <strong><mark>on the stroll of the stolen life</strong></mark>, <mark>the life stolen by enlightenment</mark> and <strong><mark>stolen back</strong></mark>, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons</u>. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; <u><mark>it’s about <strong>allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others</strong></mark>, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching</u>.</p> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,912 | 1 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,601 | The ballot is also a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – This rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn – The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents the AFF project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot. | Chow 1993 | Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993 | While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? | The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper | (Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17)
While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense? | 5,388 | <h4><strong>The ballot is also a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – This rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn – The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents the AFF project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot.</h4><p><u>Chow</u> </strong>– Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown -<strong> <u>1993</p><p></u></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u>to haunt us.</u> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p> | 1NC | null | Case | 323,208 | 67 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,602 | Their 1AC Omalade ev uses the term “blindness” to describe a weakness, the Williams evidence uses the term “debilitate” - this is unacceptable, and reinforce exclusion and oppression; the use of this terminology must be rejected | Mandolin ‘8 | Mandolin ‘8 (Wheelchair Dancer, “On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, http://www.amptoons.com/blog/2008/04/28/on-making-argument-disability-and-language-by-wheelchair-dancer/, mg) | We all use disablist or ableist metaphorical language, and I bet most of us say something that is potentially offensive every day: we might be blind to this, deaf to that, pass disabled vehicles, chat about being paralyzed in a situation ;” I almost never say blind, deaf, paralyzed, cripple, but I occasionally I find myself saying, “that’s dumb,” with full negative rhetorical force If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden — too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? — perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we’ve accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b*ch word? If you do, I bet you check which community you are in…. Same thing for the N word. These days, depending on your age, you might say something is retarded or spastic, but you probably never say that it’s gay. I’d like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people’s concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality — as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can’t use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place | As a community commonly used words can be slurs we avoid them society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people’s concerns about language not paying attention to the literal value the psychological emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate the lack of awareness about disability and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort the worst. Disability language to which we turn when we know we can’t use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours When we deploy these strategies underscore the value of our existence we strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place. | We all use disablist or ableist metaphorical language, and I bet most of us say something that is potentially offensive every day: we might be blind to this, deaf to that, pass disabled vehicles, chat about being paralyzed in a situation, etc., etc. I’m often uncomfortable with it — I never use the moron or cretin words — but, honesty here, I do say idiot. I never say, “that’s lame;” I almost never say blind, deaf, paralyzed, cripple, but I occasionally I find myself saying, “that’s dumb,” with full negative rhetorical force. Most of the time, if I slip up the non-disableds I’m with don’t notice; however, the disableds get it, call me on it, and we talk. If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I’d ask you to think about it. If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden — too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? — perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we’ve accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b*ch word? If you do, I bet you check which community you are in…. Same thing for the N word. These days, depending on your age, you might say something is retarded or spastic, but you probably never say that it’s gay. I’d like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people’s concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how “oppressed, minoritized” groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks? As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There’s a kind of hierarchy here: the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality — as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can’t use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place. | 3,987 | <h4>Their 1AC Omalade ev uses the term “blindness” to describe a weakness, the Williams evidence uses the term “debilitate” - this is unacceptable, and reinforce exclusion and oppression; the use of this terminology must be rejected</h4><p><u><strong>Mandolin ‘8</u></strong> (Wheelchair Dancer, “On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, http://www.amptoons.com/blog/2008/04/28/on-making-argument-disability-and-language-by-wheelchair-dancer/, mg)</p><p><u>We all use disablist or ableist metaphorical language, and I bet most of us say something that is potentially offensive every day: we might be blind to this, deaf to that, pass disabled vehicles, chat about being paralyzed in a situation</u>, etc., etc. I’m often uncomfortable with it — I never use the moron or cretin words — but, honesty here, I do say idiot. I never say, “that’s lame<u>;” I almost never say blind, deaf, paralyzed, cripple, but I occasionally I find myself saying, “that’s dumb,” with full negative rhetorical force</u>. Most of the time, if I slip up the non-disableds I’m with don’t notice; however, the disableds get it, call me on it, and we talk. If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I’d ask you to think about it. <u>If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden — too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? — perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. <mark>As a community</mark>, we’ve accepted that <mark>commonly used words can be slurs</mark>, and as a rule, <mark>we avoid them</mark>, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b*ch word? If you do, I bet you check which community you are in…. Same thing for the N word. These days, depending on your age, you might say something is retarded or spastic, but you probably never say that it’s gay. I’d like to suggest that <mark>society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people’s concerns about language</mark>. By <mark>not paying attention to the literal value</mark>, <mark>the</mark> very real substantive, physical, <mark>psychological</mark>, sensory, and <mark>emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate</u></mark>. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how “oppressed, minoritized” groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks? As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There’s a kind of hierarchy here: <u><mark>the lack of awareness about disability</mark>, disability culture and identity, <mark>and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort</mark>: the bottom, <mark>the worst.</mark> <mark>Disability language</mark> has about it a kind of untouchable quality — as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone <mark>to which we</mark> can <mark>turn when we know we can’t use misogynistic or racist language.</mark> <mark>When we engage</mark> <mark>in these</mark> kinds of <mark>argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours</mark>. <mark>When we deploy these</mark> kinds of <mark>strategies</mark> to <mark>underscore the value of our</mark> own <mark>existence</mark> in the world, <mark>we</mark> reaffirm and <mark>strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place</u>.</p></mark> | 1NC | null | Case | 197,634 | 4 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,603 | The legalization of prostitution ensures a violent sovereign apparatus tailoring exclusionary policies towards individuals resulting in increased social control and micro fascism - this card is long but on fire | Scoular 10 , Vol. 37, No. 1, March, [AB] | Jane Scoular 10, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, “What's Law Got to Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, March, [AB] | 1. Norms legal strategies for the governance of sex work share regulatory ambitions Empirical evidence points to two parallel processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's wider efforts to responsibilize citizens, while simultaneously maintaining spaces for the operation of the capitalist economy. Processes of licensing and exiting operate to normalize particular forms of citizenship and sexual activity which enhance a broader structure of consumption, rendering deviant those who cannot through poverty, race, immigration status or health meet these increasingly restricted norms of citizenship, and marginalizing unproductive spaces. the normalization of other forms of commercial sex business reveal a shared set of underlying economic and cultural interests; the excision of class and racial Others from gentrifying inner cities the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and the creation of clean urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in recreational commercial sexual consumption. This normative order is established via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms Law has no privilege in this system but it does play a vital role in authorizing other forms of knowledge, helping to shape content, and empowering a group of regulatory agents in exercising diffuse power 2. Authorizations Examining extended forms of governance enlighten us more about what law is doing than the statute book despite differences at a sovereign level in prostitution policy law authorizes and operates though quasi-legal forums exiting programmes, rehabilitation schemes, and licensing boards and techniques fines which an extended group of regulatory agents exercise normalizing power all the little judges of conduct exercise petty powers of adjudication in `the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence These forums feature a hybridization of legal and non-legal authority. The state's role appears to recede but it may actually be augmented by a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention that may be even more pervasive than the previous systems. Licensing decision making operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of commercial sex. This ensures that the wider structures of governmentality fit with local conditions while appearing to comply with the liberal objection to state interference. the apparent increased `protection' promised by reforms results in the increased policing of many women's lives. 3. Subjectifications Foucault's observation in The Dangerous Individual is that law in normalizing societies is increasingly concerned with lives rather than with acts This is evident in the current preoccupation with particular subjects and spaces of sex work and the operationalizing of forms of governance to save, empower, responsibilize, and ethically reconstruct individuals – all testament to law's increasing normalizing ambitions as it acts alongside other discourses to construct `the fabric of the modern subject'. In doing so it operates not ideologically but through a process of subjectification encouraging self-projects in ways that align with the diverse objectives of legislation both licensing and exiting operate to encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required by the wider context of neo-liberalism and to identify those who cannot self-manage or who resist normalization in order that they be excluded. when we ask what law is doing with regard to the types of subjectifications it encourages, we see that while it decriminalizes selling sex it replaces this with a system of welfare and therapeutic interventions which operate to support wider systems of neo-liberal governance contemporary forms of governance operate through these techniques of responsibilization prostitution must be viewed in the wider context of neo-liberalism in which welfare states are retracting and being replaced by systems of private insurance thus leading to increasing conditionality in citizenship and penalty for those who cannot meet their terms/manage risks In this context social exclusion is not tackled by structural change but via individual re-education abolitionist systems promote forms of self-governance which require active citizens to self-regulate according to the norms of the family and the market Those who act responsibly by adopting appropriate lifestyles via work and norms of sexuality are offered inclusion those who do not or cannot are further excluded having failed to meet the increasingly normalized terms of citizenship in late-capitalist societies. Research suggests that legalized systems create a industry as the costs and norms of compliance are too onerous for most individuals and small brothel owners to bear it overwhelmingly favours profitable sex businesses Alongside this the system of licensing encourages workers to self- regulate their behaviour in the interests of public health promotion to conform to certain modes of working in order to meet the conditions of registration Inclusion is offered to those who 'can perform the rituals of middle class society' This 'ideal' typifies the rational subjects encouraged by these processes as law operates alongside practices such as public health to create and 101 maintain a 'responsible prostitution population'. it operates to identify and exclude those who cannot meet the increasingly conditional nature of citizenship for example, migrants, the underage, and drug-users all of whom are not incorporated within the framework of regulatory protection. the moral engineering of advanced liberal governance has co-opted feminist concerns into techniques of governance and control Whether based on a recognition of sex workers' inherent agency or victimhood, social exclusion is being used as leverage for increased control rather than for increased social justice Empowerment operates to sanction forms of self-governance that support neo-liberal interests the proliferation of state-sponsored programmes of empowerment must be treated with critical caution as even while they are utilizing the vocabulary of radical politics their promise of emancipation may be merely rhetorical as they 'endeavour to operationalise the self-governing capacity of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives' both processes identify those who cannot perform rendering them vulnerable to exclusion or banishment. | Empirical evidence points to processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's wider efforts to responsibilize citizens licensing and exiting normalize particular forms of citizenship and sexual activity rendering deviant those who cannot through poverty, race, immigration status or health restricted norms of citizenship and marginalizing unproductive spaces. the normalization of commercial sex reveal the excision of class and racial Others from gentrifying inner cities Law does play a vital role in authorizing knowledge helping to shape regulatory agents in exercising power despite differences in prostitution policy law authorizes and operates though quasi-legal forums exiting programmes rehabilitation schemes, and licensing and techniques which extended regulatory agents normalizing power The state appears to recede but it may be augmented by wider control mechanisms and professional intervention that may be even more pervasive than previous systems. Licensing operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of sex. This ensures wider structures of governmentality appear to comply with the liberal objection to state interference increased `protection' results in increased policing law is concerned with lives rather than acts evident in sex work and the operationalizing of governance to save empower responsibilize and reconstruct individuals it operates through subjectification encouraging self-projects that align with objectives of legislation licensing and exiting operate to encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required to identify those who resist normalization in order that they be excluded. law replaces this with interventions to support neo-liberal governance governance operate through responsibilization prostitution must be viewed in the context of states being replaced by private insurance leading to conditionality in citizenship and penalty for those who cannot meet terms social exclusion is not tackled by structural change but via individual re-education abolitionist systems promote self-governance which require citizens to self-regulate according to the norms of the family and market legalized systems create costs of compliance too onerous for individuals it favours profitable businesses licensing encourages workers to self- regulate in the interests of public health This 'ideal' typifies rational subjects as law operates alongside practices such as health to create a 'responsible prostitution population'. it operates to exclude those migrants underage drug-users not incorporated within protection liberal governance co-opted feminist concerns into techniques of control state programmes of empowerment must be treated with critical caution their promise of emancipation may be merely rhetorical as they operationalise self-governing in the pursuit of governmental objectives' both processes identify those who cannot perform rendering them vulnerable to banishment | 1. Norms By examining what law is doing in both cases, it becomes apparent that despite the difference in rhetoric, legal strategies for the governance of sex work share a number of similarities in terms of their regulatory ambitions. Empirical evidence points to two parallel processes in which prostitution becomes a target for the state's wider efforts to responsibilize citizens, while simultaneously maintaining spaces for the operation of the capitalist economy. Processes of licensing and exiting operate to normalize particular forms of citizenship and sexual activity which enhance a broader structure of consumption, rendering deviant those who cannot through poverty, race, immigration status or health meet these increasingly restricted norms of citizenship, and marginalizing unproductive spaces. As Bernstein notes: both the state policing of the street-level sex trade and the normalization of other forms of commercial sex business reveal a shared set of underlying economic and cultural interests; the excision of class and racial Others from gentrifying inner cities, the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and the creation of clean and shiny urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in recreational commercial sexual consumption.86 This normative order is established not through law as such but via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms of which it forms part. Law has no privilege in this system but it does play a vital role in authorizing other forms of knowledge, helping to shape content, and empowering a much wider group of regulatory agents in exercising more diffuse forms of power. 2. Authorizations Examining the extended forms of governance operating in this area may enlighten us more about what law is doing than the statute book. Thus, in the context of Sweden and the Netherlands, despite differences at a sovereign level in prostitution policy, law authorizes and operates though a number of quasi-legal forums (john schools, exiting programmes, rehabilitation schemes, and licensing boards) and techniques (anti-social behaviour orders, fines, rehabilitation orders, licenses) in which an extended group of regulatory agents exercise normalizing power: `all the little judges of conduct [who] exercise their petty powers of adjudication and enforcement'87 in what Valverde and Rose call `the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence'.88 These forums feature a hybridization of legal and non-legal authority. The state's role appears to recede but it may actually be augmented by a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention that may be even more pervasive than the previous systems. Licensing decision making is devolved to a wider group, yet operates to reaffirm the dividing lines between legitimate and illegitimate forms of commercial sex. Indeed, it may be more useful than direct control as delegated authority refines law more minutely in response to shifting realities on the ground and employs a wider group of authorities in its realization. This ensures that the wider structures of governmentality fit with local conditions while appearing to comply with the liberal objection to state interference. Thus, in the case of the Netherlands, while street sex work has not been outlawed it has been made more and more difficult, as a number of municipalities in closing their tippelzones have dispensed with their previous assumed duties to provide safe places for street sex work. Similarly the economic and racial segregation apparent in indoor settings appears distant and accidental as it is effected by powers exercised by diverse groups. In Sweden decriminalization premised on exiting may actually signal a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention which are even more pervasive than the previous system of fines. Thus, the apparent increased `protection' promised by reforms results in the increased policing of many women's lives.89 3. Subjectifications There is a question which is essential in the Modern Tribunal, but which would have had a strange ring to it 150 years [ago]: `Who are You?'90 Foucault's observation in The Dangerous Individual is that law in normalizing societies is increasingly concerned with lives rather than with acts. This is evident in the current preoccupation with particular subjects and spaces of sex work and the operationalizing of forms of governance to save, empower, responsibilize, and ethically reconstruct individuals – all testament to law's increasing normalizing ambitions as it acts alongside other discourses to construct `the fabric of the modern subject'.91 In doing so it operates not ideologically, as there is always resistance, nor through the simple imputation of legal consciousness,92 but through a process of subjectification, encouraging self-projects in ways that align with the diverse objectives of legislation.93 Thus, if we examine the continuities in the projects of self-governance promoted in each jurisdiction, we begin to see that the commonly accepted opposition between victim and agent may not be as marked when viewed through a governmental lens. Thus, through parallel forms of subjectification, both licensing and exiting operate to encourage subjects to perform as `self-governing, rational actors' required by the wider context of neo-liberalism and to identify those who cannot self-manage or who resist normalization in order that they be excluded. Thus when we look to Sweden and ask what law is doing with regard to the types of subjectifications it encourages, we see that while it decriminalizes selling sex (due to women's assumed victimhood), it replaces this with a system of welfare and therapeutic interventions which operate to support wider systems of neo-liberal governance. Despite being heralded as a 'renewed welfare approach', which in any event is not necessarily benign, as my previous work with Maggie O'Neill 94 points out, contemporary forms of governance operate through these techniques of responsibilization. Techniques of 'exiting' women from prostitution must be viewed in the wider context of neo-liberalism in which welfare states, including the much renowned Swedish system, are retracting and being replaced by systems of private insurance, thus leading to increasing conditionality in citizenship and penalty for those who cannot meet their terms/manage risks. In this context social exclusion is not tackled by structural change but via individual re-education, re-training, and entry into legitimate economies and relationships. By prioritizing 'exiting' as a means of facilitating social inclusion rather than offering recognition, rights or redistribution to sex workers as a group, abolitionist systems promote forms of self-governance which require active citizens to self-regulate according to the norms of the family and the market. Those who act responsibly by adopting appropriate lifestyles via work and norms of sexuality are offered inclusion, those who do not or cannot and instead remain in sex work (which retains its criminal label) are further excluded, having failed to meet the increasingly normalized terms of citizenship in late-capitalist societies. The increased focus on male clients involves the promotion of similar individuating modes of governance. Despite the rhetoric of gender equality, the increased punitiveness towards (some) purchasers represents no more than the shifting of the 'whore stigma' to a new deviant group. Respon- sibility becomes increasingly narrowed to client motives and individual sexual ethics, which are pathologized rather than explained in relation to their historical specificity and to the social and economic institutions that themselves structure the relations of gender domination. When action is taken through criminalization, or via the quasi-legal forums of john schools and name-and-shame campaigns, it typically operates on 'a lower-tier of male heterosexual practices' or to 're-gender sexual stigma in certain middle class fractions' , leaving the more mainstream corporate and private market untouched. The system of regulationism in the Netherlands encourages similar forms of self-governance and produces analogous exclusions. Research suggests that legalized systems create a two-tiered (if not more) industry, as the costs and norms of compliance are too onerous for most individuals and small brothel owners to bear. Thus, it overwhelmingly favours profitable sex businesses which, as Brents and Hausbeck note, can now hardly be described as 'other' to late-capitalist industries. Alongside this, the system of licensing encourages workers to self- regulate their behaviour in the interests of public health promotion, to conform to certain modes of working in order to meet the conditions of registration. Inclusion is offered to those who 'can perform the rituals of middle class society' with all of the typical exclusions based on age, status, race, health, and class that this entails. This point is well illustrated in an advert which followed the decriminalization of brothels in New South Wales: . tall, blonde and stylish, she recently completed her tertiary marketing course and is looking for employment in the field . She provides her own condoms ... and comes complete with a medical certificate. This 'ideal' typifies the rational subjects encouraged by these processes, as law operates alongside practices, such as public health, to create and 101 maintain what Scott calls a 'responsible prostitution population'. The low take-up rate in the Netherlands indicates that very few can conform to this responsibilized model, meaning that while licensing can offer some increased improvement in the working conditions for a small section of workers, it also operates to identify and exclude those who cannot meet the increasingly conditional nature of citizenship, for example, migrants, the underage, and drug-users, all of whom are not incorporated within the framework of regulatory protection. Thus in both systems, the moral engineering of advanced liberal governance has co-opted feminist concerns into techniques of governance and control. Whether based on a recognition of sex workers' inherent agency or victimhood, social exclusion is being used as leverage for increased control rather than for increased social justice. Empowerment simply operates to sanction forms of self-governance that support neo-liberal interests. As Cruikshank notes, the recent proliferation of state-sponsored programmes of empowerment must be treated with critical caution, as even while they are utilizing the vocabulary of radical politics, their promise of emancipation may be merely rhetorical as they 'endeavour to operationalise the self-governing capacity of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives'. Yet what both processes do well is to identify those who cannot perform, rendering them vulnerable to exclusion or banishment. | 10,992 | <h4>The legalization of prostitution ensures a violent sovereign apparatus tailoring exclusionary policies towards individuals resulting in increased social control and micro fascism - this card is long but on fire</h4><p>Jane<u><strong> Scoular 10</u></strong>, Professor of Law at University of Strathclyde, “What's Law Got to Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work,” Journal of Law and Society<u><strong>, Vol. 37, No. 1, March, [AB] </p><p>1. Norms </u></strong>By examining what law is doing in both cases, it becomes apparent that despite the difference in rhetoric, <u>legal strategies for the governance of sex work share</u> a number of similarities in terms of their <u><strong>regulatory ambitions</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Empirical evidence</strong> points to</mark> two parallel <mark>processes in which <strong>prostitution becomes a target</strong> for the state's</mark> <strong><mark>wider efforts to responsibilize citizens</strong></mark>, while simultaneously maintaining spaces for the operation of the capitalist economy. Processes of <mark>licensing and exiting </mark>operate to <strong><mark>normalize particular forms of citizenship and sexual activity</strong></mark> which enhance a broader structure of consumption, <strong><mark>rendering deviant those who cannot</strong> through <strong>poverty, race, immigration status or health</strong></mark> meet these increasingly <strong><mark>restricted norms of citizenship</strong></mark>, <mark>and <strong>marginalizing unproductive spaces.</u></strong></mark> As Bernstein notes: both the state policing of the street-level sex trade and <u><mark>the <strong>normalization of</strong></mark> other forms of <strong><mark>commercial sex</strong></mark> business <mark>reveal</mark> a shared set of underlying economic and cultural interests; <strong><mark>the excision of class and racial Others</strong> from <strong>gentrifying inner cities</u></strong></mark>, <u>the facilitation of the post-industrial service sector, and the creation of clean</u> and shiny <u>urban spaces in which middle-class men can safely indulge in recreational commercial sexual consumption.</u>86 <u><strong>This normative order is established</u></strong> not through law as such but <u><strong>via a continuum of regulatory mechanisms</u></strong> of which it forms part. <u><strong><mark>Law</u></strong></mark> <u>has no privilege in this system but it <mark>does play a <strong>vital role</strong> in authorizing</mark> other forms of <mark>knowledge</mark>, <mark>helping to shape</mark> content, and empowering a</u> much wider <u>group of <mark>regulatory agents in exercising</mark> </u>more <u>diffuse</u> forms of<u> <mark>power</u></mark>. <u><strong>2. Authorizations </strong>Examining</u> the <u><strong>extended forms of governance</u></strong> operating in this area may <u>enlighten us <strong>more about what law is doing than the statute</strong> book</u>. Thus, in the context of Sweden and the Netherlands, <u><strong><mark>despite differences</strong> </mark>at a sovereign level <mark>in prostitution policy</u></mark>, <u><mark>law authorizes and operates though</u></mark> a number of <u><strong><mark>quasi-legal forums</u></strong></mark> (john schools, <u><mark>exiting programmes</mark>, <mark>rehabilitation schemes, and licensing</mark> boards</u>) <u><strong><mark>and techniques</u></strong></mark> (anti-social behaviour orders, <u>fines</u>, rehabilitation orders, licenses) in <u><mark>which</u></mark> <u>an <mark>extended</mark> group of <strong><mark>regulatory agents</u></strong></mark> <u>exercise <strong><mark>normalizing power</u></strong></mark>: `<u>all the <strong>little judges of conduct</u></strong> [who] <u>exercise</u> their <u><strong>petty powers of adjudication</u></strong> and enforcement'87 <u>in</u> what Valverde and Rose call <u>`the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence</u>'.88 <u>These forums feature a <strong>hybridization of legal and non-legal authority</strong>. <strong><mark>The state</mark>'s role <mark>appears to recede but it may</mark> actually <mark>be augmented by</mark> a <mark>wider</mark> range of <mark>control mechanisms and</mark> forms of <mark>professional intervention that may be even more pervasive than</mark> the <mark>previous systems.</mark> </strong><mark>Licensing</mark> decision making</u> is devolved to a wider group, yet <u><mark>operates to <strong>reaffirm the dividing lines</strong> between <strong>legitimate and illegitimate forms of</strong> </mark>commercial <strong><mark>sex</strong>.</mark> </u>Indeed, it may be more useful than direct control as delegated authority refines law more minutely in response to shifting realities on the ground and employs a wider group of authorities in its realization. <u><mark>This ensures</mark> that the <strong><mark>wider structures of governmentality</strong> </mark>fit with local conditions while <strong><mark>appear</mark>ing <mark>to comply with the liberal objection to state interference</strong></mark>.</u> Thus, in the case of the Netherlands, while street sex work has not been outlawed it has been made more and more difficult, as a number of municipalities in closing their tippelzones have dispensed with their previous assumed duties to provide safe places for street sex work. Similarly the economic and racial segregation apparent in indoor settings appears distant and accidental as it is effected by powers exercised by diverse groups. In Sweden decriminalization premised on exiting may actually signal a wider range of control mechanisms and forms of professional intervention which are even more pervasive than the previous system of fines. Thus, <u>the <strong>apparent <mark>increased `protection'</strong> </mark>promised by reforms <strong><mark>results in</mark> the <mark>increased policing</u></strong></mark> <u>of many women's lives.</u>89 <u><strong>3. Subjectifications </u></strong>There is a question which is essential in the Modern Tribunal, but which would have had a strange ring to it 150 years [ago]: `Who are You?'90 <u>Foucault's observation in The Dangerous Individual is that <mark>law</mark> in normalizing societies <mark>is</mark> increasingly <mark>concerned with lives rather than</mark> with <mark>acts</u></mark>. <u>This is <mark>evident in</mark> the current preoccupation with particular subjects and spaces of <mark>sex work and the <strong>operationalizing</mark> of forms <mark>of governance</strong></mark> <mark>to <strong>save</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>empower</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>responsibilize</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> ethically <mark>reconstruct individuals</mark> – all <strong>testament to law's</strong> increasing <strong>normalizing ambitions</strong> as it acts alongside other discourses to construct `the fabric of the modern subject'.</u>91 <u>In doing so<mark> it operates</mark> not ideologically</u>, as there is always resistance, nor through the simple imputation of legal consciousness,92 <u>but</u> <u><mark>through</mark> a process of <mark>subjectification</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>encouraging self-projects</strong></mark> in ways <mark>that align with</mark> the diverse <strong><mark>objectives of legislation</u></strong></mark>.93 Thus, if we examine the continuities in the projects of self-governance promoted in each jurisdiction, we begin to see that the commonly accepted opposition between victim and agent may not be as marked when viewed through a governmental lens. Thus, through parallel forms of subjectification, <u>both <mark>licensing and exiting operate to</mark> <strong><mark>encourage subjects</strong> to perform as `<strong>self-governing, rational actors'</strong> required</mark> by the wider context of neo-liberalism and <mark>to identify those</mark> who cannot self-manage or <mark>who <strong>resist normalization</strong> in order that <strong>they be excluded.</u></strong></mark> Thus <u>when we</u> look to Sweden and <u>ask what <mark>law</mark> is doing with regard to the types of subjectifications it encourages, we see that while it decriminalizes selling sex</u> (due to women's assumed victimhood), <u>it <strong><mark>replaces this</strong></mark> <mark>with</mark> a system of <strong>welfare and therapeutic <mark>interventions</u></strong></mark> <u>which operate <mark>to support</mark> wider systems of <mark>neo-liberal governance</u></mark>. Despite being heralded as a 'renewed welfare approach', which in any event is not necessarily benign, as my previous work with Maggie O'Neill 94 points out, <u><strong>contemporary forms of <mark>governance operate through</mark> these techniques of <mark>responsibilization</u></strong></mark>. Techniques of 'exiting' women from <u><mark>prostitution <strong>must be viewed in the</mark> wider <mark>context</strong> of</u></mark> <u>neo-liberalism in which welfare <mark>states</u></mark>, including the much renowned Swedish system, <u>are retracting and <mark>being <strong>replaced by</mark> systems of <mark>private insurance</u></strong></mark>, <u>thus <mark>leading to</mark> <strong>increasing <mark>conditionality in citizenship</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>penalty for those who cannot meet</mark> their <mark>terms</mark>/manage risks</u></strong>. <u>In this context <strong><mark>social exclusion is not tackled by structural change but via individual re-education</u></strong></mark>, re-training, and entry into legitimate economies and relationships. By prioritizing 'exiting' as a means of facilitating social inclusion rather than offering recognition, rights or redistribution to sex workers as a group, <u><strong><mark>abolitionist systems promote</strong></mark> forms of <mark>self-governance which require</mark> active <mark>citizens to <strong>self-regulate according to the norms of the family and</mark> the <mark>market</u></strong></mark>. <u>Those who act responsibly by adopting appropriate lifestyles via work and norms of sexuality are offered inclusion</u>, <u>those who do not or cannot</u> and instead remain in sex work (which retains its criminal label) <u><strong>are further excluded</u></strong>, <u>having failed to meet the increasingly <strong>normalized terms of citizenship</strong> in late-capitalist societies. </u>The increased focus on male clients involves the promotion of similar individuating modes of governance. Despite the rhetoric of gender equality, the increased punitiveness towards (some) purchasers represents no more than the shifting of the 'whore stigma' to a new deviant group. Respon- sibility becomes increasingly narrowed to client motives and individual sexual ethics, which are pathologized rather than explained in relation to their historical specificity and to the social and economic institutions that themselves structure the relations of gender domination. When action is taken through criminalization, or via the quasi-legal forums of john schools and name-and-shame campaigns, it typically operates on 'a lower-tier of male heterosexual practices' or to 're-gender sexual stigma in certain middle class fractions' , leaving the more mainstream corporate and private market untouched. The system of regulationism in the Netherlands encourages similar forms of self-governance and produces analogous exclusions. <u>Research suggests that <mark>legalized systems create</mark> a</u> two-tiered (if not more) <u>industry</u>, <u>as the <mark>costs</mark> and norms <mark>of compliance</mark> are <mark>too onerous for</mark> most <mark>individuals</mark> and small brothel owners to bear</u>. Thus, <u><mark>it</mark> overwhelmingly <mark>favours</mark> <mark>profitable</mark> sex <mark>businesses</u></mark> which, as Brents and Hausbeck note, can now hardly be described as 'other' to late-capitalist industries. <u>Alongside this</u>, <u>the system of <mark>licensing encourages workers to <strong>self- regulate</mark> their behaviour</u></strong> <u><mark>in the interests of <strong>public health</mark> promotion</u></strong>, <u>to conform to certain modes of working in order to meet the conditions of registration</u>. <u><strong>Inclusion is offered to those who 'can perform the rituals of middle class society'</u></strong> with all of the typical exclusions based on age, status, race, health, and class that this entails. This point is well illustrated in an advert which followed the decriminalization of brothels in New South Wales: . tall, blonde and stylish, she recently completed her tertiary marketing course and is looking for employment in the field . She provides her own condoms ... and comes complete with a medical certificate. <u><mark>This 'ideal' typifies</mark> the <strong><mark>rational subjects</strong></mark> encouraged by these processes</u>, <u><mark>as</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>law operates alongside practices</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>such as</mark> public <mark>health</u></mark>, <u><mark>to create</mark> and 101 maintain </u>what Scott calls <u><mark>a <strong>'responsible prostitution population'.</u></strong></mark> The low take-up rate in the Netherlands indicates that very few can conform to this responsibilized model, meaning that while licensing can offer some increased improvement in the working conditions for a small section of workers, <u><mark>it</u></mark> also <u><mark>operates to</mark> <strong>identify and <mark>exclude those</u></strong></mark> <u>who cannot meet the increasingly <strong>conditional nature of citizenship</u></strong>, <u>for example, <mark>migrants</mark>, the <mark>underage</mark>, and <mark>drug-users</u></mark>, <u>all of whom are <strong><mark>not incorporated within</mark> the framework of regulatory <mark>protection</strong></mark>. </u>Thus in both systems, <u>the moral engineering of advanced <strong><mark>liberal governance</mark> has <mark>co-opted feminist concerns</strong></mark> <mark>into <strong>techniques of</mark> governance and <mark>control</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Whether based on a recognition of</strong> sex workers' inherent <strong>agency</strong> or victimhood, <strong>social exclusion is being used</strong> as leverage for <strong>increased control rather than for increased social justice</u></strong>. <u>Empowerment</u> simply <u>operates to <strong>sanction forms of self-governance</strong> that support neo-liberal interests</u>. As Cruikshank notes, <u>the</u> recent <u>proliferation of <strong><mark>state</mark>-sponsored <mark>programmes of empowerment</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>must be <strong>treated with critical caution</u></strong></mark>, <u>as</u> <u><strong>even while they are utilizing</strong> the <strong>vocabulary of radical politics</u></strong>, <u><mark>their</mark> <strong><mark>promise of emancipation</strong> may be <strong>merely</mark> <mark>rhetorical</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>as they </mark>'endeavour to <strong><mark>operationalise</mark> the <mark>self-governing</mark> capacity</u></strong> <u>of the governed <mark>in the <strong>pursuit of</mark> <mark>governmental objectives'</u></strong></mark>. Yet what <u><mark>both</mark> <mark>processes</u></mark> do well is to <u><strong><mark>identify those who cannot perform</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>rendering them vulnerable</mark> <mark>to</mark> exclusion or <mark>banishment</mark>. </p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | Off | 429,913 | 13 | 16,988 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round4.docx | 564,730 | N | NDT | 4 | Emory BD | Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram | 1ac was prostitution workers rights
1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case
2nc was legalism k and case
1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp
2nr was legalism k and case | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round4.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
740,604 | Absence of real reparations following legalization means SQ system will simply reformulate itself and continue mass incarceration and institutional racism | Short ‘14 | Short ‘14 | activists need to cultivate a conversation about repairing the damages done by the systemic racism of the war on drugs, before cashing in on legalization After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools to fail; we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now we have to be willing as we’re talking about legalization, to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs . After apartheid ended a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to “elicit truth there was an understanding that there could be no healing, no progress, no reconciliation without truth You can’t just destroy a people and then say ‘It’s over, we’re stopping now Alexander pointed to America’s tendency to shove its racist legacies under the rug rather than own up to them When the civil war ended slaves were free on paper but they were left with nothing The only option was to work low-paying contract jobs for the same slave owners And after a brief period of reconstruction a new caste system was imposed—Jim Crow If we’re going to downsize prisons and change marijuana laws we haven’t woken up to the magnitude of the harm that we have done Ultimately this movement to end mass incarceration and the drug war is about breaking our nation’s habit of creating caste-like systems in America If we’re not going to have a real conversation and ultimately be willing to care for those who’ve been demonized we’re going to find ourselves years from now either still having a slightly downsized system of mass incarceration that continues to hum along very well, or we will have managed to downsize our prisons but some new system of racial and social control will have emerged again because we have not yet learned the core lesson that our racial history has been trying to teach us.” | activists need to cultivate a conversation about repairing the damages by the systemic racism before cashing in on legalization After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now . After apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to “elicit truth there was an understanding that there could be no healing without truth You can’t just destroy a people and then say ‘It’s over America’s tendency to shove its racist legacies under the rug we haven’t woken up to the magnitude of the harm that we have done | April http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/legal_weeds_race_problem_white_men_get_rich_black_men_stay_in_prison_partner/?utm_content=buffer04b55&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
Alexander cautioned that drug policy activists need to keep this disparity in mind and cultivate a conversation about repairing the damages done by the systemic racism of the war on drugs, before cashing in on legalization. “After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color, a drug war that has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness through entire communities, and a war that has fanned the flames of the very violence it was supposedly intended to address and control; after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools to fail; we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now?” Alexander said. “I think we have to be willing, as we’re talking about legalization, to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs, how to repair the harm caused.” Alexander used the example of post-apartheid reparations in South Africa to point out the way a society can and should own up to its past mistakes. After apartheid ended, the nation passed a law called the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. Under the new law, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to “elicit truth” about the human rights violations that had occurred. The commission recorded the statements of witnesses who endured “gross human rights violations” and facilitated public hearings. Those who had committed violence could request amnesty from civil and criminal prosecution in order to share testimony about what they’d done with the commission. “At the end of apartheid in South Africa there was an understanding that there could be no healing, no progress, no reconciliation without truth,” she said. “You can’t just destroy a people and then say ‘It’s over, we’re stopping now.’ You have to be willing to deal with the truth, deal with the history openly and honestly.” Alexander pointed to America’s tendency to shove its racist legacies under the rug rather than own up to them. When the civil war ended, slaves were free on paper but they were left with nothing—“no 40 acres and a mule, nothing,” Alexander said. The only option was to work low-paying contract jobs for the same slave owners who had previously brutalized them. “And after a brief period of reconstruction a new caste system was imposed—Jim Crow—and another extraordinary movement arose and brought the old Jim Crow to its knees,” she said. “Americans said, OK, we’ll stop now. We’ll take down the whites-only signs, we’ll stop doing that. But there were not reparations for slavery, not for Jim Crow, and scarcely an acknowledgement of the harm done except for Martin Luther King Day, one day out of the year. And I feel like, here we go again.” Last week, Obama pushed out an initiative called My Brother’s Keeper, focused on helping black boys who have fallen down the social ladder. Alexander said she’s glad Obama is shining a spotlight on the crisis facing black communities. However, she said Obama has perpetuated the backward way of framing the situation when he talks about the issues facing those communities. “I am worried that much of the initiative is more based in rhetoric than in meaningful commitment to address the structures and institutions that have created the conditions in these communities,” she said. Asked about the unlikely relationship forming between U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Kentucky’s Tea Party senator Rand Paul, both of whom are standing together to end mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, Alexander responded she is wary of whether these politicians are making the right decisions for the wrong reasons. She cautioned that politicians across the political spectrum are “highly motivated” to downsize prisons because the U.S. can no longer afford to maintain a massive prison state without raising taxes “on the predominantly white middle class.” That shortsighted way of thinking fails to recognize the larger societal patterns that keep the U.S. cycling through various “caste-like” systems. “If we’re going to downsize these prisons and change marijuana laws and all that, in order to save some cash, but in that process to change these laws, we haven’t woken up to the magnitude of the harm that we have done,” she said. “Ultimately, at least from my perspective, this movement to end mass incarceration and this movement to end the drug war is about breaking our nation’s habit of creating caste-like systems in America,” she said. She added that regardless of whether they’re struggling with addiction and drug abuse or have a felony on their record, people deserve to be treated with basic human rights. “How were we able to permanently lock out of mainstream society tens of millions of people, destroy families?” she said. “If we’re not going to have a real conversation about that and ultimately be willing to care for ‘them,’ the ‘others,’ those ‘ghetto dwellers’ who’ve been demonized in this rush to declare war, we’re going to find ourselves years from now either still having a slightly downsized system of mass incarceration that continues to hum along very well, or we will have managed to downsize our prisons but some new system of racial and social control will have emerged again because we have not yet learned the core lesson that our racial history has been trying to teach us.” | 5,475 | <h4><u><strong>Absence of real reparations following legalization means SQ system will simply reformulate itself and continue mass incarceration and institutional racism</h4><p>Short ‘14</p><p></u></strong>April http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/legal_weeds_race_problem_white_men_get_rich_black_men_stay_in_prison_partner/?utm_content=buffer04b55&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer</p><p>Alexander cautioned that drug policy <u><strong><mark>activists need to</u></strong></mark> keep this disparity in mind and <u><strong><mark>cultivate a conversation about repairing the damages</mark> done <mark>by the systemic racism</mark> of the war on drugs, <mark>before cashing in on legalization</u></strong></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color</u></strong></mark>, a drug war that has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness through entire communities, and a war that has fanned the flames of the very violence it was supposedly intended to address and control; <u><strong>after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools to fail; <mark>we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now</u></strong></mark>?” Alexander said. “I think <u><strong>we have to be willing</u></strong>, <u><strong>as we’re talking about legalization, to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs</u></strong>, how to repair the harm caused.” Alexander used the example of post-apartheid reparations in South Africa to point out the way a society can and should own up to its past mistakes<u><strong><mark>. After apartheid</mark> ended</u></strong>, the nation passed a law called the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. Under the new law, <u><strong>a <mark>Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to “elicit truth</u></strong></mark>” about the human rights violations that had occurred. The commission recorded the statements of witnesses who endured “gross human rights violations” and facilitated public hearings. Those who had committed violence could request amnesty from civil and criminal prosecution in order to share testimony about what they’d done with the commission. “At the end of apartheid in South Africa <u><strong><mark>there was an understanding that there could be no healing</mark>, no progress, no reconciliation <mark>without</mark> <mark>truth</u></strong></mark>,” she said. “<u><strong><mark>You can’t just destroy a people and then say ‘It’s over</mark>, we’re stopping now</u></strong>.’ You have to be willing to deal with the truth, deal with the history openly and honestly.” <u><strong>Alexander pointed to <mark>America’s tendency to shove its racist legacies under the rug</mark> rather than own up to them</u></strong>. <u><strong>When the civil war ended</u></strong>, <u><strong>slaves were free on paper but they were left with nothing</u></strong>—“no 40 acres and a mule, nothing,” Alexander said. <u><strong>The only option was to work low-paying contract jobs for the same slave owners</u></strong> who had previously brutalized them. “<u><strong>And after a brief period of reconstruction a new caste system was imposed—Jim Crow</u></strong>—and another extraordinary movement arose and brought the old Jim Crow to its knees,” she said. “Americans said, OK, we’ll stop now. We’ll take down the whites-only signs, we’ll stop doing that. But there were not reparations for slavery, not for Jim Crow, and scarcely an acknowledgement of the harm done except for Martin Luther King Day, one day out of the year. And I feel like, here we go again.” Last week, Obama pushed out an initiative called My Brother’s Keeper, focused on helping black boys who have fallen down the social ladder. Alexander said she’s glad Obama is shining a spotlight on the crisis facing black communities. However, she said Obama has perpetuated the backward way of framing the situation when he talks about the issues facing those communities. “I am worried that much of the initiative is more based in rhetoric than in meaningful commitment to address the structures and institutions that have created the conditions in these communities,” she said. Asked about the unlikely relationship forming between U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Kentucky’s Tea Party senator Rand Paul, both of whom are standing together to end mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, Alexander responded she is wary of whether these politicians are making the right decisions for the wrong reasons. She cautioned that politicians across the political spectrum are “highly motivated” to downsize prisons because the U.S. can no longer afford to maintain a massive prison state without raising taxes “on the predominantly white middle class.” That shortsighted way of thinking fails to recognize the larger societal patterns that keep the U.S. cycling through various “caste-like” systems. “<u><strong>If we’re going to downsize</u></strong> these <u><strong>prisons and change marijuana laws</u></strong> and all that, in order to save some cash, but in that process to change these laws, <u><strong><mark>we haven’t woken up to the magnitude of the harm that we have done</u></strong></mark>,” she said. “<u><strong>Ultimately</u></strong>, at least from my perspective, <u><strong>this movement to end mass incarceration and</u></strong> this movement to end <u><strong>the drug war is about breaking our nation’s habit of creating caste-like systems in America</u></strong>,” she said. She added that regardless of whether they’re struggling with addiction and drug abuse or have a felony on their record, people deserve to be treated with basic human rights. “How were we able to permanently lock out of mainstream society tens of millions of people, destroy families?” she said. “<u><strong>If we’re not going to have a real conversation</u></strong> about that <u><strong>and ultimately be willing to care for</u></strong> ‘them,’ the ‘others,’ <u><strong>those</u></strong> ‘ghetto dwellers’ <u><strong>who’ve been demonized</u></strong> in this rush to declare war, <u><strong>we’re going to find ourselves years from now either still having a slightly downsized system of mass incarceration that continues to hum along very well, or we will have managed to downsize our prisons but some new system of racial and social control will have emerged again because we have not yet learned the core lesson that our racial history has been trying to teach us.”</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | Case | 429,914 | 27 | 16,986 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | 564,707 | N | Kentucky | 7 | Berkeley MS | Jim Schultz | 1ac was marijuana racial justice movements
1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case
2nc was the politics of pain university k
1nr was case
2nr was the k | ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx | null | 48,386 | EvZo | Baylor EvZo | null | Sa..... | Ev..... | Gr..... | Zo..... | 18,750 | Baylor | Baylor | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |