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The impact is an ongoing politics of indistinction which makes violence inevitable

Prozorov ’10

Prozorov ’10 (Sergei, professor of political and economic studies at the University of Helsinki, “Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist,” Philosophy Social Criticism 2010, pgs. 1054-1056, [SG])

Both the supporters and the critics of Agamben’s political thought agree that his account of the contemporary state of politics offers a staggering account of a total crisis of a global scope Among his more famous zones of indistinction are those between democracy and totalitarianism, violence and law, nature and culture, our era of nihilism, which he dates back to the First World War, is marked by the ultimate dissolution of these and other distinctions that grounded political orders and the consequent vacuity both of the ideologies and the practices of western modernity that were based on these distinctions. a ‘global civil war’ is thus not a result of a malfunctioning, ineffectiveness. abandonment, or betrayal of any of the classical political paradigms but rather a holistic crisis of occidental politics, which reveals the nullity of its foundational distinctions that was there all along but was concealed by the relatively ordered character of political life. In this holistic crisis there is literally nothing in our tradition that we can rely on as a foundation for political transformation. Agamben explicitly rejects any possibility of transforming power relations within the immanent logic of their ‘game’, since the game in question has long lost any recognizable meaning and is running on ‘empty’. This totalized image of the global state of exception has been criticized as both hyperbolically excessive and internally contradictory. the analysis of late-modem power relations constitutes a contradiction, we must recall that this duality of the con temporary apparatus of power the indissociability of sovereignty, discipline and government. regularly insists that ‘the system is always double’.” The inextricable link between the two aspects of the contemporary social order consists in the nihilistic deployment of life itself as a (post)historical task. . The contemporary neo-liberal governmentality extends the operation of economic rationality to life itself, whereby life is conceived as a paradigmatic form of enterprise,’2 and in this manner expropriates the being-in-language that defines human existence and subjects it to the laws of exchange-value or ‘exhibition value’. sovereign power expropriates the potentiality of human existence, transforming it into the bare life that it then grounds itself in and applies itself to in the perpetual state of exception. The state does nothing more than sustain the spectacle with its apparatuses of security, while the spectacle does nothing more than perpetually produce the degraded forms-of-life that sovereign power can apply itself to the contemporary situation there is nothing to lose from a total ‘halting of the machine’.’ subversion of sovereignty in the name of the undeconstructibIe justice and ‘democracy to come’, which serves only to highlight the undecidability at the heart of the law, which is essential to the latter’s Since the state of anomie is the constitutive outside of any nomos, it is bound to remain inscribed within it irrespectively of the way the positive structure of order is transformed. The state of exception and its product. the bare life of homo sacer, are not a ‘political problem’ to be resolved within any positive system, but rather a problem of the political itself). Any search for a more effective, ‘exception-proof’ positive order is entirely in vain, especially in today’s condition of nihilism, in which the vacuity of historical forms-of-life has brought the sovereign ban to the foreground as the sole substance of politics.

contemporary politics offers total crisis of a global scope. zones of indistinction between democracy and totalitarianism, violence and law marked by the dissolution of distinctions that grounded political orders a ‘global civil war’ is not a result of ineffectiveness of political paradigms but rather a holistic crisis of occidental politics concealed by the ordered character of political life. In this crisis there is nothing that we can rely on as a foundation for political transformation Agamben rejects any relations within the immanent logic of their ‘game’, since the game in question has long lost any recognizable meaning and is running on ‘empty’ governmentality defines existence and subjects it to the laws of exchange-value sovereign power expropriates the potentiality of human existence, transforming it into the bare life that it then grounds itself in and applies the state of exception. perpetually produce the degraded forms-of-life that sovereign power can apply itself to democracy serves only to highlight the undecidability at the heart of the law, it is bound to remain inscribed within the positive structure of order The state of exception and the bare life of homo sacer, are not a ‘political problem’ but rather a problem of the political itself). search for a more effective, order is in vain, especially in today’s condition of nihilism, in which historical life has brought the sovereign to the foreground

Both the supporters and the critics of Agamben’s political thought agree that his account of the contemporary state of politics offers a staggering account of a total crisis of a global scope. In contrast to the tendency in today’s critical political thought to appreciate differences, discontinuities, distinctions and diversity, Agamben presents a totalizing image of the global state of exception, which appears bent on collapsing all differences in the ‘zone of indistinction’, which is the privileged topos of Agamben’s writings.3 Among his more famous zones of indistinction are those between democracy and totalitarianism, violence and law, nature and culture, etc. In the logic of Agamben’s argument. our era of nihilism, which he dates back to the First World War, is marked by the ultimate dissolution of these and other distinctions that grounded political orders and the consequent vacuity both of the ideologies and the practices of western modernity that were based on these distinctions. The contemporary condition that Agamben, following Carl Schmitt, likens to a ‘global civil war’ is thus not a result of a malfunctioning, ineffectiveness. abandonment, or betrayal of any of the classical political paradigms but rather a holistic crisis of occidental politics, which reveals the nullity of its foundational distinctions that was there all along but was concealed by the relatively ordered character of political life.4 In this holistic crisis there is literally nothing in our tradition that we can rely on as a foundation for political transformation. Agamben’s political stance is therefore radically anti-strategic insofar as it explicitly renounces any involvement in the contemporary ‘apparatuses’ of sovereignty and govemmentality for the purpose of, for example, tactical alliances or reversals, playing one logic of power against the other, internal subversion. etc.5 While the latter form of strategic intervention into the field of power relations is most usually associated with Michel Foucault’s work, which emphasized the plurality, diversity and reversibility of power relations that offer opportunities for immanent resistance, Agamben is inspired by a different, less widely discussed position of Foucault with respect to power, his ‘anti-strategic’ stance on resistance, formulated in the context of the Iranian Revolution.6 Agamben explicitly rejects any possibility of transforming power relations within the immanent logic of their ‘game’, since the game in question has long lost any recognizable meaning and is running on ‘empty’. This totalized image of the global state of exception has been criticized as both hyperbolically excessive and internally contradictory. Paul Passavant has argued that Agamben’s theory suffers from a contradictory concept of the state that also plagues his affirmative vision of the ‘coming politics’.7 While Agamben is most famous for his deconstruction of the logic of sovereignty that radicalizes Schmitt’s conception.5 he has also, from his earliest work onwards, confronted the more dispersed, ‘governmentalized’ modes of power relations characteristic of late capitalism in the manner highly influenced by Guy Debord’s work on the society of the spectacle.9 Against the argument that this conjunction of sovereignty and govemmentality in the analysis of late-modem power relations constitutes a contradiction, we must recall that this duality of the con temporary apparatus of power is explicitly affirmed by Agamben himself, who, similarly to Foucault’s claim for the indissociability of sovereignty, discipline and government.’0 regularly insists that ‘the system is always double’.” The inextricable link between the two aspects of the contemporary social order consists in the nihilistic deployment of life itself as a (post)historical task. Both state sovereignty and the late-capitalist society of the spectacle are biopolitical and thus permanently feed into each other. The contemporary neo-liberal governmentality extends the operation of economic rationality to life itself, whereby life is conceived as a paradigmatic form of enterprise,’2 and in this manner expropriates the being-in-language that defines human existence and subjects it to the laws of exchange-value or, in Againben’s later woilts, ‘exhibition value’.’3 Conversely, sovereign power expropriates the potentiality of human existence, transforming it into the bare life that it then grounds itself in and applies itself to in the perpetual state of exception. The state does nothing more than sustain the spectacle with its apparatuses of security, while the spectacle does nothing more than perpetually produce the degraded forms-of-life that sovereign power can apply itself to. Yet, how can this claim about the mutual reinforcement of the sovereign state and the society of the spectacle under the aegis of biopolitical nihilism ground any optimistic disposition? It is precisely this totalized image that allows Agamben to claim that in the contemporary situation there is nothing to lose from a total ‘halting of the machine’.’4 On the one hand, Agamben refuses both the possibility of reforming or even revolutionizing social life by re-engaging with sovereignty, e.g. through the political struggle for hegemony along the lines of Laclau’s populism or the Habermasian formation of a more inclusive political community tHrough communicative action. Neither is there any point in a Derridean deconstructive subversion of sovereignty in the name of the undeconstructibIe justice and ‘democracy to come’, which serves only to highlight the undecidability at the heart of the law, which is essential to the latter’s Since the state of anomie is the constitutive outside of any nomos, it is bound to remain inscribed within it irrespectively of the way the positive structure of order is transformed. The state of exception and its product. the bare life of homo sacer, are not a ‘political problem’ to be resolved within any positive system, but rather a problem of the political itself). Any search for a more effective, ‘exception-proof’ positive order is entirely in vain, especially in today’s condition of nihilism, in which the vacuity of historical forms-of-life has brought the sovereign ban to the foreground as the sole substance of politics.

<h4>The impact is an ongoing politics of indistinction which makes violence inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Prozorov ’10</u> </strong>(Sergei, professor of political and economic studies at the University of Helsinki, “Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist,” Philosophy Social Criticism 2010<u>, pgs. 1054-1056, [SG]) </p><p>Both the supporters and the critics of Agamben’s political thought agree that his account of the <mark>contemporary </mark>state of <mark>politics offers</mark> a staggering account of a <strong><mark>total crisis of a global scope</u></strong>.</mark> In contrast to the tendency in today’s critical political thought to appreciate differences, discontinuities, distinctions and diversity, Agamben presents a totalizing image of the global state of exception, which appears bent on collapsing all differences in the ‘zone of indistinction’, which is the privileged topos of Agamben’s writings.3 <u>Among his more famous <strong><mark>zones of indistinction</strong></mark> are those <mark>between democracy and totalitarianism, violence and law</mark>, nature and culture,</u> etc. In the logic of Agamben’s argument. <u>our era of nihilism, which he dates back to the First World War, is <mark>marked by the</mark> ultimate <mark>dissolution of</mark> these and other <mark>distinctions that grounded political orders </mark>and the consequent vacuity both of the ideologies and the practices of western modernity that were based on these distinctions.</u> The contemporary condition that Agamben, following Carl Schmitt, likens to <u><mark>a ‘global civil war’ is</mark> thus <mark>not a result of</mark> a malfunctioning, <mark>ineffectiveness</mark>. abandonment, or betrayal <mark>of</mark> any of the classical <mark>political paradigms but rather a <strong>holistic crisis of occidental politics</strong></mark>, which reveals the nullity of its foundational distinctions that was there all along but was <strong><mark>concealed by the</mark> relatively <mark>ordered character of political life</strong>.</u></mark>4 <u><mark>In this</mark> holistic <mark>crisis there is</mark> literally <strong><mark>nothing </mark>in our tradition <mark>that we can rely on as a foundation for political transformation</strong></mark>.</u> Agamben’s political stance is therefore radically anti-strategic insofar as it explicitly renounces any involvement in the contemporary ‘apparatuses’ of sovereignty and govemmentality for the purpose of, for example, tactical alliances or reversals, playing one logic of power against the other, internal subversion. etc.5 While the latter form of strategic intervention into the field of power relations is most usually associated with Michel Foucault’s work, which emphasized the plurality, diversity and reversibility of power relations that offer opportunities for immanent resistance, Agamben is inspired by a different, less widely discussed position of Foucault with respect to power, his ‘anti-strategic’ stance on resistance, formulated in the context of the Iranian Revolution.6 <u><mark>Agamben</mark> explicitly <strong><mark>rejects any </mark>possibility of transforming power <mark>relations within the immanent logic</mark> <mark>of their ‘game’</strong>, since the game in question has <strong>long lost any recognizable meaning</strong> and is running on ‘empty’</mark>. This totalized image of the global state of exception has been criticized as both hyperbolically excessive and internally contradictory.</u> Paul Passavant has argued that Agamben’s theory suffers from a contradictory concept of the state that also plagues his affirmative vision of the ‘coming politics’.7 While Agamben is most famous for his deconstruction of the logic of sovereignty that radicalizes Schmitt’s conception.5 he has also, from his earliest work onwards, confronted the more dispersed, ‘governmentalized’ modes of power relations characteristic of late capitalism in the manner highly influenced by Guy Debord’s work on the society of the spectacle.9 Against the argument that this conjunction of sovereignty and govemmentality in <u>the analysis of late-modem power relations constitutes a contradiction, we must recall that this duality of the con temporary apparatus of power</u> is explicitly affirmed by Agamben himself, who, similarly to Foucault’s claim for <u>the indissociability of sovereignty, discipline and government.</u>’0 <u>regularly insists that ‘the system is always double’.” The inextricable link between the two aspects of the contemporary social order consists in the nihilistic deployment of life itself as a (post)historical task.</u> Both state sovereignty and the late-capitalist society of the spectacle are biopolitical and thus permanently feed into each other<u>. The contemporary neo-liberal <mark>governmentality</mark> extends the operation of economic rationality to life itself, whereby life is conceived as a paradigmatic form of enterprise,’2 and in this manner expropriates the being-in-language that <mark>defines</mark> human <mark>existence and subjects it to the <strong>laws of exchange-value</strong> </mark>or</u>, in Againben’s later woilts, <u>‘exhibition value’.</u>’3 Conversely, <u><mark>sovereign power <strong>expropriates the potentiality of human existence</strong>, transforming it into the <strong>bare life</strong> that it then <strong>grounds itself in</strong> and applies</mark> itself to in <mark>the</mark> perpetual <strong><mark>state of exception</strong>. </mark>The state does nothing more than sustain the spectacle with its apparatuses of security, while the spectacle does nothing more than <strong><mark>perpetually produce the degraded forms-of-life</strong> that sovereign power can apply itself to</u></mark>. Yet, how can this claim about the mutual reinforcement of the sovereign state and the society of the spectacle under the aegis of biopolitical nihilism ground any optimistic disposition? It is precisely this totalized image that allows Agamben to claim that in <u>the contemporary situation there is nothing to lose from a total ‘halting of the machine’.’</u>4 On the one hand, Agamben refuses both the possibility of reforming or even revolutionizing social life by re-engaging with sovereignty, e.g. through the political struggle for hegemony along the lines of Laclau’s populism or the Habermasian formation of a more inclusive political community tHrough communicative action. Neither is there any point in a Derridean deconstructive <u>subversion of sovereignty in the name of the undeconstructibIe justice and ‘<mark>democracy</mark> to come’, which <mark>serves only to highlight the <strong>undecidability at the heart of the law</strong>,</mark> which is essential to the latter’s Since the state of anomie is the constitutive outside of any nomos, <mark>it is bound to <strong>remain inscribed</strong> within</mark> it irrespectively of the way <mark>the positive structure of order</mark> is transformed. <mark>The state of exception and</mark> its product. <mark>the bare life of homo sacer, are <strong>not a ‘political problem’</strong> </mark>to be resolved within any positive system, <mark>but rather <strong>a problem of the political itself</strong>). </mark>Any <mark>search for a more effective, </mark>‘exception-proof’ positive <mark>order is </mark>entirely <mark>in vain, especially in today’s <strong>condition of nihilism</strong>, in which</mark> the vacuity of <mark>historical</mark> forms-of-<mark>life has brought the sovereign</mark> ban <mark>to the foreground</mark> as the sole substance of politics.</p></u>

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Emory BD

Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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Claiming to solve racism through legalization is both incorrect AND minimizes structural racism overall; legalization will simply shift resources to police communities in other ways AND will crowd SQ sellers out

Nakagwa ‘14

Nakagwa ‘14 (community organizer in 1980, and since then has worked in organizational management, social research, public policy analysis and advocacy, and philanthropy. He also has a background as a teacher and a service provider working with low-income communities to create accountable organizations that are responsive to community needs)

while I support legalization we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs such a hugely devastating law enforcement strategy for Black people legalization would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people What relief legalization would provide would be mostly temporary Times readers think law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems Those “graver problems” bother me because folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t available prison is a form of disguised unemployment Without a job people are forced to commit crimes Once convicted a criminal record can make you unemployable Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment Being excluded will drive some to drug dealing legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade legalization is a dead-end Richer people with capital to invest will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk and squeeze them out

we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice. Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs hugely devastating legalization would not lead to less over-policing What relief legalization would provide would be temporary legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade legalization is a dead-end.

Scott http://www.laprogressive.com/pot-legalization/ And, when you know so many people in the trade, you also know that the crackdown on marijuana has had grossly disproportionate impacts on poor people. Here in the continental U.S., people of color, especially African Americans (who use illegal drugs, including marijuana, at a lower rate than whites, yet are nonetheless more than three times more likely to be arrested for drug possession) have paid by far the highest price for marijuana enforcement. And this is true even when the lion’s share of the capital driving the marijuana trade is coming from white consumers. But, while I support legalization as an incremental step in the right direction, I think we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice. Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs such a hugely devastating law enforcement strategy for Black people. The legalization of marijuana, in my opinion, would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people. What relief legalization would provide, and I do believe there would be some immediate relief, would be mostly temporary. MARKED Why? The New York Times report on reader response to their legalization editorials sums it up nicely, Times readers favor legalization for the same reasons the Times editorial board does: They think the criminalization of marijuana has ruined lives; that the public health risks have been overstated; and that law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems. Those “graver problems” bother me. They bother me because the illegal drug trade is as much an economic issue as it is public health issue. My experience growing up in a drug economy tells me that folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t available. And decent paying legal jobs have rarely been harder to find than right now. As a sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, prison is a form of disguised unemployment. That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often don’t work. Without a job, people are often forced to commit crimes, like selling marijuana. Once convicted of that crime, a criminal record can make you unemployable. Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back in prison, and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy, ironically in part because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants, cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. Being excluded from decent employment opportunities will drive some people to drug dealing. Unless we deal with this reality, legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments and less public sympathy. From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade for their living, legalization is a dead-end. Richer people with the capital to invest in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk involved in developing marijuana markets illegally and squeeze them out. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to where?”

<h4><u><strong>Claiming to solve racism through legalization is both incorrect AND minimizes structural racism overall; legalization will simply shift resources to police communities in other ways AND will crowd SQ sellers out</h4><p>Nakagwa ‘14</u></strong> (community organizer in 1980, and since then has worked in organizational management, social research, public policy analysis and advocacy, and philanthropy. He also has a background as a teacher and a service provider working with low-income communities to create accountable organizations that are responsive to community needs)</p><p>Scott http://www.laprogressive.com/pot-legalization/</p><p>And, when you know so many people in the trade, you also know that the crackdown on marijuana has had grossly disproportionate impacts on poor people. Here in the continental U.S., people of color, especially African Americans (who use illegal drugs, including marijuana, at a lower rate than whites, yet are nonetheless more than three times more likely to be arrested for drug possession) have paid by far the highest price for marijuana enforcement. And this is true even when the lion’s share of the capital driving the marijuana trade is coming from white consumers. But, <u><strong>while I support legalization</u></strong> as an incremental step in the right direction, I think <u><strong><mark>we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs</mark> such a <mark>hugely devastating</mark> law enforcement strategy for Black people</u></strong>. The <u><strong><mark>legalization</u></strong></mark> of marijuana, in my opinion, <u><strong><mark>would not lead to less over-policing</mark>, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>What relief legalization would provide</u></strong></mark>, and I do believe there would be some immediate relief, <u><strong><mark>would be</mark> mostly <mark>temporary</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>MARKED</p><p>Why? The New York Times report on reader response to their legalization editorials sums it up nicely, <u><strong>Times readers</u></strong> favor legalization for the same reasons the Times editorial board does: They <u><strong>think</u></strong> the criminalization of marijuana has ruined lives; that the public health risks have been overstated; and that <u><strong>law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems</u></strong>. <u><strong>Those “graver problems” bother me</u></strong>. They bother me <u><strong>because</u></strong> the illegal drug trade is as much an economic issue as it is public health issue. My experience growing up in a drug economy tells me that <u><strong>folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t available</u></strong>. And decent paying legal jobs have rarely been harder to find than right now. As a sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, <u><strong>prison is a form of disguised unemployment</u></strong>. That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often don’t work. <u><strong>Without a job</u></strong>, <u><strong>people are</u></strong> often <u><strong>forced to commit crimes</u></strong>, like selling marijuana. <u><strong>Once convicted</u></strong> of that crime, <u><strong>a criminal record can make you unemployable</u></strong>. <u><strong>Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back</u></strong> in prison, <u><strong>and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment</u></strong>, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy, ironically in part because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants, cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. <u><strong>Being excluded</u></strong> from decent employment opportunities <u><strong>will drive some</u></strong> people <u><strong>to drug dealing</u></strong>. Unless we deal with this reality, <u><strong><mark>legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments</u></strong></mark> and less public sympathy. <u><strong><mark>From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade</u></strong></mark> for their living, <u><strong><mark>legalization is a dead-end</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Richer people with</u></strong> the <u><strong>capital to invest</u></strong> in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., <u><strong>will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk</u></strong> involved in developing marijuana markets illegally <u><strong>and squeeze them out</u></strong>. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to where?”</p>

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Berkeley MS

Jim Schultz

1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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The alternative is to reject the 1ACs normative internalization of the law. Voting negative is a refusal of their practice of legalism in favor of a process of study that unmasks problematic legal thought

Snoek 12

Anke Snoek 12, PhD in Philosophy Department @ Macquarie University, Agamben’s Joyful Kafka

study is a strategy for living outside the law and making it inoperative The study Agamben is aiming at does not have a predetermined goal: getting a degree and a good position in society, or getting some valuable insight that can be used to overthrow a political structure. Just as the strategy to close the door of the law was especially hard because the law does not prescribe anything and the task of the Messiah is paradoxical because there is no original structure of the law to restore, so study also lacks a transcendent meaning it can aim at, a goal it can set Here Agamben sees a close affinity with Aristotle’s description of potentiality is active an unstoppable drive to undertake something, to do something, to engage in action. Study is the place where undergoing and undertaking converge; it is a gesture The rhythm of studying is an alternation between amazement and clarity, discovery and loss, doing and undergoing. This combination of undergoing and undertaking yields a kind of passive activity, a radical passivity. Something happens without seeming to happen. Agamben argues that study is pre-eminently unending. Study does not have an appropriate end nor does it desire it This gives the scholar a woeful air. The student cannot really help him either; he does not offer Karl any insight in what he must do and even advises him to remain with Delamarche ‘absolutely33 Karl wonders where studying had got him [or her] — he [or she] had forgotten everything again 34 The most extreme example of a student the scriber who stopped writing they have stopped writing or that they have lost the object of study the students can no longer decipher it Their commentaries on the Schrift, on the Law, are notes in the margin of a blank page.35 Study does not lead to an a priori determined goal study has gone beyond itself. Its gesture is that of a power that does not precede but follows its action, which it has left behind forever ‘At this point, study shakes off the sadness that disfigured it and returns to its truest nature: not work, but inspiration, the self-nourishment of the soul’ that law is set over against myth in the name of justice: instead of taking part in the mythical (pre-law) struggle the goal is to unmask mythical-juridical violence and human beings must tame the mythical forces at whatever cost what is new about this ‘new lawyer what is new for the legal profession, is that he does not practice law but only studies it, reading in tranquil lamplight. The door to justice is not to employ law but to make it inoperative — not by practicing law (which would be a repetition of the mythical forces, given that law is in force without significance), but by doing nothing more than studying it. ‘The law which is studied but no longer practiced is the gate to justice. Bucephalus’ strategy against law is thus study. Agamben remarks that it is decisive that the law that is not practiced but only studied does not itself become justice but only the door to it. The study of the law has no ‘higher purpose’ – that is why the law has become inoperative.4’ ‘That which opens the passage to justice is not the abolishment of the law but its deactivation and inactivity — that is, another use of the law’ This is a law that is liberated from all discipline and all relation to sovereignty a figure of the law that is possible after its link with violence and power has been deposed, a law that is no longer in force and applied just as the study of doorkeepers by the man from the country makes it possible to remain living outside the law. Agamben then outlines the following picture of the future: One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use, but to free them from it for good.

study is a strategy for living outside the law and making it inoperative The study does not have a predetermined goal getting insight to overthrow political structure study lacks a meaning it can aim at potentiality is active a drive to do something to engage in action Study yields radical passivity study is pre-eminently unending power follows its action, which it left behind forever the goal is to unmask mythical-juridical violence this ‘new lawyer does not practice law but only studies it The door to justice is not to employ law but to make it inoperative practicing law would be repetition given that law is force without significance study has no ‘higher purpose’ – that is why law has become inoperative law is possible after its link with violence and power has been deposed, a law that is no longer in force and applied humanity will play with law as children play with disused objects not to restore them but to free them from it

According to Agamben, study is an important strategy for living outside the law and making it inoperative. In what sense can study be a strategy? Study has a long tradition in Judaism as a form of resistance. In 586 BC, Jerusalem was plundered by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar and the temple of the Jews destroyed. Many Jews died and the rest were taken captive and brought to Babylonia. During the Babylonian exile, when they no longer had a temple and were forbidden to practise their faith, the Jewish people focused on the study of their holy books. After the Persian king Cyrus defeated Babylonia and issued a decree in 537 BC that the exiled Jews could return to their homelands and rebuild their holy sanctuaries, 40,000 Jews returned to rebuild the temple. But the religion of the Jews was already marked by exile and in 70 AD the temple was again destroyed, this time by the Romans. The temple was not rebuilt and study has since then become the true temple of the Jews. The Jewish religion is no longer focused on worship but on study. This gave the scholar a messianic significance (IP, 63). Talmud means ‘study’; the original meaning of Torah is not ‘law’ but ‘instruction’ Mishnan, the set of rabbinic laws, is derived from a root that has ‘repetition’ as its basic meaning. The study Agamben is aiming at does not have a predetermined goal: getting a degree and a good position in society, or getting some valuable insight that can be used to overthrow a political structure. Just as the strategy to close the door of the law was especially hard because the law does not prescribe anything and the task of the Messiah is paradoxical because there is no original structure of the law to restore, so study also lacks a transcendent meaning it can aim at, a goal it can set. As far as etymology is concerned, the word studium is closely related to a root that indicates a coffision, a shock or influence. Study and surprise are closely related in that sense. Whoever studies finds oneself shocked, amazed and is, in a certain sense, stupid (cf. studium, stupefying). On the one hand, study is undergone and, on the other, undertaken. Here Agamben sees a close affinity with Aristotle’s description of potentiality, which is passive on the one hand — an undergoing — and active on the other — an unstoppable drive to undertake something, to do something, to engage in action. Study is the place where undergoing and undertaking converge; it is a gesture (IP, 64). The rhythm of studying is an alternation between amazement and clarity, discovery and loss, doing and undergoing. This combination of undergoing and undertaking yields a kind of passive activity, a radical passivity. Something happens without seeming to happen. Agamben argues that study is pre-eminently unending. Study does not have an appropriate end nor does it desire it. This gives the scholar a woeful air. At first glance, the students in Kafka’s works seem to be of little use or significance. Nevertheless, Benjamin contends that they have a major role to play: ‘Among Kafka’s creations, there is a clan which reckons with the brevity of life in a peculiar way. The students who appear in the strangest places in Kafka’s works are the spokesmen for and leaders of this clan3° Agamben is in complete agreement with this view: [T]he latest, most exemplary embodiment of study in our culture is not the great philosopher nor the sainted doctor. It is rather the student, such as he appears in certain novels of Kafka or Walser. (IP, 65) It is precisely the apparent uselessness of the students and the hopelessness of study that plays such an important role in the strategy they develop with respect to power. Kafka’s useless students without Schrift So the students operating in Kafkas stories have an important characteristic: their studies seem to be useless. In Amerika, Karl sees a strange young man: He watched silently as the man read in his book, turned the pages and occasionally checked something in another book that he always picked up at lightning speed, often making entries in a notebook, his face always bent surprisingly low over it. Could this man be a student? He did seem to be studying. ... ‘You’re studying?’ asked Karl. ‘Yes, yes’, said the man, using the few moments lost to his studies to rearrange his books.3’ (...) And when wifi you be finished with your studies?’ asked Karl. ‘It’s slow going’, said the student. ... ‘[Y]ou can be happy about having given up your studies. I myself have been studying for years, out of pure single-mindedness. It has given me little satisfaction and even less chance of a decent future. 32 Karl explains his problems with Delamarche to the student. The student cannot really help him either; he does not offer Karl any insight in what he must do and even advises him to remain with Delamarche ‘absolutely33 Karl wonders where studying had got him [or her] — he [or she] had forgotten everything again.34 The most extreme example of a student, in Agamben’s view, is MelvillËs Bartleby, the scriber who stopped writing. According to Benjamin, Kafkas students have also lost the Schrift. This can mean either that they have stopped writing or that they have lost the Schrift in the sense of the Torah, the object of study. According to Scholem, the students have not lost the Schrift or the Torah, but they can no longer decipher it (cited in HS, 51). Nonetheless, Benjamin’s genius is apparent, according to Agamben, precisely in the fact that the students have lost the Schrift. Their commentaries on the Schrift, on the Law, are notes in the margin of a blank page.35 Study does not lead to an a priori determined goal; Kafka does not attach any promises to study that are traditionally attached to the study of the Torah. According to Agamben, the messianic tension of study is turned around here. Or better: it has gone beyond itself. Its gesture is that of a power that does not precede but follows its action, which it has left behind forever, of a Talmud that has not only announced the reconstruction of the temple but has already forgotten it. ‘At this point, study shakes off the sadness that disfigured it and returns to its truest nature: not work, but inspiration, the self-nourishment of the soul’ (IP, 65).36 Kafkas assistants are members of a congregation who have lost their house of prayer. His students have forgotten how to write, have lost the Schrift. Now nothing stops them on their ‘[u]ntrammeled, happy journey:37 The study of the horse Bucephalus But the most enigmatic example of the student in Kafkas work may be Alexander the Great’s horse Bucephalus, who happens to become a lawyer to the surprise of his colleagues. We have a new lawyer, Dr. Bucephalus. In his outward appearance there is little to recall the time when he was the warhorse of Alexander of Macedonia. ... I recently saw a quite simple court usher with the knowing eye of a little racetrack regular marveffing at the lawyer as the latter, lifting his thighs high, mounted step by step with a stride that made the marble clang. In general the bar approves the admission of Bucephalus. ... Nowadays, as no one can deny, there is no great Alexander. To be sure, many know how to commit murder ... and many feel that Macedonia is too narrow ... but no one, no one, can lead the way to India. Even in those days India’s gates were beyond reach, but their direction was indicated by the royal sword. ... Today ... no one shows the way; many carry swords but only wave them in the air and the gaze that tries to follow them grows confused. Perhaps, therefore, it is really best, as Bucephalus has done, to immerse oneself in law books. Free, his flanks unburdened by the loins of the rider, by quiet lamplight, far from the tumult of Alexander’s baffle, he reads and turns the pages of our old books.38 In his interpretation of this story, Werner Kraft concludes that law is set over against myth in the name of justice: instead of taking part in the mythical (pre-law) struggle, Bucephalus devotes himself to law.39 Benjamin sees this as a serious misunderstanding of Kafkas story. Indeed, the goal is to unmask mythical-juridical violence and human beings, like the horse Bucephalus, must tame the mythical forces at whatever cost (SE, 63). But, according to Benjamin, what is new about this ‘new lawyer what is new for the legal profession, is that he does not practice law but only studies it, reading in tranquil lamplight. Bucephalus is free: his flanks are no longer squeezed by Alexander the Great’s thighs and he is no longer carrying the latter on his back. The door to justice is not to employ law but to make it inoperative — not by practicing law (which would be a repetition of the mythical forces, given that law is in force without significance), but by doing nothing more than studying it. ‘The law which is studied but no longer practiced is the gate to justice. Bucephalus’ strategy against law is thus study. Agamben remarks that it is decisive that the law that is not practiced but only studied does not itself become justice but only the door to it. The study of the law has no ‘higher purpose’ – that is why the law has become inoperative.4’ ‘That which opens the passage to justice is not the abolishment of the law but its deactivation and inactivity — that is, another use of the law’ (SE, 63). This is a law that is liberated from all discipline and all relation to sovereignty. Bucephalus depicts a figure of the law that is possible after its link with violence and power has been deposed, a law that is no longer in force and applied (SE, 63-64), just as the study of doorkeepers by the man from the country makes it possible to remain living outside the law. Agamben then outlines the following picture of the future: One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use, but to free them from it for good. (SE, 64)

<h4>The alternative is to reject the <u>1ACs normative internalization of the law</u>. Voting negative is a refusal of their practice of legalism in favor of a <u>process of study</u> that unmasks problematic legal thought </h4><p>Anke <u><strong>Snoek 12</u></strong>, PhD in Philosophy Department @ Macquarie University, Agamben’s Joyful Kafka</p><p>According to Agamben, <u><mark>study is a</u></mark>n important<u> <mark>strategy for <strong>living outside the law</strong> and <strong>making it inoperative</u></strong></mark>. In what sense can study be a strategy? Study has a long tradition in Judaism as a form of resistance. In 586 BC, Jerusalem was plundered by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar and the temple of the Jews destroyed. Many Jews died and the rest were taken captive and brought to Babylonia. During the Babylonian exile, when they no longer had a temple and were forbidden to practise their faith, the Jewish people focused on the study of their holy books. After the Persian king Cyrus defeated Babylonia and issued a decree in 537 BC that the exiled Jews could return to their homelands and rebuild their holy sanctuaries, 40,000 Jews returned to rebuild the temple. But the religion of the Jews was already marked by exile and in 70 AD the temple was again destroyed, this time by the Romans. The temple was not rebuilt and study has since then become the true temple of the Jews. The Jewish religion is no longer focused on worship but on study. This gave the scholar a messianic significance (IP, 63). Talmud means ‘study’; the original meaning of Torah is not ‘law’ but ‘instruction’ Mishnan, the set of rabbinic laws, is derived from a root that has ‘repetition’ as its basic meaning. <u><strong><mark>The study</strong></mark> Agamben is aiming at <strong><mark>does not have a predetermined goal</strong></mark>: <mark>getting</mark> a degree and a good position in society, or getting some valuable <mark>insight</mark> that can be used <mark>to overthrow</mark> a <mark>political structure</mark>. Just as the strategy to close the door of the law was especially hard because the law does not prescribe anything and the task of the Messiah is paradoxical because there is no original structure of the law to restore, so <strong><mark>study</strong></mark> also <strong><mark>lacks a</mark> transcendent <mark>meaning it can aim at</mark>, a goal it can set</u></strong>. As far as etymology is concerned, the word studium is closely related to a root that indicates a coffision, a shock or influence. Study and surprise are closely related in that sense. Whoever studies finds oneself shocked, amazed and is, in a certain sense, stupid (cf. studium, stupefying). On the one hand, study is undergone and, on the other, undertaken. <u>Here Agamben sees a close affinity with Aristotle’s description of <mark>potentiality</u></mark>, which<u> <mark>is</u></mark> passive on the one hand — an undergoing — and <u><strong><mark>active</strong></mark> </u>on the other —<u> <mark>a</mark>n unstoppable <mark>drive to</mark> <strong>undertake something</strong>, to <strong><mark>do something</strong></mark>, <mark>to <strong>engage in action</strong></mark>. <mark>Study</mark> is the place where undergoing and undertaking converge; it is a gesture</u> (IP, 64). <u>The rhythm of <strong>studying is an alternation between amazement and clarity, discovery and loss, doing and undergoing</strong>. This combination of undergoing and undertaking <mark>yields</mark> a kind of <strong>passive activity</strong>, a <strong><mark>radical passivity</strong></mark>. Something happens without seeming to happen. Agamben argues that <mark>study is <strong>pre-eminently unending</strong></mark>. <strong>Study does not have an appropriate end nor does it desire it</u></strong>. <u>This gives the scholar a woeful air. </u>At first glance, the students in Kafka’s works seem to be of little use or significance. Nevertheless, Benjamin contends that they have a major role to play: ‘Among Kafka’s creations, there is a clan which reckons with the brevity of life in a peculiar way. The students who appear in the strangest places in Kafka’s works are the spokesmen for and leaders of this clan3° Agamben is in complete agreement with this view: [T]he latest, most exemplary embodiment of study in our culture is not the great philosopher nor the sainted doctor. It is rather the student, such as he appears in certain novels of Kafka or Walser. (IP, 65) It is precisely the apparent uselessness of the students and the hopelessness of study that plays such an important role in the strategy they develop with respect to power. Kafka’s useless students without Schrift So the students operating in Kafkas stories have an important characteristic: their studies seem to be useless. In Amerika, Karl sees a strange young man: He watched silently as the man read in his book, turned the pages and occasionally checked something in another book that he always picked up at lightning speed, often making entries in a notebook, his face always bent surprisingly low over it. Could this man be a student? He did seem to be studying. ... ‘You’re studying?’ asked Karl. ‘Yes, yes’, said the man, using the few moments lost to his studies to rearrange his books.3’ (...) And when wifi you be finished with your studies?’ asked Karl. ‘It’s slow going’, said the student. ... ‘[Y]ou can be happy about having given up your studies. I myself have been studying for years, out of pure single-mindedness. It has given me little satisfaction and even less chance of a decent future. 32 Karl explains his problems with Delamarche to the student. <u>The student cannot really help him either; he does not offer Karl any insight in what he must do and even advises him to remain with Delamarche ‘absolutely33 Karl wonders where studying had got him [or her] — he [or she] had forgotten everything again</u>.<u>34 The most extreme example of a student</u>, in Agamben’s view, is MelvillËs Bartleby, <u>the scriber who stopped writing</u>. According to Benjamin, Kafkas students have also lost the Schrift. This can mean either that <u>they have stopped writing or that they have lost</u> the Schrift in the sense of the Torah, <u>the object of study</u>. According to Scholem, <u>the students</u> have not lost the Schrift or the Torah, but they <u>can no longer decipher it</u> (cited in HS, 51). Nonetheless, Benjamin’s genius is apparent, according to Agamben, precisely in the fact that the students have lost the Schrift. <u>Their commentaries on the Schrift, on the Law, are notes in the margin of a blank page.35 Study does not lead to an a priori determined goal</u>; Kafka does not attach any promises to study that are traditionally attached to the study of the Torah. According to Agamben, the messianic tension of <u>study</u> is turned around here. Or better: it <u>has gone beyond itself. Its gesture is that of a <mark>power</mark> that does not precede but <mark>follows its action, which it </mark>has <mark>left behind forever</u></mark>, of a Talmud that has not only announced the reconstruction of the temple but has already forgotten it. <u>‘At this point, study shakes off the sadness that disfigured it and returns to its truest nature: not work, but inspiration, the self-nourishment of the soul’</u> (IP, 65).36 Kafkas assistants are members of a congregation who have lost their house of prayer. His students have forgotten how to write, have lost the Schrift. Now nothing stops them on their ‘[u]ntrammeled, happy journey:37 The study of the horse Bucephalus But the most enigmatic example of the student in Kafkas work may be Alexander the Great’s horse Bucephalus, who happens to become a lawyer to the surprise of his colleagues. We have a new lawyer, Dr. Bucephalus. In his outward appearance there is little to recall the time when he was the warhorse of Alexander of Macedonia. ... I recently saw a quite simple court usher with the knowing eye of a little racetrack regular marveffing at the lawyer as the latter, lifting his thighs high, mounted step by step with a stride that made the marble clang. In general the bar approves the admission of Bucephalus. ... Nowadays, as no one can deny, there is no great Alexander. To be sure, many know how to commit murder ... and many feel that Macedonia is too narrow ... but no one, no one, can lead the way to India. Even in those days India’s gates were beyond reach, but their direction was indicated by the royal sword. ... Today ... no one shows the way; many carry swords but only wave them in the air and the gaze that tries to follow them grows confused. Perhaps, therefore, it is really best, as Bucephalus has done, to immerse oneself in law books. Free, his flanks unburdened by the loins of the rider, by quiet lamplight, far from the tumult of Alexander’s baffle, he reads and turns the pages of our old books.38 In his interpretation of this story, Werner Kraft concludes <u>that law is set over against myth in the name of justice: instead of taking part in the mythical (pre-law) struggle</u>, Bucephalus devotes himself to law.39 Benjamin sees this as a serious misunderstanding of Kafkas story. Indeed, <u><mark>the goal is to <strong>unmask mythical-juridical violence</mark> and human beings</u></strong>, like the horse Bucephalus, <u>must tame the mythical forces at whatever cost</u> (SE, 63). But, according to Benjamin, <u>what is new about <mark>this ‘new lawyer</mark> what is new for the legal profession, is that he <strong><mark>does not practice law but only studies it</strong></mark>, reading in tranquil lamplight.</u> Bucephalus is free: his flanks are no longer squeezed by Alexander the Great’s thighs and he is no longer carrying the latter on his back. <u><strong><mark>The door to justice is not to employ law but to make it inoperative</strong></mark> — <strong>not by <mark>practicing law</strong></mark> (which <strong><mark>would be</mark> a <mark>repetition</strong></mark> of the mythical forces, <mark>given <strong>that law is</mark> in <mark>force without significance</strong></mark>), but by doing nothing more than studying it. ‘<strong>The law which is studied but no longer practiced is the gate to justice</strong>. Bucephalus’ strategy against law is thus study. Agamben remarks that it is decisive that the law that is not practiced but only studied does not itself become justice but only the door to it. <strong>The <mark>study </mark>of the law <mark>has no ‘higher purpose’ – that is why</mark> the <mark>law has become inoperative</mark>.</strong>4’ ‘That which opens the passage to justice is not the abolishment of the law but its deactivation and inactivity — that is, another use of the law’</u> (SE, 63). <u>This is a law that is liberated from all discipline and all relation to sovereignty</u>. Bucephalus depicts <u>a figure of the <mark>law</mark> that <mark>is possible <strong>after its link with violence and power has been deposed</strong>, a law that is <strong>no longer in force and applied</u></strong></mark> (SE, 63-64), <u>just as the study of doorkeepers by the man from the country makes it possible to remain living outside the law. Agamben then outlines the following picture of the future: One day <strong><mark>humanity will play with law</mark> just <mark>as children play with disused</mark> <mark>objects</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>not</mark> in order <mark>to restore them</strong></mark> to their canonical use, <strong><mark>but to free them from it</u></strong></mark> <u>for good.</u> (SE, 64)</p>

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Racialized colonialism is only made possible through the technologies of the university

Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 11-13) gz

While the heightened patriotism in the wake of 9/11 and a decade of U.S. wars and occupation overseas have amplified the role of the academy in shaping our understanding of U.S. global dominance and simultaneously intensified attacks on “anti-American” views there is nothing “new” about this state of emergency Ongoing debates about the role of the imperial university are indicative of the “state of exception the exclusion of some from liberal democracy and eviction from political rights is not a sudden break but is constitutive of the imperial state and the state of permanent war The notion of the “imperial university” suggests that the War on Terror and the post-9/11 culture wars made hypervisible the persistent role of higher education in shaping the discourses of nationalism, patriotism, citizenship, and democracy. This is a key premise of our framework and one that underlies many of the chapters here. Lynne Cheney and Joseph Lieberman’s American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) and other neoconservative groups sounded a clarion call for an intensified scrutiny of scholarship that challenged U.S. dominance These campaigns underscored the frontlines of the culture wars through robust deployment of notions of patriotism and national security considered key to defending “Western civilization” in a nation presumably facing an existential threat Animating this powerful sense of danger to U.S. dominance are specific kinds of “anti-American” scholarship and the dangerous knowledges they impart. Furthermore, the specter unleashed by unruly student protestors and the repression that they elicit can be viewed as one important aspect of this end game of cultural and imperial supremacy—and its pepper spraying and paranoias. This is a matrix that is historically formed: an imperial “knowledge complex” is fed by the profitable business of militarism, incarceration, and war The “downsizing” of the university unmasks an ideological “precarity” even for critically engaged tenured or tenure-track faculty, among the most elite and “protected” of academic workers liberal arts institutions are crucial to the corporate logics of the “global knowledge marketplace,” so that the neoliberal restructuring of the public university is clearly at work at private institutions as well liberal arts colleges provide the corporate sector and the military-prison- industrial complex with “moral capital” precisely because of their supposed liberalism. As Prashad’s analysis suggests, the crises of “academic freedom” or student debt allow us to dig more deeply into the ways in which neoliberal practices and their geopolitics intersect—and how this informs the consolidation of the corporate university. The police in riot gear do not signal something exceptional; rather, their presence unmasks the codes of “the normal” in academic discourse and practice. It is a normalization that we see routinely in the grants that we are encouraged to apply for and in Department of Defense funding that many scientists, social scientists, and technologists receive for their research The alliance between military research and science, which is well known, builds the deepest strata of connection and complicity between imperial statecraft and the knowledge complex of the U.S. academy U.S. intelligence and prison systems enact violent logics of incapacitation and counterinsurgency.

While 9/11 and a decade of wars have amplified the role of the academy in shaping our understanding global dominance there is nothing “new” about this state of emergency exclusion is not a sudden break but is constitutive of the imperial state and permanent war post-9/11 culture made hypervisible the persistent role of higher education in shaping nationalism neoconservative groups sounded a clarion call for scrutiny of scholarship that challenged U.S. dominance This is an imperial “knowledge complex” fed by militarism, incarceration, and war liberal arts institutions are crucial to the global knowledge marketplace colleges provide the corporate sector and military-prison- industrial complex with “moral capital” because of their supposed liberalism The police in riot gear unmasks the normal” in academic discourse and practice. It is a normalization we see in Department of Defense funding many scientists, social scientists, and technologists receive U.S. intelligence and prison systems enact violent logics of incapacitation and counterinsurgency.

While the heightened patriotism in the wake of 9/11 and a decade of U.S. wars and occupation overseas have amplified the role of the academy in shaping our understanding of U.S. global dominance and simultaneously intensified attacks on “anti-American” views—particularly in relation to the Middle East and to Islam—there is nothing “new” about this state of emergency. Ongoing debates about the role of the imperial university are indicative of the “state of exception”; that is, the exclusion of some from liberal democracy and eviction from political rights is not a sudden break but is constitutive of the imperial state and the state of permanent war.12 The notion of the “imperial university” suggests that the War on Terror and the post-9/11 culture wars made hypervisible the persistent role of higher education in shaping the discourses of nationalism, patriotism, citizenship, and democracy. This is a key premise of our framework and one that underlies many of the chapters here. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Lynne Cheney and Joseph Lieberman’s American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) and other neoconservative groups sounded a clarion call for an intensified scrutiny of scholarship that challenged U.S. dominance.13 These campaigns underscored the frontlines of the culture wars through robust deployment of notions of patriotism and national security considered key to defending “Western civilization” in a nation presumably facing an existential threat. Animating this powerful sense of danger to U.S. dominance are specific kinds of “anti-American” scholarship and the dangerous knowledges they impart. Furthermore, the specter unleashed by unruly student protestors and the repression that they elicit can be viewed as one important aspect of this end game of cultural and imperial supremacy—and its pepper spraying and paranoias. The post-9/11 policing of knowledge and the neoliberal restructuring of the university create pressure points that reveal the forces of political imperialism and the economic matrix within which they are embedded, as argued by Godrej and Prashad, among others. This is a matrix that is historically formed: an imperial “knowledge complex” is fed by the profitable business of militarism, incarceration, and war. A decade after 9/11, the crises of late capitalism in the global North (and the dismantling of public education) unravel the “safety nets” for many university students and employees; this is a process that Gumbs points out has a much longer genealogy that is intertwined with the racial management of populations within and beyond the campus. The “downsizing” of the university unmasks an ideological “precarity” even for critically engaged tenured or tenure-track faculty, among the most elite and “protected” of academic workers, as suggested by Pulido’s reflection on tenure battles in an elite, private institution. In fact, Oparah points out that private, liberal arts institutions are crucial to the corporate logics of the “global knowledge marketplace,” so that the neoliberal restructuring of the public university is clearly at work at private institutions as well, as wittily observed in Prashad’s account of his own college. Furthermore, Oparah argues that liberal arts colleges provide the corporate sector and the military-prison- industrial complex with “moral capital” precisely because of their supposed liberalism. As Prashad’s analysis suggests, the crises of “academic freedom” or student debt allow us to dig more deeply into the ways in which neoliberal practices and their geopolitics intersect—and how this informs the consolidation of the corporate university. The bursts of dissent (both within scholarly production and in student protests and the Occupy movement) suggest that “business as usual” is being disrupted in the U.S. university. However, this dissent—and the modes of repression it provokes—begs the question of what sustains “business as usual.” Our introductory vignette, juxtaposing the bucolic green of a “peaceful” campus with the performance of militarized power, offers our unease with the normalized terms of “peace” in our elysian surroundings, not to mention with the complicity of the U.S. state with military occupations elsewhere and the lockdown on open critique of particular foreign states. The police in riot gear do not signal something exceptional; rather, their presence unmasks the codes of “the normal” in academic discourse and practice. It is a normalization that we see routinely in the grants that we are encouraged to apply for and in Department of Defense funding that many scientists, social scientists, and technologists receive for their research, as discussed in Roberto González’s chapter. The capital provided by these grants has built the foundations of some of the most powerful and preeminent universities in the world: MIT, Stanford, UC Berkeley, California Institute of Technology (Caltech), and many others. The alliance between military research and science, which is well known, builds the deepest strata of connection and complicity between imperial statecraft and the knowledge complex of the U.S. academy. This, also, is nothing new, as González and Oparah demonstrate in analyzing the historical, global economies within which U.S. intelligence and prison systems enact violent logics of incapacitation and counterinsurgency.

<h4>Racialized colonialism is only made possible through the technologies of the university</h4><p><u><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</u></strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 11-13) gz</p><p><u><mark>While</mark> the heightened patriotism in the wake of <mark>9/11 and a decade of</mark> U.S. <mark>wars</mark> and occupation overseas <mark>have amplified the role of the academy in</mark> <mark>shaping our understanding</mark> of U.S. <mark>global dominance</mark> and simultaneously intensified attacks on “anti-American” views</u>—particularly in relation to the Middle East and to Islam—<u><strong><mark>there is nothing “new” about this state of emergency</u></strong></mark>. <u>Ongoing debates about the role of the imperial university are indicative of the “<strong>state of exception</u></strong>”; that is, <u>the <mark>exclusion</mark> of some from liberal democracy and eviction from political rights <mark>is not a sudden break but is <strong>constitutive of the imperial state and</mark> the state of <mark>permanent war</u></strong></mark>.12 <u>The notion of the “imperial university” suggests that the War on Terror and the <mark>post-9/11 culture</mark> wars <mark>made hypervisible the <strong>persistent role of higher education in shaping</mark> the discourses of <mark>nationalism</mark>, patriotism, citizenship, and democracy</strong>. This is a key premise of our framework and one that underlies many of the chapters here.</p><p></u>Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, <u>Lynne Cheney and Joseph Lieberman’s American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) and other <mark>neoconservative groups sounded a clarion call for</mark> an <strong>intensified <mark>scrutiny of scholarship that challenged U.S. dominance</u></strong></mark>.13 <u>These campaigns underscored the frontlines of the culture wars through robust deployment of notions of patriotism and national security considered key to defending “Western civilization” in a nation presumably facing an existential threat</u>. <u>Animating this powerful sense of danger to U.S. dominance are specific kinds of “anti-American” scholarship and the dangerous knowledges they impart. Furthermore, the specter unleashed by unruly student protestors and the repression that they elicit can be viewed as one important aspect of this end game of cultural and imperial supremacy—and its pepper spraying and paranoias.</p><p></u>The post-9/11 policing of knowledge and the neoliberal restructuring of the university create pressure points that reveal the forces of political imperialism and the economic matrix within which they are embedded, as argued by Godrej and Prashad, among others. <u><mark>This is </mark>a matrix that is historically formed: <strong><mark>an imperial “knowledge complex”</strong></mark> is <mark>fed by</mark> the profitable business of <mark>militarism, incarceration, and war</u></mark>. A decade after 9/11, the crises of late capitalism in the global North (and the dismantling of public education) unravel the “safety nets” for many university students and employees; this is a process that Gumbs points out has a much longer genealogy that is intertwined with the racial management of populations within and beyond the campus. <u>The “downsizing” of the university unmasks an <strong>ideological “precarity”</strong> even for critically engaged tenured or tenure-track faculty, among the most elite and “protected” of academic workers</u>, as suggested by Pulido’s reflection on tenure battles in an elite, private institution. In fact, Oparah points out that private, <u><mark>liberal arts institutions are <strong>crucial to the</mark> corporate logics of the “<mark>global knowledge marketplace</mark>,”</strong> so that the neoliberal restructuring of the public university is clearly at work at private institutions as well</u>, as wittily observed in Prashad’s account of his own college. Furthermore, Oparah argues that <u>liberal arts <mark>colleges provide the corporate sector and</mark> the <mark>military-prison- industrial complex with <strong>“moral capital”</strong></mark> precisely <mark>because of their supposed liberalism<strong></mark>. As Prashad’s analysis suggests, the crises of “academic freedom” or student debt allow us to dig more deeply into the ways in which neoliberal practices and their geopolitics intersect—and how this informs the consolidation of the corporate university.</p><p></u></strong>The bursts of dissent (both within scholarly production and in student protests and the Occupy movement) suggest that “business as usual” is being disrupted in the U.S. university. However, this dissent—and the modes of repression it provokes—begs the question of what sustains “business as usual.” Our introductory vignette, juxtaposing the bucolic green of a “peaceful” campus with the performance of militarized power, offers our unease with the normalized terms of “peace” in our elysian surroundings, not to mention with the complicity of the U.S. state with military occupations elsewhere and the lockdown on open critique of particular foreign states. <u><mark>The police in riot gear</mark> do not signal something exceptional; rather, their presence <mark>unmasks</mark> the codes of “<mark>the normal” in academic discourse and practice. It is a normalization</mark> that <mark>we see</mark> routinely in the grants that we are encouraged to apply for and <mark>in <strong>Department of Defense funding</mark> that <mark>many scientists, social scientists, and technologists receive</strong></mark> for their research</u>, as discussed in Roberto González’s chapter. The capital provided by these grants has built the foundations of some of the most powerful and preeminent universities in the world: MIT, Stanford, UC Berkeley, California Institute of Technology (Caltech), and many others. <u>The <strong>alliance between military research and science</strong>, which is well known, builds the deepest strata of connection and complicity between imperial statecraft and the knowledge complex of the U.S. academy</u>. This, also, is nothing new, as González and Oparah demonstrate in analyzing the historical, global economies within which <u><mark>U.S. intelligence and prison systems enact <strong>violent logics of incapacitation and counterinsurgency.</p></u></strong></mark>

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CP Text: The United States should remove criminal penalties on prostitution in the United States.

<h4>CP Text: <u><strong>The United States should remove criminal penalties on prostitution in the United States</u></strong>.</h4>

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 18-19) gz

If the protest movements of the 1960s interrupted the hegemonic workings of the military-academy nexus, the post-9/ 11 historical moment, according to many, is a retrenchment and intensification of this matrix of power It is important to recognize the paradox cohering within the processes of collusion and protest at work in the academic-military- industrial complex ethnic studies is increasingly part of an institutional incorporation and recuperation of protest movements and dissenting scholarship that can reproduce the deeply imperial logics of management and violence This recomposition and absorption rests in the very paradox of the material realities that greatly expanded the U.S. academy and historically allowed it to prosper—military funding and military science. It was a prosperity that meant, and continues to mean, the normalization and acceptance of great repression within the academy and beyond repression and protest, then, might be viewed as part of the Janus-faced coin of the imperial university as engendered by U.S. economic power, especially in the immediate postwar period: a global supremacy intimately connected to the state-military alliance that protected its global capitalist interests.

If the movements of the 60s interrupted the military-academy nexus, the post-9/ 11 historical moment is a retrenchment and intensification of this matrix of power ethnic studies is part of an institutional incorporation and recuperation of protest movements and dissenting scholarship that can reproduce deeply imperial logics of management and violence This recomposition and absorption rests in the paradox of the material realities that greatly expanded the academy and historically allowed it to prosper—military funding and science a prosperity that meant the normalization of repression within the academy and beyond repression and protest might be viewed as a global supremacy intimately connected to the state-military alliance that protected global capitalist interests

If the protest movements of the 1960s interrupted the hegemonic workings of the military-academy nexus, the post-9/ 11 historical moment, according to many, is a retrenchment and intensification of this matrix of power. It is important to recognize the paradox cohering within the processes of collusion and protest at work in the academic-military- industrial complex. On the one hand, if it were not for the ruptures of the 1960s, however short-lived, we as scholars in ethnic studies and women’s studies would not be employed in the very institutional sites that were created by those interventions. On the other hand, as Roderick Ferguson has argued and as Rojas and Gumbs suggest here, ethnic studies is increasingly part of an institutional incorporation and recuperation of protest movements and dissenting scholarship that can reproduce the deeply imperial logics of management and violence.40 This recomposition and absorption rests in the very paradox of the material realities that greatly expanded the U.S. academy and historically allowed it to prosper—military funding and military science. It was a prosperity that meant, and continues to mean, the normalization and acceptance of great repression within the academy and beyond, as evoked by Godrej and De Genova. Both repression and protest, then, might be viewed as part of the Janus-faced coin of the imperial university as engendered by U.S. economic power, especially in the immediate postwar period: a global supremacy intimately connected to the state-military alliance that protected its global capitalist interests.

<h4>no</h4><p><u><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</u></strong> (<u>Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 18-19) gz</p><p><mark>If the</mark> protest <mark>movements of the</mark> 19<mark>60s interrupted</mark> the hegemonic workings of <mark>the military-academy nexus, the post-9/ 11 historical moment</mark>, according to many, <mark>is a <strong>retrenchment and intensification of this matrix of power</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is important to recognize the paradox cohering within the processes of collusion and protest at work in the academic-military- industrial complex</u>. On the one hand, if it were not for the ruptures of the 1960s, however short-lived, we as scholars in ethnic studies and women’s studies would not be employed in the very institutional sites that were created by those interventions. On the other hand, as Roderick Ferguson has argued and as Rojas and Gumbs suggest here, <u><mark>ethnic studies is</mark> increasingly <mark>part of an <strong>institutional incorporation and recuperation</strong> of protest movements and dissenting scholarship that can <strong>reproduce</mark> the <mark>deeply imperial logics of management and violence</u></strong></mark>.40 <u><mark>This <strong>recomposition and absorption</strong> rests in the</mark> very <mark>paradox of the material realities</mark> <mark>that greatly expanded the</mark> U.S. <mark>academy and historically allowed it to prosper—military funding and</mark> military <mark>science</mark>. It was <mark>a prosperity that meant</mark>, and continues to mean, <mark>the <strong>normalization</mark> and acceptance <mark>of</mark> great <mark>repression</strong> within the academy and beyond</u></mark>, as evoked by Godrej and De Genova. Both <u><mark>repression and protest</mark>, then, <mark>might be viewed as</mark> part of the Janus-faced coin of the imperial university as engendered by U.S. economic power, especially in the immediate postwar period: <strong><mark>a global supremacy intimately</strong> connected to the state-military alliance that protected</mark> its <mark>global capitalist interests</mark>.</p></u>

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“Legalize” requires regulatory distinctions

Moser 13

Moser 13

Legalization vs. Decriminalization¶ To decriminalize an act means to reduce the severity of the offense so that, instead of prison, an offender will pay a fine.¶ Legalization means making something completely legal The issue would no longer be deciding if an act or product was legal to buy or sell. Now there would be a distinction between how much or how often would be considered acceptable

To decriminalize means to reduce the severity of the offense Legalization means making something completely legal

Sam, “The Difference between Legalization and Decriminalization” [http://www.criminaldefenceblawg.com/uncategorized/the-difference-between-legalization-and-decriminalization/] February 5 // Legalization vs. Decriminalization¶ The question in situations like this has often been whether to decriminalize an offense, such as possessing marijuana, or to legalize it. To decriminalize an act usually means to reduce the severity of the offense so that, instead of prison, an offender will pay a fine.¶ According to the legal system, however, decriminalization often amounts to prioritizing. Law enforcement authorities have other things to worry about besides people smoking dope. Also, police and judges might decide that it is the degree to which someone commits a crime (i.e. how often and how much she charges for a prostitute, how much marijuana a person possesses, etc.) which inform their decisions to arrest and punish someone.¶ Legalization means making something completely legal. The issue would no longer be deciding if an act or product was legal to buy or sell. Now there would be a distinction between how much (of a drug) or how often (prostituting) would be considered acceptable.

<h4><u><strong>“Legalize” requires regulatory distinctions</h4><p>Moser 13 </p><p></u></strong>Sam, “The Difference between Legalization and Decriminalization” [http://www.criminaldefenceblawg.com/uncategorized/the-difference-between-legalization-and-decriminalization/] February 5 //</p><p><u>Legalization vs. Decriminalization¶</u> The question in situations like this has often been whether to decriminalize an offense, such as possessing marijuana, or to legalize it. <u><mark>To decriminalize</mark> an act</u> usually <u><mark>means to reduce the severity of the offense</mark> so that, instead of prison, an offender will pay a fine.¶</u> According to the legal system, however, decriminalization often amounts to prioritizing. Law enforcement authorities have other things to worry about besides people smoking dope. Also, police and judges might decide that it is the degree to which someone commits a crime (i.e. how often and how much she charges for a prostitute, how much marijuana a person possesses, etc.) which inform their decisions to arrest and punish someone.¶ <u><mark>Legalization means making something completely legal</u></mark>. <u>The issue would no longer be deciding if an act or product was legal to buy or sell. Now there would be a distinction between how much</u> (of a drug) <u>or how often</u> (prostituting) <u>would be considered acceptable</u>.</p>

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Prostitutes don’t want workplace regulation, which only moves them under the control of what they’ve said is a masculinist state.

McClintock 92

McClintock 92Anne McClintock, “Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law,” boundary 2 19.2 (Summer 1992): 70-95. 87-91.

Prostitutes are becoming their own media and political activists Since the 70s, hundreds of prostitution organizations have burgeoned worldwide In 1986, prostitutes met in Brussels at an extraordinary session of the European Parliament representing millions of sexworkers worldwide, the prostitutes drew up a Whores' Charter, calling for the decriminalization of sexwork prostitutes regard legalized prostitution as legalized abuse legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law tightly curbed by the state and ad- ministered by the police prostitutes want the law off their bodies and are calling for the decriminalization and the repeal of all legislation not ordinarily applicable to a business Legalization puts women's bodies in men's hands Under legalization, the profits of women's work clatter into men's pockets. The state becomes a licit pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels and levying punitive taxes at rates higher than other workers Most prostitutes prefer to work illegally rather than submit to state-controlled brothels "Legalizing prostitution sees women as a controlled sub- stance-controlled by men." The international prostitutes' movement thus calls for the decriminalization, not the legalization, of their work If their work were decriminalized, prostitutes could ply their trade in safety and respect, paying normal rent and taxes, in houses as clean and comfortable as those of the average therapist or chiropractor

Prostitutes are becoming their own political activist millions of sexworkers worldwide drew up a Whores' Charter, calling for the decriminalization of sexwork legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law prostitutes want the law off their bodies Legalization puts women's bodies in men's hands. Under legalization, the profits of women's work clatter into men's pockets. The state becomes a pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels and levying punitive taxes at rates higher than other workers prostitutes prefer to work illegally rather than submit to state-controlled brothels The international prostitutes' movement calls for the decrim not legalization If decrim ed, prostitutes could ply their trade in safety and respect, paying normal rent and taxes

Prostitutes around the world are now becoming their own media advocates and political activists, radically challenging the stigma of sexual and racial deviance.50 Since the 1970s, hundreds of prostitution organizations have burgeoned worldwide, from Hawaii to Austria, from Canada to the Philippines, from Zimbabwe to the Netherlands. In 1986, prostitutes from around the world met in Brussels at an extraordinary session of the European Parliament, where they launched the Second World Whores' Congress. Drawn from over sixteen countries and representing millions of sexworkers worldwide, the prostitutes drew up a Whores' Charter, calling for the decriminalization of sexwork and an end to all violations of sexworker rights. In October 1991, sexworkers from sixteen countries met in Frankfurt at the First European Prostitutes' Congress to call for the recognition of voluntary prostitution as a profession in the European Charter and for full rights as workers under European labor law.52 To the consternation of many governments, and some feminists, prostitutes called not for the abolition of prostitution but for the redistribution of sexual pleasure, power, and profit; for the transformation of land and property rights; for the removal of foreign armies; and for the right of women and men to work voluntarily in the sex trade under safe, unregulated, and respected conditions. Many men, however, prefer to find whores in their beds than in their parliaments, and attempts by sexworkers to organize have met with un- swerving violence. An Irish organizer was burnt to death, and Thai orga- nizers have been murdered. Ecuadoran brothel owners rotate prostitutes regularly to prevent them from organizing.54 Yet by and large, the interna- tional Left has been largely indifferent to the issue, while the abolitionist tendency among some feminists has been nothing short of calamitous for working prostitutes. Most prostitutes insist that the first target of their international orga- nizing is the state and the law. Prostitutes argue that the laws punish, rather than protect, women, especially women of color. Where sexwork is a crime, clients can rape, rob, and batter women with impunity. Murderers know the weight of a prostitute's life in the scales of the law. As Dallas Judge Jack Hampton admitted, "I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prosti- tute." 55 Not surprisingly, more prostitutes are murdered in the United States, where prostitution is still a crime, than anywhere else in the world. Prostitutes denounce the laws that shunt them into dangerous, deso- late docklands, meatpacking districts, and railway yards, unable to organize for decent conditions or against coercion. Where prostitution is a crime, women cannot demand police protection or claim legal recourse for robbery or coercion, for they thereby expose themselves as implicated in a crimi- nalized trade. Where sexwork is a crime, prostitutes are forced by landlords to pay exorbitant rents or are driven to work the freezing and dangerous streets. Prostitutes cannot claim social welfare or life insurance, health care or maternity benefits, childcare or pensions. Where prostitution is a crime, migrant women are evicted from their homes, are denied work papers, and are detained and deported. Every cent of a prostitute's earnings is crimi- nally contaminated. The property and possessions of prostitutes are often forfeited, and mothers, brothers, friends, and lovers can be flung into prison for living off immoral earnings. Most cruelly, a prostitute cannot keep her children. Most prostitutes are mothers, and most are in the game for their children. In many countries, however, social workers have the power to take a prostitute's children out of "moral danger" into "care." In these ways, the state curtails women's power, diverting illicit female money back into the coffers of male circulation and curtailing the emergence of independent female heads of family. Sexwork that benefits the male state, however, is tolerated and ad- ministered by a system of international euphemisms: massage parlors, escort agencies, bars, rest and recreation resorts, and so on, which are run not by hookers but by male "entertainment managers." In Thailand, for example, prostitution inhabits a twilight realm of legal ambiguity. The law makes prostitution a crime, but the green light is given to male "tour opera- tors" and "entertainment managers," whose operations are sanctioned and defined as the "personal service sector. Most prostitutes regard legalized prostitution as legalized abuse. Despite its benign ring, legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law, where it is tightly curbed by the state and ad- ministered by the police. Instead, prostitutes want the law off their bodies and are calling for the decriminalization of the profession and the repeal of all legislation not ordinarily applicable to a business or trade. Legalization puts women's bodies firmly in men's hands. In the aptly named Chicken Ranch, a legalized brothel in Nevada, prostitutes are forced to work three weeks at a stretch, servicing any man who picks them, at any time of the day or night, a dizzying and dispiriting carousel of faceless tricks. In many of the legalized brothels and clubs in Europe, Lisbet, a German prostitute, told me, "Women have no right to refuse men and often no right to use a condom. Under legalization, the profits of women's work clatter into men's pockets. The state becomes a licit pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels and levying punitive taxes at rates higher than other workers. In Germany, legalized prostitutes pay 56 percent of their earnings in taxes, but, unlike other taxpayers, they are not eligible for any social benefits whatsoever. Under legalization, the state controls prostitutes' work and leisure, prevent- ing organization and often making it very hard for them to leave the trade if they wish. Most prostitutes prefer to work illegally rather than submit to the abusive and humiliating ordeals of state-controlled brothels. French prostitutes cannot live with a husband, wife, lover, or child, as anyone under their roof can be charged with "cohabitation." Italian prosti- tutes cannot help their husbands or wives pay the rent or give their parents money, as they can be charged with living off "immoral earnings." In Brit- ain, engaging in prostitution is not a crime (which lets the johns off the hook), but virtually every aspect of a prostitute's work is criminalized. Two women working together for safety can be charged with keeping a brothel. In Switzerland, if a woman decides to leave the trade and seek other work, she first has to get a "good girl" letter from the police to prove her good conduct. To get the letter, she has to wait three years without working as a prostitute to prove her good conduct. Until then, she cannot legally find other work. In Frankfurt, zoning laws force women to work the deserted har- bor area, where they can be tortured and dumped in the water without a stir. In Canada, prostitution is not a crime, but "communicating for the purposes of prostitution" is. Prostitutes can be penalized for organizing and informing each other of dangerous tricks or corrupt police. Austrian prostitutes have to report to the police simply to go on holiday. Some of the most appalling conditions prevail in India. Between 1980 and 1984, not a single landlord was arrested for illegally pandering to prostitutes, but 44,633 prostitutes were arrested for soliciting in Bombay Alone. As Dolores French, author, activist, and prostitute, told me in a pri- vate interview, "Legalizing prostitution sees women as a controlled sub- stance-controlled by men." The international prostitutes' movement thus calls for the decriminalization, not the legalization, of their work. Prostitutes demand that their work be respected as a social service for both men and women and that it be brought under commercial law like other professions. Why, they ask, can masseurs command respect and gratitude for servicing naked clients in comfortable rooms, while prostitutes are criminalized? If their work were decriminalized, prostitutes could ply their trade in safety and respect, paying normal rent and taxes, in houses as clean and comfortable as those of the average therapist or chiropractor.

<h4>Prostitutes don’t want workplace regulation, which only moves them under the control of what they’ve said is a masculinist state.</h4><p><u><strong>McClintock 92</u></strong>Anne McClintock, “Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law,” boundary 2 19.2 (Summer 1992): 70-95. 87-91.</p><p><u><mark>Prostitutes</u></mark> around the world <u><mark>are</u></mark> now <u><mark>becoming their own</mark> media</u> advocates <u>and <mark>political activist</mark>s</u>, radically challenging the stigma of sexual and racial deviance.50 <u>Since the</u> 19<u>70s, hundreds of prostitution organizations have burgeoned worldwide</u>, from Hawaii to Austria, from Canada to the Philippines, from Zimbabwe to the Netherlands. <u>In 1986, prostitutes</u> from around the world <u>met in Brussels at an extraordinary session of the European Parliament</u>, where they launched the Second World Whores' Congress. Drawn from over sixteen countries and <u>representing <mark>millions of sexworkers worldwide</mark>, the prostitutes <mark>drew up a Whores' Charter, calling for the decriminalization of sexwork</u></mark> and an end to all violations of sexworker rights. In October 1991, sexworkers from sixteen countries met in Frankfurt at the First European Prostitutes' Congress to call for the recognition of voluntary prostitution as a profession in the European Charter and for full rights as workers under European labor law.52 To the consternation of many governments, and some feminists, prostitutes called not for the abolition of prostitution but for the redistribution of sexual pleasure, power, and profit; for the transformation of land and property rights; for the removal of foreign armies; and for the right of women and men to work voluntarily in the sex trade under safe, unregulated, and respected conditions. Many men, however, prefer to find whores in their beds than in their parliaments, and attempts by sexworkers to organize have met with un- swerving violence. An Irish organizer was burnt to death, and Thai orga- nizers have been murdered. Ecuadoran brothel owners rotate prostitutes regularly to prevent them from organizing.54 Yet by and large, the interna- tional Left has been largely indifferent to the issue, while the abolitionist tendency among some feminists has been nothing short of calamitous for working prostitutes. Most prostitutes insist that the first target of their international orga- nizing is the state and the law. Prostitutes argue that the laws punish, rather than protect, women, especially women of color. Where sexwork is a crime, clients can rape, rob, and batter women with impunity. Murderers know the weight of a prostitute's life in the scales of the law. As Dallas Judge Jack Hampton admitted, "I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prosti- tute." 55 Not surprisingly, more prostitutes are murdered in the United States, where prostitution is still a crime, than anywhere else in the world. Prostitutes denounce the laws that shunt them into dangerous, deso- late docklands, meatpacking districts, and railway yards, unable to organize for decent conditions or against coercion. Where prostitution is a crime, women cannot demand police protection or claim legal recourse for robbery or coercion, for they thereby expose themselves as implicated in a crimi- nalized trade. Where sexwork is a crime, prostitutes are forced by landlords to pay exorbitant rents or are driven to work the freezing and dangerous streets. Prostitutes cannot claim social welfare or life insurance, health care or maternity benefits, childcare or pensions. Where prostitution is a crime, migrant women are evicted from their homes, are denied work papers, and are detained and deported. Every cent of a prostitute's earnings is crimi- nally contaminated. The property and possessions of prostitutes are often forfeited, and mothers, brothers, friends, and lovers can be flung into prison for living off immoral earnings. Most cruelly, a prostitute cannot keep her children. Most prostitutes are mothers, and most are in the game for their children. In many countries, however, social workers have the power to take a prostitute's children out of "moral danger" into "care." In these ways, the state curtails women's power, diverting illicit female money back into the coffers of male circulation and curtailing the emergence of independent female heads of family. Sexwork that benefits the male state, however, is tolerated and ad- ministered by a system of international euphemisms: massage parlors, escort agencies, bars, rest and recreation resorts, and so on, which are run not by hookers but by male "entertainment managers." In Thailand, for example, prostitution inhabits a twilight realm of legal ambiguity. The law makes prostitution a crime, but the green light is given to male "tour opera- tors" and "entertainment managers," whose operations are sanctioned and defined as the "personal service sector. Most <u>prostitutes regard legalized prostitution as legalized abuse</u>. Despite its benign ring, <u><mark>legalization places prostitution under criminal law instead of commercial law</u></mark>, where it is <u>tightly curbed by the state and ad- ministered by the police</u>. Instead, <u><mark>prostitutes want the law off their bodies</mark> and are calling for the decriminalization</u> of the profession <u>and the repeal of all legislation not ordinarily applicable to a business</u> or trade. <u><mark>Legalization puts women's bodies</u></mark> firmly <u><mark>in men's hands</u>.</mark> In the aptly named Chicken Ranch, a legalized brothel in Nevada, prostitutes are forced to work three weeks at a stretch, servicing any man who picks them, at any time of the day or night, a dizzying and dispiriting carousel of faceless tricks. In many of the legalized brothels and clubs in Europe, Lisbet, a German prostitute, told me, "Women have no right to refuse men and often no right to use a condom. <u><mark>Under legalization, the profits of women's work clatter into men's pockets. The state becomes a</mark> licit <mark>pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels and levying punitive taxes at rates higher than other workers</u></mark>. In Germany, legalized prostitutes pay 56 percent of their earnings in taxes, but, unlike other taxpayers, they are not eligible for any social benefits whatsoever. Under legalization, the state controls prostitutes' work and leisure, prevent- ing organization and often making it very hard for them to leave the trade if they wish. <u>Most <mark>prostitutes prefer to work illegally rather than submit to</u></mark> the abusive and humiliating ordeals of <u><mark>state-controlled brothels</u></mark>. French prostitutes cannot live with a husband, wife, lover, or child, as anyone under their roof can be charged with "cohabitation." Italian prosti- tutes cannot help their husbands or wives pay the rent or give their parents money, as they can be charged with living off "immoral earnings." In Brit- ain, engaging in prostitution is not a crime (which lets the johns off the hook), but virtually every aspect of a prostitute's work is criminalized. Two women working together for safety can be charged with keeping a brothel. In Switzerland, if a woman decides to leave the trade and seek other work, she first has to get a "good girl" letter from the police to prove her good conduct. To get the letter, she has to wait three years without working as a prostitute to prove her good conduct. Until then, she cannot legally find other work. In Frankfurt, zoning laws force women to work the deserted har- bor area, where they can be tortured and dumped in the water without a stir. In Canada, prostitution is not a crime, but "communicating for the purposes of prostitution" is. Prostitutes can be penalized for organizing and informing each other of dangerous tricks or corrupt police. Austrian prostitutes have to report to the police simply to go on holiday. Some of the most appalling conditions prevail in India. Between 1980 and 1984, not a single landlord was arrested for illegally pandering to prostitutes, but 44,633 prostitutes were arrested for soliciting in Bombay Alone. As Dolores French, author, activist, and prostitute, told me in a pri- vate interview, <u>"Legalizing prostitution sees women as a controlled sub- stance-controlled by men." <mark>The international prostitutes' movement</mark> thus <mark>calls for the decrim</mark>inalization, <mark>not</mark> the <mark>legalization</mark>, of their work</u>. Prostitutes demand that their work be respected as a social service for both men and women and that it be brought under commercial law like other professions. Why, they ask, can masseurs command respect and gratitude for servicing naked clients in comfortable rooms, while prostitutes are criminalized? <u><mark>If</mark> their work were <mark>decrim</mark>inaliz<mark>ed, prostitutes could ply their trade in safety and respect, paying normal rent and taxes</mark>, in houses as clean and comfortable as those of the average therapist or chiropractor</u>.</p>

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round4.docx

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That’s especially true in relation to the university

Hartman 1997

Hartman 1997

/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/ we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, the acclaimed transformative capacities of pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of public displays of suffering inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors, , all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings and consciousness of the enslaved were most available at this site. However, what I am trying to suggest is that if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment and, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering effaces and restricts black sentience. in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,” the problem is that in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated. suffering elude or escape us precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power, pleasure, and profit, then it is no less true that it is the white or near-white body that makes the captive’s suffering visible and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the source of opacity, the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body. this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. this attempt exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close. Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. Empathic identification is complicated further by the fact that it cannot be extricated from the economy of chattel slavery with which it is at odds, for this projection of one’s feeling upon or into the object of property and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, is entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred possession or occupation of the captive body In other words The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion. Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery the spectacle of sufferance is the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master; and the confusion of performing before the master,

the acclaimed transformative capacities of public displays of suffering the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings of the enslaved were available at this site. if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment an increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering effaces and restricts black sentience. in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power and profit, then it is the white that makes the captive’s suffering visible a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body this exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close. Empathic identification is complicated by the fact that it cannot be extricated from the economy of slavery for this projection of one’s feeling upon the object of property is entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred possession or occupation of the captive body The relation between pleasure and possession can be by the fungibility of the slave the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings desires, and values Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery

/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/ As well, we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, the acclaimed transformative capacities of pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of public displays of suffering inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors, the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative, all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings and consciousness of the enslaved were most available at this site. However, what I am trying to suggest is that if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment and, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, effaces and restricts black sentience. As Rankin himself states, in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,” to quote Zygmunt Bauman, the problem is that in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated. According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does suffering elude or escape us in the very effort to bring it near? It does so precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power, pleasure, and profit, then it is no less true that it is the white or near-white body that makes the captive’s suffering visible and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the source of opacity, the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body. MARKED And as noted earlier, this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, this attempt exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close. Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? Empathic identification is complicated further by the fact that it cannot be extricated from the economy of chattel slavery with which it is at odds, for this projection of one’s feeling upon or into the object of property and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, is nonetheless entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred possession or occupation of the captive body, albeit on a different register. In other words, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion. Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from the spectacle of sufferance. Here my intention is not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master; the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; and the confusion of song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, performing before the master, and other popular amusements.

<h4><u>That’s especially true in relation to the university</h4><p><strong>Hartman</strong> <strong>1997</p><p></strong>/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/</p><p></u>As well, <u>we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, <mark>the acclaimed transformative capacities of</mark> pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of <mark>public displays of suffering</mark> inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, <mark>the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors</mark>,</u> the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative<u>, <mark>all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings</mark> and consciousness <mark>of the enslaved were</mark> most <mark>available at this site.</mark> However, what I am trying to suggest is that <mark>if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment an</mark>d, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, <mark>increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain</mark>. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, <mark>the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering</u></mark>, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, <u><mark>effaces and restricts black sentience.</u></mark> As Rankin himself states,<strong> <u></strong><mark>in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close</mark>. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,”</u> to quote Zygmunt Bauman, <u>the problem is that <mark>in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated</mark>.</u> According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does <u>suffering elude or escape us</u> in the very effort to bring it near? It does so <u>precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy</u> and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. <u><mark>If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power</mark>, pleasure, <mark>and profit, then it is</mark> no less true that it is <mark>the white</mark> or near-white body <mark>that makes the captive’s suffering visible</mark> and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to <mark>a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as</mark> the source of opacity, <mark>the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body</mark>.</p><p></u>MARKED</p><p> And as noted earlier, <u>this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. </u> While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, <u><mark>this</mark> attempt <mark>exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close.</mark> Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. </u>What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? <u><mark>Empathic identification is complicated</mark> further <mark>by the fact that it</u> <u>cannot be extricated from the economy of</mark> chattel <mark>slavery</mark> with which it is at odds, <mark>for this projection of one’s feeling upon</mark> or into <mark>the object of property</mark> and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, <mark>is</u></mark> nonetheless <u><mark>entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred</mark> <mark>possession or occupation of the captive body</u></mark>, albeit on a different register. <u>In other words</u>, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. <u><mark>The relation between pleasure</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>possession</mark> of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, <mark>can be</mark> explained in part <mark>by the fungibility of the slave</u></mark>-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, <u><mark>the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings</mark>, ideas, <mark>desires, and values</mark>; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.</u> Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. <u><mark>Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery</u></mark>. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from <u>the spectacle of sufferance</u>. Here my intention<u> is</u> not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically <u>the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master;</u> the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; <u>and the confusion of</u> song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, <u>performing before the master,</u> and other popular amusements.</p>

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1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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Legalization requires specifying how drugs are made legally available

Haden 2

Mark Haden 2, Adjunct Professor of the UBC School of Population and Public Health, “Illicit IV Drugs: A Public Health Approach,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH VOLUME 93, NO. 6, http://journal.cpha.ca/index.php/cjph/article/download/390/390

With “decrimalization”, criminal prosecution is not an option This term is often confused with the term “legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available “decriminalization” is limited in its utility, as it only states what will not be done and does not explain what legal options are available Kleiman and Ziskind 2014 Policy Details The actual outcomes of any scheme of legal access would depend strongly on details rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-and-con discussion of whether to legalise A central decision is whether to allow private enterprises or restrict licit activity to Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises Some variety of state monopoly If the private enterprise model is chosen an additional choice must be made about whether to limit market concentration or allow oligopolistic competition as in the markets for cigarettes and beer label information consumer information point of sale taxation sales training decisions have to be made about marketing Education ground Vitiello 2012 The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of the culture wars the partisans are not going to give ground the potential to tax marijuana may give legalization efforts the final push questions about what we want a post-legalization world to look like are far more interesting than the old pro and con debate My hope is a more sensible debate about how not whether to legalize and regulate marijuana

“decrimalization is often confused with legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available decriminalization” is limited in its utility, as it only states what will not be done and not what legal options are available actual outcomes of any scheme depend strongly on details central is whether to allow private enterprises to produce and sell Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises Some variety of state monopoly label information consumer information point of sale taxation training decisions have to be made about marketing The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of the culture wars the partisans are not going to give ground questions about what we want a post-legalization world to look like are far more interesting than the old pro and con debate a more sensible debate about how, not whether, to legalize and regulate marijuana

The existing laws could be changed to remove legal sanctions. With “decrimalization”, criminal prosecution is not an option for dealing with drugs. This term is often confused with the term “legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available. The term “decriminalization” is limited in its utility, as it only states what will not be done and does not explain what legal options are available. Proponents of “decriminalization” usually distinguish between personal use, and trafficking and smuggling. Those who profit from the black market would still be subject to criminal charges but personal use would not be subject to legal sanctions. Decriminalization, or benign neglect, means ignoring the problem and results in unregulated access to drugs of unknown purity and potency. Without details, “legalize” isn’t a policy – Kleiman, professor of public policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, and Ziskind, crime and drug policy analyst with BOTEC Analysis, May 2014 (Mark and Jeremy, “Lawful Access to Cannabis: Gains, Losses and Design Criteria,” Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, http://botecanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Lawful-Access-to-Cannabis.Gains-Losses-and-Design-Criteria_Effects-of-Prohibition-Enforcement-and-Interdiction-on-Drug-Use_Ending-the-Drug-Wars.Report-of-the-LSE-Expert-Group-on-the-Econ-of-Drug_Jonathan-Caulkins_Mark-Kleiman_Jeremy-Ziskind_May-2014.pdf) Policy Details The actual outcomes of any scheme of legal access would depend strongly on details rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-and-con discussion of whether to legalise. The risk of a large increase in damaging forms of consumption would be greater at a lower price; the need for enforcement against illicit production and sale, or tax evasion by licensed producers and sellers, would be higher. Another central decision is whether to allow private for-profit enterprises to produce and sell cannabis, or instead to restrict licit activity to: (1) Production for personal use and free distribution only. (2) Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises such as consumer-owned cooperatives like the Spanish ‘cannabis clubs’ (3) Some variety of state monopoly, perhaps of retail sales only, leaving production to private enterprise. If the private enterprise model is chosen, an additional choice must be made about whether to limit market concentration to ensure the existence of a variety of competing firms (thus perhaps limiting the marketing and political power of the industry as a whole and – again perhaps – increasing the rate of product innovation and the range of products easily available) or instead to allow the likely development of oligopolistic competition, as in the markets for cigarettes and beer. A potential advantage of legalisation would be the provision of consumer information superior to that available on the illicit market. The corresponding disadvantage might be the application of powerful marketing techniques to making excessive consumption seem desirable and fashionable. Cannabis is a more complex product than beer, with at least two and perhaps dozens of significantly psychoactive chemicals and, to date, only limited scientific knowledge about their actions and interactions. Requiring accurate label information about chemical content seems a sensible approach, but not all consumers will be able to make good use of a collection of chemical names and percentages. Industry participants could be given the responsibility of providing sound consumer information, including due warnings about the risks of habituation, at the point of sale or via websites, or that responsibility could be assigned to NGOs or public agencies, perhaps financed by cannabis taxation. It seems at least arguable that cannabis sales personnel should have extensive training both about the pharmacology of the drug and about offering good advice to consumers, making their role closer to that of a pharmacist or nutritionist than of a mere sales clerk or bartender. By the same token, decisions would have to be made and executed about whether and how to limit marketing efforts. To some eyes at least, the alcohol industry provides a warning by example of what could go wrong. In the United States, the doctrine of ‘commercial free speech’ might gravely impair the capacity of the state to allow private enterprise but restrain promotion. (C) Vote neg: Education and ground – Vitiello, professor of law at University of the Pacific, 2012 (Michael, “Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215,” 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, Lexis) The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of debates surrounding the culture wars. Armed with enough plausible evidence to support their sides, the partisans are not going to give ground. n250 Rather than weighing in on that never-ending story, I have focused on a different point. [*90] Marijuana is big business, largely untaxed, and remarkably resistant to eradication efforts. n251 We are shortsighted not to tax a business worth billions of dollars. And viewed objectively, the potential to tax marijuana may give legalization efforts the final push. n252 As a result, questions about what we want a post-legalization world to look like are far more interesting than the old pro and con debate. My hope is the policymakers will begin that conversation in earnest sooner rather than later. As I suggested above, an advantage of the legislative process over the initiative process is that the legislative process can involve greater transparency and can accommodate legitimate objections of opponents. n253 I would urge law enforcement and other traditional prohibitionists to come to the table to voice their legitimate concerns. We ended up with Proposition 215 - our version of the Trojan horse - because of then-Governor Wilson's reflexive tough-on-crime stance and his resulting veto of AB 1529. n254 Similarly, hard-line local law enforcement efforts have hindered reasonable regulation of medical marijuana. n255 Members of law enforcement do raise legitimate concerns. For example, what about crime in neighborhoods where dispensaries have opened? n256 What about drug-impaired drivers? n257 Cooperation between law enforcement and medical marijuana providers has reduced or eliminated the parade of horribles raised by marijuana opponents, like rampant crime in neighborhoods with dispensaries. n258 My hope is that this symposium can be part of a more sensible debate about how, not whether, to legalize and regulate marijuana.

<h4>Legalization requires <u>specifying</u> how drugs are made legally available</h4><p>Mark <u><strong>Haden 2</u></strong>, Adjunct Professor of the UBC School of Population and Public Health, “Illicit IV Drugs: A Public Health Approach,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH VOLUME 93, NO. 6, http://journal.cpha.ca/index.php/cjph/article/download/390/390</p><p>The existing laws could be changed to remove legal sanctions. <u>With <mark>“decrimalization</mark>”, criminal prosecution is <strong>not an option</u></strong> for dealing with drugs. <u>This term <mark>is often confused with</mark> the term “<mark>legalization” which <strong>specifies how drugs can be legally available</u></strong></mark>. The term <u>“<mark>decriminalization” is <strong>limited in its utility</strong>, as it <strong>only states what will not be done</strong> and <strong></mark>does <mark>not </mark>explain <mark>what legal options are available</u></strong></mark>. Proponents of “decriminalization” usually distinguish between personal use, and trafficking and smuggling. Those who profit from the black market would still be subject to criminal charges but personal use would not be subject to legal sanctions. Decriminalization, or benign neglect, means ignoring the problem and results in unregulated access to drugs of unknown purity and potency.</p><p>Without details, “legalize” isn’t a policy –</p><p><u><strong>Kleiman</u></strong>, professor of public policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, <u><strong>and Ziskind</u></strong>, crime and drug policy analyst with BOTEC Analysis, May <u><strong>2014</p><p></u></strong>(Mark and Jeremy, “Lawful Access to Cannabis: Gains, Losses and Design Criteria,” Ending the Drug Wars: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, http://botecanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Lawful-Access-to-Cannabis.Gains-Losses-and-Design-Criteria_Effects-of-Prohibition-Enforcement-and-Interdiction-on-Drug-Use_Ending-the-Drug-Wars.Report-of-the-LSE-Expert-Group-on-the-Econ-of-Drug_Jonathan-Caulkins_Mark-Kleiman_Jeremy-Ziskind_May-2014.pdf)</p><p><u>Policy Details<strong> </strong>The <strong><mark>actual outcomes</strong></mark> <mark>of <strong>any</strong></mark> <mark>scheme</mark> of legal access would <strong><mark>depend strongly on details</mark> rarely mentioned in the abstract pro-and-con discussion of whether to legalise</u></strong>. The risk of a large increase in damaging forms of consumption would be greater at a lower price; the need for enforcement against illicit production and sale, or tax evasion by licensed producers and sellers, would be higher. <u>A</u>nother <u><mark>central</mark> decision <mark>is whether to allow private</u></mark> for-profit <u><mark>enterprises</u></mark> <mark>to produce</mark> <mark>and sell</mark> cannabis, <u>or</u> instead to <u>restrict licit activity to</u>: (1) Production for personal use and free distribution only. (2) <u><mark>Production and sale by not-for-profit enterprises</u></mark> such as consumer-owned cooperatives like the Spanish ‘cannabis clubs’ (3) <u><mark>Some variety of state monopoly</u></mark>, perhaps of retail sales only, leaving production to private enterprise. <u>If the private enterprise model is chosen</u>, <u>an additional choice must be made about whether to limit market concentration</u> to ensure the existence of a variety of competing firms (thus perhaps limiting the marketing and political power of the industry as a whole and – again perhaps – increasing the rate of product innovation and the range of products easily available) <u>or</u> instead to <u>allow</u> the likely development of <u>oligopolistic competition</u>, <u>as in the markets for cigarettes and beer</u>. A potential advantage of legalisation would be the provision of consumer information superior to that available on the illicit market. The corresponding disadvantage might be the application of powerful marketing techniques to making excessive consumption seem desirable and fashionable. Cannabis is a more complex product than beer, with at least two and perhaps dozens of significantly psychoactive chemicals and, to date, only limited scientific knowledge about their actions and interactions. Requiring accurate <u><mark>label information</u></mark> about chemical content seems a sensible approach, but not all consumers will be able to make good use of a collection of chemical names and percentages. Industry participants could be given the responsibility of providing sound <u><mark>consumer information</u></mark>, including due warnings about the risks of habituation, at the <u><mark>point of sale</u></mark> or via websites, or that responsibility could be assigned to NGOs or public agencies, perhaps financed by cannabis <u><mark>taxation</u></mark>. It seems at least arguable that cannabis <u>sales</u> personnel should have extensive <u><mark>training</u></mark> both about the pharmacology of the drug and about offering good advice to consumers, making their role closer to that of a pharmacist or nutritionist than of a mere sales clerk or bartender. By the same token, <u><mark>decisions</u></mark> would <u><mark>have to be made</u></mark> and executed <u><mark>about</u></mark> whether and how to limit <u><mark>marketing</u></mark> efforts. To some eyes at least, the alcohol industry provides a warning by example of what could go wrong. In the United States, the doctrine of ‘commercial free speech’ might gravely impair the capacity of the state to allow private enterprise but restrain promotion.</p><p>(C) Vote neg: <u>Education</u> and <u>ground</u> –</p><p><u><strong>Vitiello</u></strong>, professor of law at University of the Pacific, <u><strong>2012</p><p></u></strong>(Michael, “Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215,” 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, Lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The debate over marijuana is reminiscent of</u></mark> debates surrounding <u><mark>the culture wars</u></mark>. Armed with enough plausible evidence to support their sides, <u><mark>the partisans are not going to give ground</u></mark>. n250 Rather than weighing in on that never-ending story, I have focused on a different point. [*90] Marijuana is big business, largely untaxed, and remarkably resistant to eradication efforts. n251 We are shortsighted not to tax a business worth billions of dollars. And viewed objectively, <u>the potential to tax marijuana may give legalization efforts the final push</u>. n252 As a result, <u><mark>questions about what we want</mark> <mark>a post-legalization world to look like are <strong>far more interesting than the old pro and con debate</u></strong></mark>. My hope is the policymakers will begin that conversation in earnest sooner rather than later. As I suggested above, an advantage of the legislative process over the initiative process is that the legislative process can involve greater transparency and can accommodate legitimate objections of opponents. n253 I would urge law enforcement and other traditional prohibitionists to come to the table to voice their legitimate concerns. We ended up with Proposition 215 - our version of the Trojan horse - because of then-Governor Wilson's reflexive tough-on-crime stance and his resulting veto of AB 1529. n254 Similarly, hard-line local law enforcement efforts have hindered reasonable regulation of medical marijuana. n255 Members of law enforcement do raise legitimate concerns. For example, what about crime in neighborhoods where dispensaries have opened? n256 What about drug-impaired drivers? n257 Cooperation between law enforcement and medical marijuana providers has reduced or eliminated the parade of horribles raised by marijuana opponents, like rampant crime in neighborhoods with dispensaries. n258 <u>My hope is</u> that this symposium can be part of <u><mark>a more sensible debate <strong>about how</u></strong>, <u><strong>not whether</u></strong>, <u>to legalize and regulate marijuana</u></mark>.</p>

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Kristen Stout

1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

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Regulations turn and outweigh the aff- reinforces stigmatization, denies prostitutes’ rights, increases illegal prostitution, and promotes a victimizing representation of both prostitute and non-prostitute women- it is new form of control that is no better than criminalization

Kuo ‘5

Kuo ‘5

. ETB] The Nevada regulations result not only in a system that reinforces stigmatization and denies their rights, but also creates working conditions that are so unattractive that prostitutes prefer to work in illegal venues. Nevada’s policies altogether disfranchise prostitutes as citizens and rights holders, violate them as workers and persons, and promote dangerous client expectations, all in order to control the “victimizing” prostitute. Nowhere is the importance of conceptual constructs to the construction of policy more evident. Systems of legalization not only promote such representations but carry a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women In Nevada, various unwritten rules circumscribe the behavior of non-prostitute women. Like criminalization, legalization embodies and perpetuates the continued stigmatization of the prostitute and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women. It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens the quality of life of prostitutes, making most of them criminals for noncompliance, and it promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations. It does achieve its purpose: the control of the prostitute body.

The Nevada regulations result not only in a system that reinforces stigmatization and denies their rights but also creates working conditions that are so unattractive that prostitutes prefer to work in illegal venues Nevada’s policies disfranchise prostitutes violate them as persons and promote dangerous client expectations to control the “victimizing” prostitute legalization not only promote such representations but carry a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women legalization embodies and perpetuates stigmatization and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens quality of life and promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations It does achieve its purpose: the control of the prostitute body.

[Lenore, Professor of Women's Studies at California State University, Fresno. Prostitution Policy: Revolutionizing Practice Through a Gendered Perspective. ETB] The Nevada regulations result not only in a system that reinforces the stigmatization of prostitutes and denies them their most basic rights, but also creates a working environment and conditions that are so unattractive that legal brothels are hard pressed to find women who will work in them. It is for good reason that prostitutes in general prefer to work in illegal venues. Nevada’s policies altogether disfranchise prostitutes as citizens and rights holders, violate them as workers and persons, and promote dangerous client expectations, all in order to control the “victimizing” prostitute. Nowhere is the importance of conceptual constructs to the construction of policy more evident. Systems of legalization not only promote such representations of prostitutes but carry along, on this tide of misogynistic control, a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women. In Nevada, various unwritten rules circumscribe the behavior of non-prostitute women. As Pillard Notes: One of the most curious unwritten rules is that [in Winnemucca] no non-establishment female can visit any of the brothels or even drive through the area. [Winnemucca] police chief [Lee] Jones told in an interview that this rule was enforced to protect customers of these brothels. Apparently there is some concern that an angry wife could drive through the Line [a public road] looking for her husband’s car. Like criminalization, legalization embodies and perpetuates the continued stigmatization of the prostitute and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women. It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens the quality of life of prostitutes, making most of them criminals for noncompliance, and it promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations. It does, however, effectively achieve its purpose: the control of the prostitute body.

<h4>Regulations <u>turn and outweigh the aff</u>- reinforces stigmatization, denies prostitutes’ rights, increases illegal prostitution, and promotes a victimizing representation of both prostitute and non-prostitute women- it is new form of control that is <u>no better<strong> than criminalization </h4><p>Kuo ‘5</p><p></u></strong>[Lenore, Professor of Women's Studies at California State University, Fresno. Prostitution Policy: Revolutionizing Practice Through a Gendered Perspective<u><strong>. ETB]</p><p></strong><mark>The Nevada regulations</u> <u>result not only in a system that <strong>reinforces</strong> </u></mark>the<u> <strong><mark>stigmatization</strong></mark> </u>of prostitutes<u> <mark>and <strong>denies</strong></mark> </u>them<u> <strong><mark>their</strong> </u></mark>most basic<u> <strong><mark>rights</strong></mark>, <mark>but also creates</mark> </u>a<u> <mark>working </u></mark>environment and<u> <mark>conditions that are <strong>so unattractive</strong> that </u></mark>legal brothels are hard pressed to find women who will work in them. It is for good reason that<u> <mark>prostitutes </u></mark>in general<u> <strong><mark>prefer to work in illegal venues</strong></mark>. <mark>Nevada’s policies </mark>altogether <strong><mark>disfranchise prostitutes</strong> </mark>as citizens and rights holders, <strong><mark>violate them</strong> as </mark>workers and <mark>persons</mark>, <mark>and <strong>promote dangerous client expectations</strong></mark>, all in order <strong><mark>to control the “victimizing” prostitute</mark>. </strong>Nowhere is the importance of conceptual constructs to the construction of policy more evident. Systems of <strong><mark>legalization not only promote such representations</strong> </u></mark>of prostitutes<u> <strong><mark>but carry</strong> </u></mark>along, on this tide of misogynistic control,<u> <strong><mark>a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women</u></strong></mark>. <u>In Nevada, various unwritten rules circumscribe the behavior of non-prostitute women. </u>As Pillard Notes: One of the most curious unwritten rules is that [in Winnemucca] no non-establishment female can visit any of the brothels or even drive through the area. [Winnemucca] police chief [Lee] Jones told in an interview that this rule was enforced to protect customers of these brothels. Apparently there is some concern that an angry wife could drive through the Line [a public road] looking for her husband’s car. <u><strong>Like criminalization, <mark>legalization embodies and perpetuates</strong></mark> the continued <strong><mark>stigmatization</strong> </mark>of the prostitute <strong><mark>and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women</strong></mark>.</u> <u><strong><mark>It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens </strong></mark>the <strong><mark>quality of life </strong></mark>of prostitutes, making most of them criminals for noncompliance, <mark>and </mark>it <mark>promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations</mark>. <mark>It does</u></mark>, however, effectively <u><mark>achieve its purpose: the</mark> <mark>control of the prostitute body. </p></u></mark>

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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Finishing bifo (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

exhaustion a slow movement withdrawal adopt the mode of passivity radical passivity threaten the ethos working too much Suicide a form of political action deserted a huge wave of withdrawal emerge in that moment abandon the law of accumulation and growth

<h4><u>Finishing bifo</h4><p></u> (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u><mark>No need</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u>A <strong>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></mark>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><mark>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong></mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u><mark>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></mark>. <u>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u>

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Jim Schultz

1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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The affirmative uses the phrase "nearly all" instead of specifying what the aff specifically legalizes—voting issue—

<h4>The affirmative uses the phrase "nearly all" instead of specifying what the aff specifically legalizes—voting issue—</h4>

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Michigan AP

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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The United States should remove criminal penalties on and apply labor laws to prostitution in the United States with the exception of indoor prostitution and brothels.

<h4>The United States should remove criminal penalties on and apply labor laws to prostitution in the United States with the exception of indoor prostitution and brothels.</h4>

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Emory BD

Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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They are essentially a mirror posed against a mirror

Zupancic ‘3

Zupancic ‘3 (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]

A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent

A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play. . . .Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”

<h4>They are essentially a mirror posed against a mirror</h4><p><u><strong>Zupancic ‘3</u></strong> (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]</p><p><u>A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene</u>” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. <u>Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play</u>. . . .<u>Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—<strong>that of an endless metonymic illusion</u></strong>. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. <u>The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth</u>. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. <u>The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent</u>. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”</p>

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Berkeley MS

Jim Schultz

1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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Discourse of the Mexican narco-state under siege by cartels instantiates waves of racialized colonialism by positioning Mexico as culturally inferior and in need of development – these representations undergird violent neoliberal apparatuses which makes structural violence and Mexican instability inevitable

Carlos 14

Carlos 14 (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz

Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Clinton described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency The Los Angeles Times suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful Foucault argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it Said says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth. Dominant discourses, meta-narratives and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites Western powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North and scholars from the South and even between white and nonwhite scholars Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives. The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when Mexicans were depicted as an “uncivilized species—dirty, unkempt, immoral, diseased, lazy, unambitious and despised for being peons This discourse set the stage for the creation of a “culture of empire,” in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests This narrative depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it continues to dominate U.S. understandings of Mexico The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. Mexico is suffering much more from extreme economic inequality, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), than from drug-related violence While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact. Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.” The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified The importance of the drug-related violence story lies in its masking the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s social and economic problems It perpetuates a relationship of imperialism between the United States and Mexico that manifests itself in NAFTA, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, and direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and military assistance to help bring order to Mexico free trade has led only to the enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates NAFTA is just one of the most recent examples of U.S. domination over Mexico and how it continues to misdevelop and tear apart the socioeconomic integrity of that society They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico this means continuing Mexico’s long history as a U.S. economic colony, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State investment in agriculture was reduced by 95.5 percent and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for Mexican national agricultural producers. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands NAFTA has resulted in the “complete inability of the Mexican nation to produce the food required to feed its own people free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital Poverty in rural areas has risen significantly from 37 percent in 1992 to 52.4 percent in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people we can only call this imperialism the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico. economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people.

The L A Times suggested Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels Drug-related violence is not Mexico’s foremost problem, and it obscures economic and social problems it masks their origin in U.S. policy while providing justification for domination It is linked to discourses surrounding colonization the white man’s burden extermination of the native population Manifest Destiny racial segregation and prejudice against immigrants discourse serves to make possible interventions power produces discourse that justifies and increases it literature elaborates empire construct “realities” that are acted upon dominant narratives validate norms deemed intersubjectively legitimate Western powers maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized Through repetition, a racialized “other” is constructed literature describes Latin America as “backward” development literature becomes the justification for underdevelopment non-Western scholarship is not regarded as legitimate There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North and South It is important to deconstruct discourses expose power relationships and examine counterhegemonic alternatives Mexicans were depicted as uncivilized dirty diseased and despised This narrative continues to dominate Mexico is suffering much more from economic inequality than from drug violence Representing Mexico as a “failing state” provides justification for economic paternalism there were 23 million crimes of violence in the U S statistics do not justify that the U S is a “failing state.” Yet jumps to that conclusion about Mexico more people kill themselves in the U S drug violence does not make Mexico a “failing state.” the drug story perpetuates imperialism that manifests in NAFTA and military assistance NAFTA continues to misdevelop and tear apart socioeconomic integrity continuing Mexico’s history as a U.S. economic colony The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater investment was reduced by 95.5 percent The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for agricultural producers NAFTA resulted in the “complete inability to feed its own people Poverty has risen from 37 percent to 52.4 percent discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for military intervention NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a violent Mexico needing development to solve its social problems, when it is capital that has caused those problems Focusing on drugs obscures this

According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.” Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (quoted in Dibble, 2010) described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. The Los Angeles Times (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it suggested that Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. Drug-related violence is not, however, Mexico’s foremost problem, and the reporting on it obscures the more serious and immediate economic and social problems it faces. More important, it masks their origin in U.S. economic foreign policy while providing justification for continued and future U.S. paternalism and domination.¶ The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. It is linked to discourses surrounding the colonization of the Americas, the white man’s burden, the extermination of the native population, Manifest Destiny, the Mexican-American War, racial segregation in the United States, and prejudice against immigrants. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story. In that regard discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful.¶ Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses¶ Michel Foucault (1972–1977: 120) argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth.” Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power. This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” In essence, power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it. Similarly, Edward Said (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. He says that literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” (Said, 1994: xiii). They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.¶ Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance (36). Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action. For Said, there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge.” They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth.¶ Dominant discourses, meta-narratives (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites. Western1 powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies (Dunn, 2003). Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” Consequently, dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions, particularly economic ones.¶ Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly literature that describes Latin America as a “backward” region that “irrationally” resists modernization. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, the discourse created by the modernization and development literature focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and becomes the West’s justification for the continued underdevelopment of the region. These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism.¶ Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations.¶ This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which non-Western scholarship is excluded because it is not regarded as legitimate. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North (the United States) and scholars from the South (Latin America, Africa, et al.) and even between white and nonwhite (American Latino) scholars. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate (Dunn, 2003).¶ It is important, then, to understand and deconstruct discourses, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal, as Lynch (1999) points out, is to expose the material and ideological power relationships that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—and to examine counterhegemonic alternatives.¶ The U.S. Discourse on Mexico¶ The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when Mexicans were depicted as an “uncivilized species—dirty, unkempt, immoral, diseased, lazy, unambitious and despised for being peons” (Gonzalez, 2004: 8). This discourse set the stage for the creation of what Gonzalez calls a “culture of empire,” in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests (2004: 6). This narrative depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it continues to dominate U.S. understandings of Mexico. Sometimes this is done with the help of Mexican politicians themselves, as in President Felipe Calderón’s extension of the hegemonic discourse of the “war on drugs.” The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. Mexico is suffering much more from extreme economic inequality, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), than from drug-related violence. The great migration that has occurred since 1994 has been the result of a decimated economy. While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families. The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact.¶ Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has dedicated a web site to the series “Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep.” It has reported, among other things, that President Calderón deployed 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to 18 states (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2010) and that there were 10,031 deaths from drug-related violence between January 1, 2007, and June 5, 2009 (Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2012). (One may question the reliability of these figures, given that on February 3, 2010, the paper had reported 9,903 such deaths since January 2007 and that on August 18 of that year it had reported a total of 28,228.) As far back as 1997, M. Delal Baer (1997: 138), the director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, suggested that “skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico.” He asserted that “drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, leaping from 338 in 1991, to 515 in 1996, and 538 during the first eight months of 1997 alone” (138). This was 16 years ago; one can only imagine what the numbers are today as the drug problem in Mexico is depicted more and more as a U.S. national security problem.¶ The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico (Gomez, 2010). The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.” Within days of the outbreak Mexico was under pressure from the world community and especially the United States to close down schools and heavily populated areas in order to avert the spread of the flu. The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations that Gonzalez discusses. Lost on the majority of the U.S. media and, consequently, on average Americans, however, was the fact that the outbreak originated in a town where the Smithfield Corporation, an American company with massive hog-raising operations known to improperly handle its waste, had a factory farm (Morales, 2009). The CDCP (2010) reported that only around 11,000 people died of the H1N1 virus between April through December of 2009, in comparison with the average of 36,000 people dying in the United States each year of the “regular” seasonal flu. If the H1N1 flu was such an epidemic, why was no one reporting on the deaths from the regular seasonal flu in the United States, which were clearly more numerous?¶ A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35):¶ The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.¶ Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999).¶ Representing Mexico as a potential “failing state” in the midst of violent anarchy provides the U.S. justification for continued economic paternalism. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus manufacturing consent as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further neoliberal economic development or military intervention. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s.¶ Deconstructing the Dominant Discourse¶ Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the barbaric brutality of the “others” (Said, 1994). This American exceptionalism has been used to legitimate its domination over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it.¶ In 2010 there were an estimated 23 million reported crimes of violence and/or theft in the United States. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these statistics clearly do not justify any assertion that the United States is a “failing state.” Yet such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that jumps to that conclusion about Mexico.¶ In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state.”¶ Furthermore, while more people are killed in Mexico, more people kill themselves in the United States. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period.¶ The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs.¶ There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence.¶ Is there drug violence in Mexico? Yes, but this does not make Mexico a “failing state.” While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination.¶ Implications of the Dominant Discourse¶ The importance of the drug-related violence story lies in its masking the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s social and economic problems. It perpetuates a relationship of imperialism between the United States and Mexico that manifests itself in NAFTA, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, and direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and military assistance to help bring order to Mexico. Mexican politicians have bought the story and have been willing collaborators with economic development to “help” Mexico. Former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his Institutional Revolutionary Party vigorously pursued NAFTA as a mechanism for injecting foreign capital into Mexico’s ailing economy (Castañeda, 1993). Jaime Serra, a former secretary of trade, and J. Enrique Espinoza, an economist formerly on the council of economic advisers to the president of Mexico, have fervently proclaimed NAFTA a resounding success (Serra and Espinoza, 2002a), pointing to increased foreign direct investment as evidence. However, free trade has led only to the enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates (Robledo, 2006). Gilbert Gonzalez and Raul Fernandez (2003: 54) argue that “NAFTA is just one of the most recent examples of U.S. domination over Mexico and how it continues to misdevelop and tear apart the socioeconomic integrity of that society.” They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico.” In effect this means continuing Mexico’s long history as a U.S. economic colony, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 55). This process was supposed to lead to an opening for investment, economic growth, and access to diversified export markets for Mexico.¶ The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State investment in agriculture was reduced by 95.5 percent and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent (Quintana, 2004: 251). Disinvestment in Mexican agriculture has meant that agricultural enterprises are unable to compete with subsidized U.S. commodities. The United States maintains domestic subsidies that allow it to export corn at 30 percent below the cost of production, wheat at 40 percent below, and cotton at 57 percent below—a practice known as “asymmetrical trading” and “dumping” and deemed illegal in world commerce (Fernandez and Whitesell, 2008). Serra and Espinoza (2002b) suggest that this is a nonissue because of NAFTA’s tariff-rate quota system, which charges tariffs for exceeding the import quotas. However, Cavanaugh and Anderson (2002) point out that under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. The outcome has been the disappearance of profitability for Mexican national agricultural producers. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent (Quintana, 2004: 256). Despite these figures the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR, 2006) points to the growth of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States by US$5.6 billion during the past 12 years as proof of the success of NAFTA. However, producers continue to abandon agricultural endeavors en masse, vacating 1.6 million previously cultivated hectares (3.95 million acres) in the first eight years of NAFTA (Quintana, 2004: 256). Peter Goodman (2007) tells the story of Ruben Rivera,¶ who sat on a bench in a forlorn plaza, rather than working on his seven-acre farm. He used to grow tomatoes and onions, hiring 150 workers to help at harvest. Now he doesn’t even bother to plant. He can buy onions in the supermarket more cheaply than he can grow them. A crop of tomatoes yields less than the taxes. He lives off the $800 sent home monthly by his three sons, who run a yard work business in Macon, Ga.¶ Stories like this have become all too common. As Quintana (2004: 256) puts it, “One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands.” Mexico now imports 95 percent of its edible oils, 40 percent of its beef, pork, and other meat products, 30 percent of its corn, and 50 percent of its rice. NAFTA has resulted in the “complete inability of the Mexican nation to produce the food required to feed its own people” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 57).¶ In the end, “free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital. It was promoted by huge U.S. multinational corporations as benevolent economic development to allow them to integrate themselves into the Mexican market without having to deal with that country’s requirements and legislative issues. Mark Weisbrot (2004) of the Center of Economic Policy Research in Washington suggests that, had Mexico’s economy¶ grown at the same pace from 1980 to the present as it did in the period from 1960 to 1980, today it would have the same standard of living as Spain. . . . To have 25 years of this rotten economic performance, you’d have to conclude something is wrong. . . . It is hard to make the case that Mexico’s aggregate economic performance would have been even worse without NAFTA.¶ Not only has NAFTA not accomplished the growth propulsion its supporters promised in Mexico but it has had devastating social costs for Mexican society. Poverty in rural areas has risen significantly from 37 percent in 1992 to 52.4 percent in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty (Quintana, 2004: 257). NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration (Dickerson, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Since 1994 an average of 600 peasants a day (at least 1.78 million people) have migrated from rural areas, many to northern cities along the U.S.-Mexican border and others into the United States (Quintana, 2004: 258). Migration means family disintegration and the destruction of the social fabric of Mexico. Many of these jobless displaced workers will try their luck at crossing a militarized border into the United States. Peter Goodman (2007), interviewing Luz Maria Vazquez, a tomato picker from Jalisco, reports that six of her brothers and sisters are in the United States, most of them without papers. More than 11 million Mexicans (a conservative estimate) now live in the United States without documents, and 7 million of them immigrated after NAFTA, between 1994 and 2005 (Passel, 2006).4 Clearly the politics in Mexico are much more complex than the drug story in the United States makes them out to be.¶ Conclusion¶ The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones (O’Reilly, 2013), and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people. Even at its most basic level, we can only call this imperialism.¶ While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico.¶ The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism.¶ For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary.¶ The irony of it all is that NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest. In the end, the way Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people. This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.

<h4>Discourse of the Mexican narco-state under siege by cartels instantiates waves of racialized colonialism by positioning Mexico as culturally inferior and in need of development – these representations undergird violent neoliberal apparatuses which makes structural violence and Mexican instability inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Carlos 14</u></strong> (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz</p><p>According to major U.S. newspapers and policy makers, <u>Mexico is currently waging a “war on drugs.”</u> Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary <u>Clinton</u> (quoted in Dibble, 2010) <u>described the situation as “starting to resemble an insurgency</u>” and compared it to Colombia’s crisis some two decades earlier. <u><mark>The L</mark>os <mark>A</mark>ngeles <mark>Times</u></mark> (February 19, 2009) sponsored a conference with the University of San Diego’s Trans-Border Institute at which it <u><mark>suggested</mark> that <mark>Mexico is “under siege” by drug cartels</u></mark>. Regular updates on the drug war appear in U.S. newspapers. For instance, on January 20, 2010, the Associated Press ran a story entitled “7 Bodies Linked to Drug Cartels Found in Mexico”; on March 19, CNN had one entitled “Drug Criminals Block Roads in Mexico”; and on June 23 the New York Daily News announced, “Mexican Drug Violence Nears Bloodiest Month, President Felipe Calderon Pleads for Country’s Support.” <u>A simple Google News search will show that Mexican drugs, drug-related violence, and antidrug efforts are front and center in Mexico and the United States and have become the primary issue between the two countries. <mark>Drug-related violence is not</mark>, however, <mark>Mexico’s foremost problem, and</mark> the reporting on <mark>it <strong>obscures</mark> the more serious and immediate <mark>economic and social problems</strong></mark> it faces</u>. More important, <u><mark>it <strong>masks their origin in U.S.</mark> economic foreign <mark>policy</strong> while providing justification for</mark> continued and future <strong>U.S. paternalism and <mark>domination</u></strong></mark>.¶ <u>The media and the government in the United States have a long history of constructing and perpetuating this type of discourse about Mexico. <mark>It is linked to discourses surrounding</mark> the <strong><mark>colonization</mark> of the Americas, <mark>the white man’s burden</mark>, the <mark>extermination of the native population</mark>, <mark>Manifest Destiny</mark>, the Mexican-American War, <mark>racial segregation</mark> in the United States, <mark>and prejudice against immigrants</u></strong></mark>. While the current discourse regarding Mexico is different in that Mexicans themselves are concerned about what is going on, the way it is shaped and manipulated by the media reflects the earlier ones. Gilbert Gonzalez (2004: 7) suggests that the <u>current understandings and representations of Mexico date back to the 1800s, when “U.S. capital interests sought to penetrate Mexico.” The original discourse was expressly linked to economic processes, and the same is true of the current drug-related violence story</u>. In that regard <u>discourse can be and in this case is extremely powerful</u>.¶ Meta-Narratives and Dominant Discourses¶ Michel <u>Foucault</u> (1972–1977: 120) <u>argues that “<strong><mark>discourse serves to make possible</mark> a whole series of <mark>interventions</mark>, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth</u></strong>.” <u>Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power</u>. <u>This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth</u>” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “<u>what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse</u>.” In essence, <u><mark>power produces discourse that justifies</mark>, legitimates, <mark>and increases it</u></mark>. Similarly, Edward <u>Said</u> (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, <u>says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics.</u> He says that <u><mark>literature</mark> <strong>supports, <mark>elaborates</mark>, and consolidates the practices of <mark>empire</strong></mark>. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, <strong>creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them”</u></strong> (Said, 1994: xiii). <u>They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges</u>.¶ <u>Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons</u>. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, <u>representations have <strong>very precise political consequences</strong>.</u> <u>They either legitimize or delegitimize power</u>, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). <u>Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a <strong>justification for imperialism</strong> and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance</u> (36). <u>Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action</u>. For Said, <u>there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful</u>. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, <u>through repetition <strong>they become “regimes of truth and knowledge</u></strong>.” <u>They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> Dominant discourses, meta-narratives</u> (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), <u>and cultural representations are important because they <strong><mark>construct “realities” that are</mark> taken seriously and <mark>acted upon</u></strong></mark>. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “<u><mark>dominant narratives</mark> do ‘work’ <strong>even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence</strong>, to the degree that their conceptual foundations <strong>call upon or <mark>validate norms</strong></mark> that are <mark>deemed intersubjectively legitimate</mark>.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be <strong>constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed</strong> by actual people</u> (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that <u>the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites</u>. <u><mark>Western</u></mark>1 <u><mark>powers</mark>, including the United States, have <mark>maintained hegemony by <strong>establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized</strong></mark> are identities that have provided <strong>justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism</u></strong> (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). <u>The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies</u> (Dunn, 2003). <u><mark>Through</mark> constant <mark>repetition, a racialized </mark>identity of the non-American, barbaric <mark>“other” is constructed</mark>, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.”</u> Consequently, <u>dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide <strong>a veil for “imperial encounters</strong>,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control</u> (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that <u>dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions</u>, particularly economic ones.¶ <u>Scholars, intellectuals, and academics also engage in the perpetuation of discourses and participate in their construction. There is a large body of scholarly <mark>literature</mark> that <strong><mark>describes Latin America as</mark> a <mark>“backward”</strong></mark> region that “irrationally” resists modernization</u>. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986), drawing on Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, portrays Latin America as having different, “inherently” faulty and “detrimental” value systems that lack the entrepreneurial ethic and are therefore antithetical to the systematic accumulation of capital. A newer version of this theory is promoted by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus on countries that allow “self-expression” and ones that do not. Howard Wiarda (1986) suggests that the religious history of Latin America promotes a corporatist tradition that is averse to democratic and liberal values, asentiment more recently echoed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). Along these same lines, Jacques Lambert (1986) argues that the paternalistic latifundia (feudal-like) social structure of Latin America provides no incentive for self-improvement or mobility. Ultimately, <u>the discourse created by the modernization and <mark>development literature</mark> focuses on the “backward” values of the “other” and <mark>becomes the</mark> West’s <strong><mark>justification for</mark> the continued <mark>underdevelopment</mark> of the region</strong>.</u> These interpretations lead to partial, misleading, and unsophisticated treatment of complex political and economic dynamics, particularly in Latin America. <u><strong>They ignore the long history of colonization and imperialism</u></strong>.¶ Several notable Latin American intellectuals have countered with a critique of the development literature through dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism. Writing on underdevelopment, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) focuses on exogenous factors affecting Latin American economic development, among them the penetration of capital into the region and the asymmetrical trading relationships that were created. Celso Furtado (1986) expands this notion and writes about the international division of labor and Latin America’s weakened position as the producer of primary raw materials for Europe and the United States. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) suggest that the domestic economic processes in Latin American states emerged from this relationship of dependency. More notably Raul Fernandez and Jorge Ocampo (1974) argue that the Marxist theory of <u>imperialism provides an explanation for the persistence of “backwardness” and identifies the basic contradictions in Latin America as between imperialism and the Latin American nations</u>.¶ This Latin American scholarship, with rich critiques of mainstream modernization theory, has been dismissed, however, because it comes from non-mainstream academic and professional circles. Doty (1996: 164) views scholarship as an inventory in which <u><strong><mark>non-Western scholarship is</mark> excluded</strong> because it is <mark>not regarded as legitimate</u></mark>. While dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism were briefly allowed into the inventory in the late 1980s and the 1990s, they quickly went out of fashion and are now excluded from the canon, easily dismissed and ultimately illegitimate. Dale Johnson (1981) suggests that these theories were rejected for their determinism—the assumption that Latin American nations had no agency in their own economic development. Others criticized them for assuming that economic development in its neoliberal form was a positive goal and still others for providing no prescriptions for change or alternatives to modernization. Scholars critical of modernization theories, including Theotônio dos Santos (1971) and Fernandez and Ocampo (1974), addressed all of these critiques and argued that these theories were not in fact deterministic but, rather, merely sought to highlight exogenous historical processes, including the penetration of industrialized capital, that had affected endogenous economic and political dynamics in Latin America and led to the persistence of “backwardness.” Yet dependency theory and Marxist theories of imperialism and their corresponding discourse remained marginalized, largely because the scholarship itself is not from an industrialized society or from scholars in the mainstream of their disciplines. <u><mark>There is an asymmetrical relationship between scholars from the North</u></mark> (the United States) <u><mark>and</mark> scholars from the <mark>South</u></mark> (Latin America, Africa, et al.) <u>and even between white and nonwhite</u> (American Latino) <u>scholars</u>. The literature, while rich in analysis and highlighting critical issues, is read by many Northern scholars from an impoverished, reductionist, and simplistic perspective. Discursive authorship is thus not equal, and clearly <u>Western representations exert hegemony by constructing discourses, representations, and narratives from underdeveloped regions as illegitimate</u> (Dunn, 2003).¶ <u><mark>It is important</mark>, then, <strong><mark>to</mark> understand and <mark>deconstruct discourses</strong></mark>, unmasking their political and economic motivations and consequences. The goal</u>, as Lynch (1999) points out, <u>is to <strong><mark>expose</mark> the material and ideological <mark>power relationships</strong></mark> that underlie them—in the current case, U.S. imperialism—<mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>examine counterhegemonic alternatives</strong></mark>.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>The U.S. Discourse on Mexico¶ <u>The original U.S. discourse on Mexico dates back to the 1800s, when <mark>Mexicans were depicted as</mark> an “<strong><mark>uncivilized</mark> species—<mark>dirty</mark>, unkempt, immoral, <mark>diseased</mark>, lazy, unambitious <mark>and despised</mark> for being peons</u></strong>” (Gonzalez, 2004: 8). <u>This discourse set the stage for the creation of </u>what Gonzalez calls<u> <strong>a “culture of empire,”</strong> in which the United States made a concerted effort to dominate Mexico economically and <strong>subordinate it to U.S. corporate interests</u></strong> (2004: 6). <u><mark>This narrative</mark> depicted the country as a huge social problem and its people as inferior to Americans, and it <strong><mark>continues to dominate</mark> U.S. understandings of Mexico</u></strong>. Sometimes this is done with the help of Mexican politicians themselves, as in President Felipe Calderón’s extension of the hegemonic discourse of the “war on drugs.” <u>The problem with this contemporary representation is that it oversimplifies the country’s complex political dynamics and obscures what is really going on. <mark>Mexico is suffering <strong>much more from</mark> extreme <mark>economic inequality</strong></mark>, caused in large part by U.S. economic imperialism and capital extraction (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), <mark>than from drug</mark>-related <mark>violence</u></mark>. The great migration that has occurred since 1994 has been the result of a decimated economy. <u>While some people may leave Mexico out of fear of violence, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants have left because of the necessity to feed their families</u>. <u>The discourse about drug-related violence detracts from the recognition of this fact.</u>¶ <u>Media coverage of drug-related violence and other negative reporting about Mexico have steadily increased over the past 10–15 years and skyrocketed in the recent past</u>. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has dedicated a web site to the series “Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep.” It has reported, among other things, that President Calderón deployed 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to 18 states (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2010) and that there were 10,031 deaths from drug-related violence between January 1, 2007, and June 5, 2009 (Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2012). (One may question the reliability of these figures, given that on February 3, 2010, the paper had reported 9,903 such deaths since January 2007 and that on August 18 of that year it had reported a total of 28,228.) As far back as 1997, M. Delal Baer (1997: 138), the director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, suggested that “<u>skewed coverage is just another example of how the U.S. media, average Americans, and their representatives in Congress increasingly subscribe to a tabloid view of Mexico</u>.” He asserted that “<u>drug and corruption stories have increased every year in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal</u>, leaping from 338 in 1991, to 515 in 1996, and 538 during the first eight months of 1997 alone” (138). This was 16 years ago; one can only imagine what the numbers are today as the drug problem in Mexico is depicted more and more as a U.S. national security problem.¶ <u>The U.S. State Department sent out travel warnings in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to all U.S. universities regarding spring-break travel to Mexico, cautioning them about the increase in crime and spreading fear about Mexico</u> (Gomez, 2010). <u>The same was done with the outbreak of H1N1, originally referred to as the “swine flu.”</u> Within days of the outbreak Mexico was under pressure from the world community and especially the United States to close down schools and heavily populated areas in order to avert the spread of the flu. <u>The association of a disease named after swine with Mexico reinforced the “dirty,” “unkempt,” and “uncivilized” representations</u> that Gonzalez discusses. Lost on the majority of the U.S. media and, consequently, on average Americans, however, was the fact that the outbreak originated in a town where the Smithfield Corporation, an American company with massive hog-raising operations known to improperly handle its waste, had a factory farm (Morales, 2009). The CDCP (2010) reported that only around 11,000 people died of the H1N1 virus between April through December of 2009, in comparison with the average of 36,000 people dying in the United States each year of the “regular” seasonal flu. If the H1N1 flu was such an epidemic, why was no one reporting on the deaths from the regular seasonal flu in the United States, which were clearly more numerous?¶ A large portion of the U.S. Department of State web page on Mexico is dedicated to warning Americans about such crime, safety, security, and health issues (U.S. Department of State, 2011). It currently advises citizens to delay unnecessary travel to Mexico because of the drug war. One may expect this type of warning from an agency concerned with its citizens’ welfare, but <u>it is disturbing when the negative narrative becomes “common knowledge” and is included in government military strategic reports</u>. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense published a report entitled The Joint Operation Environment offering perspectives “on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.” Part 3, Section C, of the report, entitled “Weak and Failing States,” describes the “usual suspects” in this category—in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Discussing the concept of “rapid collapse,” it asserts that while, “for the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods, the collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems.” It goes on to suggest that “two large and important states bear consideration for rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico.” The discussion of Mexico is as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008: 35):¶ The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.¶ Among the many things that make this statement problematic is its simplification of Mexico’s political dynamics. First, <u>it assumes that politicians, the police, and the judiciary are separate from and therefore adversaries of criminal gangs and drug cartels</u>. Jorge Chabat (2002), a Mexican expert on drug trafficking and national security, challenges this assumption, arguing that <u>the drug cartels buy off politicians and are imbedded in political structures and institutions</u>. While the Mexican state has sought to clean up its politics and provide more transparency, historically the political elite and government technocrats have used their positions of power to increase their wealth, turning a blind eye to illicit operations. The Department of Defense statement is noteworthy because it goes on to lay the groundwork for potential military intervention in the event that Mexico descends into chaos. <u>The problem here, of course, is who gets to define “chaos</u>.” The Drug Enforcement Administration is already preparing for such an event, maintaining a presence in Mexico (see Toro, 1999).¶ <u><strong><mark>Representing Mexico as a</mark> potential <mark>“failing state”</strong></mark> in the midst of violent anarchy <mark>provides</mark> the U.S. <mark>justification for</mark> continued <mark>economic paternalism</mark>. The U.S. media and government have become extremely effective in representing a strange and threatening foreign culture for the American audience and thus <strong>manufacturing consent</strong> as it is considered necessary for action in Mexico, whether it be further <strong>neoliberal economic development or military intervention</u></strong>. It is therefore not surprising to see the rise in negative reporting parallel the time line of increased U.S. capital penetration into Mexico in the mid-1990s.¶ Deconstructing the Dominant Discourse¶ Since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, <u>the United States has historically operated as if it had the moral high ground in the international community. It has contrasted its supposed traditional commitment to human dignity, liberty, and self-determination with the <strong>barbaric brutality of the “others</u></strong>” (Said, 1994). <u>This American exceptionalism has been used to <strong>legitimate its domination</strong> over other countries. The notion of “world responsibility” is the rationale for its economic or military endeavors</u>. Because of this, it may be instructive to look at its track record on some of the issues for which it criticizes other countries. Because the current negative discourse about Mexico is constructed around crime, comparing crime statistics in the two countries is helpful in deconstructing it.¶ In 2010 <u><mark>there were</mark> an estimated <mark>23 million</mark> reported <mark>crimes of violence</mark> and/or theft <mark>in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Of these 1,246,248 were violent crimes,2 403 per 100,000 people, and of these 14,748 were homicides (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a). A murder is committed every 31 minutes (Watt, 2008). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1.35 million high school students in 2009 were either threatened or injured with a weapon on school property at least once, while approximately 1.2 million acknowledged having carried a weapon on school property (CDCP, 2009). In the 2007–2008 school year, a record 34 Chicago public school students were killed (IOSCC, 2008). The proportion of prisoners to its population in the United States is at an all-time high, with 1.6 million criminals behind bars, more than any other nation in the world; 1 in every 31 adults is in some part of the criminal justice system (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b). This proportion of prisoners to the total population is six times the world average (IOSCC, 2008). This snapshot does not include crimes committed or provoked by U.S. military aggression abroad.3 However, these <u><mark>statistics</mark> clearly <mark>do not justify</mark> any assertion <mark>that the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is a “failing state.” Yet </mark>such data and observations are used to perpetuate a discourse that <mark>jumps to that conclusion about Mexico</u></mark>.¶ In comparison, Mexico’s rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as recently as 2007 was 8.1 and has only risen in response to a heavy government crack-down in what Youngers and Rosin (2005) call the “cockroach effect.” The most recent data suggest that in 2011 the rate was 23.7, still middling and actually low compared with those of other Latin American nations (see Table 1). The United States, with a rate of 4.8, is barely better than Uruguay and much worse than Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Compared with other industrialized countries, it lags behind, closer to “chaos.” While proportionally more people are victims of homicide in Mexico than in the United States, <u>Mexico is far from being an extreme outlier</u>. It is safe to say that there are many countries in Latin America that have similar if not much more serious problems of crime and violence, while at the same time the <u>United States faces similar issues within its own borders. Yet, Mexico is scrutinized much more closely and is the only one viewed with concern as a possible “failing state</u>.”¶ Furthermore, <u>while more people are killed in Mexico, <mark>more people kill themselves in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. Are we to conclude, then, that people in the United States are more self-destructive or psychotic? No one would argue that U.S. society is disintegrating into chaos because a sizable number of its citizens want to end their lives. Yet similar figures are used to arrive at this very conclusion when regarding Mexico. Some argue that Mexico is scrutinized because it borders the United States in a post-9/11 world or because of corruption or the ineffectiveness of the Mexican judicial system. And while these critiques have some merit, the negative discourse that dominates is about the violence, not about Mexican corruption or their ineffective institutions. If looked at historically, <u>Mexico’s violence problem has remained relatively constant over the course of the past 25 years, while the negative discourse has grown exponentially in this same time period</u>.¶ The condescending discourse perpetuated in the United States makes it seem as though Mexico were becoming uninhabitable, when in reality this is far from the case. While many residents do have concerns about the violence and it has in fact affected tourism, <u>there are still people in Mexico going about their daily lives</u>. There is a web site called “The Truth about Mexico” that is dedicated to making this very point. It was created by Americans who have moved to Mexico to live but is now used by Mexicans as well to challenge the dominant discourse. One story, entitled “Mexico Murder Rate Reality Check,” suggests that, according to the Mexican attorney general in 2009, “<u>the drug-related violence has scared away tourists and prompted some commentators to warn that Mexico risks collapse</u> . . . but the country registered about 11 homicides per 100,000 residents last year, down from 16 in 1997” (quoted in Brown, 2009). This was at the height of the negative reporting and was still a decrease of 30 percent since 1997 at that point in time. An article regarding the U.S. State Department’s spring-break advisory by Frank Koughan (2009), a former CBS News 60 Minutes producer who has been living in Queretaro since 2006, suggests that “consumers of American media could easily get the impression that Mexico is a blood-soaked killing field, when in fact the bulk of the drug violence is happening near the border. (In fact, one way of putting this would be that <u>Mexico is safe as long as you stay far, far away from the US</u>.)” While there may have been an increase in the numbers since 2009, the dominant discourse at the time was at least as horrific as today’s, even though the statistics show that between 1997 and 2009 homicide rates had actually fallen and have since grown in proportion to the expansion of the war on drugs.¶ There has also been strong public pressure and civic engagement regarding the violence. One example is the Marcha por la Paz, a march led by the poet-journalist Javier Sicilia seeking to draw attention to the government’s militaristic tactics for fighting narcotrafficking, which have only increased and intensified the violence (Samano and Alonso, 2011). The march in 2011 attracted tens of thousands of participants from 38 cities in different states in Mexico and from 26 other countries. Yet, the average television viewer in the United States never hears about events like this or about the people who have been fighting to end the violence.¶ <u>Is there <mark>drug violence</mark> in Mexico? Yes, but this <strong><mark>does not make Mexico a “failing state.”</u></strong></mark> While people are victims of drug violence in Mexico, in the United States they are also victims of drug, gang, or random violence and more recently of mass shootings. <u>Both countries experience senseless violence that stems from complex societal and political dynamics that cannot be easily simplified</u>. It is essential that the dominant narrative be deconstructed in order to see why such narratives are perpetuated to begin with, which in the case of Mexico brings us back to continued economic domination.¶ Implications of the Dominant Discourse¶ <u>The importance of <mark>the drug</mark>-related violence <mark>story</mark> lies in its <strong>masking the nature of U.S. involvement</strong> in Mexico’s social and economic problems</u>. <u>It <mark>perpetuates</mark> a <strong>relationship of <mark>imperialism</strong></mark> between the United States and Mexico <mark>that manifests</mark> itself <mark>in <strong>NAFTA</strong></mark>, International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending policies, <mark>and</mark> direct intervention in Mexico’s “sovereign” internal politics disguised as economic development and <mark>military assistance</mark> to help bring order to Mexico</u>. Mexican politicians have bought the story and have been willing collaborators with economic development to “help” Mexico. Former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his Institutional Revolutionary Party vigorously pursued NAFTA as a mechanism for injecting foreign capital into Mexico’s ailing economy (Castañeda, 1993). Jaime Serra, a former secretary of trade, and J. Enrique Espinoza, an economist formerly on the council of economic advisers to the president of Mexico, have fervently proclaimed NAFTA a resounding success (Serra and Espinoza, 2002a), pointing to increased foreign direct investment as evidence. However, <u>free trade has led only to the <strong>enrichment of a few monopolistic corporations</strong> in the United States while the economic situation of Mexico’s people deteriorates</u> (Robledo, 2006). Gilbert Gonzalez and Raul Fernandez (2003: 54) argue that “<u><mark>NAFTA</mark> is just one of the most recent examples of <strong>U.S. domination over Mexico </strong>and how it <mark>continues to misdevelop and <strong>tear apart</mark> the <mark>socioeconomic integrity</mark> of that society</u></strong>.” <u>They describe NAFTA as having two purposes: to “<strong>guarantee a free hand to U.S. enterprises</strong> willing and able to invest in Mexico to take advantage of that country’s cheaper wages” and to “deny in various forms and degrees to other economic powers the advantage of operations in and exporting from Mexico</u>.” In effect <u>this means <mark>continuing Mexico’s</mark> long <mark>history as <strong>a U.S. economic colony</strong></mark>, providing cheap labor, raw materials, and manufactures for consumption in the United States while restricting Mexico’s access to the U.S. market. NAFTA called for the privatization of state companies and the flexibilization of the labor market through “restrictions on wage increases, curtailment of vacations and sick-leave time, extensions of workweek, and increased management powers</u>” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 55). This process was supposed to lead to an opening for investment, economic growth, and access to diversified export markets for Mexico.¶ <u><mark>The impact of NAFTA on Mexican agriculture has been greater</mark> because agricultural production was once the foundation of Mexico’s national development. State <mark>investment</mark> in agriculture <mark>was <strong>reduced by 95.5 percent</strong></mark> and credit made available to the rural sector by 64.4 percent</u> (Quintana, 2004: 251). Disinvestment in Mexican agriculture has meant that agricultural enterprises are unable to compete with subsidized U.S. commodities. The United States maintains domestic subsidies that allow it to export corn at 30 percent below the cost of production, wheat at 40 percent below, and cotton at 57 percent below—a practice known as “asymmetrical trading” and “dumping” and deemed illegal in world commerce (Fernandez and Whitesell, 2008). Serra and Espinoza (2002b) suggest that this is a nonissue because of NAFTA’s tariff-rate quota system, which charges tariffs for exceeding the import quotas. However, Cavanaugh and Anderson (2002) point out that <u>under NAFTA the tariffs were mandated to be phased out in 2008, and even while they were intact the Mexican government declined to collect them. <mark>The outcome has been the <strong>disappearance of profitability for</mark> Mexican national <mark>agricultural producers</strong></mark>. Five years after NAFTA, corn had lost 64 percent of its value and beans lost 46 percent while at the same time prices of staple consumer goods rose 257 percent</u> (Quintana, 2004: 256). Despite these figures the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR, 2006) points to the growth of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States by US$5.6 billion during the past 12 years as proof of the success of NAFTA. However, producers continue to abandon agricultural endeavors en masse, vacating 1.6 million previously cultivated hectares (3.95 million acres) in the first eight years of NAFTA (Quintana, 2004: 256). Peter Goodman (2007) tells the story of Ruben Rivera,¶ who sat on a bench in a forlorn plaza, rather than working on his seven-acre farm. He used to grow tomatoes and onions, hiring 150 workers to help at harvest. Now he doesn’t even bother to plant. He can buy onions in the supermarket more cheaply than he can grow them. A crop of tomatoes yields less than the taxes. He lives off the $800 sent home monthly by his three sons, who run a yard work business in Macon, Ga.¶ Stories like this have become all too common. As Quintana (2004: 256) puts it, “<u>One of the historically great agricultural civilizations of the world [now places] its food supplies in foreign hands</u>.” Mexico now imports 95 percent of its edible oils, 40 percent of its beef, pork, and other meat products, 30 percent of its corn, and 50 percent of its rice. <u><mark>NAFTA</mark> has <mark>resulted in the “<strong>complete inability</mark> of the Mexican nation to produce the food required <mark>to feed its own people</u></strong></mark>” (Gonzalez and Fernandez, 2003: 57).¶ In the end, “<u>free trade” has made Mexico a completely open market for U.S. products while U.S. producers are guarded against Mexico’s products by subsidies and tariffs. NAFTA was never meant as a development policy for Mexico or a policy to help cure its social ills. It was a policy of U.S. economic expansion for the purpose of <strong>deepening U.S. hegemony while allowing the continued extraction of capital</u></strong>. It was promoted by huge U.S. multinational corporations as benevolent economic development to allow them to integrate themselves into the Mexican market without having to deal with that country’s requirements and legislative issues. Mark Weisbrot (2004) of the Center of Economic Policy Research in Washington suggests that, had Mexico’s economy¶ grown at the same pace from 1980 to the present as it did in the period from 1960 to 1980, today it would have the same standard of living as Spain. . . . To have 25 years of this rotten economic performance, you’d have to conclude something is wrong. . . . It is hard to make the case that Mexico’s aggregate economic performance would have been even worse without NAFTA.¶ Not only has NAFTA not accomplished the growth propulsion its supporters promised in Mexico but it has had devastating social costs for Mexican society. <u><mark>Poverty</mark> in rural areas <mark>has risen </mark>significantly <mark>from 37 percent</mark> in 1992 <mark>to 52.4 percent</mark> in 2002, with 86.2 percent of rural inhabitants living in poverty</u> (Quintana, 2004: 257). <u>NAFTA has left nearly half of Mexico’s 106 million people, 51 percent of the total population in 2010, living in poverty, causing the mass displacement of workers and forced migration</u> (Dickerson, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Since 1994 an average of 600 peasants a day (at least 1.78 million people) have migrated from rural areas, many to northern cities along the U.S.-Mexican border and others into the United States (Quintana, 2004: 258). Migration means family disintegration and the destruction of the social fabric of Mexico. Many of these jobless displaced workers will try their luck at crossing a militarized border into the United States. Peter Goodman (2007), interviewing Luz Maria Vazquez, a tomato picker from Jalisco, reports that six of her brothers and sisters are in the United States, most of them without papers. More than 11 million Mexicans (a conservative estimate) now live in the United States without documents, and 7 million of them immigrated after NAFTA, between 1994 and 2005 (Passel, 2006).4 Clearly the politics in Mexico are much more complex than the drug story in the United States makes them out to be.¶ Conclusion¶ The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. <u>The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south</u> (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). <u>It employs a foreign policy that advances its <strong>imperialist interests</strong>. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a <mark>discourse of a <strong>“chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” </strong>has provided justification for</mark> direct U.S. <mark>military intervention</mark>, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones</u> (O’Reilly, 2013), <u>and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people</u>. Even at its most basic level, <u><strong>we can only call this imperialism</u></strong>.¶ While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But <u>the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about <strong>“othering” Mexico</strong>.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its <u>economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has <strong>stunted Mexican economic growth</strong> and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity</u>. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since <u>the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism</u>.¶ For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. <u>Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to <strong>evade responsibility</strong> for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary</u>.¶ The irony of it all is that <u><mark>NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a</mark> chaotic and <mark>violent Mexico needing</mark> economic programs of <mark>development to solve its social problems, when</mark> in fact <mark>it is</mark> the penetration of <strong>U.S. <mark>capital that has caused</mark> many of <mark>those problems</strong></mark>. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the <strong>veil for this “imperial encounter”</strong> to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest</u>. In the end, the way <u>Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is <strong>a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism</strong> in Mexico.</u> Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. <u><strong><mark>Focusing on drugs</mark> and violence <mark>obscures this</u></strong></mark>. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. <u>Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people.</u> This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.</p>

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a. Education—the phrase "nearly all" papers over debates about specifics of legalization and compromises research, hurting education—the plan would be considered invalid in policymaking

Milne 94—Philip Milne 94 - Partner in Simpson Grierson's Wellington Local Government and Environment work group. "Validity of Rules in Regional Plans." Seminar for Wellington Regional Council Officers. Available online @ <http://www.qualityplanning.org.nz/pubs/3665.pdf>

Milne 94—Philip Milne 94 - Partner in Simpson Grierson's Wellington Local Government and Environment work group. "Validity of Rules in Regional Plans." Seminar for Wellington Regional Council Officers. Available online @ <http://www.qualityplanning.org.nz/pubs/3665.pdf>

issues of uncertainty and delegation of discretions are closely related. A rule should not include words or phrases which are so vague or subjective as to be indeterminable by the reader or which of necessity implicitly leave the council to make a discretionary/subjective judgment Wholesale or retail shops for bulky goods or drive-in retail shops whereby nearly all customers take away goods The phrase "nearly all was found to be too imprecise and therefore invalid.

A rule should not include phrases which are so vague as to be indeterminable which implicitly leave the council to make a subjective judgment The phrase "nearly all was found to be too imprecise and therefore invalid.

In Re Draft Water Conservation (Buller giver) Order (C28/93), the Tribunal considered the validity of a "restriction" in a conservation order. It held that the words "provided that the granting of such rights would not detract from the outstanding features and characteristics specified" were "an example of reserving discretions to exercise value judgments rather than a lack of certainty". The last case illustrates that the issues of uncertainty and delegation of discretions are closely related. A rule should not include words or phrases which are so vague or subjective as to be indeterminable by the reader or which of necessity implicitly leave the council to make a discretionary/subjective judgment. For example, a condition regarding measures aimed at remedying "detrimental impacts observed and ensuring that further detrimental impacts will not occur" was ruled invalid so far as it required avoidance of future impacts. (New Zealand Underwater Association Incorporated v Auckland Regional Council A 131/91). In McLeod Holdings Limited v Countdown Properties Limited 14 NZ irA 362, the ordinance in question defined predominant uses and stated: "Wholesale or retail shops for bulky goods or drive-in retail shops whereby nearly all customers take away goods in motor vehicles for which adequate drive-in and parking provision is made on the site itself provided that no vehicle entrance or exit is within 10m of a road junction". The phrase "nearly all customers" was found to be too imprecise and therefore invalid.

<h4>a. Education—the phrase "nearly all" papers over debates about specifics of legalization and compromises research, hurting education—the plan would be considered invalid in policymaking</h4><p><u><strong>Milne 94—Philip Milne 94 - Partner in Simpson Grierson's Wellington Local Government and Environment work group. "Validity of Rules in Regional Plans." Seminar for Wellington Regional Council Officers. Available online @ <http://www.qualityplanning.org.nz/pubs/3665.pdf></p><p></u></strong>In Re Draft Water Conservation (Buller giver) Order (C28/93), the Tribunal considered the validity of a "restriction" in a conservation order. It held that the words "provided that the granting of such rights would not detract from the outstanding features and characteristics specified" were "an example of reserving discretions to exercise value judgments rather than a lack of certainty". The last case illustrates that the <u>issues of uncertainty and delegation of discretions are closely related. <mark>A rule should not include </mark>words or <mark>phrases which are so vague</mark> or subjective <mark>as to be indeterminable</mark> by the reader or <mark>which</mark> of necessity <mark>implicitly leave the council to make a</mark> discretionary/<mark>subjective judgment</u></mark>. For example, a condition regarding measures aimed at remedying "detrimental impacts observed and ensuring that further detrimental impacts will not occur" was ruled invalid so far as it required avoidance of future impacts. (New Zealand Underwater Association Incorporated v Auckland Regional Council A 131/91). In McLeod Holdings Limited v Countdown Properties Limited 14 NZ irA 362, the ordinance in question defined predominant uses and stated: "<u>Wholesale or retail shops for bulky goods or drive-in retail shops whereby nearly all customers take away goods</u> in motor vehicles for which adequate drive-in and parking provision is made on the site itself provided that no vehicle entrance or exit is within 10m of a road junction". <u><strong><mark>The phrase "nearly all</u></strong></mark> customers" <u><strong><mark>was found to be too imprecise and therefore invalid.</p></u></strong></mark>

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The brothel system conceals violence against women- CP solves

Forrey ‘14

Forrey ‘14 [Chariane K. Forrey is a 2014 J.D. Candidate at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 14 Nev. L.J. 970. ETB]

the brothel system has created a cover-up system of violence, where women trapped indoors endure abuse that is concealed by managers Panic buttons have failed to get a woman help As one brothel prostitute shared, "Panic buttons are a joke ... usually they're across the room, but if you can get across the room you can get out the door." Monitors provide a false sense of security, as the manager is not always listening The rape rate in counties with legal prostitution is five times higher than rural counties without legal prostitution supporting the idea that legal prostitution may increase a woman's risk of sexual violence.

the brothel system has created a cover-up system of violence, where women trapped indoors endure abuse that is concealed by managers Panic buttons have failed to get a woman help Monitors provide a false sense of security, as the manager is not always listening The rape rate in counties with legal prostitution is five times higher than counties without legal prostitution may increase a woman's risk of sexual violence

What's more, the Nevada brothel system has created a cover-up system of violence, where women trapped n135 indoors endure abuse that is concealed by managers. n136 Panic buttons placed in the rooms of most brothel houses, intended to alert security that a woman is in danger, sometimes have failed to get a woman help soon enough. n137 As one brothel prostitute shared, "Panic buttons are a joke ... usually they're across the room, but if you can get across the room you can get out the door." n138 Monitors located inside a prostitute's room provide a false sense of security, as the manager - sometimes an elderly lady - is not always listening. n139 The rape rate in rural counties with legal prostitution is five times higher than rural counties without legal prostitution, supporting the idea that legal prostitution may increase a woman's risk of sexual violence. n140

<h4><u><strong>The brothel system conceals violence against women- CP solves</h4><p>Forrey ‘14</p><p></u></strong>[Chariane K. Forrey is a 2014 J.D. Candidate at the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 14 Nev. L.J. 970<strong>. ETB]</p><p></strong>What's more, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> </mark>Nevada <u><strong><mark>brothel system has created a cover-up system of violence, where women trapped</u></strong></mark> n135 <u><strong><mark>indoors endure abuse that is concealed by managers</u></strong></mark>. n136 <u><mark>Panic buttons</u> </mark>placed in the rooms of most brothel houses, intended to alert security that a woman is in danger, sometimes <u><mark>have</u> <u>failed to get a woman help</u> </mark>soon enough. n137 <u>As one brothel prostitute shared, "Panic buttons are a joke ... usually they're across the room, but if you can get across the room you can get out the door."</u> n138 <u><strong><mark>Monitors</u></strong> </mark>located inside a prostitute's room <u><strong><mark>provide a false sense of security, as the manager</u></strong> </mark>- sometimes an elderly lady - <u><strong><mark>is not always listening</u></strong></mark>. n139 <u><strong><mark>The rape rate in</u></strong> </mark>rural <u><strong><mark>counties with legal prostitution is five times higher than</strong> </mark>rural <strong><mark>counties without</strong> </mark>legal prostitution</u>, <u>supporting the idea that <strong><mark>legal prostitution may increase a woman's risk of sexual violence</strong></mark>.</u> n140</p>

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

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Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements

Coward 14

Coward 14 (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz

What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’ The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism In Feinberg and Willer’s study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism where economy assumes the role of reality everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital Klein describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself

environmental apocalypse’ says Either the status quo must change, or humanity will end although awareness of environmental issues is very high, they continue to be low priority the result is perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation apocalyptic rhetoric disengages the public from environmental activism In Willer’s study, individuals primed with just-world statements, followed by dire messages reported higher levels of skepticism participants were less likely to change their lifestyle it is acknowledged that natural limits exist. Despite this production and consumption continue capitalist social relations are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and Earth’s environment It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental narratives are populist, resisting a proper political framing This results in the insistence that the threat is a technical problem a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral such as privatization of the school system in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the framing of catastrophe implies devastation is to be managed within current institutions the solutions are foreclosed by co-option by capitalist institutions

What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism. First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative in environmental literature is political. It is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level. The technique recognizes the fact that although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets. From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option It is important, however, to state that although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality. Ultimately, the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize. Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism. The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism. In Feinberg and Willer’s (2011) study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism (ibid, 36). These participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism. Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth. What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism. As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world - we cosset and succor to the economy; our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2009), where economy assumes the role of reality. In capitalist realism, everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system1. Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions. A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense (ibid., 11,13). This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge. Of course, a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral. Therefore any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital (ibid., 13). Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine (2008) describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident. Additionally, the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions. Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporation2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3

<h4>Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements</h4><p><u><strong>Coward 14</u></strong> (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz</p><p><u>What, then, is the function of the ‘<mark>environmental apocalypse’</u></mark>, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism.</p><p>First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. <u>The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone</u> adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function <u><mark>says</mark> implicitly or explicitly: <mark>Either the status quo must change, or humanity</mark> and nature <mark>will end</u></mark>. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, <u>the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative</u> in environmental literature is political. It <u>is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level</u>. The technique recognizes the fact that <u><mark>although awareness of environmental issues is</mark> <strong>now <mark>very high</strong>, they continue to be <strong>low priority</strong></mark> for many</u> (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets.</p><p>From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option</p><p>It is important, however, to state that <u>although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, <strong>this is not necessarily translated into reality</u></strong>. Ultimately, <u>the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner <strong>do not always materialize</u></strong>. <u>Instead, <mark>the result is</mark> not that of transformation, but of a <strong><mark>perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation</strong></mark>, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite</u>. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism.</p><p>The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, <u>empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that <mark>apocalyptic rhetoric</mark> can <strong><mark>disengages the </mark>wider <mark>public from</mark> partaking in <mark>environmental activism</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>In </mark>Feinberg and <mark>Willer’s</u></mark> (2011) <u><mark>study, individuals</mark> who were <mark>primed with just-world statements, followed by</mark> exposure to <mark>dire messages</mark> of the severity of global warming, <mark>reported <strong>higher levels of </mark>climate change <mark>skepticism</u></strong></mark> (ibid, 36). These <u><mark>participants were</mark> also <strong><mark>less likely to change their lifestyle</strong></mark> to reduce their carbon footprint</u>. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism.</p><p>Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, <u>ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities</u>. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that <u>a prophetic ecology <strong>cannot espouse radical change</strong> because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview</u>. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather <u>the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth</u>.</p><p>What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that <u><mark>it is acknowledged that natural limits</mark> and environmental tipping points <mark>exist. Despite this</mark> knowledge, <mark>production and consumption continue</mark> at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted</u>. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. <u>It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism</u>.</p><p>As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, <u><strong>the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world</u></strong> - we cosset and succor to the economy; <u>our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism</u>’ (Fisher 2009), <u>where <strong>economy assumes the role of reality</u></strong>. In capitalist realism, <u>everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute</u>.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) <u>It is the failure to see <mark>capitalist social relations</mark> as what they truly <mark>are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and</mark> ultimately to <mark>Earth’s environment</mark>al system</u>1.</p><p>Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: <u><strong><mark>It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism</u></strong></mark>. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions.</p><p>A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that <u>environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic <mark>environmental narratives</mark> that stem from this, <mark>are populist, resisting a proper political framing</mark> in the traditional left-right sense</u> (ibid., 11,13). <u><mark>This results in the insistence that the </mark>fear-inducing <mark>threat is</mark> <strong>merely <mark>a technical problem</strong></mark>, requiring techno-managers to take charge</u>. Of course, <u><strong><mark>a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral</u></strong></mark>. Therefore <u>any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital</u> (ibid., 13). Naomi <u>Klein</u>’s Shock Doctrine (2008) <u>describes numerous examples of this tendency, <mark>such as</mark> the mass <mark>privatization of the</mark> public <mark>school system</mark> in New Orleans, <mark>in the wake of Hurricane Katrina</u></mark>: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, <u>the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident</u>.</p><p>Additionally, <u><mark>the framing of catastrophe</mark> as crisis <mark>implies</mark> that total (environmental) <mark>devastation is</mark> something <mark>to be managed within current</mark> social, political and economic <mark>institutions</u></mark>: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, <u>crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention</u>. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that <u>using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather <mark>the solutions </mark>it intends <mark>are <strong>foreclosed by </mark>the <mark>co-option </mark>of the narrative <mark>by capitalist institutions</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, <u>Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio</u>n2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “<u>we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation</u>[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, <u>the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself</u>. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3</p>

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They are an affirmation of continual production – prefer seduction

Baudrillard 77 , pp 37-41) gz

Baudrillard 77 (Jean Baudrillard, “Forget Foucault,” translated by Nicole Dufresne, pp 37-41) gz The production channel leads from work to sex, but only by switching tracks; as we move from political to "libidinal" economy (the last acquisition of '68), we change from a violent and archaic model of socialization (work) to a more subtle and fluid model which is at once more "psychic" and more in touch with the body (the sexual and the libidinal). There is a metamorphosis and a veering away from labor power to drive (pulsion) , a veering away from a model founded on a system of representations (the famous "ideology") to a model operating on a system of affect (sex being only a kind of anamorphosis of the categorical social imperative) . From one discourse to the other-since it really is a question of discourse-there runs the same ultimatum of pro-duction in the literal sense of the word. The original sense of "production" is not in fact that of material manufacture; rather, it means to render visible, to cause to appear and be made to appear: pro-ducere. Sex is produced as one produces a document, or as an actor is said to appear (se produire) on stage. To produce is to force what belongs to another order (that of secrecy and seduction) to materialize. Seduction is that which is everywhere and always opposed to pro-duction; seduction withdraws something from the visible order and so runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear view, whether it be an object, a number, or a concept. Let everything be produced, be read, become real, visible

, and marked with the sign of effectiveness; let everything be transcribed into force relations, into conceptual systems or into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.” Ours is a culture of "monstration" and demonstration, of "productive" monstrosity (the "confession" We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a frenzied activation of pleasure we find no seduction in those bodies penetrated by a gaze literally absorbed by the suction of the transparent void Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national product isn't the sexual itself a forced materialization, and isn't the coming of sexuality already part of the Western notion of what is real-the obsession peculiar to our culture with "instancing" and instrumentalizing all things We do not understand, or we vaguely sympathize with, those cultures for which the sexual act has no finality in itself and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body These are cultures which maintain long processes of seduction and sensuousness in which sexuality is one service among others, a long procedure of gifts and counter-gifts the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure What an extraordinary crystallization of the orgastic function, which is itself the materialization of an energetic substance Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation. More and more, all seduction, all manner of seduction disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative calling for the immediate realization of a desire. Our center of gravity has in fact shifted toward an unconscious and libidinal economy which only leaves room for the total naturalization of a desire bound either to fateful drives or to pure and simple mechanical operation, but above all to the imaginary order of repression and liberation. Nowadays, one no longer says: "You've got a soul and you must save it," but: "You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it well." You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it." You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies. It is capital which gives birth in the same movement to the energetic of labor power and to the body we dream of today as the locus of desire and the unconscious Thus, to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy which would be opposed to the bound energy of productive bodies, and to rediscover a phantasmal and instinctual truth of the body in desire, is still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital. This is the nature of desire and of the unconscious: the trash heap of political economy and the psychic metaphor of capital And sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means, in a fantastic extension of the jurisdiction governing private property, for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual capital, unconscious capital. And each individual will be accountable to himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. nothing functions with repression everything functions with production; nothing functions with repression everything functions with liberation Any form of liberation is fomented by repression: the liberation of productive forces is like that of desire There is no exception to the logic of liberation: any force or any liberated form of speech constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power The “desiring machine” only fulfills the destiny of Marxism and psychoanalysis today, on the basis of a productivity cleansed of its contradictions and of a libido cleansed of the Oedipus complex, repression the mirror of production and that of desire will be able to refract each other endlessly "We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.” It is our moral system which remains hidden behind the hypothesis of repression To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not, "sublimated" or not is a sign of utter foolishness there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture in the sense that there has never truly been any sexuality. Sexuality, like political economy, is only montage sexuality as we hear about it and as it "is spoken," is only a simulacrum which experience has forever crossed up, baffled, and surpassed homo sexualis has never had more reality than homo oeconomicus

; let everything be transcribed into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered Ours is a culture of the "confession" We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a frenzied activation of pleasure; we find no seduction in those bodies penetrated by a gaze absorbed by the suction of the transparent void isn't the sexual itself a forced materialization We do not understand cultures for which the sexual act has no finality and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body These are cultures in which sexuality is a long procedure of gifts and counter-gifts the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation all seduction disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and accelerated circulation is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction It is capital which gives birth to the energetic of labor power to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy is still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital. sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital any force or any liberated form of speech constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power The “desiring machine” only fulfills the destiny of Marxism "We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.” To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not is a sign of utter foolishness there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture there has never truly been any sexuality sexuality is only a simulacrum homo sexualis has never had more reality than that of homo oeconomicus.

MARKED , and marked with the sign of effectiveness; let everything be transcribed into force relations, into conceptual systems or into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.” Ours is a culture of "monstration" and demonstration, of "productive" monstrosity (the "confession" so well analyzed by Foucault is one of its forms) . We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a frenzied activation of pleasure; we find no seduction in those bodies penetrated by a gaze literally absorbed by the suction of the transparent void. Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national product.5 Pornography is only the paradoxical limit of the sexual, a realistic exacerbation and a mad obsession with the real-this is the "obscene," etymologically speaking and in all senses. But isn't the sexual itself a forced materialization, and isn't the coming of sexuality already part of the Western notion of what is real-the obsession peculiar to our culture with "instancing" and instrumentalizing all things? Just as it is absurd to separate in other cultures the religious, the economic, the political, the juridical, and even the social and other phantasmagorical categories, for the reason that they do not occur there, and because these concepts are like so many venereal diseases with which we infect them in order to "understand" them better, so it is also absurd to give autonomy to the sexual as "instance" and as an irreducible given to which all other "givens" can be reduced. We need to do a critique of sexual Reason, or rather a genealogy of sexual Reason, as Nietzsche has done a genealogy of Morals-because this is our new moral system. One could say of sexuality as of death: "It is a habit to which consciousness has not long been accustomed." We do not understand, or we vaguely sympathize with, those cultures for which the sexual act has no finality in itself and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body. These are cultures which maintain long processes of seduction and sensuousness in which sexuality is one service among others, a long procedure of gifts and counter-gifts; lovemaking is only the eventual outcome of this reciprocity measured to the rhythm of an ineluctable ritual. For us, this no longer has any meaning: for us, the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure—all the rest is "literature." What an extraordinary crystallization of the orgastic function, which is itself the materialization of an energetic substance. Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation. More and more, all seduction, all manner of seduction (which is itself a highly ritualized process), disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative calling for the immediate realization of a desire. Our center of gravity has in fact shifted toward an unconscious and libidinal economy which only leaves room for the total naturalization of a desire bound either to fateful drives or to pure and simple mechanical operation, but above all to the imaginary order of repression and liberation. Nowadays, one no longer says: "You've got a soul and you must save it," but: "You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it well." "You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it." "You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it." "You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it," etc. , etc. This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies. Besides, the body to which we constantly refer has no other reality than that of the sexual and productive model. It is capital which gives birth in the same movement to the energetic of labor power and to the body we dream of today as the locus of desire and the unconscious. This is the body which serves as a sanctuary for psychic energy and drives and which, dominated by these drives and haunted by primary processes, has itself become primary process-and thus an anti-body, the ultimate revolutionary referent. Both are simultaneously conceived in repression, and their apparent antagonism is yet another effect of repression. Thus, to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy which would be opposed to the bound energy of productive bodies, and to rediscover a phantasmal and instinctual truth of the body in desire, is still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital. This is the nature of desire and of the unconscious: the trash heap of political economy and the psychic metaphor of capital. And sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means, in a fantastic extension of the jurisdiction governing private property, for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual capital, unconscious capital. And each individual will be accountable to himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. This is what Foucault tells us (in spite of himself) : nothing functions with repression (repression), everything functions with production; nothing functions with repression (refoulement) , everything functions with liberation. But it is the same thing. Any form of liberation is fomented by repression: the liberation of productive forces is like that of desire; the liberation of bodies is like that of women's liberation, etc. There is no exception to the logic of liberation: any force or any liberated form of speech constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power. This is how "sexual liberation" accomplishes a miracle by uniting in the same revolutionary ideal the two major effects of repression, liberation and sexuality. Historically, this process has been building up for at least two centuries, but today it is in full bloom with the blessing of psychoanalysis- just as political economy and production have only made great strides with Marx's sanction and blessing. It is this conjecture which dominates us completely today, even through the "radical" contestation of Marx and psychoanalysis. It is in this way that the purified axioms of Marxism and psychoanalysis converge in today's only "revolutionary" catchword- that of the “productivity” of “desire.” The “desiring machine” only fulfills, in one single movement, the positive destiny of Marxism and psychoanalysis. They at last come together under less naïve auspices than Reich's, still too strongly marked by the Oedipus complex, the proletariat, repression, and class struggle. Reich had aimed too soon at the synthesis of two disciplines that were both historical and psychological and that were still cluttered with cumbersome elements: his mixture is archaic and his interpretation does not hold up; the times were not yet ready. But today, on the basis of a productivity cleansed of its contradictions, its historical objectives and its determinations and of a libido cleansed in its own way (of the Oedipus complex, repression, and of its too-genital, too familial, determinations) the collusion and synthesis may finally be accomplished to each other's benefit: the mirror of production and that of desire will be able to refract each other endlessly. The category of the sexual and sexual discourse were born in the same way that the category of the clinical and the clinical gaze came into being-where there was nothing before except uncontrolled, senseless, unstable, or highly ritualized forms. And where there was therefore no repression either, that leitmotiv by which we evaluate all earlier societies much more so than ours; we condemn them for being primitive from the technological point of view; these were repressed, non-"liberated" societies which did not even know of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis came to clear the way for sex by telling what was hidden-how incredible is the racism of truth, the evangelical racism of psychoanalysis; everything changes with the coming of the Word. If the question remains unsettled for our culture (repression or not), it is nonetheless without ambiguity for the others: they know neither repression nor the unconscious because they do not know the category of the sexual. "We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.” It is our moral system (psychic and psychoanalytic) which remains hidden behind the hypothesis of repression and which governs our blindness. To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not, "sublimated" or not, in feudal, rural, and primitive societies is a sign of utter foolishness (like reinterpreting religion, ne varietur, as ideology and mystification). And on that basis, then, it becomes possible again to say with Foucault: there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture either-not, however, according to his meaning, but in the sense that there has never truly been any sexuality. Sexuality, like political economy, is only montage (all of whose twists and turns Foucault analyzes); sexuality as we hear about it and as it "is spoken," even as the "id speaks," is only a simulacrum which experience has forever crossed up, baffled, and surpassed, as in any system. The coherence and transparence of homo sexualis has never had more reality than that of homo oeconomicus.

<h4>They are an affirmation of continual production – prefer seduction</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard 77</u></strong> (Jean Baudrillard, “Forget Foucault,” translated by Nicole Dufresne<u><strong>, pp 37-41) gz</p><p></strong>The <mark>production</mark> channel <mark>leads from work to sex</mark>, but only by switching tracks; <mark>as we move from <strong>political to "libidinal" economy</u></strong></mark> (the last acquisition of '68), <u>we change from a violent and archaic model of socialization</u> (work) <u>to a more subtle and fluid model which is at once more "psychic" and more in touch with the body</u> (the sexual and the libidinal). <u><mark>There is a metamorphosis</mark> and a veering away <strong><mark>from labor power to drive</u></strong></mark> (pulsion) , a veering away from a model founded on a system of representations (the famous "ideology") to a model operating on a system of affect (sex being only a kind of anamorphosis of the categorical social imperative) . <u>From one discourse to the other</u>-since it really is a question of discourse-<u><mark>there runs <strong>the same ultimatum of pro-duction</strong></mark> in the literal sense of the word. The original sense of "production</u>" is not in fact that of material manufacture; rather, it <u>means <mark>to <strong>render visible, to cause to appear and be made to appear</u></strong></mark>: pro-ducere. Sex is produced as one produces a document, or as an actor is said to appear (se produire) on stage. <u>To produce is <mark>to force what belongs to</mark> another order (<strong>that of <mark>secrecy and seduction</strong></mark>) <mark>to materialize. </mark>Seduction is that which is everywhere and always opposed to pro-duction; <mark>seduction <strong>withdraws something from the visible order</strong> and so runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear view</mark>, whether it be an object, a number, or a concept. <mark>Let everything <strong>be produced, be read, become real, visible</p><p></u></strong></mark>MARKED</p><p><u><strong>, and marked with the sign of effectiveness</strong><mark>; let everything be transcribed </mark>into force relations, into conceptual systems or <strong><mark>into calculable energy</strong>; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered</mark>: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.” <mark>Ours is a culture of</mark> "monstration" and demonstration, of "productive" monstrosity (<strong><mark>the "confession"</strong></mark> </u>so well analyzed by Foucault is one of its forms) . <u><mark>We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a <strong>frenzied activation of pleasure</u></strong>; <u>we find no seduction in those <strong>bodies penetrated by a gaze</mark> literally <mark>absorbed by the suction of the transparent void</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national product</u>.5 </p><p>Pornography is only the paradoxical limit of the sexual, a realistic exacerbation and a mad obsession with the real-this is the "obscene," etymologically speaking and in all senses. But <u><mark>isn't the sexual itself a <strong>forced materialization</strong></mark>, and isn't the coming of sexuality already part of the Western notion of what is real-the obsession peculiar to our culture with "instancing" and <strong>instrumentalizing all things</u></strong>? Just as it is absurd to separate in other cultures the religious, the economic, the political, the juridical, and even the social and other phantasmagorical categories, for the reason that they do not occur there, and because these concepts are like so many venereal diseases with which we infect them in order to "understand" them better, so it is also absurd to give autonomy to the sexual as "instance" and as an irreducible given to which all other "givens" can be reduced. We need to do a critique of sexual Reason, or rather a genealogy of sexual Reason, as Nietzsche has done a genealogy of Morals-because this is our new moral system. One could say of sexuality as of death: "It is a habit to which consciousness has not long been accustomed." </p><p><u><mark>We do not understand</mark>, or we vaguely sympathize with, those <mark>cultures for which the sexual act has no finality</mark> in itself <mark>and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, <strong>a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>These are cultures</mark> which maintain long processes of seduction and sensuousness <mark>in which sexuality is</mark> one service among others, <mark>a long procedure of <strong>gifts and counter-gifts</u></strong></mark>; lovemaking is only the eventual outcome of this reciprocity measured to the rhythm of an ineluctable ritual. For us, this no longer has any meaning: for us, <u><strong><mark>the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure</u></strong></mark>—all the rest is "literature." <u>What an extraordinary crystallization of the orgastic function, which is itself the materialization of an energetic substance</u>. </p><p><u><strong><mark>Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation</strong></mark>. More and more, <mark>all seduction</mark>, all manner of seduction</u> (which is itself a highly ritualized process), <u><mark>disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative</mark> calling for the immediate realization of a desire<strong>. Our center of gravity has in fact shifted toward an unconscious and libidinal economy which only leaves room for the total naturalization of a desire bound either to fateful drives or to pure and simple mechanical operation, but above all to the imaginary order of repression and liberation. </p><p></strong>Nowadays, one no longer says: "You've got a soul and you must save it," but: "<strong><mark>You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it</mark> well." </p><p></u></strong>"<u><strong><mark>You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it</u></strong></mark>." </p><p>"<u><strong><mark>You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it</strong></mark>." </p><p></u>"<u><strong><mark>You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it</u></strong></mark>," etc. , etc. <u><mark>This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and</mark> an <mark>accelerated circulation</mark> of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body <mark>is the <strong>exact replica of the force which rules market value</strong>: capital must circulate</mark>; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; <mark>the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction</u></mark>. <u><strong>This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies. </p><p></u></strong>Besides, the body to which we constantly refer has no other reality than that of the sexual and productive model. <u><mark>It is capital which gives birth</mark> in <strong>the same movement <mark>to the energetic of labor power</strong></mark> and to the body we dream of today as the locus of desire and the unconscious</u>. This is the body which serves as a sanctuary for psychic energy and drives and which, dominated by these drives and haunted by primary processes, has itself become primary process-and thus an anti-body, the ultimate revolutionary referent. Both are simultaneously conceived in repression, and their apparent antagonism is yet another effect of repression. <u>Thus, <mark>to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy</mark> which would be opposed to the bound energy of productive bodies, and to rediscover a phantasmal and instinctual truth of the body in desire, <mark>is <strong>still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital.</strong></mark> </p><p>This is the nature of desire and of the unconscious: <strong>the trash heap of political economy and the psychic metaphor of capital</u></strong>. <u>And <mark>sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means</mark>, in a fantastic extension of the jurisdiction governing private property, <mark>for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital</mark>: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual capital, unconscious capital.</u> <u>And each individual will be accountable to himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. </p><p></u>This is what Foucault tells us (in spite of himself) : <u>nothing functions with repression</u> (repression), <u>everything functions with production; nothing functions with repression</u> (refoulement) , <u>everything functions with liberation</u>. But it is the same thing. <u>Any form of liberation is fomented by repression: the liberation of productive forces is like that of desire</u>; the liberation of bodies is like that of women's liberation, etc. <u>There is no exception to the logic of liberation: <mark>any force or any liberated form of speech <strong>constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power</u></strong></mark>. This is how "sexual liberation" accomplishes a miracle by uniting in the same revolutionary ideal the two major effects of repression, liberation and sexuality. </p><p>Historically, this process has been building up for at least two centuries, but today it is in full bloom with the blessing of psychoanalysis- just as political economy and production have only made great strides with Marx's sanction and blessing. It is this conjecture which dominates us completely today, even through the "radical" contestation of Marx and psychoanalysis.</p><p>It is in this way that the purified axioms of Marxism and psychoanalysis converge in today's only "revolutionary" catchword- that of the “productivity” of “desire.” <u><mark>The “desiring machine” only fulfills</u></mark>, in one single movement, <u><mark>the</u></mark> positive <u><mark>destiny of Marxism</mark> and psychoanalysis</u>. They at last come together under less naïve auspices than Reich's, still too strongly marked by the Oedipus complex, the proletariat, repression, and class struggle. Reich had aimed too soon at the synthesis of two disciplines that were both historical and psychological and that were still cluttered with cumbersome elements: his mixture is archaic and his interpretation does not hold up; the times were not yet ready. But <u>today, on the basis of a productivity cleansed of its contradictions</u>, its historical objectives and its determinations <u>and of a libido cleansed</u> in its own way (<u>of the Oedipus complex, repression</u>, and of its too-genital, too familial, determinations) the collusion and synthesis may finally be accomplished to each other's benefit: <u>the mirror of production and that of desire will be able to refract each other endlessly</u>. The category of the sexual and sexual discourse were born in the same way that the category of the clinical and the clinical gaze came into being-where there was nothing before except uncontrolled, senseless, unstable, or highly ritualized forms. And where there was therefore no repression either, that leitmotiv by which we evaluate all earlier societies much more so than ours; we condemn them for being primitive from the technological point of view; these were repressed, non-"liberated" societies which did not even know of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis came to clear the way for sex by telling what was hidden-how incredible is the racism of truth, the evangelical racism of psychoanalysis; everything changes with the coming of the Word. If the question remains unsettled for our culture (repression or not), it is nonetheless without ambiguity for the others: they know neither repression nor the unconscious because they do not know the category of the sexual. <u><mark>"We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.”</mark> It is our moral system</u> (psychic and psychoanalytic) <u>which remains hidden behind the hypothesis of repression</u> and which governs our blindness. <u><mark>To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not</mark>, "sublimated" or not</u>, in feudal, rural, and primitive societies <u><mark>is a sign of utter foolishness</u></mark> (like reinterpreting religion, ne varietur, as ideology and mystification). And on that basis, then, it becomes possible again to say with Foucault: <u><mark>there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture</u></mark> either-not, however, according to his meaning, but <u>in the sense that <mark>there has never truly been any sexuality</mark>. Sexuality, like political economy, is only montage</u> (all of whose twists and turns Foucault analyzes); <u><mark>sexuality</mark> as we hear about it and as it "is spoken,"</u> even as the "id speaks," <u><mark>is only a simulacrum</mark> which experience has forever crossed up, baffled, and surpassed</u>, as in any system. The coherence and transparence of <u><mark>homo sexualis has never had more reality than</u> that of <u>homo oeconomicus</u>.</p></mark>

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Berkeley MS

Jim Schultz

1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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b. Ground—aff bias means all PICs or case-specific DAs we lose are vital—specifying in the 2AC is too late, neg strategy is already irreparably skewed

<h4>b. Ground—aff bias means all PICs or case-specific DAs we lose are vital—specifying in the 2AC is too late, neg strategy is already irreparably skewed</h4>

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Michigan AP

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Municipalities control zoning laws for prostitution

ALLIL No Date

ALLIL No Date

ETB] A growing tendency is to segregat prostitution associated overt prostitution is shunted into specific enclaves These have usually been "low-rent" neighborhoods in or near ethnic minority or migrants' residential areas the only place where it is legally tolerated are areas whose development alternatives include weapons testing and waste dumps.

A growing tendency is to segregat prostitution associated overt prostitution is shunted into specific enclaves These have usually been "low-rent" neighborhoods in or near ethnic minority or migrants' residential areas the only place where it is legally tolerated are areas whose development alternatives include weapons testing and waste dumps.

[American Law and Legal Information Library, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1880/Prostitution-Regimes-prohibition-criminalization-regulation.html#ixzz3JKp8jdwf ETB] A growing tendency is to make use of strategies for spatially segregating prostitution and activities associated with it in order to manage or minimize perceived externalities. This echoes the long-time practice in many cities where overt prostitution is de facto shunted into specific enclaves, often called "red light districts." These have usually been "low-rent" neighborhoods, that is, low-valued land-use urban zones, in or near ethnic minority or migrants' residential areas. It is illustrative of the spatial logic of minimizing the social costs of prostitution that the only place where it is legally tolerated in the United States are certain rural counties of Nevada—areas with very low population densities whose economic development alternatives include military weapons testing sites and toxic waste dumps.

<h4><u><strong>Municipalities control zoning laws for prostitution</h4><p>ALLIL No Date</p><p></u></strong>[American Law and Legal Information Library, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1880/Prostitution-Regimes-prohibition-criminalization-regulation.html#ixzz3JKp8jdwf<u> ETB]</p><p><mark>A growing tendency is to</u> </mark>make use of strategies for spatially <u><mark>segregat</u></mark>ing <u><mark>prostitution</u> </mark>and activities <u><mark>associated</u> </mark>with it in order to manage or minimize perceived externalities. This echoes the long-time practice in many cities where <u><mark>overt prostitution is</u> </mark>de facto <u><mark>shunted into specific enclaves</u></mark>, often called "red light districts." <u><mark>These have usually been "low-rent" neighborhoods</u></mark>, that is, low-valued land-use urban zones, <u><mark>in or near ethnic minority or migrants' residential areas</u></mark>. It is illustrative of the spatial logic of minimizing the social costs of prostitution that <u><mark>the only place where it is legally tolerated</u> </mark>in the United States <u><mark>are</u> </mark>certain rural counties of Nevada—<u><mark>areas</u> </mark>with very low population densities <u><mark>whose</u> </mark>economic <u><mark>development alternatives include</u> </mark>military <u><mark>weapons testing</u> </mark>sites <u><mark>and</u> </mark>toxic <u><mark>waste dumps.</p></u></mark>

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Emory BD

Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political

Spanos 8

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)

We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas

We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

<h4>Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>

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1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

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The affirmative’s role as peddler of suffering ensures that they become addicted to their colonial praxis, ensuring an endless cycle of appropriation as their make their way into the upper echelons of the academy

Nayar 13 ) gz

Nayar 13 (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975) gz

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.

Suffering serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of colonial) theory for the theory-producer s/he progresses through academic career paths these are mega-industries whose reach covers the colonised world Suffering does indeed generate surplus value There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer Neither¶ do we have to suffer the material nature of bodies that suffer Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account to any real embodiment of suffering the suffering-Other remains in her place compliantly

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured.15 And these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption.16 Neither¶ do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! And most advantageously, suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.

<h4>The affirmative’s role as peddler of suffering ensures that they become addicted to their colonial praxis, ensuring an endless cycle of appropriation as their make their way into the upper echelons of the academy</h4><p><u><strong>Nayar 13</u></strong> (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975<u><strong>) gz</p><p></strong><mark>Suffering</mark>, as a witnessed condition of others, <mark>serves as a <strong>renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of</mark> (still <mark>colonial) theory</mark> production</strong>, both individually <mark>for the theory-producer</mark> as <mark>s/he <strong>progresses through</mark> professional and <mark>academic career paths</strong></mark>, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured</u>.15 And <u><mark>these are <strong>mega-industries</strong> whose reach covers</mark> vast spans of <mark>the</mark> (neo/post)<mark>colonised</mark>/integrated/globalised, <mark>world </mark>where the desires of civil-isation in the form of <strong>expertise accumulation and accreditation </strong>are peddled in the name of education and training</u>. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. <u><strong><mark>Suffering does indeed generate surplus value</strong></mark>. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. <mark>There is <strong>no danger that we may be confronted</strong> by any sufferer</mark> seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption</u>.16 <u><mark>Neither</u>¶ <u>do we have to suffer</mark> the inconvenience of <mark>the material nature of bodies that suffer</mark> contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality!</u> And most advantageously, <u>suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? <strong><mark>Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account</mark> in any way, <mark>to any</mark> one <mark>real embodiment of suffering</mark> (in)Humanity</strong>; <mark>the suffering-Other</mark> plays her part well in this, and importantly, <strong><mark>remains in her place compliantly</strong></mark>. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.</p></u>

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1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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c. Aff condo is uniquely worse than neg condo because it undermines the burden of rejoinder and makes stable links to any position impossible.

<h4>c. Aff condo is uniquely worse than neg condo because it undermines the burden of rejoinder and makes stable links to any position impossible.</h4>

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Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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CP: The United States should legalize nearly all cannabis in the United States.

<h4>CP: The United States should legalize nearly all cannabis in the United States.</h4>

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1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

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That turns case

Farley ‘10

Farley ‘10 [Melissa Farley is a research and clinical psychologist at Prostitution Research & Education, a San Francisco non-profit organization. http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_real_harms_of_prostitution#sthash.6CiGViVR.dpuf ETB]

regulation of prostitution by zoning is a physical manifestation of the stigma that advocates want to avoid. Whether in Turkish genelevs or Nevada brothels

regulation of prostitution by zoning is a physical manifestation of the stigma that advocates want to avoid. Whether in Turkish genelevs or Nevada brothels

The regulation of prostitution by zoning is a physical manifestation of the same social/psychological stigma that decriminalisation advocates allegedly want to avoid. Whether in Turkish genelevs (walled-off multi-unit brothel complexes) or in Nevada brothels (ringed with barbed wire or electric fencing), women in state-zoned prostitution are physically isolated and socially rejected by the rest of society.

<h4><u><strong><mark>That turns case</h4><p></mark>Farley ‘10</p><p></u></strong>[Melissa Farley is a research and clinical psychologist at Prostitution Research & Education, a San Francisco non-profit organization. http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_real_harms_of_prostitution#sthash.6CiGViVR.dpuf ETB]</p><p>The <u><mark>regulation of prostitution by zoning is a physical manifestation</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> </mark>same social/psychological <u><mark>stigma</u> <u>that</u> </mark>decriminalisation <u><mark>advocates</u> </mark>allegedly <u><mark>want to avoid.</u> <u>Whether in Turkish genelevs</u> </mark>(walled-off multi-unit brothel complexes) <u><mark>or</u> </mark>in <u><mark>Nevada brothels</u> </mark>(ringed with barbed wire or electric fencing), women in state-zoned prostitution are physically isolated and socially rejected by the rest of society.</p>

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Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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LANGUAGE MATTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF ABLEISM - pedagogical spaces need to be held accountable for their rhetoric

Moshe 2005

Liat Moshe, PhD Student in Sociology, Disability Studies and Women Studies at Syracuse University, 2005, “’Lame Idea: Disabling Language in the Classroom’”, Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating Disability in the University Classroom and Curriculum

These words were actually created to describe people with different abilities as inferior within particular value systems. For instance, the words “moron,” “idiot” and “imbecile” were used throughout the 20th century as medical classifications to denote different levels of intellectual deficiency. mental retardation is a social construction, not a real condition that is innate in people’s minds. The only requirement for inclusion in this category is deviation from a norm prescribed by the use of IQ test) and perceived incompetenc . Mental retardation is by itself a linguistic metaphor that means “cognitively delayed When used metaphorically in everyday speech, “retarded” stands for slow or underdeveloped thought processes. we use terms like “retarded,” “lame” or “blind”— even if we are referring to acts or ideas and not to people at all— we perpetuate the stigma associated with disability we reproduce the oppression of people with disabilities. we must be aware of the oppressive power of “everyday” language and try to change it

mental retardation is a social construction, not a real condition Mental retardation is a linguistic metaphor we use terms like “retarded,” “lame” or “blind”— even if we are referring to acts or ideas and not to people at all— we perpetuate the stigma associated with disability we reproduce the oppression of people with disabilities. must be aware of the oppressive power of “everyday” language and try to change it.

As educators, we must bear in mind that disability labels have a history, and that those labels have been highly contested over the decades. These words were actually created to describe people with different abilities as inferior within particular value systems. For instance, the words “moron,” “idiot” and “imbecile” were used throughout the 20th century as medical classifications to denote different levels of intellectual deficiency. Later on, all these terms were conflated under the umbrella of “mental retardation” (Clark & Marsh, 2002). The category of mental retardation, by itself, is highly contested for its reification of all perceived differences in cognitive abilities into one unified category. The important fact here is that mental retardation is a social construction, not a real condition that is innate in people’s minds. The only requirement for inclusion in this category is deviation from a norm (usually prescribed by the use of IQ test) and perceived incompetence. Mental retardation is by itself a linguistic metaphor that means “cognitively delayed.” When used metaphorically in everyday speech, “retarded” stands for slow or underdeveloped thought processes. When we use terms like “retarded,” “lame” or “blind”— even if we are referring to acts or ideas and not to people at all— we perpetuate the stigma associated with disability. By using a 108 “lame idea” 4105-11_SU 4/1/05 3:50 PM Page 124 label which is commonly associated with disabled people to denote a deficiency, a lack or an ill-conceived notion, we reproduce the oppression of people with disabilities. As educators, we must be aware of the oppressive power of “everyday” language and try to change it.

<h4>LANGUAGE MATTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF ABLEISM - pedagogical spaces need to be held accountable for their rhetoric </h4><p>Liat<u><strong> <mark>Moshe</u></strong></mark>,<u><strong> </u></strong>PhD Student in Sociology, Disability Studies and Women Studies at Syracuse University, <strong>20<mark>05</strong></mark>, “’Lame Idea: Disabling Language in the Classroom’”, Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating Disability in the University Classroom and Curriculum</p><p>As educators, we must bear in mind that disability labels have a history, and that those labels have been highly contested over the decades. <u>These words were actually created to describe people with different abilities as inferior within particular value systems. For instance, the words “moron,” “idiot” and “imbecile” were used throughout the 20th century as medical classifications to denote different levels of intellectual deficiency.</u> Later on, all these terms were conflated under the umbrella of “mental retardation” (Clark & Marsh, 2002). The category of mental retardation, by itself, is highly contested for its reification of all perceived differences in cognitive abilities into one unified category. The important fact here is that <u><mark>mental retardation is a social construction, not a real condition </mark>that is innate in people’s minds. The only requirement for inclusion in this category is deviation from a norm </u>(usually <u>prescribed by the use of IQ test) and perceived incompetenc</u>e<u>. <mark>Mental retardation is </mark>by itself <mark>a linguistic metaphor </mark>that means “cognitively delayed</u>.” <u>When used metaphorically in everyday speech, “retarded” stands for slow or underdeveloped thought processes. </u>When <u><mark>we use terms like “retarded,” “lame” or “blind”— even if we are referring to acts or ideas and not to people at all— we perpetuate the stigma associated with disability</u></mark>. By using a 108 “lame idea” 4105-11_SU 4/1/05 3:50 PM Page 124 label which is commonly associated with disabled people to denote a deficiency, a lack or an ill-conceived notion, <u><mark>we reproduce the oppression of people with disabilities.</u></mark> As educators<strong>, <u></strong>we <mark>must be aware of the oppressive power of “everyday” language and try to change it</u>.</mark> </p>

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Marijuana legalization is merely a palliative which obscures the broader structures of classist and racialized subjectivity which ensure mass violence – the aff is a neoliberal ruse which benefits only the economic elite

Calhoun 14

Calhoun 14 (Ryan Calhoun, philosophy student at the University of Buffalo, 1-12-14, “Weed Legalization As Privatization, Disempowerment,” http://c4ss.org/content/23632) gz

Marijuana’s legalization seems much more like neoliberal privatization of markets than true liberation of them the decency of these even as weed is legalized, those in prison for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana will remain there those who formerly tried to compete in this market remain locked up in cages. it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address. legalization picks the winners of the weed market from those who were lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to the capital to invest into this expensive business many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it. now facing the age of Big Marijuana

Marijuana’s legalization seems more like neoliberal privatization of markets as weed is legalized, those in prison will remain there those who formerly tried to compete remain locked in cages it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address legalization picks the winners from those lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to capital

Marijuana’s legalization seems much more like neoliberal privatization of markets than true liberation of them. While I do not question the decency of these first major marijuana retailers, there are legitimate concerns. Those most victimized by the state’s rabid oppression of marijuana markets will find themselves very often out of luck, as extensive background checks are required by law, and any drug felony charge is enough to exclude individuals from operating as vendors. TakePart magazine notes in an article that even as weed is legalized, those in prison for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana will remain there. While new businesses boom with customers, those who formerly tried to compete in this market remain locked up in cages. The drug war has affected millions during its hellish tear through Americans’ lives and culture, but it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address. Like with the beltway libertarian conception of privatization, legalization picks the winners of the weed market from those who were lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to the capital to invest into this expensive business. Legalization, at its best, functions as an opposition to continued state violence against drug users and possessors. It is therefore troubling that we find even after this so-called legalization, many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it. It is never by the political means we realize our freedom, but only a hold-back of even worse oppression. We fight an uphill battle against the incredible damage the state does. And now facing the age of Big Marijuana, we might be shocked to find the sorts of restrictions many established pot shops favor. In order to delegitimize street dealers, we have to treat them as inherently dangerous and volatile.

<h4>Marijuana legalization is merely a palliative which obscures the broader structures of classist and racialized subjectivity which ensure mass violence – the aff<u><strong> is a neoliberal ruse which benefits only the economic elite</h4><p>Calhoun 14 </p><p></u></strong>(Ryan Calhoun, philosophy student at the University of Buffalo, 1-12-14, “Weed Legalization As Privatization, Disempowerment,” http://c4ss.org/content/23632) gz</p><p><u><mark>Marijuana’s legalization seems</mark> much <mark>more like <strong>neoliberal privatization of markets</strong></mark> than true liberation of them</u>. While I do not question <u><strong>the decency of these</u></strong> first major marijuana retailers, there are legitimate concerns. Those most victimized by the state’s rabid oppression of marijuana markets will find themselves very often out of luck, as extensive background checks are required by law, and any drug felony charge is enough to exclude individuals from operating as vendors. TakePart magazine notes in an article that <u>even <mark>as weed is legalized, <strong>those in prison</mark> for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana <mark>will remain there</u></strong></mark>. While new businesses boom with customers, <u><mark>those who formerly tried to compete</mark> in this market <mark>remain <strong>locked</mark> up <mark>in cages</strong></mark>. </u>The drug war has affected millions during its hellish tear through Americans’ lives and culture, but <u><mark>it has always been particularly <strong>racialized and classist</strong>. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a <strong>permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address</strong></mark>.</u> Like with the beltway libertarian conception of privatization, <u><mark>legalization <strong>picks the winners</strong></mark> of the weed market <mark>from those</mark> who were <mark>lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who <strong>already have access to</mark> the <mark>capital</mark> to invest into this expensive business</u></strong>. Legalization, at its best, functions as an opposition to continued state violence against drug users and possessors. It is therefore troubling that we find even after this so-called legalization, <u>many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it.</u> It is never by the political means we realize our freedom, but only a hold-back of even worse oppression. We fight an uphill battle against the incredible damage the state does. And <u>now facing the age of <strong>Big Marijuana</u></strong>, we might be shocked to find the sorts of restrictions many established pot shops favor. In order to delegitimize street dealers, we have to treat them as inherently dangerous and volatile.</p>

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Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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The term “marihuana” is historically racist – CP solves

Leafly 14

Leafly 14

The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture Many organizations publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of cannabis why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used in Between the years of 1910 and 1920 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression hit the United States, Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants in the South Americans began to treat cannabis and the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger testified Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon

The word “marijuana” gained publicity as a racist term Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist cannabis” was used 1920 Mexicans immigrated After The Depression Americans were searching for someone to blame Americans began to treat cannabis and Blacks and immigrants who consumed it as a foreign substance used to corrupt individuals Anslinger used the term “marijuana adding to the herb’s new “foreign” identity Though the word marijuana is common its history is deeply steeped in race the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction

http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon.

<h4><u><strong>The term “marihuana” is historically racist – CP solves</h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></u></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><mark>The word “marijuana” </mark>plays a controversial role in cannabis culture</u>. <u>Many</u> well-known <u>organizations</u> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u>publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of</u> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u>cannabis</u>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u>why has the word <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word in American culture. Rather, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u>in</u> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u>Between the years of 1910 and <mark>1920</u></mark>, over <u>890,000 <mark>Mexicans</mark> legally <mark>immigrated </mark>into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war.</u> <u>Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption</u>. <u>The idea of smoking cannabis entered</u> <u>mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. </u>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><mark>After</mark>math</u> <u>1930s: <mark>The </mark>Great <mark>Depression</u></mark> had just <u>hit the United States,</u> and <u><mark>Americans were <strong>searching for someone to blame</strong></mark>. Due to the influx of immigrants</u> (particularly <u>in the South</u>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><mark>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></mark> (<u><mark>and</u></mark>, arguably, <u><strong>the <mark>Blacks and </mark>Mexican <mark>immigrants who consumed it</mark>) <mark>as a foreign substance used to corrupt</mark> the minds and bodies of low-class <mark>individuals</mark>. </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u>Anslinger</u> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u>. In one documented incident, <u>Anslinger</u> <u>testified</u> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u>In another statement, <u>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the <strong>term “marijuana</mark>”</strong> when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <strong><mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</strong></mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p>

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UTD LO

Kristen Stout

1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security

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And it leads to prostitution free zones

ALLIL No Date

ALLIL No Date

ETB] cities have employed zoning to exclude prostitutes by establishing "prostitution-free zones people who have been identified as known prostitutes are legally banned from whole sections of the city. The "cleansing" of New York City's Times Square in the 1990s is another example of such exclusionary strategies.

cities have employed zoning to exclude prostitutes by establishing "prostitution-free zones people who have been identified as prostitutes are legally banned from whole sections of the city. The "cleansing" of Times Square is another example

[American Law and Legal Information Library, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1880/Prostitution-Regimes-prohibition-criminalization-regulation.html#ixzz3JKp8jdwf ETB] In the 1990s, other cities (notably Portland, Oregon) have employed zoning in a different fashion. Rather than quarantining sexual commerce by zoning it into a specific urban area like Boston's Combat Zone, now zoning is used to exclude prostitutes by establishing "prostitution-free zones." Drawing upon new urban strategies such as business improvement districts and area-specific gang-abatement injunctions, people who have been identified as known prostitutes are legally banned from whole sections of the city. The "cleansing" of New York City's Times Square in the 1990s is another example of such exclusionary strategies.

<h4><u><strong>And it leads to prostitution free zones</h4><p>ALLIL No Date</p><p></u></strong>[American Law and Legal Information Library, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1880/Prostitution-Regimes-prohibition-criminalization-regulation.html#ixzz3JKp8jdwf<u> ETB]</p><p></u>In the 1990s, other <u><mark>cities</u> </mark>(notably Portland, Oregon) <u><mark>have employed zoning</u> </mark>in a different fashion. Rather than quarantining sexual commerce by zoning it into a specific urban area like Boston's Combat Zone, now zoning is used <u><mark>to exclude prostitutes by establishing "prostitution-free zones</u></mark>." Drawing upon new urban strategies such as business improvement districts and area-specific gang-abatement injunctions, <u><mark>people who have been identified as</mark> known <mark>prostitutes are legally banned from whole sections of the city. The "cleansing" of</mark> New York City's <mark>Times Square</mark> in the 1990s <mark>is another example</mark> of such exclusionary strategies.</p></u>

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Emory BD

Sean Kennedy, Joe Bellon, Travis Cram

1ac was prostitution workers rights 1nc was legalism k decrim cp brothels pic municipalities da sex trafficking da and case 2nc was legalism k and case 1nr was municipalities da and decrim cp 2nr was legalism k and case

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Discourse shapes and precedes action

Cassiman 8

Cassiman 8 (Shawn, Department of Sociology, University of Dayton, “Resisting the Neo-liberal Poverty Discourse: On Constructing Deadbeat Dads and Welfare Queens”, Sociology Compass, Volume 2, Issue 5, pages 1690–1700, September 2008)

Words are powerful words construct our lives and realities words do have the power to wound they gain a life of their own, impart meaning, discursively elevate some while sending others to the margins, and have a profound impact upon our lives and on policies there are many ways of constructing and understanding social reality discourse situates isolated actions in context so as to give them meaning That it is lived language that is materialized in practice Words frame our world-views, our values, and ourselves

The facts belie the substance of this rhyme. Words do hurt. Words are powerful. A cursory examination of the rhyme hints at the power of words, of discourse, of the stories we tell, of how we construct our lives and realities. The rhyme also serves the function of a talisman; using some words to ward off the power of others – words will never hurt me. But no matter the talisman, words do have the power to wound. With repetition, they gain a life of their own, impart meaning, discursively elevate some while sending others to the margins, and have a profound impact upon our lives and on the social policies most important to us. This essay describes the power of words, of discourse, upon poverty policy and those living in poverty. This contribution to the discourse is also concerned with encouraging critical reflection of the welfare reform discourse, reflection upon our discursive participation, and issues of social justice. What is discourse? Scholars variously describe discourse as speech, an exchange of ideas or as a, ‘... a discussion that is representative of ... a particular school or epoch’, or more broadly ‘... every kind of symbolic order of intentional processes of communication and understanding’ (Neubert and Reich 2002, 2). Hollander (2002) argues that, ‘Discourses are collective, social and historically developed’ (477) while emphasizing that there are many ways of constructing and understanding social reality. Schram (2006) reminds us that discourse also, ‘... situates isolated actions in context so as to give them a meaning they would not otherwise have’ (xi) and ‘That it is lived language that is materialized in practice’ (12). Erickson n (2004) argues that, ‘... talk is both a local process and a global one’ (107), while Wetherell et al. (2001) describes discourse as social action. What these authors argue, then, is the very real and powerful nature of discourse. Foucault's (1981) discussions of discourse focus upon the power relationships laid bare in discourse. Words frame/shape/create our world-views, our values, and ourselves. Swift (1995) argues that, ‘The term “discourse” implies dialogue, a field that is not static but is continuously shaped by interaction within a particular context’ (25). Discursive arenas and/or discursive fields (Threadgold 1997) abound, though, for the most part, we remain oblivious to discourse and its impact.

<h4>Discourse shapes and precedes action</h4><p><u><strong>Cassiman 8</u></strong> (Shawn, Department of Sociology, University of Dayton, “Resisting the Neo-liberal Poverty Discourse: On Constructing Deadbeat Dads and Welfare Queens”, Sociology Compass, Volume 2, Issue 5, pages 1690–1700, September 2008)</p><p>The facts belie the substance of this rhyme. Words do hurt. <u>Words are powerful</u>. A cursory examination of the rhyme hints at the power of <u>words</u>, of discourse, of the stories we tell, of how we <u>construct our lives and realities</u>. The rhyme also serves the function of a talisman; using some words to ward off the power of others – words will never hurt me. But no matter the talisman, <u>words do have the power to wound</u>. With repetition, <u>they gain a life of their own, impart meaning, discursively elevate some while sending others to the margins, and have a profound impact upon our lives and on</u> the social <u>policies</u> most important to us. This essay describes the power of words, of discourse, upon poverty policy and those living in poverty. This contribution to the discourse is also concerned with encouraging critical reflection of the welfare reform discourse, reflection upon our discursive participation, and issues of social justice. What is discourse? Scholars variously describe discourse as speech, an exchange of ideas or as a, ‘... a discussion that is representative of ... a particular school or epoch’, or more broadly ‘... every kind of symbolic order of intentional processes of communication and understanding’ (Neubert and Reich 2002, 2). Hollander (2002) argues that, ‘Discourses are collective, social and historically developed’ (477) while emphasizing that <u>there are many ways of constructing and understanding social reality</u>. Schram (2006) reminds us that <u>discourse</u> also, ‘... <u>situates isolated actions in context so as to give them</u> a <u>meaning</u> they would not otherwise have’ (xi) and ‘<u>That it is lived language that is materialized in practice</u>’ (12). Erickson n (2004) argues that, ‘... talk is both a local process and a global one’ (107), while Wetherell et al. (2001) describes discourse as social action. What these authors argue, then, is the very real and powerful nature of discourse. Foucault's (1981) discussions of discourse focus upon the power relationships laid bare in discourse. <u>Words frame</u>/shape/create <u>our world-views, our values, and ourselves</u>. Swift (1995) argues that, ‘The term “discourse” implies dialogue, a field that is not static but is continuously shaped by interaction within a particular context’ (25). Discursive arenas and/or discursive fields (Threadgold 1997) abound, though, for the most part, we remain oblivious to discourse and its impact.</p>

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Jim Schultz

1ac was marijuana racial justice movements 1nc was t legalization plan pik the politics of pain university k and case 2nc was the politics of pain university k 1nr was case 2nr was the k

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Capitalism causes destroys value to life

Robinson 14

Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)

US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.

capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the ability to sustain life global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings as a response by the capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction There have been countless studies documenting the escalation of inequalities 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” We are headed towards a global police state The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for obedience States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities billions have been thrown off the land or out of employment relegated to migration We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb expanding output The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and absorb is growing this leads to a crisis of overproduction Unloading the surplus aggravates the solution as we saw with the collapse of 08 it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict This is a new transnational power bloc the polarization of the world population generates new social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and controlled while guards protect that 20 percent this and more are part of the “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”

However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.

<h4><u><strong>Capitalism causes destroys value to life </h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global <mark>capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis </mark>in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s <mark>because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the</mark> very earth system and the <mark>ability to sustain life</strong></mark>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u><mark>as a response by the</mark> US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> <mark>capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis.</mark> </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u><mark>There have been countless studies</mark> in recent years <mark>documenting the escalation of inequalities</u></mark>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong><mark>We are headed</u></strong></mark> in this regard <u><strong><mark>towards a global police state</u></strong></mark>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong><mark>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse</mark> than Orwell imagined, <mark>because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for</mark> their <mark>obedience</mark> and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps <mark>billions</mark>, <mark>have been</mark> made “superfluous”, <mark>thrown off the land or out of</mark> productive <mark>employment</mark>, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and <mark>relegated to migration</mark> and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u><mark>extreme inequality and social polarization</u></mark> in the global system <u><mark>means that the global market cannot absorb</mark> the <mark>expanding output</mark> of the global economy. <strong><mark>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>The gap between what the global economy can produce and </mark>what the global market can <mark>absorb is growing</mark> and <mark>this leads to a crisis of overproduction</mark>: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u><mark>Unloading the surplus</mark> through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u><mark>aggravates the solution</mark>, <mark>as we saw with the collapse of</mark> 20<mark>08</mark>. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong><mark>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong></mark> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u><mark>the polarization of the world population</mark> into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated <mark>generates new</mark> spatial <mark>social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and</mark> carefully <mark>controlled</mark>, <mark>while</mark> surveillance systems and security <mark>guards</mark> must patrol and <mark>protect</mark> <mark>that 20 percent</mark>.</u> <u>All <mark>this</mark> <mark>and</mark> much <mark>more are part of the</mark> militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>

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Dems can sweep the midterms, but only by using marijuana as a wedge issue – plan robs them of it

Applebaum 14

Applebaum 14 <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS

By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans support legalizing marijuana among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). Udall will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican This presents a golden opportunity to flip seats 4 When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014

By running on legalization, Democrats can spur turnout and sweep the Midterms a majority of Americans support legalizing among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular By pushing legalized marijuana Democrats can provide motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election This presents a golden opportunity to flip seats Legalizing is the perfect solution pot legalization might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory

By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans (55%) support legalizing marijuana, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. It’s simple and straightforward. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark Udall of Colorado, will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican. This presents a golden opportunity to flip House seats in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 2014. THE TIME IS NOW When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.

<h4>Dems can sweep the midterms, but only by using marijuana as a wedge issue – plan robs them of it</h4><p><u><strong>Applebaum 14</u></strong> <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS</p><p><u><mark>By running on </mark>pot <mark>legalization, Democrats can spur </mark>voter <mark>turnout and sweep the </mark>2014 <mark>Midterms</mark>. </u>In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, <u>the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections.</u> <u>If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. </u>IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT <u>A recent CNN poll showed that <mark>a majority of Americans</u></mark> (55%) <u><mark>support legalizing</mark> marijuana</u>, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, <u><mark>among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular</mark>: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections</u>, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. <u>In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people</u> to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. <u>Marijuana is different.</u> <u>It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion.</u> Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, <u>marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to.</u> It’s simple and straightforward. <u><strong><mark>By pushing legalized marijuana </mark>nationally, <mark>Democrats can provide </mark>much-needed <mark>motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them.</u></strong></mark> Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. <u><mark>Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot </mark>just so happen to <mark>have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election</mark>.</u> <u>This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall).</u> A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark <u>Udall</u> of Colorado, <u>will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch.</u> A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, <u>the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican</u>. <u><mark>This presents a golden opportunity to flip</u></mark> House <u><mark>seats</u></mark> in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 201<u>4</u>. THE TIME IS NOW <u>When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges</u>. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. <u><mark>Legalizing </mark>marijuana <mark>is the perfect</mark> bipartisan <mark>solution</mark>: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security.</u> <u>It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, <mark>pot legalization</mark> just <mark>might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory </mark>in 2014</u>, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.</p>

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