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740,405
Mexico’s economy is recovering but is fragile
Montes 6-25
Montes 6-25
upbeat April data buoyed hopes that the economy is finally on the path toward improved growth. economists welcomed the broad 1.3% expansion in the global index of economic activity in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012 "The frequency of the positive data over the negative data is increasing. There are a whole range of indicators that show that we're in a recovery cycle Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside Capistrán chief economist said the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period" the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, suggesting that the economic recovery in the coming months will be more moderate. unemployment is relatively high and that the slack in the economy is widening economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm. indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand nonmanufacturing index fell the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May Inflation was subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices. consumer credit growth has been weak.
"The frequency of the positive data is increasing we're in a recovery cycle the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year government spending jumped 13% central bank cut interest rates and will lower its growth estimate suggesting that the recovery will be moderate unemployment is high and the slack is widening economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm.
(JUAN MONTES, reporter, “Mexican Economy Sees Glimpse of Recovery” June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexican-economy-sees-glimpse-of-recovery-1403719934, KB) After many months of dreary economic news from Mexico, upbeat April data buoyed hopes that the economy is finally on the path toward improved growth. The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto and some economists welcomed the broad 1.3% expansion in the global index of economic activity in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012, bolstered by growth in services, construction and industry. "The frequency of the positive data over the negative data is increasing. There are a whole range of indicators that show that we're in a recovery cycle," said Fernando Aportela, Mexico's deputy finance minister. In an interview, Mr. Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging. The data, released Tuesday, surprised a market that had been discounting another disappointing year for growth. In 2013, Mexico expanded just 1.1%, the lowest rate since the recession of 2009. Prospects for this year worsened quickly after a sluggish first quarter that prompted the government to cut its growth estimates to 2.7%, well below the 5% growth target sought by Mr. Peña Nieto. The finance ministry is confident that the effect of new taxes on consumption is dissipating, that a battered construction sector is picking up and that Mexico's export engine is gaining pace. Mexico sends 80% of its exports to the U.S., where economic activity is recovering after an unusually harsh winter knocked down demand. The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside (in coming months) as there are still unjustified bearish views regarding the economy's performance in 2014," said Marco Oviedo, an economist with Barclays, reaffirming his 3% growth forecast. Carlos Capistrán, chief economist of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period" that began in mid-2012, when the country's export engine started to slow and delays in government spending dented investments. "We're very confident that the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year," Mr. Capistrán said, adding that the government is now spending at a much faster pace. In the January-April period, government spending jumped 13% compared with the same period a year earlier. Among the chorus of optimism, however, the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in early June, the central bank cut interest rates to support economic growth and said that it will likely lower its 2.3% to 3.3% growth estimate for the year, suggesting that the economic recovery in the coming months will be more moderate. Mexico's central bank has said unemployment is relatively high and that the slack in the economy is widening. The bank is expecting the output gap—the difference between actual output and its potential—to close only in late 2015. Some economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm. "It's premature to say that this is the beginning of a strong recovery. The April data could just be a one-time rebound, given the huge contraction seen in March," said Jonathan Heath, an independent economist. In March, Mexico's economy shrank 0.6% versus February. Mr. Heath said some indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand. The Mexican Institute of Finance Executives' nonmanufacturing index fell for a fourth straight month in May, and the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May, giving no clues of improvement. Inflation was also subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices. And consumer credit growth has been weak. "We should wait to see the economic growth in May and June to be sure that this is a long-lasting recovery and not something temporary," said Mr. Heath. Gross domestic product data for the second quarter of the year will be released on August 21.
4,166
<h4><strong>Mexico’s economy is recovering but is fragile</h4><p>Montes 6-25</p><p></strong>(JUAN MONTES, reporter, “Mexican Economy Sees Glimpse of Recovery” June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexican-economy-sees-glimpse-of-recovery-1403719934, KB)</p><p>After many months of dreary economic news from Mexico, <u><strong>upbeat April data buoyed hopes that the economy is finally on the path toward improved growth.</u></strong> The government of President Enrique Peña Nieto and some <u><strong>economists welcomed the broad 1.3% expansion in the global index of economic activity in April, which marked the best monthly performance since November 2012</u></strong>, bolstered by growth in services, construction and industry. <u><strong><mark>"The frequency of the positive data </mark>over the negative data <mark>is increasing</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>There are a whole range of indicators that show that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>we're in a recovery cycle</u></strong></mark>," said Fernando Aportela, Mexico's deputy finance minister. In an interview, Mr. <u><strong>Aportela cited recent improvements in retail sales and industrial production as encouraging</u></strong>. The data, released Tuesday, surprised a market that had been discounting another disappointing year for growth. In 2013, Mexico expanded just 1.1%, the lowest rate since the recession of 2009. Prospects for this year worsened quickly after a sluggish first quarter that prompted the government to cut its growth estimates to 2.7%, well below the 5% growth target sought by Mr. Peña Nieto. The finance ministry is confident that the effect of new taxes on consumption is dissipating, that a battered construction sector is picking up and that Mexico's export engine is gaining pace. Mexico sends 80% of its exports to the U.S., where economic activity is recovering after an unusually harsh winter knocked down demand. <u><strong>The finance ministry is keeping its 2.7% growth forecast for now. Some analysts argue that this guidance could be too pessimistic. "Markets might be surprised to the upside</u></strong> (in coming months) as there are still unjustified bearish views regarding the economy's performance in 2014," said Marco Oviedo, an economist with Barclays, reaffirming his 3% growth forecast. Carlos <u><strong>Capistrán</u></strong>, <u><strong>chief economist</u></strong> of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, <u><strong>said the Mexican economy is exiting a "recessive period"</u></strong> that began in mid-2012, when the country's export engine started to slow and delays in government spending dented investments. "We're very confident that <u><strong><mark>the Mexican economy will significantly rebound in the second half of the year</u></strong></mark>," Mr. Capistrán said, adding that the government is now spending at a much faster pace. In the January-April period, <u><strong><mark>government spending jumped 13%</mark> compared with the same period a year earlier</u></strong>. Among the chorus of optimism, however, <u><strong>the Bank of Mexico is sounding a note of discord. In its most recent policy decision in</u></strong> early <u><strong>June, the <mark>central bank cut interest rates</mark> to support economic growth <mark>and</mark> said that it <mark>will</mark> likely <mark>lower its</mark> 2.3% to 3.3% <mark>growth estimate</mark> for the year, <mark>suggesting that</u></strong> <u><strong>the</mark> economic <mark>recovery</mark> in the coming months <mark>will be</mark> more <mark>moderate</mark>. </u></strong>Mexico's central bank has said <u><strong><mark>unemployment is </mark>relatively <mark>high and</mark> that <mark>the slack</mark> in the economy <mark>is widening</u></strong></mark>. The bank is expecting the output gap—the difference between actual output and its potential—to close only in late 2015. Some <u><strong><mark>economists argue it's too early to say that the recovery is firm.</mark> </u></strong>"It's premature to say that this is the beginning of a strong recovery. The April data could just be a one-time rebound, given the huge contraction seen in March," said Jonathan Heath, an independent economist. In March, Mexico's economy shrank 0.6% versus February. Mr. Heath said some <u><strong>indicators are still showing weakness in domestic demand</u></strong>. The Mexican Institute of Finance Executives' <u><strong>nonmanufacturing index fell</u></strong> for a fourth straight month in May, and <u><strong>the urban unemployment rate was close to 6% in May</u></strong>, giving no clues of improvement. <u><strong>Inflation was</u></strong> also <u><strong>subdued until early June, indicating that there is no significant demand pressure on prices.</u></strong> And <u><strong>consumer credit growth has been weak.</u></strong> "We should wait to see the economic growth in May and June to be sure that this is a long-lasting recovery and not something temporary," said Mr. Heath. Gross domestic product data for the second quarter of the year will be released on August 21.</p>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Mexico DA
429,545
3
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,406
Economic inequality has to be addressed before and separate from legislation – this answers the permutation because you’re the wrong starting point
Haynes, 4
Haynes, 4 (Dina F., “Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported.” Human Rights Quarterly 26.2 – Project Muse)
Trafficking in women is fueled by poverty, and women in transitioning and developing countries are exceptionally vulnerable Poverty conditions in these countries tend to impact women in particular, as their economic status vis-à-vis men is usually even lower in these countries While the eradication of poverty is too large to be tackled within an anti-trafficking scheme, the conditions that foster a vulnerability to trafficking must be addressed In both the smuggling and trafficking scenarios, it is crucial to look at the reasons why a person would feel the need to leave her home in search of work Fully understanding the reasons women fall prey to traffickers can help legislators determine how best to draft and implement anti-trafficking legislation
Trafficking in women is fueled by poverty Poverty conditions in these countries tend to impact women in particular, as their economic status vis-à-vis men is usually lower While the eradication of poverty is too large to be tackled within an anti-trafficking scheme, the conditions that foster a vulnerability to trafficking must be addressed it is crucial to look at the reasons why a person would feel the need to leave her home in search of work
Trafficking in women is fueled by poverty, and women in transitioning and developing countries are exceptionally vulnerable.144 Poverty conditions in these countries tend to impact women in particular, as their economic status vis-à-vis men is usually even lower in these countries. While the eradication of gender-based poverty is too large of an agenda to be tackled within an anti-trafficking scheme, the conditions that foster a vulnerability to trafficking must at least be addressed at some point. In both the smuggling and trafficking scenarios, it is crucial to look at the reasons why a person would feel the need to leave her home country and travel abroad in search of work or escape from a violent or unsuitable life, but also to remember that some simply leave home in search of adventure or a better life and find themselves held against their will or forced into labor. Fully understanding the reasons women fall prey to traffickers can help legislators determine how best to draft and implement anti-trafficking legislation.
1,040
<h4>Economic inequality has to be addressed before and separate from legislation – this answers the permutation because you’re the wrong starting point</h4><p><strong>Haynes, 4</strong> (Dina F., “Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported.” Human Rights Quarterly 26.2 – Project Muse)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Trafficking in women is fueled by poverty</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong>and women in transitioning and developing countries are exceptionally vulnerable</u></strong>.144 <u><strong><mark>Poverty conditions in these countries tend to impact women in particular, as their economic status vis-à-vis men is usually</mark> even <mark>lower</mark> in these countries</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>While the eradication of</mark> </u></strong>gender-based <u><strong><mark>poverty is too large</u></strong></mark> of an agenda <u><strong><mark>to be tackled within an anti-trafficking scheme, the conditions that foster a vulnerability to trafficking must</u></strong></mark> at least <u><strong><mark>be addressed</u></strong></mark> at some point. <u><strong>In both the smuggling and trafficking scenarios, <mark>it is crucial to look at the reasons why a person would feel the need to leave her home</u></strong></mark> country and travel abroad <u><strong><mark>in search of work</mark> </u></strong>or escape from a violent or unsuitable life, but also to remember that some simply leave home in search of adventure or a better life and find themselves held against their will or forced into labor. <u><strong>Fully understanding the reasons women fall prey to traffickers can help legislators determine how best to draft and implement anti-trafficking legislation</u></strong>. </p>
2NC
Cap K
2NC AT: Gender>Econ
429,846
1
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,407
Voting neg recognizes that rejecting the totality of capitalism is the only ethical decision possible. It means preferring not to engage in the affirmative’s logic of overspecific criticism which blunts radical critique by creating wounded attachments to status quo minutia.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Voting neg recognizes that rejecting the totality of capitalism is the only ethical decision possible. It means preferring not to engage in the affirmative’s logic of overspecific criticism which blunts radical critique by creating wounded attachments to status quo minutia. </h4>
2NC
Cap K
2NC Alternative
429,844
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,408
The plan destroys cartels
Pullen ‘09
Pullen ‘09 (Doug Pullen “Cheech and Chong: Comedy tour stokes talk on pot legalization” May 10, 2009 Sunday Lexis, TSW)
75 percent of the cartels' revenues are dependent upon marijuana If you take that away from them, it will at destabilize and affect their ability to recruit new members and the kind of heavy weaponry used to outgun the Mexican military
75 percent of the cartels' revenues are dependent upon marijuana If you take that away from them, it will at destabilize and affect their ability to recruit new members and the kind of heavy weaponry used to outgun the Mexican military
"If you legalize it, at least you eliminate that huge problem of law enforcement. Now you've got a cap on it." While elected officials debate marijuana legalization, Chong says he doesn't smoke the herb anymore. Nor does he believe Cheech and Chong were wrong to use or joke about marijuana. Cheech and Chong was a comedy team first and foremost, he said, not advocates for drug use or abuse. "The thing about our humor is it was a gentle approach. It wasn't a militant approach. And it's still working," Chong said. "It's what's made us last all these years. We weren't fighting a war. We were showing people how life really is." O'Rourke said he has studied drug legalization more intensely since he created a media firestorm by adding his amendment to a series of recommendations by the Border Relations Committee to address drug-related violence. He says decriminalizing marijuana might hurt cartels. "There's no true way to know, because it's a non-reported black market, but people say that 50 to 75 percent of the cartels' revenues are dependent upon marijuana," O'Rourke said. "If you take that away from them, it will at least destabilize and affect their ability to recruit new members and the kind of heavy weaponry used to outgun the Juárez police and, frankly, the Mexican military." In many ways, Chong became a symbol for those who say U.S. marijuana laws are wrongheaded.
1,387
<h4><strong>The plan destroys cartels</h4><p>Pullen ‘09</p><p></strong>(Doug Pullen “Cheech and Chong: Comedy tour stokes talk on pot legalization” May 10, 2009 Sunday Lexis, TSW)</p><p>"If you legalize it, at least you eliminate that huge problem of law enforcement. Now you've got a cap on it." While elected officials debate marijuana legalization, Chong says he doesn't smoke the herb anymore. Nor does he believe Cheech and Chong were wrong to use or joke about marijuana. Cheech and Chong was a comedy team first and foremost, he said, not advocates for drug use or abuse. "The thing about our humor is it was a gentle approach. It wasn't a militant approach. And it's still working," Chong said. "It's what's made us last all these years. We weren't fighting a war. We were showing people how life really is." O'Rourke said he has studied drug legalization more intensely since he created a media firestorm by adding his amendment to a series of recommendations by the Border Relations Committee to address drug-related violence. He says decriminalizing marijuana might hurt cartels. "There's no true way to know, because it's a non-reported black market, but people say that 50 to <u><strong><mark>75 percent of the cartels' revenues are dependent upon marijuana</u></strong></mark>," O'Rourke said. "<u><strong><mark>If you take that away from them, it will at </u></strong></mark>least<u><strong><mark> destabilize and affect their ability to recruit new members and the kind of heavy weaponry used to outgun </u></strong></mark>the Juárez police and, frankly,<u><strong><mark> the Mexican military</u></strong></mark>." In many ways, Chong became a symbol for those who say U.S. marijuana laws are wrongheaded.</p>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Mexico DA
429,847
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,409
Legalization expands the black market, increases violence from customers, makes it exceedingly difficult to get police help, and decreases support services and exit programs
Forrey ‘14
Forrey ‘14 [Chariane K. Forrey is a 2014 J.D. Candidate at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 14 Nev. L.J. 970. ETB]
Nevada is not alone in attempting legalization Victoria enacted the Prostitution Control Act of 1994 to reform and legalize adult prostitution. the Act was meant to protect prostitutes from violence and health risks and to eliminate criminals from providing prostitution services the opposite occurred To meet the demand 400 illegal brothels sprung up as compared with 95 legal brothels This does not include other unlicensed escort agencies and the surge in street prostitution For women working in legal brothels, the rising demand increased the competition among prostitutes This resulted in increased pressure on women to book a sex buyer even if the buyer was violent, drunk, or demanding The blurred line between what constituted [*986] work and what constituted sexual assault made it exceedingly difficult for women to know when to seek help from the police. The normalization of prostitution resulted in a lack of support services rather than a push for exit programs, such that "those involved in a cycle of drugs, prostitution, conviction and vulnerability were likely to be trapped within the industry many women in the legal sex industry remained vulnerable to labor abuse because the industry often employed young workers from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds These women often worked long hours and were poorly paid, yet because of their backgrounds they remained unaware of their employment rights
Victoria enacted the the Act to protect prostitutes from violence the opposite occurred To meet the demand 400 illegal brothels sprung up compared with 95 legal brothels the competition among prostitutes resulted in increased pressure to book a buyer even if the buyer was violent, drunk, or demanding The blurred line between work and sexual assault made it exceedingly difficult for women to seek help from the police normalization of prostitution resulted in a lack of support services rather than a push for exit programs, such that "those involved were likely to be trapped women remained vulnerable to abuse because the industry employed workers from diverse backgrounds
Nevada is not alone in attempting legalization. Victoria, Australia is a state similar to Nevada in that international tourists flock toward its gaming industry. n149 Australian popular culture has promoted its reputation as a "nation [*985] of gamblers." n150 Victoria in particular has been the heartland for gambling within the racing industry since the 1800s, n151 but the state began to increase its profits in the casino industry in 1991. n152 The Victorian casino industry tends to attract young tourists between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, usually students. n153¶ Almost two decades ago, Victoria enacted the Prostitution Control Act of 1994 to reform and legalize adult prostitution. n154 Parts of the casino and prostitution industry combined efforts, with one brothel requesting customers book appointments with casino chips. n155 Among other goals, the Prostitution Control Act of 1994 was meant to protect prostitutes from violence and health risks and to eliminate criminals from providing prostitution services. n156 However, the opposite occurred. n157¶ To meet the demand for cheap sex and limitless sexual services, 400 illegal brothels sprung up throughout the state by 2003, n158 as compared with 95 legal brothels. n159 This number does not include other unlicensed escort agencies n160 and the surge in street prostitution. n161 Additionally, within a few years after legalization, Victoria became the state with the highest number of children used in commercial sex, including children less than ten years of age. n162 Although Australia legalized prostitution to keep children out of the sex trade, both legal and illegal brothels engaged in the sex trafficking of minors. n163¶ For women working in legal brothels, the rising demand for sex in Victoria increased the competition among prostitutes. n164 This resulted in brothels placing increased pressure on women to book a sex buyer even if the buyer was violent, drunk, or demanding. n165 The blurred line between what constituted [*986] work and what constituted sexual assault made it exceedingly difficult for women to know when to seek help from the police. n166 The normalization of prostitution resulted in a lack of support services rather than a push for exit programs, such that "those involved in a cycle of drugs, prostitution, conviction and vulnerability were likely to be trapped within the industry." n167¶ Other promised benefits of legalization did not materialize. Tax evasion continued to occur among both legal and illegal brothels. n168 Women working in legal brothels were unwilling to submit tax returns because they did not want an official register of their work in prostitution. n169 Also, many women in the legal sex industry remained vulnerable to labor abuse because the industry often employed young workers from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. n170 These women often worked long hours and were poorly paid, yet because of their backgrounds they remained unaware of their employment rights. n171
3,026
<h4><strong>Legalization expands the black market, increases violence from customers, makes it exceedingly difficult to get police help, and decreases support services and exit programs</h4><p>Forrey ‘14</p><p></strong>[Chariane K. Forrey is a 2014 J.D. Candidate at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 14 Nev. L.J. 970. ETB]</p><p><u><strong>Nevada is not alone in attempting legalization</u></strong>. Victoria, Australia is a state similar to Nevada in that international tourists flock toward its gaming industry. n149 Australian popular culture has promoted its reputation as a "nation [*985] of gamblers." n150 Victoria in particular has been the heartland for gambling within the racing industry since the 1800s, n151 but the state began to increase its profits in the casino industry in 1991. n152 The Victorian casino industry tends to attract young tourists between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, usually students. n153¶ Almost two decades ago, <u><strong><mark>Victoria enacted the </mark>Prostitution Control Act of 1994 to reform and legalize adult prostitution.</u></strong> n154 Parts of the casino and prostitution industry combined efforts, with one brothel requesting customers book appointments with casino chips. n155 Among other goals, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> </mark>Prostitution Control <u><strong><mark>Act</u></strong> </mark>of 1994 <u><strong>was meant <mark>to protect prostitutes from violence </mark>and health risks and to eliminate criminals from providing prostitution services</u></strong>. n156 However, <u><strong><mark>the opposite occurred</u></strong></mark>. n157¶ <u><strong><mark>To meet the demand</u></strong> </mark>for cheap sex and limitless sexual services, <u><strong><mark>400 illegal brothels sprung up</u></strong> </mark>throughout the state by 2003, n158 <u><strong>as <mark>compared with 95 legal brothels</u></strong></mark>. n159 <u><strong>This</u></strong> number <u><strong>does not include other unlicensed escort agencies</u></strong> n160 <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>the surge in street prostitution</u></strong>. n161 Additionally, within a few years after legalization, Victoria became the state with the highest number of children used in commercial sex, including children less than ten years of age. n162 Although Australia legalized prostitution to keep children out of the sex trade, both legal and illegal brothels engaged in the sex trafficking of minors. n163¶ <u><strong>For women working in legal brothels, the rising demand</u></strong> for sex in Victoria <u><strong>increased <mark>the competition among prostitutes</u></strong></mark>. n164 <u><strong>This <mark>resulted in </u></strong></mark>brothels placing <u><strong><mark>increased pressure </mark>on women <mark>to book a</mark> sex <mark>buyer even if the buyer was violent, drunk, or demanding</u></strong></mark>. n165 <u><strong><mark>The blurred line between </mark>what constituted [*986] <mark>work and </mark>what constituted <mark>sexual assault made it exceedingly difficult for women to </mark>know when to <mark>seek help from the police</mark>.</u></strong> n166 <u><strong>The <mark>normalization of prostitution resulted in a lack of support services rather than a push for exit programs,</mark> <mark>such that "those involved </mark>in a cycle of drugs, prostitution, conviction and vulnerability <mark>were likely to be trapped </mark>within the industry</u></strong>." n167¶ Other promised benefits of legalization did not materialize. Tax evasion continued to occur among both legal and illegal brothels. n168 Women working in legal brothels were unwilling to submit tax returns because they did not want an official register of their work in prostitution. n169 Also, <u><strong>many <mark>women </mark>in the legal sex industry <mark>remained vulnerable to </mark>labor <mark>abuse because the industry</mark> often <mark>employed </mark>young <mark>workers from diverse </mark>cultural and linguistic <mark>backgrounds</u></strong></mark>. n170 <u><strong>These women often worked long hours and were poorly paid, yet because of their backgrounds they remained unaware of their employment rights</u></strong>. n171</p>
1NR
Case
Ext – 1NC #2
429,849
1
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,410
This refusal represents the direct prioritization of class struggle as a direct confrontation with the constitutive societal antagonism – which radicalizes political subjectivity, embraces the universal kernel of emancipation, and imposes universal punishment on the structural oppressors of humanity.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>This refusal represents the direct prioritization of class struggle as a direct confrontation with the constitutive societal antagonism – which radicalizes political subjectivity, embraces the universal kernel of emancipation, and imposes universal punishment on the structural oppressors of humanity. </h4>
2NC
Cap K
2NC Alternative
429,848
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,411
Cartels are key to Mexico’s banking sector – collapse crushes the entire economy
Lange 10
Lange 10 (Jason Lange, Correspondent, Washington, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122, KB)
Collins is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business, whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. cartels bring $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil drug cash is everywhere in Mexico It has propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. Drug money has fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Ibarra "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that helped the banks drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. Another problem the economy could face is that drug funding could one day fall if authorities cracked down on money laundering or wrenched power away from the cartels. the moment it stops it all crashes
Mexico made more money moving drugs than it did exporting oil It has propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate During the financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that helped the banks drug money is driving 20 percent of the state's economy. drug funding could one day fall the moment it stops it all crashes
At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles, Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines. But the United States contends that the company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines. Grupo Collins, which has denied any connection to organized crime, is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business, whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. Mexican cartels, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring an estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. To put that in perspective: Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico. It has even propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said George Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. "The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said. During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Guillermo Ibarra of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that to a certain extent helped the banks," Ibarra said. Indeed, drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish. "You will wind up with mafia capitalism here before things improve," he said. Even though cartels are clearly creating jobs and giving a lot of people extra spending money, some of these economic benefits are neutralized by a raging drug war that has scared investors. About a dozen foreign companies in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from Texas, are postponing investments in factories there because of regular gun battles in the city, said Soledad Maynez, who heads a local factory association. She met with the companies' representatives in November. "They need the security issue improved," she said. Business leaders say thousands of shops have closed in Ciudad Juarez because of the violence. Another problem the economy could face is that drug funding could one day fall if authorities cracked down on money laundering or somehow wrenched power away from the cartels. "(Drug money) could have a short-term positive effect. But in the long run, because you're propping up this artificial economy, the moment it stops it all crashes," the U.S. law enforcement official said. (Additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana, editing by Claudia Parsons and Jim Impoco)
10,597
<h4>Cartels are key to Mexico’s banking sector – collapse crushes the entire economy</h4><p><strong>Lange 10</p><p></strong>(Jason Lange, Correspondent, Washington, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122, KB)</p><p>At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles, Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines. But the United States contends that the company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines. Grupo <u><strong>Collins</u></strong>, which has denied any connection to organized crime, <u><strong>is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business,</u></strong> <u><strong>whose growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life. </u></strong>Mexican <u><strong>cartels</u></strong>, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, <u><strong>bring</u></strong> an estimated $25 billion to <u><strong>$40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. </u></strong>To put that in perspective: <u><strong><mark>Mexico</mark> probably <mark>made more money</mark> in 2009 <mark>moving drugs than it did exporting oil</u></strong></mark>, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, <u><strong>drug cash is everywhere in Mexico</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It has</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong><mark>propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy.</mark> </u></strong>Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. <u><strong>"Mexico is saturated with this money," said</u></strong> George <u><strong>Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor.</u></strong> In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as <u><strong><mark>the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate</u></strong></mark>, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE <u><strong>What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. </u></strong>A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. <u><strong>Drug money has </u></strong>also <u><strong>fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts</u></strong> such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that <u><strong>cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. </u></strong>"The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS <u><strong>Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system</u></strong>, the U.S. official said. <u><strong><mark>During the</mark> global <mark>financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity</mark>, says economist</u></strong> Guillermo <u><strong>Ibarra</u></strong> of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. <u><strong><mark>"They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that</u></strong></mark> to a certain extent <u><strong><mark>helped the banks</u></strong></mark>," Ibarra said. Indeed, <u><strong>drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico.</u></strong> A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." <u><strong>Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," </u></strong>said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that <u><strong>more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating.</u></strong> "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that <u><strong><mark>drug money is driving</mark> nearly <mark>20 percent of the state's economy.</mark> </u></strong>Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found <u><strong>organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy. </u></strong>Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish. "You will wind up with mafia capitalism here before things improve," he said. Even though cartels are clearly creating jobs and giving a lot of people extra spending money, some of these economic benefits are neutralized by a raging drug war that has scared investors. About a dozen foreign companies in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from Texas, are postponing investments in factories there because of regular gun battles in the city, said Soledad Maynez, who heads a local factory association. She met with the companies' representatives in November. "They need the security issue improved," she said. Business leaders say thousands of shops have closed in Ciudad Juarez because of the violence. <u><strong>Another problem the economy could face is that <mark>drug funding could one day fall</mark> if authorities cracked down on money laundering or</u></strong> somehow <u><strong>wrenched power away from the cartels. </u></strong>"(Drug money) could have a short-term positive effect. But in the long run, because you're propping up this artificial economy, <u><strong><mark>the moment it stops it all crashes</u></strong></mark>," the U.S. law enforcement official said. (Additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana, editing by Claudia Parsons and Jim Impoco)</p>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Mexico DA
296,358
6
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,412
Legalization doesn’t solve stigma
Raymond ‘3
Raymond ‘3 [Ph.D. Janice Raymond is a professor at the University of Massachusetts.¶ “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution ¶ And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution.” (Published in simultaneously in hard copy in Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: ¶ pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley ¶ (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003. ETB]
Legalization of prostitution increases clandestine, ¶ illegal and street prostitution. ¶ One goals of legalized prostitution was to move prostituted women indoors into ¶ brothels and clubs where they would be allegedly less vulnerable than in street ¶ prostitution. However, many women are in street prostitution because they want ¶ to avoid being controlled and exploited by pimps transformed in legalized ¶ systems into sex businessmen). legalization may actually drive some women ¶ into street prostitution. /// women in prostitution point out that legalization does not erase the stigma of prostitution. ¶ Because they must register and lose their anonymity, women are more ¶ vulnerable to being stigmatized as “whores,” and this identity follows them ¶ everyplace. Thus, the majority of women in prostitution still operate illegally and ¶ underground. Some who originally supported the ¶ legalization of brothels on the grounds that this would liberate women are now ¶ seeing that legalization actually reinforces the oppression of women The argument that legalization was supposed to take the criminal elements out of ¶ sex businesses by strict regulation of the industry has failed. The real growth in ¶ prostitution in Australia since legalization took effect has been in the illegal ¶ sector. Over a period of 12 months from 1998-1999, unlicensed brothels in ¶ Victoria tripled in number and still operate with impunity In New South Wales where brothels were decriminalized in 1995, the ¶ number of brothels in Sydney had tripled to 400-500 by 1999, with the vast ¶ majority having no license to advertise or operate
Legalization increases illegal and street prostitution women want ¶ to avoid being controlled by pimps (transformed in legalized ¶ systems into sex businessmen legalization may drive some into street prostitution legalization does not erase the stigma Because they must register and lose their anonymity, women are more ¶ vulnerable to being stigmatized as “whores,” and this identity follows them still operate illegally and ¶ underground The real growth in Australia since legalization has been in the illegal ¶ sector from 1998-1999, unlicensed brothels tripled
4. Legalization/decriminalizaton of prostitution increases clandestine, ¶ illegal and street prostitution. ¶ ¶ One goals of legalized prostitution was to move prostituted women indoors into ¶ brothels and clubs where they would be allegedly less vulnerable than in street ¶ prostitution. However, many women are in street prostitution because they want ¶ to avoid being controlled and exploited by pimps (transformed in legalized ¶ systems into sex businessmen). Other women do not want to register or submit to health checks, as required by law in some countries where prostitution is ¶ legalized (Schelzig, 2002). Thus, legalization may actually drive some women ¶ into street prostitution. ///Arguing against an Italian proposal for legalized ¶ prostitution, Esohe Aghatise has suggested that brothels actually deprive women ¶ of what little protection they may have on the street, confining women to closed ¶ spaces where they have little chance of meeting outreach workers or others ¶ who might help them exit prostitution (Aghatise, in press). ¶ ¶ In the Netherlands, women in prostitution point out that legalization or ¶ decriminalization of the sex industry does not erase the stigma of prostitution. ¶ Because they must register and lose their anonymity, women are more ¶ vulnerable to being stigmatized as “whores,” and this identity follows them ¶ everyplace. Thus, the majority of women in prostitution still operate illegally and ¶ underground. Some members of Parliament who originally supported the ¶ legalization of brothels on the grounds that this would liberate women are now ¶ seeing that legalization actually reinforces the oppression of women (Daley, ¶ 2001, p. A1). ¶ ¶ Chief Inspector Nancy Pollock, one of Scotland’s highest-ranking female police ¶ officers, established Glasgow’s street liaison team for women in prostitution in ¶ 1998. Pollock stated that legalization or decriminalization of prostitution is ¶ “…simply to abandon women to what has to be the most demeaning job in the ¶ world” (Martin, 2002, p. A5). Countering the argument that legalized prostitution ¶ provides safer venues for women, Pollock noted that women in sauna ¶ prostitution, for example, “have even less control over what services they will ¶ perform. On the street, very few women will do anal sex and few do sex without a ¶ condom. But in the saunas, the owners, who obviously don’t want their punters ¶ going away disappointed, decide what the women will do, and very often that is ¶ anal sex and sex – oral and vaginal – without a condom” (Martin, 2002, p. A5). ¶ ¶ The argument that legalization was supposed to take the criminal elements out of ¶ sex businesses by strict regulation of the industry has failed. The real growth in ¶ prostitution in Australia since legalization took effect has been in the illegal ¶ sector. Over a period of 12 months from 1998-1999, unlicensed brothels in ¶ Victoria tripled in number and still operate with impunity (Sullivan & Jeffreys, ¶ 2001). In New South Wales where brothels were decriminalized in 1995, the ¶ number of brothels in Sydney had tripled to 400-500 by 1999, with the vast ¶ majority having no license to advertise or operate. In response to widespread ¶ police corruption, control of illegal prostitution was removed from police ¶ jurisdiction and placed under the control of local councils and planning ¶ regulators. However, the local councils do not have the resources to investigate ¶ illegal brothel operators (Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001).
3,510
<h4><strong>Legalization doesn’t solve stigma </h4><p>Raymond ‘3</p><p></strong>[Ph.D. Janice Raymond is a professor at the University of Massachusetts.¶ “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution ¶ And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution.” (Published in simultaneously in hard copy in Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: ¶ pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley ¶ (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003. ETB]</p><p>4. <u><strong><mark>Legalization</u></strong></mark>/decriminalizaton <u><strong>of prostitution <mark>increases </mark>clandestine, ¶ <mark>illegal and street prostitution</mark>. ¶ </u></strong>¶ <u><strong>One goals of legalized prostitution was to move prostituted women indoors into ¶ brothels and clubs where they would be allegedly less vulnerable than in street ¶ prostitution. However, many <mark>women </mark>are in street prostitution because they <mark>want ¶ to avoid being controlled </mark>and exploited <mark>by pimps</u></strong> (<u><strong>transformed in legalized ¶ systems into sex businessmen</mark>). </u></strong>Other women do not want to register or submit to health checks, as required by law in some countries where prostitution is ¶ legalized (Schelzig, 2002). Thus, <u><strong><mark>legalization may </mark>actually <mark>drive some </mark>women ¶ <mark>into street prostitution</mark>. ///</u></strong>Arguing against an Italian proposal for legalized ¶ prostitution, Esohe Aghatise has suggested that brothels actually deprive women ¶ of what little protection they may have on the street, confining women to closed ¶ spaces where they have little chance of meeting outreach workers or others ¶ who might help them exit prostitution (Aghatise, in press). ¶ ¶ In the Netherlands, <u><strong>women in prostitution point out that <mark>legalization </u></strong></mark>or ¶ decriminalization of the sex industry<u><strong> <mark>does not erase the stigma </mark>of prostitution. ¶ <mark>Because they must register and lose their anonymity, women are more ¶ vulnerable to being stigmatized as “whores,” and this identity follows them</mark> ¶ everyplace. Thus, the majority of women in prostitution <mark>still operate illegally and ¶ underground</mark>. Some</u></strong> members of Parliament <u><strong>who originally supported the ¶ legalization of brothels on the grounds that this would liberate women are now ¶ seeing that legalization actually reinforces the oppression of women</u></strong> (Daley, ¶ 2001, p. A1). ¶ ¶ Chief Inspector Nancy Pollock, one of Scotland’s highest-ranking female police ¶ officers, established Glasgow’s street liaison team for women in prostitution in ¶ 1998. Pollock stated that legalization or decriminalization of prostitution is ¶ “…simply to abandon women to what has to be the most demeaning job in the ¶ world” (Martin, 2002, p. A5). Countering the argument that legalized prostitution ¶ provides safer venues for women, Pollock noted that women in sauna ¶ prostitution, for example, “have even less control over what services they will ¶ perform. On the street, very few women will do anal sex and few do sex without a ¶ condom. But in the saunas, the owners, who obviously don’t want their punters ¶ going away disappointed, decide what the women will do, and very often that is ¶ anal sex and sex – oral and vaginal – without a condom” (Martin, 2002, p. A5). ¶ ¶ <u><strong>The argument that legalization was supposed to take the criminal elements out of ¶ sex businesses by strict regulation of the industry has failed. <mark>The real growth </mark>in ¶ prostitution <mark>in Australia since legalization </mark>took effect <mark>has been in the illegal ¶ sector</mark>. Over a period of 12 months <mark>from 1998-1999, unlicensed brothels </mark>in ¶ Victoria <mark>tripled </mark>in number and still operate with impunity</u></strong> (Sullivan & Jeffreys, ¶ 2001). <u><strong>In New South Wales where brothels were decriminalized in 1995, the ¶ number of brothels in Sydney had tripled to 400-500 by 1999, with the vast ¶ majority having no license to advertise or operate</u></strong>. In response to widespread ¶ police corruption, control of illegal prostitution was removed from police ¶ jurisdiction and placed under the control of local councils and planning ¶ regulators. However, the local councils do not have the resources to investigate ¶ illegal brothel operators (Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001).</p>
1NR
Case
Ext – 1NC #2
62,064
25
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,413
Our starting point of class analysis resolves the case better than the 1AC
Cole 12
Cole 12
Preston’s pedagogical solutions are the abolition of both ‘whiteness’ and capitalism, of which the former is perhaps capitalism’s ‘weakest link’ There are major problems with ‘the abolition of whiteness’. it is too vague to have any practical implications hardly surprising given the abstract theorizing that preceded its announcement how are white people to be persuaded to ‘abolish their whiteness’, and what would follow abolition? it is seriously open to misinterpretation. abolition of ‘whiteness’ is useless as a unifier and counter-productive as a political rallying point. were the abolition of whiteness to be routinely promoted in educational establishments it would cause severe confusion and mayhem. Unproductive divisions would accelerate. abstract academic Marxism not linked to practice is not appropriate for pedagogy. the urgent need is to partake in Marxist praxis. This must entail a concrete engagement with the real possibilities of twenty-first-century socialism Rather than abolish ‘whiteness’, it is more appropriate to unite around a common purpose. Central should be a theoretical exploration linked to concrete practice, such as communal councils and communes where people are directly involved in decision-making and where Marxism is being considered seriously as a viable alternative to capitalism.
There are major problems with ‘the abolition of whiteness’ it is too vague to have any practical implications how are white people to be persuaded to ‘abolish their whiteness’ what would follow it is open to misinterpretation abolition of ‘whiteness’ is useless as a unifier and counter-productive as a rallying point were the abolition of whiteness to be promoted in educational establishments, it would cause severe confusion Unproductive divisions would accelerate abstract Marxism not linked to practice, is not appropriate for pedagogy Marxist praxis must entail a concrete engagement with real possibilities of socialism Rather than abolish ‘whiteness’ it is more appropriate to unite around a common purpose Central should be theoretical exploration linked to concrete practice
Centre for Education for Social Justice @ Bishop Grosseteste U College Lincoln, (Mike, “Critical race theory in education, Marxism and abstract racial domination,” British Journal of Sociology of Education, 33:2, p. 167-183) What then are the implications for educational practice? Preston’s pedagogical solutions are the abolition of both ‘whiteness’ and capitalism, of which the former, according to Preston, is perhaps capitalism’s ‘weakest link’ (2010, 123). There are three major problems with ‘the abolition of whiteness’. First it is too vague to have any practical implications (hardly surprising given the abstract theorizing that preceded its announcement).12 Just how are white people to be persuaded to ‘abolish their whiteness’, and what would follow such abolition? Second, given its vagueness, it is seriously open to misinterpretation. While Preston clearly does not propose the abolition of white people, his advocacy of the abolition of ‘whiteness’ is clearly open to being interpreted as such. Third, and following on from the first and second problems, the abolition of ‘whiteness’ is useless as a unifier and counter-productive as a political rallying point. Indeed, were the abolition of whiteness to be routinely promoted in educational establishments, it would most likely cause severe confusion and indeed mayhem. Unproductive divisions on grounds of ‘race’, class and culture would undoubtedly accelerate.13 As far as the abolition of capitalism is concerned, by its very nature, abstract academic Marxism, as developed by Postone and not linked to practice, is not appropriate for Marxist pedagogy. Rather the urgent need is to partake in Marxist praxis. This must entail a concrete engagement with the real possibilities of twenty-first-century socialism (for example, Lebowitz 2006; Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010; Motta and Cole 2013, forthcoming). Rather than abolish ‘whiteness’, however perceived, it is more appropriate to unite around a common purpose. Central should be a theoretical exploration of the concept of participatory democracy, but linked to concrete practice, such as in the communal councils and communes of Venezuela – a country where people are directly involved in decision-making and where Marxism, in the form of twenty-first-century socialism, is being considered seriously as a viable alternative to capitalism.14
2,370
<h4>Our <u>starting point</u> of class analysis resolves the case better than the 1AC</h4><p><strong>Cole 12</p><p></strong>Centre for Education for Social Justice @ Bishop Grosseteste U College Lincoln, (Mike, “Critical race theory in education, Marxism and abstract racial domination,” British Journal of Sociology of Education, 33:2, p. 167-183)</p><p>What then are the implications for educational practice? <u><strong>Preston’s pedagogical solutions are the abolition of both ‘whiteness’ and capitalism, of which the former</u></strong>, according to Preston, <u><strong>is perhaps capitalism’s ‘weakest link’ </u></strong>(2010, 123). <u><strong><mark>There are</u></strong></mark> three <u><strong><mark>major problems</u></strong> <u><strong>with ‘the abolition of whiteness’</mark>. </u></strong>First <u><strong><mark>it is too vague to have any practical implications</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong>hardly surprising</u></strong> <u><strong>given the abstract theorizing that preceded its announcement</u></strong>).12 Just <u><strong><mark>how are white people to be persuaded to ‘abolish their whiteness’</mark>, and <mark>what would</u></strong> <u>follow</u></mark> such <u><strong>abolition?</u></strong> Second, given its vagueness, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> seriously <mark>open to misinterpretation</mark>.</u></strong> While Preston clearly does not propose the abolition of white people, his advocacy of the abolition of ‘whiteness’ is clearly open to being interpreted as such. Third, and following on from the first and second problems, the <u><strong><mark>abolition of ‘whiteness’ is useless as a unifier and</mark> <mark>counter-productive as a</mark> political <mark>rallying point</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed, <u><strong><mark>were the abolition of whiteness to be</mark> routinely <mark>promoted in educational establishments</u></strong>, <u><strong>it would</u></strong></mark> most likely <u><strong><mark>cause</mark> <mark>severe confusion</mark> and</u></strong> indeed <u><strong>mayhem. <mark>Unproductive</u></strong> <u><strong>divisions</u></strong></mark> on grounds of ‘race’, class and culture <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> undoubtedly <u><strong><mark>accelerate</mark>.</u></strong>13 As far as the abolition of capitalism is concerned, by its very nature, <u><strong><mark>abstract</mark> academic <mark>Marxism</u></strong></mark>, as developed by Postone and <u><strong><mark>not linked to practice</u></strong>, <u><strong>is not appropriate for</u></strong></mark> Marxist <u><strong><mark>pedagogy</mark>.</u></strong> Rather <u><strong>the urgent need is to partake in <mark>Marxist praxis</mark>. This <mark>must entail a concrete</mark> <mark>engagement with</mark> the <mark>real possibilities of</mark> twenty-first-century <mark>socialism</u></strong></mark> (for example, Lebowitz 2006; Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010; Motta and Cole 2013, forthcoming). <u><strong><mark>Rather than abolish ‘whiteness’</mark>,</u></strong> however perceived, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> <mark>more appropriate to unite around a common purpose</mark>. <mark>Central should be</mark> a <mark>theoretical exploration</u></strong></mark> of the concept of participatory democracy, but <u><strong><mark>linked to concrete practice</mark>, such as</u></strong> in the <u><strong>communal councils and communes</u></strong> of Venezuela – a country <u><strong>where people are directly involved in decision-making and where Marxism</u></strong>, in the form of twenty-first-century socialism, <u><strong>is being considered seriously as a viable alternative to capitalism.</u></strong>14</p>
2NC
Cap K
2NC Alternative
429,850
14
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,414
That spills over and crushes the US econ
Olson 9
Olson 9
Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, although the current economic slowdown presents special challenges that will have to be addressed with great care Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, border states economies are particularly tied with Mexico’ This degree of integration creates opportunities for more focused economic cooperation, but also generates risks for spillover effects in times of economic crisis An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border . The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop a framework for economic integration that helps to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes advantage of complementarities to increase the competitive position of both countries
Mexico remains vital for the U.S. economy Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports border states economies ¶are tied with Mexico integration generates ¶risks for spillover effects in times of economic ¶ crisis.An economic slowdown will affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border
(Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, ¶ although the current economic slowdown ¶presents special challenges that will have to be ¶addressed with great care. Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, and the first or ¶ second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live ¶ in cities and counties on the border and over ¶ 60 million in border states, whose economies ¶are particularly tied with Mexico’s. This degree ¶of integration creates opportunities for more ¶focused economic cooperation, but also generates ¶risks for spillover effects in times of economic ¶ crisis.An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border. ¶ Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the ¶ two countries presents a long-term challenge that ¶ has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at ¶ deepening cross-border economic ties. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop ¶a framework for economic integration that helps ¶to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes ¶advantage of complementarities to increase the ¶competitive position of both countries, and, above ¶ all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being ¶ of average citizens in both countries.
1,805
<h4><strong>That spills over and crushes the US econ</h4><p>Olson 9 </p><p></strong>(Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Mexico</mark> also <mark>remains vital for the U.S. economy</mark>, </u></strong>¶ <u><strong>although the current economic slowdown </u></strong>¶<u><strong>presents special challenges that will have to be </u></strong>¶<u><strong>addressed with great care</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports</mark>, </u></strong>and the first or ¶ second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live ¶ in cities and counties on the border and over ¶ 60 million in <u><strong><mark>border states</u></strong></mark>, whose <u><strong><mark>economies </u></strong>¶<u><strong>are</mark> particularly <mark>tied with Mexico</mark>’</u></strong>s. <u><strong>This degree </u></strong>¶<u><strong>of <mark>integration</mark> creates opportunities for more </u></strong>¶<u><strong>focused economic cooperation, but also <mark>generates </u></strong>¶<u><strong>risks for spillover effects in times of economic </u>¶<u> crisis</u></strong>.<u><strong>An economic slowdown</mark> in either country <mark>will</mark> inevitably <mark>affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border</u></strong></mark>. ¶ Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the ¶ two countries presents a long-term challenge that ¶ has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at ¶ deepening cross-border economic ties<u><strong>. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop </u></strong>¶<u><strong>a framework for economic integration that helps </u></strong>¶<u><strong>to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes </u></strong>¶<u><strong>advantage of complementarities to increase the </u></strong>¶<u><strong>competitive position of both countries</u></strong>, and, above ¶ all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being ¶ of average citizens in both countries.</p>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Mexico DA
301,596
7
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,415
Evaluating political costs and understanding tradeoffs key to prevent genocide
Lanz 8
Lanz 8
The fi rst is that resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – money, political capital, personnel – to achieve this objective The second lesson is that actors working in or on confl ict, whatever approach they take, must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm well-intentioned people can fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce. those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts
resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – political capital to achieve this objective actors working in or on confl ict must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm.” well-intentioned people fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.” those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict , moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts
(David, Mediation Support Project for Swisspeace, “Conflict Management and Opportunity Cost: the International Response to the Darfur Crisis”) There are no simple solutions for the contradictions outlined above – they represent complicated dilemmas and tricky trade-offs. It would be naïve to call for more coordination among external actors in Darfur, as the difference of their approaches is structural and refl ects their respective interests and contexts. There are, however, two lessons that we can learn. The fi rst is that resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities. It is not possible to simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of Sudan. We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – money, political capital, personnel – to achieve this objective. The second lesson is that actors working in or on confl ict, whatever approach they take, must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm.” As David Kennedy writes, “the darker sides can swamp the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.”30 Also, those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict Darfur must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the Arab world. Indeed, moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere.
1,865
<h4><strong>Evaluating political costs and understanding tradeoffs key to prevent genocide</h4><p>Lanz 8</p><p></strong> (David, Mediation Support Project for Swisspeace, “Conflict Management and Opportunity Cost: the International Response to the Darfur Crisis”)</p><p>There are no simple solutions for the contradictions outlined above – they represent complicated dilemmas and tricky trade-offs. It would be naïve to call for more coordination among external actors in Darfur, as the difference of their approaches is structural and refl ects their respective interests and contexts. There are, however, two lessons that we can learn. <u>The fi rst is that <mark>resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities</u></mark>. It is not possible to simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of Sudan. <u><mark>We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources –</mark> money, <mark>political capital</mark>, personnel – <mark>to achieve this objective</u></mark>. <u>The second lesson is that <mark>actors working in or on confl ict</mark>, whatever approach they take, <mark>must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm</u>.”</mark> As David Kennedy writes, “the darker sides can swamp the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and <u><mark>well-intentioned people</mark> can <mark>fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.</u>”</mark>30 Also, <u><mark>those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict</u></mark> Darfur <u>must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such,</u> especially in the Arab world. Indeed<mark>, <u>moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts</u><strong></mark> in Darfur and elsewhere. </p></strong>
1NR
MT
1NR AT: K of Politics
423,864
2
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,416
Only the alt solves—must foreground class struggle -- materialism forms the basis for all oppression, which then is subdivided by individual and collective structures
McLaren 4
McLaren 4
we are now in the midst of returning to the ‘most fundamental form of class struggle class struggle is ‘not yet a thing of the past’ those who seek to undermine its centrality are largely blind to the ‘needs of the large mass of people who are barely surviving capital's newly-honed mechanisms of globalized greed’ a more comprehensive and politically useful understanding of the contemporary historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class analysis This does not render as ‘secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race, ethnicity, etc It is often assumed that foregrounding capitalist social relations undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ and/or trivializes struggles against racism in favor of an abstractly defined class-based politics typically identified as ‘white.’ Yet, such formulations rest on a bizarre but generally unspoken logic that assumes that racial minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class. This is absurd A good deal of post-Marxist critique is racist insofar as it implies that ‘people of color’ could not possibly be concerned with issues beyond racial’ difference This posits ‘people of color’ as single-minded, one-dimensional caricatures and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent ]he primacy of class means building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so that the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not. forms of exploitation and oppression are located in the same totality defined by capitalist rule. Capitalism is an overarching totality that is becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct. In the capitalist development of U.S. society, African, Mexican, and Asian bodies— their labor power and its reproductive efficacy—were colonized and racialized idea of ‘internal colonialism’ retains explanatory validity. Race’ is thus constructed out of raw materials furnished by class relations the history of class conflicts, and the building of imperial hegemony. The refunctioning of physical traits as ideological and political signifiers of class identity reifies social relations. Such ‘racial’ markers enter the field of the alienated labor process essentializing historical traditions and values which are contingent racism and nationalism are modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history racial or ethnic group solidarity is given ‘meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order Harvey's criticism suggests that post-Marxists have been busy fiddling while Rome burns and echo the Young Hegelians who were, ‘in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering” statements, the staunchest conservatives.’ simply fighting ‘phrases’ One may speak of any number of disorientations and even oppressions, but one cultivates all kinds of politeness and indirection about the structure of capitalist class relations in which those oppressions are embedded while various post-Marxists have invited us to join their euphoric celebrations honoring the decentering of capitalism, the abandonment of class politics, and the decline of metanarratives they have failed to see that the most ‘meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries, the- creeping annexation of the globe for the dominance of capital over laboring humanity if social change is the aim, progressive educators and theorists must cease displacing class analysis
a more comprehensive understanding of the historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class analysis This does not render secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race It is often assumed foregrounding capitalist social relations undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ or trivializes struggles against racism in favor of class-based politics identified as ‘white.’ such formulations rest on a generally unspoken logic that assumes racial minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class post-Marxist critique is racist insofar as it implies people of color’ could not possibly be concerned with issues beyond racial’ difference This posits ‘people of color’ as one-dimensional caricatures primacy of class means building a multiracial, multi-gendered working-class organization should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not exploitation and oppression are defined by capitalist rule In capitalist development of U.S. society, African, Mexican, and Asian bodies were colonized and racialized Race’ is constructed out of raw materials furnished by class relations refunctioning of physical traits as signifiers of class identity reifies social relations racism and nationalism are modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points One may speak of any number of oppressions but one cultivates politeness and indirection about the structure of capitalist class relations in which oppressions are embedded post-Marxists have failed to see the most ‘meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries the annexation of the globe for the dominance of capital if social change is the aim, educators and theorists must cease displacing class analysis
Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, (Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199) We have argued that it is virtually impossible to conceptualize class without attending to the forms and contents of difference, but we insist that this does not imply that class struggle is now outdated by the politics of difference. As Jameson (1998, p. 136) notes, we are now in the midst of returning to the ‘most fundamental form of class struggle’ in light of current global conditions. Today's climate suggests that class struggle is ‘not yet a thing of the past’ and that those who seek to undermine its centrality are not only ‘morally callous’ and ‘seriously out of touch with reality’ but also largely blind to the ‘needs of the large mass of people who are barely surviving capital's newly-honed mechanisms of globalized greed’ (Harvey, 1998, pp. 7–9). In our view, a more comprehensive and politically useful understanding of the contemporary historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class analysis and the primacy of the working class as the fundamental agent of change.8 This does not render as ‘secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race, ethnicity, etc. as is routinely charged by post-Marxists. It is often assumed that foregrounding capitalist social relations necessarily undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ and/or trivializes struggles against racism, etc., in favor of an abstractly defined class-based politics typically identified as ‘white.’ Yet, such formulations rest on a bizarre but generally unspoken logic that assumes that racial and ethnic ‘minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class. This stance is patently absurd since the concept of the ‘working class’ is undoubtedly comprised of men and women of different races, ethnicities, etc. (Mitter, 1997). A good deal of post-Marxist critique is subtly racist (not to mention essentialist) insofar as it implies that ‘people of color’ could not possibly be concerned with issues beyond those related to their ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ ‘difference.’ This posits ‘people of color’ as single-minded, one-dimensional caricatures and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding (and survival) than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts.9 It also ignores ‘the fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody's lives’ (Gimenez, 2001, p. 2) and that social oppression is much more than tangentially linked to class background and the exploitative relations of production. On this topic, Meyerson (2000) is worth quoting at length: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not render women and people of color ‘secondary.’ This view assumes that ‘working class’ means white—this division between a white working class and all the others, whose identity (along with a corresponding social theory to explain that identity) is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid …[T]he primacy of class means … that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so that the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not. The cohesiveness of this position suggests that forms of exploitation and oppression are related internally to the extent that they are located in the same totality—one which is currently defined by capitalist class rule. Capitalism is an overarching totality that is, unfortunately, becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct. For example, E. San Juan (2003) argues that race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. He further notes that the capitalist mode of production has articulated ‘race’ with class in a peculiar way. He too is worth a substantial quotation: While the stagnation of rural life imposed a racial or castelike rigidity to the peasantry, the rapid accumulation of wealth through the ever more intensifying exploitation of labor by capital could not so easily ‘racialize’ the wage-workers of a particular nation, given the alienability of labor-power—unless certain physical or cultural characteristics can be utilized to divide the workers or render one group an outcast or pariah removed from the domain of ‘free labor.’ In the capitalist development of U.S. society, African, Mexican, and Asian bodies—more precisely, their labor power and its reproductive efficacy—were colonized and racialized; hence the idea of ‘internal colonialism’ retains explanatory validity. ‘Race’ is thus constructed out of raw materials furnished by class relations, the history of class conflicts, and the vicissitudes of colonial/capitalist expansion and the building of imperial hegemony. It is dialectically accented and operationalized not just to differentiate the price of wage labor within and outside the territory of the metropolitan power, but also to reproduce relations of domination–subordination invested with an aura of naturality and fatality. The refunctioning of physical or cultural traits as ideological and political signifiers of class identity reifies social relations. Such ‘racial’ markers enter the field of the alienated labor process, concealing the artificial nature of meanings and norms, and essentializing or naturalizing historical traditions and values which are contingent on mutable circumstances. For San Juan, racism and nationalism are modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points¶ in history. He argues that racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy. He maintains, rightly in our view, that racial or ethnic group solidarity is given ‘meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these “racial” solidarities’. It is remarkable, in our opinion, that so much of contemporary social theory has largely abandoned the problems of labor, capitalist exploitation, and class analysis at a time when capitalism is becoming more universal, more ruthless and more deadly. The metaphor of a contemporary ‘tower of Babel’ seems appropriate here—academics striking radical poses in the seminar rooms while remaining oblivious to the possibility that their seemingly radical discursive maneuvers do nothing to further the struggles ‘against oppression and exploitation which continue to be real, material, and not merely “discursive” problems of the contemporary world’ (Dirlik, 1997, p. 176). Harvey (1998, pp. 29–31) indicts the new academic entrepreneurs, the ‘masters of theory-in-and-for-itself’ whose ‘discourse radicalism’ has deftly side-stepped ‘the enduring conundrums of class struggle’ and who have, against a ‘sobering background of cheapened discourse and opportunistic politics,’ been ‘stripped of their self-advertised radicalism.’ For years, they ‘contested socialism,’ ridiculed Marxists, and promoted ‘their own alternative theories of liberatory politics’ but now they have largely been ‘reduced to the role of supplicants in the most degraded form of pluralist politics imaginable.’ As they pursue the politics of difference, the ‘class war rages unabated’ and they seem ‘either unwilling or unable to focus on the unprecedented economic carnage occurring around the globe.’ Harvey's searing criticism suggests that post-Marxists have been busy fiddling while Rome burns and his comments echo those made by Marx (1978, p. 149) in his critique of the Young Hegelians who were, ‘in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering” statements, the staunchest conservatives.’ Marx lamented that the Young Hegelians were simply fighting ‘phrases’ and that they failed to acknowledge that in offering only counter-phrases, they were in no way ‘combating the real existing world’ but merely combating the phrases of the world. Taking a cue from Marx and substituting ‘phrases’ with ‘discourses’ or ‘resignifications’ we would contend that the practitioners of difference politics who operate within exaggerated culturalist frameworks that privilege the realm of representation as the primary arena of political struggle question some discourses of power while legitimating others. Moreover, because they lack a class perspective, their gestures of radicalism are belied by their own class positions.10 As Ahmad (1997a, p. 104) notes: One may speak of any number of disorientations and even oppressions, but one cultivates all kinds of politeness and indirection about the structure of capitalist class relations in which those oppressions are embedded. To speak of any of that directly and simply is to be ‘vulgar.’ In this climate of Aesopian languages it is absolutely essential to reiterate that most things are a matter of class. That kind of statement is … surprising only in a culture like that of the North American university … But it is precisely in that kind of culture that people need to hear such obvious truths. Ahmad's provocative observations imply that substantive analyses of the carnage wrought by ‘globalized’ class exploitation have, for the most part, been marginalized by the kind of radicalism that has been instituted among the academic Left in North America. He further suggests that while various post-Marxists have invited us to join their euphoric celebrations honoring the decentering of capitalism, the abandonment of class politics, and the decline of metanarratives (particularly those of Marxism and socialism), they have failed to see that the most ‘meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries, the- creeping annexation of the globe for the dominance of capital over laboring humanity has met, during those same decades, with stunning success’ (Ahmad, 1997b, p. 364). As such, Ahmad invites us to ask anew, the proverbial question: What, then, must be done? To this question we offer no simple theoretical, pedagogical or political prescriptions. Yet we would argue that if social change is the aim, progressive educators and theorists must cease displacing class analysis with the politics of difference.
11,098
<h4>Only the alt solves—must foreground class struggle -- materialism forms <u>the basis</u> for all oppression, which then is <u>subdivided</u><strong> by individual and collective structures</h4><p>McLaren</strong> <strong>4</p><p></strong>Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, (Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)</p><p>We have argued that it is virtually impossible to conceptualize class without attending to the forms and contents of difference, but we insist that this does not imply that class struggle is now outdated by the politics of difference. As Jameson (1998, p. 136) notes, <u><strong>we are now in the midst of returning to the ‘most fundamental form of class struggle</u></strong>’ in light of current global conditions. Today's climate suggests that <u><strong>class struggle is ‘not yet a thing of the past’ </u></strong>and that <u><strong>those who seek to undermine its centrality are</u></strong> not only ‘morally callous’ and ‘seriously out of touch with reality’ but also <u><strong>largely blind to the ‘needs of the large mass of people who are barely surviving capital's newly-honed mechanisms of globalized greed’</u></strong> (Harvey, 1998, pp. 7–9). In our view, <u><strong><mark>a more comprehensive</mark> and politically useful <mark>understanding of the</mark> contemporary <mark>historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class</mark> <mark>analysis</u></strong></mark> and the primacy of the working class as the fundamental agent of change.8 <u><strong><mark>This does not render</mark> as ‘<mark>secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race</mark>, ethnicity, etc</u></strong>. as is routinely charged by post-Marxists. <u><strong><mark>It is often assumed</mark> that <mark>foregrounding capitalist social relations</u></strong></mark> necessarily <u><strong><mark>undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and/<mark>or trivializes struggles against racism</u></strong></mark>, etc., <u><strong><mark>in favor of</mark> an abstractly defined <mark>class-based politics</mark> typically <mark>identified as ‘white.’</mark> Yet, <mark>such formulations rest on a</mark> bizarre but <mark>generally unspoken logic that assumes</mark> that <mark>racial</mark> </u></strong>and ethnic ‘<u><strong><mark>minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This</u></strong> stance <u><strong>is</u></strong> patently <u><strong>absurd</u></strong> since the concept of the ‘working class’ is undoubtedly comprised of men and women of different races, ethnicities, etc. (Mitter, 1997). <u><strong>A good deal of <mark>post-Marxist critique is</u></strong></mark> subtly <u><strong><mark>racist</u></strong></mark> (not to mention essentialist) <u><strong><mark>insofar as it implies</mark> that ‘<mark>people of color’ could not possibly be concerned with</mark> <mark>issues beyond</u></strong></mark> those related to their ‘<u><strong><mark>racial’</u></strong></mark> or ‘ethnic’ ‘<u><strong><mark>difference</u></strong></mark>.’ <u><strong><mark>This posits ‘people of color’ as</mark> single-minded, <mark>one-dimensional caricatures</mark> and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding</u></strong> (and survival) <u><strong>than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts</u></strong>.9 It also ignores ‘the fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody's lives’ (Gimenez, 2001, p. 2) and that social oppression is much more than tangentially linked to class background and the exploitative relations of production. On this topic, Meyerson (2000) is worth quoting at length: <u><strong>Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class </u></strong>in a number of senses.<u><strong> One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent</u></strong>—a primacy which does not render women and people of color ‘secondary.’ This view assumes that ‘working class’ means white—this division between a white working class and all the others, whose identity (along with a corresponding social theory to explain that identity) is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid …[T<u><strong>]he <mark>primacy of class means</u></strong></mark> … that <u><strong><mark>building a multiracial, multi-gendered</mark> international <mark>working-class organization</mark> </u></strong>or organizations <u><strong><mark>should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so</mark> that <mark>the primacy of class puts the fight</mark> <mark>against racism and sexism at the center</mark>.</u></strong> The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class oppression. <u><strong><mark>Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not</mark>. </u></strong>The cohesiveness of this position suggests that <u><strong>forms of <mark>exploitation and oppression are</u></strong></mark> related internally to the extent that they are <u><strong>located in the same totality</u></strong>—one which is currently <u><strong><mark>defined by capitalist</u></strong></mark> class <u><strong><mark>rule</mark>. Capitalism is an overarching totality that i</strong>s</u>, unfortunately, <u><strong>becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct.</strong> </u>For example, E. San Juan (2003) argues that race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. He further notes that the capitalist mode of production has articulated ‘race’ with class in a peculiar way. He too is worth a substantial quotation: While the stagnation of rural life imposed a racial or castelike rigidity to the peasantry, the rapid accumulation of wealth through the ever more intensifying exploitation of labor by capital could not so easily ‘racialize’ the wage-workers of a particular nation, given the alienability of labor-power—unless certain physical or cultural characteristics can be utilized to divide the workers or render one group an outcast or pariah removed from the domain of ‘free labor.’ <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the <mark>capitalist development of U.S. society,</mark> <mark>African, Mexican, and Asian bodies</mark>—</u></strong>more precisely, <u><strong>their labor power and its reproductive efficacy—<mark>were colonized and racialized</u></strong></mark>; hence the <u><strong>idea of ‘internal colonialism’ retains explanatory validity.</u></strong> ‘<u><strong><mark>Race’ is</mark> thus <mark>constructed out of raw materials furnished by class relations</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the history of class conflicts,</u></strong> and the vicissitudes of colonial/capitalist expansion <u><strong>and the building of imperial hegemony.</u></strong> It is dialectically accented and operationalized not just to differentiate the price of wage labor within and outside the territory of the metropolitan power, but also to reproduce relations of domination–subordination invested with an aura of naturality and fatality. <u><strong>The <mark>refunctioning of physical</u></strong></mark> or cultural <u><strong><mark>traits</mark> <mark>as</mark> ideological and political <mark>signifiers of class identity reifies social relations</mark>. Such ‘racial’ markers enter the field of the alienated labor process</u></strong>, concealing the artificial nature of meanings and norms, and <u><strong>essentializing</u></strong> or naturalizing <u><strong>historical traditions and values which are contingent</u></strong> on mutable circumstances. For San Juan, <u><strong><mark>racism and nationalism are modalities</u></strong> <u><strong>in which class struggles</mark> <mark>articulate themselves at strategic points</u></mark>¶<u> in history</u></strong>. He argues that racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy. He maintains, rightly in our view, that <u><strong>racial or ethnic group solidarity is given ‘meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order</u></strong>; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these “racial” solidarities’. It is remarkable, in our opinion, that so much of contemporary social theory has largely abandoned the problems of labor, capitalist exploitation, and class analysis at a time when capitalism is becoming more universal, more ruthless and more deadly. The metaphor of a contemporary ‘tower of Babel’ seems appropriate here—academics striking radical poses in the seminar rooms while remaining oblivious to the possibility that their seemingly radical discursive maneuvers do nothing to further the struggles ‘against oppression and exploitation which continue to be real, material, and not merely “discursive” problems of the contemporary world’ (Dirlik, 1997, p. 176). Harvey (1998, pp. 29–31) indicts the new academic entrepreneurs, the ‘masters of theory-in-and-for-itself’ whose ‘discourse radicalism’ has deftly side-stepped ‘the enduring conundrums of class struggle’ and who have, against a ‘sobering background of cheapened discourse and opportunistic politics,’ been ‘stripped of their self-advertised radicalism.’ For years, they ‘contested socialism,’ ridiculed Marxists, and promoted ‘their own alternative theories of liberatory politics’ but now they have largely been ‘reduced to the role of supplicants in the most degraded form of pluralist politics imaginable.’ As they pursue the politics of difference, the ‘class war rages unabated’ and they seem ‘either unwilling or unable to focus on the unprecedented economic carnage occurring around the globe.’ <u><strong>Harvey's</u></strong> searing <u><strong>criticism suggests that post-Marxists have been busy fiddling while Rome burns</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> his comments <u><strong>echo</u></strong> those made by Marx (1978, p. 149) in his critique of <u><strong>the Young Hegelians</u></strong> <u><strong>who were, ‘in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering” statements, the staunchest conservatives.’</u></strong> Marx lamented that the Young Hegelians were <u><strong>simply fighting ‘phrases’</u></strong> and that they failed to acknowledge that in offering only counter-phrases, they were in no way ‘combating the real existing world’ but merely combating the phrases of the world. Taking a cue from Marx and substituting ‘phrases’ with ‘discourses’ or ‘resignifications’ we would contend that the practitioners of difference politics who operate within exaggerated culturalist frameworks that privilege the realm of representation as the primary arena of political struggle question some discourses of power while legitimating others. Moreover, because they lack a class perspective, their gestures of radicalism are belied by their own class positions.10 As Ahmad (1997a, p. 104) notes: <u><strong><mark>One may speak of any number</mark> <mark>of </mark>disorientations and even <mark>oppressions</mark>, <mark>but one cultivates</mark> all kinds of <mark>politeness and</mark> <mark>indirection about</mark> <mark>the structure of capitalist class relations in which</mark> those <mark>oppressions are embedded</u></strong></mark>. To speak of any of that directly and simply is to be ‘vulgar.’ In this climate of Aesopian languages it is absolutely essential to reiterate that most things are a matter of class. That kind of statement is … surprising only in a culture like that of the North American university … But it is precisely in that kind of culture that people need to hear such obvious truths. Ahmad's provocative observations imply that substantive analyses of the carnage wrought by ‘globalized’ class exploitation have, for the most part, been marginalized by the kind of radicalism that has been instituted among the academic Left in North America. He further suggests that <u><strong>while various <mark>post-Marxists</mark> have invited us to join their euphoric celebrations honoring the decentering of capitalism, the abandonment of class politics, and the decline of metanarratives</u></strong> (particularly those of Marxism and socialism), <u><strong>they <mark>have failed to see</mark> that <mark>the most ‘meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries</mark>, <mark>the</mark>- creeping <mark>annexation of the globe for</mark> <mark>the dominance of capital</mark> over laboring humanity</u></strong> has met, during those same decades, with stunning success’ (Ahmad, 1997b, p. 364). As such, Ahmad invites us to ask anew, the proverbial question: What, then, must be done? To this question we offer no simple theoretical, pedagogical or political prescriptions. Yet we would argue that <u><strong><mark>if social change is the aim,</mark> progressive <mark>educators and theorists must cease displacing class analysis</u></strong></mark> with the politics of difference.</p>
2NC
Cap K
2NC AT: Alt Bad
46,572
863
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
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48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,417
Nuclear war
Merlini 11
Merlini 11 (Cesare Merlini, BA in humanities, holds a diploma for industrial engineering, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center on the United States at the Brookings Institute, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute of International Affairs, President of the Italian Institute of International Affairs, founder and former Executive-Vice-Chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, former co-editor of Global-FP, an Italian magazine associated with Foreign Affairs, former member of the Trilateral Commission, member of the Board of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, previously held the chair of Nuclear Technologies at the Polytechnic University of Turin, nuclear scientist at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, expert on transatlantic relations, European integration, nuclear non-proliferation, and the impact of change in society on international relations, 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, published in Survival volume 53 number 2, page 117, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2011/04_international_relations_merlini/04_international_relations_merlini.pdf)
The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements
The scenario entails the crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. tensions evolves into conflict between states involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic system the rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes converging with nationalism
Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism. One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible. Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements. 10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of rising influence and power.
2,134
<h4>Nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Merlini 11</strong> (Cesare Merlini, BA in humanities, holds a diploma for industrial engineering, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center on the United States at the Brookings Institute, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute of International Affairs, President of the Italian Institute of International Affairs, founder and former Executive-Vice-Chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, former co-editor of Global-FP, an Italian magazine associated with Foreign Affairs, former member of the Trilateral Commission, member of the Board of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, previously held the chair of Nuclear Technologies at the Polytechnic University of Turin, nuclear scientist at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, expert on transatlantic relations, European integration, nuclear non-proliferation, and the impact of change in society on international relations, 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, published in Survival volume 53 number 2, page 117, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2011/04_international_relations_merlini/04_international_relations_merlini.pdf)</p><p>Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. <u><mark>The</mark> first <mark>scenario entails the </mark>premature <mark>crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. </mark>One or more of the acute <mark>tensions </mark>apparent today <mark>evolves into</mark> an open and traditional <mark>conflict between states</mark>, perhaps even <mark>involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic </mark>and financial <mark>system</mark>, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first</u>. Whatever the trigger, <u>the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable.</u> Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, <u><mark>the</mark> secular <mark>rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes</mark>, competing or <mark>converging with</mark> secular absolutes such as unbridled <mark>nationalism</u></mark>. One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible. <u>Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger</u> (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) <u>has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements</u>. 10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of rising influence and power.</p>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Mexico DA
32,231
280
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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college
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740,418
You should evaluate our politics DA. Their dogmatic refusal to consider political process implications is grounded in the same destructive blindness the aff criticizes.
Chandler ‘3
David Chandler, Centre for the Study of Democracy - University of Westminster, ‘3
attention to a political mission, beyond petty partisanship through foreign policy activism has been an important resource of authority and credibility for western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute Bush’s shaky start was transformed by his speech in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’ The demise of the framework of party politics is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework Governments This search for a moral grounding through solidarity has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-western world Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables western governments to declare an unequivocal moral stance, which helps to mitigate awkward questions of government mission and political coherence in the domestic sphere the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or policy outcomes has made ethical foreign policy-making a strong card for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home
attention to a political mission has been an important resource of credibility for political leaders. search for a moral grounding has led to an increasingly moralised good versus evil’ view of crisis situations The emphasis on ethical policy commitments enables governments to declare an unequivocal moral stance, which helps to mitigate awkward questions of government mission and political coherence in the domestic sphere the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or policy outcomes has made ethical policy-making a strong card for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their authority at home.
(British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5.3, “Rhetoric without responsibility”) The attention to the articulation of a political mission, beyond the petty partisanship of left and right, through foreign policy activism abroad has been an important resource of authority and credibility for western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute. George W. Bush’s shaky start to the US presidency was transformed by his speech to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’ (Bush 2001). Similarly, Tony Blair was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not’ (The Guardian, 27 March 1999). Peter Hain, minister of state at the UK Foreign Office, also focused on the ‘values that the terrorists attacked’ in his call for political unity around ‘tough action’ (The Guardian, 24 September 2001). By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, western governments can easily gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process. Even general election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turnouts. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria—this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turnout which meant only one in four of the electorate voted for New Labour. The demise of the framework of traditional party politics, the source of western governments’ domestic malaise, is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy. This process is illustrated in Michael Ignatieff’s quote from the writings of British war reporter Don McCullin: But what are my politics? I certainly take the side of the underprivileged. I could never say I was politically neutral. But whether I’m of the right or the left—I can’t say ... I feel, in my guts, at one with the victims. And I find there’s integrity in that stance (Ignatieff 1998, 22–23). Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of legitimacy or moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework, stating that ‘there are no good causes left—only victims of bad causes’ (ibid., 23). Governments, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. This search for a moral grounding through solidarity with the ‘victims of bad causes’ has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-western world.10 The jet-setting UK prime minister, Tony Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing. The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables western governments to declare an unequivocal moral stance, which helps to mitigate awkward questions of government mission and political coherence in the domestic sphere. The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this prime minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong’ (UKGovernment 2002). Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears there are opportunities for western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because it is easier to promote a position which can be claimed to be based on clear ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism, in foreign policy than it is in domestic policy. There are three big advantages: first, the object of policy activism, and criticism, is a foreign government; second, the British or American government is not so accountable for matching rhetoric to international actions; and third, credit can be claimed for any positive outcome of international policy, while any negative outcome can be blamed on the actions or inaction of the government or population of the country concerned. The following sections highlight that the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or policy outcomes has made selected high-profile examples of ethical foreign policy-making a strong card for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home.
5,768
<h4>You should evaluate our politics DA. Their dogmatic refusal to consider political process implications is grounded in the same destructive blindness the aff criticizes.</h4><p>David <u><strong>Chandler</u></strong>, Centre for the Study of Democracy - University of Westminster, <u><strong>‘3</p><p></u></strong>(British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5.3, “Rhetoric without responsibility”)</p><p>The <u><mark>attention to</u></mark> the articulation of <u><mark>a political mission</mark>, beyond</u> the <u>petty partisanship</u> of left and right, <u>through foreign policy activism</u> abroad <u><mark>has been an important resource of</mark> authority and <mark>credibility for</mark> western <mark>political leaders.</mark> The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute</u>. George W. <u>Bush’s shaky start</u> to the US presidency <u>was transformed by his speech</u> to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, <u>in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’</u> (Bush 2001). Similarly, Tony Blair was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not’ (The Guardian, 27 March 1999). Peter Hain, minister of state at the UK Foreign Office, also focused on the ‘values that the terrorists attacked’ in his call for political unity around ‘tough action’ (The Guardian, 24 September 2001). By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, western governments can easily gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process. Even general election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turnouts. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria—this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turnout which meant only one in four of the electorate voted for New Labour. <u>The demise of the framework of</u> traditional <u>party politics</u>, the source of western governments’ domestic malaise, <u>is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy</u>. This process is illustrated in Michael Ignatieff’s quote from the writings of British war reporter Don McCullin: But what are my politics? I certainly take the side of the underprivileged. I could never say I was politically neutral. But whether I’m of the right or the left—I can’t say ... I feel, in my guts, at one with the victims. And I find there’s integrity in that stance (Ignatieff 1998, 22–23). <u>Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of</u> legitimacy or <u>moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework</u>, stating that ‘there are no good causes left—only victims of bad causes’ (ibid., 23). <u>Governments</u>, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. <u>This <mark>search for a moral grounding</mark> through solidarity</u> with the ‘victims of bad causes’ <u><mark>has led to an increasingly moralised</mark> ‘black and white’ or ‘<mark>good versus evil’ view of crisis situations</mark> in the non-western world</u>.10 The jet-setting UK prime minister, Tony <u>Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing.</u> The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas. <u><mark>The emphasis on ethical</mark> foreign <mark>policy commitments enables</mark> western <mark>governments to declare an <strong>unequivocal</strong> moral stance, which helps to <strong>mitigate</strong> <strong>awkward</strong> <strong>questions</strong> of government mission and <strong>political</strong> <strong>coherence</strong> in the domestic sphere</u></mark>. The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this prime minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong’ (UKGovernment 2002). Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears there are opportunities for western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because it is easier to promote a position which can be claimed to be based on clear ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism, in foreign policy than it is in domestic policy. There are three big advantages: first, the object of policy activism, and criticism, is a foreign government; second, the British or American government is not so accountable for matching rhetoric to international actions; and third, credit can be claimed for any positive outcome of international policy, while any negative outcome can be blamed on the actions or inaction of the government or population of the country concerned. The following sections highlight that <u><mark>the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or <strong>policy</strong> <strong>outcomes</strong> has made</u></mark> selected high-profile examples of <u><mark>ethical</mark> foreign <mark>policy-making a <strong>strong card</strong> for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their</mark> standing and <mark>authority at home</u>.</p></mark>
1NR
MT
1NR AT: K of Politics
423,866
2
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,419
The 1AC misreads history—slavery was not based on racial antagonism but economic exploitation
Alexander 2010 , The New Press 2010, pages 23-25
Alexander 2010 (Michelle, associate professor of law, Ohio State University, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, former direct of ACLU’S Racial Justice Project, J.D., Stanford Law School) The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, The New Press 2010, pages 23-25
Only in the past few centuries, owing largely to European imperialism, have people been classified along racial lines in America, the idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery as well as the extermination of American Indians—with ideals of freedom when settlements remained small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of securing labor. whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy the big planter apparatus Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved As plantation farming expanded demand increased greatly for both labor and land. The demand for land was met by invading territory. The growing demand for labor was met through slavery. American Indians were unsuitable because tribes were in a position to fight back. The fear of raids by Indian tribes led plantation owners to grasp for alternative labor. European immigrants were poor candidates they were in short supply and enslavement would interfere with voluntary immigration The systematic enslavement of Africans emerged with all deliberate speed In an effort to protect their superior status and economic position, the planters shifted their strategy for maintaining dominance. slaves were shipped directly from Africa. These slaves would be far easier to control and far less likely to form alliances with poor whites. Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient the planter class took an additional precautionary step, a “racial bribe.” Deliberately and strategically, the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. Poor whites suddenly had a direct, personal stake in the existence of a race-based system of slavery. Their own plight had not improved but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites sought ways to expand their racially privileged position.
Only in the past few centuries, owing to European imperialism, have people been classified along racial lines in America, race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery as well as extermination of American Indians with freedom when settlements remained small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of labor Initially, blacks were not enslaved As plantation expanded demand increased for labor and land. demand for land was met by invading territory demand for labor was met through slavery Indians were unsuitable because tribes were in a position to fight back European immigrants were poor candidates they were in short supply enslavement would, interfere with voluntary immigration to protect their status and economic position planters shifted their strategy slaves were shipped from Africa slaves would be easier to control and less likely to form alliances with poor whites the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites to drive a wedge between them and slaves Poor whites had a direct stake in race-based slavery
The concept of race is a relatively recent development. Only in the past few centuries, owing largely to European imperialism, have the world’s people been classified along racial lines. Here, in America, the idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery—as well as the extermination of American Indians—with ideals of freedom preached by whites in the new colonies. In the early colonial period, when settlements remained relatively small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of securing cheap labor. Under this system, whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy, what historian Lerone Bennett Jr. describes as “the big planter apparatus and a social system that legalized terror against black and white bondsmen.” Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved; many were treated as indentured servants. As plantation farming expanded, particular tobacco and cotton farming, demand increased greatly for both labor and land. The demand for land was met by invading and conquering larger and larger swaths of territory. American Indians became a growing impediment to white European “progress,” and during this period, the images of American Indians promoted in books, newspapers, and magazines became increasingly negative. As sociologists Keith Kilty and Eric Swank have observed, eliminating “savages” is less of a moral problem than eliminating human beings, and therefore American Indians came to be understood as a lesser race—uncivilized savages—thus providing a justification for the extermination of a native peoples. The growing demand for labor on plantations was met through slavery. American Indians were considered unsuitable as slaves, largely because native tribes were clearly in a position to fight back. The fear of raids by Indian tribes led plantation owners to grasp for an alternative source of free labor. European immigrants were also deemed poor candidates for slavery, not because of their race, but rather because they were in short supply and enslavement would, quite naturally, interfere with voluntary immigration to the new colonies. Plantation owners thus viewed African, who were relatively powerless, as the ideal slaves. The systematic enslavement of Africans, and the rearing of their children under bondage, emerged with all deliberate speed—quickened by events such as Bacon’s Rebellion. Nathaniel Bacon was a white property owner in Jamestown, Virginia, who managed to unite slaves, indentured servants, and poor whites in a revolutionary effort to overthrow the planter elite. Although slaves clearly occupied the lowest position in the social hierarchy and suffered the most under the plantation system, the condition of indentured whites was barely better, and the majority of free whites lived in extreme poverty. As explained by historian Edmund Morgan, in colonies like Virginia, the planter elite, with huge land grants, occupied a vastly superior position to workers of all colors. Southern colonies did not hesitate to invent ways to extend the terms of servitude, and the planter class accumulated uncultivated lands to restrict the options of free workers. The simmering resentment against the planter class created conditions that were ripe for revolt. Varying accounts of Bacon’s rebellion abound, but the basic facts are these: Bacon developed plans in 1675 to seize Native American lands in order to acquire more property for himself and others and nullify the threat of Indian raids. When the planter elite in Virginia refused to provide militia support for his scheme, Bacon retaliated, leading an attack on the elite, their homes, and their property. He openly condemned the rich for their oppression of the poor and inspired an alliance of white and black bond laborers, as well as slaves, who demanded an end to their servitude. The attempted revolution was ended by force and false promises of amnesty. A number of people who participated in the revolt were hanged. The events in Jamestown were alarming to the planter elite, who were deeply fearful of the multiracial alliance of bond workers and slaves. Word of Bacon’s Rebellion spread far and wide, and several more uprisings of a similar type followed. In an effort to protect their superior status and economic position, the planters shifted their strategy for maintaining dominance. They abandon their heavy reliance on indentured servants in favor of the importation of more black slaves. Instead of importing English-speaking slaves from the West Indies, who were more likely to be familiar with European language and culture, many more slaves were shipped directly from Africa. These slaves would be far easier to control and far less likely to form alliances with poor whites. Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient to protect their interests, the planter class took an additional precautionary step, a step that would later become known as a “racial bribe.” Deliberately and strategically, the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. White settlers were allowed greater access to Native American lands, white servants were allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and militias, and barriers were created so that free labor would not be placed in competition with slave labor. These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. Poor whites suddenly had a direct, personal stake in the existence of a race-based system of slavery. Their own plight had not improved by much, but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites responded to the logic of their situation and sought ways to expand their racially privileged position.
5,803
<h4>The 1AC misreads history—slavery was not based on racial antagonism but economic exploitation</h4><p><strong>Alexander 2010</strong> (Michelle, associate professor of law, Ohio State University, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, former direct of ACLU’S Racial Justice Project, J.D., Stanford Law School) The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness<u><strong>, The New Press 2010, pages 23-25</p><p></u></strong>The concept of race is a relatively recent development. <u><strong><mark>Only in the past few centuries, owing</mark> largely <mark>to</mark> <mark>European imperialism, have</u></strong></mark> the world’s <u><strong><mark>people been classified along racial lines</u></strong></mark>. Here, <u><strong><mark>in America,</mark> the idea of <mark>race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>as well as</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>extermination of American Indians</mark>—<mark>with</mark> ideals of <mark>freedom</u></strong></mark> preached by whites in the new colonies. In the early colonial period, <u><strong><mark>when settlements remained</u></strong></mark> relatively <u><strong><mark>small, indentured servitude was the</mark> <mark>dominant means of</mark> securing</u></strong> cheap <u><strong><mark>labor</mark>.</u></strong> Under this system, <u><strong>whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy</u></strong>, what historian Lerone Bennett Jr. describes as “<u><strong>the big planter apparatus </u></strong>and a social system that legalized terror against black and white bondsmen.” <u><strong><mark>Initially, blacks</mark> brought to this country <mark>were not</mark> all <mark>enslaved</u></strong></mark>; many were treated as indentured servants. <u><strong><mark>As plantation</mark> farming <mark>expanded</u></strong></mark>, particular tobacco and cotton farming, <u><strong><mark>demand increased</mark> greatly <mark>for </mark>both <mark>labor and land.</mark> The <mark>demand for land was met by invading</u></strong></mark> and conquering larger and larger swaths of <u><strong><mark>territory</mark>.</u></strong> American Indians became a growing impediment to white European “progress,” and during this period, the images of American Indians promoted in books, newspapers, and magazines became increasingly negative. As sociologists Keith Kilty and Eric Swank have observed, eliminating “savages” is less of a moral problem than eliminating human beings, and therefore American Indians came to be understood as a lesser race—uncivilized savages—thus providing a justification for the extermination of a native peoples. <u><strong>The growing <mark>demand for</mark> <mark>labor</u></strong></mark> on plantations <u><strong><mark>was met through slavery</mark>. American <mark>Indians were</u></strong></mark> considered <u><strong><mark>unsuitable</u></strong></mark> as slaves, largely <u><strong><mark>because</u></strong></mark> native <u><strong><mark>tribes were</u></strong></mark> clearly <u><strong><mark>in a position to fight back</mark>. The fear of raids by Indian tribes led plantation owners to grasp for</u></strong> an <u><strong>alternative</u></strong> source of free <u><strong>labor. <mark>European immigrants</mark> <mark>were</u></strong></mark> also deemed <u><strong><mark>poor candidates</u></strong></mark> for slavery, not because of their race, but rather because <u><strong><mark>they were in</mark> <mark>short supply</mark> and <mark>enslavement would</u></strong>,</mark> quite naturally, <u><strong><mark>interfere with voluntary immigration</u></strong></mark> to the new colonies. Plantation owners thus viewed African, who were relatively powerless, as the ideal slaves. <u><strong>The systematic enslavement of Africans</u></strong>, and the rearing of their children under bondage, <u><strong>emerged with all deliberate speed</u></strong>—quickened by events such as Bacon’s Rebellion. Nathaniel Bacon was a white property owner in Jamestown, Virginia, who managed to unite slaves, indentured servants, and poor whites in a revolutionary effort to overthrow the planter elite. Although slaves clearly occupied the lowest position in the social hierarchy and suffered the most under the plantation system, the condition of indentured whites was barely better, and the majority of free whites lived in extreme poverty. As explained by historian Edmund Morgan, in colonies like Virginia, the planter elite, with huge land grants, occupied a vastly superior position to workers of all colors. Southern colonies did not hesitate to invent ways to extend the terms of servitude, and the planter class accumulated uncultivated lands to restrict the options of free workers. The simmering resentment against the planter class created conditions that were ripe for revolt. Varying accounts of Bacon’s rebellion abound, but the basic facts are these: Bacon developed plans in 1675 to seize Native American lands in order to acquire more property for himself and others and nullify the threat of Indian raids. When the planter elite in Virginia refused to provide militia support for his scheme, Bacon retaliated, leading an attack on the elite, their homes, and their property. He openly condemned the rich for their oppression of the poor and inspired an alliance of white and black bond laborers, as well as slaves, who demanded an end to their servitude. The attempted revolution was ended by force and false promises of amnesty. A number of people who participated in the revolt were hanged. The events in Jamestown were alarming to the planter elite, who were deeply fearful of the multiracial alliance of bond workers and slaves. Word of Bacon’s Rebellion spread far and wide, and several more uprisings of a similar type followed. <u><strong>In an effort <mark>to protect their</mark> superior <mark>status and economic</mark> <mark>position</mark>, the <mark>planters shifted their strategy</mark> for maintaining dominance.</u></strong> They abandon their heavy reliance on indentured servants in favor of the importation of more black slaves. Instead of importing English-speaking slaves from the West Indies, who were more likely to be familiar with European language and culture, many more <u><strong><mark>slaves were shipped</mark> directly <mark>from Africa</mark>. These <mark>slaves would be</mark> far <mark>easier to control</mark> <mark>and</mark> far <mark>less likely to form alliances with poor whites</mark>. Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient</u></strong> to protect their interests, <u><strong>the planter class took an additional precautionary step,</u></strong> a step that would later become known as <u><strong>a “racial bribe.”</u></strong> <u><strong>Deliberately and strategically, <mark>the planter class</mark> <mark>extended special privileges to poor whites</mark> in an effort <mark>to drive a wedge</u></strong> <u><strong>between them and</mark> black <mark>slaves</mark>.</u></strong> White settlers were allowed greater access to Native American lands, white servants were allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and militias, and barriers were created so that free labor would not be placed in competition with slave labor. <u><strong>These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. <mark>Poor whites</mark> suddenly <mark>had a direct</mark>, personal <mark>stake in</mark> the existence of a <mark>race-based</mark> system of <mark>slavery</mark>. Their own plight had not improved</u></strong> by much, <u><strong>but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites</u></strong> responded to the logic of their situation and <u><strong>sought ways to expand their racially privileged position.</p></u></strong>
2NC
Cap K
2NC AT: History
113,645
59
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,420
CP Text: The United States should hold a binding national referendum to coincide with the 2014 midterm elections on the legalization of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin through federal policy waivers. The United States should legalize the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin through federal policy waivers if and only if the referendum receives more than 50% of the popular vote.
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null
null
null
null
<h4>CP Text: The United States should hold a binding national referendum to coincide with the 2014 midterm elections on the legalization of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin through federal policy waivers. The United States should legalize the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin through federal policy waivers if and only if the referendum receives more than 50% of the popular vote. </h4>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Referendum CP
429,851
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,421
The CP solves 100% of the case, avoids the midterms DA and provides Uniqueness for it. A national referendum on marijuana legalization would pass – that’s the 1NC Marczyk. That means that legalization still happens, it just happens three months from now – no 1AC card is specific enough to give a warrant for why that would be insufficient to solve the aff.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>The CP solves 100% of the case, avoids the midterms DA and provides Uniqueness for it. A national referendum on marijuana legalization would pass – that’s the 1NC Marczyk. That means that legalization still happens, it just happens three months from now – no 1AC card is specific enough to give a warrant for why that would be insufficient to solve the aff.</h4>
1NR
CP
2NC Overview
429,852
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,422
Extinction justifies sacrificing the lesser number
null
Kateb 92 – Prof Politics, Princeton (George, The Inner Ocean, p 12)
null
null
The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. The situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say,circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to be killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third party—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.
1,890
<h4>Extinction justifies sacrificing the lesser number</h4><p>Kateb 92<strong> </strong>– Prof Politics, Princeton<strong> </strong>(George, The Inner Ocean, p 12)</p><p>The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. The situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say,circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to be killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third party—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed. </p>
1NR
MT
1NR – Util F/L
74,232
12
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,423
The referendum passes and provides uniqueness to the midterms disad
Marczyk 13
Marczyk 13
The writing is on the wall; marijuana will be completely legal in the U.S. within 10 years. Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority among younger voters legalization is just a matter of time You cannot legislate against a social movement that is on the right side of history. prohibition seems to be crumbling before our eyes This current vote is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless Marijuana is an idea whose time has come; this new marijuana majority social movement is a political force that politicians who want to get elected must now listen to; they need to start a conversation with us if they want votes. Going against the will of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system is not something to be taken lightly by any elected official who wants to be voted into office Think we don’t vote? Think again! Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than Obama in Colorado marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012 it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA The majority pro-marijuana vote that took place in Colorado and Washington state is a directive to the federal government to stand down These two states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be about the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis
marijuana will be legal in 10 years Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority legalization is just a matter of time You cannot legislate against a social movement prohibition seems to be crumbling The majority vote in Colorado is a directive to the fed to stand down. These states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis
Ron, former drug education specialist and M.S. in cardiac rehabilitation and exercise physiology, “Worth Repeating: ‘Marijuana Spring’ Will Save Future of Earth”, http://www.tokesignals.com/worth-repeating-marijuana-spring-will-save-future-of-earth/, October 18th, AB The writing is on the wall; marijuana will be completely legal in the U.S. within 10 years. “Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority among younger voters,” and legalization is just a matter of time. Hey… Have you ever tried putting toothpaste back into the tube? The new marijuana spring is here to stay… You cannot legislate against a social movement that is on the right side of history. “The Berlin Wall of pot prohibition seems to be crumbling before our eyes.” This current vote also is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law back in the 1937. The hidden agency that originally made cannabis illegal was designed to replace a plant that was in use by humans for 10,000 years and to replace it worldwide with petroleum and plastics for profit by the oligarchies of the day. You see where that got us? As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless as gay marriage is to society, a normal, and good for you, healthy behavior. Trying to outlaw marijuana is like trying to outlaw gay. Marijuana as a social movement is an idea whose time has come; this new marijuana majority social movement is a political force that politicians who want to get elected must now listen to; they need to start a conversation with us if they want our votes. Going against the will of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system is not something to be taken lightly by any elected official who wants to be voted into office. Think we don’t vote? Think again! Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than President Obama did in Colorado. As a matter of fact, marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012. Americans are in love with this gentle plant. Maybe it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA misinformation that frames people who use cannabis as addicted, apathetic, criminals. We are your mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters; we are your family. Marijuana prohibition destroys families; that’s why it is a failure. And one more thing: historically, the word “marijuana” was a made-up word to discriminate and demonize Hispanics who are now the upcoming new racial majority in the U.S. Remember, the word “marijuana” was used to discriminate against your great-grandparents who picked fruit in the hot sun, and whose purpose was to profile them as lazy, degenerate and violent marijuana-smokers who should be deported. I would like to watch any prohibitionist explain to a Hispanic town meeting how marijuana first became illegal and why and then ask for their support and vote. Karma can be a real bitch. The majority pro-marijuana vote that took place in Colorado and Washington state is a directive to the federal government to stand down. These two states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole. Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be about the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis. You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.
3,364
<h4>The referendum passes and provides uniqueness to the midterms disad<strong> </h4><p>Marczyk 13</p><p></strong>Ron, former drug education specialist and M.S. in cardiac rehabilitation and exercise physiology, “Worth Repeating: ‘Marijuana Spring’ Will Save Future of Earth”, http://www.tokesignals.com/worth-repeating-marijuana-spring-will-save-future-of-earth/, October 18th, AB </p><p><u><strong>The writing is on the wall; <mark>marijuana will be</mark> completely <mark>legal in</mark> the U.S. within <mark>10 years</mark>. </u></strong>“<u><strong><mark>Demographics project legalization with a 2-1 majority</mark> among younger voters</u></strong>,” and <u><strong><mark>legalization is just a matter of time</u></strong></mark>. Hey… Have you ever tried putting toothpaste back into the tube? The new marijuana spring is here to stay… <u><strong><mark>You cannot legislate against a social movement</mark> that is on the right side of history. </u></strong>“The Berlin Wall of pot <u><strong><mark>prohibition seems to be crumbling</mark> before our eyes</u></strong>.” <u><strong>This current vote</u></strong> also <u><strong>is the start of correcting the original ignorance that allowed marijuana prohibition to become a law</u></strong> back in the 1937. The hidden agency that originally made cannabis illegal was designed to replace a plant that was in use by humans for 10,000 years and to replace it worldwide with petroleum and plastics for profit by the oligarchies of the day. You see where that got us? <u><strong>As 60+ people in my generation die off, our replacements view marijuana use as harmless</u></strong> as gay marriage is to society, a normal, and good for you, healthy behavior. Trying to outlaw marijuana is like trying to outlaw gay. <u><strong>Marijuana</u></strong> as a social movement <u><strong>is an idea whose time has come; this new marijuana majority social movement is a political force that politicians who want to get elected must now listen to; they need to start a conversation with us if they want</u></strong> our<u><strong> votes. Going against the will of an overwhelming majority of Americans who worked though the system is not something to be taken lightly by any elected official who wants to be voted into office</u></strong>. <u><strong>Think we don’t vote? Think again!</u></strong> <u><strong>Marijuana legalization polled 3 points higher than </u></strong>President <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> did <u><strong>in Colorado</u></strong>. As a matter of fact, <u><strong>marijuana was voted more popular than either presidential candidate in November 2012</u></strong>. Americans are in love with this gentle plant. Maybe <u><strong>it’s time for the media and politicians to lose the DEA</u></strong> misinformation that frames people who use cannabis as addicted, apathetic, criminals. We are your mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters; we are your family. Marijuana prohibition destroys families; that’s why it is a failure. And one more thing: historically, the word “marijuana” was a made-up word to discriminate and demonize Hispanics who are now the upcoming new racial majority in the U.S. Remember, the word “marijuana” was used to discriminate against your great-grandparents who picked fruit in the hot sun, and whose purpose was to profile them as lazy, degenerate and violent marijuana-smokers who should be deported. I would like to watch any prohibitionist explain to a Hispanic town meeting how marijuana first became illegal and why and then ask for their support and vote. Karma can be a real bitch. <u><strong><mark>The majority</mark> pro-marijuana <mark>vote</mark> that took place <mark>in Colorado</mark> and Washington state <mark>is a directive to the</mark> <mark>fed</mark>eral government <mark>to stand down</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>These</mark> two <mark>states are a strong representative sample of the country as a whole.</u></strong> <u><strong>Put it to a national referendum and the numbers would be</mark> about <mark>the same– a majority of Americans want legalized cannabis</u></strong></mark>. You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.</p>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Referendum CP
429,554
4
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,424
Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else
Kacou 8
Kacou 8 Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184
finding things good can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.
finding things good can not exist without consciousness without “life only in living therefore, a priori, life ought to be indefinitely) pursued for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding good the fact that we have (subjective) desire for life shows life to have (objective) value
Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.
3,476
<h4><strong>Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else</h4><p>Kacou 8</p><p></strong>Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184</p><p>Furthermore, that manner of <u><strong><mark>finding things good</u></strong> </mark>that is in pleasure <u><strong><mark>can </mark>certainly <mark>not exist </mark>in any world <mark>without consciousness </mark>(i.e., <mark>without “life</mark>,”</u></strong> as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, <u><strong>pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation</u></strong>, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, <u><strong>something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.</u></strong> And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, <u><strong>we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living</u></strong> (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] <u><strong>and <mark>only in living</mark>, <mark>therefore, a priori, life ought to be </mark>continuously (and <mark>indefinitely) pursued </mark>at least <mark>for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding </mark>that<mark> good</mark>.</u></strong> However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that <u><strong><mark>the fact that we </mark>already <mark>have </mark>some <mark>(subjective) desire for life shows life to have </mark>some <mark>(objective) value</mark>.</u></strong> But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.</p>
1NR
MT
1NR – Util F/L
96,600
214
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,425
Debating over the specific merits of policies using empirical evidence is necessary to solve propagandist takeover and serial policy failure. Evaluating opportunity costs is key.
null
Anderson 3 – Lisa Anderson, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, former President of the Middle East Studies Association, November 2003, online: http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871
We have a special responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness of the Middle East to ensure that our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible policy can shape the arena in which scholarship takes place, for good and for ill, and there is a widespread presumption that scholarship should also shape policy. we should speak publicly about such topics because our opinions are likely to be much better informed than most citizens policy should be based on empirical, scientifically developed evidence--as opposed to religious conviction, ideology, personal whims or merely guesswork. The ability of policy-makers to draw on university-based expertise --has been the rationale for government support of university-based research in the United States and around the world for the six decades since that war In the wars on terror and on Iraq, evidence has been scarce and little regarded. From the questions about "sexed-up" intelligence reports; the suggestion that claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction were really rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem ."[24] Informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world. To be responsible citizens, deploying our expertise effectively, we need not agree with a policy--or even with each other. Some of us may testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces in the newspapers or appear on television as "experts." Others will organize campus debates, We must train our successors in this discipline and educate the broader public about the value of evidence and the various ways to critically assess it. This is how we contribute to the public good . We must encourage and celebrate efforts to collect evidence and to refine how we assess it, and to bring those efforts to bear in the classroom and in vigorous public debates about the policies of governments throughout the region as well as here at home
We have a responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible policy can shape scholarship and scholarship should shape policy we should speak publicly because our opinions are much better informed than most citizens policy should be based on empirical, evidence--as opposed to ideology, personal whims or guesswork In the wars on terror and on Iraq evidence has been scarce and little regarded claims about W M D were rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq willingness to lock up terror suspects without evidence Public policy has increasingly been debated through the lenses of ideology Discussion focuses on the politics instead of the substance of the policy The question will the policy work?-- gets short shrift evidence frames costs of various alternatives in its absence, policies fail Informing policy debates with the evidence scholars bring is responsible policymaking Some of us may testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces Others will organize campus debates
Yet, there is far more that we must do, as an institution and as individuals. We have a special responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness of the Middle East to ensure that our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned. Scientific and scholarly exchange should not be impeded and dissemination of ideas must be respected without regard to the national origin, political persuasion or disciplinary loyalty of their authors. We need to be able to acknowledge the failings of our work without embarrassment--remember that no bench scientist is afraid to report negative experimental results--but we must also assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East. The Middle East Studies Association is, in fact, where people congregate who speak the languages, fathom the economies, know the histories (and the debates about the histories), appreciate the jokes, understand the insults, and recognize the aspirations in the Middle East today. What does that unique insight and understanding mean, and what relationship might it have to policy? This question is worth reflecting on carefully, for the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible. Certainly, scholars are often dismissive of the lack of analytical rigor that typifies the conduct of public policy--the need to act before all the answers are known--while policy practitioners are bemused by the theoretical pretensions of scholars--the reluctance to act in the absence of all the answers.[20] Yet we have already seen how policy can shape the arena in which scholarship takes place, for good and for ill, and there is a widespread presumption that scholarship should also shape policy. On the part of policymakers, for example, Representative Pete Hoekstra in his press release announcing that the authorization of Title VI has passed the House subcommittee describes the purposes of the Title VI centers: "to advance knowledge of world regions, encourage the study of foreign languages, and train Americans to have the international expertise and understanding to fulfill pressing national security needs."[21] From the scholar's perspective, just last year, my predecessor as MESA President, Joel Beinin, while acknowledging that " we cannot and should not speak with one voice as authorities whose academic expertise give us exact knowledge of the best way to protect Americans from acts of terror, to remove Saddam Husayn from power, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other desirable goals" nonetheless argued that "we should speak publicly about such topics because our opinions are likely to be much better informed than most citizens."[22] Clearly we all believe that knowledge, understanding and issues of public moment should somehow be linked. And, in fact, ever since the creation of research universities in the United States, more than a century ago, academic research, particularly but not exclusively scientific and social scientific research, has been presumed to serve important purposes for policy and policy-makers. Probably since the rise of the early modern state, and certainly since the development of the modern welfare state, it has been assumed that policy should be based on empirical, scientifically developed evidence--as opposed to religious conviction, ideology, personal whims or merely guesswork. This search for evidence in the formulation and conduct of policy led quite naturally to scholars. During the Second World War, for example, as Alexander Stille tells us, The United States, which did not even have a foreign intelligence service before the war, hired numerous professors, scholars and intellectuals of varying backgrounds to prepare reports to help them understand Germany [and Japan], including Herbert Marcuse (even though he was a well-know Marxist philosopher), the psychologist Erik Ericson, the Great German art historian Richard Krautheimer and the anthropologists Margaret Mead [and Ruth Benedict].[23] The ability of policy-makers to draw on university-based expertise–independent, it should be noted, of the partisan or ideological preferences of its authors--has been the rationale for government support of university-based research in the United States and around the world for the six decades since that war. What makes the disputes today so exceptionally troubling is not that they reflect debates about whether partisan preferences should be a filter or standard by which the contributions of scholarship should be evaluated, although that is often how the issue is framed. Nor is it really a question of whether scholars and policymakers even acknowledge their mutual reliance. No, far more profoundly, this debate is about whether evidence is important in policy-making at all. In the wars on terror and on Iraq, evidence has been scarce and little regarded. From the questions about "sexed-up" intelligence reports; the suggestion that claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction were really rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa'ida, we have been living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable."[24] Informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world. We, as the community of scientists and scholars devoted to the production and deployment of evidence, a project we sometimes call the search for truth, must remain faithful to that purpose even, perhaps especially, when policymakers seem distracted or uninterested. We must also make that evidence accessible. This neither requires nor excludes scholars, or their students, serving on the government payroll or endorsing a particular policy position. On the contrary, particularly in a democracy, the fulfillment of what we call "national security needs" is as much about meeting an obligation to contribute to the education of citizens--voters and taxpayers--as it is assessing or adopting particular policy stances. This we can do in the private and not-for-profit sectors, in think tanks and advocacy organizations, in the media and private businesses, in classrooms and research journals--wherever our work informs open and vigorous debates about the merits of policy perspectives and proposals–as well, of course, as in government. To be responsible citizens, deploying our expertise effectively, we need not agree with a policy--or even with each other. Some of us may testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces in the newspapers or appear on television as "experts." Others will organize campus debates, seminars and demonstrations. Still others will simply equip their students with knowledge and insight enough to be better citizens of their county and the world, more knowledgeable, more critical, armed with better evidence and more refined analytical skills. To sustain the remarkable–and remarkably important–position we hold in society, as both scholars and citizens, we have two obligations. We must do what we do--proudly, confidently, and energetically. We must be constantly, restlessly open to new ideas, searching for new evidence, critical of received wisdom, old orthodoxies, and ancient bigotries, always creating and criticizing ourselves, each other and our world. This is the life of scholarship and we must embrace it for what it is and do it well. We must train our successors in this discipline and educate the broader public about the value of evidence and the various ways to critically assess it. This is how we contribute to the public good, directly and indirectly. At the same time, we must be absolutely uncompromising in upholding the rights that permit us to fulfill that first responsibility: the rights to freedom of information, expression and association, in the United States and around the world, for ourselves and our colleagues. If MESA is to accomplish its purposes in this difficult time, we as an institution must devise ways to support and defend our members both individually and as a scholarly community. We must encourage and celebrate efforts to collect evidence and to refine how we assess it, and to bring those efforts to bear in the classroom and in vigorous public debates about the policies of governments throughout the region as well as here at home. We cannot be idle when polltakers are roughed up or jailed because their findings are politically unpalatable, when students are told to report on faculty whose partisan commitments may be politically unpopular, when research is discredited not on its merits but by the sources of its funding, whether in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the United States.
10,266
<h4>Debating over the specific merits of policies using empirical evidence is necessary to solve propagandist takeover and serial policy failure. Evaluating opportunity costs is key.</h4><p>Anderson 3 – Lisa Anderson, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, former President of the Middle East Studies Association, November 2003, online: http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871</p><p>Yet, there is far more that we must do, as an institution and as individuals. <u><strong><mark>We have a</mark> special <mark>responsibility, in fostering</mark> <mark>intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship</mark>, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness </strong>of the Middle East to ensure that<strong> our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned</u></strong>. Scientific and scholarly exchange should not be impeded and dissemination of ideas must be respected without regard to the national origin, political persuasion or disciplinary loyalty of their authors. We need to be able to acknowledge the failings of our work without embarrassment--remember that no bench scientist is afraid to report negative experimental results--but we must also <u><strong>assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East</u></strong>. The Middle East Studies Association is, in fact, where people congregate who speak the languages, fathom the economies, know the histories (and the debates about the histories), appreciate the jokes, understand the insults, and recognize the aspirations in the Middle East today. What does that unique insight and understanding mean, and what relationship might it have to policy? This question is worth reflecting on carefully, for <u><strong><mark>the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible</u></strong></mark>. Certainly, scholars are often dismissive of the lack of analytical rigor that typifies the conduct of public policy--the need to act before all the answers are known--while policy practitioners are bemused by the theoretical pretensions of scholars--the reluctance to act in the absence of all the answers.[20] Yet we have already seen how <u><strong><mark>policy can shape</mark> the arena in which <mark>scholarship</mark> takes place, for good and for ill, <mark>and</mark> there is a widespread presumption that <mark>scholarship should</mark> also <mark>shape policy</mark>.</u></strong> On the part of policymakers, for example, Representative Pete Hoekstra in his press release announcing that the authorization of Title VI has passed the House subcommittee describes the purposes of the Title VI centers: "to advance knowledge of world regions, encourage the study of foreign languages, and train Americans to have the international expertise and understanding to fulfill pressing national security needs."[21] From the scholar's perspective, just last year, my predecessor as MESA President, Joel Beinin, while acknowledging that " we cannot and should not speak with one voice as authorities whose academic expertise give us exact knowledge of the best way to protect Americans from acts of terror, to remove Saddam Husayn from power, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other desirable goals" nonetheless argued that "<u><strong><mark>we should speak publicly</mark> about such topics <mark>because our opinions are</mark> likely to be <mark>much better informed than most citizens</u></strong></mark>."[22] Clearly we all believe that knowledge, understanding and issues of public moment should somehow be linked. And, in fact, ever since the creation of research universities in the United States, more than a century ago, academic research, particularly but not exclusively scientific and social scientific research, has been presumed to serve important purposes for policy and policy-makers. Probably since the rise of the early modern state, and certainly since the development of the modern welfare state, it has been assumed that <u><strong><mark>policy should be based on empirical,</mark> scientifically developed <mark>evidence--as opposed to</mark> religious conviction, <mark>ideology, personal whims or</mark> merely <mark>guesswork</mark>.</u></strong> This search for evidence in the formulation and conduct of policy led quite naturally to scholars. During the Second World War, for example, as Alexander Stille tells us, The United States, which did not even have a foreign intelligence service before the war, hired numerous professors, scholars and intellectuals of varying backgrounds to prepare reports to help them understand Germany [and Japan], including Herbert Marcuse (even though he was a well-know Marxist philosopher), the psychologist Erik Ericson, the Great German art historian Richard Krautheimer and the anthropologists Margaret Mead [and Ruth Benedict].[23] <u><strong>The ability of policy-makers to draw on university-based expertise</u></strong>–independent, it should be noted, of the partisan or ideological preferences of its authors<u><strong>--has been the rationale for government support of university-based research in the United States and around the world for the six decades since that war</u></strong>. What makes the disputes today so exceptionally troubling is not that they reflect debates about whether partisan preferences should be a filter or standard by which the contributions of scholarship should be evaluated, although that is often how the issue is framed. Nor is it really a question of whether scholars and policymakers even acknowledge their mutual reliance. No, far more profoundly, this debate is about whether evidence is important in policy-making at all. <u><strong><mark>In the wars on terror and on Iraq</mark>, <mark>evidence has been scarce and little regarded</mark>. From the questions about "sexed-up" intelligence reports; the suggestion that <mark>claims about</mark> <mark>W</mark>eapons of <mark>M</mark>ass <mark>D</mark>estruction <mark>were</mark> really <mark>rationales of bureaucratic convenience</mark> <mark>in creating constituents for the war on Iraq</mark>; the cavalier <mark>willingness to lock up terror suspects</mark> for months or years <mark>without</mark> any verifiable <mark>evidence</mark> of wrongdoing</u></strong>; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa'ida, we have been living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: <u><strong><mark>Public policy</mark> in the United States in recent years <mark>has increasingly been</mark> conceived, <mark>debated</mark>, and evaluated <mark>through the lenses of</mark> politics and <mark>ideology</u></strong></mark>--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. <u><strong><mark>Discussion</mark> surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives <mark>focuses on the politics</mark> of the compromise <mark>instead of the substance</mark> or impact <mark>of the policy</mark>. <mark>The</mark> fundamental <mark>question</mark>--<mark>will the policy work?--</mark>too often <mark>gets short shrift</mark> or is ignored altogether.</u></strong> <u><strong>As Reischauer points out, the <mark>evidence</mark> produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely <mark>frames</mark> the choices and identifies the <mark>costs of various alternatives</mark>--but <mark>in its absence,</u></strong> <u><strong>policies</mark> are, as he put it, "likely to <mark>fail</mark> because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem</u></strong>....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable<u><strong>."[24] <mark>Informing policy debates with</mark> <mark>the</mark> sort of <mark>evidence</mark> <mark>scholars bring</mark> to bear <mark>is</mark> an essential part of <mark>responsible policymaking</mark> in the modern world.</u></strong> We, as the community of scientists and scholars devoted to the production and deployment of evidence, a project we sometimes call the search for truth, must remain faithful to that purpose even, perhaps especially, when policymakers seem distracted or uninterested. We must also make that evidence accessible. This neither requires nor excludes scholars, or their students, serving on the government payroll or endorsing a particular policy position. On the contrary, particularly in a democracy, the fulfillment of what we call "national security needs" is as much about meeting an obligation to contribute to the education of citizens--voters and taxpayers--as it is assessing or adopting particular policy stances. This we can do in the private and not-for-profit sectors, in think tanks and advocacy organizations, in the media and private businesses, in classrooms and research journals--wherever our work informs open and vigorous debates about the merits of policy perspectives and proposals–as well, of course, as in government. <u><strong>To be responsible citizens, deploying our expertise effectively, we need not agree with a policy--or even with each other. <mark>Some of us may</mark> <mark>testify before Congress or write op-ed pieces</mark> in the newspapers or appear on television as "experts." <mark>Others</mark> <mark>will</mark> <mark>organize campus debates</mark>, </u></strong>seminars and demonstrations. Still others will simply equip their students with knowledge and insight enough to be better citizens of their county and the world, more knowledgeable, more critical, armed with better evidence and more refined analytical skills. To sustain the remarkable–and remarkably important–position we hold in society, as both scholars and citizens, we have two obligations. We must do what we do--proudly, confidently, and energetically. We must be constantly, restlessly open to new ideas, searching for new evidence, critical of received wisdom, old orthodoxies, and ancient bigotries, always creating and criticizing ourselves, each other and our world. This is the life of scholarship and we must embrace it for what it is and do it well. <u><strong>We must train our successors in this discipline and educate the broader public about the value of evidence and the various ways to critically assess it. This is how we contribute to the public good</u></strong>, directly and indirectly. At the same time, we must be absolutely uncompromising in upholding the rights that permit us to fulfill that first responsibility: the rights to freedom of information, expression and association, in the United States and around the world, for ourselves and our colleagues. If MESA is to accomplish its purposes in this difficult time, we as an institution must devise ways to support and defend our members both individually and as a scholarly community<u><strong>. We must encourage and celebrate efforts to collect evidence and to refine how we assess it, and to bring those efforts to bear in the classroom and in vigorous public debates about the policies of governments throughout the region as well as here at home</u></strong>. We cannot be idle when polltakers are roughed up or jailed because their findings are politically unpalatable, when students are told to report on faculty whose partisan commitments may be politically unpopular, when research is discredited not on its merits but by the sources of its funding, whether in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the United States.</p>
1NR
CP
2NC Process Over Product
429,853
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,426
Their epistemology of threat production justifies nuclear lashout to eliminate the threat -- causes extinction
Massumi 07
Massumi 07
Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States. preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency Preemption is not prevention. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought Prevention operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect. this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption Deterrence has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised. The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself. The quickest and most direct way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one. The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic ). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life).
Preemption is not prevention Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats Prevention operates in an knowable world in uncertainty is a lack of information, The quickest way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one , the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself the enemy will follow your lead MAD is squared objectively a threat is added You to race foward it ever faster. build more weapons, faster and The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. What began as an epistemological condition dynamizes into a a race for dear life
Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/ v010/10.2massumi.html, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption” It is certain that there will be adjustments. But it should be remembered that Bush referred to a change in "tactics," not a change in "strategy." Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States. It can be argued that preemption is in any case far more than a specific military doctrine of a particular administration. It can be plausibly argued that preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age in as infinitely space-filling and insiduously infiltrating a way as the logic of "deterrence" defined the Cold War era. By an "operative" logic I mean one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency that is not in the sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible sweeps them up in its own dynamic. Preemption is not prevention. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ epistemologically and ontologically. Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought to avoid their realization. Prevention operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect. As we will see, this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption, and entails a divergence from it on the ontological level as well. Prevention, in fact, has no ontology of its own because it assumes that what it must deal with has an objectively given existence prior to its own intervention. In practice, this means that its object is given to it predefined by other formations, in whose terms and on whose terrain it must then operate. A preventive approach to social conflict might analyze it, for example, as an effect of poverty, objectively quantifiable in terms of economic and health indexes. Each index is defined by a specialist formation (economics, medicine) in relation to a norm specific to that domain and against which goals may be set and success measured (annual income, mortality rates, life expectancy, etc.). The preventive measures will then operate as a political extension of the concerned specialist domains (economic analysis extended into politics as aid and development, medicine extended into vaccination programs, etc.). They will be regulated by the specialist logics proper to those fields. Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end. Because of this, preventive measures are not self-sustaining. They must be applied. They must be leveraged from an outside source with outside force. They are not an organizing force in their own right. They run on borrowed power. Deterrence takes over at the end of this same process, when the means of prevention have failed. Deterrence makes use of the same epistemology prevention does, in that it assumes knowability and objective measurability. However, because it starts where prevention ends, it has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised. Since it would not hold the key to its own knowledge, in the urgency of the situation it would be haunted internally by the spectre of a possible incompleteness of the knowledge coming from the outside. Since its operations would be mediated by that outside domain, neither would it hold a direct key to its own actions. Since it would be responding to causes outside its specific purview, it would not be master of its own effects. The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself. The quickest and most direct way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one. The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic (deterrence). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause. Past causes are in any case already spoken for. They have been claimed as objects of knowledge and operational spheres by a crowded world of other already-functioning formations. Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." In fact, the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's, give or take a few half-lives. The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life).
7,104
<h4>Their epistemology of threat production justifies nuclear lashout to eliminate the threat -- causes extinction </h4><p><strong><mark>Massumi 07</strong></mark> </p><p>Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/ v010/10.2massumi.html, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”</p><p>It is certain that there will be adjustments. But it should be remembered that Bush referred to a change in "tactics," not a change in "strategy." <u>Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States.</u> It can be argued that preemption is in any case far more than a specific military doctrine of a particular administration. It can be plausibly argued that <u>preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age</u> in as infinitely space-filling and insiduously infiltrating a way as the logic of "deterrence" defined the Cold War era. By an "operative" logic I mean <u>one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency</u> that is not in the sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible sweeps them up in its own dynamic. <u><mark>Preemption is not prevention</mark>. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ</u> epistemologically and ontologically. <u><mark>Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats </mark>empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought</u> to avoid their realization. <u><mark>Prevention</mark> <mark>operates</mark> <mark>in an</mark> objectively <mark>knowable world</mark> <mark>in</mark> which <mark>uncertainty</mark> <mark>is a</mark> function of a <mark>lack of information,</mark> and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect.</u> As we will see, <u>this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption</u>, and entails a divergence from it on the ontological level as well. Prevention, in fact, has no ontology of its own because it assumes that what it must deal with has an objectively given existence prior to its own intervention. In practice, this means that its object is given to it predefined by other formations, in whose terms and on whose terrain it must then operate. A preventive approach to social conflict might analyze it, for example, as an effect of poverty, objectively quantifiable in terms of economic and health indexes. Each index is defined by a specialist formation (economics, medicine) in relation to a norm specific to that domain and against which goals may be set and success measured (annual income, mortality rates, life expectancy, etc.). The preventive measures will then operate as a political extension of the concerned specialist domains (economic analysis extended into politics as aid and development, medicine extended into vaccination programs, etc.). They will be regulated by the specialist logics proper to those fields. Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end. Because of this, preventive measures are not self-sustaining. They must be applied. They must be leveraged from an outside source with outside force. They are not an organizing force in their own right. They run on borrowed power. Deterrence takes over at the end of this same process, when the means of prevention have failed. <u>Deterrence</u> makes use of the same epistemology prevention does, in that it assumes knowability and objective measurability. However, because it starts where prevention ends, it <u>has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised.</u> Since it would not hold the key to its own knowledge, in the urgency of the situation it would be haunted internally by the spectre of a possible incompleteness of the knowledge coming from the outside. Since its operations would be mediated by that outside domain, neither would it hold a direct key to its own actions. Since it would be responding to causes outside its specific purview, it would not be master of its own effects. <u>The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself.</u> <u><mark>The quickest</mark> and most direct <mark>way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one</mark>.</u> <u>The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words<mark>, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic</u></mark> (deterrence<u>). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause.</u> Past causes are in any case already spoken for. They have been claimed as objects of knowledge and operational spheres by a crowded world of other already-functioning formations. Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. <u>This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start <mark>by translating the threat into a clear and present danger.</mark> You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, <mark>you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself</mark> by precipitating a "nuclear winter." </u>In fact, <u>the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain <mark>the enemy will follow your lead </u></mark>in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). <u>Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." <mark>MAD</mark> <mark>is</mark> certainty <mark>squared</mark>: to the certainty that there is <mark>objectively a threat is added</mark> the certainty that it is balanced out.</u> The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. <u>You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. <mark>You</mark> have <mark>to race foward it ever faster.</mark> You have to <mark>build more weapons, faster and</mark> better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's</u>, give or take a few half-lives. <u>The process soon becomes self-driving. <mark>The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling.</mark> Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. <mark>What began as an epistemological condition</mark> (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) <mark>dynamizes into a</mark>n ontology or mode of being (<mark>a race for dear life</mark>). </p></u>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Security K
57,061
49
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,427
Dems win- Blumenthal and Wang both project
TDS 9/12
TDS 9/12
when Huffpost Pollster joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting that Democrats are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news Huffpost calculates a 56 percent "chance that Democrats will keep control of the Senate." 56 percent doesn't allow all that much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day, it's fair to say that it's a sign that Dems are in a much better position in the battle for Senate control than many pundits thought they would be in in mid-September, given the lopsided Democratic vulnerabilities this year. there are respected poll analysts who still believe the odds favor a GOP takeover of the U.S. Senate But with both Mark Blumenthal and Sam Wang arguing otherwise, Dems have cause for optimism
when Huffpost joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting Dem s are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news Huffpost calculates a 56 percent "chance Democrats will keep control of the Senate." 56 percent doesn't allow much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day it's a sign Dems are in a much better position than many pundits thought they would be Dems have cause for optimism
The Democratic Strategist: Huffpost Pollster Sees 56 Percent Chance Dems Will Hold Senate Majority http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2014/09/huffpost_pollster_sees_56_perc.php 09/12/14 [AW] Don't bet the ranch on it just yet, but when Huffpost Pollster joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting that Democrats are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news. Today Huffpost Pollster calculates a 56 percent "chance that Democrats will keep control of the Senate." Of course 56 percent doesn't allow all that much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day, it's fair to say that it's a sign that Dems are in a much better position in the battle for Senate control than many pundits thought they would be in in mid-September, given the lopsided Democratic vulnerabilities this year. Huffpost Pollster's Mark Blumenthal and Natalie Jackson explore the ramifications of "the Orman factor" (Independent U.S. Senate candidate Greg Orman in Kansas) in their calculations, and conclude: ...Now, however, in the simulations that project an Orman win, our model will usually assign him to the party in the majority...In the rare scenario in which Orman wins and the chamber is split with 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, we give Orman a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Democrats and a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Republicans. (Thus, the overall probabilities of each party's winning the majority still add to 100 percent.) But we also note the probability of this situation occurring -- we call it "the Orman factor." On the Senate model dashboard, this number appears right below the probabilities for Democratic and Republican majorities. Other models have also assigned Orman to one side or the other in the case of 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, but in slightly different ways: Daily Kos similarly assumes there is a 50/50 chance Orman will caucus with each party, but FiveThirtyEight assumes a 75 percent chance he will caucus with the Democrats, and The Upshot assigns him to the Democrats 100 percent of the time. Sure, as noted elsewhere there are respected poll analysts who still believe the odds favor a GOP takeover of the U.S. Senate. But with both Mark Blumenthal and Sam Wang arguing otherwise, Dems have cause for optimism -- especially if they mobilize an energetic GOTV effort where it counts.
2,373
<h4><strong>Dems win- Blumenthal and Wang both project</h4><p>TDS 9/12</p><p></strong>The Democratic Strategist: Huffpost Pollster Sees 56 Percent Chance Dems Will Hold Senate Majority http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2014/09/huffpost_pollster_sees_56_perc.php 09/12/14 [AW]</p><p>Don't bet the ranch on it just yet, but <u><strong><mark>when Huffpost</mark> Pollster <mark>joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting</mark> that <mark>Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s</mark> <mark>are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news</u></strong></mark>. Today <u><strong><mark>Huffpost</u></strong></mark> Pollster <u><strong><mark>calculates a 56 percent "chance</mark> that <mark>Democrats will keep control of the Senate."</mark> </u></strong>Of course <u><strong><mark>56 percent doesn't allow</mark> all that <mark>much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day</mark>, it's fair to say that <mark>it's a sign</mark> that <mark>Dems are in a much better position</mark> in the battle for Senate control <mark>than many pundits thought they would be</mark> in in mid-September, given the lopsided Democratic vulnerabilities this year. </u></strong>Huffpost Pollster's Mark Blumenthal and Natalie Jackson explore the ramifications of "the Orman factor" (Independent U.S. Senate candidate Greg Orman in Kansas) in their calculations, and conclude: ...Now, however, in the simulations that project an Orman win, our model will usually assign him to the party in the majority...In the rare scenario in which Orman wins and the chamber is split with 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, we give Orman a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Democrats and a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Republicans. (Thus, the overall probabilities of each party's winning the majority still add to 100 percent.) But we also note the probability of this situation occurring -- we call it "the Orman factor." On the Senate model dashboard, this number appears right below the probabilities for Democratic and Republican majorities. Other models have also assigned Orman to one side or the other in the case of 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, but in slightly different ways: Daily Kos similarly assumes there is a 50/50 chance Orman will caucus with each party, but FiveThirtyEight assumes a 75 percent chance he will caucus with the Democrats, and The Upshot assigns him to the Democrats 100 percent of the time. Sure, as noted elsewhere <u><strong>there are respected poll analysts who still believe the odds favor a GOP takeover of the U.S. Senate</u></strong>. <u><strong>But with both Mark Blumenthal and Sam Wang arguing otherwise, <mark>Dems have cause for optimism</mark> </u></strong>-- especially if they mobilize an energetic GOTV effort where it counts.</p>
1NR
MT
1NR Uniqueness Wall
429,854
4
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,428
Refusing to calculate masks the most totalitarian calculations. Refusal to be responsible for all the potential outcomes of our actions is the worst for violence and totally unethical
Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999
Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1999 (David, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility,” Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. 45-7)
Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others incalculable justice requires us to calculate It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be re-appropriated by the most perverse calculation The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism this responsibility commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention
justice requires us to calculate left to itself, the incalculable and giving ) idea of justice can always be re-appropriated by the most perverse calculation The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, that compels the decision to avoid "the bad calculation This is the necessary condition," for resistance to totalitarianism we recognize all too well the crimes of xenophobia, racism, this responsibility commissions a " strategy that is which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible
That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."91 Indeed, "incalculable justice requires us to calculate." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be re-appropriated by the most perverse calculation."92 The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism."93Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, containing, combating, or negating the worst violence — though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, "must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention."'1'' This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have expected: "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities."96>
3,102
<h4><strong>Refusing to calculate masks the most totalitarian calculations. Refusal to be responsible for all the potential outcomes of our actions is the worst for violence and totally unethical</h4><p><mark>Campbell</mark>, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 19<mark>99</mark> </p><p></strong>(David, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility,” Moral Spaces, Eds. Michael J. Shapiro & David Campbell, p. 45-7)</p><p>That undecidability resides within the decision, <u><strong>Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others</u></strong>."91 Indeed, "<u><strong>incalculable <mark>justice requires us to calculate</u></strong></mark>." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? <u><strong>It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "<mark>left to itself, the incalculable and giving</u></strong></mark> (donatrice<mark>) <u><strong>idea of justice </mark>is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it <mark>can always be re-appropriated by the most perverse calculation</u></strong></mark>."92 <u><strong><mark>The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, </mark>a duty <mark>that </mark>inhabits the instant of madness and <mark>compels the decision to avoid "the bad</mark>," the "perverse <mark>calculation</mark>," even "the worst." <mark>This</mark> <mark>is</mark> the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, <mark>the</mark> "at least <mark>necessary condition," for </mark>the organization of <mark>resistance to totalitarianism </mark>in all its forms</u></strong>. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "<u><strong><mark>we recognize all too well </mark>without yet having thought them through,<mark> the crimes of xenophobia, racism, </mark>anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism</u></strong>."93Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, containing, combating, or negating the worst violence — though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, <u><strong><mark>this responsibility</u></strong></mark>, which is the responsibility of responsibility, <u><strong><mark>commissions a "</mark>utopian" strategy. Not a <mark>strategy that is </mark>beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one <mark>which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible</u></strong></mark>, "must take it as far as possible, <u><strong>beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private</u></strong>, and so on."94 <u><strong>As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention</u></strong>."'1'' This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have expected: "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities."96></p>
1NR
CP
2NC Process Over Product
1,373,885
11
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,429
The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s security logic
Neocleous 08
Neocleous 08
Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] Security politics is, , an anti-politics,"' reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, learning to tolerate the uncertainties, that come with being human; 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'
Security politics is anti-politics," We need to get beyond security politics not add more 'sectors' to it The task is not to fill the hole with another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which allow us to forge another kind of politics it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition
Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sewnse, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'
3,600
<h4>The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s security logic </h4><p><strong><mark>Neocleous 08</strong></mark> </p><p><u>Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6]</p><p></u>could be told - what might count as having achieved it. <u><mark>Security politics is</mark>,</u> in this sewnse<u>, an <mark>anti-politics,"</mark>'</u> dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, <u>reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <mark>We</mark> therefore <mark>need to get beyond security politics</mark>, <mark>not add</mark> yet <mark>more 'sectors' to it</u></mark> in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if <u>you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever</u>. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. <u><mark>The</mark> real <mark>task is</mark> <mark>not to fill the</mark> supposed <mark>hole with</mark> yet <mark>another vision of security, but</mark> <mark>to fight for an alternative political language which</mark> </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u>does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language</u> more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that <u>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would </u>allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also<u> <mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics </mark>centred on a different conception of the good. </u>We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; <mark>it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition</mark>, </u>and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead <u>learning to tolerate the uncertainties, </u>ambiguities and 'insecurities'<u> that come with being human;</u> it requires accepting that <u>'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p></u>
1NC
OFF CASE
1NC Security K
421,953
6
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,430
Poll based models are better than fundamentals
Wang 5/27
Wang 5/27 <Sam, data scientist, a co-founder of the Princeton Election Consortium and an associate professor of neuroscience and molecular biology at Princeton University, better predictor of midterms than Silver, “The War of the Senate Models,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/the-war-of-the-senate-models-107132.html#ixzz3CyZaIN3f>#SPS
because of this reliance on national public opinion, as a general rule, with a Democratic president in power, the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor the Republicans. When it comes to extremely close races Type 1 models are of limited use Modelers put in lots of factors that have been shown to affect election outcomes such as the economy and incumbency. But each factor you add also contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties that, once added, cannot be taken out. these are simplifications. From a reader’s standpoint, probabilities in Type 1 models should never be read with more certainty than, say, the National Weather Service’s numbers. Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data, fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes. All the fundamentals are naturally baked into the polling data. Even 160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and are enough by themselves to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play. One question faced by all the models is when to start phasing in polling data and phasing out fundamentals. In 2012, I used a polls-only Type 2 approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while the election-eve FiveThirtyEight calculations, which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong.
because of reliance on public opinion with a Democratic president the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor Republicans each factor you add contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes Even 160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and enough to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play In 2012, I used a polls-only approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while FiveThirtyEight which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong
Type 1: Fundamentals only. Type 1 models, which rely on no polling data at all, have the advantage that they can be created before the campaign even starts. The Monkey Cage model is currently pure Type 1, relying on a large number of fundamentals, from candidate “quality” to economic growth. This year, the most important fundamental is that, in midterm elections, national public opinion tends to go against the president’s party. That gives us some idea of the range of possible outcomes: Basically, Democrats are going to lose seats. Interestingly, because of this reliance on national public opinion, as a general rule, with a Democratic president in power, the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor the Republicans. Note that the probability of a GOP takeover is higher in the Monkey Cage model than it is in the others. When it comes to extremely close races, though, Type 1 models are of limited use. Modelers put in lots of factors that have been shown to affect election outcomes (“signals,” in engineering parlance), such as the economy and incumbency. But each factor you add also contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties that, once added, cannot be taken out. For example, during a midterm election year, the generic congressional poll (Would you rather vote for a Democrat or a Republican?) tends to move against the president’s party—but the range of actual outcomes on Election Day ranges from an 11 percentage-point loss to a 4 percentage-point gain in the national popular vote margin. Fundamentals can be national factors, such as the generic congressional ballot, which captures a general national mood. Or they can be local, such as whether an incumbent is in the race, a factor that attempts to capture how well known a candidate is. But these are simplifications. From a reader’s standpoint, probabilities in Type 1 models should never be read with more certainty than, say, the National Weather Service’s numbers. Rain forecast probabilities are good enough to help us plan our weekend outings—and even they are uncertain enough always to be rounded to the nearest 10 percent. Rather, Type 1 models are hypotheses about where a campaign is naturally headed. You can think of them as asking, “Do our assumptions about how politics works give the correct prediction?” They tend to be of most use after the results are in.In 2012, Type 1 presidential models ranged from predicting a Romney win to an Obama landslide—and everything in between. If past history is any guide, FiveThirtyEight comes up with a more exact model, it will have a strong Type 1 component but will also include some polling data. That probably explains why FiveThirtyEight’s state-by-state win probabilities seem to give Democrats a better shot than the Monkey Cage does. Type 2: Polls only. Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data, fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes. All the fundamentals are naturally baked into the polling data. Even today, about 160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and are enough by themselves to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play. The Upshot is closer to a Type 2 model. It focuses on polling data, using fundamentals about candidate quality and national trends to set expectations for how voter sentiment might change between now and the election. (This is an excellent approach to combining polls with fundamentals, one that was pioneered by Drew Linzer’s Votamatic.) The Upshot’s method is likely to be more accurate than the others, though the Monkey Cage does plan to update its model to reflect new polling data. One question faced by all the models is when to start phasing in polling data and phasing out fundamentals. To estimate the possible range of outcomes, it is even possible to skip using fundamentals at all, simply by using the ups and downs of polls to estimate the range of likely movement between now and Election Day. In 2012, I used a polls-only Type 2 approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while the election-eve FiveThirtyEight calculations, which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong. What does a pure Type 2 approach for 2014 look like? Using my time-tested methods, I took a shot at it.
4,274
<h4>Poll based models are better than fundamentals</h4><p><strong>Wang 5/27</strong> <Sam, data scientist, a co-founder of the Princeton Election Consortium and an associate professor of neuroscience and molecular biology at Princeton University, better predictor of midterms than Silver, “The War of the Senate Models,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/the-war-of-the-senate-models-107132.html#ixzz3CyZaIN3f>#SPS</p><p>Type 1: Fundamentals only. Type 1 models, which rely on no polling data at all, have the advantage that they can be created before the campaign even starts. The Monkey Cage model is currently pure Type 1, relying on a large number of fundamentals, from candidate “quality” to economic growth. This year, the most important fundamental is that, in midterm elections, national public opinion tends to go against the president’s party. That gives us some idea of the range of possible outcomes: Basically, Democrats are going to lose seats. Interestingly, <u><strong><mark>because of</mark> this <mark>reliance on</mark> national <mark>public opinion</mark>, as a general rule, <mark>with a Democratic president</mark> in power, <mark>the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor</mark> the <mark>Republicans</mark>.</u></strong> Note that the probability of a GOP takeover is higher in the Monkey Cage model than it is in the others. <u><strong>When it comes to extremely close races</u></strong>, though, <u><strong>Type 1 models are of limited use</u></strong>. <u><strong>Modelers put in lots of factors that have been shown to affect election outcomes</u></strong> (“signals,” in engineering parlance), <u><strong>such as the economy and incumbency. But <mark>each factor you add </mark>also <mark>contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties</mark> that, once added, cannot be taken out.</u></strong> For example, during a midterm election year, the generic congressional poll (Would you rather vote for a Democrat or a Republican?) tends to move against the president’s party—but the range of actual outcomes on Election Day ranges from an 11 percentage-point loss to a 4 percentage-point gain in the national popular vote margin. Fundamentals can be national factors, such as the generic congressional ballot, which captures a general national mood. Or they can be local, such as whether an incumbent is in the race, a factor that attempts to capture how well known a candidate is. But <u><strong>these are simplifications.</u></strong> <u><strong>From a reader’s standpoint, probabilities in Type 1 models should never be read with more certainty than, say, the National Weather Service’s numbers. </u></strong>Rain forecast probabilities are good enough to help us plan our weekend outings—and even they are uncertain enough always to be rounded to the nearest 10 percent. Rather, Type 1 models are hypotheses about where a campaign is naturally headed. You can think of them as asking, “Do our assumptions about how politics works give the correct prediction?” They tend to be of most use after the results are in.In 2012, Type 1 presidential models ranged from predicting a Romney win to an Obama landslide—and everything in between. If past history is any guide, FiveThirtyEight comes up with a more exact model, it will have a strong Type 1 component but will also include some polling data. That probably explains why FiveThirtyEight’s state-by-state win probabilities seem to give Democrats a better shot than the Monkey Cage does. Type 2: Polls only. <u><strong><mark>Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data</mark>, <mark>fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>All the fundamentals are naturally baked into the polling data.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> today, about <u><strong><mark>160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and</mark> are <mark>enough</mark> by themselves <mark>to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play</mark>.</u></strong> The Upshot is closer to a Type 2 model. It focuses on polling data, using fundamentals about candidate quality and national trends to set expectations for how voter sentiment might change between now and the election. (This is an excellent approach to combining polls with fundamentals, one that was pioneered by Drew Linzer’s Votamatic.) The Upshot’s method is likely to be more accurate than the others, though the Monkey Cage does plan to update its model to reflect new polling data. <u><strong>One question faced by all the models is when to start phasing in polling data and phasing out fundamentals.</u></strong> To estimate the possible range of outcomes, it is even possible to skip using fundamentals at all, simply by using the ups and downs of polls to estimate the range of likely movement between now and Election Day. <u><strong><mark>In 2012, I used a polls-only</mark> Type 2 <mark>approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while</mark> the election-eve <mark>FiveThirtyEight</mark> calculations, <mark>which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong</mark>. </u></strong>What does a pure Type 2 approach for 2014 look like? Using my time-tested methods, I took a shot at it.</p>
1NR
MT
1NR Uniqueness Wall
224,333
6
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,431
Focusing on the details of policy implementation is key to solve inevitable extinction. Awareness of the issue is insufficient – debating rules and procedures is key to engaging the political
Beres 2003 Louis Rene, Journal and Courier, June 5 ln)
Beres 2003 (professor of international law @ Purdue University, ’03; Louis Rene, Journal and Courier, June 5 ln)
within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. various governments will try to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring.To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.
expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars , we must Reject analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs some college students are exposed to an occasional course in "global awareness," but exposure sidesteps the overriding issues: our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. Rather, all students must be made aware of where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, .
For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring.To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.
4,127
<h4>Focusing on the details of policy implementation is key to solve inevitable extinction. Awareness of the issue is insufficient – debating rules and procedures is key to engaging the political</h4><p><u><strong>Beres 2003</u></strong> (professor of international law @ Purdue University, ’03; <u><strong>Louis Rene, Journal and Courier, June 5 ln)</p><p></u></strong>For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, <u><strong>within a few short years, <mark>expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars</strong></mark>.</u> Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, <u>various governments will try</u>, desperately,<u> to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort.</u> Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. <u><strong>What shall we do? For a start<mark>, we must</mark> all begin to look carefully behind the news. <mark>Reject</mark>ing superficial <mark>analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs</mark>, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet</strong>.</u> Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. <u>We must also look closely at higher education in the United States</u>, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but <u>from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary <strong>threats to human survival</u></strong>. For the moment, <u><strong><mark>some college students are exposed to an occasional course in </mark>what is fashionably described as<mark> "global awareness," but </mark>such <mark>exposure </mark>usually <mark>sidesteps the overriding issues: </mark>We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; <mark>our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration;</mark> our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring</strong>.<strong>To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, <mark>colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions</u></strong>.</mark> In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). <u><strong><mark>Rather, all students must be made aware</mark> - as a primary objective of the curriculum - <mark>of</mark> where we are heading, as a species, and <mark>where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered</mark>. </u></strong>There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform.<u><strong> Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, <mark>America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures</mark>. <mark>Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, </mark>an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps<mark>.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
CP
2NC Process Over Product
86,619
23
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,432
Advantage is non unique – doesn’t account for august 2013 memo that created fed-state co-op
Flatow 13
Nicole Flatow 8-29-13 Journalist, “BREAKING: Justice Department Won’t Challenge State Marijuana Laws, Announces Major Shift In Law Enforcement Policy”, http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/29/2551851/breaking-justice-department-wont-challenge-state-marijuana-laws-announces-major-shift-law-enforcement-policy/ Accessed 8-30-14
the Department of Justice also issued new guidance to prosecutors today calling for scaled back prosecution not just of users of marijuana, but also of distributors and growers complying with state law: prosecutors should continue to review marijuana cases and on a case-by-case basis and weigh all available information and evidence, including, but not limited to, whether the operation is demonstrably in compliance with a strong and effective regulatory system. this is a change from DOJ’s previous position. Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest said, “While the prosecution of drug traffickers remains an important priority, the president and the administration believe that targeting individual marijuana users, especially those with serious illnesses and their caregivers, is not the best allocation of federal law enforcement resources.” Now, we can add state-compliant growers and distributors to that list who are not otherwise violating the federal government’s rules.
the Department of Justice also issued new guidance to prosecutors today calling for scaled back prosecution not just of users of marijuana, but also of distributors and growers complying with state law: prosecutors should continue to review marijuana cases and on a case-by-case basis in compliance with a strong and effective regulatory system. this is a change from DOJ’s previous position Now, we can add state-compliant growers and distributors to that list who are not otherwise violating the federal government’s rules.
More than six months after Washington and Colorado passed ballot initiatives to legalize and regulate recreational marijuana, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said today he would not sue to block the implementation of the laws — at least not until he sees how the laws operate in effect. This announcement came as little surprise, after reports from earlier communication between DOJ and the governor. More significantly, the Department of Justice also issued new guidance to prosecutors today calling for scaled back prosecution not just of users of marijuana, but also of distributors and growers complying with state law: [T]he previous guidance drew a distinction between the serious ill and their caregivers, on the one hand, and large-scale, for-profit commercial enterprises, on the other, and advised that the latter continued to be appropriate targets for federal enforcement and prosecution. In drawing this distinction, the Department relied on the common-sense judgment that the size of a marijuana operation was a reasonable proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the federal enforcement priorities set forth above. As explained above, however, both the existence of a strong and effective state regulatory system and an operation’s compliance with such a system, may allay the threat that an operations’s size poses to federal enforcement interests. Accordingly, in exercising prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors should not consider the size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s enforcement priorities listed above. Rather, prosecutors should continue to review marijuana cases and on a case-by-case basis and weigh all available information and evidence, including, but not limited to, whether the operation is demonstrably in compliance with a strong and effective regulatory system. As the memo points out, this is a change from DOJ’s previous position. When asked just last week about the administration’s position on marijuana, Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest said, “While the prosecution of drug traffickers remains an important priority, the president and the administration believe that targeting individual marijuana users, especially those with serious illnesses and their caregivers, is not the best allocation of federal law enforcement resources.” Now, we can add state-compliant growers and distributors to that list who are not otherwise violating the federal government’s rules. This would ostensibly mean that prosecutors would no longer go after large medical marijuana dispensaries that have been viewed as models for state compliance, as they have on several previous occasions.
2,739
<h4>Advantage is non unique – doesn’t account for august 2013 memo that created fed-state co-op</h4><p>Nicole <strong>Flatow</strong> 8-29-<strong>13 </strong>Journalist, “BREAKING: Justice Department Won’t Challenge State Marijuana Laws, Announces Major Shift In Law Enforcement Policy”, http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/29/2551851/breaking-justice-department-wont-challenge-state-marijuana-laws-announces-major-shift-law-enforcement-policy/ Accessed 8-30-14</p><p>More than six months after Washington and Colorado passed ballot initiatives to legalize and regulate recreational marijuana, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said today he would not sue to block the implementation of the laws — at least not until he sees how the laws operate in effect. This announcement came as little surprise, after reports from earlier communication between DOJ and the governor. More significantly, <u><strong><mark>the Department of Justice also issued new guidance to prosecutors today calling for scaled back prosecution not just of users of marijuana, but also of distributors and growers complying with state law:</u></strong></mark> [T]he previous guidance drew a distinction between the serious ill and their caregivers, on the one hand, and large-scale, for-profit commercial enterprises, on the other, and advised that the latter continued to be appropriate targets for federal enforcement and prosecution. In drawing this distinction, the Department relied on the common-sense judgment that the size of a marijuana operation was a reasonable proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the federal enforcement priorities set forth above. As explained above, however, both the existence of a strong and effective state regulatory system and an operation’s compliance with such a system, may allay the threat that an operations’s size poses to federal enforcement interests. Accordingly, in exercising prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors should not consider the size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s enforcement priorities listed above. Rather, <u><strong><mark>prosecutors should continue to review marijuana cases and on a case-by-case basis</mark> and weigh all available information and evidence, including, but not limited to, whether the operation is demonstrably <mark>in compliance with a strong and effective regulatory system.</mark> </u></strong>As the memo points out, <u><strong><mark>this is a change from DOJ’s previous position</mark>. </u></strong>When asked just last week about the administration’s position on marijuana, <u><strong>Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest said, “While the prosecution of drug traffickers remains an important priority, the president and the administration believe that targeting individual marijuana users, especially those with serious illnesses and their caregivers, is not the best allocation of federal law enforcement resources.” <mark>Now, we can add state-compliant growers and distributors to that list who are not otherwise violating the federal government’s rules.</mark> </u></strong>This would ostensibly mean that prosecutors would no longer go after large medical marijuana dispensaries that have been viewed as models for state compliance, as they have on several previous occasions. </p>
1NC
CASE
AT: Federalism
429,855
5
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,433
No
Kurtz 9/12 -save-democrats-this-fall/>#SPS
Kurtz 9/12 <Howard, Fox, “Why Obama’s assault on ISIS probably won’t save the Democrats this fall,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/12/why-obamas-assault-on-isis-probably-wont-save-democrats-this-fall/>#SPS
People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.
People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.
People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.
257
<h4><strong>No</h4><p>Kurtz 9/12</strong> <Howard, Fox, “Why Obama’s assault on ISIS probably won’t save the Democrats this fall,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/12/why-obamas-assault-on-isis-probably-wont<u><strong>-save-democrats-this-fall/>#SPS</p><p><mark>People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
MT
1NR AT: Obama Foreign Policy
429,856
1
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,434
B.) Certainty --
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>B.) <u>Certainty</u> --</h4>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,857
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,435
Pot is irrelevant- tons of alt causes
Natelson 14
Natelson 14 (Rob, Independence Institute's Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1-4-14, "Lessons for Federalism from Colorado's Pot Legalization" The American Thinker) www.americanthinker.com/2014/01/lessons_for_federalism_from_colorados_pot_legalization.html
From Colorado's marijuana "legalization" some federalism advocates draw a conclusion that the only way to restore constitutional limits is for constitutionalists to form alliances with hard core "progressives" in areas of common concern There are, however, at least two problems with this approach. the few areas of common concern are mostly very small and of limited importance. "Progressives" very rarely take a genuine pro-federalism position, and when they do, the issue is usually narrow. By any objective measure, marijuana legalization is small compared to massive programs like Obamacare.
From Colorado's legalization" some draw a conclusion that the only way to restore constitutional limits is for constitutionalists to form alliances with progressives the few areas of common concern are mostly very small and of limited importance. "Progressives" very rarely take a genuine pro-federalism position, and when they do, the issue is usually narrow. marijuana legalization is small compared to massive programs like Obamacare
From Colorado's marijuana "legalization" some federalism advocates draw a conclusion that is both (1) obvious and (2) wrong. The conclusion is that the only way to restore constitutional limits is for constitutionalists to form alliances with hard core "progressives" in areas of common concern. After all, wasn't it a right-and-left-wing coalition that successfully repealed Colorado's marijuana ban? There are, however, at least two problems with this approach. First, the few areas of common concern are mostly very small and of limited importance. "Progressives" very rarely take a genuine pro-federalism position, and when they do, the issue is usually narrow. By any objective measure, marijuana legalization is small POT-atoes compared to massive programs like Obamacare.
778
<h4>Pot is irrelevant- tons of alt causes</h4><p><strong>Natelson 14<u></strong> (Rob, Independence Institute's Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1-4-14, "Lessons for Federalism from Colorado's Pot Legalization" The American Thinker) www.americanthinker.com/2014/01/lessons_for_federalism_from_colorados_pot_legalization.html</p><p><strong><mark>From Colorado's</mark> marijuana "<mark>legalization" some</mark> federalism advocates <mark>draw a conclusion</u></strong></mark> that is both (1) obvious and (2) wrong. The conclusion is <u><strong><mark>that the only way to restore constitutional limits is for constitutionalists to form alliances with</mark> hard core "<mark>progressives</mark>" in areas of common concern</u></strong>. After all, wasn't it a right-and-left-wing coalition that successfully repealed Colorado's marijuana ban? <u><strong>There are, however, at least two problems with this approach.</u></strong> First, <u><strong><mark>the few areas of common concern are mostly very small and of limited importance. "Progressives" very rarely take a genuine pro-federalism position, and when they do, the issue is usually narrow.</mark> By any objective measure,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization is small</u></strong></mark> POT-atoes <u><strong><mark>compared to massive programs like Obamacare</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NC
CASE
AT: Federalism
56,535
46
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,436
First - “Resolved” means
null
re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\
: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) to make a definite decision to do something
to make a definite decision to do something
: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) : to make a definite and serious decision to do something That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]
216
<h4>First - “Resolved” means </h4><p>re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\</p><p><u><strong>: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to make a definite</u></strong></mark> and serious <u><strong><mark>decision to do something</p><p></u></mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14 </strong>[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]</p>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,571
3
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,437
GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs
The Hill, 9/6
The Hill, 9/6
Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan blamed Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources , vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands. That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year
Sullivan blamed Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix He added that the E P A are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands That could all change if voters put Republicans in charge If Republicans win the Senate he GOP will make energy a priority Republicans will block the administration's carbon pollution proposal and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize
[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE] Republican Senate candidate Dan Sullivan (Alaska) blamed President Obama and Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources in the party's weekly address, vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. He added that the Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington, D.C., are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands." That could all change, he explains, if voters put him, and fellow Republicans in charge. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." If Republicans win the Senate in November, Sullivan says the GOP will make energy a priority. "A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally," Sullivan said. “We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine," he added. Republicans won't stop there, they will also work to block the administration's carbon pollution proposal for existing power plants, and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize by next year. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.
2,187
<h4><strong>GOP Majority would cut Obama EPA Regs</h4><p>The Hill, 9/6</p><p></strong>[Laura Barron-Lopez, “Senate hopeful: GOP-majority would squash Obama's climate agenda” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/216827-senate-hopeful-gop-majority-would-squash-obamas-climate-agenda, CBE]</p><p><u><strong>Republican Senate candidate Dan <mark>Sullivan</u></strong></mark> (Alaska) <u><strong><mark>blamed</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Senate Democrats for locking up the country's energy resources</u></strong></mark> in the party's weekly address<u><strong>, <mark>vowing that a GOP-controlled Senate would be the best fix</u></strong></mark>. Sullivan, who is challenging Sen. Mark Begich (D-Alaska) this year, worries for his three teenage daughters, who he claims won't be able to take advantage of the state's wealth of oil, natural gas, hydropower, and more, if the administration's regulatory agenda continues unchecked. "<u><strong>The Obama-Reid agenda has locked up America’s natural resources, burdened small businesses throughout the country with an avalanche of regulations and suffocated job growth through a complete disrespect for the rule of law</u></strong>," Sullivan said during the address on Saturday. <u><strong><mark>He added that the E</mark>nvironmental <mark>P</mark>rotection <mark>A</mark>gency, and Washington, D.C., <mark>are trying to "dictate how we manage our state-owned lands</mark>.</u></strong>" <u><strong><mark>That could all change</mark>, he explains, <mark>if voters put</mark> him, and fellow <mark>Republicans in charge</u></strong></mark>. "The American Dream is resilient," he said. "All we need is new leadership in Washington to make it happen once again." <u><strong><mark>If Republicans win the Senate</mark> in November, Sullivan says t<mark>he GOP will make energy a priority</mark>. </u></strong>"<u><strong>A Republican Senate would approve Keystone XL pipeline jobs, because Canada is our neighbor and ally,"</u></strong> Sullivan said. “<u><strong>We’ll authorize more offshore development, because it’s good for coastal states and the rest of the country. We’ll seize the opportunity to expand our energy trade, because that will benefit our nation, and others who need energy – like Ukraine</u></strong>," he added. <u><strong><mark>Republicans</mark> won't stop there, they <mark>will</mark> also work to <mark>block the administration's carbon pollution proposal</mark> for existing power plants, <mark>and other regulations the EPA is trying to finalize</mark> by next year</u></strong>. Sullivan accused the administration and Democrats of being "stuck in the last century" tied to a system of "burdensome federal regulations" that is "stifling" the nation.</p>
1NR
MT
1NR Internal Link Wall
429,530
6
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,438
Cooperative federalism is resilient
Greve 2K (Michael, John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Ph.D. (Government) Cornell University, 1987, “Against Cooperative Federalism” Mississippi Law Journal, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, Lexis)
Greve 2K (Michael, John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Ph.D. (Government) Cornell University, 1987, “Against Cooperative Federalism” Mississippi Law Journal, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, Lexis)
Cooperative federalism is enormously resilient and self-stabilizing. The range of conflict within the system is defined by the participant-beneficiaries' fight over the terms of cooperation. State and local governments will complain about federal imposition; national interest groups and congressional patrons will complain about state shirking and non-compliance. Furor over unfunded mandates produces more money and less onerous federal conditions; interest group complaints leads to the re-categorization of federal programs Either way, the system returns to its bargaining equilibrium cooperative arrangements are virtually immune to political reform In Germany and in the United States, cooperative federalism came under challenge during periods of serious economic malaise and manifest civic alienation The record strongly suggests that cooperative federalism is impregnable even under those disadvantageous conditions.
Cooperative federalism is enormously resilient and self-stabilizing Furor over unfunded mandates produces more money and less onerous federal conditions; interest group complaints leads to the re-categorization of federal programs system returns to its bargaining equilibrium cooperative arrangements are virtually immune to political reform cooperative federalism came under challenge during periods of serious economic malaise and manifest civic alienation The record strongly suggests that cooperative federalism is impregnable even under those disadvantageous conditions.
Cooperative federalism is enormously resilient and, moreover, self-stabilizing. The range of conflict within the system is defined by the participant-beneficiaries' fight over the terms of cooperation. State and local governments will complain about unfunded mandates and federal imposition; national interest groups and their congressional patrons will complain about state shirking and non-compliance. Furor over unfunded mandates produces more money and less onerous federal conditions; interest group complaints over the states' failure to use federal block grants for their intended purposes leads to the re-categorization of federal programs. n150 Either way, the system returns to its bargaining equilibrium, typically at a higher level of aggregate spending. Under ordinary political conditions, cooperative arrangements are virtually immune to political reform. In Germany and in the United States, cooperative federalism came under challenge during periods of serious economic malaise and manifest civic alienation, coupled with exogenous shocks (re-unification and European integration in Germany's case, and the ascent of a determined, ideological administration in the United States). The record strongly suggests that cooperative federalism is impregnable even under those disadvantageous conditions.
1,314
<h4>Cooperative federalism is resilient</h4><p><strong>Greve 2K<u> (Michael, John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Ph.D. (Government) Cornell University, 1987, “Against Cooperative Federalism” Mississippi Law Journal, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, Lexis)</p><p><mark>Cooperative federalism is enormously resilient and</u></strong></mark>, moreover, <u><strong><mark>self-stabilizing</mark>. The range of conflict within the system is defined by the participant-beneficiaries' fight over the terms of cooperation. State and local governments will complain</u></strong> <u><strong>about </u></strong>unfunded mandates and <u><strong>federal imposition; national interest groups and</u></strong> their <u><strong>congressional patrons will complain about state shirking and non-compliance. <mark>Furor over unfunded mandates produces more money and less onerous federal conditions; interest group complaints</u></strong></mark> over the states' failure to use federal block grants for their intended purposes <u><strong><mark>leads to the re-categorization of federal programs</u></strong></mark>. n150 <u><strong>Either way, the <mark>system returns to its bargaining equilibrium</u></strong></mark>, typically at a higher level of aggregate spending. Under ordinary political conditions, <u><strong><mark>cooperative arrangements are virtually immune to political reform</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>In Germany and in the United States, <mark>cooperative federalism came under challenge during periods of serious economic malaise and manifest civic alienation</u></strong></mark>, coupled with exogenous shocks (re-unification and European integration in Germany's case, and the ascent of a determined, ideological administration in the United States). <u><strong><mark>The record strongly suggests that cooperative federalism is impregnable even under those disadvantageous conditions.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NC
CASE
AT: Federalism
56,547
27
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,439
Warming is real and anthropogenic–best climate data and models
Mueller 12
Mueller 12 (The New York Times, Richard A. Mueller, July 28, 2012, “The Conversion of a Climate Change Skeptic” Richard A. Muller, a professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, is the author, most recently, of “Energy for Future Presidents: The Science Behind the Headlines.” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all)
CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research I concluded that global warming was real I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the I.P.C.C Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment ////////(our work is completely automated and hands-off none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant We tried fitting the shape to solar activity By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice our record is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent the temperature rise of the past 250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes the brightness of the sun very little The carbon dioxide curve gives a better match than anything else we’ve tried. Its magnitude is consistent with the calculated greenhouse effect — extra warming from trapped heat radiation. These facts raise the bar: to be considered seriously, an alternative explanation must match the data at least as well as carbon dioxide does. Adding methane, a second greenhouse gas, to our analysis doesn’t change the results Our result is based simply on the close agreement between the shape of the observed temperature rise and the known greenhouse gas increase
following intensive research I concluded global warming was real Humans almost entirely the cause. average temperature has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years all of this results from human emission of greenhouse gases These findings are stronger than the I.P.C.C Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods to determine earth land temperature further back in time. We studied urban heating data selection poor station quality human intervention and data adjustment none of these biased our conclusions. The temperature pattern has abrupt dips that match emissions of volcanic eruptions El Niño is not statistically significant the best match was carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes the sun very little an alternative explanation must match the data as well as carbon dioxide Adding methane doesn’t change the results
CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment ////////(our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice. Just as important, our record is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent. Although the I.P.C.C. allowed for the possibility that variations in sunlight could have ended the “Little Ice Age,” a period of cooling from the 14th century to about 1850, our data argues strongly that the temperature rise of the past 250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes. This conclusion is, in retrospect, not too surprising; we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes the brightness of the sun very little. How definite is the attribution to humans? The carbon dioxide curve gives a better match than anything else we’ve tried. Its magnitude is consistent with the calculated greenhouse effect — extra warming from trapped heat radiation. These facts don’t prove causality and they shouldn’t end skepticism, but they raise the bar: to be considered seriously, an alternative explanation must match the data at least as well as carbon dioxide does. Adding methane, a second greenhouse gas, to our analysis doesn’t change the results. Moreover, our analysis does not depend on large, complex global climate models, the huge computer programs that are notorious for their hidden assumptions and adjustable parameters. Our result is based simply on the close agreement between the shape of the observed temperature rise and the known greenhouse gas increase.
4,578
<h4>Warming is real and anthropogenic–<strong>best climate data and models</h4><p>Mueller 12 </p><p></strong>(The New York Times, Richard A. Mueller, July 28, 2012, “The Conversion of a Climate Change Skeptic” Richard A. Muller, a professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, is the author, most recently, of “Energy for Future Presidents: The Science Behind the Headlines.” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all)</p><p><u><strong>CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, <mark>following</mark> an <mark>intensive research</u></strong></mark> effort involving a dozen scientists, <u><strong><mark>I concluded</mark> that <mark>global warming was real</u></strong></mark> and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. <u><strong>I’m now going a step further: <mark>Humans </mark>are <mark>almost entirely the cause. </mark>My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project</u></strong>, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that <u><strong>the <mark>average temperature</mark> of the earth’s land <mark>has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years</mark>, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years</u></strong>. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially <u><strong><mark>all of this</mark> increase <mark>results from</mark> the <mark>human emission of greenhouse gases</mark>. <mark>These findings are stronger than</mark> those of <mark>the</u></strong></mark> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the <u><strong><mark>I.P.C.C</u></strong></mark>. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. <u><strong><mark>Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods</mark> developed largely by our lead scientist</u></strong>, Robert Rohde, <u><strong>which allowed us <mark>to determine earth land temperature</mark> much <mark>further back in time. We</mark> carefully <mark>studied</mark> issues raised by skeptics: biases from <mark>urban heating</mark> (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from <mark>data selection</mark> (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from <mark>poor station quality</mark> (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from<mark> human intervention and data adjustment</mark> ////////(our work is completely automated and hands-off</u></strong>). In our papers we demonstrate that <u><strong><mark>none of these</mark> potentially troublesome effects unduly <mark>biased our conclusions. The</mark> historic <mark>temperature pattern</mark> we observed <mark>has abrupt dips that match</mark> the <mark>emissions of</mark> known explosive <mark>volcanic eruptions</u></strong></mark>; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. <u><strong>There are small, rapid variations attributable to <mark>El Niño</mark> and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim <mark>is not</mark>, in our view, <mark>statistically significant</u></strong></mark>. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? <u><strong>We tried fitting the shape</u></strong> to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), <u><strong>to solar activity</u></strong> and even to rising functions like world population. <u><strong>By far <mark>the best match was</mark> to the record of atmospheric <mark>carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice</u></strong></mark>. Just as important, <u><strong>our record is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent</u></strong>. Although the I.P.C.C. allowed for the possibility that variations in sunlight could have ended the “Little Ice Age,” a period of cooling from the 14th century to about 1850, our data argues strongly that <u><strong>the temperature rise of the past 250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes</u></strong>. This conclusion is, in retrospect, not too surprising; <u><strong><mark>we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes</mark> the brightness of <mark>the sun very little</u></strong></mark>. How definite is the attribution to humans? <u><strong>The carbon dioxide curve gives a better match than anything else we’ve tried. Its magnitude is consistent with the calculated greenhouse effect — extra warming from trapped heat radiation. These facts</u></strong> don’t prove causality and they shouldn’t end skepticism, but they <u><strong>raise the bar: to be considered seriously, <mark>an alternative explanation must match the data </mark>at least<mark> as well as carbon dioxide</mark> does. <mark>Adding methane</mark>, a second greenhouse gas, to our analysis<mark> doesn’t change the results</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, our analysis does not depend on large, complex global climate models, the huge computer programs that are notorious for their hidden assumptions and adjustable parameters. <u><strong>Our result is based simply on the close agreement between the shape of the observed temperature rise and the known greenhouse gas increase</u></strong>.</p>
1NR
MT
1NR AT: Warming Not Real
120,367
64
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,440
Second - “Should” means
null
Should
to express obligation or expediency
to express obligation or expediency
1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal> That’s also Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]
437
<h4>Second - “Should” means </h4><p>Should<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function <u><strong><mark>to express obligation</u></strong></mark>, propriety, <u><strong><mark>or expediency</u></strong></mark> <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal></p><p><strong>That’s also Merriam Webster 14</strong> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]</p>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,575
3
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,441
Emerging economies make competitiveness decline inevitable and alt causes overwhelm their internal link
CNN ‘10
CNN ‘10
[http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/01/david-rubenstein-u-s-is-losing-its-competitive-edge/?section=magazines_fortune] Ever since China's economy surpassed Japan's this past summer, speculation has escalated over when the country might take over the United States as the world's largest. the U.S. faces losing its competitive edge amid the rise of emerging economics – in particular, China. China and other emerging economies have become eager players several pressing factors are threatening America's competitive edge. Rubenstein lists huge deficits and government debt, high unemployment, and widening income disparities.¶ the U.S. slipped a notch down the ranks of competitive economies what has hurt America's competitiveness, in particular, is the country's huge deficits and rising government debt. While China ranked far below the U.S. at No. 27, the Asian powerhouse outperformed all major developing economies. "We have to recognize as Americans that we're not going to be as dominant a force in the global economy as we have been it's inevitable that China and India surpass the U.S. economy – simply because they're just bigger, not necessarily richer.
the U.S. faces losing its competitive edge amid the rise of emerging economics – several pressing factors are threatening America's competitive edge huge deficits and government debt, high unemployment, and widening income disparities. it's inevitable that China and India surpass the U.S. economy – simply because they're bigger
[http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/01/david-rubenstein-u-s-is-losing-its-competitive-edge/?section=magazines_fortune] Ever since China's economy surpassed Japan's this past summer, speculation has escalated over when the country might take over the United States as the world's largest. The estimate has ranged from 2030 to 2035, the latter date being the one Carlyle Group co-founder David Rubenstein highlighted at a forum Wednesday in Washington DC of some of the day's biggest newsmakers.¶ Rubenstein says the U.S. faces the harsh possibility of losing some of its competitive edge amid the rapid rise of emerging economics – in particular, China. The U.S. overwhelmingly dominates the private equity and venture capital industries worldwide, the prominent investor notes. China and other emerging economies have become eager players and companies such as private equity firm Carlyle have increasingly been spending more time in these regions. To date, Carlyle has invested $3 billion in China, he says.¶ But several pressing factors are threatening America's competitive edge. Rubenstein lists huge deficits and government debt, high unemployment, and widening income disparities.¶ His remarks echo what other business executives have said recently. In a report released by the World Economic Forum in August, the U.S. slipped a notch down the ranks of competitive economies – falling behind Sweden and Singapore, which rose to the No. 1 and No. 2 spots, respectively.¶ The report, which combines economic data and a survey of more than 13,500 business executives, commended the U.S. for its innovation, excellent universities and flexible labor market. But what has hurt America's competitiveness, in particular, is the country's huge deficits and rising government debt. While China ranked far below the U.S. at No. 27, the Asian powerhouse outperformed all major developing economies.¶ "We have to recognize as Americans that we're not going to be as dominant a force in the global economy as we have been," Rubenstein says, adding that unless the U.S. lowers its debts and deficits, improves joblessness and narrow widening income gaps, future generations will have a lower quality and less affluent lifestyle.¶ Facing the inevitable decline¶ Rubenstein couldn't have been more straight-to-the point about the depths of America's economic turmoil. But perhaps more important, he points out that it's virtually inevitable that China and even India might eventually surpass the U.S. economy – simply because they're just bigger, not necessarily richer.
2,564
<h4><strong>Emerging economies make competitiveness decline inevitable and alt causes overwhelm their internal link </h4><p>CNN ‘10</p><p><u>[http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/01/david-rubenstein-u-s-is-losing-its-competitive-edge/?section=magazines_fortune]</p><p>Ever since China's economy surpassed Japan's this past summer, speculation has escalated over when the country might take over the United States as the world's largest. </u></strong>The estimate has ranged from 2030 to 2035, the latter date being the one Carlyle Group co-founder David Rubenstein highlighted at a forum Wednesday in Washington DC of some of the day's biggest newsmakers.¶ Rubenstein says <u><strong><mark>the U.S. faces </u></strong></mark>the harsh possibility of<u><strong><mark> losing </u></strong></mark>some of<u><strong><mark> its competitive edge amid the </u></strong></mark>rapid<u><strong><mark> rise of emerging economics – </mark>in particular, China. </u></strong>The U.S. overwhelmingly dominates the private equity and venture capital industries worldwide, the prominent investor notes.<u><strong> China and other emerging economies have become eager players </u></strong>and companies such as private equity firm Carlyle have increasingly been spending more time in these regions. To date, Carlyle has invested $3 billion in China, he says.¶ But <u><strong><mark>several pressing factors are threatening America's competitive edge</mark>. Rubenstein lists <mark>huge deficits and government debt, high unemployment, and widening income disparities.</mark>¶ </u></strong>His remarks echo what other business executives have said recently. In a report released by the World Economic Forum in August, <u><strong>the U.S. slipped a notch down the ranks of competitive economies </u></strong>– falling behind Sweden and Singapore, which rose to the No. 1 and No. 2 spots, respectively.¶ The report, which combines economic data and a survey of more than 13,500 business executives, commended the U.S. for its innovation, excellent universities and flexible labor market. But <u><strong>what has hurt America's competitiveness, in particular, is the country's huge deficits and rising government debt. While China ranked far below the U.S. at No. 27, the Asian powerhouse outperformed all major developing economies.</u></strong>¶ <u><strong>"We have to recognize as Americans that we're not going to be as dominant a force in the global economy as we have been</u></strong>," Rubenstein says, adding that unless the U.S. lowers its debts and deficits, improves joblessness and narrow widening income gaps, future generations will have a lower quality and less affluent lifestyle.¶ Facing the inevitable decline¶ Rubenstein couldn't have been more straight-to-the point about the depths of America's economic turmoil. But perhaps more important, he points out that <u><strong><mark>it's </u></strong></mark>virtually<u><strong> <mark>inevitable that China and </u></strong></mark>even<u><strong> <mark>India </u></strong></mark>might eventually<u><strong> <mark>surpass the U.S. economy – simply because they're </mark>just <mark>bigger</mark>, not necessarily richer.</p></u></strong>
1NC
CASE
AT: Federalism
199,640
7
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,442
Err neg — their evidence is a joke
Plait 12/11/12
Plait 12/11/12
, AM was thinking of writing a lengthy post about climate denial being completely unscientific nonsense but then Powell wrote a post that is basically a slam-dunk of debunking He looked up how many peer-reviewed scientific papers were published in professional journals about global warming, and compared the ones supporting the idea that we’re heating up compared to those that don’t. What did he find? Powell looked at 13,950 articles. Out of all those reams of scientific results, how many disputed the reality of climate change? Twenty-four. know some people will just say that this is due to mainstream scientists suppressing controversy and all that, but let me be succinct That’s bull Science thrives on dissenting ideas If there is actual evidence to support an idea, it gets published There is no scientific controversy over this Climate change denial is purely, 100 percent made-up political and corporate-sponsored crap When the loudest voices are fossil-fuel funded think tanks, when they don’t publish in journals but instead write op-eds in partisan venues when they have to manipulate the data then what they’re doing isn’t science. It’s nonsense , it’s dangerous nonsense Because they’re fiddling with the data while the world burns.
Powell looked up how many peer-reviewed papers published in professional journals about warming and compared the ones supporting the idea that we’re heating up compared to those that don’t Powell looked at 13,950 articles. how many disputed climate change? Twenty-four Science thrives on dissenting ideas If there is actual evidence it gets published denial is made-up political and corporate-sponsored crap When the loudest voices are fossil-fuel funded think tanks, when they don’t publish in journals when they have to manipulate the data then it’s dangerous nonsense
Phil, Creator of Bad Astronomy, is an astronomer, lecturer, and author. After 10years working on Hubble Space Telescope data and six more working on astronomy education, he struck out on his own as a writer, “Why Climate Change Denial Is Just Hot Air,” http://www.slate.com/blogs/bad_astronomy/2012/12/11/climate_change_denial_why_don_t_they_publish_scientific_papers.html, AM I was thinking of writing a lengthy post about climate change denial being completely unscientific nonsense, but then geochemist and National Science Board member James Lawrence Powell wrote a post that is basically a slam-dunk of debunking. His premise was simple: If global warming isn’t real and there’s an actual scientific debate about it, that should be reflected in the scientific journals. He looked up how many peer-reviewed scientific papers were published in professional journals about global warming, and compared the ones supporting the idea that we’re heating up compared to those that don’t. What did he find? This: Oh my. Powell looked at 13,950 articles. Out of all those reams of scientific results, how many disputed the reality of climate change? Twenty-four. Yup. Two dozen. Out of nearly 14,000. Now I know some people will just say that this is due to mainstream scientists suppressing controversy and all that, but let me be succinct: That’s bull. Science thrives on dissenting ideas, it grows and learns from them. If there is actual evidence to support an idea, it gets published. I can point out copious examples in my own field of astronomy where papers get published about all manners of against-the-mainstream thinking, some of which come to conclusions that, in my opinion, are clearly wrong. So let this be clear: There is no scientific controversy over this. Climate change denial is purely, 100 percent made-up political and corporate-sponsored crap. When the loudest voices are fossil-fuel funded think tanks, when they don’t publish in journals but instead write error-laden op-eds in partisan venues, when they have to manipulate the data to support their point, then what they’re doing isn’t science. It’s nonsense. And worse, it’s dangerous nonsense. Because they’re fiddling with the data while the world burns.
2,229
<h4><strong>Err neg — their evidence is a joke</h4><p>Plait 12/11/12</p><p></strong>Phil, Creator of Bad Astronomy, is an astronomer, lecturer, and author. After 10years working on Hubble Space Telescope data and six more working on astronomy education, he struck out on his own as a writer, “Why Climate Change Denial Is Just Hot Air,” http://www.slate.com/blogs/bad_astronomy/2012/12/11/climate_change_denial_why_don_t_they_publish_scientific_papers.html<u>, AM</p><p></u>I <u><strong>was thinking of writing a lengthy post about climate </u></strong>change <u><strong>denial</u></strong> <u><strong>being completely unscientific nonsense</u></strong>, <u><strong>but</u></strong> <u><strong>then</u></strong> geochemist and National Science Board member James Lawrence <u><strong><mark>Powell</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>wrote a post that is basically a slam-dunk of debunking</u></strong>. His premise was simple: If global warming isn’t real and there’s an actual scientific debate about it, that should be reflected in the scientific journals. <u><strong>He <mark>looked up</mark> <mark>how many peer-reviewed</mark> scientific <mark>papers</mark> were <mark>published in professional journals</mark> <mark>about</mark> global <mark>warming</mark>, <mark>and compared the ones</mark> <mark>supporting the idea that we’re heating up compared to those that don’t</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>What did he find?</u></strong> This: Oh my. <u><strong><mark>Powell looked at 13,950 articles.</mark> Out of all those reams of scientific results, <mark>how many disputed</mark> the reality of <mark>climate change? Twenty-four</mark>.</u></strong> Yup. Two dozen. Out of nearly 14,000. Now I <u><strong>know some people will just say that this is due to mainstream scientists suppressing controversy and all that, but let me be succinct</u></strong>: <u><strong>That’s bull</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Science thrives on dissenting ideas</u></strong></mark>, it grows and learns from them. <u><strong><mark>If there is</mark> <mark>actual evidence</mark> to support an idea, <mark>it gets published</u></strong></mark>. I can point out copious examples in my own field of astronomy where papers get published about all manners of against-the-mainstream thinking, some of which come to conclusions that, in my opinion, are clearly wrong. So let this be clear: <u><strong>There is no scientific controversy over this</u></strong>. <u><strong>Climate change <mark>denial is</mark> purely, 100 percent <mark>made-up political and corporate-sponsored crap</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>When</mark> <mark>the loudest voices are</u></strong> <u><strong>fossil-fuel funded think tanks,</u></strong> <u><strong>when they don’t publish in journals</mark> but instead write</u></strong> error-laden <u><strong>op-eds in partisan venues</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>when they have to manipulate the data</u></strong></mark> to support their point, <u><strong><mark>then</mark> what they’re doing isn’t science.</u></strong> <u>It’s nonsense</u>. And worse<u>, <mark>it’s dangerous nonsense</u></mark>. <u><strong>Because they’re fiddling with the data while the </strong>world burns.</p></u>
1NR
MT
1NR AT: Warming Not Real
271,758
4
16,976
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
564,680
N
UMKC
6
UCO SW
Brian Box
1AC Prostitution Feminist Standpoint 1NC T-FW Decrim CP Brothels PIC Midterms DA Cap K 2NC Case Cap 1NR Case Midterms 2NR Cap
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round6.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,443
Third - “Substantial” means: The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed, not hidden, exposed to view, free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including; admitting or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.
The word substantial mean in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, genuine; certain absolute real at present time
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<h4>Third - “Substantial” means:</h4><p><u><strong>The word</u></strong>s “outward, open, actual, visible, <u><strong>substantial</u></strong>, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. <u>They <strong>mean</u></strong> not concealed, not hidden, exposed to view, free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; <u><strong><mark>in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential,</u></strong></mark> apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; <u><strong><mark>genuine; certain</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>absolute</strong></mark>; <strong><mark>real at present time</u></strong></mark>, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including; admitting or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. </p>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,858
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,444
Hegemony isn’t key to peace
Fettweis, 11
Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO
there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between U.S. activism and international stability the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true During the 90s the U S cut back on its defense spending . By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990 if trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict is plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U S military none took any action that would suggest such a belief No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending . If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should pose a problem the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending the rest of the world can operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
there is no evidence to support a relationship between U.S. activism and stability During the 90s the U S cut defense The verdict is plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered No militaries enhanced no security dilemmas or arms races no regional balancing occurred incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the U S cut its military the only evidence regarding systemic reaction to a restrained U S suggests peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. global policeman.
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
4,559
<h4>Hegemony isn’t key to peace</h4><p><strong>Fettweis, 11</strong> Christopher J. Fettweis<u>, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO</p><p></u>It is perhaps worth noting that <u><strong><mark>there is no evidence to support a</mark> direct <mark>relationship between</u></strong></mark> the relative level of <u><strong><mark>U.S. activism and </mark>international <mark>stability</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u><strong>the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>During the</u></strong></mark> 19<u><strong><mark>90s</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>cut</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>back on its <mark>defense</mark> spending</u></strong> fairly substantially<u><strong>. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990</u></strong>.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, <u><strong>if</u></strong> the pacific <u><strong>trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but</u></strong> <u><strong>a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. <mark>The verdict</u></strong></mark> from the past two decades <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> fairly <u><strong><mark>plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered</mark> by a less-capable U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>military</u></strong>, or at least <u><strong>none took any action that would suggest</u></strong> <u><strong>such a belief</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>No militaries</mark> were <mark>enhanced</mark> to address power vacuums, <mark>no security dilemmas</mark> drove insecurity <mark>or arms races</mark>, and <mark>no regional balancing occurred</mark> once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished</u></strong>. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. <u><strong>The <mark>incidence and magnitude</mark> <mark>of global conflict declined while the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates <mark>cut its military</mark> spending</u></strong> under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled<u><strong>. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should</u></strong> at least <u><strong>pose a problem</u></strong>. As it stands, <u><strong><mark>the only evidence</mark> we have <mark>regarding</mark> the likely <mark>systemic reaction to a</mark> more <mark>restrained U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>suggests</mark> that the current <mark>peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S.</mark> military spending</u></strong>. Evidently <u><strong>the rest of the world can operate</u></strong> quite <u><strong>effectively without the presence of a <mark>global policeman.</strong></mark> Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.</p></u>
1NC
CASE
AT: Federalism
42,650
583
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,445
That’s Words and Phrases ‘64 [40 W&P 759]
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4><mark>That’s Words and Phrases ‘64</mark> [40 W&P 759] </h4>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,859
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,446
The perm severs all of these mandates - the counterplan doesn’t certainly result in the plan - it puts it to a vote. The CHANCE that the plan isn’t done means the perm severs the firm, certain and genuine implementation of the plan that they have to defend.
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<h4>The perm severs all of these mandates - the counterplan doesn’t certainly result in the plan - it puts it to a vote. The CHANCE that the plan isn’t done means the perm severs the firm, certain and genuine implementation of the plan that they have to defend.</h4>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,860
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,447
Heg is unsustainable Layne 10(Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n5422359 China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy around 2020. China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia United States of 2010 lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the economy have been accumulating these structural ills would erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits ), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. ." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. hegemony will be literally unaffordable the other big financial players no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts without deep reductions in defense expenditures the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Heg is unsustainable <strong>Layne 10</strong>(Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n5422359<u><strong> </h4><p><mark>China's economy has been growing </mark>much <mark>more rapidly than the United States'</u></strong> </mark>over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that <u><strong>it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy</u></strong>, measured by overall GDP, sometime <u><strong>around 2020.</u></strong> Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that <u><strong><mark>China will </mark>use its increasing wealth to <mark>build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia</u></strong></mark>. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The <u><strong>United States of 2010</u></strong> and the world in which it <u><strong>lives are far different from those of 1945. <mark>Weaknesses in the </u></strong></mark>fundamentals of the American <u><strong><mark>economy have been accumulating</u></strong></mark> for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that <u><strong>these <mark>structural ills </mark>would</u></strong> ultimately <u><strong><mark>erode the economic foundations of America's </mark>global <mark>preeminence.</u></strong></mark> A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now <u><strong>the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching.</u></strong> Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> Federal <mark>Reserve and Treasury have pumped </mark>massive amounts of <mark>dollars into circulation </mark>in hope of reviving the economy. <mark>Add to that the $1 trillion</mark>-plus budget <mark>deficits</u></strong> </mark>that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security<u><strong>), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability.</u></strong> As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem<u><strong>." <mark>The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' </mark>geopolitical <mark>Achilles' heel. </u></strong></mark>Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, <u><strong><mark>hegemony will be </mark>literally <mark>unaffordable</u></strong></mark>. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, <u><strong>the other big financial players</u></strong> in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and <u><strong>no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat</u></strong>. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, <u><strong>the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar</u></strong> by preventing runaway inflation. <u><strong><mark>This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline </mark>through</u></strong> some combination of <u><strong>budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes.</u></strong> Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But <u><strong><mark>it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts</u></strong> </mark>in federal spending <u><strong><mark>without</mark> deep <mark>reductions in defense expenditures</u></strong></mark>. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So <u><strong>the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices</u></strong>. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, <u><strong><mark>Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NC
CASE
AT: Federalism
429,861
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,448
Innovation solves – 5 platforms
Reuters 3-28
Reuters 3-28 (Monsanto Blog, citing Dr. Robb Fraley, Ph.D in microbiology and biochemistry from the University of Illinois, technical advisor to numerous government agencies, on the editorial boards of numerous scientific journals, fellow at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, DATE \@ "M/d/yyyy" 9/14/2014, “Monsanto Chief Technology Officer Calls for Continued Agriculture Innovation at Borlaug Centennial Celebration,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/monsanto-company-idUSnBw285642a+100+BSW20140328, accessed DATE \@ "M/d/yyyy" 9/14/2014, bs)
Fraley outlined the range of challenges faced by farmers today, including the vast impact of climate change future advances in agricultural technology would be realized from a combination of a systems approach that has five distinct technology platforms: breeding, biotechnology, crop protection, biological, and data science. These five platforms will progress and combine to enable farmers to operate more efficiently and farm more sustainably
Fraley outlined the challenges faced by farmers including climate change advances in technology would be realized from five distinct platforms: breeding, biotechnology, crop protection, biological, and data science. These platforms will enable farmers to operate more efficiently and farm more sustainably
Fraley outlined the range of challenges faced by farmers today, including the vast impact of climate change, which is already leading to more volatile weather and drought conditions, changing crop planting zones and increased threats from insects, weeds and disease. Fraley predicted that future advances in agricultural technology would be realized from a combination of a systems approach that has five distinct technology platforms: breeding, biotechnology, crop protection, biological, and data science. These five platforms will progress and combine to enable farmers to operate more efficiently and farm more sustainably.
627
<h4>Innovation solves – 5 platforms</h4><p><strong>Reuters 3-28</strong> (Monsanto Blog, citing Dr. Robb Fraley, Ph.D in microbiology and biochemistry from the University of Illinois, technical advisor to numerous government agencies, on the editorial boards of numerous scientific journals, fellow at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, DATE \@ "M/d/yyyy" 9/14/2014, “Monsanto Chief Technology Officer Calls for Continued Agriculture Innovation at Borlaug Centennial Celebration,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/monsanto-company-idUSnBw285642a+100+BSW20140328, accessed DATE \@ "M/d/yyyy" 9/14/2014, bs)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Fraley outlined the</mark> range of <mark>challenges faced by farmers</mark> today, <mark>including</mark> the vast impact of <mark>climate change</u></strong></mark>, which is already leading to more volatile weather and drought conditions, changing crop planting zones and increased threats from insects, weeds and disease. Fraley predicted that <u><strong>future <mark>advances in</mark> agricultural <mark>technology would be realized from</mark> a combination of a systems approach that has <mark>five distinct</mark> technology <mark>platforms: breeding, biotechnology, crop protection, biological, and data science. These</mark> five <mark>platforms will</mark> progress and combine to <mark>enable farmers to operate more efficiently and farm more sustainably</u></strong></mark>.</p>
1NC
CASE
AT: Cali Water
429,863
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,449
Severance of certainty is a voting issue, particularly on this topic -- it allows the aff to say the plan might not be done in order to get out of any disad and still garner advantages based on cooperative federalism, democratic representation or the perception of the war on drugs
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Severance of certainty is a voting issue, particularly on this topic -- it allows the aff to say the plan might not be done in order to get out of any disad and still garner advantages based on cooperative federalism, democratic representation or the perception of the war on drugs </h4>
1NR
CP
AT: Perm Do The CP
429,862
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,450
Any growing of marijuana causes the impact
Moriarty 14
Moriarty 14 Liam Moriarty. IJPR: Pot vs Fish: Can We Grow Salmon-Friendly Weed? http://ijpr.org/post/pot-vs-fish-can-we-grow-salmon-friendly-weed 01/29/14 DA-07/07/14
As marijuana has become more mainstream, the business of cultivating the plant has boomed coastal northern California is believed to be the largest cannabis-growing region in the US. The Eel River runs through the heart of the Emerald Triangle, draining California’s third-largest watershed And it’s a key battleground in the struggle to save once-abundant Northwest coastal salmon runs. Over the decades, poorly-regulated fishing, grazing and logging have all taken their toll on the fish that spawn in the river. Drought and ocean conditions likely related to climate change are making life hard, as well But says there’s a newer and growing threat to the salmon. think it’s pretty clear that the marijuana industry at this point is the biggest single business in terms of its impact on the river
northern California is believed to be the largest cannabis-growing region in the US. And it’s key to save coastal salmon it’s pretty clear that the marijuana industry at this point is the biggest single business in terms of its impact on the river
As marijuana has become more mainstream, the business of cultivating the plant has boomed. That’s true nowhere more than in coastal northern California. There, the so-called Emerald Triangle of Mendocino, Trinity and Humboldt counties is believed to be the largest cannabis-growing region in the US. But as the hills have sprouted thousands of new grow operations, haphazard cultivation is threatening the recovery of endangered west coast salmon and steelhead populations. The Eel River runs through the heart of the Emerald Triangle, draining California’s third-largest watershed. And it’s a key battleground in the struggle to save once-abundant Northwest coastal salmon runs. Over the decades, poorly-regulated fishing, grazing and logging have all taken their toll on the fish that spawn in the river. Drought and ocean conditions likely related to climate change are making life hard, as well. But Scott Greacen, who heads the conservation group Friends of the Eel River, says there’s a newer and growing threat to the salmon. Scott Greacen: “I think it’s pretty clear that the marijuana industry at this point is the biggest single business in terms of its impact on the river.”
1,185
<h4><strong>Any growing of marijuana causes the impact</h4><p>Moriarty 14</p><p></strong>Liam Moriarty. IJPR: Pot vs Fish: Can We Grow Salmon-Friendly Weed? http://ijpr.org/post/pot-vs-fish-can-we-grow-salmon-friendly-weed 01/29/14 DA-07/07/14</p><p><u><strong>As marijuana has become more mainstream, the business of cultivating the plant has boomed</u></strong>. That’s true nowhere more than in <u><strong>coastal <mark>northern California</u></strong></mark>. There, the so-called Emerald Triangle of Mendocino, Trinity and Humboldt counties <u><strong><mark>is believed to be the largest cannabis-growing region in the US.</mark> </u></strong>But as the hills have sprouted thousands of new grow operations, haphazard cultivation is threatening the recovery of endangered west coast salmon and steelhead populations. <u><strong>The Eel River runs through the heart of the Emerald Triangle, draining California’s third-largest watershed</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>And it’s</mark> a <mark>key</mark> battleground in the struggle <mark>to save</mark> once-abundant Northwest <mark>coastal salmon</mark> runs. Over the decades, poorly-regulated fishing, grazing and logging have all taken their toll on the fish that spawn in the river. Drought and ocean conditions likely related to climate change are making life hard, as well</u></strong>. <u><strong>But </u></strong>Scott Greacen, who heads the conservation group Friends of the Eel River, <u><strong>says there’s a newer and growing threat to the salmon. </u></strong>Scott Greacen: “I <u><strong>think <mark>it’s pretty clear that the marijuana industry at this point is the biggest single business in terms of its impact on the river</u></mark>.”</p></strong>
1NC
CASE
AT: Cali Water
429,864
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,451
Prioritization of discourse destroys critique – discussing questions of implementation are key to progressive change
Brown ‘1
Wendy Brown, Poli Sci and Women’s Studies @ Berkeley, ‘1 (Politics Out of History, p. 35-6)
“Speech codes kill critique Gates remarked Gates was referring to what happens when debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets turning political questions into moralistic ones – as speech codes of any sort do – not only prohibits certain questions expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth that can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique by configuring political injustice as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of political-economic formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks There is a politics of rhetoric that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We rather than examine this loss we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names
Speech codes kill critique debates about them usurp space in which one might have offered a substantive political response turning political questions into moralistic ones – as speech codes do expresses a profound hostility toward political life moralistic reproaches to speech kill critique by configuring injustice as a problem of remarks Rather than offering substantive accounts of injustice they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remark sources that generate racism, poverty, violence remain unaddressed
“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones – as speech codes of any sort do – not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.
3,120
<h4>Prioritization of discourse destroys critique – discussing questions of implementation are key to progressive change</h4><p>Wendy <u><strong>Brown</u></strong>, Poli Sci and Women’s Studies @ Berkeley, <u><strong>‘1</u></strong> (Politics Out of History, p. 35-6)</p><p><u><strong>“<mark>Speech codes kill critique</u></strong></mark>,” Henry Louis <u><strong>Gates remarked</u></strong> in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although <u><strong>Gates was referring to what happens when</u></strong> hate speech regulations, and the <u><strong><mark>debates about them</mark>, <mark>usurp</mark> the discursive <mark>space in which one might have offered a substantive political response</mark> to bigoted epithets</u></strong>, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But <u><strong><mark>turning political questions into moralistic ones – as speech codes</mark> of any sort <mark>do</mark> – not only prohibits certain questions</u></strong> and mandates certain genuflections, it also <u><strong><mark>expresses a profound hostility toward political life</mark> insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth</u></strong>. And the realization of <u><strong>that</u></strong> patently undemocratic desire <u><strong>can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong>it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that</u></strong> Weberian <u><strong>forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction</u></strong>. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But <u><strong><mark>moralistic reproaches to</mark> certain kinds of <mark>speech</mark> or argument <mark>kill critique</u></strong></mark> not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also <u><strong><mark>by configuring</mark> political <mark>injustice</u></strong></mark> and political righteousness <u><strong><mark>as a problem of remarks</mark>, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of</u></strong> historical, <u><strong>political-economic</u></strong> and cultural <u><strong>formations of power. <mark>Rather than offering</mark> analytically <mark>substantive accounts of</mark> the forces of <mark>injustice</u></strong></mark> or injury, <u><strong><mark>they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remark</mark>s</u></strong> or events. <u><strong>There is</u></strong>, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, <u><strong>a politics of rhetoric</u></strong> and gesture <u><strong>that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of</u></strong> left and liberal <u><strong>attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented</u></strong>, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, <u><strong>the <mark>sources that generate racism, poverty, violence</mark> against women, and other elements of social injustice <mark>remain</mark> relatively unarticulated and <mark>unaddressed</mark>. We</u></strong> are lost as how to address those sources; but <u><strong>rather than examine this loss</u></strong> or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, <u><strong>we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names</u></strong>. Don’t mourn, moralize.</p>
1NR
DA
1nc frontline
241,413
30
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,452
Food shortages inevitable
Dawson ‘6
Dawson ‘6
the world is on the precipice of a population explosion Food has been relatively inexpensive This will probably not be the case for the next generation. There are now over six billion people and we will add the next billion in only a dozen years. The owners of oil and gas will probably never again allow the prices to fall very much The cost of energy and fertilizer (usually made from natural gas) are substantial costs in food production, not to mention the cost of transporting that food. The 2006 crops will be affected by the recent increase of prices in oil and gas. Expect food prices to accelerate their rise in the next year and continue to rise thereafter. To exacerbate the problem, many farmers around the world can now make more money raising crops for bio-diesel fuels than they can make raising food. Across South Asia, in the Amazon and elsewhere, farmers are razing the forests to plant crops capable of making biofuels. Even in this country, laws will be enacted to require some percentage of ethanol or the addition of some kind of bio-fuels to gasoline and diesel fuels to further subsidize and satisfy the farm lobby.
the world is on the precipice of a population explosion There are now over six billion people and we will add the next billion owners of oil and gas will probably never again allow the prices to fall very much cost of energy and fertilizer (usually made from natural gas) are substantial costs in food production, not to mention the cost of transporting that food. To exacerbate the problem, many farmers around the world can now make more money raising crops for bio-diesel fuels than they can make raising food.
Thomas, January 5. American Chronicle, “Food for Thought and the Price of Food,” http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=4533 It may seem to many that we are living in a period in which there are potentially insurmountable problems facing us on every side. Certainly the world is on the precipice of a population explosion that we will be unable to sustain. The consumption of our natural resources and the destruction of our environment continue on a scale never imagined by the majority of us. However, nearly every generation of mankind has seen periods of hard times and some of us have experienced some very good times as well. The very nature of life on earth has been a history of turmoil and upheaval, from subsistence and mere survival to prosperity and a degree of security, and sometimes, back again. Don’t expect things to change for the better in the very near future regardless of our sophisticated economy. Consider the single aspect of food prices in the western world. Food has been relatively inexpensive in the western world, except in war-torn areas for the entire lifetime of our generation. This will probably not be the case for the next generation. It was only a few years ago that the population explosion was in the news all the time, almost to the same extent that we are currently preoccupied with the energy crunch usually referred to as “peak oil”, and the erosion of the western standard of living by “globalization”. The media let up on the problems of population growth because people got tired of hearing about it. After all, the western world didn’t appear to be particularly affected by it. The population explosion has since been generally ignored in the news until recently. That is not to infer that the problem went away. It took thousands of years of human history to produce and sustain a population of a billion people by the early nineteenth century. In the past 200 years, we have multiplied that population by six. There are now over six billion people in the world and we will add the next billion people in only about a dozen years. With the advent of the industrial revolution, the western world became trade oriented over the last couple of centuries. Since the cold war has ended, our international companies have seized opportunities to sharply increase their profits by arbitraging the labor markets of Asia while selling products at home; sometimes referred to as globalization. This employment of large numbers of people has given impetus and acceleration to the already rising prosperity of a small percentage of the population in various parts of Asia. This small increase in prosperity affecting such large numbers of people has spawned a demand for resources and commodities around the world. Suddenly, a few people in the more populated parts of the world have the monetary wherewithal to improve their standard of living and have hopes for a better life for their children. They have needs of infrastructure, electricity and transportation as well as food. Now the western world finds itself competing for limited resources, especially energy. The most efficient forms of energy are oil and gas. The owners of oil and gas find themselves in an enviable position where they have an asset worthy of preservation. They will probably never again allow the prices to fall very much for any extended period of time. The cost of energy and fertilizer (usually made from natural gas) are substantial costs in food production, not to mention the cost of transporting that food. The 2006 crops will be affected by the recent increase of prices in oil and gas. Expect food prices to accelerate their rise in the next year and continue to rise thereafter. To exacerbate the problem, many farmers around the world can now make more money raising crops for bio-diesel fuels than they can make raising food. Across South Asia, in the Amazon and elsewhere, farmers are razing the forests to plant crops capable of making biofuels. Even in this country, laws will be enacted to require some percentage of ethanol or the addition of some kind of bio-fuels to gasoline and diesel fuels to further subsidize and satisfy the farm lobby.
4,204
<h4>Food shortages inevitable</h4><p><strong>Dawson ‘6</p><p></strong>Thomas, January 5. American Chronicle, “Food for Thought and the Price of Food,” http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=4533</p><p>It may seem to many that we are living in a period in which there are potentially insurmountable problems facing us on every side. Certainly <u><strong><mark>the world is on the precipice of a population explosion </u></strong></mark>that we will be unable to sustain. The consumption of our natural resources and the destruction of our environment continue on a scale never imagined by the majority of us. However, nearly every generation of mankind has seen periods of hard times and some of us have experienced some very good times as well. The very nature of life on earth has been a history of turmoil and upheaval, from subsistence and mere survival to prosperity and a degree of security, and sometimes, back again. Don’t expect things to change for the better in the very near future regardless of our sophisticated economy. Consider the single aspect of food prices in the western world. <u>Food has been relatively inexpensive</u> in the western world, except in war-torn areas for the entire lifetime of our generation. <u>This will probably not be the case for the next generation.</u> It was only a few years ago that the population explosion was in the news all the time, almost to the same extent that we are currently preoccupied with the energy crunch usually referred to as “peak oil”, and the erosion of the western standard of living by “globalization”. The media let up on the problems of population growth because people got tired of hearing about it. After all, the western world didn’t appear to be particularly affected by it. The population explosion has since been generally ignored in the news until recently. That is not to infer that the problem went away. It took thousands of years of human history to produce and sustain a population of a billion people by the early nineteenth century. In the past 200 years, we have multiplied that population by six. <u><strong><mark>There are now over six billion people </u></strong></mark>in the world <u><strong><mark>and we will add the next billion </u></strong></mark>people <u>in only</u> about <u>a dozen years.</u> With the advent of the industrial revolution, the western world became trade oriented over the last couple of centuries. Since the cold war has ended, our international companies have seized opportunities to sharply increase their profits by arbitraging the labor markets of Asia while selling products at home; sometimes referred to as globalization. This employment of large numbers of people has given impetus and acceleration to the already rising prosperity of a small percentage of the population in various parts of Asia. This small increase in prosperity affecting such large numbers of people has spawned a demand for resources and commodities around the world. Suddenly, a few people in the more populated parts of the world have the monetary wherewithal to improve their standard of living and have hopes for a better life for their children. They have needs of infrastructure, electricity and transportation as well as food. Now the western world finds itself competing for limited resources, especially energy. The most efficient forms of energy are oil and gas. <u>The <strong><mark>owners of oil and gas </u></strong></mark>find themselves in an enviable position where they have an asset worthy of preservation. They <u><strong><mark>will probably never again allow the prices to fall very much </u></strong></mark>for any extended period of time. <u>The <strong><mark>cost of energy and fertilizer (usually made from natural gas) are substantial costs in food production, not to mention the cost of transporting that food.</strong></mark> The 2006 crops will be affected by the recent increase of prices in oil and gas. Expect food prices to accelerate their rise in the next year and continue to rise thereafter. <strong><mark>To exacerbate the problem, many farmers around the world can now make more money raising crops for bio-diesel fuels than they can make raising food.</strong></mark> Across South Asia, in the Amazon and elsewhere, farmers are razing the forests to plant crops capable of making biofuels. Even in this country, laws will be enacted to require some percentage of ethanol or the addition of some kind of bio-fuels to gasoline and diesel fuels to further subsidize and satisfy the farm lobby.</p></u>
1NC
CASE
AT: Cali Water
429,865
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,453
More likely to vote if marijuana is on the ballot – most vote in favor
Davis 14
Davis 14 <Susan, USA Today, Marijuana ballot initiatives may motivate voters, March 26 http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/25/marijuana-poll-turnout/6867389/>#SPS
The latest George Washington University Battleground poll nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be "much more likely" to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot. An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them "somewhat" more likely to vote.¶ Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years.¶ Support for legalizing medical marijuana use has grown steadily with 73% in favor 53%, also back decriminalizing marijuana possession, Marijuana is hitting the tipping point. It's really astounding about how fast it's moved," Lake said.¶ supporters mobilized libertarian-leaning Republicans by running ads on country-music radio stations that reached the state's rural areas. More than a dozen other state legislatures are mulling marijuana laws.¶
nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be "much more likely" to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot. An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them "somewhat" more likely to vote Support for legalizing medical marijuana use has grown steadily with 73% in favor 53%, also back decriminalizing marijuana possession Marijuana is hitting the tipping point.
WASHINGTON — Warning: Increased voter turnout could be a political side effect of marijuana.¶ The latest George Washington University Battleground poll, a national survey of likely voters, reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be "much more likely" to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot. An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them "somewhat" more likely to vote.¶ The numbers are encouraging to Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years.¶ The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections: 64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year, compared with 57% of Democrats. Among young voters, who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote.¶ "Which is why you can imagine we're very excited about our marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election, but in terms of turnout," Lake quipped.¶ Support for legalizing medical marijuana use has grown steadily with 73% in favor, while a majority, 53%, also back decriminalizing marijuana possession, according to the survey.¶ "What's really interesting and, I think, a totally unwritten story is that everyone talks about marriage equality hitting a tipping point (of acceptance). Marijuana is hitting the tipping point. It's really astounding about how fast it's moved," Lake said.¶ The issue is also motivating beyond traditional political lines. For example, in the successful push for a 2012 Colorado ballot initiative to legalize recreational marijuana use, supporters mobilized libertarian-leaning Republicans by running ads on country-music radio stations that reached the state's rural areas.¶ Lake says the data show that the most ardent opponents to legalizing medicinal marijuana use are seniors, while suburban moms are reluctant to support the decriminalization of possession. Both groups historically turn out in midterm elections in higher frequency than young adults.¶ So far this year, only two states have approved marijuana ballot initiatives. In Alaska, voters will decide whether to follow Colorado and Washington and regulate and tax marijuana like alcohol, which in effect would legalize recreational usage. The measure appears on the Aug. 19 primary ballot because the state does not allow initiatives on the general election ballot. That ballot will also settle a hotly contested GOP primary for the U.S. Senate.¶ Florida voters in November will decide whether to allow for medicinal marijuana use, which would require a supermajority of voters, 60%, to enact. November's Florida gubernatorial election is likely to be among the most competitive races in the nation this year.¶ In Oregon, the state Legislature declined to put the issue on the November ballot but activists are considering a petition effort to circumvent that decision and get a vote on a legalization measure similar to Colorado's on the ballot this fall.¶ More than a dozen other state legislatures are mulling marijuana laws.¶ The Marijuana Policy Project plans to support a number of ballot initiatives to regulate marijuana like alcohol in Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Maine, Montana and Nevada, but those initiatives won't be ready until 2016.
3,447
<h4>More likely to vote if marijuana is on the ballot – most vote in favor</h4><p><strong>Davis 14 </strong><Susan, USA Today, Marijuana ballot initiatives may motivate voters, March 26 http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/25/marijuana-poll-turnout/6867389/>#SPS</p><p>WASHINGTON — Warning: Increased voter turnout could be a political side effect of marijuana.¶ <u><strong>The latest George Washington University Battleground poll</u></strong>, a national survey of likely voters, reveals that <u><strong><mark>nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be "much more likely"</mark> <mark>to vote</u></strong> <u><strong>if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them "somewhat" more likely to vote</mark>.</strong>¶<strong> </u></strong>The numbers are encouraging to Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because <u><strong>Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years.</strong>¶<strong> </u></strong>The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections: 64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year, compared with 57% of Democrats. Among young voters, who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote.¶ "Which is why you can imagine we're very excited about our marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election, but in terms of turnout," Lake quipped.¶ <u><strong><mark>Support for legalizing medical marijuana use has grown steadily with 73% in favor</u></strong></mark>, while a majority, <u><strong><mark>53%, also back decriminalizing marijuana possession</mark>,</u></strong> according to the survey.¶ "What's really interesting and, I think, a totally unwritten story is that everyone talks about marriage equality hitting a tipping point (of acceptance). <u><strong><mark>Marijuana is hitting the tipping point.</mark> It's really astounding about how fast it's moved," Lake said.</strong>¶<strong> </u></strong>The issue is also motivating beyond traditional political lines. For example, in the successful push for a 2012 Colorado ballot initiative to legalize recreational marijuana use, <u><strong>supporters mobilized libertarian-leaning Republicans by running ads on country-music radio stations that reached the state's rural areas.</u></strong>¶ Lake says the data show that the most ardent opponents to legalizing medicinal marijuana use are seniors, while suburban moms are reluctant to support the decriminalization of possession. Both groups historically turn out in midterm elections in higher frequency than young adults.¶ So far this year, only two states have approved marijuana ballot initiatives. In Alaska, voters will decide whether to follow Colorado and Washington and regulate and tax marijuana like alcohol, which in effect would legalize recreational usage. The measure appears on the Aug. 19 primary ballot because the state does not allow initiatives on the general election ballot. That ballot will also settle a hotly contested GOP primary for the U.S. Senate.¶ Florida voters in November will decide whether to allow for medicinal marijuana use, which would require a supermajority of voters, 60%, to enact. November's Florida gubernatorial election is likely to be among the most competitive races in the nation this year.¶ In Oregon, the state Legislature declined to put the issue on the November ballot but activists are considering a petition effort to circumvent that decision and get a vote on a legalization measure similar to Colorado's on the ballot this fall.¶ <u><strong>More than a dozen other state legislatures are mulling marijuana laws.</strong>¶<strong> </u></strong>The Marijuana Policy Project plans to support a number of ballot initiatives to regulate marijuana like alcohol in Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Maine, Montana and Nevada, but those initiatives won't be ready until 2016.</p>
1NR
DA
Link to the Aff
429,866
6
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,454
Deforestation decreasing now -- most comprehensive data
FAO 10 , AB)
FAO 10 (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, “World deforestation decreases, but remains alarming in many countries”, http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/40893/icode/, AB)
World deforestation mainly the conversion of tropical forests to agricultural land, has decreased over the past ten years Globally, around 13 million hectares of forests were converted to other uses or lost through natural causes according to key findings of FAO's most comprehensive forest review to date Brazil and Indonesia, which had the highest loss of forests in the 1990s, have significantly reduced their deforestation rates As a result the net loss of forest area was reduced to 5.2 million down from 8.3 The net annual loss of forests is equivalent to an area about the size of Costa Rica.
World deforestation has decreased over the past ten years Globally 13 million hectares of forests were converted or lost through natural causes Brazil and Indonesia which had the highest loss of forests have significantly reduced deforestation the net loss of forest area was reduced to 5.2 million down from 8.3 The net loss is equivalent to Costa Rica.
25 March 2010, Rome - World deforestation, mainly the conversion of tropical forests to agricultural land, has decreased over the past ten years but continues at an alarmingly high rate in many countries, FAO announced today. Globally, around 13 million hectares of forests were converted to other uses or lost through natural causes each year between 2000 and 2010 as compared to around 16 million hectares per year during the 1990s, according to key findings of FAO's most comprehensive forest review to date The Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. The study covers 233 countries and areas. Brazil and Indonesia, which had the highest loss of forests in the 1990s, have significantly reduced their deforestation rates. In addition, ambitious tree planting programmes in countries such as China, India, the United States and Viet Nam - combined with natural expansion of forests in some regions - have added more than seven million hectares of new forests annually. As a result the net loss of forest area was reduced to 5.2 million hectares per year between 2000 and 2010, down from 8.3 million hectares annually in the 1990s.The world's total forest area is just over four billion hectares or 31 percent of the total land area. The net annual loss of forests (when the sum of all gains in forest area is smaller than all losses) in 2000-2010 is equivalent to an area about the size of Costa Rica.
1,404
<h4>Deforestation decreasing now -- most comprehensive data </h4><p><strong>FAO 10</strong> (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, “World deforestation decreases, but remains alarming in many countries”, http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/40893/icode/<u><strong>, AB) </p><p></u></strong>25 March 2010, Rome - <u><strong><mark>World deforestation</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>mainly the conversion of tropical forests to agricultural land, <mark>has decreased over the past ten years</mark> </u></strong>but continues at an alarmingly high rate in many countries, FAO announced today. <u><strong><mark>Globally</mark>, around <mark>13 million</mark> <mark>hectares</mark> <mark>of forests</mark> <mark>were converted</mark> to other uses</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>or</mark> <mark>lost through natural causes</u></strong></mark> each year between 2000 and 2010 as compared to around 16 million hectares per year during the 1990s,<u><strong> according to key findings of FAO's most comprehensive forest review to date </u></strong>The Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. The study covers 233 countries and areas. <u><strong><mark>Brazil and Indonesia</mark>, <mark>which had the highest</mark> <mark>loss of forests</mark> in the 1990s, <mark>have significantly reduced </mark>their <mark>deforestation</mark> rates</u></strong>. In addition, ambitious tree planting programmes in countries such as China, India, the United States and Viet Nam - combined with natural expansion of forests in some regions - have added more than seven million hectares of new forests annually. <u><strong>As a result <mark>the net loss of forest area</mark> <mark>was reduced to 5.2 million</u></strong></mark> hectares per year between 2000 and 2010, <u><strong><mark>down from 8.3</u></strong></mark> million hectares annually in the 1990s.The world's total forest area is just over four billion hectares or 31 percent of the total land area. <u><strong><mark>The net </mark>annual <mark>loss</mark> of forests</u></strong> (when the sum of all gains in forest area is smaller than all losses) in 2000-2010 <u><strong><mark>is equivalent</mark> <mark>to</mark> an area about the size of <mark>Costa Rica.</mark> </p></u></strong>
1NC
CASE
AT: Deforestation
429,867
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,455
Increases Dem voter turnout but doesn’t cause GOP backlash
Edwards-Levy 14 <Ariel, HuffPo, Voters Say They're More Likely To Turn Out If Marijuana Is On The Ballot, March 25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/marijuana-turnout-poll_n_5030351.html>#SPS
Edwards-Levy 14 <Ariel, HuffPo, Voters Say They're More Likely To Turn Out If Marijuana Is On The Ballot, March 25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/marijuana-turnout-poll_n_5030351.html>#SPS
The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day, according to a poll Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot, just 13 percent said they'd be less likely Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates.¶ some Democrats hope their inclusion on state ballots could help boost midterm turnout, especially among young voters.¶ "You can imagine that we're very excited about the marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election but also in terms of turnout," With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."
The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day according to a poll Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."
The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day, according to a George Washington University Battleground poll conducted by the bipartisan team of Lake Research Partners and the Tarrance Group.¶ Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot, while just 13 percent said they'd be less likely. Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates.¶ Getting voters to the polls during midterm elections is a recurrent challenge for Democrats. No one is suggesting marijuana initiatives as a key get-out-the-vote strategy, but some Democrats hope their inclusion on state ballots could help boost midterm turnout, especially among young voters.¶ Florida will have a medical marijuana initiative on its ballot in November, and pot advocates are pushing to get initiatives on the ballot in several other states.¶ "You can imagine that we're very excited about the marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election but also in terms of turnout," Democratic pollster Celinda Lake joked at a reporter breakfast sponsored by The Christian Science Monitor. Speaking later to HuffPost, she added, "The great thing about it is, marriage equality increases turnout, but we get a backlash too. Abortion issues increase turnout, but we get a backlash too. With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."
1,538
<h4>Increases Dem voter turnout but doesn’t cause GOP backlash</h4><p><strong>Edwards-Levy 14</strong> <u><strong><Ariel, HuffPo, Voters Say They're More Likely To Turn Out If Marijuana Is On The Ballot, March 25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/marijuana-turnout-poll_n_5030351.html>#SPS</p><p><mark>The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day</mark>, <mark>according to a</u></strong></mark> George Washington University Battleground <u><strong><mark>poll</u></strong></mark> conducted by the bipartisan team of Lake Research Partners and the Tarrance Group.¶ <u><strong><mark>Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot</mark>,</u></strong> while <u><strong>just 13 percent said they'd be less likely</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates</mark>.</strong>¶<strong> </u></strong>Getting voters to the polls during midterm elections is a recurrent challenge for Democrats. No one is suggesting marijuana initiatives as a key get-out-the-vote strategy, but <u><strong>some Democrats hope their inclusion on state ballots could help boost midterm turnout, especially among young voters.</strong>¶<strong> </u></strong>Florida will have a medical marijuana initiative on its ballot in November, and pot advocates are pushing to get initiatives on the ballot in several other states.¶ <u><strong>"You can imagine that we're very excited about the marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election but also in terms of turnout,"</u></strong> Democratic pollster Celinda Lake joked at a reporter breakfast sponsored by The Christian Science Monitor. Speaking later to HuffPost, she added, "The great thing about it is, marriage equality increases turnout, but we get a backlash too. Abortion issues increase turnout, but we get a backlash too. <u><strong><mark>With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
DA
Link to the Aff
429,628
2
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,456
Regeneration solves
Tengo 07
Tengo 07 (Thomas Elmqvist (Department of Systems Ecology at Stolkholm University). Markku Pyykonin. (Stockholm Resilience Centre) and Maria (Department of Biology and Plant Ecology at the University of Antananarivo). "Patterns of Loss and Regeneration of Tropical Dry Forest in Madagascar: The Social Institutional Context." Plos One. 2007 http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1853233)
Loss of tropical forests are of growing concern worldwide , little is known about the role of regeneration of tropical forests Institutional characteristics were analyzed, testing the hypothesis that forest cover change is a function of strength of local social institutions The results showed a minor decrease of 7% total forest cover during 1984–2000 but an overall net increase of 4% during the period 1993–2000 a stable forest cover occurred in the area with highest population density and good market access The large-scale spontaneous regeneration dominated by native endemic species appears to be a result of a combination of changes in precipitation, migration under conditions of maintained and well-defined property rights Our study emphasizes the large capacity of a semi-arid system to spontaneously regenerate
results showed an overall net increase of 4% during the period 1993–2000 a stable forest cover occurred in the area with highest population density and good market access The large-scale spontaneous regeneration dominated by native endemic species appears to be a result of a combination of changes in precipitation, migration conditions of maintained and well-defined property right
Loss of tropical forests and changes in land-use/land-cover are of growing concern worldwide. Although knowledge exists about the institutional context in which tropical forest loss is embedded, little is known about the role of social institutions in influencing regeneration of tropical forests. In the present study we used Landsat images from southern Madagascar from three different years (1984, 1993 and 2000) and covering 5500 km2, and made a time-series analysis of three distinct large-scale patterns: 1) loss of forest cover, 2) increased forest cover, and 3) stable forest cover. Institutional characteristics underlying these three patterns were analyzed, testing the hypothesis that forest cover change is a function of strength and enforcement of local social institutions. The results showed a minor decrease of 7% total forest cover in the study area during the whole period 1984–2000, but an overall net increase of 4% during the period 1993–2000. The highest loss of forest cover occurred in a low human population density area with long distances to markets, while a stable forest cover occurred in the area with highest population density and good market access. Analyses of institutions revealed that loss of forest cover occurred mainly in areas characterized by insecure property rights, while areas with well-defined property rights showed either regenerating or stable forest cover. The results thus corroborate our hypothesis. The large-scale spontaneous regeneration dominated by native endemic species appears to be a result of a combination of changes in precipitation, migration and decreased human population and livestock grazing pressure, but under conditions of maintained and well-defined property rights. Our study emphasizes the large capacity of a semi-arid system to spontaneously regenerate, triggered by decreased pressures, but where existing social institutions mitigate other drivers of deforestation and alternative land-use.
1,970
<h4>Regeneration solves </h4><p><strong>Tengo 07</strong> (Thomas Elmqvist (Department of Systems Ecology at Stolkholm University). Markku Pyykonin. (Stockholm Resilience Centre) and Maria (Department of Biology and Plant Ecology at the University of Antananarivo). "Patterns of Loss and Regeneration of Tropical Dry Forest in Madagascar: The Social Institutional Context." Plos One. 2007 http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1853233)</p><p><u><strong>Loss of tropical forests</u></strong> and changes in land-use/land-cover <u><strong>are of growing concern worldwide</u></strong>. Although knowledge exists about the institutional context in which tropical forest loss is embedded<u><strong>, little is known about the role of</u></strong> social institutions in influencing <u><strong>regeneration of tropical forests</u></strong>. In the present study we used Landsat images from southern Madagascar from three different years (1984, 1993 and 2000) and covering 5500 km2, and made a time-series analysis of three distinct large-scale patterns: 1) loss of forest cover, 2) increased forest cover, and 3) stable forest cover. <u><strong>Institutional characteristics</u></strong> underlying these three patterns <u><strong>were analyzed, testing the hypothesis that forest cover change is a function of strength</u></strong> and enforcement <u><strong>of local social institutions</u></strong>. <u><strong>The <mark>results showed</mark> a minor decrease of 7% total forest cover</u></strong> in the study area <u><strong>during</u></strong> the whole period <u><strong>1984–2000</u></strong>,<u><strong> but <mark>an overall net increase of 4% during the period 1993–2000</u></strong></mark>. The highest loss of forest cover occurred in a low human population density area with long distances to markets, while <u><strong><mark>a stable forest cover occurred in the area with highest population density and good market access</u></strong></mark>. Analyses of institutions revealed that loss of forest cover occurred mainly in areas characterized by insecure property rights, while areas with well-defined property rights showed either regenerating or stable forest cover. The results thus corroborate our hypothesis. <u><strong><mark>The large-scale spontaneous regeneration dominated by native endemic species appears to be a result of a combination of changes in precipitation, migration</u></strong></mark> and decreased human population and livestock grazing pressure, but <u><strong>under <mark>conditions of maintained and well-defined property right</mark>s</u></strong>. <u><strong>Our study emphasizes the large capacity of a semi-arid system to spontaneously regenerate</u></strong>, triggered by decreased pressures, but where existing social institutions mitigate other drivers of deforestation and alternative land-use.</p>
1NC
CASE
AT: Deforestation
36,362
10
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,457
Dems have the momentum to take the senate now – ALASKA is the key swing state
Cohn 9/12 <Nate, The New York Times, “Democrats Are Seeing More Daylight in Path to Senate Control,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/upshot/democrats-are-seeing-more-daylight-in-path-to-senate-control.html?abt=0002&abg=1>#SPS
Cohn 9/12 <Nate, The New York Times, “Democrats Are Seeing More Daylight in Path to Senate Control,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/upshot/democrats-are-seeing-more-daylight-in-path-to-senate-control.html?abt=0002&abg=1>#SPS
the Democratic path to a Senate has started to look easier. today the Democratic path to victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year. That path remains narrow with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage The Democrats/// now appear to have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan, two states where Republicans entered the summer with high hopes. a diverse set of pollsters has given Udall a lead In Michigan Peters, leads by an even larger margin. These leads are not insurmountable. But they are not insubstantial, either. There is no evidence of a trend toward the Republicans and, if anything, the Democratic advantage has grown If Colorado and Michigan are penciled into the Democratic column the Democrats will then need three more states to retain control. The Democrats have a fairly broad set of options for those states In North Carolina and Iowa, the Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead in the polls, and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll. Leo now gives Hagan a 73 percent chance of victory, given that she leads her Republican opponent Tillis, by two percentage points Braley also has an advantage, albeit an even more tenuous one than Ms. Hagan. His lead, however, is fairly consistent: Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan, those in North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction for now. Their path of least resistance is Alaska Alaska is the only state where there hasn’t been a single nonpartisan, traditional telephone poll this year. It’s a state with a long history of polling miscues, perhaps in part because the state’s small, far-flung and isolated population poses unique challenges to pollsters. That’s fewer than the panel surveyed in some congressional districts, and my look at the congressional district data suggests that there’s plenty of noise in the places where the sample size is that small. There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points. So a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats
the Dem path to a Senate victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year. That path remains narrow with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage The Dem s have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan These leads are not insurmountable. But they are not insubstantial, either . If Colorado and Michigan are penciled Democratic , the Dem s need three more states to retain control . In North Carolina and Iowa Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction Their path of least resistance is Alaska a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats
A few months ago, the Democratic path to a Senate majority looked long and arduous. It has started to look easier. The Democrats started the campaign with a clear advantage in enough races to end up with 45 seats, well short of the 50 needed to retain control of the chamber. To get to 50, the party was going to have to run the table in five battleground states where polls were already showing Republicans with an occasional lead — or replace one of them by holding either Arkansas or Louisiana, two deep-red states with Democratic incumbents in jeopardy. Doing so would have been challenging under any circumstances. It seemed especially daunting this year, given the president’s low approval ratings and the long history of the president’s party suffering a “midterm penalty.” But today the Democratic path to victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year. That path remains narrow, to be sure. The Democrats will probably still need to sweep those five fairly close races. Yet with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage in four of them. And the Democrats have other opportunities that might give them more breathing room. The Democrats/// now appear to have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan, two states where Republicans entered the summer with high hopes. Over the last month, a diverse set of pollsters has given Senator Mark Udall of Colorado, a Democratic incumbent, a lead of an average of 3.7 points. In Michigan, the Democrat, Gary Peters, leads by an even larger 5.5-point margin. These leads are not insurmountable. But they are not insubstantial, either. There is no evidence of a trend toward the Republicans and, if anything, the Democratic advantage has grown over the summer. Leo, The Upshot’s Senate forecasting model, now gives the Democrats around an 80 percent chance of winning each of these states. At one point earlier this year, Leo interpreted Mr. Udall to be the underdog, and Mr. Peters had only a 59 percent chance of winning as recently as a month and a half ago. If Colorado and Michigan are penciled into the Democratic column, the Democrats will then need three more states to retain control. The Democrats have a fairly broad set of options for those states, but the likeliest possibility is that the election comes down to Alaska, Iowa and North Carolina. All three pose big challenges to Democrats. Alaska voted for Mitt Romney by 14 points in 2012. The president’s approval ratings are terrible in Iowa, where the Democrats have an imperfect nominee — one who seemed to criticize farmers in recorded remarks at a fund-raiser — in one of the few competitive races where the party will not benefit from incumbency. And there is no state where Democrats suffer more from an off-year electorate than North Carolina, where Democrats are exceptionally dependent on young and nonwhite voters to overcome the state’s conservative and older white voters. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the Republicans are favored in any of these states. In North Carolina and Iowa, the Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead in the polls, and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll. Leo now gives Senator Kay Hagan of North Carolina a 73 percent chance of victory, given that she leads her Republican opponent, Thom Tillis, by two percentage points, 45 to 43, in an average of polls. I might rate her chances somewhat lower, in part because she’s benefiting from an unlikely six-point edge in a new poll from Rasmussen, a firm with a record of relying on dubious sampling and weighting techniques. Another factor complicating the polls is that they may be underestimating the support of Mr. Tillis by asking respondents about a Libertarian candidate, Sean Haugh, who is not seriously campaigning but is nonetheless receiving more support than Libertarian candidates in North Carolina generally do. Even so, Ms. Hagan generally leads in the polls that do not name Mr. Haugh, and there’s not much question which candidate is ahead. Representative Bruce Braley, the Democratic nominee in Iowa, also has an advantage, albeit an even more tenuous one than Ms. Hagan. He has been leading by about two-thirds of a point over the last month. His lead, however, is fairly consistent: His Republican opponent, Joni Ernst, has led in just one poll over the last three months, and a more recent version of that poll, an online survey by YouGov, The New York Times and CBS, flipped to Mr. Braley. Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan, those in North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction for now. Even if Democrats were to win both Iowa and North Carolina, they would still be one seat short of 50 seats. (If the two parties each win 50 seats, Vice President Joe Biden will break the tie, to the Democrats’ advantage.) Their path of least resistance is probably Alaska, a state where a Democratic incumbent, Mark Begich, ought to have a decent chance of defeating his Republican challenger. There have only been two polls since Dan Sullivan, the Republican, won the party’s nomination in mid-August. Both of these polls show Mr. Sullivan with the lead. Nonetheless, there are plenty of reasons to have reservations about the Alaska polling. Alaska is the only state where there hasn’t been a single nonpartisan, traditional telephone poll this year. It’s a state with a long history of polling miscues, perhaps in part because the state’s small, far-flung and isolated population poses unique challenges to pollsters. The New York Times/CBS News/YouGov panel is particularly sparse in Alaska, where there were only around 400 respondents in the most recent poll. That’s fewer than the panel surveyed in some congressional districts, and my look at the congressional district data suggests that there’s plenty of noise in the places where the sample size is that small. The other poll, by Rasmussen, does not have a transparent way to survey voters without a landline telephone, and its record has not been very strong in recent years. The fairest read of the available data is that Mr. Sullivan, the Republican, has the edge. After all, he has the edge in the only two data points since his nomination. That’s why Leo, The Upshot’s Senate model, gives Mr. Sullivan a 55 percent chance of winning. But there are two ways that one can have a 55 percent chance of winning. One can imagine, for instance, a race in which a lot of polling makes it quite clear that one candidate has a narrow lead. On the other hand, the 55 percent in Alaska reflects a great deal of uncertainty about the state of the race. There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points. So a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska — and I’m not sure we’ll ever have a great sense of the race, given the polling challenges. But this much is clear: If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats, as of today.
7,151
<h4>Dems have the momentum to take the senate now – ALASKA is the key swing state</h4><p><strong>Cohn 9/12</strong> <u><strong><Nate, The New York Times, “Democrats Are Seeing More Daylight in Path to Senate Control,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/upshot/democrats-are-seeing-more-daylight-in-path-to-senate-control.html?abt=0002&abg=1>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>A few months ago, <u><strong><mark>the Dem</mark>ocratic <mark>path to a Senate</u></strong></mark> majority looked long and arduous. It <u><strong>has started to look easier. </u></strong>The Democrats started the campaign with a clear advantage in enough races to end up with 45 seats, well short of the 50 needed to retain control of the chamber. To get to 50, the party was going to have to run the table in five battleground states where polls were already showing Republicans with an occasional lead — or replace one of them by holding either Arkansas or Louisiana, two deep-red states with Democratic incumbents in jeopardy. Doing so would have been challenging under any circumstances. It seemed especially daunting this year, given the president’s low approval ratings and the long history of the president’s party suffering a “midterm penalty.” But <u><strong>today the Democratic path to <mark>victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year.</u></strong> <u><strong>That path remains narrow</u></strong></mark>, to be sure. The Democrats will probably still need to sweep those five fairly close races. Yet <u><strong><mark>with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage</u></strong></mark> in four of them. And the Democrats have other opportunities that might give them more breathing room. <u><strong><mark>The Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s</mark>/// now appear to <mark>have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan</mark>, two states where Republicans entered the summer with high hopes.</u></strong> Over the last month, <u><strong>a diverse set of pollsters has given</u></strong> Senator Mark <u><strong>Udall</u></strong> of Colorado, a Democratic incumbent, <u><strong>a lead</u></strong> of an average of 3.7 points. <u><strong>In Michigan</u></strong>, the Democrat, Gary <u><strong>Peters, leads by an even larger</u></strong> 5.5-point <u><strong>margin. <mark>These leads are not insurmountable.</u></strong> <u><strong>But they are not insubstantial, either</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>There is no evidence of a trend toward the Republicans and,</u></strong> <u><strong>if anything, the Democratic advantage has grown</u></strong> over the summer. Leo, The Upshot’s Senate forecasting model, now gives the Democrats around an 80 percent chance of winning each of these states. At one point earlier this year, Leo interpreted Mr. Udall to be the underdog, and Mr. Peters had only a 59 percent chance of winning as recently as a month and a half ago<mark>. <u><strong>If Colorado and Michigan are penciled</mark> into the <mark>Democratic</mark> column</u></strong><mark>, <u><strong>the</mark> <mark>Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s</mark> will then <mark>need three more states to retain control</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The Democrats have a fairly broad set of options for those states</u></strong>, but the likeliest possibility is that the election comes down to Alaska, Iowa and North Carolina.<u><strong> </u></strong>All three pose big challenges to Democrats. Alaska voted for Mitt Romney by 14 points in 2012. The president’s approval ratings are terrible in Iowa, where the Democrats have an imperfect nominee — one who seemed to criticize farmers in recorded remarks at a fund-raiser — in one of the few competitive races where the party will not benefit from incumbency. And there is no state where Democrats suffer more from an off-year electorate than North Carolina, where Democrats are exceptionally dependent on young and nonwhite voters to overcome the state’s conservative and older white voters. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the Republicans are favored in any of these states<mark>. <u><strong>In North Carolina and Iowa</mark>, the <mark>Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead</mark> in the polls, <mark>and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll</mark>. Leo now gives</u></strong> Senator Kay <u><strong>Hagan</u></strong> of North Carolina <u><strong>a 73 percent chance of victory, given that she leads her Republican opponent</u></strong>, Thom <u><strong>Tillis, by two percentage points</u></strong>, 45 to 43, in an average of polls. I might rate her chances somewhat lower, in part because she’s benefiting from an unlikely six-point edge in a new poll from Rasmussen, a firm with a record of relying on dubious sampling and weighting techniques. Another factor complicating the polls is that they may be underestimating the support of Mr. Tillis by asking respondents about a Libertarian candidate, Sean Haugh, who is not seriously campaigning but is nonetheless receiving more support than Libertarian candidates in North Carolina generally do. Even so, Ms. Hagan generally leads in the polls that do not name Mr. Haugh, and there’s not much question which candidate is ahead. Representative Bruce <u><strong>Braley</u></strong>, the Democratic nominee in Iowa, <u><strong>also has an advantage, albeit an even more tenuous one than Ms. Hagan.</u></strong> He has been leading by about two-thirds of a point over the last month. <u><strong>His lead, however, is fairly consistent:</u></strong> His Republican opponent, Joni Ernst, has led in just one poll over the last three months, and a more recent version of that poll, an online survey by YouGov, The New York Times and CBS, flipped to Mr. Braley. <u><strong><mark>Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan</mark>, those in <mark>North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction</mark> for now. </u></strong>Even if Democrats were to win both Iowa and North Carolina, they would still be one seat short of 50 seats. (If the two parties each win 50 seats, Vice President Joe Biden will break the tie, to the Democrats’ advantage.) <u><strong><mark>Their path of least resistance is</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>Alaska</u></strong></mark>, a state where a Democratic incumbent, Mark Begich, ought to have a decent chance of defeating his Republican challenger. There have only been two polls since Dan Sullivan, the Republican, won the party’s nomination in mid-August. Both of these polls show Mr. Sullivan with the lead. Nonetheless, there are plenty of reasons to have reservations about the Alaska polling. <u><strong>Alaska is the only state where there hasn’t been a single nonpartisan, traditional telephone poll this year.</u></strong> <u><strong>It’s a state with a long history of polling miscues, perhaps in part because the state’s small, far-flung and isolated population poses unique challenges to pollsters. </u></strong>The New York Times/CBS News/YouGov panel is particularly sparse in Alaska, where there were only around 400 respondents in the most recent poll. <u><strong>That’s fewer than the panel surveyed in some congressional districts, and my look at the congressional district data suggests that there’s plenty of noise in the places where the sample size is that small.</u></strong> The other poll, by Rasmussen, does not have a transparent way to survey voters without a landline telephone, and its record has not been very strong in recent years.<u><strong> </u></strong>The fairest read of the available data is that Mr. Sullivan, the Republican, has the edge. After all, he has the edge in the only two data points since his nomination. That’s why Leo, The Upshot’s Senate model, gives Mr. Sullivan a 55 percent chance of winning.<u><strong> </u></strong>But there are two ways that one can have a 55 percent chance of winning. One can imagine, for instance, a race in which a lot of polling makes it quite clear that one candidate has a narrow lead. On the other hand, the 55 percent in Alaska reflects a great deal of uncertainty about the state of the race.<u><strong> There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points. So <mark>a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska</u></strong></mark> — and I’m not sure we’ll ever have a great sense of the race, given the polling challenges. But this much is clear: <u><strong><mark>If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats</u></strong></mark>, as of today.</p>
1NR
DA
AK
429,802
11
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,458
No warming -- the best data proves
Whitehouse 13
Whitehouse 13 (David, PhD in Astrophysics, the Science Editor of the Global Warming Policy Foundation and BBC Science Correspondent and Editor, “The Global Warming Standstill”, The Global Warming Policy Foundation, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2013/03/Whitehouse-GT_Standstill.pdf, AB)
nobody predicted that in the age of global warming the annual average global temperature would remain unchanged for so long The observation was first made in 2006; the global annual average temperature had not increased for the previous five years even though many climate scientists were talking about anthropogenic global warming as the years passed all the major global temperature datasets showed no warming throughout the first decade of the 21st century some scientists got carried away by the intense ENSO of 1998, presuming future temperature changes would be relatively simple and strongly upward. when faced with the fact of no global temperature change in the past decade some suggest that the very strong ENSO of 1998 has influenced the statistics of subsequent years, giving the impression of a standstill or slight decline this is not the case; the standstill is independent of what happened in 1998 the global annual average temperature of the past decade, and in some datasets the past 15 years, has not increased Year-on-year fluctuations are within errors of measurement The only justifiable statistical description of the global temperature during this period is a constant this standstill can be seen in the datasets produced by NOAA, NASA, the BEST consortium, HadCRUT3, and especially, its successor HadCRUT4 15 years is not an insignificant period
nobody predicted temperature would remain unchanged for so long global annual average temperature had not increased all major temperature datasets showed no warming throughout the first decade of the 21st century the standstill is independent of what happened in 1998. global annual temperature in the past 15 years has not increased. Year fluctuations are within errors of measurement The only justifiable statistical description is a constant. this standstill can be seen in datasets produced by NOAA, NASA, BEST HadCRUT3 and HadCRUT4 15 years is not insignificant
In retrospect, nobody predicted that in the age of global warming the annual average global temperature would remain unchanged for so long. It began as a tentative observation but has become one of the most important investigations in climate science, and one of the major talking points for others interested in the debate about what is happening to our planet, and what we should do about it. The standstill observation was first made in 2006; the global annual average temperature had not increased for the previous five years, even though many climate scientists, and the media, were talking about an ever-warming planet powered by strong anthropogenic global warming. The initial debate was couched in cautious scientific terms but, because it ran counter to popular opinion, many dismissed it and questioned the motives of those pointing out these observational facts. But to the amazement of many, and the obvious annoyance of some, as the years passed all the major global temperature datasets showed no warming throughout the first decade of the 21st century and beyond. As this report shows, as the statistical significance of the standstill increased, the debate about its potential importance grew among many branches of science, even though many prominent scientists and institutions, and almost all of the media, were steadfastly looking the other way. With hindsight, it is also clear that some scientists got carried away by the intense ENSO of 1998, presuming future temperature changes would be relatively simple and strongly upward. Today, when faced with the fact of no global temperature change in the past decade or so, some suggest that the very strong ENSO of 1998 has influenced the statistics of subsequent years, giving the impression of a standstill or slight decline. As this report demonstrates, this is not the case; the standstill is independent of what happened in 1998. It is incontrovertible that the global annual average temperature of the past decade, and in some datasets the past 15 years, has not increased. Year-on-year fluctuations, and any trend over this period, are within errors of measurement. The only justifiable statistical description of the global temperature during this period is a constant. Technically, this standstill can be seen in the datasets produced by NOAA, NASA, the BEST consortium, HadCRUT3, and especially, its successor HadCRUT4. This standstill has occurred as atmospheric CO2 has increased from 370 parts per million (ppm) to 390 ppm, providing an increasing forcing factor that will raise global temperatures. Some argue that the duration of the standstill is too short to be meaningful. Thirty years is taken to be the baseline for observing climate changes and fifteen years is too short. This report argues that 15 years is not an insignificant period; what has happened to make temperatures remain constant requires an explanation. The period contains important information and should not be dismissed as having no climatic importance. The recent warming period began about 1980 after four decades of globally stable temperatures thus the years of constant temperature are about equal to years when temperatures increased. This is not a trivial observation
3,232
<h4>No warming -- the best data proves </h4><p><strong>Whitehouse 13</strong> (David, PhD in Astrophysics, the Science Editor of the Global Warming Policy Foundation and BBC Science Correspondent and Editor, “The Global Warming Standstill”, The Global Warming Policy Foundation, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2013/03/Whitehouse-GT_Standstill.pdf, AB)</p><p>In retrospect, <u><strong><mark>nobody predicted</mark> that in the age of global warming the annual average global <mark>temperature would</mark> <mark>remain</mark> <mark>unchanged</mark> <mark>for so long</u></strong></mark>. It began as a tentative observation but has become one of the most important investigations in climate science, and one of the major talking points for others interested in the debate about what is happening to our planet, and what we should do about it. <u><strong>The</u></strong> standstill <u><strong>observation was first made in 2006;</u></strong> <u><strong>the <mark>global annual average temperature had not increased</mark> for the previous five years</u></strong>, <u><strong>even though many climate scientists</u></strong>, and the media, <u><strong>were talking about</u></strong> an ever-warming planet powered by strong <u><strong>anthropogenic global warming</u></strong>. The initial debate was couched in cautious scientific terms but, because it ran counter to popular opinion, many dismissed it and questioned the motives of those pointing out these observational facts. But to the amazement of many, and the obvious annoyance of some, <u><strong>as the years passed <mark>all</mark> the <mark>major</mark> global <mark>temperature</mark> <mark>datasets</mark> <mark>showed no warming</mark> <mark>throughout</mark> <mark>the first decade</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>the 21st century</u></strong></mark> and beyond. As this report shows, as the statistical significance of the standstill increased, the debate about its potential importance grew among many branches of science, even though many prominent scientists and institutions, and almost all of the media, were steadfastly looking the other way. With hindsight, it is also clear that <u><strong>some scientists got carried away by the intense ENSO of 1998, presuming future temperature changes would be relatively simple and strongly upward.</u></strong> Today, <u><strong>when faced with the fact of no global temperature change in the past decade</u></strong> or so, <u><strong>some suggest that the very strong ENSO of 1998 has influenced the statistics of subsequent years, giving the impression of a standstill or slight decline</u></strong>. As this report demonstrates, <u><strong>this is not the case; <mark>the standstill is</mark> <mark>independent of what</mark> <mark>happened in 1998</u></strong>.</mark> It is incontrovertible that <u><strong>the <mark>global</mark> <mark>annual</mark> average <mark>temperature</mark> of the past decade, and <mark>in</mark> some datasets <mark>the past 15 years</mark>, <mark>has not increased</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Year</mark>-on-year <mark>fluctuations</u></strong></mark>, and any trend over this period, <u><strong><mark>are within</mark> <mark>errors</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>measurement</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The only</mark> <mark>justifiable</mark> <mark>statistical description</mark> of the global temperature during this period <mark>is a constant</u></strong>.</mark> Technically, <u><strong><mark>this standstill</mark> <mark>can be seen in</mark> the <mark>datasets produced by</mark> <mark>NOAA, NASA,</mark> the <mark>BEST</mark> consortium, <mark>HadCRUT3</mark>, <mark>and</mark> especially, its successor <mark>HadCRUT4</u></strong></mark>. This standstill has occurred as atmospheric CO2 has increased from 370 parts per million (ppm) to 390 ppm, providing an increasing forcing factor that will raise global temperatures. Some argue that the duration of the standstill is too short to be meaningful. Thirty years is taken to be the baseline for observing climate changes and fifteen years is too short. This report argues that <u><strong><mark>15 years is not </mark>an <mark>insignificant</mark> period</u></strong>; what has happened to make temperatures remain constant requires an explanation. The period contains important information and should not be dismissed as having no climatic importance. The recent warming period began about 1980 after four decades of globally stable temperatures thus the years of constant temperature are about equal to years when temperatures increased. This is not a trivial observation</p>
1NC
CASE
AT: Warming
429,868
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,459
Legalization on the midterm ballot spurs democratic win -- proven with the Alaska race
Walker 14
Walker 14
Could End up Saving Democratic Control of the Senate”, AB marijuana legalization could now be what helps Democrats narrowly maintain control of the Senate law required local election officials to move a marijuana legalization initiative scheduled for the primary ballot to the November general election This date change could save Begich re-election bid and Democrats control of the Senate having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people to vote the three states with legalization initiatives saw a significant increase in the percent of young voters 69 percent said they were more likely to turn out if marijuana legalization is on the ballot. any increase in youth turnout will have a noticeable benefit for Begich Even a modest boost in youth turnout can legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss for Begich given how close the race is. Alaska is the most competitive Senate race this year it is also currently projected to be the tipping point election which will decide control of the Senate moved marijuana legalization may just prove to be the small edge Begich, and by extension the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win.
legalization could be what helps Democrats narrowly maintain control of the Senate law to move a marijuana legalization initiative to the November general election This change could save Begich and Democrats control of the Senate having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people vote 69 percent said they were more likely to turn out any increase in turnout will benefit Begich Even a modest boost can legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss given how close the race is Alaska is the most competitive race marijuana legalization may prove to be the edge Begich and by extension the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win
Jon, Election analyst for FDL, http://elections.firedoglake.com/2014/04/22/how-marijuana-legalization-could-end-up-saving-democratic-control-of-the-senate/, “How Marijuana Legalization Could End up Saving Democratic Control of the Senate”, AB Thanks to a strange series of coincidences marijuana legalization could now be what helps Democrats narrowly maintain control of the Senate – even though not one Senate Democrat is willing to publicly support this popular change yet. Democrats have the Alaska state legislature’s inability to work quickly for this potential pot political windfall. This week the Alaska legislature needed to go into extend session, which means they will not finish work 120 days before the August 19th primary. As a result Alaska law required local election officials to move a marijuana legalization initiative scheduled for the August primary ballot to the November general election. This date change could be what narrowly save Sen. Mark Begich (D-AK) re-election bid and Democrats control of the Senate. There are strong indications that having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people to vote. In 2012 the three states with legalization initiatives saw a significant increase in the percent of young voters compared to 2008, but there was no similar increase in the rest of the country. Similarly, a George Washington Battleground poll found 69 percent said they were more likely to turn out if marijuana legalization is on the ballot. Since Democrats have a 13 point affiliation advantage with voters under 30, any increase in youth turnout will have a noticeable benefit for Begich. Even a modest boost in youth turnout can legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss for Begich given how close the race is. According to a new analysis by the New York Times, Alaska is the most competitive Senate race this year with Democrats and Republicans having exactly a 50 percent chance of winning. More importantly, it is also currently projected to be the tipping point election which will decide control of the Senate. On November 4th the nation could easily be up late waiting for result from Alaska to tell us if Democrats end up with a 50 senator majority (plus the Vice President who is the tie breaker) or 49 seat minority. This one recently moved marijuana legalization initiative may just prove to be the small edge Begich, and by extension the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win.
2,484
<h4>Legalization on the midterm ballot spurs democratic<strong> </strong>win<strong> -- proven with the Alaska race</h4><p>Walker 14</p><p></strong>Jon, Election analyst for FDL, http://elections.firedoglake.com/2014/04/22/how-marijuana-legalization-could-end-up-saving-democratic-control-of-the-senate/, “How Marijuana Legalization <u><strong>Could End up Saving Democratic Control of the Senate”, AB </p><p></u></strong>Thanks to a strange series of coincidences <u><strong>marijuana <mark>legalization could</mark> now <mark>be what helps Democrats</mark> <mark>narrowly maintain control of the Senate</u></strong></mark> – even though not one Senate Democrat is willing to publicly support this popular change yet. Democrats have the Alaska state legislature’s inability to work quickly for this potential pot political windfall. This week the Alaska legislature needed to go into extend session, which means they will not finish work 120 days before the August 19th primary. As a result Alaska <u><strong><mark>law</mark> required local election officials <mark>to move a marijuana legalization initiative</mark> scheduled for the</u></strong> August <u><strong>primary</u></strong> <u><strong>ballot</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>to the November general election</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This</mark> date <mark>change could</u></strong> </mark>be what narrowly <u><strong><mark>save</u></strong></mark> Sen. Mark <u><strong><mark>Begich</u></strong></mark> (D-AK) <u><strong>re-election bid <mark>and Democrats control of the Senate</u></strong></mark>. There are strong indications that <u><strong><mark>having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people</mark> to <mark>vote</u></strong></mark>. In 2012 <u><strong>the three states with legalization initiatives saw a significant increase in the percent of young voters</u></strong> compared to 2008, but there was no similar increase in the rest of the country. Similarly, a George Washington Battleground poll found <u><strong><mark>69 percent said they were more likely to turn out</mark> if marijuana legalization is on the ballot.</u></strong> Since Democrats have a 13 point affiliation advantage with voters under 30, <u><strong><mark>any increase in</mark> youth <mark>turnout</mark> <mark>will</mark> have a noticeable <mark>benefit</mark> for <mark>Begich</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even a modest boost</mark> in youth turnout <mark>can</mark> <mark>legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss</mark> for Begich <mark>given how close the race is</mark>. </u></strong>According to a new analysis by the New York Times, <u><strong><mark>Alaska is the most</mark> <mark>competitive</mark> Senate <mark>race</mark> this year</u></strong> with Democrats and Republicans having exactly a 50 percent chance of winning. More importantly, <u><strong>it is also currently projected to be the tipping point election which will decide control of the Senate</u></strong>. On November 4th the nation could easily be up late waiting for result from Alaska to tell us if Democrats end up with a 50 senator majority (plus the Vice President who is the tie breaker) or 49 seat minority. This one recently <u><strong>moved <mark>marijuana</mark> <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> initiative <u><strong><mark>may</mark> just <mark>prove to be the</mark> small <mark>edge</mark> <mark>Begich</mark>, <mark>and by extension</mark> <mark>the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NR
DA
AK
429,869
5
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,460
Diseases won’t cause extinction – burnout or variation
York 14
York 14 Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species#THUR
mostly diseases don't drive species extinct the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other Highly contagious diseases tend to burn out the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens less virulent either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV There is a small fraction naturally resistant or altogether immune And there are a handful of people who were infected that didn't progress to disease We can see this in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population.
diseases don't drive species extinct Highly contagious diseases tend to burn out the reason is variation . you end up with infected individuals who survive our genomes contain instances of pathogen resistance genes that spread through the population
But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.
1,362
<h4><strong>Diseases won’t cause extinction – burnout or variation</h4><p>York 14 </strong>Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species#THUR</p><p>But <u><strong>mostly <mark>diseases don't drive species extinct</u></strong></mark>. There are several reasons for that. For one, <u><strong>the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other</u></strong> during the infectious phase. <u><strong><mark>Highly contagious diseases tend to burn </u></strong></mark>themselves<u><strong> <mark>out</u></strong></mark> that way. Probably <u><strong><mark>the</mark> main <mark>reason is variation</mark>. Within the host and the pathogen population</u></strong> there will be a wide range of variants. <u><strong>Some hosts may be naturally resistant<mark>.</mark> Some pathogens</u></strong> will be <u><strong>less virulent</u></strong>. And <u><strong>either alone or in combination, <mark>you end up with infected individuals who survive</mark>. We see this in HIV</u></strong>, for example. <u><strong>There is a small fraction</u></strong> of humans who are <u><strong>naturally resistant or</u></strong> <u><strong>altogether immune</u></strong> to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. <u><strong>And there are a handful of people who were infected </u></strong>with defective versions of HIV<u><strong> that didn't progress to disease</u></strong>. <u><strong>We can see</u></strong> indications of <u><strong>this</u></strong> sort of thing happening <u><strong>in the past, because <mark>our genomes contain </mark>many <mark>instances of pathogen resistance genes that </mark>have <mark>spread through the </mark>whole <mark>population</mark>.</u> Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.</p></strong>
1NC
CASE
AT: Disease
24,497
495
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,461
4. More evidence – history and demographics prove
Hudak 8/20 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/08/20-harry-reid-marijuana-keep-the-senate-blue-hudak
Hudak 8/20 <John, Fellow of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institute, Managing Editor, FixGov Blog, “Harry Reid Should Love Marijuana: How Legalization Could Keep the Senate Blue,” http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/08/20-harry-reid-marijuana-keep-the-senate-blue-hudak
Marijuana legalization might ensure Harry Reid remains the Senate Majority Leader in 2014. In a year in which the battle for majority control of the Senate is the biggest story of the midterms, every race counts. One of the more competitive battles for the Senate is taking place in Alaska the Alaska Senate race is competitive. Marijuana legalization could change that by dramatically changing the character and nature of the midterm electorate in Alaska, and helping Sen. Begich win reelection. People turn out for elections when they feel passion about a candidate or a race, but ballot initiatives can also generate interest, passion and turnout. In 2012, Colorado and Washington had statewide referenda on the question of marijuana legalization. With those initiatives on the ballot, the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant ways. Using exit poll data to compare changes in the characteristics of the electorate in each state between 2008 and 2012, we can make inferences about the effects of legalization initiatives. There is also evidence those electoral shifts helped Democrats. In Colorado, those who voted in favor of Amendment 64 (marijuana legalization) voted for President Obama at a rate of 68%—far above his support among all Colorado voters (51%). Alaska will vote whether to legalize marijuana this November, and regardless of the outcomes, the presence of those initiatives will likely drive younger and more liberal voters to the polls. Marijuana may keep Mark Begich in the Senate and Harry Reid at the helm in 2014,
Marijuana legalization might ensure Harry Reid remains the Senate Majority Leader in 2014. every race counts. One of the more competitive is Alaska Marijuana legalization could change that by dramatically changing the character and nature of the midterm electorate in Alaska, and helping Sen. Begich win reelection. ballot initiatives generate interest, passion and turnout. the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant ways. those electoral shifts helped Democrats. the presence of those initiatives will likely drive younger and more liberal voters to the polls. Marijuana may keep Mark Begich in the Senate and Harry Reid at the helm in 2014,
Marijuana legalization might ensure Harry Reid remains the Senate Majority Leader in 2014. In a year in which the battle for majority control of the Senate is the biggest story of the midterms, every race counts. One of the more competitive battles for the Senate is taking place in Alaska, where incumbent Sen. Mark Begich is fighting for another six-year term. However, the Senate race is not the only choice Alaskans will face this November. They will decide whether their state will legalize recreational marijuana, following their counterparts to the south: Washington and Colorado. There are many reasons why the Alaska Senate race is competitive. Begich eked out a win in 2008 over the late Senator Ted Stevens. Alaska is a conservative, Republican-voting state. Mitt Romney carried the state by 14 points in 2012. In fact, Alaska has only given its electoral votes to a Democratic candidate once since statehood, during LBJ’s 1964 landslide victory. Finally, this year’s Senate race falls during a midterm, when electorates tend to favor Republican candidates, particularly with an unpopular Democrat in the White House. Marijuana legalization could change that by dramatically changing the character and nature of the midterm electorate in Alaska, and helping Sen. Begich win reelection. People turn out for elections when they feel passion about a candidate or a race, but ballot initiatives can also generate interest, passion and turnout. Research by Smith, DeSantis & Kassel illustrate that ballot initiatives in 2004 centering on outlawing same sex marriage generated additional turnout (even in a presidential year) among conservatives in key states. Passion about marijuana legalization can do the same, and we have evidence of this effect. In 2012, Colorado and Washington had statewide referenda on the question of marijuana legalization. With those initiatives on the ballot, the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant ways. Using exit poll data to compare changes in the characteristics of the electorate in each state between 2008 and 2012, we can make inferences about the effects of legalization initiatives. Marijuana legalization supporters, particularly passionate ones, tend to be younger and either more liberal or more libertarian in nature—though recent polls suggest broader support in the electorate. In Washington in 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 10% of the electorate. In 2012, with legalization on the ballot, that number increased to 21% of the electorate—a more than 100% increase. The effect was even more pronounced for the 18-24 demographic, where electoral composition increased from 5% to 13%. In addition, in 2008, 27% of the electorate called themselves “liberal.” In 2012, that number increased to 31%. Similar trends existed in Colorado. In 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 14% of the electorate. In 2012, that group composed 20% of voters. In fact, in Colorado the 18-24 demographic increased from 5% to 12% of the electorate from 2008 to 2012. The ideological composition of turnout changed as well. In 2008, 17% of the electorate called itself liberal. In 2012, that figure skyrocketed to 28%. In Washington and Colorado, the composition of those who turned out to vote changed dramatically between 2008 and 2012—each a presidential year. Nationally, there was little change in the composition of the electorate in terms of youth and liberalism. But in the states with marijuana legalization initiatives it did, dramatically. There is also evidence those electoral shifts helped Democrats. In Colorado, those who voted in favor of Amendment 64 (marijuana legalization) voted for President Obama at a rate of 68%—far above his support among all Colorado voters (51%). Similarly, in Washington, among those who voted in favor of Initiative 502 (marijuana legalization), 72% also voted for President Obama. The president won about 56% statewide. Roll Call’s Henry Decker and FireDogLake’s Jon Walker have also offered great insight into how electoral changes coincide with marijuana legalization initiatives. However, there is more to this story than simply turnout. In many ways, Democrats have missed a real opportunity to make electoral gains—or limit losses—by pushing legalization initiatives. Some credit President Bush’s reelection in 2004 to the push for same sex marriage initiatives on statewide ballots by spurring social conservative turnout. Democrats could have received a similar boost by pushing legalization initiatives that would alter the electorate in a year when Democrats need it for structural and political reasons. Nevertheless, marijuana legalization efforts are quite different than 2004 same sex marriage initiatives—even beyond the nature of the issues themselves. Same sex marriage initiatives were pushed by the Republican Party in 2004. Efforts in the White House, Congress, and in statehouses drove such initiatives and the political planning around them. On the other hand, the Democratic Party is not spearheading legalization efforts. In fact, there are many factions of the Democratic Party still quite resistant to legalization. Instead, legalization supporters are the ones pushing legalization initiatives. They compose an odd combination of liberal Democrats, libertarian and conservative Republicans, and apathetic moderates. In many ways, Democratic Party institutions are still not ready or too timid to spearhead legalization movements. And frankly, legalization supporters would likely resist such party control of the movement—and for good reason. Including legalization initiatives on midterm ballots would almost certainly change the composition of the electorate, but they do not guarantee a win. In fact, the standard composition of midterm electorates—which favors older, wealthier, and more conservative voters—will likely discourage initiatives in many states because of the risk of failure. When a state rejects an initiative, it serves as a blow to the momentum of that movement within the state—something legalization supporters would prefer to avoid. Alaska and Oregon will vote whether to legalize marijuana this November, and regardless of the outcomes, the presence of those initiatives will likely drive younger and more liberal voters to the polls. However, legalization supporters would be wise to wait until 2016 and capitalize on a dual effect. A presidential election year will bring out voters more sympathetic to legalization, and legalization will bring out even more young, liberal voters than normal. Marijuana may keep Mark Begich in the Senate and Harry Reid at the helm in 2014, but it may have an even bigger impact on Democratic gains in 2016.
6,700
<h4>4. More evidence – history and demographics prove</h4><p><strong>Hudak 8/20 </strong><John, Fellow of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institute, Managing Editor, FixGov Blog, “Harry Reid Should Love Marijuana: How Legalization Could Keep the Senate Blue,” <u><strong>http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/08/20-harry-reid-marijuana-keep-the-senate-blue-hudak</p><p><mark>Marijuana legalization might ensure Harry Reid remains the Senate Majority Leader in 2014.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In a year in which the battle for majority control of the Senate is the biggest story of the midterms, <mark>every race counts.</mark> <mark>One of the more competitive</mark> battles for the Senate <mark>is</mark> taking place in <mark>Alaska</u></strong></mark>, where incumbent Sen. Mark Begich is fighting for another six-year term. However, the Senate race is not the only choice Alaskans will face this November. They will decide whether their state will legalize recreational marijuana, following their counterparts to the south: Washington and Colorado. There are many reasons why <u><strong>the Alaska Senate race is competitive.</u></strong> Begich eked out a win in 2008 over the late Senator Ted Stevens. Alaska is a conservative, Republican-voting state. Mitt Romney carried the state by 14 points in 2012. In fact, Alaska has only given its electoral votes to a Democratic candidate once since statehood, during LBJ’s 1964 landslide victory. Finally, this year’s Senate race falls during a midterm, when electorates tend to favor Republican candidates, particularly with an unpopular Democrat in the White House. <u><strong><mark>Marijuana legalization could change that by dramatically changing the character and nature of the midterm electorate in Alaska, and helping Sen. Begich win reelection.</mark> People turn out for elections when they feel passion about a candidate or a race, but <mark>ballot initiatives</mark> can also <mark>generate interest, passion and turnout.</u></strong></mark> Research by Smith, DeSantis & Kassel illustrate that ballot initiatives in 2004 centering on outlawing same sex marriage generated additional turnout (even in a presidential year) among conservatives in key states. Passion about marijuana legalization can do the same, and we have evidence of this effect. <u><strong>In 2012, Colorado and Washington had statewide referenda on the question of marijuana legalization. With those initiatives on the ballot, <mark>the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant ways.</mark> Using exit poll data to compare changes in the characteristics of the electorate in each state between 2008 and 2012, we can make inferences about the effects of legalization initiatives. </u></strong>Marijuana legalization supporters, particularly passionate ones, tend to be younger and either more liberal or more libertarian in nature—though recent polls suggest broader support in the electorate. In Washington in 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 10% of the electorate. In 2012, with legalization on the ballot, that number increased to 21% of the electorate—a more than 100% increase. The effect was even more pronounced for the 18-24 demographic, where electoral composition increased from 5% to 13%. In addition, in 2008, 27% of the electorate called themselves “liberal.” In 2012, that number increased to 31%. Similar trends existed in Colorado. In 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 14% of the electorate. In 2012, that group composed 20% of voters. In fact, in Colorado the 18-24 demographic increased from 5% to 12% of the electorate from 2008 to 2012. The ideological composition of turnout changed as well. In 2008, 17% of the electorate called itself liberal. In 2012, that figure skyrocketed to 28%. In Washington and Colorado, the composition of those who turned out to vote changed dramatically between 2008 and 2012—each a presidential year. Nationally, there was little change in the composition of the electorate in terms of youth and liberalism. But in the states with marijuana legalization initiatives it did, dramatically. <u><strong>There is also evidence <mark>those electoral shifts helped Democrats.</mark> In Colorado, those who voted in favor of Amendment 64 (marijuana legalization) voted for President Obama at a rate of 68%—far above his support among all Colorado voters (51%). </u></strong>Similarly, in Washington, among those who voted in favor of Initiative 502 (marijuana legalization), 72% also voted for President Obama. The president won about 56% statewide. Roll Call’s Henry Decker and FireDogLake’s Jon Walker have also offered great insight into how electoral changes coincide with marijuana legalization initiatives. However, there is more to this story than simply turnout. In many ways, Democrats have missed a real opportunity to make electoral gains—or limit losses—by pushing legalization initiatives. Some credit President Bush’s reelection in 2004 to the push for same sex marriage initiatives on statewide ballots by spurring social conservative turnout. Democrats could have received a similar boost by pushing legalization initiatives that would alter the electorate in a year when Democrats need it for structural and political reasons. Nevertheless, marijuana legalization efforts are quite different than 2004 same sex marriage initiatives—even beyond the nature of the issues themselves. Same sex marriage initiatives were pushed by the Republican Party in 2004. Efforts in the White House, Congress, and in statehouses drove such initiatives and the political planning around them. On the other hand, the Democratic Party is not spearheading legalization efforts. In fact, there are many factions of the Democratic Party still quite resistant to legalization. Instead, legalization supporters are the ones pushing legalization initiatives. They compose an odd combination of liberal Democrats, libertarian and conservative Republicans, and apathetic moderates. In many ways, Democratic Party institutions are still not ready or too timid to spearhead legalization movements. And frankly, legalization supporters would likely resist such party control of the movement—and for good reason. Including legalization initiatives on midterm ballots would almost certainly change the composition of the electorate, but they do not guarantee a win. In fact, the standard composition of midterm electorates—which favors older, wealthier, and more conservative voters—will likely discourage initiatives in many states because of the risk of failure. When a state rejects an initiative, it serves as a blow to the momentum of that movement within the state—something legalization supporters would prefer to avoid. <u><strong>Alaska</u></strong> and Oregon <u><strong>will vote whether to legalize marijuana this November, and regardless of the outcomes, <mark>the presence of those initiatives will likely drive younger and more liberal voters to the polls.</u></strong></mark> However, legalization supporters would be wise to wait until 2016 and capitalize on a dual effect. A presidential election year will bring out voters more sympathetic to legalization, and legalization will bring out even more young, liberal voters than normal. <u><strong><mark>Marijuana may keep Mark Begich in the Senate and Harry Reid at the helm in 2014, </u></strong></mark>but it may have an even bigger impact on Democratic gains in 2016.</p>
1NR
DA
AK
429,627
45
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,462
Intervening actors check disease impact
Zakaria 9—
Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)
After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered the usual seasonal influenza Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases Why did predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated there is a mistake in the way we look at the world. we rarely anticipate the human response///// to that crisis. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast But it did not go unchecked In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly The noted expert on this subject, Garrett, says, " 'Gracias, Mexico They really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected officials bring up the Spanish influenza of 1918 But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system
predictions turn out exaggerated we rarely anticipate human response///// to crisis swine flu was met by vigorous response The Mexican government brought transmission to a halt the world looks nothing like 1918 health-care systems are better
Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response///// to that crisis. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.
2,893
<h4><strong>Intervening actors check disease impact </h4><p>Zakaria 9—</strong>Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)</p><p>Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize</p><p>It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. <u>After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered</u> something more like <u>the usual seasonal influenza</u>. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. <u>Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected</u> by the disease. <u>But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases</u> of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? <u>Why did</u> the <u><mark>predictions</mark> of a pandemic <mark>turn out </mark>to be so <mark>exaggerated</u></mark>? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think <u>there is a</u> broader <u>mistake in the way we look at the world.</u> Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> can <u><mark>rarely <strong>anticipate</mark> the <mark>human response///// to</mark> that <mark>crisis</strong></mark>. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast</u>. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. <u>But it did not go unchecked</u>. <u>In fact, <mark>swine flu was met by</mark> an extremely <mark>vigorous response </mark>at its epicenter</u>, <u>Mexico. <mark>The Mexican government</mark> reacted quickly</u> and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. <u>The noted expert on this subject,</u> Laurie <u>Garrett, says, "</u>We should all stand up and scream, <u>'Gracias, Mexico</u>!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. <u>They</u> basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby <u>really <mark>brought transmission to a halt</mark>." Every time one of these viruses is detected</u>, writers and <u>officials bring up the Spanish influenza</u> epidemic <u>of 1918</u> in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. <u>But <mark>the world</mark> we live in today <mark>looks nothing like 1918</mark>. Public <mark>health-care systems are </mark>far <mark>better</u></mark> and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. <u>Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system</u>—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century. </p>
1NC
CASE
AT: Disease
49,494
151
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,463
ISIS isn’t enough
Kurtz 9/12 <Howard, Fox, “Why Obama’s assault on ISIS probably won’t save the Democrats this fall,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/12/why-obamas-assault-on-isis-probably-wont-save-democrats-this-fall/>#SPS
Kurtz 9/12 <Howard, Fox, “Why Obama’s assault on ISIS probably won’t save the Democrats this fall,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/12/why-obamas-assault-on-isis-probably-wont-save-democrats-this-fall/>#SPS
Could President Obama’s military move against ISIS derail the Republican freight train that appeared to be barreling toward victory in the midterm elections? It’s possible, but not very likely. whether or not Obama is leading from behind he has committed to using U.S. military power against the terrorists. And that could scramble the electoral outlook. The best-scenario for Obama is that a climate of being at war creates a rally-round-the-president effect. A sense of unity against a common enemy could boost his abysmal poll numbers And that could help some shaky Democratic candidates for whom the president has been an albatross. Obama is now viewed as at least trying to take the fight to the terrorists in the wake of those brutal beheadings. things could go badly on the battlefield: American casualties, civilians mistakenly targeted, and so on. Then public sentiment could shift against Obama But the most likely outcome, in my view, is this: The military assault against ISIS becomes a slog. There are lots of airstrikes with no clear outcome. Developing adequate Iraqi and Syrian partners on the ground takes time; mobilizing an international coalition takes even longer. People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.
Could President Obama’s military move against ISIS derail the Republican freight train It’s possible, but not very likely things could go badly on the battlefield: American casualties, civilians mistakenly targeted, and so on. Then public sentiment could shift against Obama, People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.
Could President Obama’s military move against ISIS derail the Republican freight train that appeared to be barreling toward victory in the midterm elections? It’s possible, but not very likely. Until Wednesday night’s speech, the president was taking a political beating on foreign policy that had a toxic effect on his approval ratings. And that was a major drag on vulnerable Democrats, especially those red-state senators trying to hang on and keep the chamber from tipping to the GOP. But now, whether or not Obama is leading from behind, as his critics say, he has committed to using U.S. military power against the terrorists. And that could scramble the electoral outlook. You think it’s an accident that Congress doesn’t want to vote on authorizing military force before November? The Republicans feel they have a winning hand and don’t want to roll the dice, and some Democrats are nervous as well. So much easier to just issue statements and take potshots if things go badly. Talk about leading from behind—the Hill isn’t leading at all. And most of the press, laser-focused on the White House, isn't holding the leadership accountable. The best-scenario for Obama is that a climate of being at war (though John Kerry refuses to use that word) creates a rally-round-the-president effect. A sense of unity against a common enemy could boost his abysmal poll numbers (38 percent approval in a new Fox survey). And that could help some shaky Democratic candidates for whom the president has been an albatross. At the very least, the president could stop the bleeding that intensified when he said he didn’t have a strategy to defeat ISIS. In the world of politics, being seen as doing something is usually preferable to doing nothing. Obama is now viewed as at least trying to take the fight to the terrorists in the wake of those brutal beheadings. At the same time, things could go badly on the battlefield: American casualties, civilians mistakenly targeted, and so on. Then public sentiment could shift against Obama, and by extension the Democrats, as people remembered what they didn’t like about being militarily engaged in Iraq. But the most likely outcome, in my view, is this: The military assault against ISIS becomes a slog. There are lots of airstrikes with no clear outcome. Developing adequate Iraqi and Syrian partners on the ground takes time; mobilizing an international coalition takes even longer. The story slips out of crisis mode, off the front pages and the top of the newscasts. And if that happens, the big voting issue remains the economy, to a lesser extent health care, and a general unease with the country’s direction. What’s more, the traditional pattern of the party in power losing seats in the sixth year of a presidency takes hold. If the military effort against ISIS goes poorly, questions will resurface about whether the media adequately warned about the risks, which few did in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In that vein, this passage in the New York Times is instructive: “Some officials and terrorism experts believe that the actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of television punditry and alarmist statements by politicians, and that there has been little substantive public debate about the unintended consequences of expanding American military action in the Middle East.” The Washington Post sounds this cautionary note: “President Obama’s strategy to beat back Islamic State militants spread across Iraq and Syria will depend on far more than U.S. bombs and missiles hitting their intended targets. “In Iraq, dissolved elements of the army will have to regroup and fight with conviction. Political leaders will have to reach compromises on the allocation of power and money in ways that have eluded them for years. Disenfranchised Sunni tribesmen will have to muster the will to join the government’s battle. European and Arab allies will have to hang together, Washington will have to tolerate the resurgence of Iranian-backed Shiite militias it once fought, and U.S. commanders will have to orchestrate an air war without ground-level guidance from American combat forces.” People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.
4,416
<h4>ISIS isn’t enough</h4><p><strong>Kurtz 9/12</strong> <u><strong><Howard, Fox, “Why Obama’s assault on ISIS probably won’t save the Democrats this fall,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/12/why-obamas-assault-on-isis-probably-wont-save-democrats-this-fall/>#SPS</p><p><mark>Could President Obama’s military move against ISIS derail the Republican freight train</mark> that appeared to be barreling toward victory in the midterm elections? <mark>It’s possible, but not very likely</mark>. </u></strong>Until Wednesday night’s speech, the president was taking a political beating on foreign policy that had a toxic effect on his approval ratings. And that was a major drag on vulnerable Democrats, especially those red-state senators trying to hang on and keep the chamber from tipping to the GOP. But now, <u><strong>whether or not Obama is leading from behind</u></strong>, as his critics say, <u><strong>he has committed to using U.S. military power against the terrorists. And that could scramble the electoral outlook. </u></strong>You think it’s an accident that Congress doesn’t want to vote on authorizing military force before November? The Republicans feel they have a winning hand and don’t want to roll the dice, and some Democrats are nervous as well. So much easier to just issue statements and take potshots if things go badly. Talk about leading from behind—the Hill isn’t leading at all. And most of the press, laser-focused on the White House, isn't holding the leadership accountable. <u><strong>The best-scenario for Obama is that a climate of being at war</u></strong> (though John Kerry refuses to use that word) <u><strong>creates a rally-round-the-president effect.</u></strong> <u><strong>A sense of unity against a common enemy could boost his abysmal poll numbers</u></strong> (38 percent approval in a new Fox survey). <u><strong>And that could help some shaky Democratic candidates for whom the president has been an albatross. </u></strong>At the very least, the president could stop the bleeding that intensified when he said he didn’t have a strategy to defeat ISIS. In the world of politics, being seen as doing something is usually preferable to doing nothing. <u><strong>Obama is now viewed as at least trying to take the fight to the terrorists in the wake of those brutal beheadings. </u></strong>At the same time, <u><strong><mark>things could go badly on the battlefield: American casualties, civilians mistakenly targeted, and so on.</u></strong> <u><strong>Then public sentiment could shift against Obama</u></strong>,</mark> and by extension the Democrats, as people remembered what they didn’t like about being militarily engaged in Iraq. <u><strong>But the most likely outcome, in my view, is this: The military assault against ISIS becomes a slog.</u></strong> <u><strong>There are lots of airstrikes with no clear outcome.</u></strong> <u><strong>Developing adequate Iraqi and Syrian partners on the ground takes time; mobilizing an international coalition takes even longer.</u></strong> The story slips out of crisis mode, off the front pages and the top of the newscasts. And if that happens, the big voting issue remains the economy, to a lesser extent health care, and a general unease with the country’s direction. What’s more, the traditional pattern of the party in power losing seats in the sixth year of a presidency takes hold. If the military effort against ISIS goes poorly, questions will resurface about whether the media adequately warned about the risks, which few did in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In that vein, this passage in the New York Times is instructive: “Some officials and terrorism experts believe that the actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of television punditry and alarmist statements by politicians, and that there has been little substantive public debate about the unintended consequences of expanding American military action in the Middle East.” The Washington Post sounds this cautionary note: “President Obama’s strategy to beat back Islamic State militants spread across Iraq and Syria will depend on far more than U.S. bombs and missiles hitting their intended targets. “In Iraq, dissolved elements of the army will have to regroup and fight with conviction. Political leaders will have to reach compromises on the allocation of power and money in ways that have eluded them for years. Disenfranchised Sunni tribesmen will have to muster the will to join the government’s battle. European and Arab allies will have to hang together, Washington will have to tolerate the resurgence of Iranian-backed Shiite militias it once fought, and U.S. commanders will have to orchestrate an air war without ground-level guidance from American combat forces.” <u><strong><mark>People don’t usually vote on foreign policy unless we’re engaged in a full-fledged war. If the assault on ISIS doesn’t have that feel by November, most folks will do what they usually do by voting their pocketbooks and rendering a judgment on the incumbent.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
DA
AT:ISIS
429,871
1
16,975
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
564,692
N
UMKC
2
Cal MS
Jake Justice
1AC - Marijuana Prohibition is Racist 1NC - Reeferendum Midterms (Dems Good - EPA) T-FW Cap K Mexico Econ DA 2NC - T-FW Cap K Case 1NR - Midterms DA Refeerendum CP 2NR - Cap K
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round2.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,464
B.) Certainty --
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>B.) <u>Certainty</u> --</h4>
2NC
CP
AT: Perm
429,870
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,465
First - “Resolved” means
null
re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\
find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) to make a definite decision to do something
to make a definite decision to do something
: to find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something) : to make a definite and serious decision to do something That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]
216
<h4>First - “Resolved” means </h4><p>re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\</p><p>: to<u><strong> find an answer or solution to (something) : to settle or solve (something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to make a definite</u></strong></mark> and serious <u><strong><mark>decision to do something</p><p></u></mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14 </strong>[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]</p>
2NC
CP
AT: Perm
429,571
3
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,466
Second - “Should” means
null
Should
to express obligation or expediency
to express obligation or expediency
1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal> That’s also Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]
437
<h4>Second - “Should” means </h4><p>Should<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>1—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)> 2—used in auxiliary function <u><strong><mark>to express obligation</u></strong></mark>, propriety, <u><strong><mark>or expediency</u></strong></mark> <'tis commanded I should do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal></p><p><strong>That’s also Merriam Webster 14</strong> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should]</p>
2NC
CP
AT: Perm
429,575
3
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,467
C.) Legalize --
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>C.) <u>Legalize</u> --</h4>
2NC
CP
AT: Perm
429,872
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,468
It means to authorize
RANDOM HOUSE 14
RANDOM HOUSE 14 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legalize]
le·gal·ize verb (used with object . to make legal; authorize.
le·gal·ize verb with object to make legal; authorize.
le·gal·ize [lee-guh-lahyz] Show IPA verb (used with object), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing. to make legal; authorize. Also, especially British, le·gal·ise.
154
<h4>It means to authorize</h4><p><strong>RANDOM HOUSE 14</strong> [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legalize]</p><p><u><strong><mark>le·gal·ize</u></strong></mark> [lee-guh-lahyz] Show IPA</p><p><u><strong><mark>verb</mark> (used <mark>with object</u></strong></mark>), le·gal·ized, le·gal·iz·ing<u><strong>.</p><p><mark>to make legal; authorize.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Also, especially British, le·gal·ise.</p>
2NC
CP
AT: Perm
429,583
5
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,469
Authorize means
null
au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\
to give power or permission to (someone or something) to give legal or official approval to or for (something)
to give legal or official approval for something That’s Merriam Webster 14
: to give power or permission to (someone or something) : to give legal or official approval to or for (something) That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]
194
<h4>Authorize means</h4><p>au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\</p><p>: <u><strong>to give power or permission to (someone or something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to give legal or official approval </mark>to or <mark>for</mark> (<mark>something</mark>)</p><p></u><mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14</strong></mark> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]</p>
2NC
CP
AT: Perm
429,588
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,470
National referendum has never happened – obvi not normal means
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>National referendum has never happened – obvi<strong> not normal means </h4></strong>
2NC
CP
2NC AT: Normal Means
429,873
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,471
***Legalization advocates concede HR 499 is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum
Sheets 13
Sheets 13
The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make headway toward legalizing pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill which is gaining supporters by the week The legislation proposes changes to federal law regarding marijuana remove it from its list of controlled substances and instead leave it to the states to regulate The bill continues to gain support in Congress Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had the timing may be good for such a full-bore push public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization
The fight by marijuana advocates toward legalizing pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope in the HR 499 which is gaining supporters by the week. The legislation proposes to remove it from its list of controlled substances and leave it to the states to regulate The bill continues to gain support Legalization advocates are focusing attention and energy propping it up as the best hope a piece of legislation has had the timing may be good for such a full push public opinion is moving in the direction of legalizing marijuana 52 percent support legalization
Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make some headway toward legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill, which is gaining supporters by the week. The proposed legislation, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, proposes a range of changes to federal law regarding marijuana, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and remove it from its list of controlled substances, and instead leave it to the states to regulate it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. The bill -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it continues to gain support in Congress. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that the timing may be good for such a full-bore push, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.
2,273
<h4><strong>***Legalization advocates concede HR 499 is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum </h4><p>Sheets 13</p><p></strong>Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> long, hard <mark>fight by marijuana advocates</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>make</u></strong> some <u><strong>headway <mark>toward legalizing</u></strong></mark>, or at least decriminalizing, <u><strong><mark>pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope</mark> this year in the U.S. Congress</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in</mark> the form of <mark>the HR 499</mark> bill</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>which is gaining supporters by the week</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> proposed <u><strong><mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, <u><strong><mark>proposes</u></strong></mark> a range of <u><strong>changes <mark>to</mark> federal law regarding marijuana</u></strong>, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and <u><strong><mark>remove it from</mark> <mark>its list of</mark> <mark>controlled substances</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> instead <mark>leave it to the states to regulate</u></strong></mark> it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. <u><strong><mark>The bill</u></strong></mark> -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it <u><strong><mark>continues to gain support</mark> in Congress</u></strong>. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. <u><strong><mark>Legalization advocates</mark> <mark>are focusing</mark> a lot of <mark>attention and energy</mark> on the bill, <mark>propping it up as the best hope</mark> such <mark>a piece of legislation has had</mark> </u></strong>in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that <u><strong><mark>the timing may be good for such a full</mark>-bore <mark>push</u></strong></mark>, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that <u><strong><mark>public</mark> <mark>opinion is moving</mark> quickly <mark>in the direction of legalizing marijuana</mark>, and that in fact <mark>52 percent</mark> of people asked in the survey said they <mark>support legalization</u></strong></mark>, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.</p>
2NC
CP
2NC AT: Normal Means
429,591
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,472
Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization
Robelo 13
Robelo 13
When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years
When Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the house politicians spoke of holding a national referendum
Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress, while other politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”
1,019
<h4><strong>Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization</h4><p>Robelo 13 </p><p></strong>Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>When</mark> the people of <mark>Colorado and Washington</mark> <mark>made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world</u></strong></mark> — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. <u><strong><mark>A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the</mark> lower <mark>house</mark> of congress</u></strong>, while other <u><strong><mark>politicians</mark> <mark>spoke of holding a national referendum </mark>in three years</u></strong>. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”</p>
2NC
CP
2NC AT: Theory
429,592
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,473
Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves
Quinn 14
Quinn 14 Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB
A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August The means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled
A ballot initiative that could make Alaska legalize marijuana will go before voters in a general election rather than in August The means a broader swath of the public is likely vote than if it had gone before voters as scheduled
(Reuters) - A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. The move means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled during a state primary election in August.
410
<h4><strong> Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves </h4><p>Quinn 14</p><p></strong>Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB </p><p>(Reuters) - <u><strong><mark>A ballot initiative that could make Alaska </mark>the third U.S. state to <mark>legalize </mark>recreational <mark>marijuana will go before voters in a general election</mark> in November <mark>rather than in August</u></strong></mark> as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> move <u><strong><mark>means</mark> that <mark>a broader swath of the public is likely</mark> to <mark>vote</mark> on the issue <mark>than if it had gone before voters as scheduled</u></strong></mark> during a state primary election in August.</p>
2NC
CP
2NC AT: Theory
429,594
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,474
They cause serial policy failure.
Dillon and Reid 00
Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))
Governmentality creates a market for policy serial policy failure--the fate of all policy--compels a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy will overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life governance installs inequitable distributions of danger through the ways in which life is problematized by it
Governmentality creates a market for policy serial policy failure the fate of all policy compels a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy will overcome Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which governance problematizes life governance installs inequitable distributions of danger
More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.
3,548
<h4>They cause serial policy failure.</h4><p><strong>Dillon and Reid 00</strong> (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))</p><p>More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.<u> <mark>Governmentality</mark> </u>thereby<u> <mark>creates a market for policy</u></mark>, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet<u> <mark>serial policy failure</mark>--<mark>the fate</u></mark> and the fuel <u><mark>of all policy</mark>--<mark>compels</u></mark> them into <u><mark>a continuous search for</u></mark> the <u><mark>new analysis</u></mark> that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] <u><mark>Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that</mark> </u>science and <u><mark>policy</u></mark>--and policy science--<u><mark>will</mark> </u>ultimately<u> <mark>overcome</mark>. <mark>Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which</mark> global <mark>governance</mark> encounters and <mark>problematizes life</u></mark> as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal<u> <mark>governance</mark> </u>is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately<u> <mark>installs</mark> </u>socially specific and radically<u> <mark>inequitable distributions of</mark> </u>wealth, opportunity, and mortal<u> <mark>danger</mark> </u>both locally and globally<u> through the </u>very detailed<u> ways in which life is</u> variously (policy) <u>problematized by it</u>. </p>
2NC
Security K
2NC Framework - Core
16,041
75
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,475
Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny
Antonio 95
Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)
Nietzsche considered roles" as "external," phenomena symptomatic of estrangement persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in fabrications to obtain advancement They are so absorbed in simulating role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible consequences and dialogue about what others might expect rotation of "masks" reduces persons to simulacra One adopts "many roles," playing them " superficially Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine This type of actor cannot plan for the long term Superficiality rules Nietzsche feared the simulated versions. they are "violent exploitative, , arrogant according to circumstances The combination of desperate conforming overreaching and ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant
Nietzsche considered roles" as "external," phenomena symptomatic of estrangement persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in fabrications to obtain advancement They are so absorbed in simulating role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by destroying overconcern about possible consequences and dialogue about what others might expect rotation of masks reduces persons to simulacra One adopts many roles," playing them superficially Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine This type of actor cannot plan for the long term Superficiality rules Nietzsche feared the simulated versions they are "violent, exploitative arrogant according to circumstances The combination of desperate conforming overreaching and ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant
According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).
5,159
<h4><u><strong>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He <u><mark>considered</mark> </u>"<u><mark>roles" as "external,"</mark> </u>"surface," or "foreground" <u><mark>phenomena</mark> </u>and viewed close personal identification with them as <u><mark>symptomatic of estrangement</u></mark>. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><mark>persons</mark> </u>(especially male professionals) <u><mark>in</mark> <mark>specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and</mark> <mark>engage in</mark> </u>gross<u> <mark>fabrications to obtain advancement</u></mark>. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><mark>They are so</mark> </u>thoroughly <u><mark>absorbed in simulating</mark> </u>effective<u> <mark>role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity.</u></mark> The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, <u><mark>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by </mark>paralyzing [<mark>destroying</mark>] <mark>overconcern about possible </u></mark>causes, meanings, and <u><mark>consequences</mark> </u>of acts <u><mark>and</mark> </u>unending internal <u><mark>dialogue about what others might</mark> </u>think,<u> <mark>expect</u></mark>, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous <u><mark>rotation of</mark> </u>socially appropriate <u>"<mark>masks</mark>" <mark>reduces persons to</mark> </u>hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or <u><mark>simulacra</u></mark>. <u><mark>One adopts</mark> "<mark>many roles," playing them</mark> "</u>badly and <u><mark>superficially</u></mark>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" <u><mark>Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine</mark> </u>article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. <u><mark>This type of actor cannot plan for the long term</u></mark> or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><mark>Superficiality rules </u></mark>in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply<u> <mark>feared the</mark> </u>new <u><mark>simulated versions</mark>. </u>Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; <u><mark>they are "violent</u>,</mark> envious,<u> <mark>exploitative</mark>, </u>scheming, fawning, cringing<u>, <mark>arrogant</u></mark>, all<u> <mark>according to</mark> <mark>circumstances</u></mark>. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><mark>The</mark> </u>deadly<u> <mark>combination</mark> <mark>of desperate conforming</mark> </u>and<u> <mark>overreaching</mark> <mark>and</mark> </u>untrammeled<u> <mark>ressentiment</mark> <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</mark> </u>(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p>
2NC
Security K
2NC Framework - Core
5,118
314
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,476
3 -- Political blueprints coopt alt solvency
Burke 07
Burke 07
Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2] Jones is quite, militant about this If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying where immanent possibilities exist such arguments are ultimately [devastating] disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down that the critical project is most important available contours of the present, confined within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, fail to provide a stable platform either for peace or a meaningful security he critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead they have too often formed into exciusivist communities whose ultimate survival is premised upon violenc Could a critique of security help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?
If [critical theorists succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for order they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically identifying where immanent possibilities exist, such arguments are ultimately [devastating] and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project at times of pessimism the critical project is most important the ontology of the state, fail to provide a stable platform for peace republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; they have formed into exciusivist communities premised upon violence.
Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2] A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn Jones is quite, militant about this: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying where immanent possibilities exist, such arguments are ultimately [devastating] disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - that the critical project is most important. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the available contours of the present, confined as they are within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, fail to provide a stable platform either for peace or a meaningful security. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, they have too often formed into exciusivist communities whose ultimate survival is premised upon violence. Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? Could a critique of security, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?
3,407
<h4>3 -- Political blueprints coopt alt solvency </h4><p><strong>Burke</strong> <strong>07</strong> </p><p><u>Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2]</p><p></u>A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn <u>Jones is quite, militant about this</u>: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... <u><mark>If [critical theorists</mark>] <mark>succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for</mark> an emancipated <mark>order</mark> that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [<mark>they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u>it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious</u>. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. <u>Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in <mark>identifying where immanent possibilities exist</u>, <u>such arguments are ultimately [devastating] </mark>disabling <mark>and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project</u></mark>. <u>It is precisely <mark>at times of</mark> the greatest <mark>pessimism</mark>, when new potentials are being shut down</u> or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - <u>that <mark>the critical project is most important</u></mark>. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the <u>available contours of the present, confined</u> as they are <u>within <mark>the</mark> masculinist <mark>ontology of the</mark> insecure nation-<mark>state, fail to provide a stable platform</mark> either <mark>for peace</mark> or a meaningful security</u>. In the face of such obstacles t<u>he critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. </u>The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and <u>the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that <mark>republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling;</mark> instead</u>, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, <u><mark>they have</mark> too often <mark>formed into exciusivist communities</mark> whose ultimate survival is <mark>premised upon violenc</u><strong>e</strong>.</mark> Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? <u>Could a critique of security</u>, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, <u>help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?</p></u>
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1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
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Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance
Alcock 9
Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)
Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.
food security’ is symptomatic of positivist epistemologies a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence we ought to historicize them food security reproduce the kind of managerial solutions which characterise the positivistic need for certainty while lip-service is occasionally paid to hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by objective’ methods of stratifying the ‘ insecure’ food security results in technocratic discourse I interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance the militaristic component of security discourse is reproduced in food security, through the notions of risk emergency
Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.
7,480
<h4><u>Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance </h4><p></u><strong>Alcock 9<u></strong> (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)</p><p>Since the 1970s, <strong>the concept of ‘<mark>food security’</mark> has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of</strong> global <strong>hunger has been viewed</strong>. The adoption of the term at <strong>the FAO</strong>-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which <strong>takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity</strong>’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). <strong>This</strong> pervasive predilection for empirical clarity <strong><mark>is symptomatic of</mark> traditional <mark>positivist epistemologies</strong></mark> and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that <strong>to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, <mark>a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence</mark> and meaning, <mark>we ought to historicize</mark> and relativize <mark>them</mark> as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories</strong>’ (1994: 10). <strong>The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity</strong>. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. <strong>The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm</strong>. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on <strong>the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government</strong>. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘<strong>reconstruction’ of <mark>food security</mark> and re-articulation of its normative criteria <mark>reproduce </mark>precisely <mark>the kind of </mark>technical, <mark>managerial</mark> set of <mark>solutions which characterise the positivistic need for</strong></mark> definitional <strong><mark>certainty</strong></mark> that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, <strong><mark>while lip-service is occasionally paid to</mark> the lives and faces of <mark>hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by</mark> increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘<mark>objective’ methods of</mark> identifying and <mark>stratifying the ‘</mark>food <mark>insecure</strong>’</mark>. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for <strong><mark>food security</strong></mark> is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This <strong><mark>results in</mark> a <mark>technocratic discourse</mark> which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact</strong> (thematic patterns) <strong>and deflects consideration of values choices</strong> and the social, moral <strong>and political responsibility for such choices</strong>’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. <strong><mark>I</mark> adopt a broad perspective from which to <mark>interrogate</mark> <mark>food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance</mark>. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s</strong>. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how <strong><mark>the militaristic component of</mark> traditional <mark>security discourse is</mark> <mark>reproduced in</mark> the wider agenda of <mark>food security, through the notions of risk</mark>, threat and permanent <mark>emergency</mark> that constitute its governmental rationale</strong>.</p></u>
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Their discursive construction of health and disease is mediated by colonialist understandings of the “foreign” and “dangerous” other—epidemiological discourses reproduce power relations that make disease a threat in the first place.
Lewis 7
Lewis 7 Bradley Lewis 07, Professor at New York University—Department of Psychiatry and the Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, 2007, “The New Global Health Movement: Rx for the World,” New Literary History, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 459-477
All discourses deployed by the global health movement are mediated by the culture, society, and politics in which they are produced. Intentionally or not, they reproduce and relocate cultural, societal, and political ideas and constructions, including problematic constructions of the contagious foreign "other." The association of "foreignness" with contagion has long been established in scientific discourses. germ theory" represents germs—or viruses as "foreign," "dangerous," "contagious," and a threat to the "pristine, clean, uninvaded, untouched" body; a body which itself is commonly figured as "the 'virgin' land of the new world Scientific discourses associated with HIV/AIDS offer recent examples of the way these constructions continue to be reproduced. Immunologic discourses frequently deploy a language of "foreignness and invasion" Epidemiological discourses on HIV/AIDS have similarly reinvigorated these stereotypes when they have designated entire populations—such as Haitians or sub-Saharan Africans—as "risk groups." The near consensus among AIDS immunologists and epidemiologists that Africa is the primary site of HIV also powerfully reinstalls the link between foreignness and contagion such exclusionary "othering" and racist stereotypes keep being reinstated, even by the world health advocates and scientists who are concerned with saving the globe against disease and ill health. If the global health movement does not take this into account it may well reproduce the very relations of exploitation, supremacy, and servitude underlying the social and survival crises that currently face our world.
discourses deployed by the global health movement reproduce problematic constructions of the contagious foreign "other." The association of "foreignness" with contagion has long been established in scientific discourses germ theory represents viruses—as "foreign," "dangerous," "contagious," and a threat to the "pristine body figured as "the 'virgin' land of the new world discourses on AIDS have reinvigorated these stereotypes when they designated Haitians or Africans—as "risk groups such exclusionary "othering" and racist stereotypes keep being reinstated, even by advocates concerned with saving the globe it may reproduce the very relations of exploitation, supremacy, and servitude underlying the social and survival crises that currently face our world.
Of course, Rx was made for popular audiences in the U.S. and so in its populist format, some may argue, it is more likely to reproduce these kinds of stereotypes than other more professional or expert discourses. This does not mean, however, that other medical discourses are devoid of these problematic "othering" stereotypes. All discourses deployed by the global health movement—whether they are political statements or funding agendas or the finite descriptions of disease behaviors in scientific papers—are mediated by the culture, society, and politics in which they are produced. Intentionally or not, they reproduce and relocate cultural, societal, and political ideas and constructions, including problematic constructions of the contagious foreign "other." The association of "foreignness" with contagion has long been established in scientific discourses. As Cindy Patton observes, the conflation of foreigners and "immigrants" with germs has been apparent since the emergence of "germ theory" in the late 1800s: a theory which was compounded by the emergence of immunology and virology in the twentieth century.36 This theory, and its more modern incarnations, represents germs—or, more belatedly, viruses—as "foreign," "dangerous," "contagious," and a threat to the "pristine, clean, uninvaded, untouched" body; a body which itself is commonly figured as "the 'virgin' land of the new world."37 Scientific discourses associated with HIV/AIDS—such as immunology and epidemiology—offer recent examples of the way these constructions continue to be reproduced. Immunologic discourses frequently deploy a language of "foreignness and invasion" in their accounts of HIV infection.38 Emily Martin cites one popular textbook that describes the process of "foreign antigen recognition" as the "human body's police force" being "programmed to distinguish between bona fide residents and illegal aliens."39 Epidemiological discourses on HIV/AIDS have similarly reinvigorated these stereotypes when they have designated entire populations—such as Haitians or sub-Saharan Africans—as "risk groups." The near consensus among AIDS immunologists and epidemiologists that Africa is the primary site of HIV also powerfully reinstalls the link between foreignness and contagion. Whether latent or manifest, such exclusionary "othering" and racist stereotypes keep being reinstated, even by the world health advocates (such as the makers of Rx) and scientists who are concerned with saving the globe against disease and ill health. If the global health movement does not take this into account it may well, in McFadden's words, reproduce the very relations of exploitation, supremacy, and servitude underlying the social and survival crises that currently face our world.
2,765
<h4><strong>Their discursive construction of health and disease is mediated by colonialist understandings of the “foreign” and “dangerous” other—epidemiological discourses reproduce power relations that make disease a threat in the first place. </h4><p>Lewis 7</p><p><u>Bradley Lewis 07, Professor at New York University—Department of Psychiatry and the Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, 2007, “The New Global Health Movement: Rx for the World,” New Literary History, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 459-477</p><p></u></strong>Of course, Rx was made for popular audiences in the U.S. and so in its populist format, some may argue, it is more likely to reproduce these kinds of stereotypes than other more professional or expert discourses. This does not mean, however, that other medical discourses are devoid of these problematic "othering" stereotypes. <u>All <mark>discourses deployed by the global health movement</u></mark>—whether they are political statements or funding agendas or the finite descriptions of disease behaviors in scientific papers—<u><strong>are mediated by the culture, society, and politics in which they are produced.</u></strong> <u>Intentionally or not, they <mark>reproduce</mark> and relocate cultural, societal, and political ideas and constructions, including <mark>problematic <strong>constructions of the contagious foreign "other."</strong> The association of "foreignness" with contagion has <strong>long been established in scientific discourses</mark>.</u></strong> As Cindy Patton observes, the conflation of foreigners and "immigrants" with germs has been apparent since the emergence of "<u><mark>germ theory</mark>"</u> in the late 1800s: a theory which was compounded by the emergence of immunology and virology in the twentieth century.36 This theory, and its more modern incarnations, <u><mark>represents</mark> germs—or</u>, more belatedly, <u><mark>viruses</u>—<u><strong>as "foreign," "dangerous," "contagious," and a threat to the "pristine</mark>, clean, uninvaded, untouched</strong>" <mark>body</mark>; a body which itself is commonly <mark>figured as "the 'virgin' land of the new world</u></mark>."37 <u>Scientific discourses associated with HIV/AIDS</u>—such as immunology and epidemiology—<u>offer recent examples of the way these constructions continue to be reproduced. Immunologic discourses frequently deploy a language of <strong>"foreignness and invasion"</u></strong> in their accounts of HIV infection.38 Emily Martin cites one popular textbook that describes the process of "foreign antigen recognition" as the "human body's police force" being "programmed to distinguish between bona fide residents and illegal aliens."39 <u>Epidemiological <mark>discourses on</mark> HIV/<mark>AIDS have</mark> similarly <mark>reinvigorated these stereotypes when they</mark> have <mark>designated</mark> entire populations—such as <mark>Haitians or</mark> sub-Saharan <mark>Africans—as "risk groups</mark>." The near consensus among AIDS immunologists and epidemiologists that Africa is the primary site of HIV also <strong>powerfully reinstalls the link</strong> between foreignness and contagion</u>. Whether latent or manifest, <u><strong><mark>such exclusionary "othering" and racist stereotypes keep being reinstated</strong>, even by</mark> the world health <mark>advocates</u> </mark>(such as the makers of Rx) <u>and scientists who are <mark>concerned with saving the globe </mark>against disease and ill health. If the global health movement does not take this into account <mark>it may </mark>well</u>, in McFadden's words, <u><strong><mark>reproduce the very relations of exploitation, supremacy, and servitude underlying the social and survival crises that currently face our world. </p></u></strong></mark>
2NC
Security K
2NC Link - Disease
16,105
9
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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48,385
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Baylor BaSh
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An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,479
Apocalyptic environment discourse creates a politics of danger that make totalitarian control necessary in the name of ecological protection.
Waever 1995
Waever 1995 (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64)
environmental security is its mobilization potential the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist in the environmental debates A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional This does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems It might ven lead to militarization of environmental problems The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to
environmental security41 label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority in debates environmental threats are unintentional : The consequence of thinking of environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of governmental responses by state organizations the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems. It might even lead to militarization of environmental problems The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left,
Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmental or ecological security41 is its mobilization potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist in the environmental debates."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.43 This, by itself, does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. As I pointed out earlier, the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems."45 It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.
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<h4>Apocalyptic environment discourse creates a politics of danger that make totalitarian control necessary in the name of ecological protection.</h4><p><strong>Waever 1995</strong> (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64)</p><p><u><mark> </p><p></u></mark>Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of <u><mark>environmental</u></mark> or ecological <u><mark>security</u>41</mark> <u>is its mobilization potential</u>. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "<u>the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security <mark>label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority</mark>, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist <mark>in</mark> the environmental <mark>debates</u></mark>."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. <u>A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that <mark>environmental threats are </mark>generally <mark>unintentional</u></mark>.43 <u>This</u>, by itself, <u>does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will.</u> As I pointed out earlier, <u>the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty</u>. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that <u>the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state<mark>: The</mark> most serious <mark>consequence of thinking of</mark> global change and other <mark>environmental</mark> <mark>problems as threats to security is that the sorts of</mark> centralized <mark>governmental responses by</mark> powerful and autonomous <mark>state organizations</mark> that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems.</u> When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, <u>when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical</u>. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "<u><mark>the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems</u>.</mark>"45 <u><mark>It</mark> <mark>might</u></mark>, he points out, <mark>e<u>ven lead to militarization of environmental problems</u></mark> .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 <u><mark>The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems</u></mark>." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that <u><mark>the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left,</mark>" which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism</u>." Certainly, there is some risk that <u>the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to</u> holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to <strong>totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.</p></strong>
2NC
Security K
2NC Link - Deforestation + Warming
265,481
6
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
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Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,480
Framing global warming in apocalyptic turns causes elite takeover and diminishes agency, exacerbating the problem
Foust and Murphy 2009
Foust and Murphy 2009
null
null
Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167
398
<h4>Framing global<strong> </strong>warming in apocalyptic turns causes elite takeover and diminishes agency, exacerbating the problem</h4><p><strong>Foust and Murphy 2009</strong> </p><p>Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 </p>
2NC
Security K
2NC Link - Deforestation + Warming
429,875
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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48,385
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Baylor BaSh
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An.....
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Si.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,481
Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse. Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, apocalyptic framing endows an array of experts and elites (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) with the power to understand, frame, and perhaps resolve the issue; helping fuel the common sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce global warming (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), or that they will not need to because "'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family (Moser & Dilling, 2004)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets, while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that awareness needs to work toward arousing the public toward action (Hallahan, 2001). In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change. The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.
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<h4><u><strong>Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse.</u></strong> Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, <u><strong><mark>apocalyptic framing</mark> <mark>endows</mark> an array of experts and <mark>elites</u></strong></mark> (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) <u><strong><mark>with the power to</mark> understand, <mark>frame</mark>, <mark>and</mark> perhaps <mark>resolve</mark> <mark>the issue;</mark> <mark>helping fuel the</mark> common <mark>sentiment that ordinary people</mark> <mark>cannot do anything to reduce</mark> global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), <u><strong><mark>or</mark> that they will not need to because "<mark>'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem</u></strong></mark>" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps <u><strong>by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family </u></strong>(Moser & Dilling, 2004<u><strong>)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets</u></strong><mark>,</mark> while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that <u><strong><mark>awareness needs to work toward arousing</mark> the <mark>public</mark> toward <mark>action</u></strong></mark> (Hallahan, 2001). In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. <u><strong>We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a <mark>collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions</u></strong></mark> (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). <u><strong>These efforts also <mark>must extend beyond</mark> <mark>the media to</mark> include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from <mark>kitchen tables</mark> and water coolers, to <mark>board rooms and classrooms.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>By providing the public</mark>, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), <mark>and community leaders with ways to structure</mark> <mark>communication that promote agency, rhetoricians</mark> might <mark>advance</mark> widespread <mark>public action</mark> on climate change</u></strong><mark>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The apocalyptic frame</u></strong>,</mark> particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It <u><strong><mark>has been</mark> <mark>developed over</mark> at least the last decade of press coverage, <mark>a time in which the US has refused all</mark> but the most paltry political <mark>action on greenhouse gas reductions</u></strong>.</mark> Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-<u><strong>we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. </u></strong>Together, <u><strong>we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity</u></strong>.</h4>
2NC
Security K
2NC Link - Deforestation + Warming
429,874
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,482
Fear appeals decrease individual engagement with global warming and result in passive nihilism. The 1AC starting point makes effective solutions to global warming impossible - we must begin with individual agency.
O'Neill 09
O'Neill 09 (Saffron O’Neill is a tutor at the University of East Anglia, and a research fellow with the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Sophie Nicholson-Cole is a senior research associate in the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. “Fear Won’t Do It” Promoting Positive Engagement With Climate Change Through Visual and Iconic Representations)
This article presents the integrated findings from two empirical, multimethod studies, Both studies underwent ethical scrutiny by senior colleagues before participant recruitment. the use of largely qualitative methods in both studies reported here complements recent large-scale quantitative U.K. survey research by allowing participants the space to freely articulate their personal interpretations of climate change, leading to a rich and exploratory data source results from both studies provide key evidence of the impact of using fear as a communication technique on people’s perceptions of climate change focus groups disagreed strongly with using fear as a communications tool In addition to distancing the viewer from the issue, fear-inducing communication approaches were found to enhance a sense of fatalism and thus act to encourage disengagement with climate change rather than positive engagement Participants in both studies generally felt that something should be done Although the majority noted that there are things that people can do to reduce the causes of climate change however, many tended to note that their conceptions of climate change as a global and to some extent distant and future issue made individual actions akin to “a drop in the ocean,” unlikely to make any significant contribution in relation to the scale of the problem. People feel like they can’t do anything. thinking about climate change made them feel so scared and depressed that they purposefully did not think about it Fear appeals increase this response leading to denial of the problem and disengagement with the whole issue in an attempt to avoid the discomfort of contending with it. The results were consistent across the whole sample, with no marked differences between groups or even clusters of individuals representing certain viewpoints
This article presents the findings from two empirical, multimethod studies the qualitative methods here complements recent large-scale quantitative U.K. survey research leading to a rich exploratory data source. . groups disagreed strongly with using fear as a communications tool In addition to distancing the viewer from the issue, fear-inducing communication enhance a sense of fatalism and encourage disengagement Participants felt something should be done many tended to note that their conceptions of climate change as a global issue made individual actions akin to “a drop in the ocean thinking about climate change made them so scared and depressed they purposefully did not think about it. Fear appeals increase this response, leading to denial of the problem The results were consistent across the whole sample
This article presents the integrated findings from two empirical, multimethod studies, both carried out by researchers at the University of East Anglia. Both studies underwent ethical scrutiny by senior colleagues before participant recruitment. The studies explored the influence of visual and iconic representations of climate change on people’s senses of engagement with the issue. As Lorenzoni et al. (2007) note, the use of largely qualitative methods in both studies reported here complements recent large-scale quantitative U.K. survey research by allowing participants the space to freely articulate their personal interpretations of climate change, leading to a rich and exploratory data source. It was not the central aim of either study to investigate the use of fear as a climate change communications tool. This article arose from a realization of the synergies that existed in the studies investigating public engagement with climate change and the critical role that fear messaging may play in engaging (or not) the public with climate change. When viewed together, results from both studies provide key evidence of the impact of using fear as a communication technique on people’s perceptions of climate change. Table 1 displays the methods used in the two studies. [CONTINUES] Participants in the focus groups disagreed strongly with using fear as a communications tool, instead, as previously discussed, citing examples of icons that engaged with people’s everyday life as key for inducing a sense of saliency. In addition to distancing the viewer from the issue, fear-inducing communication approaches were found to enhance a sense of fatalism and thus act to encourage disengagement with climate change rather than positive engagement. Participants in both studies generally felt that humans are largely causing climate change and that something should be done about it “before it’s too late.” Although the majority noted that there are things that people can do to reduce the causes of climate change however, many tended to note that their conceptions of climate change as a global and to some extent distant and future issue made individual actions akin to “a drop in the ocean,” unlikely to make any significant contribution in relation to the scale of the problem. Obviously, from a personal point of view you can walk, use the car less and things like that, and recycle stuff. . . . But on a more sort of wider scale then, I don’t think that the individual has got enough power to do a lot. (VisionS) People feel like they can’t do anything. And to be honest, it’s not going to really have a massive effect anyway. (VisionS) Although hoping that climate change would not affect them, three participants in the imagery study specifically noted that thinking about climate change made them feel so scared and depressed that they purposefully did not think about it. Fear appeals may act to increase this response, leading to denial of the problem and disengagement with the whole issue in an attempt to avoid the discomfort of contending with it. The Q-methodology results from the imagery study provide a clear insight into the use of fearful, emotive, or dramatic imagery and its impact on people’s engagement with climate change, specifically their personal senses of issue salience and self-efficacy. The Q-method output was in the form of sets of factors (e.g., McKeown & Thomas, 1988) that represented the most significant emerging points of view held by participants in relation to the pictures. The interpretation of the Q-sort factors, or viewpoints, was aided by reasoning provided by participants for their image rankings. In addition, the focus groups explored participants’ reasoning behind their Q-sorts. The results were consistent across the whole sample, with no marked differences between groups or even clusters of individuals representing certain viewpoints.
3,902
<h4>Fear<strong> </strong>appeals decrease individual engagement with global warming and result in passive nihilism. The 1AC starting point makes effective solutions to global warming impossible - we must begin with individual agency.</h4><p><strong>O'Neill 09</strong> (Saffron O’Neill is a tutor at the University of East Anglia, and a research fellow with the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Sophie Nicholson-Cole is a senior research associate in the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. “Fear Won’t Do It” Promoting Positive Engagement With Climate Change Through Visual and Iconic Representations)</p><p><u><strong><mark>This article presents the</mark> integrated <mark>findings from two empirical, multimethod studies</mark>,</u></strong> both carried out by researchers at the University of East Anglia. <u><strong>Both studies underwent ethical scrutiny by senior colleagues before participant recruitment.</u></strong> The studies explored the influence of visual and iconic representations of climate change on people’s senses of engagement with the issue. As Lorenzoni et al. (2007) note, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> use of largely <mark>qualitative methods</mark> in both studies reported <mark>here complements recent large-scale quantitative U.K. survey research</mark> by allowing participants the space to freely articulate their personal interpretations of climate change, <mark>leading to a rich</mark> and <mark>exploratory data source</u></strong>.</mark> It was not the central aim of either study to investigate the use of fear as a climate change communications tool. This article arose from a realization of the synergies that existed in the studies investigating public engagement with climate change and the critical role that fear messaging may play in engaging (or not) the public with climate change. When viewed together, <u><strong>results from both studies provide key evidence of the impact of using fear as a communication technique on people’s perceptions of climate change</u></strong><mark>.</mark> Table 1 displays the methods used in the two studies. [CONTINUES] Participants in the <u><strong>focus <mark>groups disagreed strongly with using fear as a communications tool</u></strong></mark>, instead, as previously discussed, citing examples of icons that engaged with people’s everyday life as key for inducing a sense of saliency. <u><strong><mark>In addition to distancing the viewer from the issue, fear-inducing communication</mark> approaches were found to <mark>enhance a</mark> <mark>sense of fatalism</mark> <mark>and</mark> thus act to <mark>encourage disengagement</mark> with climate change rather than positive engagement</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Participants</mark> in both studies generally <mark>felt</mark> that</u></strong> humans are largely causing climate change and that <u><strong><mark>something should be done</u></strong></mark> about it “before it’s too late.” <u><strong>Although the majority noted that there are things that people can do to reduce the causes of climate change however, <mark>many tended to note that their</mark> <mark>conceptions of climate change as a global</mark> and to some extent distant and future <mark>issue made individual</mark> <mark>actions akin to “a drop in the ocean</mark>,” unlikely to make any significant contribution in relation to the scale of the problem.</u></strong> Obviously, from a personal point of view you can walk, use the car less and things like that, and recycle stuff. . . . But on a more sort of wider scale then, I don’t think that the individual has got enough power to do a lot. (VisionS) <u><strong>People feel like they can’t do anything.</u></strong> And to be honest, it’s not going to really have a massive effect anyway. (VisionS) Although hoping that climate change would not affect them, three participants in the imagery study specifically noted that <u><strong><mark>thinking about climate change made</mark> <mark>them</mark> feel <mark>so scared and depressed</mark> that <mark>they purposefully did not think about it</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Fear appeals</u></strong></mark> may act to <u><strong><mark>increase</mark> <mark>this response</u></strong>, <u><strong>leading to denial of the problem</mark> and disengagement with the whole issue in an attempt to avoid the discomfort of contending with it.</u></strong> The Q-methodology results from the imagery study provide a clear insight into the use of fearful, emotive, or dramatic imagery and its impact on people’s engagement with climate change, specifically their personal senses of issue salience and self-efficacy. The Q-method output was in the form of sets of factors (e.g., McKeown & Thomas, 1988) that represented the most significant emerging points of view held by participants in relation to the pictures. The interpretation of the Q-sort factors, or viewpoints, was aided by reasoning provided by participants for their image rankings. In addition, the focus groups explored participants’ reasoning behind their Q-sorts. <u><strong><mark>The results were consistent across the whole sample</mark>, with no marked differences between groups or even clusters of individuals representing certain viewpoints</u></strong>. </p>
2NC
Security K
2NC Link - Deforestation + Warming
271,918
4
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,483
B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life
Baudrillard 76
Jean Baudrillard 76 (“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)
Security is another form of control, life blackmailed with the afterlife 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force this is above all the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system in this symbolic the gift-exchange is the challenge to one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion but because it carries a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our social principle. they die the only death the system authorizes This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.
Security is control life blackmailed with the afterlife this the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system the gift-exchange t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion but because it carries a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our social principle. they die the only death the system authorizes This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.
Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force .39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only death the system authorizes: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.
2,234
<h4>B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life </h4><p>Jean <strong>Baudrillard 76 <u></strong>(“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)</p><p><mark>Security is </mark>another form of </u>social <u><mark>control</mark>,</u> in the form of <u><mark>life blackmailed with the afterlife</u></mark>. It is universally present for us today, and <u>'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force </u>.39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But <u><mark>this </mark>is above all</u> a question of <u><mark>the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death</u></mark>, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. <u><mark>It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system</u></mark>. Again, <u>in this symbolic </u>short-circuit, <u><mark>the gift-exchange </mark>is the challenge to </u>oneself and<u> one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because i<mark>t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion </u></mark>(the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), <u><mark>but because it carries </u></mark>in it <u><mark>a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our </u></mark>own<u> <mark>social</mark> </u>repressive <u><mark>principle.</mark> </u>To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that <u><mark>they die the only death the system authorizes</u></mark>: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. <u><mark>This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.</p></u></mark>
2NC
Security K
2NC Impact Wall
148,321
49
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,484
That’s a reason to vote negative on presumption -- no VTL in squo means no reason to do the aff and only a risk the alternative rejuvenates that loss of value
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>That’s a reason to vote negative on presumption -- no VTL in squo means no reason to do the aff<u><strong> and only a risk the alternative rejuvenates that loss of value </h4></u></strong>
2NC
Security K
2NC Impact Wall
429,876
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,485
C SUBPOINT - The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan.
Kessler 2008
Kessler 2008 (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)
If risk is  defined by potential loss, even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as loss goes to infinity risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down uncertainty is a precondition for catastrophies. without a warning we find meteorites. tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. we do not know the most serious future threat, even absurd scenarios gain plausibility. By a chain , improbable events are linked "Although likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the impression is plausibility . The connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the improbable yet possible connection Rumsfeld said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."
If risk is  defined by potential loss, even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as loss goes to infinity risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down even absurd scenarios gain plausibility. By a chain improbable events Although likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the impression is plausibility The connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was refuted,  but this did not prevent the connection Rumsfeld said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence
The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is  defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of  meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will  constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct-  ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.   The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection  between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld  famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.
5,527
<h4>C SUBPOINT - <strong>The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan. </h4><p>Kessler 2008</strong> (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)</p><p>The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. <u><mark>If</u></mark> the <u><mark>risk</u></mark> of terrorism <u><mark>is  defined</mark> </u>in traditional terms <u><mark>by</mark> </u>probability and <u><mark>potential loss,</mark> </u>then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that <u><mark>even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as</mark> </u>the measure of <u><mark>loss goes to infinity</u></mark>.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and <u><mark>risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down</u></mark>. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; <u>uncertainty is a </u>crucial <u>precondition for catastrophies.</u> In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, <u>without a warning</u>, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, <u>we find </u>the impact of  <u>meteorites. </u>Mars attacks, the <u>tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.</u>  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that <u>we do not </u>even <u>know </u>who or what will  constitute <u>the most serious future threat, </u>"^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  <u><mark>even</mark> </u>the most <u><mark>absurd scenarios</mark> </u>can <u><mark>gain plausibility. By</mark> </u>construct-  ing <u><mark>a chain</mark> </u>of potentialities<u>, <mark>improbable events</mark> are linked </u>and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  <u>"<mark>Although</mark> </u>the <u><mark>likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the</mark> </u>residual <u><mark>impression is</mark> </u>one of <u><mark>plausibility</u></mark>. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of<u> </u>the recent war in Iraq<u>.</u>   <u><mark>The connection between Saddam</mark> </u>Hussein <u><mark>and Al Qaeda</mark> </u>that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence <u><mark>was</mark> </u>again and again <u>presented and <mark>refuted,  but this did not prevent</mark> </u>the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war <u><mark>the</mark> improbable yet possible <mark>connection</mark>  </u>between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald <u><mark>Rumsfeld</mark> </u> famously <u><mark>said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence</mark>."</u>  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.</p>
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2NC Impact Wall
10,122
937
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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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college
2
740,486
D SUBPOINT -- The affirmative paves over structural violence as a product of securitization and locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable
Szentes 8
Szentes 8 Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf
human society can survive only in a lasting real peace arms race and militarisation have escalated many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression racial discrimination organised injustice and in the degradation of human environment the “war against Nature and large-scale pollution of our environment Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns which tend to generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars The prerequisites of a lasting peace involve not only demilitarisation, but also a and elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of inequalities, exploitation and oppression Peace requires a process of emancipation peace cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced the question is not about “sustainability of development” but about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind we live in an almost permanent crisis The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated Earth can no longer afford to have two parts: the rich, privileged on the one hand, and the poor, deprived on the other
“invisible wars” are suffered by the poor manifested in mass , poverty starvation and oppression, and degradation of environment Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international inequities which generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for “visible” wars The prerequisites of a lasting peace involve demilitarisation and elimination of the causes of “invisible wars”, of structural bases of oppression peace cannot be safeguarded when some suffer invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured, unless inequalities are reduced. the question is about the survival of [hu]mankind we live in permanent cris selfish behaviour paves the way for the final catastrophe human society cannot survive unless intra-society and international inequalities are eliminated
It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.
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<h4><strong>D SUBPOINT -- The affirmative paves over structural violence as a product of securitization and locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable </h4><p>Szentes 8</p><p></strong>Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf</p><p>It’ s a common place that <u><strong>human society can survive</u></strong> and develop <u><strong>only in a lasting real peace</u></strong>. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --<u><strong>arms race and militarisation have</u></strong> not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but <u><strong>escalated</u></strong> and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --<u>many <mark>“invisible wars” are suffered by the poor</u></mark> and oppressed people, <u><mark>manifested in mass </mark>misery<mark>, poverty</mark>, unemployment, homelessness, <mark>starvation</u></mark> and malnutrition, <u><strong>epidemics and poor health conditions,</u></strong> <u>exploitation <mark>and oppression</u>,</mark> <u><strong>racial</u></strong> and other <u><strong>discrimination</u></strong>, physical terror, <u><strong>organised injustice</u></strong>, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., <u><mark>and</u></mark> last but not least, <u>in the <mark>degradation of </mark>human <mark>environment</u></mark>, which means that --<u><strong>the “war against Nature</u></strong>”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, <u><strong>and large-scale pollution of our environment</u></strong>, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. <u><mark>Behind</mark> </u>global terrorism and <u><mark>“invisible wars” we find striking international </mark>and intrasociety <mark>inequities</mark> and distorted development patterns</u> , <u><mark>which</mark> tend to <strong><mark>generate social as well as international tensions</u></strong></mark>, thus <u><strong><mark>paving the way for</strong></mark> unrest and <strong><mark>“visible” wars</u></strong></mark>. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. <u><strong><mark>The prerequisites of a lasting peace</u></strong></mark> between and within societies <u><strong><mark>involve </mark>not only</u></strong> - though, of course, necessarily - <u><strong><mark>demilitarisation</mark>, but also a</u></strong> systematic <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> gradual <u><strong><mark>elimination of the</mark> roots of violence, of the <mark>causes of “invisible wars”, of</mark> the <mark>structural</mark> and institutional <mark>bases of</u></strong></mark> large-scale international and intra-society <u><strong>inequalities,</u></strong> <u><strong>exploitation and <mark>oppression</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Peace requires a process of</u></strong> social and national <u><strong>emancipation</u></strong>, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, <u><mark>peace</mark> </u>is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and <u><mark>cannot be safeguarded</mark> in one part of the world <mark>when some</mark> others <mark>suffer</mark> visible or <mark>invisible wars</u></mark>. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, <u><mark>no ecological balance can be ensured, unless</mark> the deep international development gap and intra-society <mark>inequalities are </mark>substantially <mark>reduced</u>.</mark> Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, <u><mark>the</u></mark> actual <u><mark>question is </mark>not about “sustainability of development” but</u> rather <u><strong><mark>about the </mark>“sustainability of human life”,</u></strong> <u><strong>i.e. <mark>survival of [hu]mankind</u></strong></mark> – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, <u><strong><mark>we live in</mark> an</u></strong> <u><strong>almost <mark>permanent cris</mark>is</u></strong> of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. <u>The narrow-minded, election-oriented, <mark>selfish behaviour </mark>motivated by thirst for power and wealth,</u> which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, <u><mark>paves the way for the final</mark>, last <mark>catastrophe</u></mark>. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. <u>Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, <strong><mark>human society cannot survive unless</strong></mark> such profound <strong><mark>intra-society and international inequalities</strong></mark> prevailing today <strong><mark>are</strong></mark> soon <strong><mark>eliminated</u></strong></mark>. Like a single spacecraft, the <u><strong>Earth can no longer afford to have</u></strong> a 'crew' divided into <u>two parts: the rich, privileged</u>, wellfed, well-educated, <u>on the one hand, and the poor, deprived</u>, starving, sick and uneducated, <u>on the other</u>. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.</p>
2NC
Security K
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912
269
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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48,385
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An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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null
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
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cx
college
2
740,487
State centered security will always fail because it centers its calculus on wild risk assessment—only by interrogating the epistemological assumptions of their securitization and the causes of crises can we solve them
Ahmed 12
Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis
recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of ecological, energy and economic crises orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises such as terrorism, violent conflict and population movements Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change energy resources have become the focus of state security The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies . this analysis fundamentally undermines the idea of a link between natural resources and conflict Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' necessitate conflict by themselves There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others' constructed as traditional security threats amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.
recommendations to shift from state-centrism toward 'human security' cannot be achieved without confronting deeper assumptions underlying approaches to 'non-traditional' security they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts such as terrorism conflict crises fuel the projection of risk The externalisation of regions by Western security discourse - is driven by epistemological failure to interrogate systemic causes Overlooking the systematic causes of crisis leads to a tendency to problematise symptoms policy 'reform' is inadequate conventional policy approaches fail to translate implications in embeddedness of systems lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection . Such an outcome is not inevitable new research is required to develop frameworks which could inform more effective policy-making
While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.¶ The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.¶ As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.¶ There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.¶ Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.¶ Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.
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<h4>State centered security will always fail because it centers its calculus on wild risk assessment—only by interrogating the epistemological assumptions of their securitization and the causes of crises can we solve them </h4><p><strong>Ahmed 12</strong> </p><p>Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis</p><p>While <u><strong><mark>recommendations to shift </mark>our frame of orientation away <mark>from</mark> conventional <mark>state-centrism toward </mark>a <mark>'human security' </mark>approach</u></strong> <u><strong>are valid, this <mark>cannot be achieved without confronting</mark> the <mark>deeper </mark>theoretical <mark>assumptions</u></strong> <u><strong>underlying</mark> conventional <mark>approaches to 'non-traditional' security</mark> issues</u></strong>.106 <u><strong>By occluding the structural origin</u></strong> <u><strong>and systemic dynamic</u></strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong> global <u><strong>ecological, energy and economic crises</u></strong>, <u><strong>orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them</u></strong>. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means <u><strong><mark>they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts</mark> of global crises</u></strong> in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, <u><strong><mark>such as</u></strong></mark> international <u><strong><mark>terrorism</mark>, violent <mark>conflict</mark> and population movements</u></strong>. <u><strong>Global <mark>crises </mark>end up <mark>fuel</mark>ling<mark> the projection of risk </mark>onto social networks,</u></strong> <u><strong>groups and countries</u></strong> that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - <u><strong>which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities</u></strong>. <u><strong>Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to</u></strong> <u><strong>climate change </u></strong>impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon <u><strong>energy resources</u></strong>, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, <u><strong>have become the focus of state security</u></strong> planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.<strong>¶<u> <mark>The </mark>intensifying problematisation and <mark>externalisation of </mark>Muslim-majority <mark>regions</mark> and populations <mark>by Western security</mark> agencies - as a <mark>discourse - is</mark> therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but <mark>driven</mark> ultimately <mark>by </mark>an <mark>epistemological failure to interrogate </mark>the <mark>systemic causes </mark>of this acceleration in collective state policies</u></strong> (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question<u><strong>.</u></strong>¶ As much as <u><strong>this analysis</u></strong> highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it <u><strong>fundamentally undermines the idea of</u></strong> <u><strong>a</u></strong> symbiotic <u><strong>link between natural resources and conflict</u></strong> per se. <u><strong>Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance'</u></strong> (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) <u><strong>necessitate conflict by themselves</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict</u></strong>. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. <u><strong>To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution</u></strong> between different social groups and classes. <u><strong><mark>Overlooking the systematic causes of</mark> social <mark>crisis leads to a</mark> heightened <mark>tendency to problematise</mark> its <mark>symptoms</mark>,</u></strong> in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. <u><strong>This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.</u>¶<u> Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional <mark>policy 'reform' is </mark>woefully <mark>inadequate</mark>. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot</u></strong>. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. <u><strong>This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.</u>¶<u> Yet <mark>conventional</mark> theoretical and <mark>policy approaches fail to</mark> (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) <mark>translate </mark>the social science <mark>implications</mark> of this research <mark>in </mark>terms of the <mark>embeddedness of</mark> human social systems in natural <mark>systems</u></strong></mark>. Hence, <u><strong><mark>lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection</u></strong></mark> and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, <u><strong>they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others'</u></strong>, newly <u><strong>constructed as traditional security threats</u></strong> enormously <u><strong>amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe</u></strong><mark>. <u><strong>Such an outcome</mark>, of course, <mark>is not inevitable</u></strong></mark>, but <u><strong>extensive <mark>new</mark> transdisciplinary <mark>research</mark> in IR</u></strong> and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - <u><strong><mark>is </mark>urgently <mark>required to develop</mark> coherent conceptual <mark>frameworks which could inform more </mark>sober, <mark>effective</mark>, and joined-up <mark>policy-making</mark> on these issues.</p></u></strong>
2NC
Security K
2NC Impact Wall
1,548,828
373
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,488
Threat con is not inevitable, it is a product of a particular historical context that assumes discursive hegemony because it has been represented as such
Bleiker, 2001
Bleiker, 2001 (Roland, Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533)
The task of critically analysing world politics is to make fuller use of various faculties and to challenge the mimetic and exclusive conventions of Realist international politics We all have an intuitive longing for the hope that what we represent is what we see and think, and that what we see and think must really be real We know that Cold War spy films are not real, yet it is much more difficult to accept that a scientific analysis of Cold War intelligence contain equally subjective representational dimensions. we are wedded to conventions of language Representation is always an act of power. This power is at its peak if a form of representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values. Realism has been unusually successful in this endeavour: it has turned one of many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as 'realistic'. but also appears and functions as essence David Campbell\Michael Dillon, “The end of philosophy and the end of international relations,” The Political Subject of Violence, 1993, pp. 17-18 Should the old objection be advanced that a return to the ethical represents a retreat from the hard violent choices entailed in the political, the reply before we proceed should be brief and ‘hard-nosed’ enough to match any realist Violence may be the ultima ratio of politics, but it has never been the only ratio; and in a life that now has to be lived with a proliferating array of devices capable of threatening lethal global consequences it simply cannot be allowed to enjoy the practical, intellectual and moral licence once extended to it in our political discourses . Monopolistic control and attempted rational deployment of the legitimate use of force by modern political authorities has helped bring human being to the threshold of prospect ultimately not only of genocidal but also of species extinction Realist and neo-realist answers not only fail intellectually — in a way that would not matter very much if they did not so impoverish our political imagination — they fail most because they are not good enough practically to match our circumstances we shall see later how modern reality has become a function of its technologies of representation a reality which always exceeds the realist representation of it, and whose unprecedented finitudes now define the horizon of life in novel ways.
The task of critically analysing world politics is to challenge conventions of Realist politics t a scientific analysis of Cold War intelligence contain equally subjective dimensions we are wedded to conventions of language power is at peak a form of representation able to disguise its subjective values Realism has been successful in this : it has turned one of many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as 'realistic'. but also appears as essence Violence may be the ultima ratio of politics, but it has never been the only ratio; and in a life that now has to be lived with a proliferating array of devices capable of threatening lethal global consequences it simply cannot be allowed to enjoy the practical, intellectual and moral licence once extended to it in our political discourses Monopolistic control and attempted rational deployment of the legitimate use of force ultimately not only of genocidal but also of species extinction. Realist answers not fail intellectually they impoverish our political imagination they fail most because they are not good enough practically to match our circumstances modern reality has become a function of its representation a reality which always exceeds the realist representation of it, and whose unprecedented finitudes now define the horizon of life in novel ways.
Nothing is harder than to notice the obvious that was not noticed before. The task of critically analysing world politics is to make fuller use of various faculties and to challenge the mimetic and exclusive conventions of Realist international politics, just as Magritte's painting of a pipe was aimed at undermining 'the mimetic conventions of realistic painting'. But few tasks are more daunting than that. We all have an intuitive longing for the hope that what we represent is what we see and think, and that what we see and think must really be real. The belief in resemblance and recognition is part of our desire to order the world. We know, of course, that Cold War spy films are not real, yet it is much more difficult to accept, for instance, that a scientific analysis of Cold War intelligence, based on quantitative archival research, can contain equally subjective representational dimensions. This is because we are wedded to conventions of language; conventions that tell us, to appropriate Michel Foucault's words, that the entire purpose of a scholarly analysis 'is to elicit recognition, to allow the object it represents to appear without hesitation and equivocation'.26 Representation is always an act of power. This power is at its peak if a form of representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values. Realism has been unusually successful in this endeavour: it has turned one of many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as 'realistic'. but also appears and functions as essence. Realism has been able to take historically contingent and political motivated commentaries-say by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau about how to deal with the spread of Nazi Germany, or by Kenneth Waltz about how to interpret the 'logic' of 'anarchy' during the Cold War-and then turn them into universal and a-historic explanations that allegedly capture the 'essence' of human nature and international politics.27 Expressed in other words, Realism has managed to suppress what Kant would have called the 'aesthetic Quality' of politics. that is, the elements which are 'purely subjective in the representation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, not to the object' . 5. Their “threat con inevitable” claims give moral license to violence resulting in extinction.Campbell and Dillon ’93 David Campbell\Michael Dillon, “The end of philosophy and the end of international relations,” The Political Subject of Violence, 1993, pp. 17-18 To broach this task anew, however, we have briefly to re-visit again an aspect of the early formation of the terminus in which we are located. Should the old objection be advanced that a return to the ethical represents a retreat from the hard violent choices entailed in the political, the reply before we proceed should be brief and ‘hard-nosed’ enough to match any realist. Violence may be the ultima ratio of politics, but it has never been the only ratio; and in a life that now has to be lived with a proliferating array of devices capable of threatening lethal global consequences it simply cannot be allowed to enjoy the practical, intellectual and moral licence once extended to it in our political discourses. Neither is there anything in the history of the technology of political violence to warrant the claim that the political rationalisation of violence diminishes its sway. Monopolistic control and attempted rational deployment of the legitimate use of force by modern political authorities has helped bring human being to the threshold of prospect ultimately not only of genocidal but also of species extinction. Human perdurance cannot afford the cost of the politics of political and ethical forgetting charged by the technologising of the political as violence. Realist and neo-realist answers not only fail intellectually — in a way that would not matter very much if they did not so impoverish our political imagination — they fail most because they are not good enough practically to match our circumstances. It is not a matter of getting knowledge ‘to represent reality truly’ (we shall see later how modern reality has become a function of its technologies of representation), but of acquiring ‘habits of action for coping with reality’;25 a reality which always exceeds the realist representation of it, and whose unprecedented finitudes now define the horizon of life in novel ways.
4,443
<h4>Threat con is not inevitable, it is a product of a particular historical context that assumes discursive hegemony because it has been represented as such</h4><p><strong><mark>Bleiker</mark>, 200<mark>1</strong></mark> (Roland, Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533)</p><p>Nothing is harder than to notice the obvious that was not noticed before. <u><mark>The task of critically analysing world politics is to</mark> make fuller use of various faculties and to <mark>challenge </mark>the mimetic and exclusive <mark>conventions of Realist </mark>international <mark>politics</u></mark>, just as Magritte's painting of a pipe was aimed at undermining 'the mimetic conventions of realistic painting'. But few tasks are more daunting than that. <u>We all have an intuitive longing for the hope that what we represent is what we see and think, and that what we see and think must really be real</u>. The belief in resemblance and recognition is part of our desire to order the world. <u>We know</u>, of course, <u>that Cold War spy films are not real, yet it is much more difficult to accept</u>, for instance, <u>tha<mark>t a scientific analysis of Cold War intelligence</u></mark>, based on quantitative archival research, can <u><mark>contain equally subjective </mark>representational <mark>dimensions</mark>.</u> This is because <u><mark>we are wedded to conventions of language</u></mark>; conventions that tell us, to appropriate Michel Foucault's words, that the entire purpose of a scholarly analysis 'is to elicit recognition, to allow the object it represents to appear without hesitation and equivocation'.26 <u>Representation is always an act of power. This <mark>power is</mark> <mark>at</mark> its <mark>peak</mark> if <mark>a form of representation</mark> is <mark>able to disguise its subjective</mark> origins and <mark>values</mark>. <mark>Realism has been </mark>unusually <mark>successful in this </mark>endeavour<mark>:</mark> <mark>it has turned one of many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as 'realistic'. but also appears </mark>and functions <mark>as essence</u></mark>. Realism has been able to take historically contingent and political motivated commentaries-say by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau about how to deal with the spread of Nazi Germany, or by Kenneth Waltz about how to interpret the 'logic' of 'anarchy' during the Cold War-and then turn them into universal and a-historic explanations that allegedly capture the 'essence' of human nature and international politics.27 Expressed in other words, Realism has managed to suppress what Kant would have called the 'aesthetic Quality' of politics. that is, the elements which are 'purely subjective in the representation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, not to the object' .</p><p><strong>5. Their “threat con inevitable” claims give moral license to violence resulting in extinction.Campbell and Dillon ’93</strong> </p><p><u>David Campbell\Michael Dillon, “The end of philosophy and the end of international relations,” The Political Subject of Violence, 1993, pp. 17-18</p><p></u>To broach this task anew, however, we have briefly to re-visit again an aspect of the early formation of the terminus in which we are located. <u>Should the old objection be advanced that a return to the ethical represents a retreat from the hard violent choices entailed in the political, the reply before we proceed should be brief and ‘hard-nosed’ enough to match any realist</u>. <u><mark>Violence may be the ultima ratio of politics, but it has never been the only ratio; and in a life that now has to be lived with a proliferating array of devices capable of threatening lethal global consequences it simply cannot be allowed to enjoy the practical, intellectual and moral licence once extended to it in our political discourses</u></mark>. Neither is there anything in the history of the technology of political violence to warrant the claim that the political rationalisation of violence diminishes its sway<u>. <mark>Monopolistic control and attempted rational deployment of the legitimate use of force</mark> by modern political authorities has helped bring human being to the threshold of prospect <mark>ultimately not only of genocidal but also of species extinction</u>.</mark> Human perdurance cannot afford the cost of the politics of political and ethical forgetting charged by the technologising of the political as violence. <u><mark>Realist</mark> and neo-realist <mark>answers</mark> <mark>not <strong></mark>only<mark> fail intellectually</strong></mark> <strong>— </strong>in a way that would not matter very much if <mark>they</mark> did not so <strong><mark>impoverish our political imagination</strong></mark> <strong>— </strong><mark>they fail most because they are not good enough <strong>practically to match our circumstances</u></strong></mark>. It is not a matter of getting knowledge ‘to represent reality truly’ (<u>we shall see later how <strong><mark>modern reality has become a function of its</strong></mark> technologies of <strong><mark>representation</u></strong></mark>), but of acquiring ‘habits of action for coping with reality’;25 <u><mark>a reality which always exceeds the realist representation of it, and whose unprecedented finitudes now define the horizon of life in novel ways.</p></u></mark>
2NC
Security K
2NC AT: Psyche
137,620
7
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,489
Diversification will happen – we will concede it – It causes cocaine and sex trafficking shift
Francis 14
Francis 14
Mexican syndicates diversifying cocaine and heroin They are heavily involved in kidnapping extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” stealing and exporting Oxycontin and Roxicodone. stealing from energy companies
Mexican syndicates diversifying cocaine They are heavily involved in kidnapping migrant smuggling
editor-at-large for the Fiscal Times; MA degree from Georgetown Univ, David “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous” January 7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous “Mexican syndicates are diversifying their sources of revenue beyond marijuana, cocaine and heroin. They are heavily involved in kidnapping — number one in the world — extortion, prostitution, migrant smuggling,” he said. “In addition, the cartels are ever-more active in stealing and exporting opioids such as Oxycontin and Roxicodone. Even cigarette smuggling is on the rise.” Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012. Grayson also said that the cartels are stealing from energy companies, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that 538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from Pemex, the state oil company. Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas for cooking methamphetamines.”
1,276
<h4><strong>Diversification will happen – we will concede it – It causes cocaine and sex trafficking shift </h4><p>Francis 14</p><p></strong> editor-at-large for the Fiscal Times; MA degree from Georgetown Univ, David “Legalizing Pot Makes Mexican Cartels Even More Dangerous” January 7, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/07/Legalizing-Pot-Makes-Mexican-Cartels-Even-More-Dangerous</p><p><strong> “<u><mark>Mexican syndicates</u></mark> are <u><mark>diversifying</u></mark> their sources of revenue beyond<u> </u>marijuana, <u><mark>cocaine</mark> and heroin</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>They are heavily involved in kidnapping</u></strong></mark> — number one in the world — <u><strong>extortion, prostitution, <mark>migrant smuggling</mark>,” </u></strong>he said. “In addition, the cartels are <strong>ever-more active in<u> stealing and exporting </u>opioids such as<u> Oxycontin and Roxicodone. </u>Even cigarette smuggling </strong>is on the rise.”<strong> Kidnapping has become so common that some have even been caught on tape. </strong>According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography<strong>, more than 105,000 people were kidnapped in 2012.<u> </u></strong>Grayson also said that the <strong>cartels are <u>stealing from energy companies</u></strong>, a practice more common in West Africa than Latin America. For instance, in 2012, the Mexican Army estimated that <strong>538,000 gallons of fuel were stolen in May in Veracruz alone. “Los Zetas, in particular, are stealing lots of oil, gas, explosives and solvents from </strong>Pemex<strong>, the state oil company. </strong>Pemex uses the chemicals for hydraulic fracking; Los Zetas<strong> for cooking methamphetamines.” </p></strong>
1NR
***Mexico***
Turn
431,057
41
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
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48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,490
Cocaine cultivation causes bioD collapse – concede 1AC Mittermer -- it causes extinction
Handwerk 11
Handwerk 11 (Brian, National Geographic News, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/110218-cocaine-coca-farming-colombia-rainforests-environment-science/, “Cocaine to Blame for Rain Forest Loss, Study Says”, AB)
Cocaine is destroying lives Farming coca, cocaine has been linked to rising deforestation rates in Colombian rain forests Dávalos quantified indirect deforestation tied to coca farming, such as clearing land for growing food crops near coca plantations there is just more probability of losing the forest close to [coca cultivation] coca cultivation is taking a heavy toll on plant and animal species in one of the world's richest biodiversity hot spots Colombia's forests are home to many animals including harpy eagles, tapirs, golden poison frogs, and spectacled bears that are at risk of extinction
Farming cocaine has been linked to deforestation in Colombian rain forests Dávalos quantified indirect deforestation such as clearing land for growing food near plantations there is more probability of losing forest close to [coca cultivation coca cultivation is taking a heavy toll species the world's richest biodiversity hot spots Colombia's forests are home to animals that are at risk of extinction
Cocaine is destroying lives and tearing homes apart—and not simply because of drug use. Farming coca, the plant used to make cocaine, has been linked to rising deforestation rates in Colombian rain forests, a new study says. What's more, ecologist Liliana M. Dávalos and colleagues have for the first time quantified indirect deforestation tied to coca farming, such as clearing land for growing food crops near coca plantations. "In southern Colombia we found geographically that there is just more probability of losing the forest close to [coca cultivation]," said Dávalos, of the State University of New York in Stony Brook. "And the more coca around you, the more forest you're likely to lose—the sheer amount of coca in the vicinity has an effect." (Related: "Cocaine, Spices, Hormones Found in Drinking Water.") That means coca cultivation is taking a heavy toll on plant and animal species in one of the world's richest biodiversity hot spots. Colombia's forests are home to many animals—including harpy eagles, tapirs, golden poison frogs, and spectacled bears—that are at risk of extinction. (See pictures: "Ten Most Threatened Forest Hot Spots Named.")
1,163
<h4>Cocaine cultivation causes bioD collapse – concede 1AC Mittermer -- it causes extinction </h4><p><strong>Handwerk 11</strong> (Brian, National Geographic News, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/110218-cocaine-coca-farming-colombia-rainforests-environment-science/, “Cocaine to Blame for Rain Forest Loss, Study Says”, AB) </p><p><u><strong>Cocaine is destroying lives</u></strong> and tearing homes apart—and not simply because of drug use. <u><strong><mark>Farming</mark> coca,</u></strong> the plant used to make <u><strong><mark>cocaine</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>has</mark> <mark>been linked to</mark> rising <mark>deforestation</mark> rates <mark>in Colombian rain forests</u></strong></mark>, a new study says.<u><strong> </u></strong>What's more, ecologist Liliana M. <u><strong><mark>Dávalos</u></strong></mark> and colleagues have for the first time <u><strong><mark>quantified</mark> <mark>indirect deforestation</mark> tied to coca farming, <mark>such as clearing land for</mark> <mark>growing</mark> <mark>food</mark> crops <mark>near</mark> coca <mark>plantations</u></strong></mark>. "In southern Colombia we found geographically that <u><strong><mark>there</mark> <mark>is</mark> just <mark>more probability</mark> <mark>of losing </mark>the <mark>forest</mark> <mark>close to [coca cultivation</mark>]</u></strong>," said Dávalos, of the State University of New York in Stony Brook. "And the more coca around you, the more forest you're likely to lose—the sheer amount of coca in the vicinity has an effect." (Related: "Cocaine, Spices, Hormones Found in Drinking Water.") That means <u><strong><mark>coca cultivation is taking a heavy</mark> <mark>toll </mark>on plant and animal <mark>species</mark> in one of <mark>the world's richest biodiversity hot spots</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Colombia's</mark> <mark>forests are home to </mark>many <mark>animals</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>including harpy eagles, tapirs, golden poison frogs, and spectacled bears</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>that are at risk of extinction</u></strong></mark>. (See pictures: "Ten Most Threatened Forest Hot Spots Named.")</p>
1NR
***Mexico***
Turn
57,832
4
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,491
Sex trafficking is a fate worse than death and causes AIDS
HTIA 8/23,
HTIA 8/23, Human Trafficking in Africa, “Social Impacts of Human Trafficking,” 8/23/14, http://htia.weebly.com/social-impact.html, FM
The social impacts of human trafficking are rather universal Those who have truly experienced human trafficking are the ones who must cope with the majority of the social impacts , HIV and AIDS can be spread because of human trafficking, which can affect any and all of the population If a person has had to experience human trafficking, they have known a life worse than death itself. The conditions those are forced to live in the brothels are thoroughly atrocious Victims of human trafficking have absolutely no freedoms, and experience horrors such as abuse, violence, deprivation, and torture. These kind of conditions often lead to trauma. One person once had to submerge their body in a barrel filled with water contaminated with scorpion and other vermin, and sit there for one week. As if that wasn’t enough, they also had to sit in the darkness all lonesome. Another way to make the victims more cooperative would be to inject them with drugs, leading to addiction, which meant the brothel was eventually their lifeline. Many people who have been trafficked fought it at first, but eventually accepted they lost that battle from the beginning. They have even been seen smiling and flirting, but it is only an act. On the inside, they are broken and crying. Since human trafficking involves selling a person for sex, pregnancies would be expected They force those who are pregnant to have abortions, with unclean instruments by non certified practitioners. This lack of sanitation is one of the many factors in the ever spreading HIV in the human trafficking world. The relationship between human trafficking and HIV isn’t always completely obvious. Really, the fact that there was any relationship at all between these two problems is a recent realization. people all over the world, especially in the world of human trafficking, people are spreading life threatening diseases, such as HIV and AIDS.
HIV and AIDS spread because of human trafficking If a person has had to experience human trafficking, they have known a life worse than death itself. Victims of human trafficking have absolutely no freedoms, and experience abuse, violence, deprivation, and torture This lack of sanitation is one of the many factors in the ever spreading HIV people in the world of human trafficking, are spreading HIV and AIDS
The social impacts of human trafficking are rather universal. This does not denote them as being not a serious matter, nonetheless. Those who have truly experienced human trafficking are the ones who must cope with the majority of the social impacts. Although, HIV and AIDS can be spread because of human trafficking, which can affect any and all of the population. Despite there being shared impacts of human trafficking, the specific incidents tend to differ from country to country. If a person has had to experience human trafficking, they have known a life worse than death itself. The conditions those are forced to live in the brothels are thoroughly atrocious. Victims of human trafficking have absolutely no freedoms, and experience horrors such as abuse, violence, deprivation, and torture. These kind of conditions often lead to trauma. With that in mind, it can be understandable how these people would feel the urge to escape. Unfortunately, this misdeed will never go without punishment, which are never minor. One person once had to submerge their body in a barrel filled with water contaminated with scorpion and other vermin, and sit there for one week. As if that wasn’t enough, they also had to sit in the darkness all lonesome. Another way to make the victims more cooperative would be to inject them with drugs, leading to addiction, which meant the brothel was eventually their lifeline. Many people who have been trafficked fought it at first, but eventually accepted they lost that battle from the beginning. They have even been seen smiling and flirting, but it is only an act. On the inside, they are broken and crying. Since human trafficking involves selling a person for sex, pregnancies would be expected. No matter, human traffickers have even found a way to make that seem dark and twisted. They force those who are pregnant to have abortions, with unclean instruments by non certified practitioners. This lack of sanitation is one of the many factors in the ever spreading HIV in the human trafficking world. The relationship between human trafficking and HIV isn’t always completely obvious. Really, the fact that there was any relationship at all between these two problems is a recent realization. Currently, there is not much research to show the connection, but more studies are being conducted in order to have that sufficient information necessary for ending the social issue of human trafficking. What is known thus far is that many are not properly educated in the area of sexually transmitted diseases, meaning they are typically unaware of what they are and most definitely whether or not one would have them. This means people all over the world, especially in the world of human trafficking, people are spreading life threatening diseases, such as HIV and AIDS.
2,807
<h4>Sex trafficking is a fate worse than death and causes AIDS </h4><p><strong>HTIA 8/23, </strong>Human Trafficking in Africa, “Social Impacts of Human Trafficking,” 8/23/14, http://htia.weebly.com/social-impact.html, FM</p><p><u><strong>The social impacts of human trafficking are rather universal</u></strong>. This does not denote them as being not a serious matter, nonetheless. <u><strong>Those who have truly experienced human trafficking are the ones who must cope with the majority of the social impacts</u></strong>. Although<u><strong>, <mark>HIV and AIDS</mark> can be <mark>spread because of human trafficking</mark>, which can affect any and all of the population</u></strong>. Despite there being shared impacts of human trafficking, the specific incidents tend to differ from country to country. <u><strong><mark>If a person has had to experience human trafficking, they have known a life worse than death itself.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>The conditions those are forced to live in the brothels are thoroughly atrocious</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Victims of human trafficking have absolutely no freedoms, and experience </mark>horrors such as <mark>abuse, violence, deprivation, and torture</mark>. These kind of conditions often lead to trauma.</u></strong> With that in mind, it can be understandable how these people would feel the urge to escape. Unfortunately, this misdeed will never go without punishment, which are never minor. <u><strong>One person once had to submerge their body in a barrel filled with water contaminated with scorpion and other vermin, and sit there for one week. As if that wasn’t enough, they also had to sit in the darkness all lonesome. Another way to make the victims more cooperative would be to inject them with drugs, leading to addiction, which meant the brothel was eventually their lifeline. Many people who have been trafficked fought it at first, but eventually accepted they lost that battle from the beginning.</u></strong> <u><strong>They have even been seen smiling and flirting, but it is only an act. On the inside, they are broken and crying. Since human trafficking involves selling a person for sex, pregnancies would be expected</u></strong>. No matter, human traffickers have even found a way to make that seem dark and twisted. <u><strong>They force those who are pregnant to have abortions, with unclean instruments by non certified practitioners. <mark>This lack of sanitation is one of the many factors in the ever spreading HIV</mark> in the human trafficking world. The relationship between human trafficking and HIV isn’t always completely obvious. Really, the fact that there was any relationship at all between these two problems is a recent realization.</u></strong> Currently, there is not much research to show the connection, but more studies are being conducted in order to have that sufficient information necessary for ending the social issue of human trafficking. What is known thus far is that many are not properly educated in the area of sexually transmitted diseases, meaning they are typically unaware of what they are and most definitely whether or not one would have them. This means <u><strong><mark>people </mark>all over the world, especially<mark> in the world of human trafficking,</mark> people <mark>are spreading</mark> life threatening diseases, such as <mark>HIV and AIDS</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NR
***Mexico***
Turn
429,878
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,492
AIDS causes extinction
Muchiri 00
Muchiri 00, Staff Member at Ministry of Education in Nairobi
AIDS was more effective than war in destabilizing African countries AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than economic crises, capital crashes or floods It has no cure yet. We are watching a continent succumb to a dehumanizing death AIDS was seen as threat to world peace other continent is on the brink of extinction signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race
AIDS was more effective than war in destabilizing countries AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than economic crises, capital crashes or floods It has no cure yet. We are watching a continent succumb to a dehumanizing death AIDS was seen as threat to world peace other continent is on the brink of extinction signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race
[Michael Kibaara, “Will Annan finally put out Africa’s fires?” Jakarta Post, March 6, LN] The executive director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, estimated that Africa would annually need between $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion to combat the disease, but currently receives only $ 160 million a year in official assistance. World Bank President James Wolfensohn lamented that Africa was losing teachers faster than they could be replaced, and that AIDS was now more effective than war in destabilizing African countries. Statistics show that AIDS is the leading killer in sub-Saharan Africa, surpassing people killed in warfare. In 1998, 200,000 people died from armed conflicts compared to 2.2 million from AIDS. Some 33.6 million people have HIV around the world, 70 percent of them in Africa, thereby robbing countries of their most productive members and decimating entire villages. About 13 million of the 16 million people who have died of AIDS are in Africa, according to the UN. What barometer is used to proclaim a holocaust if this number is not a sure measure? There is no doubt that AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than hurricanes, earthquakes, economic crises, capital crashes or floods. It has no cure yet. We are watching a whole continent degenerate into ghostly skeletons that finally succumb to a most excruciating, dehumanizing death. Gore said that his new initiative, if approved by the U.S. Congress, would bring U.S. contributions to fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases to $ 325 million. Does this mean that the UN Security Council and the U.S. in particular have at last decided to remember Africa? Suddenly, AIDS was seen as threat to world peace, and Gore would ask the congress to set up millions of dollars on this case. The hope is that Gore does not intend to make political capital out of this by painting the usually disagreeable Republican-controlled Congress as the bad guy and hope the buck stops on the whole of current and future U.S. governments' conscience. Maybe there is nothing left to salvage in Africa after all and this talk is about the African-American vote in November's U.S. presidential vote. Although the UN and the Security Council cannot solve all African problems, the AIDS challenge is a fundamental one in that it threatens to wipe out [humanity] man. The challenge is not one of a single continent alone because Africa cannot be quarantined. The trouble is that AIDS has no cure -- and thus even the West has stakes in the AIDS challenge. Once sub-Saharan Africa is wiped out, it shall not be long before another continent is on the brink of extinction. Sure as death, Africa's time has run out, signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race. Gender paraphrased
2,770
<h4>AIDS causes extinction </h4><p><strong>Muchiri 00</strong>, Staff Member at Ministry of Education in Nairobi </p><p>[Michael Kibaara, “Will Annan finally put out Africa’s fires?” Jakarta Post, March 6, LN] </p><p>The executive director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, estimated that Africa would annually need between $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion to combat the disease, but currently receives only $ 160 million a year in official assistance. World Bank President James Wolfensohn lamented that Africa was losing teachers faster than they could be replaced, and that <u><strong><mark>AIDS was</u></strong></mark> now <u><strong><mark>more effective than war in destabilizing</mark> African <mark>countries</u></strong></mark>. Statistics show that AIDS is the leading killer in sub-Saharan Africa, surpassing people killed in warfare. In 1998, 200,000 people died from armed conflicts compared to 2.2 million from AIDS. Some 33.6 million people have HIV around the world, 70 percent of them in Africa, thereby robbing countries of their most productive members and decimating entire villages. About 13 million of the 16 million people who have died of AIDS are in Africa, according to the UN. What barometer is used to proclaim a holocaust if this number is not a sure measure? There is no doubt that <u><strong><mark>AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than</u></strong></mark> hurricanes, earthquakes, <u><strong><mark>economic crises, capital crashes or floods</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It has no cure yet. We are watching</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong><mark>continent</u></strong></mark> degenerate into ghostly skeletons that finally <u><strong><mark>succumb to a</u></strong></mark> most excruciating, <u><strong><mark>dehumanizing death</u></strong></mark>. Gore said that his new initiative, if approved by the U.S. Congress, would bring U.S. contributions to fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases to $ 325 million. Does this mean that the UN Security Council and the U.S. in particular have at last decided to remember Africa? Suddenly, <u><strong><mark>AIDS was seen as threat to world peace</u></strong></mark>, and Gore would ask the congress to set up millions of dollars on this case. The hope is that Gore does not intend to make political capital out of this by painting the usually disagreeable Republican-controlled Congress as the bad guy and hope the buck stops on the whole of current and future U.S. governments' conscience. Maybe there is nothing left to salvage in Africa after all and this talk is about the African-American vote in November's U.S. presidential vote. Although the UN and the Security Council cannot solve all African problems, the AIDS challenge is a fundamental one in that it threatens to wipe out [humanity] man. The challenge is not one of a single continent alone because Africa cannot be quarantined. The trouble is that AIDS has no cure -- and thus even the West has stakes in the AIDS challenge. Once sub-Saharan Africa is wiped out, it shall not be long before an<u><strong><mark>other continent is on the brink of extinction</u></strong></mark>. Sure as death, Africa's time has run out, <u><strong><mark>signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race</u></strong></mark>. Gender paraphrased</p>
1NR
***Mexico***
Turn
295,098
7
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,493
Prolif escalates to nuclear war.
Sokolski ‘9
Sokolski ‘9 (Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, June-July 2009, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)
the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners non-NATO allies and strategic stakeholders In this world, every nuclear power center could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities There are limits to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system prior to World War I in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and nuclear war in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today
in a world with an increasing number of nuclear states actions of just one or two that might overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing the perfect nuclear storm: military and nuclear rivalries could easily be much more intense advanced military states will deploy enhanced defenses and develop preventative and preemptive war options relations between states become far less stable small developments Russian support for abroad provinces terrorist strikes Indian flanking activities Chinese weapons developments could easily prompt arms races miscues, and nuclear war “every quarrel may lead to violence of a kind different from what is possible today
So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), “non-NATO allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.
3,816
<h4>Prolif<u><strong> escalates to nuclear war.</h4><p>Sokolski ‘9</u> </strong>(Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, June-July 2009, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)</p><p>So far, <u>the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners</u>” (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), “<u>non-NATO allies</u>” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), <u>and strategic stakeholders</u> (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). <u>In this world, every nuclear power center</u> (our European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan <u>could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington</u> (and, one hopes, by no one else) <u>as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities</u> (see Figure 3). <u>There are limits</u>, however, <u>to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system</u> that failed to contain offensive actions <u>prior to World War I</u>. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But <u><mark>in a world with an increasing number of nuclear</mark>-armed or nuclear-ready <mark>states</u></mark>, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, <u>the <mark>actions of just one or two </mark>states or groups <mark>that might</mark> threaten to disrupt or<mark> overthrow a nuclear weapons state could <strong>check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing</strong></mark>. No amount of military science</u> or tactics <u>could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states</u>.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and <u>one could easily create <strong><mark>the perfect nuclear storm</strong>: </mark>Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge</u>; an overhang of <u>nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments</u>; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the <u><mark>military and nuclear rivalries</mark> between states <strong><mark>could easily be much more intense</strong></mark> than before</u>. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The <u><mark>advanced military states will</mark> also be even more inclined to develop and <mark>deploy enhanced</mark> air and missile <mark>defenses</mark> and long-range, precision guidance munitions, <mark>and</mark> to <mark>develop</mark> a variety of <mark>preventative and preemptive war options</mark>. </u>Certainly, <u>in such a world, <mark>relations between states</mark> could <mark>become far less stable</mark>. Relatively <strong><mark>small developments</u></strong></mark> — e.g., <u><mark>Russian support for</mark> sympathetic near-<mark>abroad provinces</mark>; Pakistani-inspired <mark>terrorist strikes</mark> in India</u>, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; <u>new <mark>Indian flanking activities</mark> in Iran near Pakistan; <mark>Chinese weapons developments</mark> or moves regarding Taiwan</u>; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — <u><mark>could <strong>easily prompt</mark> nuclear weapons deployments</strong> with “strategic” consequences (<mark>arms races</mark>, strategic <mark>miscues, and</u></mark> even <u><strong><mark>nuclear war</u></strong></mark>). As Herman Kahn once noted, <u>in such a world <mark>“<strong>every quarrel</mark> or difference of opinion</strong> <mark>may lead to violence of a kind</mark> quite <mark>different from what is possible today</u></mark>.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. </p>
1NR
Impact
2NC I—Prolif—Top Level
86,170
93
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,494
Deterrence Breakdown – Nuclear acquisition nullifies effective US intervention that also checks their wars – we control the only internal into escalation
Cimbala ‘7
Cimbala ‘7 (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld)
There is no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. there is some experience to suggest states might become more careful Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated: The “rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety. States’ world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces. deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seeking to intimidate Japan and South Korea . U.S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors One of the major risks is that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indications and warning
no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety .S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors One of the major risks is that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indications and warning.
There is no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. States will not become irrational on account of the possession of nuclear weapons: indeed, there is some experience during and after the Cold War to suggest that states might become more careful, rather than less. Many variables intrude here: including the intensity of regional rivalries; ethno-national and religious feelings; and, most immediately pertinent to our concerns, the pros and cons for deterrence and crisis stability of the forces themselves. Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated: especially by students of history and political science. The “rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety. States’ world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces. A U.S. model of deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis. The strategic reach of Russian or American nuclear forces against lesser nuclear powers should not be overestimated. Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seeking to intimidate Japan and South Korea, may not believe U.S. threats of preemption or retaliation. Russia’s policy of providing air defense missiles to Iran, increasing the difficulty of Israeli or American preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ironically invites the erosion of Russia’s own deterrence perimeter once the Iranians are nuclear capable. U.S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors against neighbors: or others. U.S. intelligence has not infrequently been the victim of strategic or operational-tactical military surprise by non-Western opponents: from Pearl Harbor to 9–11. Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors, compared to states. Intelligence on the best of days can give likelihoods and maybes for policy makers to mull over. One of the major risks of nuclear weapons spread in Asia is the possibility that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indications and warning.
2,388
<h4><u>Deterrence Breakdown</u> – Nuclear acquisition nullifies effective US intervention that also checks their wars – we control the only internal into escalation</h4><p><strong>Cimbala ‘7</strong> (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld)</p><p><u>There is <mark>no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century</mark>.</u> States will not become irrational on account of the possession of nuclear weapons: indeed, <u>there is some experience</u> during and after the Cold War <u>to suggest</u> that <u>states might become more careful</u>, rather than less. Many variables intrude here: including the intensity of regional rivalries; ethno-national and religious feelings; and, most immediately pertinent to our concerns, the pros and cons for deterrence and crisis stability of the forces themselves. <u><strong><mark>Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated</mark>:</u></strong> especially by students of history and political science. <u>The “<mark>rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety</mark>.</u> <u>States’ world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces.</u> A U.S. model of <u>deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis</u>. The strategic reach of Russian or American nuclear forces against lesser nuclear powers should not be overestimated.<u> Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seeking to intimidate Japan and South Korea</u>, may not believe U.S. threats of preemption or retaliation. Russia’s policy of providing air defense missiles to Iran, increasing the difficulty of Israeli or American preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ironically invites the erosion of Russia’s own deterrence perimeter once the Iranians are nuclear capable<u><strong>. U<mark>.S. intelligence</strong> cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors</u></mark> against neighbors: or others. U.S. intelligence has not infrequently been the victim of strategic or operational-tactical military surprise by non-Western opponents: from Pearl Harbor to 9–11. <u>Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors</u>, compared to states. Intelligence on the best of days can give likelihoods and maybes for policy makers to mull over. <u><mark>One of the major risks</u></mark> of nuclear weapons spread in Asia <u><mark>is</mark> </u>the possibility <u><mark>that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indications and warning</u>.</p></mark>
1NR
Impact
AT: Deterrence
250,538
6
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,495
Dems win- Blumenthal and Wang both project
TDS 9/12
TDS 9/12
when Huffpost Pollster joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting that Democrats are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news Huffpost calculates a 56 percent "chance that Democrats will keep control of the Senate." 56 percent doesn't allow all that much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day, it's fair to say that it's a sign that Dems are in a much better position in the battle for Senate control than many pundits thought they would be in in mid-September, given the lopsided Democratic vulnerabilities this year. there are respected poll analysts who still believe the odds favor a GOP takeover of the U.S. Senate But with both Mark Blumenthal and Sam Wang arguing otherwise, Dems have cause for optimism
when Huffpost joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting Dem s are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news Huffpost calculates a 56 percent "chance Democrats will keep control of the Senate." 56 percent doesn't allow much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day it's a sign Dems are in a much better position than many pundits thought they would be Dems have cause for optimism
The Democratic Strategist: Huffpost Pollster Sees 56 Percent Chance Dems Will Hold Senate Majority http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2014/09/huffpost_pollster_sees_56_perc.php 09/12/14 [AW] Don't bet the ranch on it just yet, but when Huffpost Pollster joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting that Democrats are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news. Today Huffpost Pollster calculates a 56 percent "chance that Democrats will keep control of the Senate." Of course 56 percent doesn't allow all that much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day, it's fair to say that it's a sign that Dems are in a much better position in the battle for Senate control than many pundits thought they would be in in mid-September, given the lopsided Democratic vulnerabilities this year. Huffpost Pollster's Mark Blumenthal and Natalie Jackson explore the ramifications of "the Orman factor" (Independent U.S. Senate candidate Greg Orman in Kansas) in their calculations, and conclude: ...Now, however, in the simulations that project an Orman win, our model will usually assign him to the party in the majority...In the rare scenario in which Orman wins and the chamber is split with 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, we give Orman a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Democrats and a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Republicans. (Thus, the overall probabilities of each party's winning the majority still add to 100 percent.) But we also note the probability of this situation occurring -- we call it "the Orman factor." On the Senate model dashboard, this number appears right below the probabilities for Democratic and Republican majorities. Other models have also assigned Orman to one side or the other in the case of 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, but in slightly different ways: Daily Kos similarly assumes there is a 50/50 chance Orman will caucus with each party, but FiveThirtyEight assumes a 75 percent chance he will caucus with the Democrats, and The Upshot assigns him to the Democrats 100 percent of the time. Sure, as noted elsewhere there are respected poll analysts who still believe the odds favor a GOP takeover of the U.S. Senate. But with both Mark Blumenthal and Sam Wang arguing otherwise, Dems have cause for optimism -- especially if they mobilize an energetic GOTV effort where it counts.
2,373
<h4><strong>Dems win- Blumenthal and Wang both project</h4><p>TDS 9/12</p><p></strong>The Democratic Strategist: Huffpost Pollster Sees 56 Percent Chance Dems Will Hold Senate Majority http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2014/09/huffpost_pollster_sees_56_perc.php 09/12/14 [AW]</p><p>Don't bet the ranch on it just yet, but <u><strong><mark>when Huffpost</mark> Pollster <mark>joins the Princeton Election Consortium in forecasting</mark> that <mark>Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s</mark> <mark>are more likely to keep their Senate majority, that's good news</u></strong></mark>. Today <u><strong><mark>Huffpost</u></strong></mark> Pollster <u><strong><mark>calculates a 56 percent "chance</mark> that <mark>Democrats will keep control of the Senate."</mark> </u></strong>Of course <u><strong><mark>56 percent doesn't allow</mark> all that <mark>much breathing space. But 8 weeks from election day</mark>, it's fair to say that <mark>it's a sign</mark> that <mark>Dems are in a much better position</mark> in the battle for Senate control <mark>than many pundits thought they would be</mark> in in mid-September, given the lopsided Democratic vulnerabilities this year. </u></strong>Huffpost Pollster's Mark Blumenthal and Natalie Jackson explore the ramifications of "the Orman factor" (Independent U.S. Senate candidate Greg Orman in Kansas) in their calculations, and conclude: ...Now, however, in the simulations that project an Orman win, our model will usually assign him to the party in the majority...In the rare scenario in which Orman wins and the chamber is split with 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, we give Orman a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Democrats and a 50 percent chance of caucusing with the Republicans. (Thus, the overall probabilities of each party's winning the majority still add to 100 percent.) But we also note the probability of this situation occurring -- we call it "the Orman factor." On the Senate model dashboard, this number appears right below the probabilities for Democratic and Republican majorities. Other models have also assigned Orman to one side or the other in the case of 49 Democrats and 50 Republicans, but in slightly different ways: Daily Kos similarly assumes there is a 50/50 chance Orman will caucus with each party, but FiveThirtyEight assumes a 75 percent chance he will caucus with the Democrats, and The Upshot assigns him to the Democrats 100 percent of the time. Sure, as noted elsewhere <u><strong>there are respected poll analysts who still believe the odds favor a GOP takeover of the U.S. Senate</u></strong>. <u><strong>But with both Mark Blumenthal and Sam Wang arguing otherwise, <mark>Dems have cause for optimism</mark> </u></strong>-- especially if they mobilize an energetic GOTV effort where it counts.</p>
1NR
UX
AT: Polls
429,854
4
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,496
Poll based models are better than fundamentals
Wang 5/27
Wang 5/27 <Sam, data scientist, a co-founder of the Princeton Election Consortium and an associate professor of neuroscience and molecular biology at Princeton University, better predictor of midterms than Silver, “The War of the Senate Models,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/the-war-of-the-senate-models-107132.html#ixzz3CyZaIN3f>#SPS
because of this reliance on national public opinion, as a general rule, with a Democratic president in power, the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor the Republicans. When it comes to extremely close races Type 1 models are of limited use Modelers put in lots of factors that have been shown to affect election outcomes such as the economy and incumbency. But each factor you add also contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties that, once added, cannot be taken out. these are simplifications. From a reader’s standpoint, probabilities in Type 1 models should never be read with more certainty than, say, the National Weather Service’s numbers. Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data, fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes. All the fundamentals are naturally baked into the polling data. Even 160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and are enough by themselves to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play. One question faced by all the models is when to start phasing in polling data and phasing out fundamentals. In 2012, I used a polls-only Type 2 approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while the election-eve FiveThirtyEight calculations, which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong.
because of reliance on public opinion with a Democratic president the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor Republicans each factor you add contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes Even 160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and enough to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play In 2012, I used a polls-only approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while FiveThirtyEight which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong
Type 1: Fundamentals only. Type 1 models, which rely on no polling data at all, have the advantage that they can be created before the campaign even starts. The Monkey Cage model is currently pure Type 1, relying on a large number of fundamentals, from candidate “quality” to economic growth. This year, the most important fundamental is that, in midterm elections, national public opinion tends to go against the president’s party. That gives us some idea of the range of possible outcomes: Basically, Democrats are going to lose seats. Interestingly, because of this reliance on national public opinion, as a general rule, with a Democratic president in power, the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor the Republicans. Note that the probability of a GOP takeover is higher in the Monkey Cage model than it is in the others. When it comes to extremely close races, though, Type 1 models are of limited use. Modelers put in lots of factors that have been shown to affect election outcomes (“signals,” in engineering parlance), such as the economy and incumbency. But each factor you add also contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties that, once added, cannot be taken out. For example, during a midterm election year, the generic congressional poll (Would you rather vote for a Democrat or a Republican?) tends to move against the president’s party—but the range of actual outcomes on Election Day ranges from an 11 percentage-point loss to a 4 percentage-point gain in the national popular vote margin. Fundamentals can be national factors, such as the generic congressional ballot, which captures a general national mood. Or they can be local, such as whether an incumbent is in the race, a factor that attempts to capture how well known a candidate is. But these are simplifications. From a reader’s standpoint, probabilities in Type 1 models should never be read with more certainty than, say, the National Weather Service’s numbers. Rain forecast probabilities are good enough to help us plan our weekend outings—and even they are uncertain enough always to be rounded to the nearest 10 percent. Rather, Type 1 models are hypotheses about where a campaign is naturally headed. You can think of them as asking, “Do our assumptions about how politics works give the correct prediction?” They tend to be of most use after the results are in.In 2012, Type 1 presidential models ranged from predicting a Romney win to an Obama landslide—and everything in between. If past history is any guide, FiveThirtyEight comes up with a more exact model, it will have a strong Type 1 component but will also include some polling data. That probably explains why FiveThirtyEight’s state-by-state win probabilities seem to give Democrats a better shot than the Monkey Cage does. Type 2: Polls only. Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data, fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes. All the fundamentals are naturally baked into the polling data. Even today, about 160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and are enough by themselves to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play. The Upshot is closer to a Type 2 model. It focuses on polling data, using fundamentals about candidate quality and national trends to set expectations for how voter sentiment might change between now and the election. (This is an excellent approach to combining polls with fundamentals, one that was pioneered by Drew Linzer’s Votamatic.) The Upshot’s method is likely to be more accurate than the others, though the Monkey Cage does plan to update its model to reflect new polling data. One question faced by all the models is when to start phasing in polling data and phasing out fundamentals. To estimate the possible range of outcomes, it is even possible to skip using fundamentals at all, simply by using the ups and downs of polls to estimate the range of likely movement between now and Election Day. In 2012, I used a polls-only Type 2 approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while the election-eve FiveThirtyEight calculations, which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong. What does a pure Type 2 approach for 2014 look like? Using my time-tested methods, I took a shot at it.
4,274
<h4>Poll based models are better than fundamentals</h4><p><strong>Wang 5/27</strong> <Sam, data scientist, a co-founder of the Princeton Election Consortium and an associate professor of neuroscience and molecular biology at Princeton University, better predictor of midterms than Silver, “The War of the Senate Models,” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/the-war-of-the-senate-models-107132.html#ixzz3CyZaIN3f>#SPS</p><p>Type 1: Fundamentals only. Type 1 models, which rely on no polling data at all, have the advantage that they can be created before the campaign even starts. The Monkey Cage model is currently pure Type 1, relying on a large number of fundamentals, from candidate “quality” to economic growth. This year, the most important fundamental is that, in midterm elections, national public opinion tends to go against the president’s party. That gives us some idea of the range of possible outcomes: Basically, Democrats are going to lose seats. Interestingly, <u><strong><mark>because of</mark> this <mark>reliance on</mark> national <mark>public opinion</mark>, as a general rule, <mark>with a Democratic president</mark> in power, <mark>the more a model relies on non-poll-based assumptions, the more it will favor</mark> the <mark>Republicans</mark>.</u></strong> Note that the probability of a GOP takeover is higher in the Monkey Cage model than it is in the others. <u><strong>When it comes to extremely close races</u></strong>, though, <u><strong>Type 1 models are of limited use</u></strong>. <u><strong>Modelers put in lots of factors that have been shown to affect election outcomes</u></strong> (“signals,” in engineering parlance), <u><strong>such as the economy and incumbency. But <mark>each factor you add </mark>also <mark>contributes “noise”—accumulating uncertainties</mark> that, once added, cannot be taken out.</u></strong> For example, during a midterm election year, the generic congressional poll (Would you rather vote for a Democrat or a Republican?) tends to move against the president’s party—but the range of actual outcomes on Election Day ranges from an 11 percentage-point loss to a 4 percentage-point gain in the national popular vote margin. Fundamentals can be national factors, such as the generic congressional ballot, which captures a general national mood. Or they can be local, such as whether an incumbent is in the race, a factor that attempts to capture how well known a candidate is. But <u><strong>these are simplifications.</u></strong> <u><strong>From a reader’s standpoint, probabilities in Type 1 models should never be read with more certainty than, say, the National Weather Service’s numbers. </u></strong>Rain forecast probabilities are good enough to help us plan our weekend outings—and even they are uncertain enough always to be rounded to the nearest 10 percent. Rather, Type 1 models are hypotheses about where a campaign is naturally headed. You can think of them as asking, “Do our assumptions about how politics works give the correct prediction?” They tend to be of most use after the results are in.In 2012, Type 1 presidential models ranged from predicting a Romney win to an Obama landslide—and everything in between. If past history is any guide, FiveThirtyEight comes up with a more exact model, it will have a strong Type 1 component but will also include some polling data. That probably explains why FiveThirtyEight’s state-by-state win probabilities seem to give Democrats a better shot than the Monkey Cage does. Type 2: Polls only. <u><strong><mark>Once we have a sufficient amount of polling data</mark>, <mark>fundamentals lose their importance for prediction purposes</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>All the fundamentals are naturally baked into the polling data.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Even</u></strong></mark> today, about <u><strong><mark>160 days before the election, polls are fairly predictive, and</mark> are <mark>enough</mark> by themselves <mark>to form a clear snapshot of the current state of play</mark>.</u></strong> The Upshot is closer to a Type 2 model. It focuses on polling data, using fundamentals about candidate quality and national trends to set expectations for how voter sentiment might change between now and the election. (This is an excellent approach to combining polls with fundamentals, one that was pioneered by Drew Linzer’s Votamatic.) The Upshot’s method is likely to be more accurate than the others, though the Monkey Cage does plan to update its model to reflect new polling data. <u><strong>One question faced by all the models is when to start phasing in polling data and phasing out fundamentals.</u></strong> To estimate the possible range of outcomes, it is even possible to skip using fundamentals at all, simply by using the ups and downs of polls to estimate the range of likely movement between now and Election Day. <u><strong><mark>In 2012, I used a polls-only</mark> Type 2 <mark>approach to get all 10 close Senate races correct, while</mark> the election-eve <mark>FiveThirtyEight</mark> calculations, <mark>which leaned heavily on fundamentals, got two races wrong</mark>. </u></strong>What does a pure Type 2 approach for 2014 look like? Using my time-tested methods, I took a shot at it.</p>
1NR
UX
AT: Polls
224,333
6
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,497
Dems have the momentum to take the senate now – but there is no margin of error
Cohn 9/12
Cohn 9/12 <Nate, The New York Times, “Democrats Are Seeing More Daylight in Path to Senate Control,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/upshot/democrats-are-seeing-more-daylight-in-path-to-senate-control.html?abt=0002&abg=1>#SPS
the Democratic path to a Senate has started to look easier. today the Democratic path to victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year. That path remains narrow with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage The Democrats now appear to have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan, two states where Republicans entered the summer with high hopes. a diverse set of pollsters has given Udall a lead In Michigan Peters, leads by an even larger margin. These leads are not insurmountable. But they are not insubstantial, either. There is no evidence of a trend toward the Republicans and, if anything, the Democratic advantage has grown If Colorado and Michigan are penciled into the Democratic column the Democrats will then need three more states to retain control. The Democrats have a fairly broad set of options for those states In North Carolina and Iowa, the Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead in the polls, and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll. Leo now gives Hagan a 73 percent chance of victory, given that she leads her Republican opponent Tillis, by two percentage points Braley also has an advantage, albeit an even more tenuous one than Ms. Hagan. His lead, however, is fairly consistent: Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan, those in North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction for now. Their path of least resistance is Alaska That’s fewer than the panel surveyed in some congressional districts, and my look at the congressional district data suggests that there’s plenty of noise in the places where the sample size is that small. There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points. So a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats,
the Dem path to a Senate victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year. That path remains narrow with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage The Dem s have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan These leads are not insurmountable. But they are not insubstantial, either . If Colorado and Michigan are penciled Democratic , the Dem s need three more states to retain control . In North Carolina and Iowa Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction Their path of least resistance is Alaska There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points. a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska — If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats,
A few months ago, the Democratic path to a Senate majority looked long and arduous. It has started to look easier. The Democrats started the campaign with a clear advantage in enough races to end up with 45 seats, well short of the 50 needed to retain control of the chamber. To get to 50, the party was going to have to run the table in five battleground states where polls were already showing Republicans with an occasional lead — or replace one of them by holding either Arkansas or Louisiana, two deep-red states with Democratic incumbents in jeopardy. Doing so would have been challenging under any circumstances. It seemed especially daunting this year, given the president’s low approval ratings and the long history of the president’s party suffering a “midterm penalty.” But today the Democratic path to victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year. That path remains narrow, to be sure. The Democrats will probably still need to sweep those five fairly close races. Yet with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage in four of them. And the Democrats have other opportunities that might give them more breathing room. The Democrats now appear to have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan, two states where Republicans entered the summer with high hopes. Over the last month, a diverse set of pollsters has given Senator Mark Udall of Colorado, a Democratic incumbent, a lead of an average of 3.7 points. In Michigan, the Democrat, Gary Peters, leads by an even larger 5.5-point margin. These leads are not insurmountable. But they are not insubstantial, either. There is no evidence of a trend toward the Republicans and, if anything, the Democratic advantage has grown over the summer. Leo, The Upshot’s Senate forecasting model, now gives the Democrats around an 80 percent chance of winning each of these states. At one point earlier this year, Leo interpreted Mr. Udall to be the underdog, and Mr. Peters had only a 59 percent chance of winning as recently as a month and a half ago. If Colorado and Michigan are penciled into the Democratic column, the Democrats will then need three more states to retain control. The Democrats have a fairly broad set of options for those states, but the likeliest possibility is that the election comes down to Alaska, Iowa and North Carolina. All three pose big challenges to Democrats. Alaska voted for Mitt Romney by 14 points in 2012. The president’s approval ratings are terrible in Iowa, where the Democrats have an imperfect nominee — one who seemed to criticize farmers in recorded remarks at a fund-raiser — in one of the few competitive races where the party will not benefit from incumbency. And there is no state where Democrats suffer more from an off-year electorate than North Carolina, where Democrats are exceptionally dependent on young and nonwhite voters to overcome the state’s conservative and older white voters. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the Republicans are favored in any of these states. In North Carolina and Iowa, the Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead in the polls, and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll. Leo now gives Senator Kay Hagan of North Carolina a 73 percent chance of victory, given that she leads her Republican opponent, Thom Tillis, by two percentage points, 45 to 43, in an average of polls. I might rate her chances somewhat lower, in part because she’s benefiting from an unlikely six-point edge in a new poll from Rasmussen, a firm with a record of relying on dubious sampling and weighting techniques. Another factor complicating the polls is that they may be underestimating the support of Mr. Tillis by asking respondents about a Libertarian candidate, Sean Haugh, who is not seriously campaigning but is nonetheless receiving more support than Libertarian candidates in North Carolina generally do. Even so, Ms. Hagan generally leads in the polls that do not name Mr. Haugh, and there’s not much question which candidate is ahead. Representative Bruce Braley, the Democratic nominee in Iowa, also has an advantage, albeit an even more tenuous one than Ms. Hagan. He has been leading by about two-thirds of a point over the last month. His lead, however, is fairly consistent: His Republican opponent, Joni Ernst, has led in just one poll over the last three months, and a more recent version of that poll, an online survey by YouGov, The New York Times and CBS, flipped to Mr. Braley. Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan, those in North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction for now. Even if Democrats were to win both Iowa and North Carolina, they would still be one seat short of 50 seats. (If the two parties each win 50 seats, Vice President Joe Biden will break the tie, to the Democrats’ advantage.) Their path of least resistance is probably Alaska, a state where a Democratic incumbent, Mark Begich, ought to have a decent chance of defeating his Republican challenger. There have only been two polls since Dan Sullivan, the Republican, won the party’s nomination in mid-August. Both of these polls show Mr. Sullivan with the lead. Nonetheless, there are plenty of reasons to have reservations about the Alaska polling. Alaska is the only state where there hasn’t been a single nonpartisan, traditional telephone poll this year. It’s a state with a long history of polling miscues, perhaps in part because the state’s small, far-flung and isolated population poses unique challenges to pollsters. The New York Times/CBS News/YouGov panel is particularly sparse in Alaska, where there were only around 400 respondents in the most recent poll. That’s fewer than the panel surveyed in some congressional districts, and my look at the congressional district data suggests that there’s plenty of noise in the places where the sample size is that small. The other poll, by Rasmussen, does not have a transparent way to survey voters without a landline telephone, and its record has not been very strong in recent years. The fairest read of the available data is that Mr. Sullivan, the Republican, has the edge. After all, he has the edge in the only two data points since his nomination. That’s why Leo, The Upshot’s Senate model, gives Mr. Sullivan a 55 percent chance of winning. But there are two ways that one can have a 55 percent chance of winning. One can imagine, for instance, a race in which a lot of polling makes it quite clear that one candidate has a narrow lead. On the other hand, the 55 percent in Alaska reflects a great deal of uncertainty about the state of the race. There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points. So a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska — and I’m not sure we’ll ever have a great sense of the race, given the polling challenges. But this much is clear: If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats, as of today.
7,148
<h4>Dems have the momentum to take the senate now – but there is no margin of error</h4><p><strong>Cohn 9/12</strong> <Nate, The New York Times, “Democrats Are Seeing More Daylight in Path to Senate Control,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/upshot/democrats-are-seeing-more-daylight-in-path-to-senate-control.html?abt=0002&abg=1>#SPS</p><p>A few months ago, <u><strong><mark>the Dem</mark>ocratic <mark>path to a Senate</u></strong></mark> majority looked long and arduous. It <u><strong>has started to look easier. </u></strong>The Democrats started the campaign with a clear advantage in enough races to end up with 45 seats, well short of the 50 needed to retain control of the chamber. To get to 50, the party was going to have to run the table in five battleground states where polls were already showing Republicans with an occasional lead — or replace one of them by holding either Arkansas or Louisiana, two deep-red states with Democratic incumbents in jeopardy. Doing so would have been challenging under any circumstances. It seemed especially daunting this year, given the president’s low approval ratings and the long history of the president’s party suffering a “midterm penalty.” But <u><strong>today the Democratic path to <mark>victory looks as clear as it has at any point this year.</u></strong> <u><strong>That path remains narrow</u></strong></mark>, to be sure. The Democrats will probably still need to sweep those five fairly close races. Yet <u><strong><mark>with just two months to go, the party appears to have an advantage</u></strong></mark> in four of them. And the Democrats have other opportunities that might give them more breathing room. <u><strong><mark>The Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s</mark> now appear to <mark>have a modest lead in Colorado and Michigan</mark>, two states where Republicans entered the summer with high hopes.</u></strong> Over the last month, <u><strong>a diverse set of pollsters has given</u></strong> Senator Mark <u><strong>Udall</u></strong> of Colorado, a Democratic incumbent, <u><strong>a lead</u></strong> of an average of 3.7 points. <u><strong>In Michigan</u></strong>, the Democrat, Gary <u><strong>Peters, leads by an even larger</u></strong> 5.5-point <u><strong>margin. <mark>These leads are not insurmountable.</u></strong> <u><strong>But they are not insubstantial, either</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>There is no evidence of a trend toward the Republicans and,</u></strong> <u><strong>if anything, the Democratic advantage has grown</u></strong> over the summer. Leo, The Upshot’s Senate forecasting model, now gives the Democrats around an 80 percent chance of winning each of these states. At one point earlier this year, Leo interpreted Mr. Udall to be the underdog, and Mr. Peters had only a 59 percent chance of winning as recently as a month and a half ago<mark>. <u><strong>If Colorado and Michigan are penciled</mark> into the <mark>Democratic</mark> column</u></strong><mark>, <u><strong>the</mark> <mark>Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s</mark> will then <mark>need three more states to retain control</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The Democrats have a fairly broad set of options for those states</u></strong>, but the likeliest possibility is that the election comes down to Alaska, Iowa and North Carolina.<u><strong> </u></strong>All three pose big challenges to Democrats. Alaska voted for Mitt Romney by 14 points in 2012. The president’s approval ratings are terrible in Iowa, where the Democrats have an imperfect nominee — one who seemed to criticize farmers in recorded remarks at a fund-raiser — in one of the few competitive races where the party will not benefit from incumbency. And there is no state where Democrats suffer more from an off-year electorate than North Carolina, where Democrats are exceptionally dependent on young and nonwhite voters to overcome the state’s conservative and older white voters. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the Republicans are favored in any of these states<mark>. <u><strong>In North Carolina and Iowa</mark>, the <mark>Democrats maintain a fairly clear, if small, lead</mark> in the polls, <mark>and Alaska is notoriously difficult to poll</mark>. Leo now gives</u></strong> Senator Kay <u><strong>Hagan</u></strong> of North Carolina <u><strong>a 73 percent chance of victory, given that she leads her Republican opponent</u></strong>, Thom <u><strong>Tillis, by two percentage points</u></strong>, 45 to 43, in an average of polls. I might rate her chances somewhat lower, in part because she’s benefiting from an unlikely six-point edge in a new poll from Rasmussen, a firm with a record of relying on dubious sampling and weighting techniques. Another factor complicating the polls is that they may be underestimating the support of Mr. Tillis by asking respondents about a Libertarian candidate, Sean Haugh, who is not seriously campaigning but is nonetheless receiving more support than Libertarian candidates in North Carolina generally do. Even so, Ms. Hagan generally leads in the polls that do not name Mr. Haugh, and there’s not much question which candidate is ahead. Representative Bruce <u><strong>Braley</u></strong>, the Democratic nominee in Iowa, <u><strong>also has an advantage, albeit an even more tenuous one than Ms. Hagan.</u></strong> He has been leading by about two-thirds of a point over the last month. <u><strong>His lead, however, is fairly consistent:</u></strong> His Republican opponent, Joni Ernst, has led in just one poll over the last three months, and a more recent version of that poll, an online survey by YouGov, The New York Times and CBS, flipped to Mr. Braley. <u><strong><mark>Unlike the races in Colorado and Michigan</mark>, those in <mark>North Carolina and Iowa are true tossups. The current Democratic advantage could prove to be fleeting, but there’s not much evidence of movement in the Republicans’ direction</mark> for now. </u></strong>Even if Democrats were to win both Iowa and North Carolina, they would still be one seat short of 50 seats. (If the two parties each win 50 seats, Vice President Joe Biden will break the tie, to the Democrats’ advantage.) <u><strong><mark>Their path of least resistance is</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>Alaska</u></strong></mark>, a state where a Democratic incumbent, Mark Begich, ought to have a decent chance of defeating his Republican challenger. There have only been two polls since Dan Sullivan, the Republican, won the party’s nomination in mid-August. Both of these polls show Mr. Sullivan with the lead. Nonetheless, there are plenty of reasons to have reservations about the Alaska polling. Alaska is the only state where there hasn’t been a single nonpartisan, traditional telephone poll this year. It’s a state with a long history of polling miscues, perhaps in part because the state’s small, far-flung and isolated population poses unique challenges to pollsters.<u><strong> </u></strong>The New York Times/CBS News/YouGov panel is particularly sparse in Alaska, where there were only around 400 respondents in the most recent poll. <u><strong>That’s fewer than the panel surveyed in some congressional districts, and my look at the congressional district data suggests that there’s plenty of noise in the places where the sample size is that small.</u></strong> The other poll, by Rasmussen, does not have a transparent way to survey voters without a landline telephone, and its record has not been very strong in recent years.<u><strong> </u></strong>The fairest read of the available data is that Mr. Sullivan, the Republican, has the edge. After all, he has the edge in the only two data points since his nomination. That’s why Leo, The Upshot’s Senate model, gives Mr. Sullivan a 55 percent chance of winning.<u><strong> </u></strong>But there are two ways that one can have a 55 percent chance of winning. One can imagine, for instance, a race in which a lot of polling makes it quite clear that one candidate has a narrow lead. On the other hand, the 55 percent in Alaska reflects a great deal of uncertainty about the state of the race.<u><strong> <mark>There’s so much uncertainty that no one should be surprised if the very next poll happens to show Mr. Begich with a lead of five points.</mark> So <mark>a lot is riding on what’s actually going on in Alaska</u></strong> —</mark> and I’m not sure we’ll ever have a great sense of the race, given the polling challenges. But this much is clear: <u><strong><mark>If Mr. Begich is the favorite, then the Democrats have a fairly clean path to 50 seats. In fact, they would have an edge in 50 seats,</u></strong></mark> as of today.</p>
1NR
Alaska DA
2NC
429,802
11
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,498
Legalization on the midterm ballot spurs democratic win in Alaska – Plan robs them of the issue
Walker 14
Walker 14
Could End up Saving Democratic Control of the Senate”, AB marijuana legalization could now be what helps Democrats narrowly maintain control of the Senate law required local election officials to move a marijuana legalization initiative scheduled for the primary ballot to the November general election This date change could save Begich re-election bid and Democrats control of the Senate having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people to vote the three states with legalization initiatives saw a significant increase in the percent of young voters 69 percent said they were more likely to turn out if marijuana legalization is on the ballot. any increase in youth turnout will have a noticeable benefit for Begich Even a modest boost in youth turnout can legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss for Begich given how close the race is. Alaska is the most competitive Senate race this year it is also currently projected to be the tipping point election which will decide control of the Senate moved marijuana legalization may just prove to be the small edge Begich, and by extension the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win.
legalization could be what helps Democrats narrowly maintain control of the Senate a marijuana legalization initiative could save Begich and Democrats control of the Senate having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people vote 69 percent said they were more likely to turn out any increase in turnout will benefit Begich Even a modest boost can legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss given how close the race is Alaska is the most competitive race marijuana legalization may prove to be the edge Begich and by extension the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win
Jon, Election analyst for FDL, http://elections.firedoglake.com/2014/04/22/how-marijuana-legalization-could-end-up-saving-democratic-control-of-the-senate/, “How Marijuana Legalization Could End up Saving Democratic Control of the Senate”, AB Thanks to a strange series of coincidences marijuana legalization could now be what helps Democrats narrowly maintain control of the Senate – even though not one Senate Democrat is willing to publicly support this popular change yet. Democrats have the Alaska state legislature’s inability to work quickly for this potential pot political windfall. This week the Alaska legislature needed to go into extend session, which means they will not finish work 120 days before the August 19th primary. As a result Alaska law required local election officials to move a marijuana legalization initiative scheduled for the August primary ballot to the November general election. This date change could be what narrowly save Sen. Mark Begich (D-AK) re-election bid and Democrats control of the Senate. There are strong indications that having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people to vote. In 2012 the three states with legalization initiatives saw a significant increase in the percent of young voters compared to 2008, but there was no similar increase in the rest of the country. Similarly, a George Washington Battleground poll found 69 percent said they were more likely to turn out if marijuana legalization is on the ballot. Since Democrats have a 13 point affiliation advantage with voters under 30, any increase in youth turnout will have a noticeable benefit for Begich. Even a modest boost in youth turnout can legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss for Begich given how close the race is. According to a new analysis by the New York Times, Alaska is the most competitive Senate race this year with Democrats and Republicans having exactly a 50 percent chance of winning. More importantly, it is also currently projected to be the tipping point election which will decide control of the Senate. On November 4th the nation could easily be up late waiting for result from Alaska to tell us if Democrats end up with a 50 senator majority (plus the Vice President who is the tie breaker) or 49 seat minority. This one recently moved marijuana legalization initiative may just prove to be the small edge Begich, and by extension the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win.
2,484
<h4>Legalization on the midterm ballot spurs democratic<strong> </strong>win<strong> in Alaska – Plan robs them of the issue</h4><p>Walker 14</p><p></strong>Jon, Election analyst for FDL, http://elections.firedoglake.com/2014/04/22/how-marijuana-legalization-could-end-up-saving-democratic-control-of-the-senate/, “How Marijuana Legalization <u><strong>Could End up Saving Democratic Control of the Senate”, AB </p><p></u></strong>Thanks to a strange series of coincidences <u><strong>marijuana <mark>legalization could</mark> now <mark>be what helps Democrats</mark> <mark>narrowly maintain control of the Senate</u></strong></mark> – even though not one Senate Democrat is willing to publicly support this popular change yet. Democrats have the Alaska state legislature’s inability to work quickly for this potential pot political windfall. This week the Alaska legislature needed to go into extend session, which means they will not finish work 120 days before the August 19th primary. As a result Alaska <u><strong>law required local election officials to move <mark>a marijuana legalization initiative</mark> scheduled for the</u></strong> August <u><strong>primary</u></strong> <u><strong>ballot</u></strong> <u><strong>to the November general election</u></strong>. <u><strong>This date change <mark>could</u></strong> </mark>be what narrowly <u><strong><mark>save</u></strong></mark> Sen. Mark <u><strong><mark>Begich</u></strong></mark> (D-AK) <u><strong>re-election bid <mark>and Democrats control of the Senate</u></strong></mark>. There are strong indications that <u><strong><mark>having legalization on the ballot has the unique ability to get young people</mark> to <mark>vote</u></strong></mark>. In 2012 <u><strong>the three states with legalization initiatives saw a significant increase in the percent of young voters</u></strong> compared to 2008, but there was no similar increase in the rest of the country. Similarly, a George Washington Battleground poll found <u><strong><mark>69 percent said they were more likely to turn out</mark> if marijuana legalization is on the ballot.</u></strong> Since Democrats have a 13 point affiliation advantage with voters under 30, <u><strong><mark>any increase in</mark> youth <mark>turnout</mark> <mark>will</mark> have a noticeable <mark>benefit</mark> for <mark>Begich</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even a modest boost</mark> in youth turnout <mark>can</mark> <mark>legitimately make the difference between a narrow win and a narrow loss</mark> for Begich <mark>given how close the race is</mark>. </u></strong>According to a new analysis by the New York Times, <u><strong><mark>Alaska is the most</mark> <mark>competitive</mark> Senate <mark>race</mark> this year</u></strong> with Democrats and Republicans having exactly a 50 percent chance of winning. More importantly, <u><strong>it is also currently projected to be the tipping point election which will decide control of the Senate</u></strong>. On November 4th the nation could easily be up late waiting for result from Alaska to tell us if Democrats end up with a 50 senator majority (plus the Vice President who is the tie breaker) or 49 seat minority. This one recently <u><strong>moved <mark>marijuana</mark> <mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> initiative <u><strong><mark>may</mark> just <mark>prove to be the</mark> small <mark>edge</mark> <mark>Begich</mark>, <mark>and by extension</mark> <mark>the entire Democratic party, needs for a close win</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NR
Alaska DA
2NC
429,869
5
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,499
Asian war is unlikely - all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives
Bitzinger & Desker ‘8
Bitzinger & Desker ‘8
despite all the potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, is stable the region has been free of warfare. the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is contained. North Korea is moving toward a denuclearisation Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict given efforts to re-open consultation as well as institutional relationships , there are many multilateral organisations and initiatives dedicated to enhancing stability countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation which is dedicated the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia is unlikely.
) the Asia-Pacific is stable the break-up of states is unlikely Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict given efforts to re-open consultation as well as institutional relationships there are many multilateral organisations and initiatives dedicated to enhancing stability countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation All this suggests that war in Asia is unlikely.
senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf) The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.
3,012
<h4><strong>Asian war is unlikely - all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives </h4><p>Bitzinger & Desker ‘8 </p><p></strong> senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf<mark>)</p><p></mark>The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet<u><strong> despite all the</u></strong>se<u><strong> potential crucibles of conflict, <mark>the Asia-Pacific</mark>, </u></strong>if not an area of serenity and calm,<u><strong> <mark>is </u></strong></mark>certainly more<u><strong> <mark>stable </u></strong></mark>than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however,<u><strong> the region has been </u></strong>relatively<u><strong> free of </u></strong>open armed<u><strong> warfare. </u></strong>Separatism remains a challenge, but<u><strong> <mark>the break-up of states is unlikely</mark>. Terrorism is </u></strong>a nuisance, but its<u><strong> </u></strong>impact is<u><strong> contained. </u></strong>The<u><strong> North Korea</u></strong>n nuclear issue, while not fully resolved,<u><strong> is </u></strong>at least<u><strong> moving toward a </u></strong>conclusion with the likely<u><strong> denuclearisation </u></strong>of the peninsula.<u><strong> <mark>Tensions between China and Taiwan</u></strong></mark>, while always just beneath the surface,<u><strong> <mark>seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict </u></strong></mark>any time<u><strong> </u></strong>soon, especially<u><strong> <mark>given </u></strong></mark>recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and<u><strong> <mark>efforts </u></strong></mark>by<u><strong> </u></strong>Taiwan and China<u><strong> <mark>to re-open </u></strong></mark>informal channels of<u><strong> <mark>consultation as well as institutional relationships </u></strong></mark>between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union<u><strong>, <mark>there are many multilateral organisations and</u></strong></mark> international <u><strong><mark>initiatives dedicated to enhancing </u></strong></mark>peace and <u><strong><mark>stability</u></strong></mark>, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, <u><strong><mark>countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation</mark> </u></strong>– the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – <u><strong>which is dedicated </u></strong>to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to<u><strong> the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit,</u></strong> ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) <u><strong>and the ASEAN Regional Forum. <mark>All this suggests that war in Asia </u></strong></mark>– while not inconceivable –<u><strong> <mark>is unlikely.</u></strong> </p></mark>
1NR
Impact Turn
2NC
129,553
67
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,500
Tensions are declining and it won’t no nuclear
Kato ‘8
Kato ‘8
The challenges that Asia will face will not require the use of force or will be low intensity if they do. Both major flashpoints-- are showing a decline in tension////. cross-strait tension has substantially declined. China will concentrate on peaceful growth while avoiding military adventurism
The challenges that Asia will face will not require the use of force or will be low intensity if they do major flashpoints are showing a decline in tension cross-strait tension has substantially declined China will concentrate on peaceful growth while avoiding military adventurism
(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis) The challenges that the Asia Pacific will face in the foreseeable future will not likely require the actual use of force or will likely be low intensity if they do. Both major potential flashpoints--North Korea and the Taiwan Strait--are showing a decline in tension////. North Korea has recently provided a report of its nuclear facilities, although the contents have turned out to be far from satisfactory to other members of the six-party talks and the path to final denuclearization is not yet clear. Taiwan has elected a new president, Ma Ying-jeou, who has demonstrated more willingness for and flexibility in working with mainland China; and as a result, cross-strait tension has substantially declined. China has been continuing its military buildup and has engaged in some provocative actions, such as its January 2007 antisatellite test, but it has not shown any intention to challenge U.S. supremacy openly in the immediate future. For the time being, especially with the Beijing Olympic Games this year and the Shanghai World Exposition in 2010, it is widely speculated that China will concentrate on the peaceful growth of its economy while avoiding any military adventurism against the United States.
1,371
<h4><strong>Tensions are declining and it won’t no nuclear</h4><p>Kato ‘8</p><p></strong>(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis) </p><p><u><strong><mark>The challenges that</mark> </u></strong>the<u><strong> <mark>Asia </u></strong></mark>Pacific<u><strong> <mark>will face</u></strong> </mark>in the foreseeable future <u><strong><mark>will not</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>require the </u></strong></mark>actual<u><strong> <mark>use of force</u></strong> <u><strong>or will</u></strong> </mark>likely <u><strong><mark>be low intensity if they do</mark>. Both <mark>major </u></strong></mark>potential <u><strong><mark>flashpoints</mark>--</u></strong>North Korea and the Taiwan Strait--<u><strong><mark>are showing a decline in tension</mark>////. </u></strong>North Korea has recently provided a report of its nuclear facilities, although the contents have turned out to be far from satisfactory to other members of the six-party talks and the path to final denuclearization is not yet clear. Taiwan has elected a new president, Ma Ying-jeou, who has demonstrated more willingness for and flexibility in working with mainland China; and as a result,<u><strong> <mark>cross-strait tension has substantially declined</mark>. </u></strong>China<u><strong> </u></strong>has been continuing its military buildup and has engaged in some provocative actions, such as its January 2007 antisatellite test, but it has not shown any intention to challenge U.S. supremacy openly in the immediate future. For the time being, especially with the Beijing Olympic Games this year and the Shanghai World Exposition in 2010, it is widely speculated that <u><strong><mark>China will concentrate on</mark> </u></strong>the<u><strong> <mark>peaceful growth </u></strong></mark>of its economy<u><strong> <mark>while avoiding</u></strong></mark> any<u><strong> <mark>military adventurism </u></mark>against the United States.</p></strong>
1NR
Impact Turn
2NC
429,879
1
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,501
No great Asian power wars
White ‘9
White ‘9
major conflicts in Asia seems unthinkable. East Asia has enjoyed peace such as never before China, Japan and the United States – have maintained harmonious and cooperative relationships. excluding minor incidents none of East Asia’s major powers has used significant force against another Asian the members of ASEAN have largely forsworn the use of force against one another; difficult issues like Taiwan, North Korea and the Spratlys have been effectively managed even India–Pakistan does not threaten outbreak of major war
major conflicts in Asia seems unthinkable. East Asia has enjoyed peace such as never before excluding minor incidents none of East Asia’s major powers has used significant force against another Asian North Korea and the Spratlys have been effectively managed even India–Pakistan does not threaten outbreak of major war
[Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies at Australian National University and a Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Survival vol. 50 no. 6] If we conceive of ‘wars’ the way our parents and grandparents did – as major conflicts among powerful states that disrupt the lives of billions and transform the international order – then war in Asia today seems close to unthinkable. For over 30 years, East Asia has enjoyed peace such as it has probably never known before. In Northeast Asia, the region’s major powers – China, Japan and the United States – have maintained harmonious and cooperative relationships. Moreover, excluding only minor incidents in the Spratly Islands, none of East Asia’s major powers has used significant force against another Asian country since China’s limited war against Vietnam in 1979. For 40 years, the members of ASEAN have largely forsworn the use of force against one another; difficult issues like Taiwan, North Korea and the Spratlys have been effectively managed, and the deep problems of Indochina have been addressed. Minor clashes remain possible in trouble spots such as the Thailand–Myanmar border, and on Asia’s western margin there remains a real risk of major, even nuclear, war between India and Pakistan. But even the risk of an India–Pakistan war does not seem to threaten an outbreak of major war in East Asia.
1,383
<h4><strong>No great Asian power wars</h4><p>White ‘9</p><p></strong>[Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies at Australian National University and a Visiting Fellow at the Lowy</p><p>Institute for International Policy, Survival vol. 50 no. 6]</p><p>If we conceive of ‘wars’ the way our parents and grandparents did – as <u><strong><mark>major conflicts</u></strong> </mark>among powerful states that disrupt the lives of billions and transform the international order – then war <u><strong><mark>in Asia</u></strong> </mark>today <u><strong><mark>seems</u></strong> </mark>close to <u><strong><mark>unthinkable.</u></strong></mark> For over 30 years, <u><strong><mark>East Asia has enjoyed peace such as </u></strong></mark>it has probably<u><strong> <mark>never </u></strong></mark>known<u><strong> <mark>before</u></strong></mark>. In Northeast Asia, the region’s major powers – <u><strong>China, Japan and the United States – have maintained harmonious and cooperative relationships.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>excluding </u></strong></mark>only<u><strong><mark> minor incidents </u></strong></mark>in the Spratly Islands,<u><strong><mark> none of East Asia’s major powers has used significant force against another Asian</u></strong></mark> country since China’s limited war against Vietnam in 1979. For 40 years, <u><strong>the members of ASEAN have largely forsworn the use of force against one another; difficult issues like Taiwan, <mark>North Korea and the Spratlys have been effectively managed</u></strong></mark>, and the deep problems of Indochina have been addressed. Minor clashes remain possible in trouble spots such as the Thailand–Myanmar border, and on Asia’s western margin there remains a real risk of major, even nuclear, war between India and Pakistan. But <u><strong><mark>even </u></strong></mark>the risk of an<u><strong> <mark>India–Pakistan </u></strong></mark>war<u><strong> <mark>does not </u></strong></mark>seem to<u><strong> <mark>threaten </u></strong></mark>an<u><strong> <mark>outbreak of major war </u></strong></mark>in East Asia.</p>
1NR
Impact Turn
2NC
429,880
2
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,502
1.) No incentive
Moss 13
Moss 13 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong and defense analyst for the Diplomat, February 10th, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true, AB)
if Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is playing the odds Japan can pursue a muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China based on numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment there are seven reasons war is a very unlikely prospect even with a hawkish prime minister Beijing’s nightmare scenario defeat would also be a very real possibility the prospect of a new avoidable humiliation is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome the surest way being not to have a war at all Jinping does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese Xi would be doomed politically the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive
Abe is playing the odds Japan can pursue a muscular foreign policy without triggering a based on numerous constraints war is a very unlikely prospect the prospect of humiliation is enough to persuade Beijing to not to have a war at all Xi would be doomed politically the Communist Party wouldn’t survive
But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.
1,251
<h4>1.) No incentive </h4><p><strong><mark>Moss 13</strong></mark> (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong and defense analyst for the Diplomat, February 10th, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true, AB)</p><p>But <u><strong>if</u></strong> Shinzo <u><strong><mark>Abe</mark> <mark>is</mark> gambling with the region’s security, he is</u></strong> at least <u><strong><mark>playing the</mark> <mark>odds</u></strong></mark>. He is calculating that <u><strong><mark>Japan can pursue a</u></strong></mark> more <u><strong><mark>muscular foreign policy without triggering</mark> <mark>a</mark> catastrophic backlash from China</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>based on</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>numerous constraints</mark> that shape Chinese actions</u></strong>, <u><strong>as well as</u></strong> <u><strong>the interlocking structure of the globalized environment</u></strong> which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, <u><strong>there are seven reasons</u></strong> to think that <u><strong><mark>war is a very unlikely prospect</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>even with a </u></strong>more <u><strong>hawkish prime</u></strong> <u><strong>minister</u></strong> running Japan: 1. <u><strong>Beijing’s nightmare scenario</u></strong>. China might well win a war against Japan, but <u><strong>defeat would also be a very real possibility</u></strong>. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, <u><strong><mark>the prospect of</mark> a new</u></strong>, <u><strong>avoidable <mark>humiliation</u></strong></mark> at the hands of its most bitter enemy <u><strong><mark>is enough to persuade Beijing</mark> <mark>to</mark> do everything it can to prevent that outcome</u></strong> (<u><strong>the surest way being <mark>not to have a war at all</u></strong></mark>). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi <u><strong>Jinping</u></strong>, <u><strong>does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese</u></strong>. In that scenario, <u><strong><mark>Xi</u></strong> <u><strong>would be doomed politically</u></strong></mark>, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, <u><strong><mark>the Communist Party </mark>probably <mark>wouldn’t survive</u></mark> either.</p></strong>
2NR
Midterms
AT: Impact Turn
60,225
88
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,503
2.) Economic interdependence
Moss 13 , AB)
Moss 13 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong and defense analyst for the Diplomat, February 10th, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true, AB)
Economic interdependence Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both The economy Abe is trying to breathe life would take a battering Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.
Economic interdependence a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous The economy would take a battering Panic would depress both economies and destroy both countries’ leaders
2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.
633
<h4>2.)<strong> </strong>Economic<strong> </strong>interdependence<strong> </h4><p><mark>Moss 13</strong></mark> (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong and defense analyst for the Diplomat, February 10th, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true<u><strong>, AB)</p><p></u></strong>2. <u><strong><mark>Economic interdependence</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Win or lose, <mark>a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>for</u></strong> <u><strong>both</u></strong> participants. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> flagging <u><strong><mark>economy</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>Abe is trying to breathe life</u></strong> into with a $117 billion stimulus package <u><strong><mark>would take a battering</u></strong></mark> as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. <u><strong><mark>Panic</mark> in the globalized economy <mark>would</mark> further <mark>depress both economies</mark>, <mark>and</mark> potentially <mark>destroy</mark> the programs of <mark>both countries’ </mark>new <mark>leaders</mark>.</p></u></strong>
2NR
Midterms
AT: Impact Turn
60,225
88
16,979
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
564,681
N
UMKC
4
Kansas KY
Jacob Thompson
1AC Marijuana Hemp Enviro Federalism 1NC T-Hemp Spec Security K Midterms DA Reeferendum Mexico Econ 2NC Security K Reeferendum 1NR Mexico Econ Turn Midterms DA 2NR Midterms DA Reeferendum
ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx
null
48,385
BaSh
Baylor BaSh
null
An.....
Ba.....
Si.....
Sh.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,504
“Legalize” requires regulatory distinctions
Moser 13
Moser 13
Legalization vs. Decriminalization¶ To decriminalize an act means to reduce the severity of the offense so that, instead of prison, an offender will pay a fine.¶ Legalization means making something completely legal The issue would no longer be deciding if an act or product was legal to buy or sell. Now there would be a distinction between how much or how often would be considered acceptable
To decriminalize means to reduce the severity of the offense Legalization means making something completely legal
Sam, “The Difference between Legalization and Decriminalization” [http://www.criminaldefenceblawg.com/uncategorized/the-difference-between-legalization-and-decriminalization/] February 5 // Legalization vs. Decriminalization¶ The question in situations like this has often been whether to decriminalize an offense, such as possessing marijuana, or to legalize it. To decriminalize an act usually means to reduce the severity of the offense so that, instead of prison, an offender will pay a fine.¶ According to the legal system, however, decriminalization often amounts to prioritizing. Law enforcement authorities have other things to worry about besides people smoking dope. Also, police and judges might decide that it is the degree to which someone commits a crime (i.e. how often and how much she charges for a prostitute, how much marijuana a person possesses, etc.) which inform their decisions to arrest and punish someone.¶ Legalization means making something completely legal. The issue would no longer be deciding if an act or product was legal to buy or sell. Now there would be a distinction between how much (of a drug) or how often (prostituting) would be considered acceptable.
1,193
<h4><u><strong>“Legalize” requires regulatory distinctions</h4><p>Moser 13 </p><p></u></strong>Sam, “The Difference between Legalization and Decriminalization” [http://www.criminaldefenceblawg.com/uncategorized/the-difference-between-legalization-and-decriminalization/] February 5 //</p><p><u>Legalization vs. Decriminalization¶</u> The question in situations like this has often been whether to decriminalize an offense, such as possessing marijuana, or to legalize it. <u><mark>To decriminalize</mark> an act</u> usually <u><mark>means to reduce the severity of the offense</mark> so that, instead of prison, an offender will pay a fine.¶</u> According to the legal system, however, decriminalization often amounts to prioritizing. Law enforcement authorities have other things to worry about besides people smoking dope. Also, police and judges might decide that it is the degree to which someone commits a crime (i.e. how often and how much she charges for a prostitute, how much marijuana a person possesses, etc.) which inform their decisions to arrest and punish someone.¶ <u><mark>Legalization means making something completely legal</u></mark>. <u>The issue would no longer be deciding if an act or product was legal to buy or sell. Now there would be a distinction between how much</u> (of a drug) <u>or how often</u> (prostituting) <u>would be considered acceptable</u>.</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,882
4
16,981
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
564,706
N
Kentucky
4
Kentucky HR
Michael Hester
1ac was marijuana legalization with cartels hemp and state budgets 1nc was t legalization marijuana word pic and ontological security 2nc was the k 1nr was case 2nr was the k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2