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The link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low
Foust and Murphy 2009
Foust and Murphy 2009 (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )
the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency
the American public has been faced with increasing communication regarding climate change Large majorities believe global warming is real yet global warming remains a low priority Meanwhile climate scientists and others have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency
Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004).
785
<h4>The link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low</h4><p><u><strong>Foust and Murphy 2009</u></strong> (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )</p><p>Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, <u><mark>the American public has been faced with</mark> steadily <mark>increasing</mark> amounts of <mark>communication regarding climate change</mark>.</u> Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "<u><mark>Large</mark> <mark>majorities</mark> of Americans <mark>believe</mark> that <mark>global warming is real</mark> and consider it a serious problem, <mark>yet global warming remains a low priority</u></mark> relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, <u>large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. <mark>Meanwhile</mark>, <mark>climate scientists and others</mark> concerned about global warming <mark>have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency</u></mark> (Moser & Dilling, 2004).</p>
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1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security
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This too has been codified in the legal system – though some laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide have been lifted, one of the earliest pro-PAS measures, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, employs “mental competency” standards which embrace a paternalistic view of disabled bodies as unable to ever act on their own which reinforces ableism – Sara Qualls and Julia Kasl-Godley explain that
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Sara Honn, Professor, Kraemer Family Professor of Aging, Director of Gerontology Center and Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University, and Julia, Ph.D from USC, End-of-Life Issues, Grief, and Bereavement: What Clinicians Need to Know, 2010, p.269-271 SJE
Disability experts have raised concerns about the capability clause. They point to evidence that people without disabilities assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically lower than do people with disabilities A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,” , capacity assessment may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted- suicide policies it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective “clinicians are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use” ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted suicide requests. The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing judgment No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment. This clause is meant to provide safeguards but it is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless. the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is that within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence of impaired judgment and mental disorder suicidal ideation is one of the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status, which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies
Disability experts raised concerns about¶ the capability clause capacity assessment is meant to provide protection, but it is subjective. clinicians¶ are left to decide on their own how strict a standard to use ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted¶ suicide requests.¶ The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing¶ judgment No medication shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the¶ patient is not suffering from a disorder This clause is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence¶ of impaired judgment suicidal ideation is one of¶ the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the¶ lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or enabling depends solely on their disability status, which experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies
Opponents of assisted suicide concur with the perspective that the capability evaluation clause is unworkable because of conceptual and empirical limitations, but they view these limitations as an argument against¶ assisted suicide rather than a reason to proceed without such an evaluation¶ (Hendin & Foley, 2008). Disability experts (Coleman, 1992, 2002; Gill,¶ 1992, 1998; Longmore, 2005; 01km, 2005) have raised other concerns about¶ the capability clause. They point to evidence that people without disabilities¶ assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically¶ lower than do people with disabilities, and they wonder whether a request¶ for physician-assisted suicide from a person with disabilities might then “be¶ subject to less scrutiny because the decision makes sense to others” (01km,¶ 2005, p. 70). “A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need¶ for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,”¶ writes Coleman (2002, p. 224). “In other words, when asked to describe¶ the ‘indignities’ that assisted suicide would help people avoid, proponents¶ describe disability” (Coleman, 2002 p. 220). “If professionals think that of¶ course the disabled person would want to die” because of the indignities¶ of disability, “might not these expectations play a disheartening role in some¶ one’s decision to seek physician-assisted suicide?” asks Olkin (2005, p. 70). In conclusion, capacity assessment may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted-¶ suicide policies (Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000, p. 388). Like the Trojan¶ horse, it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective. As advocates of assisted suicide recognize “clinicians¶ are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use”¶ (Werth et al., 2000, p. 356).¶ Clinicians asked to bring their expertise on assessments of the capability¶ to make requests to die should exercise great caution in what they promise¶ they can deliver. They should he educated and educate others about the¶ limits of scientific knowledge on capability assessment. They should also be¶ aware about the danger, in the absence of scientifically robust standards, that¶ ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted¶ suicide requests.¶ The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing¶ judgment. If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a ¶ psychiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a psychological¶ evaluation. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner¶ shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the¶ patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression¶ causing impaired judgment. This clause, like the one about capacity, is meant¶ to provide safeguards against the influence of psychological disorders on¶ judgment, but it is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless. First ¶ of all, it is an “exceedingly minimalist” clause (Burt, 2000. p. 383) because¶ it rules out only mental conditions that impair judgment. In other words,¶ the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these¶ disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards (Burt, 2000; N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005;¶ Sullivan et al., 1998). Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is¶ that within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence¶ of impaired judgment and mental disorder. In fact, suicidal ideation is one of¶ the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment (Sullivan¶ et al., 1998). Based on current clinical standards, the presence of suicidal¶ intention calls for an automatic finding of incompetence and obligates the¶ clinician to suicide prevention, including removal of lethal means. By contrast, within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the¶ lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention¶ (N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005). Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status, which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies (Coleman, 2002).
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<h4>This too has been codified in the legal system – though some laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide have been lifted, one of the earliest pro-PAS measures, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, employs “mental competency” standards which embrace a paternalistic view of disabled bodies as unable to ever act on their own which reinforces ableism – Sara Qualls and Julia Kasl-Godley explain that</h4><p>Sara Honn, Professor, Kraemer Family Professor of Aging, Director of Gerontology Center and Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University, and Julia, Ph.D from USC, End-of-Life Issues, Grief, and Bereavement: What Clinicians Need to Know, 2010, p.269-271 SJE</p><p>Opponents of assisted suicide concur with the perspective that the capability evaluation clause is unworkable because of conceptual and empirical limitations, but they view these limitations as an argument against¶ assisted suicide rather than a reason to proceed without such an evaluation¶ (Hendin & Foley, 2008). <u><strong><mark>Disability experts</u></strong></mark> (Coleman, 1992, 2002; Gill,¶ 1992, 1998; Longmore, 2005; 01km, 2005) <u><strong>have <mark>raised</u></strong></mark> other <u><strong><mark>concerns about</u>¶<u> the capability clause</mark>. They point to evidence that people without disabilities</u>¶<u> assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically</u>¶<u> lower than do people with disabilities</u></strong>, and they wonder whether a request¶ for physician-assisted suicide from a person with disabilities might then “be¶ subject to less scrutiny because the decision makes sense to others” (01km,¶ 2005, p. 70). “<u><strong>A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need</u>¶<u> for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,”</u></strong>¶ writes Coleman (2002, p. 224). “In other words, when asked to describe¶ the ‘indignities’ that assisted suicide would help people avoid, proponents¶ describe disability” (Coleman, 2002 p. 220). “If professionals think that of¶ course the disabled person would want to die” because of the indignities¶ of disability, “might not these expectations play a disheartening role in some¶ one’s decision to seek physician-assisted suicide?” asks Olkin (2005, p. 70). In conclusion<u><strong>, <mark>capacity assessment</mark> may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted-</u>¶<u> suicide policies</u></strong> (Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000, p. 388). Like the Trojan¶ horse, <u><strong>it <mark>is meant to provide protection, but </mark>it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that <mark>it is subjective</u></strong>.</mark> As advocates of assisted suicide recognize <u><strong>“<mark>clinicians</u>¶<u> are left to decide on their own </mark>[what to use and] <mark>how strict a standard to use</mark>”</u></strong>¶ (Werth et al., 2000, p. 356).¶ Clinicians asked to bring their expertise on assessments of the capability¶ to make requests to die should exercise great caution in what they promise¶ they can deliver. They should he educated and educate others about the¶ limits of scientific knowledge on capability assessment. They should also be¶ aware about the danger, in the absence of scientifically robust standards, that¶ <u><strong><mark>ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted</u></strong>¶<u><strong> suicide requests.</u>¶<u> The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing</u>¶<u> judgment</u></strong></mark>. If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a ¶ psychiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a psychological¶ evaluation. <u><strong><mark>No medication </mark>to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner</u>¶<u> <mark>shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the</u>¶<u> patient is not suffering from a </mark>psychiatric or psychological <mark>disorder </mark>or depression</u>¶<u> causing impaired judgment. <mark>This clause</u></strong></mark>, like the one about capacity, <u><strong>is meant</u>¶<u> to provide safeguards</u></strong> against the influence of psychological disorders on¶ judgment, <u><strong>but it <mark>is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless</mark>.</u></strong> First ¶ of all, it is an “exceedingly minimalist” clause (Burt, 2000. p. 383) because¶ it rules out only mental conditions that impair judgment. In other words,¶ <u><strong>the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these</u>¶<u> disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards</u></strong> (Burt, 2000; N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005;¶ Sullivan et al., 1998). <u><strong>Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is</u>¶<u> that <mark>within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence</u>¶<u> of impaired judgment</mark> and mental disorder</u></strong>. In fact, <u><strong><mark>suicidal ideation is one of</u>¶<u> the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment</u></strong></mark> (Sullivan¶ et al., 1998). Based on current clinical standards, the presence of suicidal¶ intention calls for an automatic finding of incompetence and obligates the¶ clinician to suicide prevention, including removal of lethal means. By contrast, <u><strong><mark>within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the</u>¶<u> lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention</u></strong></mark>¶ (N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005). <u><strong><mark>Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or </mark>suicide <mark>enabling depends solely on their </mark>health or <mark>disability status, which </mark>disability <mark>experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies</u></strong></mark> (Coleman, 2002).</p>
1ac
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1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
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Everyone says “yes”---CP spurs broad legalization and state-level experimentation, but the waiver creates a functional condition that checks industry capture
Kleiman 14
Kleiman 14 – Mark Kleiman, Professor of Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization”, Washington Monthly, March/April/May, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all
To avoid getting locked into bad policies, lawmakers need to act, and quickly What’s needed is federal legislation requiring states that legalize cannabis to structure their pot markets such that they won’t get captured by commercial interests. There are any number of ways to do that, so the legislation wouldn’t have to be overly prescriptive. States could, for instance, allow marijuana to be sold only through nonprofit outlets, or distributed via small consumer-owned co-ops The most effective way would be through a system of state-run retail stores There’s plenty of precedent for this: states from Utah to Pennsylvania to Alabama restrict hard liquor sales to stateoperated or state-controlled outlets. Such “ABC” stores operationally they work fine. Similar “pot control” stores could work fine for marijuana, too. A “state store” system would also allow the states to control the pot supply chain. By contracting with many small growers, rather than a few giant ones, states could check the industry’s political power (concentrated industries are almost always more effective at lobbying than those comprised of many small companies) States could insist that the private growers sign contracts forbidding them from marketing to the public How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation
needed is legislation requiring states that legalize structure markets such that they won’t get captured States could allow marijuana sold only through state-run stores By contracting with small growers states could check industry’s political power concentrated industries are more effective at lobbying States could insist private growers sign contracts forbidding marketing federal government get states to structure markets like these? By giving a tried-and-true tool Obama wielded effectively: the waiver federal government would recognize legal status making activities actually legal, not merely tolerated only if state contained adequate controls That would change the politics with advocates and industry supporting tight controls to get, and keep, the all-important waiver we would see laboratories doing serious experimentation
To avoid getting locked into bad policies, lawmakers in Washington need to act, and quickly. I know it’s hard to imagine anything good coming out of the current Congress, but there’s no real alternative. What’s needed is federal legislation requiring states that legalize cannabis to structure their pot markets such that they won’t get captured by commercial interests. There are any number of ways to do that, so the legislation wouldn’t have to be overly prescriptive. States could, for instance, allow marijuana to be sold only through nonprofit outlets, or distributed via small consumer-owned co-ops (see Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Nonprofit Motive”). The most effective way, however, would be through a system of state-run retail stores. There’s plenty of precedent for this: states from Utah to Pennsylvania to Alabama restrict hard liquor sales to stateoperated or state-controlled outlets. Such “ABC” (“alcoholic beverage control”) stores date back to the end of Prohibition, and operationally they work fine. Similar “pot control” stores could work fine for marijuana, too. A “state store” system would also allow the states to control the pot supply chain. By contracting with many small growers, rather than a few giant ones, states could check the industry’s political power (concentrated industries are almost always more effective at lobbying than those comprised of many small companies) and maintain consumer choice by avoiding a beer-like oligopoly offering virtually interchangeable products. States could also insist that the private growers sign contracts forbidding them from marketing to the public. Imposing that rule as part of a vendor agreement rather than as a regulation might avoid the “commercial free speech” issue, thus eliminating the specter of manipulative marijuana advertising filling the airwaves and covering highway billboards. To prevent interstate smuggling, the federal government should do what it has failed to do with cigarettes: mandate a minimum retail price. Of course, there’s a danger that states themselves, hungry for tax dollars, could abuse their monopoly power over pot, just as they have with state lotteries. To avert that outcome, states should avoid the mistake they made with lotteries: housing them in state revenue departments, which focus on maximizing state income. Instead, the new marijuana control programs should reside in state health departments and be overseen by boards with a majority of health care and substance-abuse professionals. Politicians eager for revenue might still press for higher pot sales than would be good for public health, but they’d at least have to fight a resistant bureaucracy. How could the federal government get the states to structure their pot markets in ways like these? By giving a new twist to a tried-and-true tool that the Obama administration has wielded particularly effectively: the policy waiver. The federal government would recognize the legal status of cannabis under a state system—making the activities permitted under that system actually legal, not merely tolerated, under federal law—only if the state system contained adequate controls to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. That would change the politics of legalization at the state level, with legalization advocates and the cannabis industry supporting tight controls in order to get, and keep, the all-important waiver. Then we would see the laboratories of democracy doing some serious experimentation.
3,578
<h4>Everyone says “yes”---CP spurs broad legalization and state-level experimentation, but the waiver creates a functional condition that checks industry capture</h4><p><u><strong>Kleiman 14</u></strong> – Mark Kleiman, Professor of Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization”, Washington Monthly, March/April/May, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all</p><p><u>To avoid getting locked into bad policies, lawmakers</u> in Washington <u>need to act, and quickly</u>. I know it’s hard to imagine anything good coming out of the current Congress, but there’s no real alternative.</p><p><u>What’s <mark>needed is</mark> federal <mark>legislation requiring states that legalize</mark> cannabis to <mark>structure</mark> their pot <mark>markets such that they <strong>won’t get captured</mark> by commercial interests</strong>. There are any number of ways to do that, so the legislation wouldn’t have to be overly prescriptive. <mark>States could</mark>, for instance, <mark>allow marijuana</mark> to be <mark>sold only</mark> through nonprofit outlets, or distributed via small consumer-owned co-ops</u> (see Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Nonprofit Motive”). <u>The most effective way</u>, however, <u>would be <mark>through</mark> a system of <strong><mark>state-run</mark> retail <mark>stores</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>There’s plenty of precedent for this: states from Utah to Pennsylvania to Alabama restrict hard liquor sales to stateoperated or state-controlled outlets. Such “ABC”</u> (“alcoholic beverage control”) <u>stores</u> date back to the end of Prohibition, and <u>operationally they work fine. Similar “pot control” stores could work fine for marijuana, too. A “state store” system would also allow the states to control the pot supply chain. <mark>By contracting with</mark> many <mark>small growers</mark>, rather than a few giant ones, <mark>states could <strong>check</mark> the <mark>industry’s political power</u></strong></mark> <u>(<mark>concentrated industries are</mark> almost always <mark>more effective at lobbying</mark> than those comprised of many small companies)</u> and maintain consumer choice by avoiding a beer-like oligopoly offering virtually interchangeable products.</p><p><u><mark>States could</u></mark> also <u><mark>insist</mark> that the <mark>private growers sign contracts forbidding</mark> them from <mark>marketing</mark> to the public</u>. Imposing that rule as part of a vendor agreement rather than as a regulation might avoid the “commercial free speech” issue, thus eliminating the specter of manipulative marijuana advertising filling the airwaves and covering highway billboards. To prevent interstate smuggling, the federal government should do what it has failed to do with cigarettes: mandate a minimum retail price.</p><p>Of course, there’s a danger that states themselves, hungry for tax dollars, could abuse their monopoly power over pot, just as they have with state lotteries. To avert that outcome, states should avoid the mistake they made with lotteries: housing them in state revenue departments, which focus on maximizing state income. Instead, the new marijuana control programs should reside in state health departments and be overseen by boards with a majority of health care and substance-abuse professionals. Politicians eager for revenue might still press for higher pot sales than would be good for public health, but they’d at least have to fight a resistant bureaucracy.</p><p><u>How could the <mark>federal government get</mark> the <mark>states to structure</mark> their pot <mark>markets</mark> in ways <mark>like these? By giving a</mark> new twist to a <mark>tried-and-true tool</mark> that the <mark>Obama</mark> administration has <strong><mark>wielded</mark> particularly <mark>effectively</strong>: the</mark> <strong>policy <mark>waiver</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>federal government would recognize</mark> the <mark>legal status</mark> of cannabis under a state system—<mark>making</mark> the <mark>activities</mark> permitted under that system <strong><mark>actually legal, not merely tolerated</strong></mark>, under federal law—<strong><mark>only if</strong></mark> the <mark>state</mark> system <mark>contained adequate controls</mark> to protect public health and safety, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of the department of health and human services. <mark>That would <strong>change the politics</mark> of legalization</strong> at the state level, <mark>with</mark> legalization <mark>advocates and</mark> the cannabis <mark>industry <strong>supporting tight controls</strong></mark> in order <mark>to get, and keep, <strong>the all-important</strong> waiver</mark>. Then <mark>we would see</mark> the <strong><mark>laboratories</mark> of democracy</strong> <mark>doing</mark> some <strong><mark>serious experimentation</u></strong></mark>.</p>
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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
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*TWO, trade doesn’t stop war
Parlow and Chakrabati 9
Parlow and Chakrabati 9 Does trade promote peace? A new window in Economics Anton Parlow and Prof. Avik Chakrabati University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Department of Economics November 24, 2009 https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/aparlow/www/papers/conflict_2.pdf
conflict does not explain trade and trade does not explain current level of conflicts Meaning there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations. the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all.
trade does not explain current level of conflicts there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all
The regression results for the unrestricted bivariate VAR-model including one lag are presented in table 5. The main result is that conflict does not explain trade and trade does not explain current level of conflicts. Meaning there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables using the sample chosen here. Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations. Furthermore the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model (very low R2 and F-value). The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all. There is no comparable approach so far in the literature which means we need further research to con_rm these results. Furthermore a longer time pe- riod is needed and maybe more variables for the VAR-model e.g. GDP as a measurement for economic size. A problem with adding more variables to a VAR-system is that it gets less tractable and needs some structure to make useful interpretations of the parameter estimates.
1,071
<h4>*TWO, trade doesn’t stop war</h4><p><u><strong>Parlow and Chakrabati 9 </u></strong>Does trade promote peace? A new window in Economics Anton Parlow and Prof. Avik Chakrabati University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Department of Economics November 24, 2009 https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/aparlow/www/papers/conflict_2.pdf</p><p>The regression results for the unrestricted bivariate VAR-model including one lag are presented in table 5. The main result is that <u><strong>conflict does not explain trade and <mark>trade does not explain current level of conflicts</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Meaning <mark>there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables</u></strong></mark> using the sample chosen here. <u>Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations.</u> Furthermore <u>the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model </u>(very low R2 and F-value). <u><mark>The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all</mark>.</u> There is no comparable approach so far in the literature which means we need further research to con_rm these results. Furthermore a longer time pe- riod is needed and maybe more variables for the VAR-model e.g. GDP as a measurement for economic size. A problem with adding more variables to a VAR-system is that it gets less tractable and needs some structure to make useful interpretations of the parameter estimates.</p>
1NC
null
Banks
429,640
3
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,809
Fairness first – it’s a pre-requisite to maintaining debate as an open marketplace of ideas for your project to flourish.
Speice and Lyle ‘3
Speice and Lyle ‘3 [Patrick (Wake Forest Debater) and Jim (Director of Debate @ Clarion). “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More than Ever”. The Debater’s Research Guide, 2003. groups.wfu.edu/debate ]
creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent
null
As with any game or sport, creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted toward one particular competitor, the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants
809
<h4><u><strong>Fairness first – it’s a pre-requisite to maintaining debate as an open marketplace of ideas for your project to flourish. </h4><p>Speice and Lyle ‘3</p><p></u></strong>[Patrick (Wake Forest Debater) and Jim (Director of Debate @ Clarion). “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More than Ever”. The Debater’s Research Guide, 2003. groups.wfu.edu/debate ]</p><p>As with any game or sport, <u><strong>creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted</u></strong> toward one particular competitor, <u><strong>the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” </u></strong>Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. <u><strong>The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent</u></strong> because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants</p>
1NR
T
OV
389,479
11
16,992
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
564,703
N
UMKC
5
Iowa HS
Brian Lain
1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,810
Economic impacts create a state of emergency which allows sovereignty to exercise violence
Agamben 2k
Agamben 2k, philosopher and professor of aesthetics at University of Verona Italy, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, 2000, pg. 133
those who have turned money into their only raison d’etre periodically wave around the scarecrow of economic crisis those who have made themselves stolidly complicitous with the imbalance of the public debt, by handing all their savings over to the state in exchange for bonds, now receive the warning blow without batting an eyelash the crisis is always in process and that it constitutes the internal motor of capitalism in its present phase, much as the state of exception is today the normal structure of political power. the state of exception requires that there be increasingly numerous sections of residents reduced to naked life, demands that the people of the Third World become increasingly poor, but also that a growing percentage of the citizens of the industrialized societies be marginalized and without a job.
those who have turned money into their only raison d’etre wave around the scarecrow of economic crisis those who have made themselves stolidly complicitous receive the warning blow without batting an eyelash the state of exception requires that there be increasingly numerous sections of residents reduced to naked life, demands people of the Third World become increasingly poor, but also that a growing percentage of the citizens of the industrialized societies be marginalized and without a job
Nothing is more nauseating than the impudence with which those who have turned money into their only raison d’etre periodically wave around the scarecrow of economic crisis: the rich nowadays wear plain rags so as to warn the poor that sacrifices will be necessary for everybody. And the docility is just as astonishing; those who have made themselves stolidly complicitous with the imbalance of the public debt, by handing all their savings over to the state in exchange for bonds, now receive the warning blow without batting an eyelash and ready themselves to tighten their belts. And yet those who have any lucidity left in them know that the crisis is always in process and that it constitutes the internal motor of capitalism in its present phase, much as the state of exception is today the normal structure of political power. And just as the state of exception requires that there be increasingly numerous sections of residents deprived of political rights and that in fact at the outer limit all citizens be reduced to naked life, in such a way crisis, having now become permanent, demands not only that the people of the Third World become increasingly poor, but also that a growing percentage of the citizens of the industrialized societies be marginalized and without a job. And there is no so-called democratic state today that is not compromised and up to its neck in such a massive production of human misery.
1,425
<h4>Economic impacts create a state of emergency which allows sovereignty to exercise violence </h4><p><u><strong>Agamben 2k</u></strong>, philosopher and professor of aesthetics at University of Verona Italy, Means Without<u> End: Notes on Politics, 2000, pg. 133</p><p></u>Nothing is more nauseating than the impudence with which<u> <mark>those who have turned money into their only raison d’etre</mark> periodically <mark>wave around the scarecrow of economic crisis</u></mark>: the rich nowadays wear plain rags so as to warn the poor that sacrifices will be necessary for everybody. And the docility is just as astonishing; <u><mark>those who have made themselves stolidly complicitous</mark> with the imbalance of the public debt, by handing all their savings over to the state in exchange for bonds, now <mark>receive the warning blow without batting an eyelash</u></mark> and ready themselves to tighten their belts. And yet those who have any lucidity left in them know that <u>the crisis is always in process and that it constitutes the internal motor of capitalism in its present phase, much as the state of exception is today the normal structure of political power. </u>And just as <u><mark>the state of exception requires that there be increasingly numerous sections of residents</u></mark> deprived of political rights and that in fact at the outer limit all citizens be <u><mark>reduced to naked life,</u></mark> in such a way crisis, having now become permanent, <u><mark>demands</u></mark> not only <u>that the <mark>people of the Third World become increasingly poor, but also that a growing percentage of the citizens of the industrialized societies be marginalized and without a job</mark>.</u> And there is no so-called democratic state today that is not compromised and up to its neck in such a massive production of human misery.</p>
1NC
null
Econ
158,538
2
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,811
They remove barriers to entry and push Afghanistan farmers out of the market
Fox 14 Vitz
Marlowe Fox 14, “Drug Cartels, Terrorism, and Marijuana,” http://raybounmulligan.com/mexican-drug-cartels-afghanistan-and-marijuana/, Vitz
Goodman illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream , he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for American and international entrepreneurs. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana Hence, entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization the conjectured stabilization in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization is not likely to happen.
Goodman illustrates the benefits of legalizing marijuana and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for American and international entrepreneurs entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization the stabilization is not likely to happen
In his recent blog, H.A. Goodman illustrates some of the possible benefits of legalizing marijuana. Goodman notes that Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream. Goodman concludes that this revenue would contribute to the overall stability in the region. However, he does not consider the fact that legalization would remove barriers of entry for American and international entrepreneurs. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana. Hence, entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization. Thus, the conjectured stabilization in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization is not likely to happen.
863
<h4>They remove barriers to entry and push Afghanistan farmers out of the market </h4><p>Marlowe<u><strong> Fox 14</u></strong>, “Drug Cartels, Terrorism, and Marijuana,” http://raybounmulligan.com/mexican-drug-cartels-afghanistan-and-marijuana/, <u><strong>Vitz</p><p></u></strong>In his recent blog, H.A. <u><mark>Goodman illustrates</mark> some of <mark>the</mark> possible <mark>benefits of legalizing marijuana</mark>. Goodman notes that Afghanistan</u> <u>is the world’s largest supplier of cannabis <mark>and legalization would allow Afghans to realize an immediate revenue stream</u></mark>. Goodman concludes that this revenue would contribute to the overall stability in the region. However<u>, <mark>he does not consider the fact that legalization would</mark> <strong><mark>remove barriers of entry</u></strong> <u>for American and international entrepreneurs</mark>. Goodman cites Rand Corporation figures that Americans spend approximately $40.6 billion a year on marijuana</u>. <u>Hence, <mark>entrepreneurs from around the world would put their hat into the ring and effectively push <strong>Afghan growers out of any new market created by legalization</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><mark>the</mark> conjectured <mark>stabilization </mark>in Afghanistan as a result from marijuana legalization <mark>is <strong>not likely to happen</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NR
War on Drugs
Turn
56,558
31
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,812
Diversity cushions shocks
International Oil Daily ‘3
International Oil Daily ‘3
World oil supply is becoming "more diverse," BP's chief economist, Davies, said As a result oil markets proved resilient and flexible, with current structures able to maintain oil supplies without excessive price spikes during unexpected disruptions.
World oil supply is becoming "more diverse," As a result oil markets proved resilient and flexible, with current structures able to maintain oil supplies without excessive price spikes during unexpected disruptions
HEADLINE: Diversity of Oil Market Helps Cushion Against Price Shocks: BP World oil supply is becoming "more diverse," while global production capacity "comfortably exceeds" demand, BP's chief economist, Peter Davies, said Tuesday in London, at the launch of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003.The underlying factors for the trend include a significant 1.45 million barrel per day increase in non-Opec oil output last year, coupled with largely flat demand growth. The exception was China, which accounted for all of the increase in oil demand last year, and 68.5% of the rise in global primary energy consumption. As a result, Davies said oil markets proved resilient and flexible, with current structures able to maintain oil supplies without excessive price spikes during the Iraqwar and unexpected disruptions. "Producers were able to meet the needs of oil consumers during the Iraqwar and during unplanned supply disruptions in Venezuelaand Nigeria. Consuming nations were not required to tap their emergency reserves," he said.
1,054
<h4><u><strong>Diversity cushions shocks</h4><p>International Oil Daily ‘3 </p><p></u></strong>HEADLINE: Diversity of Oil Market Helps Cushion Against Price Shocks: BP <u><strong> </strong><mark>World oil supply is becoming "more diverse,"</u></mark> while global production capacity "comfortably exceeds" demand, <u><strong>BP's chief economist, </u></strong>Peter <u><strong>Davies, said </u></strong>Tuesday in London, at the launch of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003.The underlying factors for the trend include a significant 1.45 million barrel per day increase in non-Opec oil output last year, coupled with largely flat demand growth. The exception was China, which accounted for all of the increase in oil demand last year, and 68.5% of the rise in global primary energy consumption. <u><mark>As a result</u></mark>, Davies said <u><mark>oil markets proved resilient and flexible, with current structures able to maintain oil supplies without excessive price spikes during</u> </mark>the Iraqwar and <u><mark>unexpected disruptions<strong></mark>.</u></strong> "Producers were able to meet the needs of oil consumers during the Iraqwar and during unplanned supply disruptions in Venezuelaand Nigeria. Consuming nations were not required to tap their emergency reserves," he said.</p>
1NR
Cartels
Oil Shocks
429,999
1
16,985
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
564,709
N
Kentucky
5
UTD LO
Kristen Stout
1ac was marijuana with hemp and cartels 1nc was security and gop bad midterms and marijuana word pic and t legalization spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was case and security
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,813
This vested interest in preserving a vital community categorizes life according to purity, creating a vicious form of state racism used to protect sovereignty. Foucault explains
null
Michel, “Society Must Be Defended,” (Lectures at College de France), Lecture Four, 1/28/76 SJE
At the time when this discourse was being converted into a revolutionary discourse it was only natural that attempts should he made by one side to recode the old counterhistory in terms of race in the biological and medical sense of that term. You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form and function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them, and it will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle for existence. It is a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest species. the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals, but by medico-normalizing techniques. sovereignty was able to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution
. At the time when this discourse was being converted into a revolutionary discourse it was natural that attempts should he made to recode the old counterhistory in terms¶ of race in the biological and medical sense You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form¶ and function of the discourse on race struggle the theme of historical war will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle¶ for existence. the State is no longer an instrument one race uses¶ against another: the State is the protector of the superiority of the race. racism is born when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political the discourse of race was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State whose vigor were guaranteed by medico-normalizing techniques sovereignty was able¶ to take race for its own strategy. State sovereignty becomes the imperative to¶ protect the race an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution
I think this provides us with a starting point for understanding¶ how and why historical discourse could become a new issue in the¶ mid nineteenth century. At the time when this discourse was being displaced, translated, or converted into a revolutionary discourse, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to be¶ replaced by that of class struggle—and in fact, when I say “the mid-¶ nineteenth century,” that’s too late; it was in the first half of the¶ nineteenth century, as it was [Thiers] who transformed race struggle¶ into class struggle—at the time when this conversion was going on,¶ it was in fact only natural that attempts should he made by one side¶ to recode the old counterhistory not in terms of class, but in terms¶ of races-—races in the biological and medical sense of that term. And¶ it was at the moment when a counterhistory of the revolutionary type¶ was taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shape—¶ but it will be a counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that was¶ present in this discourse. You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form¶ and function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them,¶ and it will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war—with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its victories, and its¶ defeats—will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle¶ for existence. It is no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would¶ understand the term, but a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest¶ species. Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided¶ into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so¶ on will he replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically¶ monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not¶ divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,¶ and which are in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreigners¶ have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this¶ society’s by products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,¶ finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into¶ its opposite: the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses¶ against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race. The idea of racial¶ purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that¶ is what replaces the idea of race struggle.¶ I think that racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle, and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism. The connection between racism and antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,¶ then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice that¶ appears at a given moment in a sort of’ grand antirevolutionary protect.¶ At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was being trans¶ formed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionary¶ thought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism now¶ began to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite literally,¶ revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we could¶ put it this way: Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political¶ discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the singular) was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it,¶ of using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose¶ luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals,¶ but by medico-normalizing techniques. Thanks to the shift from law¶ to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the¶ emancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, sovereignty was able¶ to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it¶ for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to¶ protect the race. It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.
4,575
<h4>This vested interest in preserving a vital community categorizes life according to purity, creating a vicious form of state racism used to protect sovereignty. Foucault explains</h4><p>Michel, “Society Must Be Defended,” (Lectures at College de France), Lecture Four, 1/28/76 SJE</p><p>I think this provides us with a starting point for understanding¶ how and why historical discourse could become a new issue in the¶ mid nineteenth century<mark>. <u><strong>At the time when this discourse was being</u></strong></mark> displaced, translated, or <u><strong><mark>converted into a revolutionary discourse</u></strong></mark>, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to be¶ replaced by that of class struggle—and in fact, when I say “the mid-¶ nineteenth century,” that’s too late; it was in the first half of the¶ nineteenth century, as it was [Thiers] who transformed race struggle¶ into class struggle—at the time when this conversion was going on,¶ <u><strong><mark>it was</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong>only <mark>natural that attempts should he made</mark> by one side</u>¶<u> <mark>to recode the old counterhistory</u></strong></mark> not in terms of class, but <u><strong><mark>in terms</u>¶<u> of race</u></strong></mark>s-—races <u><strong><mark>in the biological and medical sense</mark> of that term.</u></strong> And¶ it was at the moment when a counterhistory of the revolutionary type¶ was taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shape—¶ but it will be a counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that was¶ present in this discourse. <u><strong><mark>You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form</u>¶<u> and function of the discourse on race struggle</mark>, but it distorts them,</u>¶<u> and it will be characterized by the fact that <mark>the theme of historical war</u></strong></mark>—with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its victories, and its¶ defeats—<u><strong><mark>will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle</u>¶<u> for existence. </mark>It is </u></strong>no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would¶ understand the term, but <u><strong>a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest</u>¶<u> species.</u></strong> Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided¶ into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so¶ on will he replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically¶ monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not¶ divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,¶ and which are in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreigners¶ have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this¶ society’s by products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,¶ finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into¶ its opposite: <u><strong><mark>the State is no longer an instrument </mark>that <mark>one race uses</u>¶<u> against another: the State is</mark>, and must be, <mark>the protector of the </mark>integrity, the <mark>superiority</mark>, and the purity <mark>of the race</u></strong>.</mark> The idea of racial¶ purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that¶ is what replaces the idea of race struggle.¶ I think that <u><strong><mark>racism is born </mark>at the point <mark>when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism</u></strong>. The connection between racism and antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,¶ then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice that¶ appears at a given moment in a sort of’ grand antirevolutionary protect.¶ At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was being trans¶ formed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionary¶ thought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism now¶ began to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite literally,¶ revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we could¶ put it this way: <u><strong>Whereas <mark>the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political</u></mark>¶<u> discourse of Roman sovereignty, <mark>the discourse of race</u></strong></mark> (in the singular)<u><strong> <mark>was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it</u></strong></mark>,¶ of <u><strong><mark>using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State</mark>, a sovereignty <mark>whose</u></mark>¶<u> luster and <mark>vigor were </mark>no longer <mark>guaranteed by</mark> magico-juridical rituals,</u>¶<u> but by <mark>medico-normalizing techniques</mark>.</u></strong> Thanks to the shift from law¶ to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the¶ emancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, <u><strong><mark>sovereignty was able</u>¶<u> to </mark>invest or <mark>take </mark>over the discourse of <mark>race </mark>struggle and reutilize it</u>¶<u> <mark>for its own strategy. State sovereignty</mark> thus <mark>becomes the imperative to</u>¶<u> protect the race</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It becomes both <mark>an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution</u></strong></mark> that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.</p>
1ac
null
null
221,997
5
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,814
Pot consolidation waters down regulations---causes environmental destruction and corporate takeover
Mitchell 14
Mitchell 14 – Dan Mitchell, Independent Journalist for Fortune and the New York Times, “Federal Inaction Spells Bad News For Marijuana Business”, Fortune, 3-21, http://fortune.com/2014/03/21/federal-inaction-spells-bad-news-for-marijuana-business/
the lack of oversight will almost certainly end up with the pot business consolidated in the hands of a few big companies with enormous political and economic power, to the detriment of customers the environment, and social well-being after several more states legalize marijuana, which would create legitimate pot-industry constituencies in states where there currently are none a hodgepodge of incompatible state laws will be enacted, which will destroy any chance of the federal government getting a handle on rationally taxing and regulating it. This could lead to all kinds of problems, such as pot businesses marketing to children, inadequate labeling, and environmental problems. (Without smart regulation, pot cultivation can ravage the environment.) Further, taxing marijuana sales only at the state level could lead to rampant smuggling between states with different tax rates, as we see now with tobacco It could also lead, eventually, to massive industry consolidation, as happened with beer after prohibition was lifted when regulation was left almost entirely to the states. Rather than open marketplaces filled with lots of small, competing players, the pot industry could end up being a corporate-controlled oligopoly that resists competition and enjoys massive lobbying power to keep itself in place
lack of oversight will end with pot consolidated in a few big companies with enormous power, to the detriment of the environment a hodgepodge of state laws will destroy any chance of rationally regulating This could lead to environmental problems. (Without smart regulation, pot cultivation can ravage the environment taxing could lead to rampant smuggling between states with different rates It could lead to massive consolidation pot could end up a corporate-controlled oligopoly that resists competition
In the short term, an industry that most Americans want to see legitimized is severely hampered by the fact that what it does is a still serious federal crime. In the long term, the lack of federal oversight now, in the industry’s nascent stages, will almost certainly end up with the pot business consolidated in the hands of a few big companies with enormous political and economic power, to the detriment of its own customers, people who work in the business, the environment, and our social well-being. This week, we learned just how unlikely it is that our moribund Congress will take the steps necessary to create an environment for a healthy, thriving, relatively harmless marijuana industry to take root. The Denver Post reported on Thursday that a bill that would allow banks to serve marijuana companies that are legal under state laws is being met with silence by nearly all 99 members of the two House committees that could get it passed. Marijuana businesses can’t use credit cards, get loans, or receive any of the other banking services that are routine for most companies. Bill sponsor Denny Heck, a Democrat of Washington (which along with Colorado is one of two states that have legalized marijuana for recreational use) said that when he approaches his fellow members to discuss the bill, they have nothing to say. “The almost universal response is the rolling of one’s eyes,” he told the Post. So operators of legitimate businesses in Colorado and Washington, plus the 18 other states and Washington, D.C. that allow sales of medical marijuana, are still hauling giant wads of cash around with them and — along with their customers — must be constantly on guard against robbers and thieves. And they’ll be doing so until at least next year. The industry’s main lobbyist, the National Cannabis Industry Association, remains optimistic, and even understanding, to some degree, of the intractable Congress. “A few years ago, there would have been no such bill,” says Taylor West, the group’s deputy director. The “dramatic change in public opinion over the past few years” will simply take time to have its effect on Congress. Despite the swell of public support for legitimizing the pot business (more than half the country is now in favor, according to most polls), many members of Congress are hesitant in part because their own states haven’t yet legalized marijuana for either medicinal or recreational use. It so happens that most of the members of the two committees — Financial Services and Judiciary — that could push the banking bill to the House floor represent districts in states where marijuana remains entirely illegal. The Justice Department last month approved rules for prosecuting marijuana crimes that explicitly excluded banks from being prosecuted for doing business with the pot industry. But those rules don’t amount to a guarantee, and they aren’t nearly good enough for the banks, most of which will likely continue to steer clear of the industry until stronger protections are in place. Ironically, the Justice Department’s move seems to be helping to keep the banking bill stuck in committee. The Post reports that some members questioned the need for the bill given the administration’s order to federal prosecutors to stand down. It likely that action on the bills will come only after several more states legalize either medical or recreational marijuana, which would create legitimate pot-industry constituencies in states where there currently are none. The Marijuana Policy Project estimates that five more states will legalize pot in one way or another over the next year, which would put the number over half. Will that be enough for Congress? “It’s hard to predict anything with this Congress,” says West. And it doesn’t seem likely that the next Congress will be any more predictable or reliable. Even if the banking bill were passed, and even if most or all states were to legalize pot in some form, there would still be the enormous problem of the federal government’s classification of marijuana as a Schedule 1 narcotic, which puts it on a par with heroin in terms of the criminal penalties for possession and sale. The NCIA for now isn’t even really trying to get marijuana rescheduled to (at the very least) make it a lesser offense. “It’s just less than feasible right now,” West says. So the NCIA is taking an incremental approach with Congress, trying for now just to get the banking bill passed and to get IRS rules changed so that state-sanctioned pot businesses can take what are for other businesses legitimate tax deductions. A provision of the Internal Revenue Code still considers marijuana sales to be “drug trafficking,” and bars such deductions. This puts a serious crimp in earnings. “In fact, some medical cannabis operations could be driven out of business on account of this provision,” according to the NCIA. As the years wear on and the federal government continues to take tiny steps toward legitimizing the industry, a hodgepodge of incompatible state laws will be enacted, which not only will burden the industry, but will destroy any chance of the federal government getting a handle on rationally taxing and regulating it. This could lead to all kinds of problems, such as pot businesses marketing to children, inadequate labeling, and environmental problems. (Without smart regulation, pot cultivation can ravage the environment.) Further, taxing marijuana sales only at the state level could lead to rampant smuggling between states with different tax rates, as we see now with tobacco. It could also lead, eventually, to massive industry consolidation, as happened with the beer business in the years and decades after prohibition was lifted in 1933, when regulation was (and still is) left almost entirely to the states. Rather than thriving, open marketplaces filled with lots of small, competing players, the pot industry could end up being a corporate-controlled oligopoly that resists competition and enjoys massive lobbying power to keep itself in place.
6,048
<h4>Pot consolidation waters down regulations---causes environmental destruction and corporate takeover</h4><p><u><strong>Mitchell 14</u></strong> – Dan Mitchell, Independent Journalist for Fortune and the New York Times, “Federal Inaction Spells Bad News For Marijuana Business”, Fortune, 3-21, http://fortune.com/2014/03/21/federal-inaction-spells-bad-news-for-marijuana-business/</p><p>In the short term, an industry that most Americans want to see legitimized is severely hampered by the fact that what it does is a still serious federal crime. In the long term, <u>the <mark>lack of</u></mark> federal <u><mark>oversight</u></mark> now, in the industry’s nascent stages, <u><mark>will</mark> almost certainly <mark>end</mark> up <mark>with</mark> the <mark>pot</mark> business <strong><mark>consolidated</strong> in</mark> the hands of <mark>a <strong>few big companies</strong> with <strong>enormous</mark> political and economic <mark>power</strong>, to the detriment of</u></mark> its own <u>customers</u>, people who work in the business, <u><mark>the <strong>environment</strong></mark>, and</u> our <u>social well-being</u>.</p><p>This week, we learned just how unlikely it is that our moribund Congress will take the steps necessary to create an environment for a healthy, thriving, relatively harmless marijuana industry to take root. The Denver Post reported on Thursday that a bill that would allow banks to serve marijuana companies that are legal under state laws is being met with silence by nearly all 99 members of the two House committees that could get it passed. Marijuana businesses can’t use credit cards, get loans, or receive any of the other banking services that are routine for most companies.</p><p>Bill sponsor Denny Heck, a Democrat of Washington (which along with Colorado is one of two states that have legalized marijuana for recreational use) said that when he approaches his fellow members to discuss the bill, they have nothing to say. “The almost universal response is the rolling of one’s eyes,” he told the Post.</p><p>So operators of legitimate businesses in Colorado and Washington, plus the 18 other states and Washington, D.C. that allow sales of medical marijuana, are still hauling giant wads of cash around with them and — along with their customers — must be constantly on guard against robbers and thieves. And they’ll be doing so until at least next year.</p><p>The industry’s main lobbyist, the National Cannabis Industry Association, remains optimistic, and even understanding, to some degree, of the intractable Congress. “A few years ago, there would have been no such bill,” says Taylor West, the group’s deputy director. The “dramatic change in public opinion over the past few years” will simply take time to have its effect on Congress.</p><p>Despite the swell of public support for legitimizing the pot business (more than half the country is now in favor, according to most polls), many members of Congress are hesitant in part because their own states haven’t yet legalized marijuana for either medicinal or recreational use. It so happens that most of the members of the two committees — Financial Services and Judiciary — that could push the banking bill to the House floor represent districts in states where marijuana remains entirely illegal.</p><p>The Justice Department last month approved rules for prosecuting marijuana crimes that explicitly excluded banks from being prosecuted for doing business with the pot industry. But those rules don’t amount to a guarantee, and they aren’t nearly good enough for the banks, most of which will likely continue to steer clear of the industry until stronger protections are in place. Ironically, the Justice Department’s move seems to be helping to keep the banking bill stuck in committee. The Post reports that some members questioned the need for the bill given the administration’s order to federal prosecutors to stand down.</p><p>It likely that action on the bills will come only <u>after several more states legalize</u> either medical or recreational <u>marijuana, which would create legitimate pot-industry constituencies in states where there currently are none</u>. The Marijuana Policy Project estimates that five more states will legalize pot in one way or another over the next year, which would put the number over half.</p><p>Will that be enough for Congress? “It’s hard to predict anything with this Congress,” says West. And it doesn’t seem likely that the next Congress will be any more predictable or reliable.</p><p>Even if the banking bill were passed, and even if most or all states were to legalize pot in some form, there would still be the enormous problem of the federal government’s classification of marijuana as a Schedule 1 narcotic, which puts it on a par with heroin in terms of the criminal penalties for possession and sale. The NCIA for now isn’t even really trying to get marijuana rescheduled to (at the very least) make it a lesser offense.</p><p>“It’s just less than feasible right now,” West says. So the NCIA is taking an incremental approach with Congress, trying for now just to get the banking bill passed and to get IRS rules changed so that state-sanctioned pot businesses can take what are for other businesses legitimate tax deductions. A provision of the Internal Revenue Code still considers marijuana sales to be “drug trafficking,” and bars such deductions. This puts a serious crimp in earnings. “In fact, some medical cannabis operations could be driven out of business on account of this provision,” according to the NCIA.</p><p>As the years wear on and the federal government continues to take tiny steps toward legitimizing the industry, <u><mark>a hodgepodge of</mark> incompatible <mark>state laws will</mark> be enacted, which</u> not only will burden the industry, but <u>will <strong><mark>destroy any chance</strong> of</mark> the federal government getting a handle on <strong><mark>rationally</mark> taxing</strong> and <strong><mark>regulating</strong></mark> it. <mark>This could lead to</mark> all kinds of problems, such as pot businesses <strong>marketing to children</strong>, <strong>inadequate labeling</strong>, and <strong><mark>environmental problems</strong>. (Without smart regulation, pot cultivation can <strong>ravage the environment</strong></mark>.) Further, <mark>taxing</mark> marijuana sales only at the state level <mark>could lead to <strong>rampant smuggling</strong> between states with different</mark> tax <mark>rates</mark>, as we see now with tobacco</u>.</p><p><u><mark>It could</mark> also <mark>lead</mark>, eventually, <mark>to massive</mark> industry <mark>consolidation</mark>, as happened with</u> the <u>beer</u> business in the years and decades <u>after prohibition was lifted</u> in 1933, <u>when regulation was</u> (and still is) <u>left almost entirely to the states. Rather than</u> thriving, <u>open marketplaces filled with lots of small, competing players, the <mark>pot</mark> industry <mark>could end up</mark> being <mark>a <strong>corporate-controlled oligopoly</strong> that resists competition</mark> and enjoys <strong>massive lobbying power</strong> to keep itself in place</u>.</p>
1NC
null
Off
64,364
26
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,815
They don’t meet their counterinterp – “almost all” means all but a small finite set, usually about one
Wikipedia 14
Wikipedia 14
the phrase "almost all" has specialised uses. "Almost all" is used with "all but [except] finitely many" , a cofinite set or "all but a countable set" almost all prime numbers are odd, which is based on the fact that all but one prime number are odd
null
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almost_all In mathematics, the phrase "almost all" has a number of specialised uses.¶ "Almost all" is sometimes used synonymously with "all but [except] finitely many" (formally, a cofinite set) or "all but a countable set" (formally, a cocountable set); see almost.¶ A simple example is that almost all prime numbers are odd, which is based on the fact that all but one prime number are odd. (The exception is the number 2, which is prime but not odd.)
482
<h4>They don’t meet their counterinterp<u><strong> – “almost all” means all but a small finite set, usually about one </h4><p>Wikipedia 14</p><p></u></strong>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almost_all</p><p>In mathematics, <u>the phrase "almost all" has</u> a number of <u>specialised uses.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> "Almost all" is </u>sometimes <u>used</u> synonymously <u>with "all but [except] finitely many"</u> (formally<u>, a cofinite set</u>) <u>or "all but a countable set"</u> (formally, a cocountable set); see almost.¶ A simple example is that <u>almost all prime numbers are odd, which is based on the fact that all but one prime number are odd</u>. (The exception is the number 2, which is prime but not odd.)</p>
1NR
T
Interp
430,000
1
16,992
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
564,703
N
UMKC
5
Iowa HS
Brian Lain
1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,816
DSM is fine now and gambling doesn’t matter.
Davey 2014
Davey 2014
WTO members have implicitly endorsed the WTO dispute settlement system by making extensive use of it. The extensive use by developing countries has continued to date China has joined the United States and the European Union as a frequent user, probably in large part in response to the frequent use of the system against it by those two members by any measure the system has been quite active and can be said to have reached a normal, sustainable level of consultation requests. Overall, from the cases that are brought, it appears that the system continues to serve the function of providing a forum for resolving significant disputes between the major trading nations I have done on two separate periods of WTO dispute settlement, it appears that close to one-half of the cases are disposed of appropriately at the based on its usage, the system seems to be functioning well The consultation process has been effective is resolving many disputes. Based on studies consultation stage As to those cases that result in a panel and/or Appellate Body report, the DSU recommendations in the vast majority of cases are implemented In the two studies mentioned above, I found that in general during the periods examined, there was a implementation rate of 80-85%. if one takes a longer term perspective and asks in which disputes implementation has never been achieved, it can be said that for the most part, there are only a few, relatively insignificant cases that have remained on the DSB's surveillance agenda at the DSB meeting of 25 April 2014, there were 10 items on the agenda One of those cases involved a US antidumping measure on shrimp The third case concerned US claims that China has failed to implement completely the decision in the China — Electronic Payment Systems case.53 Implementation was long overdue in the remaining six cases. Four of those case involved EU and/or Japanese complaints against US measures that overall involve relatively little trade Finally, there is the Antiguan challenge to US restrictions on cross-border internet gaming, a matter that the United States has negotiated settlements with all other interested WTO members while it would be nice to see these items finally removed from the DSB's agenda, they are not major cases
WTO members have endorsed the d s m by making extensive use of it China has joined the U S and the E U as a frequent user the system has reached a , sustainable level of consultation a forum for resolving significant disputes there was a implementation rate of 85%. there are only a few, insignificant cases that have remained on the DSB's agenda there is the Antiguan challenge to internet gaming, a matter that the U S has negotiated settlements with all other interested WTO members while it would be nice to see these items finally removed from the DSB's agenda, they are not major cases
William J., Guy Raymond Jones Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Illinois College of Law, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute Settlement: Historical Evolution, Operational Success and Future Challenges, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 14-41 WTO members have implicitly endorsed the WTO dispute settlement system by making extensive use of it. There are four particular features of member usage that warrant comment. First, the pattern of usage among WTO members has varied over time. Initially, in the first five years of the system’s operation, the overwhelmingly dominant users of the system were the United States and the European Union.38 These two members have remained the most frequent users of the system since then, but they have not been as dominant as they were in the early years. Instead, starting in 2000 or thereabouts, there was a significant expansion of use by developing countries, and particularly the large developing countries.39 The extensive use by developing countries has continued to date.40 Second, in the last few years, China has joined the United States and the European Union as a frequent user, probably in large part in response to the frequent use of the system against it by those two members.41 Third, in terms of respondents, the United States is by far the WTO member whose measures are challenged the most frequently in WTO dispute settlement. Indeed, since 2000, the United States has been the respondent in 47% of the panel reports issued (and in 54% of the Appellate Body reports issued).42 In the first 5 years of WTO dispute settlement, it was the respondent in only 21% of the panel reports issued.43 The EU is a distant second, as it has been the respondent in only 15% of the panel reports issued since 2000, a figure that was the same in the early years.44 The third most often challenged country in recent years is China. All others WTO members lag far behind on this metric. Fourth, in recent years there has been a noticeable drop in annual consultations requests since the 1997 peak of 50. The average for the years 2009-2011 was 13 consultation requests per year. However, recently there has been an upsurge in dispute settlement activity. There were 27 such requests in 2012 and 21 in 2013. 45 I doubt this moderation in the number of annual consultation requests signals any dissatisfaction with the system on the part of the WTO membership, rather I tend to think that it is due mainly to better case selection by the parties – they have a better sense of when it would be useful to initiate a case – and secondarily to the fact that there was some pent-up demand to bring cases at the end of the Uruguay Round, which resulted in a larger than normal number of consultation requests in the early years of WTO dispute settlement. 46 In any event, by any measure the system has been quite active and can be said to have reached a normal, sustainable level of consultation requests. Overall, from the cases that are brought, it appears that the system continues to serve the function of providing a forum for resolving significant disputes between the major trading nations – the Airbus-Boeing dispute would be a prime example, but there are many cases involving the United States, the European Union and China – and the system continues to serve as a forum for challenges by I have done on two separate periods of WTO dispute settlement, it appears that close to one-half of the cases are disposed of appropriately at the other nations to actions taken by those Big Three nations – Brazil’s challenges to EU sugar subsidies and US cotton subsidies would be examples. Thus, based on its usage, the system seems to be functioning well. B. Dispute resolution: Results of consultations and DSU recommendations The consultation process has been effective is resolving many disputes. Based on studies consultation stage. ; While the parties often do not notify a solution to the DSB as they are supposed to do. further research — such as interviews with the individuals involved in the case or an examination of the status of the challenged measure — confirms this high disposition rate. In more recent years, the percentage of settlements through consultations has fallen as a higher percentage of cases end up before panels, but the consultation requirement still seems useful as many cases are settled at that stage. As to those cases that result in a panel and/or Appellate Body report, the DSU recommendations in the vast majority of cases are implemented. That is to say, the non- compliant measure is brought into conformity with WTO obligations or there is a mutually agreed solution to the case. In the two studies mentioned above, I found that in general during the periods examined, there was a implementation rate of 80-85%.49 Indeed, if one takes a longer term perspective and asks in which disputes implementation has never been achieved, it can be said that for the most part, there are only a few, relatively insignificant cases that have remained on the DSB's surveillance agenda. For example, at the DSB meeting of 25 April 2014, there were 10 items on the surveillance part of the agenda and in respect of one of the items the reasonable period of time for implementation had not expired.'0 In three cases, implementation may have been overdue, but only by a year or two. One of those cases involved a US antidumping measure on shrimp challenged by Vietnam, where some of the contested implementation issues are soon to be considered by a new panel sought by Vietnam in respect of related US antidumping measures on shrimp.5' The second case involved a Filipino challenge to various Thai customs measures involving Thai treatment of Filipino cigarettes, a matter which has been implemented for the most part.'2 The third case concerned US claims that China has failed to implement completely the decision in the China — Electronic Payment Systems case.53 Implementation was long overdue in the remaining six cases. Four of those case involved EU and/or Japanese complaints against US measures that overall involve relatively little trade (Section 111 — Havana Club; Section 1105 — Irish Music)54 or have been partially implemented or settled (Hot-Rolled Steel and Byrd)." One involved a US complaint against the EU (Biotech) that the EU has settled with the other complainants." Finally, there is the Antiguan challenge to US restrictions on cross-border internet gaming, a matter that the United States has negotiated settlements with all other interested WTO members. Thus, while it would be nice to see these items finally removed from the DSB's agenda, they are not major cases. While this implementation record is very good, two caveats must be mentioned. First, in many cases, as described below, implementation was not at all achieved in a timely matter. Second, in some cases, it is likely that the complainants have not pursued the matter — for cost or whatever reasons — even though they believe that full implementation has not occurred.
7,046
<h4><u><strong>DSM is fine now and gambling doesn’t matter.</h4><p>Davey 2014</p><p></u></strong>William J., Guy Raymond Jones Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Illinois College of Law, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute Settlement: Historical Evolution, Operational Success and Future Challenges, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 14-41</p><p><u><mark>WTO members have</mark> implicitly <mark>endorsed the</mark> WTO <mark>d</mark>ispute <mark>s</mark>ettlement syste<mark>m</mark> <mark>by making extensive use of it</mark>.</u> There are four particular features of member usage that warrant comment. First, the pattern of usage among WTO members has varied over time. Initially, in the first five years of the system’s operation, the overwhelmingly dominant users of the system were the United States and the European Union.38 These two members have remained the most frequent users of the system since then, but they have not been as dominant as they were in the early years. Instead, starting in 2000 or thereabouts, there was a significant expansion of use by developing countries, and particularly the large developing countries.39 <u>The extensive use by developing countries has continued to date</u>.40 Second, in the last few years, <u><mark>China has joined the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and the E</mark>uropean <mark>U</mark>nion <mark>as a frequent user</mark>, probably in large part in response to the frequent use of the system against it by those two members</u>.41 Third, in terms of respondents, the United States is by far the WTO member whose measures are challenged the most frequently in WTO dispute settlement. Indeed, since 2000, the United States has been the respondent in 47% of the panel reports issued (and in 54% of the Appellate Body reports issued).42 In the first 5 years of WTO dispute settlement, it was the respondent in only 21% of the panel reports issued.43 The EU is a distant second, as it has been the respondent in only 15% of the panel reports issued since 2000, a figure that was the same in the early years.44 The third most often challenged country in recent years is China. All others WTO members lag far behind on this metric. Fourth, in recent years there has been a noticeable drop in annual consultations requests since the 1997 peak of 50. The average for the years 2009-2011 was 13 consultation requests per year. However, recently there has been an upsurge in dispute settlement activity. There were 27 such requests in 2012 and 21 in 2013. 45 I doubt this moderation in the number of annual consultation requests signals any dissatisfaction with the system on the part of the WTO membership, rather I tend to think that it is due mainly to better case selection by the parties – they have a better sense of when it would be useful to initiate a case – and secondarily to the fact that there was some pent-up demand to bring cases at the end of the Uruguay Round, which resulted in a larger than normal number of consultation requests in the early years of WTO dispute settlement. 46 In any event, <u>by any measure <mark>the system has </mark>been quite active and can be said to have <mark>reached a </mark>normal<mark>, sustainable level of consultation</mark> requests. Overall, from the cases that are brought, it appears that the system continues to serve the function of providing <mark>a forum for resolving significant disputes</mark> between the major trading nations</u> – the Airbus-Boeing dispute would be a prime example, but there are many cases involving the United States, the European Union and China – and the system continues to serve as a forum for challenges by <u>I have done on two separate periods of WTO dispute settlement, it appears that close to one-half of the cases are disposed of appropriately at the </u>other nations to actions taken by those Big Three nations – Brazil’s challenges to EU sugar subsidies and US cotton subsidies would be examples. Thus, <u>based on its usage, the system seems to be functioning well</u>. B. Dispute resolution: Results of consultations and DSU recommendations <u>The consultation process has been effective is resolving many disputes. Based on studies consultation stage</u>. ; While the parties often do not notify a solution to the DSB as they are supposed to do. further research — such as interviews with the individuals involved in the case or an examination of the status of the challenged measure — confirms this high disposition rate. In more recent years, the percentage of settlements through consultations has fallen as a higher percentage of cases end up before panels, but the consultation requirement still seems useful as many cases are settled at that stage. <u>As to those cases that result in a panel and/or Appellate Body report, the DSU recommendations in the vast majority of cases are implemented</u>. That is to say, the non- compliant measure is brought into conformity with WTO obligations or there is a mutually agreed solution to the case. <u>In the two studies mentioned above, I found that in general during the periods examined,<mark> there was a implementation rate of</mark> 80-<mark>85%.</u></mark>49 Indeed, <u>if one takes a longer term perspective and asks in which disputes implementation has never been achieved, it can be said that for the most part, <strong><mark>there are only a few, </mark>relatively <mark>insignificant cases</strong> that have remained on the DSB's</mark> surveillance <mark>agenda</u></mark>. For example, <u>at the DSB meeting of 25 April 2014, there were 10 items on the</u> surveillance part of the <u>agenda</u> and in respect of one of the items the reasonable period of time for implementation had not expired.'0 In three cases, implementation may have been overdue, but only by a year or two. <u>One of those cases involved a US antidumping measure on shrimp</u> challenged by Vietnam, where some of the contested implementation issues are soon to be considered by a new panel sought by Vietnam in respect of related US antidumping measures on shrimp.5' The second case involved a Filipino challenge to various Thai customs measures involving Thai treatment of Filipino cigarettes, a matter which has been implemented for the most part.'2 <u>The third case concerned US claims that China has failed to implement completely the decision in the China — Electronic Payment Systems case.53 Implementation was long overdue in the remaining six cases. Four of those case involved EU and/or Japanese complaints against US measures that overall involve relatively little trade</u> (Section 111 — Havana Club; Section 1105 — Irish Music)54 or have been partially implemented or settled (Hot-Rolled Steel and Byrd)." One involved a US complaint against the EU (Biotech) that the EU has settled with the other complainants." <u>Finally,<mark> there is the Antiguan challenge to</mark> US restrictions on cross-border <mark>internet gaming, a matter that <strong>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has negotiated settlements with all other interested WTO members</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>while it would be nice to see these items finally removed from the DSB's agenda, they are not major cases</u></strong></mark>. While this implementation record is very good, two caveats must be mentioned. First, in many cases, as described below, implementation was not at all achieved in a timely matter. Second, in some cases, it is likely that the complainants have not pursued the matter — for cost or whatever reasons — even though they believe that full implementation has not occurred.</p>
1NC
null
China
430,001
21
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,817
No internal to state budget -- just a drop in the bucket
Gleckman 12
Gleckman 12 Howard, 12-6-2012, "Dude, Would Legalizing And Taxing Weed Solve Our Budget Woes?," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/12/06/dude-would-legalizing-and-taxing-weed-solve-states-budget-woes/, AB
Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets The answer is yes, but it wouldn’t help much legalizing pot would both reduce spending and raise tax revenue by about 0.5 percent the revenue estimates from an excise tax are much less certain revenues could be much lower current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream people would smoke more pot But some users might also reduce their intake of booze that substitution of one drug for another might also reduce the net increase in tax revenue. how about supply suppliers would no longer incur the costs of prohibition On the other, they would face new regulatory costs lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs. taxing dope would increase revenues by 9 billion which isn’t very much money Legalizing certainly won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff
Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets it wouldn’t help much revenue estimates are much less certain. current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream users might also reduce their intake of booze that substitution might also reduce the net increase in tax revenue. suppliers would face new regulatory costs lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs. Legalizing won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff
Starting today, it is legal to smoke marijuana in Washington State. That got me thinking: Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets? The answer is yes, but it wouldn’t help much. One 2010 study, done for the libertarian CATO Institute, figures legalizing and taxing weed would increase state tax revenues by about $9 billion a year and reduce spending on enforcement by about the same amount. Overall, legalizing pot would both reduce spending and raise tax revenue by about 0.5 percent, according to the authors, Jeffrey Miron and Katherine Waldock. The RAND Corporation, in its own 2010 report, concludes the revenue estimates from an excise tax on dope are much less certain. California officials estimated a state pot tax of $50 an ounce could generate as much as $1.4 billion but RAND concluded revenues could be much lower or even somewhat higher. Btw, the $50 tax is not pulled out of a hat—or, um, a bong. It is roughly equal to the tax on cigarettes. As with any excise tax, the amount of revenue a weed tax could generate is a function of four big things: The tax rate, supply, demand, and price. Each, of course, affects the other three. And, with marijuana, this gets pretty interesting—at least for a tax wonk. Besides, it gives a whole new meaning to the phrase Tea Party. How much would legalization boost demand? Well, economists can only guess. RAND reports there is good research on the response of cocaine use to changes in price, but not much when it comes to pot. Don’t ask. Stoners probably wouldn’t change behavior much. They seem to be getting as high as they want, even with illegal weed. Some current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream, and thus boring. Economists call this the “forbidden fruit” effect. Still, it is reasonable to expect legalization would increase demand overall–in part because casual users who won’t buy illicit marijuana might purchase once it is legal. On net, people would smoke more pot. But some users might also reduce their intake of booze. If so, that substitution of one drug for another might also reduce the net increase in tax revenue. And how about supply? Well, the two-handed economists strike again. On one hand, suppliers would no longer incur the costs of prohibition (such as, say, arrest). On the other, they would face new regulatory costs—and those pesky taxes. C’mon dude. Why can’t I get a straight answer? By comparing prices in the Netherlands, where grass was de facto legal, with prices in the U.S., Miron and Waldock figure the price of dope would fall by as much as half if the drug were legalized in the U.S. The RAND authors conclude it would decline even more, so legal weed (including tax) would cost only one-quarter to one-third as much as illicit marijuana. A brief word on spending. Both studies suggest that net costs to state and local governments would fall if pot is legalized. However lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs. All this seems to suggest two results. First, given an excuse (and some funding), economists will research almost anything. Second, legalizing dope will trim spending and generate some new taxes. Nationally, Miron and Waldock estimate that taxing dope would increase revenues by about $9 billion which, in the scheme of things, isn’t very much money. Legalizing dope and making it widely available certainly won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff. On the other hand, maybe we won’t care as much.
3,512
<h4><u><strong>No internal to state budget -- just a drop in the bucket</h4><p>Gleckman 12</p><p></u></strong>Howard, 12-6-2012, "Dude, Would Legalizing And Taxing Weed Solve Our Budget Woes?," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/12/06/dude-would-legalizing-and-taxing-weed-solve-states-budget-woes/, AB</p><p>Starting today, it is legal to smoke marijuana in Washington State. That got me thinking: <u><strong><mark>Could taxing stoners help balance state budgets</u></strong></mark>? <u>The answer is yes, but <strong><mark>it wouldn’t help much</u></strong></mark>. One 2010 study, done for the libertarian CATO Institute, figures legalizing and taxing weed would increase state tax revenues by about $9 billion a year and reduce spending on enforcement by about the same amount. Overall, <u><strong>legalizing pot would both reduce spending and raise tax revenue by about 0.5 percent</u></strong>, according to the authors, Jeffrey Miron and Katherine Waldock. The RAND Corporation, in its own 2010 report, concludes <u>the <mark>revenue estimates</mark> from an excise tax</u> on dope <u><strong><mark>are much less certain</u></strong>.</mark> California officials estimated a state pot tax of $50 an ounce could generate as much as $1.4 billion but RAND concluded <u><strong>revenues could be much lower </u></strong>or even somewhat higher. Btw, the $50 tax is not pulled out of a hat—or, um, a bong. It is roughly equal to the tax on cigarettes. As with any excise tax, the amount of revenue a weed tax could generate is a function of four big things: The tax rate, supply, demand, and price. Each, of course, affects the other three. And, with marijuana, this gets pretty interesting—at least for a tax wonk. Besides, it gives a whole new meaning to the phrase Tea Party. How much would legalization boost demand? Well, economists can only guess. RAND reports there is good research on the response of cocaine use to changes in price, but not much when it comes to pot. Don’t ask. Stoners probably wouldn’t change behavior much. They seem to be getting as high as they want, even with illegal weed. Some <u><strong><mark>current users might even stop or curtail their usage once dope becomes mainstream</u></strong></mark>, and thus boring. Economists call this the “forbidden fruit” effect. Still, it is reasonable to expect legalization would increase demand overall–in part because casual users who won’t buy illicit marijuana might purchase once it is legal. On net, <u>people would smoke more pot</u>. <u>But some <strong><mark>users might also reduce their intake of booze</u></strong></mark>. If so, <u><strong><mark>that substitution</strong></mark> of one drug for another <mark>might also <strong>reduce the net increase in tax revenue.</mark> </u></strong>And <u>how about supply</u>? Well, the two-handed economists strike again. On one hand, <u><mark>suppliers</mark> would no longer incur the costs of prohibition</u> (such as, say, arrest). <u>On the other, <strong>they <mark>would face new regulatory costs</u></strong></mark>—and those pesky taxes. C’mon dude. Why can’t I get a straight answer? By comparing prices in the Netherlands, where grass was de facto legal, with prices in the U.S., Miron and Waldock figure the price of dope would fall by as much as half if the drug were legalized in the U.S. The RAND authors conclude it would decline even more, so legal weed (including tax) would cost only one-quarter to one-third as much as illicit marijuana. A brief word on spending. Both studies suggest that net costs to state and local governments would fall if pot is legalized. However <u><strong><mark>lower enforcement costs might be offset a bit by higher medical and regulatory costs.</mark> </u></strong>All this seems to suggest two results. First, given an excuse (and some funding), economists will research almost anything. Second, legalizing dope will trim spending and generate some new taxes. Nationally, Miron and Waldock estimate that <u>taxing dope would increase revenues</u> <u>by</u> about $<u>9 billion</u> <u>which</u>, in the scheme of things, <u><strong>isn’t very much money</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Legalizing</u></strong></mark> dope and making it widely available <u><strong>certainly <mark>won’t prevent us from going over the fiscal cliff</u></strong></mark>. On the other hand, maybe we won’t care as much.</p>
1NC
null
Econ
429,895
6
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,818
Afghan stability is resolved by regional cooperation and institutions
PAN 4/27
PAN 4/27 (Pajhwok Afghanistan News, April 27, 2013, “Regional states underline Afghan stability”, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/27/regional-states-underline-afghan-stability, AB)
the international community and the region had a shared responsibility and common interest in working together for the sake of Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations is essential to the success Our shared interests are best served by cooperation, rather than competition in the Heart of Asia. The first priority and area of common concern is security Contemporary security threats have a global character and the only possible way to effectively counter them is for states to work together according to agreed principles and mechanisms of cooperation. we are determined to work together through the Istanbul Process to respond to our common security challenges and threats
the international community had a shared responsibility and common interest in working together for Afghanistan and the region interests are served by cooperation rather than competition The first concern is security. to effectively counter them is for mechanisms of cooperation we are determined to work together to respond to threats
It added the international community and the region had a shared responsibility and common interest in working together for the sake of Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations involved in the Istanbul Process is essential to the success of this shared effort. It welcomed efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. “Our shared interests are best served by cooperation, rather than competition, in the Heart of Asia. We will therefore use the Istanbul Process to build a common platform of shared regional interests, as well as a secure and prosperous ‘Heart of Asia’ region where Afghanistan has a crucial role as a land-bridge, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East. “The first priority and area of common concern is security. Contemporary security challenges and threats have a global character and impact and the only possible way to effectively counter them is for states to work together according to agreed principles and mechanisms of cooperation. “In this context, as representatives of a region that is most affected by common security challenges, we are determined to work together through the Istanbul Process to respond to our common security challenges and threats,” the document said.
1,319
<h4>Afghan stability is resolved by regional cooperation and institutions </h4><p><u><strong><mark>PAN 4/27</u></strong></mark> (Pajhwok Afghanistan News, April 27, 2013, “Regional states underline Afghan stability”, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/27/regional-states-underline-afghan-stability, AB)</p><p>It added <u><mark>the international community</mark> and the region <mark>had a <strong>shared responsibility</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>common interest</mark> </strong><mark>in working together for</mark> the sake of <mark>Afghanistan</mark> <mark>and the region</mark> as a whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations</u> involved in the Istanbul Process <u>is essential</u> <u>to the success</u> of this shared effort. It welcomed efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. “<u>Our shared <mark>interests</mark> <mark>are</mark> best <mark>served by <strong>cooperation</mark>, <mark>rather than competition</u></strong></mark>, <u>in</u> <u>the Heart of Asia.</u> We will therefore use the Istanbul Process to build a common platform of shared regional interests, as well as a secure and prosperous ‘Heart of Asia’ region where Afghanistan has a crucial role as a land-bridge, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East. “<u><mark>The</mark> <mark>first</mark> priority and area of common <mark>concern is security</u>. <u></mark>Contemporary security</u> challenges and <u>threats have a global character and</u> impact and <u>the only possible way <mark>to effectively counter them is for</mark> states to work together according to agreed principles and <strong><mark>mechanisms of cooperation</strong></mark>. </u>“In this context, as representatives of a region that is most affected by common security challenges, <u><strong><mark>we are determined to work together</u></strong></mark> <u>through the Istanbul Process <mark>to</mark> <mark>respond to</mark> our common security challenges and <mark>threats</u></mark>,” the document said.</p>
1NR
War on Drugs
Afghan Impact
97,575
4
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,819
No risk of bioterror
Ivanov 9/23
Ivanov 9/23 (Sandra Ivanov, postgraduate student at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago in New Zealand, 9-23-14, “HOW TO MAKE THE ‘EBOLA BOMB': WHY YOU SHOULD STOP WORRYING ABOUT BIOTERRORISM,” http://cimsec.org/make-ebola-bomb-stop-worrying-bioterrorism/13069) gz
Many studies from a health, as well as a humanities perspective, assume that terrorists could successfully generate biological or chemical agents and weaponise them any terrorist group wanting to create and weaponise a biological or chemical agent will need to have an appropriate kitchen a standard biosafety level 4 scene will be required Some features of these laboratories include decontamination mechanisms, pest management systems, air filters, and special suits the kitchen will have to be in a separate building, or in an isolated area within a building to meet the safety requirements the baking process will need to be kept in total secrecy. The constant threat of law enforcements raiding facilities, and intelligence and secret services detecting activities will have to be avoided there are only some fifty of these laboratories successfully maintained worldwide a terrorist group must decide what kind of agent they would like to use in a bioterror attack Although Ebola infection of animals through aerosol particles can be effective, it has not successfully been transferred with this method to humans a substantial amount of material and money is required. Investment is needed from the very outset – taking into account membership size and capabilities of a terrorist group, financial assets of a group, and making sure territory and proper infrastructure is available for the biological agent. For a successful bomb to be created, a group must think about the resources they will need for each stage of the baking process, such as weapons production, potential testing phases, and logistics, such as transportation and communications technologies Resources needed for an “Ebola Bomb” will most likely need to be imported from the outside, and a group must determine the feasibility of acquiring the materials and technologies needed for the bomb A surplus of money would also be a smart idea in case technical difficulties arise. 5 Cups of Expertise the recipe will require the right kind of know-how a terrorist group should have members with high levels of education and training in science, engineering, and technological development, to deal with highly virulent agents, and for successful weaponisation A group may need to be integrated into knowledge flows and institutions, or be able to recruit members to their cause with this specific expertise Knowledge and expertise is required to create the correct strain, handling the agent, growing the agent with the desired characteristics, and maintaining the agent. Taking Ebola specifically requires synthesising proteins which make it infectious, and becomes a task that is difficult and unlikely to succeed If Ebola is successfully created in the kitchen, it is not itself a biological weapon – an expert will be required to transform the virus into a workable mechanism for dissemination spoon of Risk The decision MARKED to use biological weapons for an attack is in itself extremely risky bioterrorism could cause dissenting views among followers, and that public approval and opinion may channel the way a group operates terrorists are political communicators, wanting to bring attention to their grievances. If a group becomes polarised or resented by their actions, they will not see the benefits of pursuing certain methods. Terrorists want to send powerful messages, gain more members, in which these members assist to bring about certain plans and demands. Therefore, public opinion and political opportunism will be risked in a quest to create a bioweapon a terrorist group may be subject to more scrutiny or attention States will be more vigilant towards groups that are known to be seeking and acquiring biological and chemical capabilities risk will always cling on to funding requirements, and potential technical difficulties in all stages of the bioweapon making process. A fist full of time may be needed so that knowledge, both tacit and explicit, can be acquired, as well as accounting for the various mistakes and learning curves to overcome It will take time to create a successful weapon with prior testing, and wait for the correct environmental conditions when it comes to dissemination. A Pinch of Curiosity of the Unknown risk coincides with uncertainty, and there will need to be a commitment to potential unknown factors. It is unknown what will happen once a virus is disseminated. Will the weapon even work in the first place? Weather conditions are unpredictable and Ebola will not have a prominent effect in certain environments. What happens to the terrorist group if the attack fails? What happens to the reputation of the group and its membership, or will the group cease to exist? If the recipe is a success, it is impossible to control the biological agent which is released – not only can it affect the targeted population, but it may annihilate the terrorist group itself. There will be an unknown into potentially losing local and international support, and donors if this causes widespread catastrophe. The process of turning a biological agent into a weapon for attack is the phase with the most hurdles for terrorist groups it has to be disseminated through an effective delivery mechanism Weaponising a live host is more difficult than other agents which can be cultured on dishes of nutrients. The process has many stages which involve testing, refining, upgrading, and toughening. The methods to disseminate an agent are only known to few people, and rarely published Let’s take Aum Shinrikyo as an example of conducting a bioterrorist attack even with money and resources, they failed to effectively weaponise the chemical. Factors which led to their failure included internal secrecy and breakdown in communication; selecting members only solely dedicated to their cause to work on the weapons, ultimately employing unskilled people to operate and maintain the project, causing accidents and leaks Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to disseminate botulinum toxin into Tokyo using a truck with a compressor and vents, did not work because they had not acquired an infectious strain this “Ebola Bomb” has not come close to containing the right requirements needed to explode. Looking back historically, pathogens, and all kinds of toxins have been used as tools in sabotage and assassinations since the beginning of time. the likelihood of its development and use by a terrorist group is quite improbable Mentioning Aum Shinrikyo again, they are an organisation which at the time, had a war chest of more than $300 million, with six laboratories and a handful of biologists, in the end having insurmountable difficulties with the weaponisation and dissemination processes, and killing a dozen people Examining state biological weapons programmes, Soviet Russia had almost 60,000 personnel employed in their weapons development, with only about 100 people that actually knew how to take an agent through the full production process. In the United States, at Fort Detrick, there were 250 buildings with 3,000 personnel, and it took them a while to weaponise a single agent, such as botulinum the narrative has assumed a worst case scenario analysis, and subsequently narrowed down bioterrorism to a single threat prognosis There is little distinction made between what is conceivable and possible, and what is likely in terms of bioterrorism. Anything can be conceived as a terrorist threat, but what is the reality? The “Ebola Bomb” is not a danger. The likelihood of a bioterrorist attack remains highly unlikely The effectiveness of biological weapons has never been clearly shown, the numbers of casualties have been small and it is likely that hoaxes and false alarms in the future will continue to outnumber real events and create disruptive hysteria
any group wanting to weaponise a biological agent will need a biosafety level 4 scene features include decontamination pest management filters, and suits in total secrecy law enforcements and intelligence will have to be avoided there are only fifty of these worldwide Ebola through aerosol has not successfully been transferred to humans substantial money is required a group must think about resources for each stage Resources will need to be imported a group should have education in science, engineering, and tech A group may need to be integrated into knowledge flows Ebola requires synthesising proteins a task that is difficult and unlikely to succeed spoon of Risk The decision to use bio weapons is extremely risky bioterrorism could cause dissent among followers terrorists want attention If a group becomes resented they will not pursu certain methods States will be more vigilant towards groups known to seek biological capabilities It will take time to create a successful weapon It is unknown what will happen Will the weapon work ? Weather conditions are unpredictable What happens if the attack fails? it is impossible to control the agent which is released it may annihilate the terrorist group turning a biological agent into a weapon is the phase with the most hurdles Weaponising a live host has many stages which involve testing, refining, upgrading, and toughening methods are only known to few and rarely published Let’s take Aum Shinrikyo even with money they failed to weaponise the chemical employing unskilled people causing accidents and leaks Aum Shinrikyo had more than $300 million six laboratories and biologists Russia had only 100 people that knew how to take an agent through production the U S took a while to weaponise a single agent a bioterrorist attack remains highly unlikely
Many studies from a health, as well as a humanities perspective, assume that terrorists could successfully generate biological or chemical agents and weaponise them. Taking this initial premise, a lot of literature has been based around this looming threat, subsequently offering policy advice, public health recommendations, and technological investment to avoid such catastrophes. However it would be useful to deconstruct this claim entirely. So I’ll begin by offering a baking recipe, to explore at the very core, what a group would need to do to successfully create a biological weapon, in this case, utilising the Ebola virus. Ingredients Firstly, any terrorist group wanting to create and weaponise a biological or chemical agent will need to have an appropriate kitchen. In the case of the Ebola virus, a standard biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) scene will be required (Adeline M. Nyamathi et al., “Ebola Virus: Immune Mechanisms of Protection and Vaccine Development“, Biological Research For Nursing 4, No. 4, April 2003: 276-281). Some features of these laboratories include decontamination mechanisms, pest management systems, air filters, and special suits. Sometimes the kitchen will have to be in a separate building, or in an isolated area within a building to meet the safety requirements. Not only will the kitchen be under strict conditions, the baking process will need to be kept in total secrecy. The constant threat of law enforcements raiding facilities, and intelligence and secret services detecting activities will have to be avoided. Also, there are only some fifty of these laboratories successfully maintained worldwide. Before starting, make sure there is a baking dish of ‘uncertainty’ readily available to just throw all of the following ingredients into: 1 Tablespoon of Proper Agent Initially, a terrorist group must decide what kind of agent they would like to use in a bioterror attack. This is one part of the recipe which can be modified, but the other ingredients will be standard for all types of attacks. The recent spread of the deadly Ebola virus will be the agent of choice for this bomb. Ebola is a virus which is passed to humans through contact with infected animals. The spread of the virus from person-to-person is brought about through blood and bodily fluids, as well as exposure to a contaminated environment. An infected live host with Ebola would need to be maintained in a human or animal – only a few animals are able to be used as hosts, such as primates, bats, and forest antelope. Although Ebola infection of animals through aerosol particles can be effective, it has not successfully been transferred with this method to humans (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan, “Bioterrorism: Preparing for the impossible or the improbable“, Critical Care Medicine 33, No. 1, January 2005: 75-95). 1 Bucket of Resources and Money In order to develop a biological weapon, a substantial amount of material and money is required. Investment is needed from the very outset – taking into account membership size and capabilities of a terrorist group, financial assets of a group, and making sure territory and proper infrastructure is available for the biological agent. For a successful bomb to be created, a group must think about the resources they will need for each stage of the baking process, such as weapons production, potential testing phases, and logistics, such as transportation and communications technologies (Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism“, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2006). Resources needed for an “Ebola Bomb” will most likely need to be imported from the outside, and a group must determine the feasibility of acquiring the materials and technologies needed for the bomb (Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation to terrorists“, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999: 17-34). A surplus of money would also be a smart idea in case technical difficulties arise. 5 Cups of Expertise With all the correct resources and necessary amount of monetary support, the recipe will require the right kind of know-how. For an operation like this, a terrorist group should have members with high levels of education and training in science, engineering, and technological development, to deal with highly virulent agents, and for successful weaponisation (Zanders). A group may need to be integrated into knowledge flows and institutions, or be able to recruit members to their cause with this specific expertise (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). Knowledge and expertise is required to create the correct strain, handling the agent, growing the agent with the desired characteristics, and maintaining the agent. Taking Ebola specifically requires synthesising proteins which make it infectious, and becomes a task that is difficult and unlikely to succeed (Amanda M. Teckma, “The Bioterrorist Threat of Ebola in East Africa and Implications for Global Health and Security“, Global Policy Essay, May 2013). If Ebola is successfully created in the kitchen, it is not itself a biological weapon – an expert will be required to transform the virus into a workable mechanism for dissemination. A Teaspoon of Risk The decision MARKED to use biological weapons for an attack is in itself extremely risky. There is a risk that bioterrorism could cause dissenting views among followers, and that public approval and opinion may channel the way a group operates. After all, terrorists are political communicators, wanting to bring attention to their grievances. If a group becomes polarised or resented by their actions, they will not see the benefits of pursuing certain methods. Terrorists want to send powerful messages, gain more members, in which these members assist to bring about certain plans and demands. Therefore, public opinion and political opportunism will be risked in a quest to create a bioweapon such as an “Ebola Bomb” (Zanders). Secondly, a terrorist group may be subject to more scrutiny or attention. This is why keeping activities covert will be a key to success. States will be more vigilant towards groups that are known to be seeking and acquiring biological and chemical capabilities (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). And finally, risk will always cling on to funding requirements, and potential technical difficulties in all stages of the bioweapon making process. A Fist of Time Now this recipe is going to take a while to prepare and bake in the oven, and there is no particular moment to determine when it should be removed from the baking dish. So, whatever group wants to make this bomb, will need to realise this is a long-term and complex effort. It will not work like most conventional weapons, which produce a high number of casualties with a single explosion, and that could be a reason why bioterrorism is not the most popular means for a violent attack – demanding time, effort, and resources without guarantees of a concrete result. A fist full of time may be needed so that knowledge, both tacit and explicit, can be acquired, as well as accounting for the various mistakes and learning curves to overcome (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). It can also refer to how long it will take to cook up, maintain and prepare a virus for an attack. It will take time to create a successful weapon with prior testing, and wait for the correct environmental conditions when it comes to dissemination. Time will have to be a group investment – it is not the kind of bomb that will detonate immediately. A Pinch of Curiosity of the Unknown The teaspoon of risk coincides with uncertainty, and there will need to be a commitment to potential unknown factors. It is unknown what will happen once a virus is disseminated. Will the weapon even work in the first place? Weather conditions are unpredictable and Ebola will not have a prominent effect in certain environments. What happens to the terrorist group if the attack fails? What happens to the reputation of the group and its membership, or will the group cease to exist? If the recipe is a success, it is impossible to control the biological agent which is released – not only can it affect the targeted population, but it may annihilate the terrorist group itself. There will be an unknown into potentially losing local and international support, and donors if this causes widespread catastrophe. Method: Weaponisation and Dissemination Mix that up good in your baking dish of what is now “deep uncertainty” and pop it in the oven to bake. But as time passes, it seems as though the ingredients are not rising. The process of turning a biological agent into a weapon for attack is the phase with the most hurdles for terrorist groups. In order for a virus to inflict a lot of harm, it has to be disseminated through an effective delivery mechanism. As mentioned previously, the Ebola virus needs a live host. Weaponising a live host is more difficult than other agents which can be cultured on dishes of nutrients. The process has many stages which involve testing, refining, upgrading, and toughening. The methods to disseminate an agent are only known to few people, and rarely published – it is not a basement project (Teckman). Let’s take Aum Shinrikyo as an example of conducting a bioterrorist attack (even it was “only” a chemical attack). This apocalyptic religious organisation in Japan managed to release sarin gas inside a Tokyo subway, killing a dozen people, and injuring 50. However, even with money and resources, they failed to effectively weaponise the chemical. Factors which led to their failure included internal secrecy and breakdown in communication; selecting members only solely dedicated to their cause to work on the weapons, ultimately employing unskilled people to operate and maintain the project, causing accidents and leaks (Zanders). Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to disseminate botulinum toxin into Tokyo using a truck with a compressor and vents, did not work because they had not acquired an infectious strain (Sharon Begley, “Unmasking Bioterror“, Newsweek, 13.03.2010; “Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities“, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001). Finally, a major obstacle to successfully disseminating Ebola, is because this virus requires a specific environment in order to thrive. Weather conditions can be unpredictable, and Ebola particularly needs high temperatures and humidity to remain effective. Decoration: Results and Conclusions Obviously, this “Ebola Bomb” has not come close to containing the right requirements needed to explode. Looking back historically, pathogens, and all kinds of toxins have been used as tools in sabotage and assassinations since the beginning of time. Now, it would be silly to say this recipe will never work – there will always be a possibility that Ebola or other viruses may be used as biological weapons in the future. However, the likelihood of its development and use by a terrorist group is quite improbable. Mentioning Aum Shinrikyo again, they are an organisation which at the time, had a war chest of more than $300 million, with six laboratories and a handful of biologists, in the end having insurmountable difficulties with the weaponisation and dissemination processes, and killing a dozen people (Begley). There is a greater amount of knowledge and technology available in our day and age than in 1995 with the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, but it is still unlikely that this will be the weapon of choice. Examining state biological weapons programmes, Soviet Russia had almost 60,000 personnel employed in their weapons development, with only about 100 people that actually knew how to take an agent through the full production process. In the United States, at Fort Detrick, there were 250 buildings with 3,000 personnel, and it took them a while to weaponise a single agent, such as botulinum (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan). Nowadays, the narrative has assumed a worst case scenario analysis, and subsequently narrowed down bioterrorism to a single threat prognosis. There is little distinction made between what is conceivable and possible, and what is likely in terms of bioterrorism. Anything can be conceived as a terrorist threat, but what is the reality? The “Ebola Bomb” is not a danger. The likelihood of a bioterrorist attack remains highly unlikely (Teckman). The focus should be on preventing natural pandemics of human disease, such as tuberculosis, SARS, AIDS and influenza – emphasis placed on how we can cure diseases, and how medical training could be improved to contain, and avoid viruses such as Ebola altogether. Resources are being pumped into biodefence in the security as well as the medical sector, but preparedness and investment in bioterrorism needs to be in proportion to actual threats, otherwise, funds are diverted away from much needed public health programmes: The effectiveness of biological weapons has never been clearly shown, the numbers of casualties have been small and it is likely that hoaxes and false alarms in the future will continue to outnumber real events and create disruptive hysteria (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan). Emphasis needs to be back on medical research, as well as social science investigations into the roots of why terrorist groups would even want to pursue biological weapons, and the lengths they would go to use them. Let this be an avenue for further pondering and exploring, the realities of bioterrorism.
13,654
<h4>No risk of bioterror</h4><p><u><strong>Ivanov 9/23</u></strong> (Sandra Ivanov, postgraduate student at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago in New Zealand, 9-23-14, “HOW TO MAKE THE ‘EBOLA BOMB': WHY YOU SHOULD STOP WORRYING ABOUT BIOTERRORISM,” http://cimsec.org/make-ebola-bomb-stop-worrying-bioterrorism/13069) gz</p><p><u>Many studies from a health, as well as a humanities perspective, assume that terrorists could successfully generate biological or chemical agents and weaponise them</u>. Taking this initial premise, a lot of literature has been based around this looming threat, subsequently offering policy advice, public health recommendations, and technological investment to avoid such catastrophes. However it would be useful to deconstruct this claim entirely. So I’ll begin by offering a baking recipe, to explore at the very core, what a group would need to do to successfully create a biological weapon, in this case, utilising the Ebola virus.</p><p>Ingredients</p><p>Firstly, <u><mark>any</mark> terrorist <mark>group wanting to</mark> create and <mark>weaponise a biological</mark> or chemical <mark>agent will need</mark> to have an appropriate kitchen</u>. In the case of the Ebola virus,<mark> <u>a </mark>standard <mark>biosafety level 4</u></mark> (BSL-4) <u><mark>scene</mark> will be required</u> (Adeline M. Nyamathi et al., “Ebola Virus: Immune Mechanisms of Protection and Vaccine Development“, Biological Research For Nursing 4, No. 4, April 2003: 276-281). <u>Some <mark>features</mark> of these laboratories <mark>include decontamination</mark> mechanisms, <mark>pest management</mark> systems, air <mark>filters, and</mark> special <mark>suits</u></mark>. Sometimes <u>the kitchen will have to be in a separate building, or in an isolated area within a building to meet the safety requirements</u>. Not only will the kitchen be under strict conditions, <u>the baking process will need to be kept <mark>in total secrecy</mark>. The constant threat of <mark>law enforcements</mark> raiding facilities, <mark>and intelligence</mark> and secret services detecting activities <mark>will have to be avoided</u></mark>. Also, <u><mark>there are only</mark> some <mark>fifty of these</mark> laboratories successfully maintained <mark>worldwide</u></mark>.</p><p>Before starting, make sure there is a baking dish of ‘uncertainty’ readily available to just throw all of the following ingredients into:</p><p>1 Tablespoon of Proper Agent</p><p>Initially, <u>a terrorist group must decide what kind of agent they would like to use in a bioterror attack</u>. This is one part of the recipe which can be modified, but the other ingredients will be standard for all types of attacks. The recent spread of the deadly Ebola virus will be the agent of choice for this bomb. Ebola is a virus which is passed to humans through contact with infected animals. The spread of the virus from person-to-person is brought about through blood and bodily fluids, as well as exposure to a contaminated environment. An infected live host with Ebola would need to be maintained in a human or animal – only a few animals are able to be used as hosts, such as primates, bats, and forest antelope. <u>Although <mark>Ebola</mark> infection of animals <mark>through aerosol</mark> particles can be effective, it <mark>has not successfully been transferred</mark> with this method <mark>to humans</u></mark> (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan, “Bioterrorism: Preparing for the impossible or the improbable“, Critical Care Medicine 33, No. 1, January 2005: 75-95).</p><p>1 Bucket of Resources and Money</p><p>In order to develop a biological weapon, <u>a <mark>substantial</mark> amount of material and <mark>money is required</mark>. Investment is needed from the very outset – taking into account membership size and capabilities of a terrorist group, financial assets of a group, and making sure territory and proper infrastructure is available for the biological agent. For a successful bomb to be created, <mark>a group must think about</mark> the <mark>resources</mark> they will need <mark>for each stage</mark> of the baking process, such as weapons production, potential testing phases, and logistics, such as transportation and communications technologies</u> (Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism“, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2006). <u><mark>Resources</mark> needed for an “Ebola Bomb” <mark>will</mark> most likely <mark>need to be imported</mark> from the outside, and a group must determine the feasibility of acquiring the materials and technologies needed for the bomb</u> (Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation to terrorists“, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999: 17-34). <u>A surplus of money would also be a smart idea in case technical difficulties arise.</p><p>5 Cups of Expertise</p><p></u>With all the correct resources and necessary amount of monetary support, <u>the recipe will require the right kind of know-how</u>. For an operation like this,<mark> <u>a </mark>terrorist <mark>group should have</mark> members with high levels of <mark>education</mark> and training <mark>in science, engineering, and tech</mark>nological development, to deal with highly virulent agents, and for successful weaponisation</u> (Zanders). <u><mark>A group may need to be integrated into knowledge flows</mark> and institutions, or be able to recruit members to their cause with this specific expertise</u> (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). <u>Knowledge and expertise is required to create the correct strain, handling the agent, growing the agent with the desired characteristics, and maintaining the agent. Taking <mark>Ebola</mark> specifically <mark>requires synthesising proteins</mark> which make it infectious, and becomes <mark>a task that is difficult and unlikely to succeed</u></mark> (Amanda M. Teckma, “The Bioterrorist Threat of Ebola in East Africa and Implications for Global</p><p>Health and Security“, Global Policy Essay, May 2013). <u>If Ebola is successfully created in the kitchen, it is not itself a biological weapon – an expert will be required to transform the virus into a workable mechanism for dissemination</u>.</p><p>A Tea<u><mark>spoon of Risk</p><p>The decision </p><p></mark>MARKED</p><p><mark>to use bio</mark>logical <mark>weapons</mark> for an attack <mark>is</mark> in itself <mark>extremely risky</u></mark>. There is a risk that <u><mark>bioterrorism could cause dissent</mark>ing views <mark>among followers</mark>, and that public approval and opinion may channel the way a group operates</u>. After all, <u><mark>terrorists</mark> are political communicators, <mark>want</mark>ing to bring <mark>attention</mark> to their grievances. <mark>If a group becomes</mark> polarised or <mark>resented</mark> by their actions, <mark>they will not</mark> see the benefits of <mark>pursu</mark>ing <mark>certain methods</mark>. Terrorists want to send powerful messages, gain more members, in which these members assist to bring about certain plans and demands. Therefore, public opinion and political opportunism will be risked in a quest to create a bioweapon</u> such as an “Ebola Bomb” (Zanders). Secondly, <u>a terrorist group may be subject to more scrutiny or attention</u>. This is why keeping activities covert will be a key to success. <u><mark>States will be more vigilant towards groups</mark> that are <mark>known to</mark> be <mark>seek</mark>ing and acquiring <mark>biological</mark> and chemical <mark>capabilities</u></mark> (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). And finally, <u>risk will always cling on to funding requirements, and potential technical difficulties in all stages of the bioweapon making process.</p><p></u>A Fist of Time</p><p>Now this recipe is going to take a while to prepare and bake in the oven, and there is no particular moment to determine when it should be removed from the baking dish. So, whatever group wants to make this bomb, will need to realise this is a long-term and complex effort. It will not work like most conventional weapons, which produce a high number of casualties with a single explosion, and that could be a reason why bioterrorism is not the most popular means for a violent attack – demanding time, effort, and resources without guarantees of a concrete result. <u>A fist full of time may be needed so that knowledge, both tacit and explicit, can be acquired, as well as accounting for the various mistakes and learning curves to overcome</u> (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). It can also refer to how long it will take to cook up, maintain and prepare a virus for an attack. <u><mark>It will take time to create a successful weapon</mark> with prior testing, and wait for the correct environmental conditions when it comes to dissemination.</u> Time will have to be a group investment – it is not the kind of bomb that will detonate immediately.</p><p><u>A Pinch of Curiosity of the Unknown</p><p></u>The teaspoon of <u>risk coincides with uncertainty, and there will need to be a commitment to potential unknown factors. <mark>It is unknown what will happen</mark> once a virus is disseminated. <mark>Will the weapon</mark> even <mark>work</mark> in the first place<mark>? Weather conditions are unpredictable</mark> and Ebola will not have a prominent effect in certain environments. <mark>What happens</mark> to the terrorist group <mark>if the attack fails?</mark> What happens to the reputation of the group and its membership, or will the group cease to exist? If the recipe is a success, <mark>it is impossible to control the</mark> biological <mark>agent which is released</mark> – not only can it affect the targeted population, but <mark>it may annihilate the terrorist group</mark> itself. There will be an unknown into potentially losing local and international support, and donors if this causes widespread catastrophe.</p><p></u>Method: Weaponisation and Dissemination </p><p>Mix that up good in your baking dish of what is now “deep uncertainty” and pop it in the oven to bake. But as time passes, it seems as though the ingredients are not rising. <u>The process of <mark>turning a biological agent into a weapon</mark> for attack <mark>is the phase with the most hurdles</mark> for terrorist groups</u>. In order for a virus to inflict a lot of harm, <u>it has to be disseminated through an effective delivery mechanism</u>. As mentioned previously, the Ebola virus needs a live host. <u><mark>Weaponising a live host </mark>is more difficult than other agents which can be cultured on dishes of nutrients. The process <mark>has many stages which involve testing, refining, upgrading, and toughening</mark>. The <mark>methods</mark> to disseminate an agent <mark>are only known to few</mark> people, <mark>and rarely published</u></mark> – it is not a basement project (Teckman).</p><p><u><mark>Let’s take Aum Shinrikyo</mark> as an example of conducting a bioterrorist attack</u> (even it was “only” a chemical attack). This apocalyptic religious organisation in Japan managed to release sarin gas inside a Tokyo subway, killing a dozen people, and injuring 50. However, <u><mark>even with money</mark> and resources, <mark>they failed to</mark> effectively <mark>weaponise the chemical</mark>. Factors which led to their failure included internal secrecy and breakdown in communication; selecting members only solely dedicated to their cause to work on the weapons, ultimately <mark>employing unskilled people</mark> to operate and maintain the project, <mark>causing accidents and leaks</u></mark> (Zanders). <u>Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to disseminate botulinum toxin into Tokyo using a truck with a compressor and vents, did not work because they had not acquired an infectious strain</u> (Sharon Begley, “Unmasking Bioterror“, Newsweek, 13.03.2010; “Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities“, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001). Finally, a major obstacle to successfully disseminating Ebola, is because this virus requires a specific environment in order to thrive. Weather conditions can be unpredictable, and Ebola particularly needs high temperatures and humidity to remain effective.</p><p>Decoration: Results and Conclusions</p><p>Obviously, <u>this “Ebola Bomb” has not come close to containing the right requirements needed to explode. Looking back historically, pathogens, and all kinds of toxins have been used as tools in sabotage and assassinations since the beginning of time.</u> Now, it would be silly to say this recipe will never work – there will always be a possibility that Ebola or other viruses may be used as biological weapons in the future. However, <u>the likelihood of its development and use by a terrorist group is quite improbable</u>.</p><p><u>Mentioning <mark>Aum Shinrikyo</mark> again, they are an organisation which at the time, <mark>had</mark> a war chest of <mark>more than $300 million</mark>, with <mark>six laboratories and</mark> a handful of <mark>biologists</mark>, in the end having insurmountable difficulties with the weaponisation and dissemination processes, and killing a dozen people</u> (Begley). There is a greater amount of knowledge and technology available in our day and age than in 1995 with the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, but it is still unlikely that this will be the weapon of choice. <u>Examining state biological weapons programmes, Soviet <mark>Russia had</mark> almost 60,000 personnel employed in their weapons development, with <mark>only</mark> about <mark>100 people that</mark> actually <mark>knew how to take an agent through</mark> the full <mark>production</mark> process. In <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, at Fort Detrick, there were 250 buildings with 3,000 personnel, and it <mark>took</mark> them <mark>a while to weaponise a single agent</mark>, such as botulinum</u> (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan).</p><p>Nowadays, <u>the narrative has assumed a worst case scenario analysis, and subsequently narrowed down bioterrorism to a single threat prognosis</u>. <u>There is little distinction made between what is conceivable and possible, and what is likely in terms of bioterrorism. Anything can be conceived as a terrorist threat, but what is the reality? The “Ebola Bomb” is not a danger. The likelihood of <mark>a bioterrorist attack remains highly unlikely</u></mark> (Teckman). The focus should be on preventing natural pandemics of human disease, such as tuberculosis, SARS, AIDS and influenza – emphasis placed on how we can cure diseases, and how medical training could be improved to contain, and avoid viruses such as Ebola altogether. Resources are being pumped into biodefence in the security as well as the medical sector, but preparedness and investment in bioterrorism needs to be in proportion to actual threats, otherwise, funds are diverted away from much needed public health programmes:</p><p><u>The effectiveness of biological weapons has never been clearly shown, the numbers of casualties have been small and it is likely that hoaxes and false alarms in the future will continue to outnumber real events and create disruptive hysteria</u> (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan). Emphasis needs to be back on medical research, as well as social science investigations into the roots of why terrorist groups would even want to pursue biological weapons, and the lengths they would go to use them. Let this be an avenue for further pondering and exploring, the realities of bioterrorism.</p>
1NR
Cartels
Bioterror
158,609
10
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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
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ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx
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The illegality of PAS bars women from the transgressive act of death in the name of futurity and life preservation, allowing gendered norms to dominate end-of-life care. This regime of medicalization keeps suffering women alive to sustain patriarchal values. Diane Raymond explains
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Diane, professor of Gender Studies at Simmons College, Ph.D in philosophy from NYU, “’Fatal practices’: A feminist analysis of physician-assisted suicide and Euthanasia” Hypatia Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE
Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where passivity have been the normative ideal. Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures equated suicide with courage and thereby framed the practice as male. Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" might be as inaccurate and overly monolithic a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two, one might argue that, given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. even if we agree that popular discussions of PAS and euthanasia "may be animated by gendered logic all that follows is the more modest conclusion that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice. if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that men are undertreated and women are overtreated the superficial inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might instead reflect a pattern consistent with patriarchal ideology, namely that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women. gender ideology, in valorizing female passivity, may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping dying, suffering women alive. one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.
Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures equated suicide with courage and framed the practice as male Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" might be inaccurate and overly monolithic the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. even if discussions of PAS may be animated by gendered logic all that follows is that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice men are undertreated and women are overtreated. the inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might reflect patriarchal ideology that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women gender ideology may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping suffering women alive
In the section "Gender in Cases, Images, and Practices," Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where female self-sacrifice and passivity have been the normative ideal. That insight leads her to explore the historical and cultural background of suicide and its ideology, suggestively using Greek tragedy, the nineteenth-century cult of True Womanhood, and Carol Gilligan's research to confirm that self-sacrifice has traditionally been associated with women and regarded thereby as a feminine virtue. Yet, while there is no doubt as to the misogynistic history of women's constrained choices, Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures--the Stoic, for example--equated suicide with courage and thereby framed the practice as male. The Greek tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than be taken as slaves, the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, the examples of Hemingway, Kohlberg, and numerous others--these easily recoverable cases suggest that suicide can be seen as part of a masculinist ideology or at least not unproblematically feminine. 10 While a more in-depth analysis would probably reveal much divergence even in ancient Greek practice, Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" (Wolf 1996, 289) might be as inaccurate and overly monolithic a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average (National Center for Health Statistics Report 1987). Given patriarchal ideology's equation of masculinity with strength and power, men's heightened inability to cope with aging and illness makes sense intuitively. Further, women's lived experiences with multiple forms of dependence and interdependence--pregnancy, childrearing, and so forth--may mitigate some of the anxiety associated with aging, dependence on others, and decreasing physical autonomy.¶ Further, the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice (a "feminine not masculine virtue" [1996, 289]) to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two, one might argue that, given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse, particularly in the domestic sphere, suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. One need not, however, go that far or make men's behavior normative to challenge Wolf's argument. For even if we agree that popular discussions of PAS and euthanasia "may be animated by unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain gendered logic and felt correctness" (Wolf 1996, 289), all that follows is the more modest conclusion that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice. The gender ideology fleshed out in Wolf's analysis may lead, as suggested earlier, to great reluctance, not eagerness, to allow PAS or euthanasia for women. Indeed, some evidence suggests that if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that men are undertreated and women are overtreated. Steven Miles and Allison August, for example, have examined a number of judicial decisions relating to withdrawal of treatment at end-of-life and find a pattern of acceding to male patients' wishes over females'. They note that women are held to higher evidentiary standards when requests to die are examined, and they remark on the ways in which gendered language in judicial treatments of these cases tends to rob women of their agency. Women and not men, for example, are routinely infantilized by referring to them by their first names ("Debbie" and "Diane" fit this pattern); and men's statements about end-of-life treatment are held to reflect "mature, rational choice" while women's are seen as "unreflective, emotional, or immature" (Miles and August 1990, 87). Karen Quinlan's comments to her mother were thereby dismissed as a "wish" or personal "distaste" and not a genuine expression of her values. In another case, a woman's repeated comments regarding her desire not to be kept on life support were trivialized as no "more than immediate reaction to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another unnecessarily prolonged death" (in Miles and August 1990, 88). Courts seem even to discount women's advance directives, preferring instead to appoint family members as decision-makers for the incompetent woman; in one case, the Court empowered a woman's husband/guardian to make the decision "for" her, despite the fact that she had been an active member of the state's "Euthanasia Council." Women's "overtreatment" at end-of-life may seem odd considering men's greater access to earlier interventions, including more standard diagnostic procedures like angiograms and more "exotic" treatments like organ transplants. But the superficial inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might instead reflect a pattern consistent with patriarchal ideology, namely that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women. If such is the case, then gender ideology, in valorizing female passivity, may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping dying, suffering women alive. Likewise, ideological constructions of masculinity as inextricably aligned with agency, activity, and transcendence might lead to respect for men's medical directives--formal and informal--as well as to gendered distinctions on quality-of-life issues. Those unfamiliar with the ravages of persistent vegetative state (PVS) may picture the comatose or PVS patient as a comfortable "sleeping beauty" waiting for her miraculous awakening; such gendered imagery may help to account for the resistance to withdrawal of life support in the classic Quinlan and Cruzan cases, and the willingness of the Georgia Supreme Court to grant the physicians of Larry McAfee, a C-2 quadriplegic (a non-terminal condition), permission to provide him with the drugs necessary for him to be free of pain when his respirator was disconnected. Wolf's analysis of cultural ideology, while extremely suggestive, needs elaboration and nuance. Further, in the course of that extended analysis we should not be surprised by gaps and inconsistencies, for culture is never monolithic or fixed, and cultural practices do not follow consistently or irresistibly even the most hegemonic ideology. Thus, one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.
6,765
<h4>The illegality of PAS bars women from the transgressive act of death in the name of futurity and life preservation, allowing gendered norms to dominate end-of-life care. This regime of medicalization keeps suffering women alive to sustain patriarchal values. Diane Raymond explains </h4><p>Diane, professor of Gender Studies at Simmons College, Ph.D in philosophy from NYU, “’Fatal practices’: A feminist analysis of physician-assisted suicide and Euthanasia” Hypatia Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE</p><p>In the section "Gender in Cases, Images, and Practices," <u><strong>Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where</u></strong> female self-sacrifice and<u><strong> passivity have been the normative ideal.</u></strong> That insight leads her to explore the historical and cultural background of suicide and its ideology, suggestively using Greek tragedy, the nineteenth-century cult of True Womanhood, and Carol Gilligan's research to confirm that self-sacrifice has traditionally been associated with women and regarded thereby as a feminine virtue. Yet, while there is no doubt as to the misogynistic history of women's constrained choices, <u><strong><mark>Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history.</mark> <mark>Many cultures</u></strong></mark>--the Stoic, for example--<u><strong><mark>equated suicide with courage</mark> <mark>and</mark> thereby <mark>framed the practice as male</mark>.</u></strong> The Greek tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than be taken as slaves, the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, the examples of Hemingway, Kohlberg, and numerous others--these easily recoverable cases suggest that suicide can be seen as part of a masculinist ideology or at least not unproblematically feminine. 10 While a more in-depth analysis would probably reveal much divergence even in ancient Greek practice, <u><strong><mark>Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution"</u></strong></mark> (Wolf 1996, 289) <u><strong><mark>might</mark> <mark>be</mark> as <mark>inaccurate and overly monolithic</mark> a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average</u></strong> (National Center for Health Statistics Report 1987). Given patriarchal ideology's equation of masculinity with strength and power, men's heightened inability to cope with aging and illness makes sense intuitively. Further, women's lived experiences with multiple forms of dependence and interdependence--pregnancy, childrearing, and so forth--may mitigate some of the anxiety associated with aging, dependence on others, and decreasing physical autonomy.¶ Further, <u><strong><mark>the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice</u></strong></mark> (a "feminine not masculine virtue" [1996, 289]) <u><strong><mark>to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two</mark>, one might argue that, <mark>given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse</u></strong></mark>, particularly in the domestic sphere, <u><strong><mark>suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act.</u></strong></mark> One need not, however, go that far or make men's behavior normative to challenge Wolf's argument. For <u><strong><mark>even if</mark> we agree that popular <mark>discussions of PAS</mark> and euthanasia "<mark>may be animated by</u></strong></mark> unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain <u><strong><mark>gendered logic</u></strong></mark> and felt correctness" (Wolf 1996, 289), <u><strong><mark>all that follows is </mark>the more modest conclusion <mark>that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice</mark>. </u></strong>The gender ideology fleshed out in Wolf's analysis may lead, as suggested earlier, to great reluctance, not eagerness, to allow PAS or euthanasia for women. Indeed, some evidence suggests that <u><strong>if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that <mark>men are undertreated and women are overtreated</u></strong>.</mark> Steven Miles and Allison August, for example, have examined a number of judicial decisions relating to withdrawal of treatment at end-of-life and find a pattern of acceding to male patients' wishes over females'. They note that women are held to higher evidentiary standards when requests to die are examined, and they remark on the ways in which gendered language in judicial treatments of these cases tends to rob women of their agency. Women and not men, for example, are routinely infantilized by referring to them by their first names ("Debbie" and "Diane" fit this pattern); and men's statements about end-of-life treatment are held to reflect "mature, rational choice" while women's are seen as "unreflective, emotional, or immature" (Miles and August 1990, 87). Karen Quinlan's comments to her mother were thereby dismissed as a "wish" or personal "distaste" and not a genuine expression of her values. In another case, a woman's repeated comments regarding her desire not to be kept on life support were trivialized as no "more than immediate reaction to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another unnecessarily prolonged death" (in Miles and August 1990, 88). Courts seem even to discount women's advance directives, preferring instead to appoint family members as decision-makers for the incompetent woman; in one case, the Court empowered a woman's husband/guardian to make the decision "for" her, despite the fact that she had been an active member of the state's "Euthanasia Council." Women's "overtreatment" at end-of-life may seem odd considering men's greater access to earlier interventions, including more standard diagnostic procedures like angiograms and more "exotic" treatments like organ transplants. But <u><strong><mark>the</mark> superficial <mark>inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might</mark> instead <mark>reflect</mark> a pattern consistent with <mark>patriarchal ideology</mark>, namely <mark>that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women</mark>.</u></strong> If such is the case, then <u><strong><mark>gender ideology</mark>, in valorizing female passivity, <mark>may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping</mark> dying, <mark>suffering women alive</mark>.</u></strong> Likewise, ideological constructions of masculinity as inextricably aligned with agency, activity, and transcendence might lead to respect for men's medical directives--formal and informal--as well as to gendered distinctions on quality-of-life issues. Those unfamiliar with the ravages of persistent vegetative state (PVS) may picture the comatose or PVS patient as a comfortable "sleeping beauty" waiting for her miraculous awakening; such gendered imagery may help to account for the resistance to withdrawal of life support in the classic Quinlan and Cruzan cases, and the willingness of the Georgia Supreme Court to grant the physicians of Larry McAfee, a C-2 quadriplegic (a non-terminal condition), permission to provide him with the drugs necessary for him to be free of pain when his respirator was disconnected. Wolf's analysis of cultural ideology, while extremely suggestive, needs elaboration and nuance. Further, in the course of that extended analysis we should not be surprised by gaps and inconsistencies, for culture is never monolithic or fixed, and cultural practices do not follow consistently or irresistibly even the most hegemonic ideology. Thus, <u><strong>one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.</p></u></strong>
1ac
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430,002
5
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,821
Dems can sweep the midterms, but only by using marijuana as a wedge issue – plan robs them of it
Applebaum 14
Applebaum 14 <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS
By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans support legalizing marijuana among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). Udall will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican This presents a golden opportunity to flip seats 4 When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014
By running on legalization, Democrats can spur turnout and sweep the Midterms a majority of Americans support legalizing among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular By pushing legalized marijuana Democrats can provide motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election This presents a golden opportunity to flip seats Legalizing is the perfect solution pot legalization might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory
By running on pot legalization, Democrats can spur voter turnout and sweep the 2014 Midterms. In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans (55%) support legalizing marijuana, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. Marijuana is different. It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. It’s simple and straightforward. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally, Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall). A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark Udall of Colorado, will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican. This presents a golden opportunity to flip House seats in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 2014. THE TIME IS NOW When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.
6,540
<h4>Dems can sweep the midterms, but only by using marijuana as a wedge issue – plan robs them of it</h4><p><u><strong>Applebaum 14</u></strong> <Josh, B.A. from University of Vermont and Boston-area columnist, “LET’S WEED OUT REPUBLICANS IN 2014,” March 4, 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/>#SPS</p><p><u><mark>By running on </mark>pot <mark>legalization, Democrats can spur </mark>voter <mark>turnout and sweep the </mark>2014 <mark>Midterms</mark>. </u>In many ways, the legacy of Barack Obama will be determined by how the final two years of his presidency play out. He will either be remembered as a transformational president who achieved great legislative victories despite unprecedented obstruction, or a president who underestimated the partisanship of the political landscape and failed to deliver on his grandiose message of hope and change. At the moment, you could make the case for either. His accomplishments are impressive: digging us out of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression, passing the Affordable Care Act, getting us out of Iraq and (by the end of this year) Afghanistan, forty-six straight months of job growth, killing Osama Bin Laden. But his first five years in office have also been marred by dysfunction and disappointment, stagnation and inaction. Nothing can get passed in Congress because the Republicans refuse to work with him. No jobs bills. No background checks on gun sales. No extension of unemployment insurance. No Immigration Reform or minimum wage increase. If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country. To accomplish this goal, <u>the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections.</u> <u>If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen. So how can Democrats win big in 2014? It’s simple: run on pot. </u>IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT <u>A recent CNN poll showed that <mark>a majority of Americans</u></mark> (55%) <u><mark>support legalizing</mark> marijuana</u>, which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story. Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%. However, <u><mark>among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular</mark>: over 66% support full legalization. This is great news for the Democratic Party, which has struggled in recent years to turn out voters during Midterm Elections</u>, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote. <u>In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people</u> to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract. <u>Marijuana is different.</u> <u>It’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion.</u> Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, <u>marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to.</u> It’s simple and straightforward. <u><strong><mark>By pushing legalized marijuana </mark>nationally, <mark>Democrats can provide </mark>much-needed <mark>motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them.</u></strong></mark> Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does. Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%. In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%. If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it. THE PATH TO VICTORY Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21 of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control. It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority. According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana. <u><mark>Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot </mark>just so happen to <mark>have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election</mark>.</u> <u>This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall).</u> A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark <u>Udall</u> of Colorado, <u>will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch.</u> A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue. Aside from full out legalization, <u>the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican</u>. <u><mark>This presents a golden opportunity to flip</u></mark> House <u><mark>seats</u></mark> in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 201<u>4</u>. THE TIME IS NOW <u>When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges</u>. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington. <u><mark>Legalizing </mark>marijuana <mark>is the perfect</mark> bipartisan <mark>solution</mark>: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security.</u> <u>It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge. It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them. As crazy as it sounds, <mark>pot legalization</mark> just <mark>might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory </mark>in 2014</u>, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock. All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.</p>
1NC
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Off
429,543
57
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,822
Simony can mean any sacred thing
Dictionary.com
Dictionary.com
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/simony simony the making of profit out of sacred things buying or selling ecclesiastical preferments, benefices, etc.
null
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/simony simony¶ [sahy-muh-nee, sim-uh-] noun¶ 1.¶ the making of profit out of sacred things.¶ 2.¶ the sin of buying or selling ecclesiastical preferments, benefices, etc.
208
<h4><u><strong>Simony can mean any sacred thing</h4><p>Dictionary.com</p><p></strong>http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/simony</p><p>simony</u>¶ [sahy-muh-nee, sim-uh-] noun¶ 1.¶ <u>the making of profit out of sacred things</u>.¶ 2.¶ the sin of <u>buying or selling ecclesiastical preferments, benefices, etc.</p></u>
1NR
T
Interp
430,003
1
16,992
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
564,703
N
UMKC
5
Iowa HS
Brian Lain
1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
null
48,386
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Baylor EvZo
null
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Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,823
China has a strong track record of compliance --- they prioritize reputational costs and are committed to building institutions for a peaceful rise.
Zhang and Li 2014
Xiaowen Zhang and Xiaoling Li, 2014. Assistant professor of political science at Augustana College, PhD in International Relations @ University of Southern California; and associated professor of law at the China Youth University for Political Sciences in Beijing, China,Ph.D. in Law from the East China University of Political Science and Law. “The Politics of Compliance with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, 23:85, 143-160.
little systemic attention has been paid to compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings Consistent with the political economy of compliance in general, compliance in WTO disputes is an act generating uneven political and economic payoffs for various special interests in a respondent state the prospect of successful implementation is subjected to the political influence of the affected producer group in the respondent state Theoretically, decision makers in authoritarian countries face less domestic constraints when it comes to complying with international commitments than democracies The choice of compliance is largely shaped by the perception of a small group of individuals of the material and reputational costs of noncompliance, which in turn is influenced by the relative power of the state and its degree of reliance on the good will of the international community Nonetheless, China's record of compliance in WTO disputes indicates that there must be more going on concerning the politics of compliance in authoritarian China Of the disputes against China that went through WTO litigation, the United States was either the sole complainant or the leading co-complainant, indicating a similar level of material costs if China chose noncompliance and sanctions were authorized policy making in China is characterized by a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ model China's legislature puts few constraints on the ability of the executives to comply with international commitments. There is no special procedural law regarding the implementation of WTO panel/Appellate Body recommendations According to Liyu Han and Henry Gao, under most circumstances, top leaders in China are under no or little pressure from individual industries or businesses when it comes to compliance with adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings Their top concern is the material and reputational costs of noncompliance to the country as a whole. Although as China's economy grows, the material costs of noncompliance decline relatively, China still has great concern about the reputational costs of noncompliance, which explains its largely satisfactory performance as a respondent in the WTO DSS As a rising economic power that takes continuous economic growth as its top priority, China is very concerned about the reputational costs of noncompliance in the WTO DSS. Noncompliance will hurt China's image as a credible power in the international community, upset China's trading partners and undermine the legitimacy of the WTO, all of which are indispensible to China's economic development The concern over the reputational costs of noncompliance is well aligned with China's national objective of ‘peaceful rising’ China's rise has been driven by ‘capital, technology, and resources acquired through peaceful means’ The key to rising in a peaceful manner is to embrace economic globalization According to China's current strategic plan, it will take another 40 years—until 2050—before China can be called a modernized, medium-level developed country To rise peacefully, China needs an open and orderly world market so that China can continue to take advantage of globalization noncompliance can mean two types of reputational costs to China. Firstly, noncompliance will hurt China's reputation as a credible rule player in the international community, which in turn will alienate its trading partners Secondly, noncompliance will hurt China's reputation as a system builder. Because the WTO DSS is the central pillar of the WTO, its effectiveness is crucial to the legitimacy of the WTO as a whole As the second largest member in the WTO and the largest developing country in the WTO, China's performance in the WTO DSS attracts wide attention, especially among developing countries Noncompliance will not only undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the WTO DSS and, in turn, the WTO as a whole, but will also hurt the image of China as a system builder, affecting its future ability to lead China's relatively good performance as a respondent in the DSS has well demonstrated its high concern over reputational costs For the cases that China settled through mutually agreed solutions, China could have waited until the adoption of panel reports and then further extended the litigation process by filing an appeal before the Appellate Body. Since there are no retroactive remedies in the current DSS, the material costs of noncompliance will only be lower in this case, as the affected producer will benefit from the status quo for longer. In fact, many respondent states have chosen to take advantage of this loophole, escalating the disputes all the way to the end of the litigation process despite almost 90% of the adopted panel and/or the Appellate Body reports finding WTO violations In contrast, China has settled nine of the 19 resolved cases out of court, showing great caution over the risk of reputational damage as a result of adverse panel/Appellate Body rulings When the chance of winning is perceived to be small, China has chosen to settle in order to avoid the reputational costs, despite the material benefits of escalation The unusual rush during the implementation stage of China—Intellectual Property Rights provides another good example the State Council waited until 10 February 2010 to pass and submit the proposed amendments, leaving the NPC Standing Committee only 16 days before its next, also the last, session prior to the implementation deadline Despite that, the Standing Committee rushed to pass the amendments on 26 February 2010, skipping steps such as releasing the proposed revisions to the public for opinions before the vote Such unusual practice showed that it had become a consensus in China that compliance with WTO dispute settlement was extremely important
compliance in WTO disputes is an act generating uneven political and economic payoffs China's record of compliance in WTO disputes indicates that there must be more going on concerning the politics of compliance in authoritarian China Of the disputes against China the U S was the sole complainant policy making in China is characterized by a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ China's legislature puts few constraints on the ability of the executives to comply with international commitments There is no special procedural law regarding the implementation of WTO panel under most circumstances top leaders in China are under no pressure when it comes to compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings Their top concern is the material and reputational costs of noncompliance to the country as a whole As a rising economic power China is very concerned about the reputational costs of noncompliance Noncompliance will hurt China's image China's rise has been driven by ‘capital, technology, and resources rise peacefully, China needs an open and orderly world market so that China can continue to take advantage of globalization noncompliance will hurt China's reputation Because the DSS is the central pillar of the WTO, its effectiveness is crucial to the legitimacy of the WTO as a whole China's performance attracts wide attention China's relatively good performance has well demonstrated its high concern over reputational costs
Although much has been written about the factors affecting compliance with international commitments in general, little systemic attention has been paid to compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings. A few observers have examined the record of compliance in WTO disputes and identified some features of the pattern of compliance. For instance, Bruce Wilson finds that compliance has been more rapid where the WTO violations can be corrected through administrative action as opposed to legislative action, indicating that the procedural arrangement of implementation in respondent states influences the prospect of compliance.24 Regrettably, these studies are mainly descriptive, without offering in-depth explanations for why respondent states sometimes fail to implement the panel/Appellate Body recommendations in due time.25 Consistent with the political economy of compliance in general, compliance in WTO disputes is an act generating uneven political and economic payoffs for various special interests in a respondent state. Anticipating increasing competition as a result of compliance, the producer group that has been benefiting from the status quo has strong incentives to block the implementation of panel/Appellate Body recommendations. Under this circumstance, the prospect of successful implementation is subjected to the political influence of the affected producer group in the respondent state. However, there is no systematic study yet examining how special interests within a respondent state may influence the prospect of compliance in WTO disputes. Even less is known about how domestic politics in authoritarian countries like China may influence the prospect of compliance in WTO disputes, as the vast majority of respondent states that have been found violating WTO obligations are democracies.26 Theoretically, decision makers in authoritarian countries face less domestic constraints when it comes to complying with international commitments than democracies. While in democracies, re-election-minded governments may drag their feet as long as possible before they change WTO-inconsistent trade policies just to please politically influential special interests, decision makers in authoritarian regimes are largely autonomous, facing fewer constraints from special interests. The choice of compliance is largely shaped by the perception of a small group of individuals of the material and reputational costs of noncompliance, which in turn is influenced by the relative power of the state and its degree of reliance on the good will of the international community. Nonetheless, China's record of compliance in WTO disputes indicates that there must be more going on concerning the politics of compliance in authoritarian China. Of the disputes against China that went through WTO litigation, the United States was either the sole complainant or the leading co-complainant, indicating a similar level of material costs if China chose noncompliance and sanctions were authorized. Besides, these disputes were initiated when the same group of Chinese leaders was in power (between 2006 and 2009). Despite these similarities, China made a different policy choice in China—Publications and Audiovisual Productsthan for others. To explain this puzzle, an in-depth analysis of the compliance decision-making process in China is needed. WTO compliance decision making in China Generally speaking, policy making in China is characterized by a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ model.27 Compared with democracies, policies in China are made by a much more concentrated group of individuals in a top-down manner. Although it is fragmented in the sense that various actors at different levels of the power hierarchy are charged with the enforcement of policies, the framework places emphasis on achieving consensus and narrowing the divergent policy goals of different ministries and agencies. At the central government level, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the primary bureaucratic unit responsible for matters related to foreign economic relations. Within MOFCOM, there is a WTO Division in the Department of Treaty and Law that handles WTO disputes. However, according to the mandate of MOFCOM, the Minister of MOFCOM officially decides whether to bring a complaint to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Meanwhile, input from the Premier or the Vice Premier in charge of foreign trade has a decisive influence on any final decisions. Since the measures at dispute are often issued by various bureaucracies, the amendment of which often requires coordination, when facing coordination difficulties as a result of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the Vice Premier in charge of MOFCOM will usually intervene.28 Unlike democracies, China's legislature, the National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee, puts few constraints on the ability of the executives to comply with international commitments. There is no special procedural law regarding the implementation of WTO panel/Appellate Body recommendations. If the measures at dispute are administrative regulations enacted by the State Council, the State Council is entitled to revise or abolish them. Likewise, ministries or commissions under the State Council, the People's Bank of China, the State Audit Administration, or other organs endowed with administrative functions, are responsible for the revision of departmental rules they enact respectively. If the measure at dispute is a national statute, normal legislative procedures apply. Panel/Appellate Body rulings are first studied by relevant government agencies, which then send their comments to the State Council. The State Council drafts the legislative proposals to be submitted to the NPC or its Standing Committee for deliberations and vote. Theoretically, NPC and its Standing Committee can block or delay implementation by voting down the proposals. In practice, however, once a proposed legislation is submitted to be voted on at the NPC or its Standing Committee, it almost always gets approved, especially when the bill is introduced by the State Council. For example, in the ten-year period of the 8th and 9th NPC between 1993 and 2003, all 44 legislative proposals introduced by the State Council were passed with high affirmative votes.29 The fact that the Premier or the Vice Premier in charge of foreign trade makes the ultimate decisions regarding WTO dispute settlement indicates the broad, complex and sometimes sensitive ramifications of panel/Appellate Boding rulings. Although respondent states are expected to implement panel/Appellate Body recommendations, a tactical matter in theory, they do choose noncompliance or incomplete compliance for a variety of strategic reasons. Not only does the decision of compliance impact the interests of affected industries, but also it often affects a country's long-term development objectives and its relationship with key trading partners. For vital decisions like this, a high degree of centralization is often observed during the policy-making process in China.30 According to Liyu Han and Henry Gao, under most circumstances, top leaders in China are under no or little pressure from individual industries or businesses when it comes to compliance with adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings.31 Their top concern is the material and reputational costs of noncompliance to the country as a whole. Although as China's economy grows, the material costs of noncompliance decline relatively, China still has great concern about the reputational costs of noncompliance, which explains its largely satisfactory performance as a respondent in the WTO DSS. A peacefully rising China As a rising economic power that takes continuous economic growth as its top priority, China is very concerned about the reputational costs of noncompliance in the WTO DSS. Noncompliance will hurt China's image as a credible power in the international community, upset China's trading partners and undermine the legitimacy of the WTO, all of which are indispensible to China's economic development. The concern over the reputational costs of noncompliance is well aligned with China's national objective of ‘peaceful rising’. Since early 2003, China's leaders have started to talk about the concept of ‘peaceful rising’ in various international settings.32 As explained by Bijian Zheng, a key advisor to the top Chinese leaders, ‘peaceful rising’ is a unique development strategy that China chose, different than that of any other emerging powers in modern history. Instead of rising through ‘invasion, colonization, expansion or even large-scale wars of aggression’, China's rise has been driven by ‘capital, technology, and resources acquired through peaceful means’. The key to rising in a peaceful manner is to embrace economic globalization. According to China's current strategic plan, it will take another 40 years—until 2050—before China can be called a modernized, medium-level developed country. To rise peacefully, China needs an open and orderly world market so that China can continue to take advantage of globalization.33 Being the central driving force behind economic globalization, the wellbeing of WTO is therefore imperative to China's long-term objective. Acknowledging that, China strived for WTO membership. After becoming a member, upholding the legitimacy of the WTO and maintaining amicable relations with trading partners became imperative. However, both could be compromised by noncompliance in the WTO DSS. In particular, noncompliance can mean two types of reputational costs to China. Firstly, noncompliance will hurt China's reputation as a credible rule player in the international community, which in turn will alienate its trading partners. Since joining the WTO, China has grown to be the largest exporter of manufactured goods in the world. On the one hand, China has gained considerably from WTO membership, as the rapid growth of the Chinese economy is, to a large extent, driven by international trade. On the other hand, China's huge trade surpluses have brought considerable pressure to its trading partners. Their import-competing industries have been harmed by the inflow of Chinese products and they keep a close eye on China and would take every opportunity to lobby the governments to take protectionist measures against China. It has been argued that one of the purposes of China joining the WTO is to send a reassuring signal to the world that China is a credible player in the international economic system.34 Noncompliance, openly reneging on China's commitments to the international free trade community, will no doubt hurt China's reputation as a trustworthy rule player and provide those who are already upset by a rising China with support when they lobby their governments. Since the future goodwill and cooperation of others are essential to China's continuous growth, such reputational costs are serious. Secondly, noncompliance will hurt China's reputation as a system builder. Because the WTO DSS is the central pillar of the WTO, its effectiveness is crucial to the legitimacy of the WTO as a whole. As the second largest member in the WTO and the largest developing country in the WTO, China's performance in the WTO DSS attracts wide attention, especially among developing countries, who look up to China and expect China to be a leader in the WTO. Noncompliance will not only undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the WTO DSS and, in turn, the WTO as a whole, but will also hurt the image of China as a system builder, affecting its future ability to lead. China's relatively good performance as a respondent in the DSS has well demonstrated its high concern over reputational costs. For the cases that China settled through mutually agreed solutions, China could have waited until the adoption of panel reports and then further extended the litigation process by filing an appeal before the Appellate Body. Since there are no retroactive remedies in the current DSS, the material costs of noncompliance will only be lower in this case, as the affected producer will benefit from the status quo for longer. In fact, many respondent states have chosen to take advantage of this loophole, escalating the disputes all the way to the end of the litigation process despite almost 90% of the adopted panel and/or the Appellate Body reports finding WTO violations.35 In contrast, China has settled nine of the 19 resolved cases out of court, showing great caution over the risk of reputational damage as a result of adverse panel/Appellate Body rulings. When the chance of winning is perceived to be small, China has chosen to settle in order to avoid the reputational costs, despite the material benefits of escalation. The unusual rush during the implementation stage of China—Intellectual Property Rights provides another good example. On 10 April 2007, the United States filed a dispute before the WTO targeting three specific sets of Chinese measures related to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. The panel reported mixed findings in March 2009 and neither party appealed before the Appellate Body. The two parties then agreed to set the deadline of the reasonable period of time for China to implement the rulings as 20 March 2010, a year after the adoption of the panel report. As the panel upheld US claims against Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, legislative action was taken on the part of China. That is, the State Council needed to propose amendments to the disputed measure and submit the amendments to the NPC or its Standing Committee for approval. Interestingly, the State Council waited until 10 February 2010 to pass and submit the proposed amendments, leaving the NPC Standing Committee only 16 days before its next, also the last, session prior to the implementation deadline. Despite that, the Standing Committee rushed to pass the amendments on 26 February 2010, skipping steps such as releasing the proposed revisions to the public for opinions before the vote. Such unusual practice revealed the limited power of the legislature. Nevertheless, it also showed that it had become a consensus in China that compliance with WTO dispute settlement was extremely important.
14,291
<h4>China has a strong track record of compliance --- they prioritize reputational costs and are committed to building institutions for a peaceful rise.</h4><p>Xiaowen <strong>Zhang and</strong> Xiaoling <strong>Li</strong>, <strong>2014</strong>. Assistant professor of political science at Augustana College, PhD in International Relations @ University of Southern California; and associated professor of law at the China Youth University for Political Sciences in Beijing, China,Ph.D. in Law from the East China University of Political Science and Law. “The Politics of Compliance with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, 23:85, 143-160.</p><p>Although much has been written about the factors affecting compliance with international commitments in general, <u>little systemic attention has been paid to compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings</u>. A few observers have examined the record of compliance in WTO disputes and identified some features of the pattern of compliance. For instance, Bruce Wilson finds that compliance has been more rapid where the WTO violations can be corrected through administrative action as opposed to legislative action, indicating that the procedural arrangement of implementation in respondent states influences the prospect of compliance.24 Regrettably, these studies are mainly descriptive, without offering in-depth explanations for why respondent states sometimes fail to implement the panel/Appellate Body recommendations in due time.25 <u>Consistent with the political economy of compliance in general, <mark>compliance in WTO disputes is an act generating <strong>uneven political and economic payoffs</strong></mark> for various special interests in a respondent state</u>. Anticipating increasing competition as a result of compliance, the producer group that has been benefiting from the status quo has strong incentives to block the implementation of panel/Appellate Body recommendations. Under this circumstance, <u>the prospect of successful implementation is <strong>subjected to the political influence of the affected producer group in the respondent state</u></strong>. However, there is no systematic study yet examining how special interests within a respondent state may influence the prospect of compliance in WTO disputes. Even less is known about how domestic politics in authoritarian countries like China may influence the prospect of compliance in WTO disputes, as the vast majority of respondent states that have been found violating WTO obligations are democracies.26 <u>Theoretically, decision makers in authoritarian countries face less domestic constraints when it comes to complying with international commitments than democracies</u>. While in democracies, re-election-minded governments may drag their feet as long as possible before they change WTO-inconsistent trade policies just to please politically influential special interests, decision makers in authoritarian regimes are largely autonomous, facing fewer constraints from special interests. <u>The choice of compliance is largely shaped by the perception of a small group of individuals of the material and reputational costs of noncompliance, which in turn is influenced by the relative power of the state and its degree of reliance on the good will of the international community</u>. <u>Nonetheless, <mark>China's record of compliance in WTO disputes indicates that there must be <strong>more going on concerning the politics of compliance in authoritarian China</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Of the disputes against China</mark> that went through WTO litigation, <mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>was</mark> either <mark>the sole complainant</mark> or the leading co-complainant, indicating a similar level of material costs if China chose noncompliance and sanctions were authorized</u>. Besides, these disputes were initiated when the same group of Chinese leaders was in power (between 2006 and 2009). Despite these similarities, China made a different policy choice in China—Publications and Audiovisual Productsthan for others. To explain this puzzle, an in-depth analysis of the compliance decision-making process in China is needed. WTO compliance decision making in China Generally speaking, <u><mark>policy making in China is characterized by a ‘fragmented authoritarian’</mark> model</u>.27 Compared with democracies, policies in China are made by a much more concentrated group of individuals in a top-down manner. Although it is fragmented in the sense that various actors at different levels of the power hierarchy are charged with the enforcement of policies, the framework places emphasis on achieving consensus and narrowing the divergent policy goals of different ministries and agencies. At the central government level, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the primary bureaucratic unit responsible for matters related to foreign economic relations. Within MOFCOM, there is a WTO Division in the Department of Treaty and Law that handles WTO disputes. However, according to the mandate of MOFCOM, the Minister of MOFCOM officially decides whether to bring a complaint to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Meanwhile, input from the Premier or the Vice Premier in charge of foreign trade has a decisive influence on any final decisions. Since the measures at dispute are often issued by various bureaucracies, the amendment of which often requires coordination, when facing coordination difficulties as a result of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the Vice Premier in charge of MOFCOM will usually intervene.28 Unlike democracies, <u><mark>China's legislature</u></mark>, the National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee, <u><mark>puts few constraints on the ability of the executives to comply with international commitments</mark>. <mark>There is no special procedural law regarding the implementation of WTO panel</mark>/Appellate Body recommendations</u>. If the measures at dispute are administrative regulations enacted by the State Council, the State Council is entitled to revise or abolish them. Likewise, ministries or commissions under the State Council, the People's Bank of China, the State Audit Administration, or other organs endowed with administrative functions, are responsible for the revision of departmental rules they enact respectively. If the measure at dispute is a national statute, normal legislative procedures apply. Panel/Appellate Body rulings are first studied by relevant government agencies, which then send their comments to the State Council. The State Council drafts the legislative proposals to be submitted to the NPC or its Standing Committee for deliberations and vote. Theoretically, NPC and its Standing Committee can block or delay implementation by voting down the proposals. In practice, however, once a proposed legislation is submitted to be voted on at the NPC or its Standing Committee, it almost always gets approved, especially when the bill is introduced by the State Council. For example, in the ten-year period of the 8th and 9th NPC between 1993 and 2003, all 44 legislative proposals introduced by the State Council were passed with high affirmative votes.29 The fact that the Premier or the Vice Premier in charge of foreign trade makes the ultimate decisions regarding WTO dispute settlement indicates the broad, complex and sometimes sensitive ramifications of panel/Appellate Boding rulings. Although respondent states are expected to implement panel/Appellate Body recommendations, a tactical matter in theory, they do choose noncompliance or incomplete compliance for a variety of strategic reasons. Not only does the decision of compliance impact the interests of affected industries, but also it often affects a country's long-term development objectives and its relationship with key trading partners. For vital decisions like this, a high degree of centralization is often observed during the policy-making process in China.30 <u>According to Liyu Han and Henry Gao, <mark>under most circumstances</mark>, <mark>top leaders in China are under no</mark> or little <mark>pressure</mark> from individual industries or businesses <mark>when it comes to compliance with </mark>adverse <mark>WTO dispute settlement rulings</u></mark>.31 <u><mark>Their top concern is the material and reputational costs of <strong>noncompliance to the country as a whole</strong></mark>. Although as China's economy grows, the material costs of noncompliance decline relatively, China still has great concern about the reputational costs of noncompliance, which explains its largely satisfactory performance as a respondent in the WTO DSS</u>. A peacefully rising China <u><mark>As a rising economic power</mark> that takes continuous economic growth as its top priority, <mark>China is very concerned about the reputational costs of</mark> <mark>noncompliance</mark> in the WTO DSS. <mark>Noncompliance will hurt China's image</mark> as a credible power in the international community, upset China's trading partners and undermine the legitimacy of the WTO, all of which are indispensible to China's economic development</u>. <u>The concern over the reputational costs of noncompliance is well aligned with China's national objective of ‘peaceful rising’</u>. Since early 2003, China's leaders have started to talk about the concept of ‘peaceful rising’ in various international settings.32 As explained by Bijian Zheng, a key advisor to the top Chinese leaders, ‘peaceful rising’ is a unique development strategy that China chose, different than that of any other emerging powers in modern history. Instead of rising through ‘invasion, colonization, expansion or even large-scale wars of aggression’, <u><mark>China's rise has been driven by ‘capital, technology, and resources </mark>acquired through peaceful means’</u>. <u>The key to rising in a peaceful manner is to embrace economic globalization</u>. <u>According to China's current strategic plan, it will take another 40 years—until 2050—before China can be called a modernized, medium-level developed country</u>. <u>To <mark>rise peacefully, China needs an open and orderly world <strong>market so that China can continue to take advantage of globalization</u></strong></mark>.33 Being the central driving force behind economic globalization, the wellbeing of WTO is therefore imperative to China's long-term objective. Acknowledging that, China strived for WTO membership. After becoming a member, upholding the legitimacy of the WTO and maintaining amicable relations with trading partners became imperative. However, both could be compromised by noncompliance in the WTO DSS. In particular, <u>noncompliance can mean two types of reputational costs to China. Firstly, noncompliance will hurt China's reputation as a credible rule player in the international community, which in turn will alienate its trading partners</u>. Since joining the WTO, China has grown to be the largest exporter of manufactured goods in the world. On the one hand, China has gained considerably from WTO membership, as the rapid growth of the Chinese economy is, to a large extent, driven by international trade. On the other hand, China's huge trade surpluses have brought considerable pressure to its trading partners. Their import-competing industries have been harmed by the inflow of Chinese products and they keep a close eye on China and would take every opportunity to lobby the governments to take protectionist measures against China. It has been argued that one of the purposes of China joining the WTO is to send a reassuring signal to the world that China is a credible player in the international economic system.34 Noncompliance, openly reneging on China's commitments to the international free trade community, will no doubt hurt China's reputation as a trustworthy rule player and provide those who are already upset by a rising China with support when they lobby their governments. Since the future goodwill and cooperation of others are essential to China's continuous growth, such reputational costs are serious. <u>Secondly, <mark>noncompliance will hurt China's reputation</mark> as a system builder. <mark>Because the </mark>WTO <mark>DSS is the central pillar of the WTO, its effectiveness is <strong>crucial to the legitimacy of the WTO as a whole</u></strong></mark>. <u>As the second largest member in the WTO and the largest developing country in the WTO, <mark>China's performance</mark> in the WTO DSS <mark>attracts wide attention</mark>, especially among developing countries</u>, who look up to China and expect China to be a leader in the WTO. <u>Noncompliance will not only undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the WTO DSS and, in turn, the WTO as a whole, but will also hurt the image of China as a system builder, affecting its future ability to lead</u>. <u><mark>China's relatively good performance</mark> as a respondent in the DSS <mark>has well demonstrated its high concern over reputational costs</u></mark>. <u>For the cases that China settled through mutually agreed solutions, China could have waited until the adoption of panel reports and then further extended the litigation process by filing an appeal before the Appellate Body. Since there are no retroactive remedies in the current DSS, the material costs of noncompliance will only be lower in this case, as the affected producer will benefit from the status quo for longer. In fact, many respondent states have chosen to take advantage of this loophole, escalating the disputes all the way to the end of the litigation process despite almost 90% of the adopted panel and/or the Appellate Body reports finding WTO violations</u>.35 <u>In contrast, China has settled nine of the 19 resolved cases out of court, showing great caution over the risk of reputational damage as a result of adverse panel/Appellate Body rulings</u>. <u>When the chance of winning is perceived to be small, China has chosen to settle in order to avoid the reputational costs, despite the material benefits of escalation</u>. <u>The unusual rush during the implementation stage of China—Intellectual Property Rights provides another good example</u>. On 10 April 2007, the United States filed a dispute before the WTO targeting three specific sets of Chinese measures related to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. The panel reported mixed findings in March 2009 and neither party appealed before the Appellate Body. The two parties then agreed to set the deadline of the reasonable period of time for China to implement the rulings as 20 March 2010, a year after the adoption of the panel report. As the panel upheld US claims against Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, legislative action was taken on the part of China. That is, the State Council needed to propose amendments to the disputed measure and submit the amendments to the NPC or its Standing Committee for approval. Interestingly, <u>the State Council waited until 10 February 2010 to pass and submit the proposed amendments, leaving the NPC Standing Committee only 16 days before its next, also the last, session prior to the implementation deadline</u>. <u>Despite that, the Standing Committee rushed to pass the amendments on 26 February 2010, skipping steps such as releasing the proposed revisions to the public for opinions before the vote</u>. <u>Such unusual practice</u> revealed the limited power of the legislature. Nevertheless, it also <u>showed that it had become a consensus in China that compliance with WTO dispute settlement was extremely important</u>.</p>
1NC
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China
430,004
5
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
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1
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ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
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2,014
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2
740,824
Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence
Gulli 13
Gulli 13 Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5
we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in Gaza or France from once again trying its luck in Africa though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007 the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance MARKED we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony this killing, just like Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.
sovereign power and authority rest on violence and terror struggle for dominance is impaired and made brutal by lack of heg U S heg has vanished drive for domination has to show raw violence traditional justifications democracy and freedom have now become weak because the contempt the (the US show toward morality punishment remains a limit Not so for dominant nations: who will stop the U S from striking anywhere these nations are aware of their structural, ontological historical, weakness they rely on a military machine drones and diplomacy, is an outpost for military operations and global policing incarnated by Africom Domination without hegemony’ captures the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty in the light of the bifurcation of financial and military power with the catastrophic war against Iraq US hegemony entered terminal crisis.” the U S relationship to the world is best described ‘domination without heg ’ What can the US do ? Not much, short of brutal dominance you can kill the bin Ladens without gaining heg Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of al-Awlaki, who many have compared to Trayvon Martin the ill-concealed fury for loss of heg becomes visible power as care is what should replace hegemony
I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony.¶ ‘Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” He continues:¶ Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. MARKED In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.
5,041
<h4>Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence</h4><p><u><strong>Gulli 13</u></strong> Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5</p><p>I think that <u>we have now an understanding of what the situation is: <strong>The <mark>sovereign </mark>everywhere</strong>, be it the political or financial elite, <strong>fakes the legitimacy</strong> on which its <mark>power and authority </mark>supposedly rest</u>. <u>In truth, they <strong><mark>rest on violence and terror</strong></mark>, or the threat thereof</u>. <u>This is an <strong>obvious and essential aspect</strong> of the singularity of the present crisis</u>. In this sense, <u>the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the <mark>struggle for dominance is </mark>at one and the same time <mark>impaired and made </mark>more <mark>brutal by <strong></mark>the <mark>lack of heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. This is true in general, but <u>it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, <strong>the <mark>U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates</strong>, whose <mark>heg</mark>emony <mark>has</mark> <strong>diminished or <mark>vanished</strong></mark>.</u> <u>It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard</u>. <u>Lacking hegemony, the <strong>sheer <mark>drive for domination</strong> has to show</mark> <strong>its true face</strong>, its <strong><mark>raw violence</u></strong></mark>. <u>The usual, <mark>traditional <strong></mark>ideological <mark>justifications </mark>for dominance</strong> (such as bringing <mark>democracy and freedom</mark> here and there) <mark>have now become <strong></mark>very <mark>weak</strong> because </u></mark>of <u><strong><mark>the contempt</strong> </mark>that <mark>the </mark>dominant nations <mark>(the US </mark>and its most powerful allies) <strong>regularly <mark>show</strong> toward </mark>legality, <mark>morality</mark>, and humanity</u>. Of course, <u>the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of <mark>punishment</mark>, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the <strong>I</strong>nternational <strong>C</strong>riminal <strong>C</strong>ourt, <mark>remains a </u></mark>clear<u><mark> limit</mark>, a possibility.</u> <u><strong><mark>Not so for </mark>the <mark>dominant nations</u></strong>: <u>who will stop the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> from striking anywhere </mark>at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in</u> the <u>Gaza</u> Strip, <u>or</u> envious <u>France from once again trying its luck in Africa</u>? Yet, <u>though still dominant, <mark>these nations are </mark>painfully <mark>aware of their <strong>structural, ontological </mark>and <mark>historical, weakness</u></strong></mark>. <u>All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) <strong>only heighten the brutality</strong> in the exertion of <strong>what remains of their dominance</u></strong>. <u>Although <mark>they rely on a <strong></mark>highly sophisticated <mark>military machine</strong></mark> (the technology of <mark>drones</mark> is a clear instance of this) <mark>and </mark>on an equally sophisticated <mark>diplomacy, </mark>which has <strong>traditionally</strong> been and <strong>increasingly</strong> <mark>is an outpost for <strong>military operations and global policing</strong></mark> (now excellently <strong><mark>incarnated by Africom</strong></mark>), <strong>they know that they have lost their hegemony</u></strong>.¶ ‘<u><strong><mark>Domination without hegemony’</u></strong></mark> <u>is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007</u>). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), <u>the phrase <mark>captures the </mark>singularity of the <mark>global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty</mark>, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future</u>” (1994/2010: 221). <u>It acquires particular meaning <mark>in the light of</mark> Arrighi’s notion of <strong><mark>the bifurcation of financial and military power</mark>.</u></strong> Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, <u>early in the twenty-first century, and certainly <mark>with the </mark>ill-advised and <mark>catastrophic war against Iraq</mark>, “the US belle époque came to an end and <mark>US </mark>world <mark>hegemony entered <strong></mark>what in all likelihood is its <mark>terminal crisis.”</u></strong></mark> He continues:¶ <u>Although <mark>the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its <mark>relationship to </mark>the rest of <mark>the world is </mark>now <mark>best described </mark>as one of <strong><mark>‘domination without heg</mark>emony<mark>’</u></strong></mark> (1994/2010: 384). <u><mark>What can the US do </mark>next<mark>? <strong>Not much, short of brutal dominance</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><strong>MARKED</p><p></u></strong> In the last few years, <u>we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too</u> (Noam Chomsky has often noted that <u>bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime</u>), <u>it is certain that <mark>you can kill <strong></mark>all <mark>the bin Ladens </mark>of the world <mark>without gaining </mark>back a bit of <mark>heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. In fact, <u>this killing, just like</u> G. W. <u>Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a <strong>Mafia-style</strong> regolamento di conti more than any other thing</u>. Barack <u><mark>Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of</mark> 16-year-old</u> Abdulrahman <u><mark>al-Awlaki, who</mark>se fate <mark>many have <strong></mark>correctly <mark>compared</strong> to <strong></mark>that of</strong> 17-year-old <mark>Trayvon Martin</u></mark> (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), <u>but it is precisely in cases like this one that <strong>the weakness at the heart of empire</strong>, <mark>the ill-concealed</mark> and uncontrolled <strong><mark>fury for</mark> the <mark>loss of heg</mark>emony</strong>, <mark>becomes visible</u></mark>. <u>The frenzy denies the possibility of <strong><mark>power as care</strong></mark>, which <mark>is <strong>what should replace hegemony</strong></mark>, let alone domination</u>. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about <u>the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence</u>. <u>What is needed is rather <strong>a radical alternative</strong> in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, <strong>a poetic rather than military and financial shift.</p></u></strong>
1NC
null
Econ
112,328
37
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,825
Taliban are giving up AND political solutions solve
Ahbrimkhil 13
Ahbrimkhil 13 (hakeela Ahbrimkhil, Afghanistan news staff writer, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11143-political-solution-in-afghanistan-inevitable-but-caution-is-key-gen-dempsey, “Political Solution in Afghanistan Inevitable, But Caution is Key: Gen. Dempsey”, AB)
Dempsey argued for a cautious approach to peace negotiations claiming that all wars come to end through political solutions. at some point we would find reconciliation with the Taliban military efforts should be continued against the Taliban Taliban leaders told Karzai they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore and were ready to talk with the Afghan High Peace Council we will get the Afghan security forces to the point where they will be able to provide security across the country Much confidence has been expressed in the ability of the ANSF to continue the fight against the insurgency
wars come to end through political solutions. at some point we would find reconciliation with the Taliban military efforts should be continued Taliban leaders told Karzai they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore and were ready to talk Afghan security forces will be able to provide security confidence has been expressed
General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued in an interview with CNN for a cautious approach to peace negotiations with the Taliban, claiming that all wars come to end through political solutions. "It is always difficult to think about the losses that we've suffered and the idea that at some point we would find reconciliation with the Taliban," said Den. Dempsey. His comments suggest sympathy with those in the US who have regarded peace talks with the Taliban as sign of defeat in the war that has lasted over a decade. However, Gen. Dempsey emphasized that military efforts should be continued against the elements of the Taliban that are not ready for negotiations. "I think there's several flavours of the Taliban. I think there are some who are reconcilable and undoubtedly some that are not," he said. His comments reinforce an increasingly common line of thought within US and Afghan government ranks that suggests reconciliation may be possible with some Taliban leaders while not with others. In a statement on Saturday, Aimal Faizi, a spokesman for President Karzai, said that some Taliban leaders had been in contact with the government and spoken about their dissatisfaction with the Qatar office opening, and unlike other Taliban leaders, did in fact wish to meet with the High Peace Council (HPC). "After the opening of the Qatar office, a number of Taliban leaders told President Karzai that they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore and were ready to talk with the Afghan High Peace Council. They added that they did not support talks after the Qatar office opening," said Mr. Faizi. Gen. Dempsey also spoke about the security transition at length, sounding reservedly hopeful. "I mean we are working and have another year-and-a-half to fundamentally get the Afghan security forces where we think they need to be in order to maintain a stable security platform in Afghanistan. I think we will achieve that, meaning, I think that we will get the Afghan security forces to the point where they will be able to provide security generally across the country, but there will still be pockets of resistance..." The interview with Gen. Dempsey comes after a turbulent few weeks for the security transition and peace negotiations. Much confidence has been expressed in the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other security branches to continue the fight against the insurgency since the beginning of the final stage in the transition between foreign and Afghan forces last month in Kabul. However, Taliban attacks have seemed to only increase in frequency and scale, with high-profile incidents at the Supreme Court, the international airport and the Presidential Palace in Kabul claiming scores of security personnel and civilian lives.
2,805
<h4>Taliban are giving up AND political solutions solve </h4><p><u><strong><mark>Ahbrimkhil 13</u></strong></mark> (hakeela Ahbrimkhil, Afghanistan news staff writer, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11143-political-solution-in-afghanistan-inevitable-but-caution-is-key-gen-dempsey, “Political Solution in Afghanistan Inevitable, But Caution is Key: Gen. Dempsey”, AB)</p><p>General Martin <u>Dempsey</u>, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>argued</u> in an interview with CNN <u>for a cautious approach to peace negotiations </u>with the Taliban, <u>claiming that all <mark>wars come to end through political solutions.</mark> </u>"It is always difficult to think about the losses that we've suffered and the idea that <u><mark>at some point we</mark> <mark>would find reconciliation</mark> <mark>with the Taliban</u></mark>," said Den. Dempsey. His comments suggest sympathy with those in the US who have regarded peace talks with the Taliban as sign of defeat in the war that has lasted over a decade. However, Gen. Dempsey emphasized that <u><mark>military efforts should be continued</mark> against the</u> elements of the <u>Taliban</u> that are not ready for negotiations. "I think there's several flavours of the Taliban. I think there are some who are reconcilable and undoubtedly some that are not," he said. His comments reinforce an increasingly common line of thought within US and Afghan government ranks that suggests reconciliation may be possible with some Taliban leaders while not with others. In a statement on Saturday, Aimal Faizi, a spokesman for President Karzai, said that some Taliban leaders had been in contact with the government and spoken about their dissatisfaction with the Qatar office opening, and unlike other Taliban leaders, did in fact wish to meet with the High Peace Council (HPC). "After the opening of the Qatar office, a number of <u><mark>Taliban leaders told</u></mark> President <u><mark>Karzai</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore</mark> </strong><mark>and were</u> <u><strong>ready to talk</u></strong></mark> <u>with the Afghan High Peace Council</u>. They added that they did not support talks after the Qatar office opening," said Mr. Faizi. Gen. Dempsey also spoke about the security transition at length, sounding reservedly hopeful. "I mean we are working and have another year-and-a-half to fundamentally get the Afghan security forces where we think they need to be in order to maintain a stable security platform in Afghanistan. I think we will achieve that, meaning, I think that <u>we will get the <mark>Afghan</mark> <mark>security</mark> <mark>forces</mark> to the point where they <mark>will be able to provide security</u></mark> generally <u>across the country</u>, but there will still be pockets of resistance..." The interview with Gen. Dempsey comes after a turbulent few weeks for the security transition and peace negotiations. <u>Much <mark>confidence has been expressed</mark> in the ability of the</u> Afghan National Security Forces (<u>ANSF</u>) and other security branches <u>to continue the fight against the insurgency</u> since the beginning of the final stage in the transition between foreign and Afghan forces last month in Kabul. However, Taliban attacks have seemed to only increase in frequency and scale, with high-profile incidents at the Supreme Court, the international airport and the Presidential Palace in Kabul claiming scores of security personnel and civilian lives.</p>
1NR
War on Drugs
Afghan Impact
430,005
2
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,826
The spread of biopolitics based on securing a vital community forms and categorizes discursive identities based on sexuality as a means of social control – Marc Spindelman describes how one such identity trope is manifested in PAS discourses through the figure of the gay man with AIDS whose sexuality damned him into seeking death – only rejecting sex as truth overcomes this form of biopower – Thomas Roach explains
null
Thomas J., Ph.D, professor at Professor of English and Cultural Studies at Bryant University’s Center for Cultural Studies, “Sense and Sexuality: Foucault, Wojnarowicz, and Biopower.” Nebula, Vol. 6:3, Fall 2009 SJE
biopower encourages an art of living: thou shalt live a good life as devised by state informed¶ expert knowledge The family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers¶ cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities that secure a “vital population.” secularized,¶ techniques of pastoral power function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security,¶ sufficient wealth, and citizenship sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the modern state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge sexuality is mobilized as a hermeneutic of desire to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity. The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity—that is, "sexuality"—is thus implemented as a means of social control, deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.
biopower encourages an art of living a good life as devised by state knowledge medicine education cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities that secure a “vital population.” secularized,¶ techniques function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security wealth, and citizenship sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge. sexuality is mobilized to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity. The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity sexuality is implemented as a means of social control, In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.
At the risk of rehearsing the familiar story of biopower's conceptual life, I begin by doing so for¶ two reasons: first, to emphasize the centrality of sexuality in Foucault's rendering of the concept; and¶ second, to show precisely how Hardt and Negri desexualize it. Foucault begins his account in the¶ seventeenth century when a "power over life" emerges as a tendency alongside an earlier, overtly repressive, penal form of power that disciplined subjects through juridical systems. In contrast to a¶ negative form of freedom predicated upon "thou shalt not," which found its logical conclusion in public¶ spectacles of death, biopower encourages an art of living: thou shalt live a good life as devised by state informed¶ expert knowledge; thou shalt do what is best for you, which conveniently coincides with what¶ is best for biopolitical administration. The family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers¶ cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities and¶ forms of life that secure a “vital population.” A docile subject is produced when procedures of¶ totalization combine with techniques of individualization, or, in Foucault’s vocabulary, when the¶ anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population become two poles in the art of¶ governance. These poles correspond chronologically to different historical moments: the anatomopolitics¶ of the body, “the first to be formed it seems […] centered on the body as a machine: its¶ disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces," while the biopolitics of the¶ population, “formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics¶ of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes.”6¶ The anatomo-politics of the body and the¶ biopolitics of the population play two roles in the operation of biopower: the former, analytical,¶ concerning the individual, the latter, quantitative, concerning the population. In an essay entitled "The¶ Subject and Power" we learn that biopower derives from a form of power implemented in archaic¶ Christian institutions—what Foucault designates pastoral power.7¶ Christian pastoral power promised¶ individuals salvation in the afterlife while anchoring one’s earthly life in a community of believers. Its¶ efficacy lay in its ability to govern a population both as individuals and as a mass. Now secularized,¶ techniques of pastoral power function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security,¶ sufficient wealth, and citizenship (334-5). On Foucault's view, sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the modern state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge.¶ In the psychiatrization and medicalization of sexuality the individual becomes legible, recordable,¶ disciplined: sexuality is mobilized as a hermeneutic of desire to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity. At the same time this marker of individuality becomes useful in administering a social¶ totality. Techniques of the state such as the population census, fertility rates, and statistics of life¶ expectancy appeal to this hermeneutic to organize individual subjects into a manageable whole. The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity—that is, "sexuality"—is thus implemented as a means of social control, deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures.¶ In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life, according to Foucault, the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.
3,664
<h4>The spread of biopolitics based on securing a vital community forms and categorizes discursive identities based on sexuality as a means of social control – Marc Spindelman describes how one such identity trope is manifested in PAS discourses through the figure of the gay man with AIDS whose sexuality damned him into seeking death – only rejecting sex as truth overcomes this form of biopower – Thomas Roach explains</h4><p>Thomas J., Ph.D, professor at Professor of English and Cultural Studies at Bryant University’s Center for Cultural Studies, “Sense and Sexuality: Foucault, Wojnarowicz, and Biopower.” Nebula, Vol. 6:3, Fall 2009 SJE </p><p><u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>At the risk of rehearsing the familiar story of biopower's conceptual life, I begin by doing so for¶ two reasons: first, to emphasize the centrality of sexuality in Foucault's rendering of the concept; and¶ second, to show precisely how Hardt and Negri desexualize it. Foucault begins his account in the¶ seventeenth century when a "power over life" emerges as a tendency alongside an earlier, overtly repressive, penal form of power that disciplined subjects through juridical systems. In contrast to a¶ negative form of freedom predicated upon "thou shalt not," which found its logical conclusion in public¶ spectacles of death, <u><strong><mark>biopower encourages an art of living</mark>: thou shalt live <mark>a good life as devised by state</mark> informed¶ expert <mark>knowledge</u></strong></mark>; thou shalt do what is best for you, which conveniently coincides with what¶ is best for biopolitical administration. <u><strong>The family, <mark>medicine</mark>, psychiatry, <mark>education</mark>, and employers¶ <mark>cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities </u></strong></mark>and¶ forms of life <u><strong><mark>that secure a “vital population.”</u></strong></mark> A docile subject is produced when procedures of¶ totalization combine with techniques of individualization, or, in Foucault’s vocabulary, when the¶ anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population become two poles in the art of¶ governance. These poles correspond chronologically to different historical moments: the anatomopolitics¶ of the body, “the first to be formed it seems […] centered on the body as a machine: its¶ disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces," while the biopolitics of the¶ population, “formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics¶ of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes.”6¶ The anatomo-politics of the body and the¶ biopolitics of the population play two roles in the operation of biopower: the former, analytical,¶ concerning the individual, the latter, quantitative, concerning the population. In an essay entitled "The¶ Subject and Power" we learn that biopower derives from a form of power implemented in archaic¶ Christian institutions—what Foucault designates pastoral power.7¶ Christian pastoral power promised¶ individuals salvation in the afterlife while anchoring one’s earthly life in a community of believers. Its¶ efficacy lay in its ability to govern a population both as individuals and as a mass. Now <u><strong><mark>secularized,¶ techniques </mark>of pastoral power <mark>function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security</mark>,¶ sufficient <mark>wealth, and citizenship</u></strong></mark> (334-5). On Foucault's view, <u><strong><mark>sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the </mark>modern <mark>state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge</u></strong>.</mark>¶ In the psychiatrization and medicalization of sexuality the individual becomes legible, recordable,¶ disciplined: <u><strong><mark>sexuality is mobilized</mark> as a hermeneutic of desire <mark>to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity.</u></strong></mark> At the same time this marker of individuality becomes useful in administering a social¶ totality. Techniques of the state such as the population census, fertility rates, and statistics of life¶ expectancy appeal to this hermeneutic to organize individual subjects into a manageable whole. <u><strong><mark>The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity</mark>—that is, "<mark>sexuality</mark>"—<mark>is</mark> thus <mark>implemented as a means of social control,</mark> deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life</u></strong></mark>, according to Foucault,<u><strong> <mark>the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.</p></u></strong></mark>
1ac
null
null
430,006
3
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,827
GOP Senate control kills Obama’s climate agenda
Stevenson 5/21
Stevenson 5/21 [Aiko Stevenson is a freelance writer from Hong Kong who used to work for BBC World News, Bloomberg, CNBC Europe, CNN and Time magazine. She went to the University of Edinburgh in the UK and recently completed a Master of Fine Arts in Creative Writing from the University of Hong Kong. “Battle of the Billionaires Shapes This Year's Midterm Elections,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aiko-stevenson/midterm-elections-climate-change_b_5362388.html | prs]
the Republicans control both the House and the Senate would mark doom for Barack Obama's final two years in office, and potentially scupper any of the president's second-term green agenda. The Koch's congressional campaign comes as they try to torpedo Obama's upcoming restrictions for power plant emissions by entangling them with several lawsuits misinformation campaigns are designed to keep the debate about global warming alive so that legislation on the matter does not pass In the end, the battle may just boil down to a handful of crucial seats that the Democrats must hold onto if they want to maintain control of the Senate most Republicans with political aspirations are forced to deny the science behind climate change otherwise they will not receive enough money to run without such a change, legislation will not pass in Congress.
the Republicans control the Senate would mark doom for Obama's office and scupper any of the president's second-term green agenda.¶ The Koch's campaign try to torpedo Obama's restrictions for power plant emissions the battle may just boil down to the Senate without such a change, legislation will not pass in Congress
To ensure that the Republicans control both the House and the Senate this November, the Koch brothers have spent at least $30 million over the past nine months to try and topple vulnerable House and Senate Democrats.¶ If they succeed, it would mark doom for Barack Obama's final two years in office, and potentially scupper any of the president's second-term green agenda.¶ The Koch-backed Americans for Prosperity advocacy group has not indicated how much it will spend this year. But, according to the Financial Times, money into such groups is currently running at about three times the rate of the 2012 presidential elections, and 17 times that of the 2010 midterms.¶ And, the Center of Responsive Politics says that these groups might spend more than $1 billion this year.¶ The Koch's congressional campaign comes as they try to torpedo Obama's upcoming restrictions for power plant emissions by entangling them with several lawsuits.¶ Scheduled for release next month, the new rules mark's the president's signature piece of climate legislation: power plants account for most of the country's carbon pollution.¶ The news comes one year after the Kochs spent millions of dollars on setting up quasi think tanks to deny the science behind climate change.¶ In a bid to confuse the public, such misinformation campaigns are designed to keep the debate about global warming alive so that legislation on the matter does not pass. It's the same tactic that Big Tobacco used in the eighties to deny the link between smoking and cancer.¶ "The Kochs' bid for a hostile takeover of the American democracy is calculated to make themselves even richer," says Senate majority leader Harry Reid. His comments came after he endorsed amending the constitution to restrict "unlimited campaign spending."¶ In a bid to fight back, Steyer has set up his own super PAC to run a series of attack ads revealing the Koch brothers' shady ties to such obstructive campaigns. Unlike the Koch's who are gunning for a Republican Senate win, Steyer is only backing politicians with climate aspirations.¶ But, the $100 million that he has pledged to spend is but a fraction of what the Koch brothers have in their vast war chest.¶ In the end, the battle may just boil down to a handful of crucial seats that the Democrats must hold onto if they want to maintain control of the Senate.¶ Although Steyer may have less money to play with, Mother Nature may step in to lend a helping hand: El Niño is expected to arrive this summer.¶ The weather phenomenon ushers in unusually warm water temperatures across the Pacific, ultimately warming up the atmosphere. Kevin Trenberth, a climate scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research describes it as a "mini" global warming event.¶ The opposite happens during el Nina, it's colder sister.¶ According to recent models, there is a 75 percent chance of El Niño arriving before the midterms, and Trenberth says that this could make 2015 the hottest year on record.¶ This could have a radical impact on public attitudes towards global warming.¶ According to Jon Krosnick from Stanford University, one third of Americans do not trust climate scientists. They base their opinion on the actual weather: In warmer than usual years, their belief in climate change thus rises.¶ As El Niño unleashes a string of extreme weather that accompanies hotter weather, it could reenergize Steyer's campaign against the Kochs who may not be able to account for events which may include torrential downpours and floods across the southern part of America.¶ It could also push climate change onto the center stage for the 2016 presidential elections: El Niño tends to be accompanied by a sustained period of warming.¶ This could leave Republicans with a public relations disaster if Senator Marco Rubio ends up being their frontrunner. He recently denied the link between human activity and the warming of our planet.¶ According to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, most Republicans with political aspirations are forced to deny the science behind climate change otherwise they will not receive enough money to run:¶ They will face primary opponents financed by the Koch Brothers, and others who are part of their group, if they even breathe the slightest breath of sympathy for the truth about climate science. It's not that complicated.¶ Mark McKinnon, a Republican strategist, says catastrophic events will eventually soften the GOP's position on climate change. And, without such a change, legislation will not pass in Congress.¶ Challenging the Koch brothers to a climate duel last month, Steyer said:¶ Democracy isn't served by underhanded attacks and the voice of the American people shouldn't be drowned out by anonymous voices with expensive megaphones. Which is why today I am issuing a formal invitation to Charles and David Koch to come out of the shadows and join me in exactly what they've requested: a free and open debate. Interestingly, they never replied.
4,982
<h4>GOP Senate control kills Obama’s climate agenda</h4><p><u><strong>Stevenson 5/21</u></strong> [Aiko Stevenson is a freelance writer from Hong Kong who used to work for BBC World News, Bloomberg, CNBC Europe, CNN and Time magazine. She went to the University of Edinburgh in the UK and recently completed a Master of Fine Arts in Creative Writing from the University of Hong Kong. “Battle of the Billionaires Shapes This Year's Midterm Elections,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aiko-stevenson/midterm-elections-climate-change_b_5362388.html | prs]</p><p>To ensure that <u><mark>the Republicans control</mark> both <mark>the</mark> House and the <mark>Senate</u></mark> this November, the Koch brothers have spent at least $30 million over the past nine months to try and topple vulnerable House and Senate Democrats.¶ If they succeed, it <u><mark>would mark doom for</mark> Barack <mark>Obama's</mark> final two years in <mark>office</mark>, <mark>and</mark> potentially <mark>scupper <strong>any of the president's second-term green agenda</strong>.</u>¶</mark> The Koch-backed Americans for Prosperity advocacy group has not indicated how much it will spend this year. But, according to the Financial Times, money into such groups is currently running at about three times the rate of the 2012 presidential elections, and 17 times that of the 2010 midterms.¶ And, the Center of Responsive Politics says that these groups might spend more than $1 billion this year.¶ <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>Koch's</mark> congressional <mark>campaign</mark> comes as they <mark>try to torpedo Obama's</mark> upcoming <mark>restrictions for power plant emissions</mark> by entangling them with several lawsuits</u>.¶ Scheduled for release next month, the new rules mark's the president's signature piece of climate legislation: power plants account for most of the country's carbon pollution.¶ The news comes one year after the Kochs spent millions of dollars on setting up quasi think tanks to deny the science behind climate change.¶ In a bid to confuse the public, such <u>misinformation campaigns are designed to keep the debate about global warming alive so that legislation on the matter <strong>does not pass</u></strong>. It's the same tactic that Big Tobacco used in the eighties to deny the link between smoking and cancer.¶ "The Kochs' bid for a hostile takeover of the American democracy is calculated to make themselves even richer," says Senate majority leader Harry Reid. His comments came after he endorsed amending the constitution to restrict "unlimited campaign spending."¶ In a bid to fight back, Steyer has set up his own super PAC to run a series of attack ads revealing the Koch brothers' shady ties to such obstructive campaigns. Unlike the Koch's who are gunning for a Republican Senate win, Steyer is only backing politicians with climate aspirations.¶ But, the $100 million that he has pledged to spend is but a fraction of what the Koch brothers have in their vast war chest.¶ <u>In the end, <mark>the battle</mark> <mark>may just boil down to </mark>a handful of crucial seats that the Democrats must hold onto if they want to maintain control of <mark>the Senate</u></mark>.¶ Although Steyer may have less money to play with, Mother Nature may step in to lend a helping hand: El Niño is expected to arrive this summer.¶ The weather phenomenon ushers in unusually warm water temperatures across the Pacific, ultimately warming up the atmosphere. Kevin Trenberth, a climate scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research describes it as a "mini" global warming event.¶ The opposite happens during el Nina, it's colder sister.¶ According to recent models, there is a 75 percent chance of El Niño arriving before the midterms, and Trenberth says that this could make 2015 the hottest year on record.¶ This could have a radical impact on public attitudes towards global warming.¶ According to Jon Krosnick from Stanford University, one third of Americans do not trust climate scientists. They base their opinion on the actual weather: In warmer than usual years, their belief in climate change thus rises.¶ As El Niño unleashes a string of extreme weather that accompanies hotter weather, it could reenergize Steyer's campaign against the Kochs who may not be able to account for events which may include torrential downpours and floods across the southern part of America.¶ It could also push climate change onto the center stage for the 2016 presidential elections: El Niño tends to be accompanied by a sustained period of warming.¶ This could leave Republicans with a public relations disaster if Senator Marco Rubio ends up being their frontrunner. He recently denied the link between human activity and the warming of our planet.¶ According to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, <u>most Republicans with political aspirations are forced to deny the science behind climate change otherwise they will not receive enough money to run</u>:¶ They will face primary opponents financed by the Koch Brothers, and others who are part of their group, if they even breathe the slightest breath of sympathy for the truth about climate science. It's not that complicated.¶ Mark McKinnon, a Republican strategist, says catastrophic events will eventually soften the GOP's position on climate change. And, <u><mark>without such a change, legislation <strong>will not pass in Congress</mark>.</u></strong>¶ Challenging the Koch brothers to a climate duel last month, Steyer said:¶ Democracy isn't served by underhanded attacks and the voice of the American people shouldn't be drowned out by anonymous voices with expensive megaphones. Which is why today I am issuing a formal invitation to Charles and David Koch to come out of the shadows and join me in exactly what they've requested: a free and open debate. Interestingly, they never replied.</p>
1NC
null
Off
271,883
6
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,828
It’s also the buying and selling of offices
Merriam Webster
Merriam Webster
simony Buying or selling of church offices or powers promotions to the priesthood or episcopate were bestowed by monarchs and nobles, in exchange for oaths of loyalty.
null
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simony simony noun (Concise Encyclopedia)¶ Buying or selling of church offices or powers. The name is taken from Simon Magus (Acts 8:18), who tried to buy the power of conferring the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Simony was said to have become widespread in Europe in the 10th–11th century, as promotions to the priesthood or episcopate were bestowed by monarchs and nobles, often in exchange for oaths of loyalty. Changes in the understanding of the nature of simony and the relationship between lay and religious orders contributed to the perception of the growth of simony, even though corrupt practices did exist. Rigorously attacked by Pope Gregory VII and the reform movement associated with him, the practice recurred in the 15th century, but after the 16th century its more flagrant forms disappeared.
847
<h4><u><strong>It’s also the buying and selling of offices</h4><p>Merriam Webster</p><p></u></strong>http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simony</p><p><u>simony</u> noun (Concise Encyclopedia)¶ <u>Buying or selling of church offices or powers</u>. The name is taken from Simon Magus (Acts 8:18), who tried to buy the power of conferring the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Simony was said to have become widespread in Europe in the 10th–11th century, as <u>promotions to the priesthood or episcopate were bestowed by monarchs and nobles,</u> often <u>in exchange for oaths of loyalty. </u>Changes in the understanding of the nature of simony and the relationship between lay and religious orders contributed to the perception of the growth of simony, even though corrupt practices did exist. Rigorously attacked by Pope Gregory VII and the reform movement associated with him, the practice recurred in the 15th century, but after the 16th century its more flagrant forms disappeared.</p>
1NR
T
Interp
430,007
1
16,992
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
564,703
N
UMKC
5
Iowa HS
Brian Lain
1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,829
US China conflict would never escalate - empirics
Allison & Blackwill 3/5
Allison & Blackwill 3/5 -- *director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND **Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)
committee Competition between the U S and China is inevitable, but conflict is not This is not the Cold War China is acting purely in its own national interests It is not interested in changing the world struggle for influence will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States markets technology students If you quarrel with the U S and become enemies all that information will be cut off. The struggle will be maintained that allows them to tap the U S Unlike during the Cold War there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the U S and China that has enthusiastically embraced the market the die has not been cast A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other The danger of a military conflict is low Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but pressure Taiwan the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone
Competition is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War China is acting in its own interests. It is not interested in changing the world struggle will be subdued because the Chinese need the U S markets technology students If you quarrel and become enemies, all that will be cut off there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict A stabilizing factor that each nation requires cooperation and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict is low. Chinese leaders know U.S. military is overwhelming They will modernize to pressure Taiwan the Chinese do not want to clash
Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.
2,545
<h4>US China conflict would never escalate - empirics</h4><p><u><strong>Allison & Blackwill 3/5</u></strong> -- *director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND **Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)</p><p>Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour<u><strong> committee</p><p></strong><mark>Competition</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China <mark>is inevitable, but <strong>conflict is not</u></strong>. <u>This is not the Cold War</u></mark>. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. <u><mark>China is acting</mark> purely <mark>in its own</mark> national <mark>interests</u>. <u><strong>It is not interested in changing the world</u></strong></mark>. There will be a <u><mark>struggle</mark> for influence</u>. I think it <u><mark>will be subdued because <strong>the Chinese need the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>, need U.S. <u><strong><mark>markets</u></strong></mark>, U.S. <u><strong><mark>technology</u></strong></mark>, need to have <u><strong><mark>students</u></strong></mark> going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. <u><mark>If you quarrel</mark> with the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>and become</u></mark> bitter <u><mark>enemies</u>, <u>all that</mark> information</u> and those technological capabilities <u><mark>will be cut off</mark>.</u> <u>The struggle</u> between the two countries <u>will be maintained</u> at the level <u>that allows them to</u> still <u>tap the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>Unlike</u> U.S.-Soviet relations <u>during the Cold War</u>, <u><mark>there is <strong>no irreconcilable ideological conflict</strong></mark> between the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and</u> a <u>China that has enthusiastically embraced the market</u>. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But <u>the die has not been cast</u>. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. <u><mark>A stabilizing factor</mark> in their relationship is <mark>that <strong>each nation requires cooperation</mark> from <mark>and healthy competition with the other</u></strong>. <u>The danger of a military conflict</u></mark> between China and the United States <u><mark>is <strong>low</u></strong>. <u>Chinese leaders know</mark> that <mark>U.S. military</mark> superiority <mark>is <strong>overwhelming</u></strong></mark> and will remain so for the next few decades. <u><mark>They will modernize</mark> their forces not <mark>to</mark> challenge America but</u> to be able, if necessary, to <u><mark>pressure Taiwan</u></mark> by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, <u><strong><mark>the Chinese do not want to clash</mark> with anyone</u></strong> -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight. </p>
1NC
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254,688
17
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
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48,386
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Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,830
be skeptical of their truth claims because high magnitude impacts have colonized the minds of the debate community – it crowds out systemic violence because we only consider what affects us in our privileged position – in this debate, you should flip that calculus
Mignolo ‘7
Mignolo ‘7 (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)
The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5
rhetoric of modernity occluded—under its rhetoric of salvation and the good life the dispensability of human lives not all massive killings have been recorded with the same value and visibility. The criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign of imperial politics the enunciator becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have institutional power to rank according to a racist classification
The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5
1,322
<h4>be<u> skeptical of their truth claims because high magnitude impacts have colonized the minds of the debate community – it crowds out systemic violence because we only consider what affects us in our privileged position – in this debate, you should flip that calculus</h4><p><strong>Mignolo ‘7</strong> (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)</p><p>The <mark>rhetoric of modernity</mark> (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) <mark>occluded—under its </mark>triumphant <mark>rhetoric of salvation and the good life</mark> for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and <mark>the <strong>dispensability of human lives</mark> </strong>from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, <mark>not all </mark>the <mark>massive killings have been recorded with the same value and</mark> the same <mark>visibility. The </mark>unspoken <mark>criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign</mark> (from a de-colonial interpretation) <mark>of </mark>the hidden <mark>imperial </mark>identity <mark>politics</mark>: that is, <mark>the </mark>value of human lives to which the life of the <mark>enunciator </mark>belongs <mark>becomes the <strong>measuring stick</strong> to evaluate other human lives who do not have </mark>the intellectual option and <mark>institutional power to</mark> tell the story and to classify events according to a <mark>rank</mark>ing of human lives; that is, <mark>according to a racist classification</mark>.5</p></u>
2NC
K
OV
5,117
160
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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18,750
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Baylor
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ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,831
Cooperation solves stability
Hadar 11
Hadar 11—former prof of IR at American U and Mount Vernon-College. PhD in IR from American U (1 July 2011, Leon, Saving U.S. Mideast Policy, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/saving-us-policy-the-mideast-5556)
the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan would not lead to more chaos Russia, India and Iran—which supported the Northern Alliance that helped Washington topple the Taliban—and Pakistan all have close ties to various groups and now have a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing the rivalries.
withdrawal would not lead to chaos Russia, India and Iran and Pakistan all have ties to groups and a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing rivalries.
Indeed, contrary to the warning proponents of U.S. military intervention typically express, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would not necessarily lead to more chaos and bloodshed in those countries. Russia, India and Iran—which supported the Northern Alliance that helped Washington topple the Taliban—and Pakistan (which once backed the Taliban) all have close ties to various ethnic and tribal groups in that country and now have a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing the rivalries.
534
<h4>Cooperation solves stability</h4><p><strong>Hadar 11<u></strong>—former prof of IR at American U and Mount Vernon-College. PhD in IR from American U (1 July 2011, Leon, Saving U.S. Mideast Policy, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/saving-us-policy-the-mideast-5556)</p><p></u>Indeed, contrary to the warning proponents of U.S. military intervention typically express, <u>the <mark>withdrawal</mark> of </u>American <u>troops from</u> Iraq and <u>Afghanistan <mark>would not</mark> </u>necessarily <u><mark>lead to</mark> more <mark>chaos</u></mark> and bloodshed in those countries. <u><strong><mark>Russia, India and Iran</mark>—which supported the Northern Alliance that helped Washington topple the Taliban—<mark>and Pakistan</u></strong></mark> (which once backed the Taliban) <u><mark>all have</mark> close <mark>ties to</mark> various</u> ethnic and tribal <u><mark>groups</u></mark> in that country <u><mark>and</mark> now have <mark>a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing </mark>the <mark>rivalries.</p></u></mark>
1NR
War on Drugs
Afghan Impact
143,968
26
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
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48,386
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null
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18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,832
Status quo justifications for PAS are based on a notion of autonomy which upholds a neoliberal notion of rights and individuation – our project consists of a disruption of those illusory forms of subjectivity – Scott Shershow, when discussing the right to die, posits two important questions: first, “can the political and legal concepts of “rights” or “freedom” apply to something that, so to speak, marks the very limit of all rights and all freedom?” and second “can one really conceive of a right to that which comes inescapably to all whether they like it or not?”
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<h4>Status quo justifications for PAS are based on a notion of autonomy which upholds a neoliberal notion of rights and individuation – our project consists of a disruption of those illusory forms of subjectivity – Scott Shershow, when discussing the right to die, posits two important questions: first, “can the political and legal concepts of “rights” or “freedom” apply to something that, so to speak, marks the very limit of all rights and all freedom?” and second “can one really conceive of a right to that which comes inescapably to all whether they like it or not?”<strong> </h4></strong>
1ac
null
null
430,008
1
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
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18,750
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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college
2
740,833
Key to protect water supplies
Goad 2/8/
Goad 2/8/13 [Ben Goad, “EPA moves forward with climate change protection plan, asks for comments,” The Hill, 02/08/13 10:55 AM ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/aaz8ual
It is essential that EPA adapt to anticipate and plan for future changes in climate Rising sea levels and drought linked to climate change will likely require the agency to take steps to protect watersheds, wetlands and water supplies Increasing temperatures will demand measures to protect public safety and adapt emergency response plans The agency would account for future global warming in its grant and loan programs and contract decisions This type of planning can be used to inspire states, regions, localities and individuals to follow suit."¶ The plan stems from Obama’s 2009 executive order requiring Sustainability Performance Plans For the first time this year, those plans include the climate change adaptation plans
It is essential that EPA plan for changes in climate Rising sea levels will require the agency to take steps to protect water supplies Increasing temperatures will demand measures to protect public safety and adapt emergency response plans This can be used to inspire states to follow suit. those plans include the climate change adaptation plans
It is essential that EPA adapt to anticipate and plan for future changes in climate,” according to the 55-page plan, which carries a 2012 date but was put forth now for public consideration. “It must integrate, or mainstream, considerations of climate change into its programs, policies, rules and operations to ensure they are effective under future climatic conditions.” Rising sea levels, loss of snowpack and drought linked to climate change will likely require the agency to take additional steps to protect watersheds, wetlands and water supplies, the report argues. Increasing temperatures and more frequent extreme weather events, meanwhile, will demand measures to protect public safety and adapt emergency response plans, it says. The report does not propose specific rules but rather sets a framework to support and prioritize future actions. By 2015, the report says, EPA will have integrated “climate change science trend and scenario information” into its rule-making processes. ¶ The agency would also account for future global warming in its grant and loan programs and contract decisions by that year, according to the report.¶ Earthjustice, a nonprofit environmental advocacy group, lauded the plan. ¶ “We are pleased the EPA is getting its house in order to respond to climate change impacts on its personnel, facilities and programs, said Sarah Saylor, senior legislative representative for the group. "This type of planning can be used to inspire states, regions, localities and individuals to follow suit."¶ The plan stems from Obama’s 2009 executive order requiring federal agencies to issue annual Strategic Sustainability Performance Plans, which set targets for reducing waste and pollution. For the first time this year, those plans include the climate change adaptation plans, which can be viewed here.
1,830
<h4>Key to protect water supplies </h4><p><strong>Goad 2/8/</strong>13 [Ben Goad, “EPA moves forward with climate change protection plan, asks for comments,” <u>The Hill</u>, 02/08/13 10:55 AM ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/aaz8ual</p><p><u><mark>It is essential that EPA </mark>adapt to anticipate and <mark>plan for</mark> future <mark>changes in climate</u></mark>,” according to the 55-page plan, which carries a 2012 date but was put forth now for public consideration. “It must integrate, or mainstream, considerations of climate change into its programs, policies, rules and operations to ensure they are effective under future climatic conditions.” <u><mark>Rising sea levels</u></mark>, loss of snowpack <u>and drought linked to climate change <mark>will</mark> likely <mark>require the agency to take</u></mark> additional <u><mark>steps to protect </mark>watersheds, wetlands and <strong><mark>water supplies</u></strong></mark>, the report argues. <u><mark>Increasing temperatures</u></mark> and more frequent extreme weather events, meanwhile, <u><mark>will demand measures to protect public safety and <strong>adapt emergency response plans</u></strong></mark>, it says. The report does not propose specific rules but rather sets a framework to support and prioritize future actions. By 2015, the report says, EPA will have integrated “climate change science trend and scenario information” into its rule-making processes. ¶ <u>The agency would</u> also <u>account for future global warming in its grant and loan programs and contract decisions</u> by that year, according to the report.¶ Earthjustice, a nonprofit environmental advocacy group, lauded the plan. ¶ “We are pleased the EPA is getting its house in order to respond to climate change impacts on its personnel, facilities and programs, said Sarah Saylor, senior legislative representative for the group. "<u><mark>This </mark>type of planning <mark>can be used to <strong>inspire states</mark>, regions, localities and individuals <mark>to follow suit</strong>.</mark>"¶ The plan stems from Obama’s 2009 executive order</u> <u>requiring</u> federal agencies to issue annual Strategic <u>Sustainability Performance Plans</u>, which set targets for reducing waste and pollution. <u>For the first time this year, <mark>those plans include the climate change adaptation plans</u></mark>, which can be viewed here. </p>
1NC
null
Off
430,009
1
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
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Baylor EvZo
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Baylor
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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college
2
740,834
That logic perpetuates global war rather than fixing it
Neocleous 08
Neocleous, Prof of Gov, 08 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, p95-]
the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its ¶ economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.9 The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security economic security’ moved to being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’ every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’. The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have ¶ been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-¶ opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile fascism flowed into Latin America because of the ideology of national security Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’
the new order moved to reassert economic and national security the major player would aim to re-order the world The reshaping of global capital could look ‘humanitarian’ This helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process economic security’ moved to being used for intervention all over the globe Security became the basis of intervention’, fusing economic management with domestic policy in an ambitious and violent strategy the ‘liberal moment’ becomes violence there have 10,000 operations to modify the activities of other countries’ rationalized in U.S. security’ The methods varied terror bombing the use of the CIA to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials the sponsorship of terror groups death squads and reviving the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army ¶ The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers we come up with six million – and this is a minimum Bush launched a round of slaughtering its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on economic order’
In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its ¶ economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the significant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 ¶ Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 ¶ In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. ¶ Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ¶ ‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have ¶ been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-¶ opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the ¶ reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 ¶ Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. ¶ The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: ¶ Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 ¶ Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twentyfirst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. ¶ While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 ¶ In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111
9,259
<h4>That logic perpetuates global war rather than fixing it</h4><p><u><strong>Neocleous</u></strong>, Prof of Gov, <u><strong>08</u> </strong>[Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, p95-]</p><p>In other words, <u><mark>the new </mark>international <mark>order moved </mark>very quickly <mark>to reassert </mark>the connection between<mark> economic and national security</u></mark>: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, <u><mark>the major player </mark>on the international stage <mark>would aim to </mark>use perhaps its most important power of all – its ¶ economic strength – in order to <mark>re-order the world</mark>. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.9</u>9 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the significant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. <u><mark>The reshaping of global capital</mark>, international order and the exercise of state power <mark>could </mark>thus <mark>look </mark>decidedly liberal and <mark>‘humanitarian’</mark>. <mark>This </mark>appearance <mark>helped <strong>co-opt the liberal Left into the process</strong></mark> </u>and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 ¶ Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 ¶ In the second half of the twentieth century<u> this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security</u>. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘<u><mark>economic security’</u> </mark>had <u><mark>moved</u> </mark>from connoting insurance policies for working people <u><mark>to</u> </mark>the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, <u><mark>being used for</mark> the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of <strong><mark>intervention </mark>and policing <mark>all over the globe</u></strong></mark>. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. ¶ <u><mark>Security </mark>politics thereby <mark>became the basis of </mark>a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘<mark>intervention’, fusing </mark>global issues of <mark>economic management with domestic policy </mark>formations <mark>in an <strong>ambitious and </mark>frequently <mark>violent strategy</mark>.</u></strong> Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face;<u> <mark>the <strong>‘liberal moment’ becomes </mark>the moment of <mark>violence</u></strong></mark>. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ¶ ‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘<u><mark>there have </mark>been about 3,000 major covert operations and over <mark>10,000 </mark>minor <mark>operations</u> </mark>– all illegal, and all <u>designed <mark>to </mark>disrupt, destabilize, or <mark>modify the activities of other countries’</u></mark>, adding that ‘<u>every covert operation has been <mark>rationalized in </mark>terms of <mark>U.S. </mark>national <mark>security’</mark>.</u>105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 <u><mark>The methods </mark>used have <mark>varied</mark>: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have ¶ been used: <mark>terror bombing</mark>; subversion; rigging elections; <mark>the use of the CIA</mark>’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was <mark>to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials</mark>; drug-trafficking;107 and <mark>the sponsorship of terror groups</mark>, counterinsurgency agencies, <mark>death squads</mark>. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups <mark>and </mark>parties have been co-¶ opted into the project, from the attempt at <mark>reviving</mark> the remnants of <mark>the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army </mark>for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile</u>; indeed, one of the ¶ reasons <u>fascism flowed into Latin America </u>was <u>because of the ideology of national security</u>.108 ¶ Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. <u>Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order</u>. <mark>¶ <u>The result has been the <strong>slaughter of untold numbers</u></strong></mark>. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: ¶ Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, <u><mark>we come up with</mark> a figure of <strong><mark>six million </mark>people killed <mark>– and this is a minimum</strong> </mark>figure</u>. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 ¶ <u>Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history</u>. All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twentyfirst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President <u><mark>Bush </mark>reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and <mark>launched a </mark>new <mark>round of slaughtering </mark>to prove it.</u> ¶ While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. <u>The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction</u> – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 ¶ <u>In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in <mark>its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on </mark>a certain vision of ‘<mark>economic order’</u></mark>. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 </p>
2NC
Security
Link – Econ
16,111
114
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,835
Broader topics require increased processing of new information- that directly trades off with information retention- means we don’t get anything out of the activity
Bukatko and Daehler 12 (Danuta Bukatko, Marvin W. Daehler, workers at Gengage learning center in Canada citing work done by Robbie Case- professor emeritus of education and a highly respected researcher in the field of child cognitive development director of the University of Toronto's Institute of Child Study, “Child Development:A Thematic Approach”, pg. 286)//JM
Bukatko and Daehler 12 (Danuta Bukatko, Marvin W. Daehler, workers at Gengage learning center in Canada citing work done by Robbie Case- professor emeritus of education and a highly respected researcher in the field of child cognitive development director of the University of Toronto's Institute of Child Study, “Child Development:A Thematic Approach”, pg. 286)//JM
Other theorist in this field have advanced a limited-resource model of the cognitive system that emphasizes a finite amount of available genitive energy that can be deployed in numerous ways, but only with certain trade-offs. Limited-resource models emphasize the allocation of energy for various cognitive activities rather than the mental structures themselve Robbie Case proposes an inverse relationship between the amount of space available for operating on information and that available for storage Operations include processes such as identifying the stimuli and recognizing relations among them; storage refers to the retention of information for use at a later time. If a substantial amount of mental effort is expended on operations, less space is available for storage or retention If these tasks cost us substantial effort, however, our resources will be taxed and little will be left for the task of remembering.
null
Other theorist in this field have advanced a limited-resource model of the cognitive system that emphasizes a finite amount of available genitive energy that can be deployed in numerous ways, but only with certain trade-offs. Limited-resource models emphasize the allocation of energy for various cognitive activities rather than the mental structures themselves. The basic assumption is that the pool of resources available for processing, retaining, and reporting information is finite (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger 1990). In one such model, Robbie Case proposes an inverse relationship between the amount of space available for operating on information and that available for storage (Case, 1985; Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982). Operations include processes such as identifying the stimuli and recognizing relations among them; storage refers to the retention of information for use at a later time. If a substantial amount of mental effort is expended on operations, less space is available for storage or retention. In the simple memory experiment we just examined, the effort used to identify the words and notice the categorical relationships among them will determine the space left over for storing those words. If we are proficient at recognizing words and their relationships, storage space will be available. If these tasks cost us substantial effort, however, our resources will be taxed and little will be left for the task of remembering. As children grow older, they can mentally
1,501
<h4><u>Broader topics require increased processing of new information- that directly trades off with information retention- means we don’t get anything out of the activity</h4><p><strong>Bukatko and Daehler 12 (Danuta Bukatko, Marvin W. Daehler, workers at Gengage learning center in Canada citing work done by Robbie Case- professor emeritus of education and a highly respected researcher in the field of child cognitive development director of the University of Toronto's Institute of Child Study, “Child Development:A Thematic Approach”, pg. 286)//JM</p><p>Other theorist in this field have advanced a limited-resource model of the cognitive system that emphasizes a finite amount of available genitive energy that can be deployed in numerous ways, but only with certain trade-offs. Limited-resource models emphasize the allocation of energy for various cognitive activities rather than the mental structures themselve</u></strong>s. The basic assumption is that the pool of resources available for processing, retaining, and reporting information is finite (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger 1990). In one such model, <u><strong>Robbie Case proposes an inverse relationship between the amount of space available for operating on information and that available for storage</u></strong> (Case, 1985; Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982). <u><strong>Operations include processes such as identifying the stimuli and recognizing relations among them; storage refers to the retention of information for use at a later time. If a substantial amount of mental effort is expended on operations, less space is available for storage or retention</u></strong>. In the simple memory experiment we just examined, the effort used to identify the words and notice the categorical relationships among them will determine the space left over for storing those words. If we are proficient at recognizing words and their relationships, storage space will be available.<u><strong> If these tasks cost us substantial effort, however, our resources will be taxed and little will be left for the task of remembering.</u> </strong>As children grow older, they can mentally</p>
1NR
T
Impact
430,010
2
16,992
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
564,703
N
UMKC
5
Iowa HS
Brian Lain
1AC was organ simony 1NC was the university k topicality and case 2NC was the university k 1nr was topicality and case 2nr was the university k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round5.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,836
they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence
Kappeler 95
Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)
'We are the war, I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere . I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords or upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon political disillusionment. our insight that indeed we are not responsible tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions we participate in 'organized irresponsibility' we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the president, the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make war possible universal responsibility becomes universal acquittal Decisions to unleash war are taken at particular levels of power focusing on the stage where major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our own competence leading to 'powerlessness' and disillusionment. it seems to absolve us from having to see any relation between our actions and events we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, 'What would I do if I were the president we regard mega spheres as the only worthwhile ones we shape 'our values' according war and violence.
War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
6,053
<h4>they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence</h4><p><u><strong>Kappeler 95</u></strong> (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs<u> 9-11)</p><p></u>War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.<u> 'We are the war,</u>' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': <u><mark>I do not know what war is</u></mark>, I want to tell my friend, <u><mark>but I see it everywhere</mark> . </u>It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And <u>I am afraid that <mark>we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make</mark> this <mark>war possible</mark> , we permit it to happen</u>. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. '<u>We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords </u>and politicians and profiteers<u> or</u>, as Ulrich Beck says, <u>upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and</u> where the conception of<u> <mark>universal responsibility becomes</mark> the equivalent of a <mark>universal acquittal</u></mark>. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations.<u> <mark>Decisions to unleash</mark> a <mark>war are</mark> indeed <mark>taken at particular levels of power</mark> by those in a position to make them </u>and to command such collective action. <u>We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of <mark>focusing on the stage where</mark> the <mark>major dramas of power take place</mark> <mark>tends to obscure our</mark> sight in relation to our <mark>own</mark> sphere of <mark>competence</mark>, our own power and our own responsibility - <mark>leading to</mark> the </u>well- known<u> illusion of our </u>apparent<u> <mark>'powerlessness' and</mark> its accompanying phenomenon </u>- our so-called<u> political <mark>disillusionment.</mark> </u>Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet<u> our insight that indeed we are not responsible</u> for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president <u>tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action</u>. In particular, <u><mark>it seems to absolve us from having to</mark> try to <mark>see any relation between our</mark> own <mark>actions and</mark> those <mark>events</mark>, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions</u>. It not only shows that <u>we participate in</u> what Beck calls <u>'organized irresponsibility'</u>, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For<u> we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything</u> , say, <u>about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because <mark>we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why</mark> many of <mark>those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics,</mark> in the style of <mark>'What would I do if I were the</mark> general, </u>the prime minister,<u> the <mark>president</mark>, </u>the foreign minister or<u> the minister of defence?' Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega spheres</mark> of action <mark>as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, </u>and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. <u>We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way <mark>we shape 'our</mark> feelings, our relationships, our <mark>values' according</mark> to the structures and the values of <mark>war and violence.</p></u></mark>
2NC
K
Framework
1,240,688
53
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,837
Afghan security forces solve
LaFranchi 13
Howard LaFranchi 13, Staff writer for CS Monitor, June 25th, “Is Afghanistan ready to defend itself”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0625/Is-Afghanistan-ready-to-defend-itself, AB
the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government are gambling that the country's security forces are ready or ready enough to take the lead in defending the entire nation from Taliban forces and Islamist insurgents There's been progress Most of the Afghan Army brigades are capable of working on their own the Afghan people are becoming more confident in the A N S F The people are getting more confident If talks proceed apace fighting and violence on the ground in Afghanistan may diminish, easing the demands on the Afghan government's forces and perhaps smoothing the path to a US-NATO exit
Afghan security forces are ready to take the lead in defending the nation There's been progress brigades are capable of working on their own the people are becoming more confident in the A N S F people are getting more confident fighting in Afghanistan may diminish
Now, the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government itself are gambling that the rest of the country's 344,000 security forces are also ready – or ready enough – to take the lead in defending the entire nation from Taliban forces and Islamist insurgents. As of June 18, NATO turned over to the Afghans the security lead for 100 percent of the country, and US and NATO troops officially shifted to an advise-and-assist role throughout Afghanistan – a role set to draw to a close with the end of NATO's combat mission in December 2014. Evidence is mixed as to the readiness of Afghanistan's Army soldiers and National Police to assume the lead in planning and fighting the war – with the summer combat season likely to be the first big test. There's been progress, to be sure. Most of the Afghan Army brigades – as many as 20 of 26, NATO officials claim – are capable of working on their own, up from one a year ago. And the Afghan people are becoming more confident in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), polls show. "The people are getting more confident, and part of that is what they have seen from the ANSF" in the initial weeks of the summer fighting season, says Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, chairman of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. How ready the Afghan forces actually need to be may depend in part on reconciliation talks expected to begin soon between the government of President Hamid Karzai and representatives of the Taliban. Qatar has agreed to host the negotiations, which Mr. Karzai announced June 18 and which US officials described as an "Afghan-led, Afghan-owned initiative." If talks proceed apace – Karzai was already expressing misgivings about the talks the day after announcing them – fighting and violence on the ground in Afghanistan may diminish, easing the demands on the Afghan government's forces and perhaps smoothing the path to a US-NATO exit, some American officials have suggested.
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<h4>Afghan security forces solve </h4><p>Howard <strong>LaFranchi 13</strong>, Staff writer for CS Monitor, June 25th, “Is Afghanistan ready to defend itself”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0625/Is-Afghanistan-ready-to-defend-itself, AB</p><p>Now, <u>the United States, NATO, and the <mark>Afghan</mark> government</u> itself <u>are gambling that the</u> rest of the <u>country's</u> 344,000 <u><mark>security</mark> <mark>forces are</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>ready</u></strong></mark> – <u>or ready enough</u> – <u><mark>to take the lead in defending</mark> <mark>the</mark> entire <mark>nation</mark> from Taliban forces and Islamist insurgents</u>. As of June 18, NATO turned over to the Afghans the security lead for 100 percent of the country, and US and NATO troops officially shifted to an advise-and-assist role throughout Afghanistan – a role set to draw to a close with the end of NATO's combat mission in December 2014. Evidence is mixed as to the readiness of Afghanistan's Army soldiers and National Police to assume the lead in planning and fighting the war – with the summer combat season likely to be the first big test. <u><mark>There's</mark> <mark>been progress</u></mark>, to be sure. <u>Most of the Afghan Army <mark>brigades</u></mark> – as many as 20 of 26, NATO officials claim – <u><mark>are capable of <strong>working on their own</u></strong></mark>, up from one a year ago. And <u><mark>the</mark> Afghan <mark>people are becoming <strong>more confident</strong></mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>the A</u></mark>fghan<mark> <u>N</u></mark>ational <u><mark>S</u></mark>ecurity <u><mark>F</u></mark>orces (ANSF), polls show. "<u>The <mark>people are getting more confident</u></mark>, and part of that is what they have seen from the ANSF" in the initial weeks of the summer fighting season, says Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, chairman of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. How ready the Afghan forces actually need to be may depend in part on reconciliation talks expected to begin soon between the government of President Hamid Karzai and representatives of the Taliban. Qatar has agreed to host the negotiations, which Mr. Karzai announced June 18 and which US officials described as an "Afghan-led, Afghan-owned initiative."<u> If talks proceed apace</u> – Karzai was already expressing misgivings about the talks the day after announcing them – <u><mark>fighting</mark> and violence on the ground <mark>in Afghanistan<strong> may diminish</strong></mark>, easing the demands on the Afghan government's forces and perhaps smoothing the path to a US-NATO exit</u>, some American officials have suggested.</p>
1NR
War on Drugs
Afghan Impact
430,011
2
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
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The impact is US colonial intervention in the name of resources
Hodges 12 December 11, 2012, pg. http://www.thecommonsenseshow.com/2012/12/11/the-coming-water-wars/
Hodges 12 [Dave Hodges, “The Coming Water Wars,” The Common Sense Show.com, December 11, 2012, pg. http://www.thecommonsenseshow.com/2012/12/11/the-coming-water-wars/
America will be forced into water wars in order to secure water for our people. This will force our people into more wars of occupation in a search for water , if America wants water Americans will have to go to war to obtain water.¶ Bolivia is being exploited to this end and is serving as the canary in the mine with regard to what lies ahead for the U S and the coming water wars.¶ Soon, very soon, our water supplies will become the most expensive in the world. Obtaining water for many Americans will soon be a life and death struggle.
America will be forced into water wars wars of occupation Bolivia is being exploited to this end and is serving as the canary in the mine with regard to what lies ahead for the U S and the coming water wars. Obtaining water will be a life and death struggle
Very soon, America will be forced into water wars in order to secure the precious asset of water for our people. This will force our people into more wars of occupation in a search for water. Meanwhile, every nation that America conquers, is one less country that the bankers have to worry about taking over. At the end of the day, if America wants water, someday, Americans will have to go to war to obtain water.¶ As any aware person knows, Agenda 21 is being used as a front for the purpose of increasing the bottom of line of select global corporations. Bolivia is being exploited to this end and is serving as the canary in the mine with regard to what lies ahead for the United States and the coming water wars.¶ The United States sits upon a fiscal cliff. Economic devastation is in the cards for the US. Many wonder what will happen when the country defaults and cannot pay its bills. The answer is simple, our country will enter receivership. Once receivership is thrust upon our country, the bankers will begin to take control of our assets. Among the prize assets coveted by the globalist bankers will be our water supply. Soon, very soon, our water supplies will become the most expensive in the world. Obtaining water for many Americans will soon be a life and death struggle.
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<h4>The impact is US colonial intervention in the name of resources</h4><p><strong>Hodges 12</strong> [Dave Hodges, “The Coming Water Wars,” <u>The Common Sense Show.com, <strong>December 11, 2012, pg. http://www.thecommonsenseshow.com/2012/12/11/the-coming-water-wars/</p><p></u></strong>Very soon, <u><mark>America will be forced into water wars</mark> in order to secure </u>the precious asset of <u>water for our people. This will force our people into more <strong><mark>wars of occupation</mark> in a search for water</u></strong>. Meanwhile, every nation that America conquers, is one less country that the bankers have to worry about taking over. At the end of the day<u>, if America wants water</u>, someday, <u>Americans will have to go to war to obtain water.¶ </u>As any aware person knows, Agenda 21 is being used as a front for the purpose of increasing the bottom of line of select global corporations. <u><mark>Bolivia is being exploited to this end and is serving as the canary in the mine with regard to what lies ahead for the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>and the coming <strong>water wars</strong>.</mark>¶ </u>The United States sits upon a fiscal cliff. Economic devastation is in the cards for the US. Many wonder what will happen when the country defaults and cannot pay its bills. The answer is simple, our country will enter receivership. Once receivership is thrust upon our country, the bankers will begin to take control of our assets. Among the prize assets coveted by the globalist bankers will be our water supply. <u>Soon, very soon, our water supplies will become the most expensive in the world. <mark>Obtaining water </mark>for many Americans <mark>will</mark> soon <mark>be a <strong>life and death struggle</strong></mark>.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
430,012
1
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
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Our affirmation of a right to die through PAS entails a recognition of the impossibility of liberalism – death inevitably reaches all of us so the juxtaposition of the project of “rights” with death’s seduction demonstrates the futility and brokenness of the liberal project of autonomy – the paradox of asserting a right to die combined with a process of countermemory constitutes an unstable bomb which destroys the conditions of possibility for liberalism’s death control – Ben Golder explains that
2011 SJE
Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, 2011 SJE
Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’ Under these conditions the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is thus intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) by opening up a different perspective upon death in life – that is, the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus. Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed, performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid these relations.
Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’. Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics by opening up a different perspective upon death in life the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions’ orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ , work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,¶ performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas¶ Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid¶ these relations.
In a recent article on this topic, Thomas Tierney neatly illustrates how Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’. In order to do this, Tier- ney reads Foucault’s comments on the ‘right to die’ against the famous intervention of the ‘Dream Team’ (a collection of six eminent liberal/libertarian philosophers, to wit: Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, TM Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Johnson) in their amicus curiae brief in the 1997 US Supreme Court case on assisted suicide, Washington v Glucksberg (see Dworkin et al. 1997). Whereas the latter is ‘concerned with providing to individuals enough control over their deaths so they can avoid a painful and/or degrading demise, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of juridico-medical authority that is aimed at preserving life’, (Tierney, 2006: 626), Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics, that which Tierney calls the ‘juridico-medical order of mod- ernity’, the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’ (Tierney, 2006: 614, 615; see also Thompson, 2004). Under these conditions the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ (Tierney, 2006: 631) by ‘rais[ing] unsettling questions about the very nature of modern subjects’ (Tierney, 2006: 605). The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is thus intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) by opening up a different perspective upon death in life – that is, the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project (cf. Foucault, 1983: 237). ‘It is quite inconceivable that we not be given the chance’, Foucault writes elsewhere, ‘to prepare ourselves with all the passion, intensity and detail that we wish, including the little extras that we have been dreaming about for such a long time’ (Foucault, 1996: 296–297), that is to make of suicide ‘a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your life’ (1996: 296). The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life (read, for Foucault: the disruption of bio-politicized subjectivity). In contrast, ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions’ (Tierney, 2006: 632). For all its insistence upon the manner of death needing to reflect autonomous decisions concerning the value of life itself (which would seemingly import some critical perspective upon that life), orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’, like that of the ‘Dream Team’, work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus. The liberal narrative reinscribes the death- bound subject of bio-politics in a milieu of suffering (see the pathos-laden conclusion to Dworkin et al., 1997) from which medicine cannot save her and it thus calls upon law¶ and the state to balance the interests of the individual’s dignity against the state’s¶ (bio-political) interest in preserving life. Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,¶ performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas¶ Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid¶ these relations.
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<h4>Our affirmation of a right to die through PAS entails a recognition of the impossibility of liberalism – death inevitably reaches all of us so the juxtaposition of the project of “rights” with death’s seduction demonstrates the futility and brokenness of the liberal project of autonomy – the paradox of asserting a right to die combined with a process of countermemory constitutes an unstable bomb which destroys the conditions of possibility for liberalism’s death control – Ben Golder explains that</h4><p>Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, <u><strong><mark>2011 SJE</p><p></u></strong></mark>In a recent article on this topic, Thomas Tierney neatly illustrates how <u><strong><mark>Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’</u></strong>.</mark> In order to do this, Tier- ney reads Foucault’s comments on the ‘right to die’ against the famous intervention of the ‘Dream Team’ (a collection of six eminent liberal/libertarian philosophers, to wit: Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, TM Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Johnson) in their amicus curiae brief in the 1997 US Supreme Court case on assisted suicide, Washington v Glucksberg (see Dworkin et al. 1997). Whereas the latter is ‘concerned with providing to individuals enough control over their deaths so they can avoid a painful and/or degrading demise, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of juridico-medical authority that is aimed at preserving life’, (Tierney, 2006: 626), <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics</u></strong></mark>, that which Tierney calls the ‘juridico-medical order of mod- ernity’, <u><strong>the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’</u></strong> (Tierney, 2006: 614, 615; see also Thompson, 2004). <u><strong>Under these conditions <mark>the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’</u></strong></mark> (Tierney, 2006: 631) by ‘rais[ing] unsettling questions about the very nature of modern subjects’ (Tierney, 2006: 605). <u><strong><mark>The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is</mark> thus <mark>intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics</mark> (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) <mark>by opening up a different perspective upon death in life</mark> – that is, <mark>the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project</u></strong></mark> (cf. Foucault, 1983: 237). ‘It is quite inconceivable that we not be given the chance’, Foucault writes elsewhere, ‘to prepare ourselves with all the passion, intensity and detail that we wish, including the little extras that we have been dreaming about for such a long time’ (Foucault, 1996: 296–297), that is to make of suicide ‘a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your life’ (1996: 296). <u><strong>The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life </u></strong>(read, for Foucault: the disruption of bio-politicized subjectivity). In contrast, <u><strong><mark>‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions</u></strong>’</mark> (Tierney, 2006: 632). For all its insistence upon the manner of death needing to reflect autonomous decisions concerning the value of life itself (which would seemingly import some critical perspective upon that life), <u><strong><mark>orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die</u></strong>’</mark>, like that of the ‘Dream Team’<mark>, <u><strong>work to</mark> <mark>reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus</mark>. </u></strong>The liberal narrative reinscribes the death- bound subject of bio-politics in a milieu of suffering (see the pathos-laden conclusion to Dworkin et al., 1997) from which medicine cannot save her and it thus calls upon law¶ and the state to balance the interests of the individual’s dignity against the state’s¶ (bio-political) interest in preserving life. <u><strong><mark>Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,</u></strong>¶<u><strong> performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas</u></strong>¶<u><strong> Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid</u></strong>¶<u><strong> these relations.</p></u></strong></mark>
1ac
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7
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
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Affect and rhetorical analysis comes first
Shanks 15
Shanks 15 [“Affect, Critique, and the Social Contract,” Torrey Shanks, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York, Theory & Event, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2015]
Cruel optimism highlights affect beyond familiar oppositions in which it is assimilated to rational social interests cruel optimism enables us to consider how fantasies structure and animate our collective political as well as personal lives, even as they disappoint and discourage Cruel optimism recalls the importance of affect mediated by shared fantasies within historical, social and political conditions it is but fantasy as a condition of political subjectivity that is important subjectivity is not forged prior to social life, but instead is situated culturally, historically politically Berlant cautions against depoliticizing tendencies disavowing the affective attachments of our social and political condition in favor of a notion of reason untouched by, or prior to, affect and Cruel Optimism is primarily directed at seeking out affective sources of a recurring sense of political failure Cruel optimism as a critical lens gestures forward toward a future that might be otherwise The possibility of other futures begins in imagining “a potentialized present,” in what is both an undoing and a remaking of worlds that “requires fantasy to motor programs of action The closing call is “to reinvent new idioms of the political, and of belonging itself, which requires debating what the baselines of survival should be in the near future Cruel optimism invites us to engage from within affective attachments That does not entail a flight from the “affectsphere but an affective reorientation in which relations and conditions come to be seen in new ways. it is necessarily rhetorical rhetoric as an imaginative language includes the power to persuade as well as to move the passions rhetoric not only strikes affectively but its effects may also reorient our attention and our encounters with the world and with others. Contract theory gives us a robust tradition in which to consider how political idioms can be ingeniously reinvented for critique that engages the affects
fantasies structure and animate our collective political lives the importance of affect mediated by shared fantasies is fantasy as a condition of political subjectivity Berlant cautions against depoliticizing tendencies disavowing the affective attachments of our social and political condition in favor of a notion of reason untouched by, or prior to, affect The closing call is “to reinvent new idioms of the political Cruel optimism invites us to engage from within affective attachments That does not entail a flight from the “affectsphere,” but reorientation in which conditions come to be seen in new ways it is necessarily rhetorical rhetoric as an imaginative language includes the power to persuade as well as to move the passions rhetoric not only strikes affectively, but may reorient our encounters with the world
Cruel optimism highlights the workings of affect beyond familiar oppositions in the tradition of political theory, in which it is assimilated to rational social interests and the individual’s private preferences or seen as detrimental to political and social order. In contrast, cruel optimism enables us to consider how fantasies – say, fantasies of freedom as choice and unencumbered individualism – structure and animate our collective political as well as personal lives, even as they disappoint and discourage. Cruel optimism is particularly rich for the way that it recalls us to the importance of affect mediated by shared fantasies within historical, social and political conditions. For Berlant, it is not fantasy that marks the failure of the otherwise rational subject, but fantasy as a condition of political subjectivity that is important. This subjectivity is not forged prior to or outside of social life, but instead its intersubjectivity is situated culturally, historically, and politically.20 Reading political affect with Berlant cautions us against two depoliticizing tendencies: first, disavowing the affective attachments of our social and political condition in favor of a notion of reason and/or interests untouched by, or prior to, affect; and second, disavowing the intersubjective and specifically social, cultural and political conditions of affect in favor of affect as an unmediated experience. Berlant’s work in Cruel Optimism is primarily directed at seeking out the psychic, affective and material sources of a recurring sense of political failure. The project is not only diagnostic, however. Cruel optimism as a critical lens gestures forward, optimistically (which is not necessarily to say happily), that is, toward a future that might be otherwise. The possibility of other futures begins in imagining “a potentialized present,” in what is both an undoing and a remaking of worlds that “requires fantasy to motor programs of action, to distort the present on behalf of what the present can become.”21 The closing call of Cruel Optimism is “to reinvent, from the scene of survival, new idioms of the political, and of belonging itself, which requires debating what the baselines of survival should be in the near future, which is, now, the future we are making.”22 Cruel optimism invites us to engage and work inventively from within affective attachments and fantastic scenes for transformative effects. That does not entail a flight from the “affectsphere,” but rather requires an affective reorientation in which relations and conditions (political, social, and historical) come to be seen in new ways. Such a project is imaginative, aesthetic, and passionate. Because it requires the capacity to communicate such imaginations and desires, it is necessarily rhetorical. More precisely, rhetoric as an imaginative language includes the power to persuade as well as to move the passions, but its more capacious meaning includes the ingenious placing of things into new relation and drawing new images into view. In this way, rhetoric not only strikes affectively, but its effects may also reorient our attention and our encounters with the world and with others. The essential work of analogy and metaphor in transferring or borrowing meanings for new contexts and new uses, on this account, is far more powerful and integral for critique than persuasion alone.23 Contract theory, capacious construed to include classical and contemporary modes and importantly critical contract theory, gives us a robust tradition in which to consider how political idioms can be ingeniously reinvented for critique that engages the affects.
3,664
<h4>Affect and rhetorical analysis comes first</h4><p><u><strong>Shanks 15</u></strong> [“Affect, Critique, and the Social Contract,” Torrey Shanks, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York, Theory & Event, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2015]</p><p><u>Cruel optimism highlights</u> the workings of <u>affect beyond familiar oppositions</u> in the tradition of political theory, <u>in which it is assimilated to rational social interests</u> and the individual’s private preferences or seen as detrimental to political and social order. In contrast, <u>cruel optimism enables us to consider how <mark>fantasies</u></mark> – say, fantasies of freedom as choice and unencumbered individualism – <u><strong><mark>structure</mark> <mark>and animate our collective political</u></strong></mark> <u>as well as personal <mark>lives</mark>, even as they disappoint and discourage</u>. <u>Cruel optimism</u> is particularly rich for the way that it <u>recalls</u> us to <u><strong><mark>the importance of affect</u></strong> <u>mediated by shared fantasies</mark> within historical, social and political conditions</u>. For Berlant, <u>it <mark>is</u></mark> not fantasy that marks the failure of the otherwise rational subject, <u>but <strong><mark>fantasy as a</mark> <mark>condition of political subjectivity</strong> </mark>that is important</u>. This <u>subjectivity is not forged prior</u> <u>to</u> or outside of <u>social life, but instead</u> its intersubjectivity<u> is situated culturally, historically</u>, and <u>politically</u>.20 Reading political affect with <u><mark>Berlant cautions</u></mark> us <u><mark>against </u></mark>two<u><strong> <mark>depoliticizing tendencies</u></strong></mark>: first, <u><mark>disavowing the affective attachments of our social and political condition</u></mark> <u><mark>in favor of a notion of reason</u></mark> and/or interests <u><strong><mark>untouched by, or prior to, affect</u></strong></mark>; <u>and</u> second, disavowing the intersubjective and specifically social, cultural and political conditions of affect in favor of affect as an unmediated experience. Berlant’s work in <u>Cruel Optimism is primarily directed at seeking out</u> the psychic, <u>affective</u> and material <u>sources of a recurring sense of political failure</u>. The project is not only diagnostic, however. <u>Cruel optimism as a critical lens gestures forward</u>, optimistically (which is not necessarily to say happily), that is, <u><strong>toward a future that might be otherwise</u></strong>. <u>The possibility of other futures begins in imagining “a potentialized present,”</u> <u>in what is both an undoing and a remaking of worlds that “requires fantasy to motor programs of action</u>, to distort the present on behalf of what the present can become.”21 <u><mark>The closing call</mark> </u>of Cruel Optimism <u><mark>is “<strong>to reinvent</u></strong></mark>, from the scene of survival, <u><strong><mark>new idioms of the political</strong></mark>, and of belonging itself, which requires <strong>debating</strong> what the baselines of survival should be in the near future</u>, which is, now, the future we are making.”22 <u><mark>Cruel optimism invites us to engage</u></mark> and work inventively <u><strong><mark>from within affective attachments</u></strong></mark> and fantastic scenes for transformative effects. <u><mark>That</mark> <mark>does not entail a flight</u> <u>from the “affectsphere</u>,” <u>but</u></mark> rather requires <u>an affective <mark>reorientation in</mark> <mark>which</mark> relations</u> <u>and <mark>conditions</u></mark> (political, social, and historical) <u><mark>come to be seen in new ways</mark>.</u> Such a project is imaginative, aesthetic, and passionate. Because it requires the capacity to communicate such imaginations and desires, <u><strong><mark>it is necessarily rhetorical</u></strong></mark>. More precisely, <u><mark>rhetoric as an imaginative language</mark> <mark>includes the power to persuade as well as to move the passions</u></mark>, but its more capacious meaning includes the ingenious placing of things into new relation and drawing new images into view. In this way, <u><strong><mark>rhetoric not only strikes affectively</u></strong>, <u>but</mark> its effects <mark>may</mark> also <mark>reorient our </mark>attention and our <mark>encounters with the world</mark> and with others.</u> The essential work of analogy and metaphor in transferring or borrowing meanings for new contexts and new uses, on this account, is far more powerful and integral for critique than persuasion alone.23 <u>Contract theory</u>, capacious construed to include classical and contemporary modes and importantly critical contract theory, <u>gives us a robust tradition in which to consider how political idioms can be ingeniously reinvented for critique that engages the affects</u>.</p>
2NC
Security
Framework
84,692
23
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,841
Footnoting DA
Der Derian 95
Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)
A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes
A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the contested' nature of realism with a footnote and then business as usual This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to commit worse epistemological crimes
But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.
954
<h4>Footnoting DA</h4><p><u><strong>Der Derian 95</u></strong> (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)</p><p>But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? <u><mark>A stop-gap solution is to supplement the</u></mark> definitional <u><mark>gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist</u></mark>, mindful of a creeping pluralism, <u><mark>will note the</mark> 'essentially <mark>contested' nature of realism</mark> - duly backed up <mark>with a footnote</u></mark> to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - <u><mark>and then</mark> get down to <mark>business as usual</u></mark>, that is, <u>using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. <mark>This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere</mark>: in exchange for not contesting</u> the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, <u><mark>the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to</mark> then turn around and <mark>commit worse epistemological crimes</u></mark>. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.</p>
2NC
K
Perm
224,576
30
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,842
Afghanistan won’t spill-over – no one will be draw-in.
Fettweis 11
Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Professor Political Science at Tulane, “Dangerous Times: The Futurist Interviews Christopher Fettweis”, World Future Society, 1-12-2011,
http://www.wfs.org/content/dangerous-times-futurist-interviews-christopher-fettweis, RSR] In that case, Afghanistan and/or Iraq could fall back into chaos. What can we do in that situation to make sure that a new regional war does not come to pass as a result? We can’t determine if Iraq will implode. But the odds of it drawing everybody else in seem low to me. People worry about the Iranians coming into Iraq. But the Iranians are more hated in Iraq than the Americans are. In the nineteenth century, power vacuums used to draw powers in. Nowadays they don't. Countries tend to stay away from them. They don’t want to even send troops into peacekeeping missions Afghanistan is the same thing. I don’t think it matters much to U.S. security either way. They may well end up having their own civil war. But will it spill over into other countries? Probably not.
power vacuums used to draw powers in. Nowadays they don't. Countries They don’t want to even send troops into peacekeeping missions Afghanistan is the same I don’t think it matters much to U.S. security They may end up having civil war. But will it spill over into other countries? Probably not.
http://www.wfs.org/content/dangerous-times-futurist-interviews-christopher-fettweis, RSR] THE FUTURIST: In the next few years, the United States will end its military oversight of Afghanistan and Iraq. We can hope that the two fledgling democracies’ civil governments will prove strong enough to withstand their armed insurgent enemies, but it’s obvious that they might possibly not. In that case, Afghanistan and/or Iraq could fall back into chaos. What can we do in that situation to make sure that a new regional war does not come to pass as a result? CHRISTOPHER FETTWEIS: We can’t determine for sure if Iraq will implode. But the odds of it drawing everybody else in seem low to me. People worry about the Iranians coming into Iraq. But the Iranians are more hated in Iraq than the Americans are. In the nineteenth century, power vacuums used to draw powers in. Nowadays they don't. Countries tend to stay away from them. They don’t want to even send troops into peacekeeping missions. I don’t think invading Iraq has made us safer or less safe. It's just been a mess. Afghanistan is the same thing. I don’t think it matters much to U.S. security either way. They may well end up having their own civil war. But will it spill over into other countries? Probably not.
1,271
<h4>Afghanistan won’t spill-over – no one will be draw-in.</h4><p><u><strong>Fettweis 11</u></strong> [Christopher, Professor Political Science at Tulane, “Dangerous Times: The Futurist Interviews Christopher Fettweis”, World Future Society, 1-12-2011, </p><p><u><strong>http://www.wfs.org/content/dangerous-times-futurist-interviews-christopher-fettweis, RSR]</p><p></u></strong>THE FUTURIST: In the next few years, the United States will end its military oversight of Afghanistan and Iraq. We can hope that the two fledgling democracies’ civil governments will prove strong enough to withstand their armed insurgent enemies, but it’s obvious that they might possibly not. <u>In that case, Afghanistan and/or Iraq could fall back into chaos. What can we do in that situation to make sure that a new regional war does not come to pass as a result?</u> CHRISTOPHER FETTWEIS: <u>We can’t determine</u> for sure <u>if Iraq will implode. But the odds of it drawing everybody else in seem low to me. People worry about the Iranians coming into Iraq. But the Iranians are more hated in Iraq than the Americans are. In the nineteenth century, <mark>power vacuums used to draw powers in. Nowadays they don't. Countries</mark> tend to stay away from them. <mark>They don’t want to even send troops into peacekeeping missions</u></mark>. I don’t think invading Iraq has made us safer or less safe. It's just been a mess. <u><mark>Afghanistan is the</mark> <mark>same</mark> thing. <mark>I don’t think it matters much to U.S. security</mark> either way. <mark>They may</mark> well <mark>end up having</mark> their own <mark>civil war. But will it spill over into other countries? Probably not.</p></u></mark>
1NR
War on Drugs
Afghan Impact
243,318
11
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,843
The FBI still hires smokers
Simpson 14
Simpson 14
SJE the FBI may be forced to turn to people who like to get heated He should go ahead and apply was the advice FBI Director Comey had Comey's comments clearly signal the FBI at least wants to move on from the increasingly outdated anti-marijuana policy
the FBI may be forced to turn to people who like to get heated He should go ahead and apply,” was the advice Comey had Comey's comments clearly signal the FBI wants to move on from anti-marijuana policy
Connor, reporter for the Wire, “FBI Director: Don't Let Weed Stop You from Applying to the FBI,” http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/05/fbi-director-dont-let-weed-stop-you-from-applying-to-the-fbi/371279/ SJE Law enforcement angencies generally don't hire stoners and slackers. But as the cyber war heats up, groups like the FBI may be forced to turn to people who like to get a little heated to stay ahead of the curve. ¶ “He should go ahead and apply,” was the advice FBI Director James B. Comey had on Monday for a young man who theoretically balked at applying for an FBI job because he liked to get lit. Comey spoke about the difficulties facing the FBI when it comes to hiring promising young hackers at the White Collar Crime Institute, an annual conference held at Manhattan's New York City Bar Association, according to the Wall Street Journal. The trouble is, a lot of hackers smoke weed, and that's something the FBI generally frowns upon. ¶ One attendee asked Comey about a friend who considered an FBI job but ultimately did not apply because of the marijuana policy. The theoretical FBI applicant knew he would never pass a drug test. But director Comey's comments clearly signal the FBI at least wants to move on from the increasingly outdated anti-marijuana policy that is complicating its efforts to fight cyber crime.
1,336
<h4><u><strong>The FBI still hires smokers</h4><p>Simpson 14</p><p></u></strong>Connor, reporter for the Wire, “FBI Director: Don't Let Weed Stop You from Applying to the FBI,” http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/05/fbi-director-dont-let-weed-stop-you-from-applying-to-the-fbi/371279/<u> SJE</p><p></u>Law enforcement angencies generally don't hire stoners and slackers. But as the cyber war heats up, groups like <u><mark>the FBI may be forced to turn to people who like to get</u></mark> a little <u><mark>heated</u></mark> to stay ahead of the curve. ¶ “<u><mark>He should go ahead and apply</u>,” <u>was the advice</mark> FBI Director</u> James B. <u><mark>Comey had</u></mark> on Monday for a young man who theoretically balked at applying for an FBI job because he liked to get lit. Comey spoke about the difficulties facing the FBI when it comes to hiring promising young hackers at the White Collar Crime Institute, an annual conference held at Manhattan's New York City Bar Association, according to the Wall Street Journal. The trouble is, a lot of hackers smoke weed, and that's something the FBI generally frowns upon. ¶ One attendee asked Comey about a friend who considered an FBI job but ultimately did not apply because of the marijuana policy. The theoretical FBI applicant knew he would never pass a drug test. But director<u> <mark>Comey's comments clearly signal the FBI</mark> at least <mark>wants to move on from</mark> the increasingly outdated <mark>anti-marijuana policy</u></mark> that is complicating its efforts to fight cyber crime. </p>
1NC
null
FBI
198,491
4
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,844
Suicide as escape is a necessary transgression within the cycle of eternal recurrence. Accepting death through the option for suicide imparts meaning onto life’s suffering – Paul Loeb explains
null
Paul, Dr. of philosophy at University of Puget Sound, Ph.D from Cal Berkeley, “Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption,” Nietzsche on Time and History, Ed. Manuel Dries, p. 163-189 SJE
eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche describes as ‘the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable’ turns out to be the new counter-ideal and the means whereby the human can for the first time will a life-affirming meaning for its past and thereby for its entire existence However, this invocation of eternal recurrence does nothing whatsoever to eliminate the irreversibility of time the human has nostalgically willed the return, and even eternal repetition, of its most treasured and joyous past moments When Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest formulation of life-affirmation that is at all attainable, his point is not that the human animal should aim to will this eternal recurrence and thereby achieve the highest life-affirmation possible his point is that the human can never will this and that therefore the human can never achieve such life-affirmation. Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal recurrence. rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, the thought of eternal recurrence actually multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past to a new and devastating degree. Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’ everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape is impossible the thought of death as escape keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or better life.
eternal recurrence Nietzsche describes as ‘the¶ highest affirmation attainable’ the counter-ideal and means whereby the human can will a life-affirming meaning for its past However, invocation of eternal recurrence does not eliminate the irreversibility of time , the human has willed the eternal repetition, of its most joyous past moments When Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest¶ formulation of life-affirmation his point is not that¶ the human should aim to will this eternal recurrence his point i the human can never will this and that therefore the human can never achieve such life-affirmation. the thought of eternal recurrence multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape¶ is impossible the thought of death as escape¶ keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting¶ meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or¶ better life.
Although Zarathustra does not explicitly introduce his teaching of eternal¶ recurrence in his redemption speech, he obviously points in this direction¶ when he concludes by asking how the creative will might be taught to will¶ backwards so that it might will something higher than any reconciliation¶ with time. According to the consensus reading I have been concerned to¶ criticize, what Zarathustra means by this is that my affirmation of my present¶ state should teach me how to ‘will backwards’—that is, to will the¶ exact repetition of my entire past. And I would not be able to will in this¶ way unless I had successfully redescribed my past as directed inevitably¶ towards my present state. As Nehamas writes: ‘If I am even for a moment¶ such as I would want to be again, then I would accept all my past actions,¶ which, essential to and constitutive of the self I want to repeat, are now¶ newly redescribed’ (1985, p. 160, my emphasis). Or, as Julian Young¶ writes, the key is to ‘“write” my life so that I not merely like it, but like it¶ so much that I can will its recurrence for ever and ever, down to every last¶ detail’ (2003, p. 91), and to do this we must be able to see the kind of personal¶ providence in things that Nietzsche describes in Gay Science 277.¶ Hence eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche describes in Ecce Homo as ‘the¶ highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable’ (EH III Z 1), turns¶ out to be the new counter-ideal and the means whereby the human animal¶ can for the first time will a life-affirming meaning for its past and thereby¶ for its entire existence.¶ However, this invocation of eternal recurrence does nothing whatsoever¶ to eliminate the kind of self-deception pointed out by Nietzsche himself¶ in Gay Science 277. Saying to my past, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated’,¶ or, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated eternally’, does not add any¶ more meaning to my past than saying to it merely, ‘Thus I will it.’ Just as¶ my present willing can do nothing whatsoever to direct my past inevitably¶ towards my present state, so too my present willing can do nothing whatsoever¶ to ensure the repetition of my vanished past. Indeed, this is precisely¶ Nietzsche’s point about the irreversibility of time: ever since its¶ acquisition of a faculty of memory, the human animal has nostalgically¶ willed the return, and even eternal repetition, of its most treasured and¶ joyous past moments. The problem is not that the human animal has never¶ before willed this, and that it should start doing so now. The problem, rather,¶ is that the human animal has always willed this, and that this willing¶ has been of no avail whatsoever. Indeed, it is precisely this impotence, this¶ confrontation with the immovable stone ‘it was’, that has caused the human¶ animal to find its existence and suffering devoid of meaning, to take revenge on life, to formulate the ascetic ideal, and to live its life against¶ life.¶ When, therefore, Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest¶ formulation of life-affirmation that is at all attainable, his point is not that¶ the human animal should aim to will this eternal recurrence and thereby¶ achieve the highest life-affirmation possible.12 Instead, his point is that the human animal can never will this and that therefore the human animal can never achieve such life-affirmation. Indeed, no matter how strong and healthy¶ he deemed himself, perhaps the strongest and healthiest of all of his¶ contemporaries, Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal¶ recurrence. Writing in his notebooks in 1883, Nietzsche exclaims: ‘I do not¶ want life again. How have I borne it? What has made me endure the sight?¶ the vision of the superhuman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm it¶ myself —alas!’ (Nachlaß November 1882–February 1883, KSA 10,¶ 4[81]).13¶ So, rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, the thought of eternal recurrence actually multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past to a new and devastating degree. This is why Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1887 notes that the thought of eternal recurrence builds¶ upon the nihilism that follows the demise of the ascetic ideal—that is, upon¶ the most paralysing thought of ‘continuing with an “in vain”, without aim¶ and purpose’. Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of¶ nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or¶ goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’ (Nachla߶ Summer 1886–Autumn 1887, KSA 12, 5[71], my emphasis). It is not¶ just the thought of meaninglessness, but the thought of meaninglessness¶ eternally. Previously the human animal sought solace in the idea of death¶ and nothingness as an escape from the meaninglessness of its life and suffering.¶ But the thought of eternal recurrence closes off all such escape and¶ condemns the human animal to eternal meaninglessness. As Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1883 notes: ‘everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape¶ is impossible!” (Nachlaß Winter 1883–1884, KSA 10, 24[7]).14¶ Nor can it be replied to this that, because death no longer affords an escape¶ to life’s suffering, there is actually less point to suicide. For in the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that the thought of death as escape¶ keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting¶ meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or¶ better life. Because eternal recurrence undermines both this meaning and¶ this hope, nothing remains to keep humans from giving in to their inherent¶ suicidal instincts.
5,651
<h4>Suicide as escape is a necessary transgression within the cycle of eternal recurrence. Accepting death through the option for suicide imparts meaning onto life’s suffering – Paul Loeb explains</h4><p>Paul, Dr. of philosophy at University of Puget Sound, Ph.D from Cal Berkeley, “Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption,” Nietzsche on Time and History, Ed. Manuel Dries, p. 163-189 SJE</p><p>Although Zarathustra does not explicitly introduce his teaching of eternal¶ recurrence in his redemption speech, he obviously points in this direction¶ when he concludes by asking how the creative will might be taught to will¶ backwards so that it might will something higher than any reconciliation¶ with time. According to the consensus reading I have been concerned to¶ criticize, what Zarathustra means by this is that my affirmation of my present¶ state should teach me how to ‘will backwards’—that is, to will the¶ exact repetition of my entire past. And I would not be able to will in this¶ way unless I had successfully redescribed my past as directed inevitably¶ towards my present state. As Nehamas writes: ‘If I am even for a moment¶ such as I would want to be again, then I would accept all my past actions,¶ which, essential to and constitutive of the self I want to repeat, are now¶ newly redescribed’ (1985, p. 160, my emphasis). Or, as Julian Young¶ writes, the key is to ‘“write” my life so that I not merely like it, but like it¶ so much that I can will its recurrence for ever and ever, down to every last¶ detail’ (2003, p. 91), and to do this we must be able to see the kind of personal¶ providence in things that Nietzsche describes in Gay Science 277.¶ Hence <u><strong><mark>eternal recurrence</mark>, which <mark>Nietzsche</u></strong> <u><strong>describes</u></strong></mark> in Ecce Homo <u><strong><mark>as ‘the</u>¶<u> highest</mark> formula of <mark>affirmation</mark> that is at all <mark>attainable’</mark> </u></strong>(EH III Z 1), <u><strong>turns</u>¶<u> out to be <mark>the</mark> new <mark>counter-ideal and</mark> the <mark>means whereby the human</mark> </u></strong>animal<strong>¶<u> <mark>can</mark> for the first time <mark>will a life-affirming meaning for its past</mark> and thereby</u>¶<u> for its entire existence</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>However, </mark>this <mark>invocation of eternal recurrence does not</mark>hing whatsoever</u>¶<u> to <mark>eliminate the</u></strong></mark> kind of self-deception pointed out by Nietzsche himself¶ in Gay Science 277. Saying to my past, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated’,¶ or, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated eternally’, does not add any¶ more meaning to my past than saying to it merely, ‘Thus I will it.’ Just as¶ my present willing can do nothing whatsoever to direct my past inevitably¶ towards my present state, so too my present willing can do nothing whatsoever¶ to ensure the repetition of my vanished past. Indeed, this is precisely¶ Nietzsche’s point about the <u><strong><mark>irreversibility of time</u></strong></mark>: ever since its¶ acquisition of a faculty of memory<mark>, <u><strong>the human</u></strong></mark> animal <u><strong><mark>has</mark> nostalgically</u>¶<u> <mark>willed the</mark> return, and even <mark>eternal repetition, of its most</mark> treasured and</u>¶<u> <mark>joyous past moments</u></strong></mark>. The problem is not that the human animal has never¶ before willed this, and that it should start doing so now. The problem, rather,¶ is that the human animal has always willed this, and that this willing¶ has been of no avail whatsoever. Indeed, it is precisely this impotence, this¶ confrontation with the immovable stone ‘it was’, that has caused the human¶ animal to find its existence and suffering devoid of meaning, to take revenge on life, to formulate the ascetic ideal, and to live its life against¶ life.¶ <u><strong><mark>When</u></strong></mark>, therefore, <u><strong><mark>Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest</u>¶<u> formulation of life-affirmation</mark> that is at all attainable, <mark>his point is not that</u>¶<u> the human</mark> animal <mark>should aim to will this eternal recurrence</mark> and thereby</u>¶<u> achieve the highest life-affirmation possible</u></strong>.12 Instead, <u><strong><mark>his point i</mark>s that <mark>the human</mark> </u></strong>animal<u><strong> <mark>can never will this and that therefore the human </u></strong></mark>animal<u><strong><mark> can never achieve such life-affirmation.</u></strong></mark> Indeed, no matter how strong and healthy¶ he deemed himself, perhaps the strongest and healthiest of all of his¶ contemporaries, <u><strong>Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal</u>¶<u> recurrence.</u></strong> Writing in his notebooks in 1883, Nietzsche exclaims: ‘I do not¶ want life again. How have I borne it? What has made me endure the sight?¶ the vision of the superhuman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm it¶ myself —alas!’ (Nachlaß November 1882–February 1883, KSA 10,¶ 4[81]).13¶ So, <u><strong>rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, <mark>the thought of eternal recurrence</mark> actually <mark>multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past</mark> to a new and devastating degree.</u></strong> This is why Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1887 notes that the thought of eternal recurrence builds¶ upon the nihilism that follows the demise of the ascetic ideal—that is, upon¶ the most paralysing thought of ‘continuing with an “in vain”, without aim¶ and purpose’. <u><strong>Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of</u>¶<u> nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or</u>¶<u> goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’</u></strong> (Nachla߶ Summer 1886–Autumn 1887, KSA 12, 5[71], my emphasis). It is not¶ just the thought of meaninglessness, but the thought of meaninglessness¶ eternally. Previously the human animal sought solace in the idea of death¶ and nothingness as an escape from the meaninglessness of its life and suffering.¶ But the thought of eternal recurrence closes off all such escape and¶ condemns the human animal to eternal meaninglessness. As Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1883 notes: ‘<u><strong><mark>everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape</u>¶<u> is impossible</u></strong></mark>!” (Nachlaß Winter 1883–1884, KSA 10, 24[7]).14¶ Nor can it be replied to this that, because death no longer affords an escape¶ to life’s suffering, there is actually less point to suicide. For in the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that <u><strong><mark>the thought of death as escape</u></strong>¶<u><strong> keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting</u></strong>¶<u><strong> meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or</u></strong>¶<u><strong> better life.</u></strong></mark> Because eternal recurrence undermines both this meaning and¶ this hope, nothing remains to keep humans from giving in to their inherent¶ suicidal instincts.</p>
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UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
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Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
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Baylor
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they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence
Kappeler 95
Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)
'We are the war, I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere . I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords or upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon political disillusionment. our insight that indeed we are not responsible tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions we participate in 'organized irresponsibility' we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the president, the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make war possible universal responsibility becomes universal acquittal Decisions to unleash war are taken at particular levels of power focusing on the stage where major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our own competence leading to 'powerlessness' and disillusionment. it seems to absolve us from having to see any relation between our actions and events we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, 'What would I do if I were the president we regard mega spheres as the only worthwhile ones we shape 'our values' according war and violence.
War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
6,053
<h4>they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence</h4><p><u><strong>Kappeler 95</u></strong> (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs<u> 9-11)</p><p></u>War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.<u> 'We are the war,</u>' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': <u><mark>I do not know what war is</u></mark>, I want to tell my friend, <u><mark>but I see it everywhere</mark> . </u>It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And <u>I am afraid that <mark>we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make</mark> this <mark>war possible</mark> , we permit it to happen</u>. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. '<u>We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords </u>and politicians and profiteers<u> or</u>, as Ulrich Beck says, <u>upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and</u> where the conception of<u> <mark>universal responsibility becomes</mark> the equivalent of a <mark>universal acquittal</u></mark>. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations.<u> <mark>Decisions to unleash</mark> a <mark>war are</mark> indeed <mark>taken at particular levels of power</mark> by those in a position to make them </u>and to command such collective action. <u>We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of <mark>focusing on the stage where</mark> the <mark>major dramas of power take place</mark> <mark>tends to obscure our</mark> sight in relation to our <mark>own</mark> sphere of <mark>competence</mark>, our own power and our own responsibility - <mark>leading to</mark> the </u>well- known<u> illusion of our </u>apparent<u> <mark>'powerlessness' and</mark> its accompanying phenomenon </u>- our so-called<u> political <mark>disillusionment.</mark> </u>Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet<u> our insight that indeed we are not responsible</u> for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president <u>tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action</u>. In particular, <u><mark>it seems to absolve us from having to</mark> try to <mark>see any relation between our</mark> own <mark>actions and</mark> those <mark>events</mark>, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions</u>. It not only shows that <u>we participate in</u> what Beck calls <u>'organized irresponsibility'</u>, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For<u> we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything</u> , say, <u>about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because <mark>we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why</mark> many of <mark>those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics,</mark> in the style of <mark>'What would I do if I were the</mark> general, </u>the prime minister,<u> the <mark>president</mark>, </u>the foreign minister or<u> the minister of defence?' Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega spheres</mark> of action <mark>as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, </u>and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. <u>We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way <mark>we shape 'our</mark> feelings, our relationships, our <mark>values' according</mark> to the structures and the values of <mark>war and violence.</p></u></mark>
2NC
Security
Framework
1,240,688
53
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
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Political blueprints coopt alt solvency
Burke 07
Burke 07
Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2] Jones is quite, militant about this If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying where immanent possibilities exist such arguments are ultimately [devastating] disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down that the critical project is most important available contours of the present, confined within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, fail to provide a stable platform either for peace or a meaningful security he critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead they have too often formed into exciusivist communities whose ultimate survival is premised upon violenc Could a critique of security help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?
If [critical theorists succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for order they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically identifying where immanent possibilities exist, such arguments are ultimately [devastating] and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project at times of pessimism the critical project is most important the ontology of the state, fail to provide a stable platform for peace republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; they have formed into exciusivist communities premised upon violence.
Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2] A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn Jones is quite, militant about this: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying where immanent possibilities exist, such arguments are ultimately [devastating] disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - that the critical project is most important. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the available contours of the present, confined as they are within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, fail to provide a stable platform either for peace or a meaningful security. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, they have too often formed into exciusivist communities whose ultimate survival is premised upon violence. Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? Could a critique of security, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?
3,407
<h4>Political blueprints coopt alt solvency </h4><p><u><strong>Burke</u></strong> <u><strong>07</u></strong> </p><p><u>Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2]</p><p></u>A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn <u>Jones is quite, militant about this</u>: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... <u><mark>If [critical theorists</mark>] <mark>succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for</mark> an emancipated <mark>order</mark> that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [<mark>they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u>it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious</u>. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. <u>Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in <mark>identifying where immanent possibilities exist</u>, <u>such arguments are ultimately [devastating] </mark>disabling <mark>and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project</u></mark>. <u>It is precisely <mark>at times of</mark> the greatest <mark>pessimism</mark>, when new potentials are being shut down</u> or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - <u>that <mark>the critical project is most important</u></mark>. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the <u>available contours of the present, confined</u> as they are <u>within <mark>the</mark> masculinist <mark>ontology of the</mark> insecure nation-<mark>state, fail to provide a stable platform</mark> either <mark>for peace</mark> or a meaningful security</u>. In the face of such obstacles t<u>he critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. </u>The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and <u>the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that <mark>republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling;</mark> instead</u>, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, <u><mark>they have</mark> too often <mark>formed into exciusivist communities</mark> whose ultimate survival is <mark>premised upon violenc</u><strong>e</strong>.</mark> Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? <u>Could a critique of security</u>, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, <u>help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?</p></u>
2NC
K
Perm
93,850
3
16,989
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564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,847
The OAS is ineffective: a lack of funding, too many mandates, weak political power, inability to make decisions, polarized ideologies, and inconsistency in applying principles. Alternative platforms solve regional issues.
Lee 2012
Lee 2012
(Brianna, senior production editor, Council on Foreign Relations, 4-13-2012, “The Organization of American States,” http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945, accessed 6-18-2014, BS) The OAS has come under fire for the weakness of its political power, ineffectiveness in decision-making, and inconsistency in applying its democratic principles to states. Ideological polarization and mistrust of the OAS have prompted doubts over its relevance in the region, spurring the creation of alternative platforms for regional integration. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years." One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [late Venezuelan president] Hugo Chávez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chávez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.
The OAS has come under fire for weakness of political power, ineffectiveness in decision-making, and inconsistency in applying democratic principles Ideological polarization and mistrust have prompted doubts over its relevance spurring the creation of alternative platforms for regional integration the OAS has declined in recent years." One of the major constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action one of the other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions is restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned the OAS are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela catering to Chávez's friends and still beholden to the U.S Chávez called the OAS a puppet of the U S the organization supported anti-democracy regimes
(Brianna, senior production editor, Council on Foreign Relations, 4-13-2012, “The Organization of American States,” http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945, accessed 6-18-2014, BS) The Organization of American States serves as a body for regional integration and political, economic, and social cooperation among its thirty-five member states. The OAS has undertaken multiple initiatives to monitor human rights, provide electoral oversight, promote development, and enhance security in the Americas. However, while the organization has been recognized for its value in providing information and serving as a forum for high-level discussion, it has also come under fire for the weakness of its political power, ineffectiveness in decision-making, and inconsistency in applying its democratic principles to states. Ideological polarization and mistrust of the OAS have prompted doubts over its relevance in the region, spurring the creation of alternative platforms for regional integration. History and Functions The OAS, known for most of the first half of the twentieth century as the Pan American Union, was created as a platform for commercial cooperation and arbitration between states in the region. The Pan American Union's duties and functions expanded over the course of the early twentieth century, and with the start of the Cold War, collective security against the threat of communism became a priority in the hemisphere. In 1948, member states convened at the group's ninth conference to sign a new charter that officially created the Organization of American States. The OAS Charter pledged to "strengthen the peace and security of the continent" and "promote and consolidate representative democracy," as well as to encourage economic, social, and cultural cooperation within the Americas. The OAS of today—headed by Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza, reelected to a second five-year term in 2010—serves several functions within the region, including providing electoral oversight, assisting in security operations, providing technical and financial assistance for disaster management and development projects, and monitoring human rights. Several autonomous institutions created by the OAS carry out some of these specialized functions, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Juridical Committee. The OAS convenes a Summit of the Americas roughly every three years for heads of state to discuss multilateral initiatives and reinforce their commitments to regional cooperation. The OAS has a regular fund, which supports the General Secretariat, and a special fund, which is geared toward specific programs and initiatives. Member countries finance the regular fund through country quotas set by the General Assembly and based on their capacity to pay—the United States contributes approximately $48 million per year. Contribution to the special fund is voluntary. The OAS's 2012 budget supplies approximately $85 million for the regular fund and $70 million for the special fund. Questions of Effectiveness and Relevance CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years." One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [late Venezuelan president] Hugo Chávez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chávez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (Foreign Policy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.
5,607
<h4>The OAS is ineffective: a lack of funding, too many mandates, weak political power, inability<u><strong> to make decisions, polarized ideologies, and inconsistency in applying principles. Alternative platforms solve regional issues.</h4><p>Lee 2012</p><p></strong>(Brianna, senior production editor, Council on Foreign Relations, 4-13-2012, “The Organization of American States,” http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945, accessed 6-18-2014, BS)</p><p></u>The Organization of American States serves as a body for regional integration and political, economic, and social cooperation among its thirty-five member states. <u><mark>The OAS</u></mark> has undertaken multiple initiatives to monitor human rights, provide electoral oversight, promote development, and enhance security in the Americas. However, while the organization has been recognized for its value in providing information and serving as a forum for high-level discussion, it <u><mark>has</u></mark> also <u><mark>come under fire for</mark> the <mark>weakness</mark> <mark>of</mark> its <mark>political power, ineffectiveness in decision-making, and inconsistency in applying</mark> its <mark>democratic principles</mark> to states. <mark>Ideological polarization and mistrust</mark> of the OAS <mark>have prompted doubts over its relevance</mark> in the region, <mark>spurring the creation of alternative platforms for regional integration</mark>. </u>History and Functions The OAS, known for most of the first half of the twentieth century as the Pan American Union, was created as a platform for commercial cooperation and arbitration between states in the region. The Pan American Union's duties and functions expanded over the course of the early twentieth century, and with the start of the Cold War, collective security against the threat of communism became a priority in the hemisphere. In 1948, member states convened at the group's ninth conference to sign a new charter that officially created the Organization of American States. The OAS Charter pledged to "strengthen the peace and security of the continent" and "promote and consolidate representative democracy," as well as to encourage economic, social, and cultural cooperation within the Americas. The OAS of today—headed by Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza, reelected to a second five-year term in 2010—serves several functions within the region, including providing electoral oversight, assisting in security operations, providing technical and financial assistance for disaster management and development projects, and monitoring human rights. Several autonomous institutions created by the OAS carry out some of these specialized functions, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Juridical Committee. The OAS convenes a Summit of the Americas roughly every three years for heads of state to discuss multilateral initiatives and reinforce their commitments to regional cooperation. The OAS has a regular fund, which supports the General Secretariat, and a special fund, which is geared toward specific programs and initiatives. Member countries finance the regular fund through country quotas set by the General Assembly and based on their capacity to pay—the United States contributes approximately $48 million per year. Contribution to the special fund is voluntary. The OAS's 2012 budget supplies approximately $85 million for the regular fund and $70 million for the special fund. Questions of Effectiveness and Relevance CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness. <u>Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says <mark>the OAS</mark> as a political entity "<mark>has declined</mark> precipitously <mark>in recent years."</u> <u>One of the</mark> OAS's <mark>major</mark> administrative <mark>constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified</mark> within the region, <mark>this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action</mark>. The polarization between American states has also led to <mark>one of the</mark> OAS's <mark>other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission</mark>. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that <mark>the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions</mark> in light of its commitment to democracy, <mark>is</mark> also <mark>restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned</mark>," CFR's O'Neil says</u>. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "<u>Insulza and <mark>the OAS</mark> itself <mark>are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela</mark> (he denies it), as <mark>catering to</mark> [late Venezuelan president] Hugo <mark>Chávez's friends</mark> in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) <mark>and</mark>, strangely, <mark>still beholden to the U.S</mark>., even though Washington seems to have lost interest."</u> <u><mark>Chávez</mark> has <mark>called the OAS a puppet of the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (Foreign Policy), on the charge that <u><mark>the organization supported anti-democracy regimes</mark> in Latin America.</p></u>
1NR
War on Drugs
OAS
296,178
13
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
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Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,848
No risk of cyber terror- too many technical and organizational hurdles- no impact
Liff ‘12
Liff ‘12 [Adam P. Liff is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Politics at¶ Princeton University. He is also a Minerva Scholar, a SPF Non-Resident¶ Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and¶ a Bradley Fellow. “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The¶ Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War,” Journal of Strategic¶ Studies, 35:3, 401-428. ETB]
***computer network attacks Despite the ostensible appeal of ‘cyberterrorism’ no incident of terrorism has involved a¶ cyberattack. Why First, one reality that is often overlooked is the¶ difficulty of developing the technical and organizational capacity¶ necessary to launch sustained, simultaneous cyberattacks against¶ multiple targets. Possession of such capabilities is a prerequisite for¶ any terrorist group aiming to cause sufficient disruption to threaten¶ seriously the interests of a state and/or coerce its leaders Second, even¶ if a terrorist group is able to launch such complex attacks, it is doubtful¶ that they would generate widespread panic and terror which¶ terrorists desire the consequences are insufficiently disastrous to¶ warrant the opportunity cost in time and money necessary to develop the necessary organizational and technical capacity.¶ the kind of cyber attacks necessary to seriously threaten¶ states’ interests are beyond the reach¶ of terrorist groups isolated attacks are more¶ likely to annoy the target state than anything else.
no incident of terrorism has involved a¶ cyberattack one reality is the¶ difficulty of developing the capacity¶ necessary to launch sustained, simultaneous cyberattacks against¶ multiple targets such capabilities is a prerequisite even¶ if a terrorist group is able to launch such complex attacks, it is doubtful¶ that they would generate widespread panic the consequences are disastrous to¶ warrant the opportunity cost cyber attacks necessary to threaten¶ states’ interests are beyond reach¶ of terrorist groups isolated attacks are more¶ likely to annoy the target state
*CND=computer¶ network defense **CNO=computer network operations ***computer network attacks Despite the ostensible appeal of ‘cyberterrorism’ to terrorist groups,¶ over the past decade no incident of terrorism has involved a¶ cyberattack. Why? First, one reality that is often overlooked in analyses¶ that focus primarily on states’ vulnerabilities to cyberattacks is the¶ difficulty of developing the technical and organizational capacity¶ necessary to launch sustained, simultaneous cyberattacks against¶ multiple targets. Possession of such capabilities is a prerequisite for¶ any terrorist group aiming to cause sufficient disruption to threaten¶ seriously the interests of a state and/or coerce its leaders.57 Second, even¶ if a terrorist group is able to launch such complex attacks, it is doubtful¶ that they would generate the level of widespread panic and terror which¶ terrorists desire.58 In short, although widespread vulnerabilities in¶ critical infrastructure seem to present easy targets for terrorist groups,¶ the consequences of an attack are probably insufficiently disastrous to¶ warrant the opportunity cost in time and money necessary to attempt to¶ develop the necessary organizational and technical capacity.¶ Although the kind of cyber attacks necessary to seriously threaten¶ states’ interests and coerce their leaders are probably beyond the reach¶ of most terrorist groups, isolated brute force attacks against small¶ numbers of targets may be feasible. Their effects, however, are more¶ likely to annoy the target state than anything else.
1,565
<h4><u><strong>No risk of cyber terror- too many technical and organizational hurdles- no impact</h4><p>Liff ‘12</p><p></u></strong>[Adam P. Liff is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Politics at¶ Princeton University. He is also a Minerva Scholar, a SPF Non-Resident¶ Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and¶ a Bradley Fellow. “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The¶ Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War,” Journal of Strategic¶ Studies, 35:3, 401-428. ETB]</p><p>*CND=computer¶ network defense</p><p>**CNO=computer network operations</p><p><u>***computer network attacks</p><p>Despite the ostensible appeal of ‘cyberterrorism’</u> to terrorist groups,¶ over the past decade <u><mark>no incident of terrorism has involved a<strong>¶</strong> cyberattack</mark>. Why</u>? <u>First,</u> <u><mark>one reality</mark> that is often overlooked</u> in analyses¶ that focus primarily on states’ vulnerabilities to cyberattacks <u><mark>is the<strong>¶</strong> difficulty of developing the</mark> technical and organizational <mark>capacity<strong>¶</strong> necessary to launch</mark> <mark>sustained, simultaneous</mark> <mark>cyberattacks</mark> <mark>against<strong>¶</strong> multiple targets</mark>. Possession of <mark>such capabilities is a prerequisite</mark> for<strong>¶</strong> any terrorist group aiming to cause sufficient disruption to threaten<strong>¶</strong> seriously the interests of a state and/or coerce its leaders</u>.57 <u>Second,</u> <u><mark>even<strong>¶</strong> if a terrorist group is able to launch such complex attacks, it is doubtful<strong>¶</strong> that they would generate</mark> </u>the level of <u><mark>widespread panic</mark> and terror which<strong>¶</strong> terrorists desire</u>.58 In short, although widespread vulnerabilities in¶ critical infrastructure seem to present easy targets for terrorist groups,¶ <u><mark>the consequences</u></mark> of an attack <u><mark>are</u></mark> probably <u>insufficiently <mark>disastrous to<strong>¶</strong> warrant the opportunity cost</mark> in time and money necessary to</u> attempt to¶ <u>develop the necessary organizational and technical capacity.<strong>¶</strong> </u>Although <u>the kind of <mark>cyber attacks necessary to</mark> seriously <mark>threaten<strong>¶</strong> states’ interests</u></mark> and coerce their leaders <u><mark>are</u></mark> probably <u><mark>beyond</mark> the <mark>reach<strong>¶</strong> of</u></mark> most <u><mark>terrorist groups</u></mark>, <u><mark>isolated</u></mark> brute force <u><mark>attacks</u></mark> against small¶ numbers of targets may be feasible. Their effects, however, <u><mark>are</u> <u>more<strong>¶</strong> likely to annoy the target state<strong></mark> than anything else.</p></u></strong>
1NC
null
FBI
430,017
7
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
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Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
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Baylor
Baylor
null
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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Political subjects under the state are ahistorical fabrications of being – our praxis of counter-memory exposes the illusion of subjectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up space for radical becoming. Michael Clifford explains
ondon, Great Britain. pp. 134-7
Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, London, Great Britain. pp. 134-7
counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the self—this identity—apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects. These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations imposed on us by such a recognition. counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.” Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” It is not a freedom against the office of government, but against governmentality—against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body. by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits. a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.
Counter-memory consists of forgetting who we are a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity Counter-memory holds us at a distance, from ourselves wrenching the self apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange The self becomes foreign We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection identity is suspended through forgetfulness of its necessity Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom by opposing discourses of truth the discourses of genealogy, lift obligations imposed on us by such a recognition counter-memory takes the form of a transgression there is freedom in refusal Counter-memory suspends identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution The purpose of genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit to its dissipation Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects disposing subjectival constraints by exposing contingency Genealogy cuts through the oppressive density of Truth and discovers that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses It is not a freedom against the government, but against governmentality a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped from the politicized body Even the most violent forms of resistance accomplish nothing if they do not open a space of possible transformation a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are
Foucault’s counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. There is freedom in forgetfulness. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the self—this identity—apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of our-selves. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects.22 These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations imposed on us by such a recognition. As a forgetfulness of these obligations, counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, in this transgression—for those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy, says Foucault, “is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.”25 Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition. Genealogy turns the firm posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.”26 Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask. Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. Rather, there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”27 Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity—identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses. Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for it—for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from it—a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. It is not a freedom against the office of government, but against governmentality—against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. At the same time, the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body. In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.”29 That is, by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits.30 This opening is a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.”31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”32 This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.
9,241
<h4>Political subjects under the state are ahistorical fabrications of being – our praxis of counter-memory exposes the illusion of subjectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up space for radical becoming. Michael Clifford explains</h4><p>Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, L<u><strong>ondon, Great Britain. pp. 134-7</p><p></u></strong>Foucault’s <u><strong>counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness”</u></strong> (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 <u><strong><mark>Counter-memory consists of</mark> essentially <mark>forgetting who we are</mark>. It is <mark>a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of</mark> the <mark>moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity</mark>.</u></strong> There is freedom in forgetfulness. <u><strong><mark>Counter-memory holds us at</mark> a remove, <mark>a distance, from ourselves</mark>; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of <mark>wrenching the self</mark>—this identity—<mark>apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange</mark> before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference.</u></strong> Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of our-selves. <u><strong><mark>The self</mark>, as a coherent identity, <mark>becomes foreign</mark> through counter-memory. <mark>We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection</mark>. The power of <mark>identity is suspended through</mark> a <mark>forgetfulness of its necessity</mark>—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain.</u></strong> This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. <u><strong>Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation</u></strong>, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. <u><strong>“<mark>Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom</mark> of open possibilities <mark>by opposing</mark> themselves to the <mark>discourses of truth</mark> through which we recognize ourselves as subjects.</u></strong>22 <u><strong>These counter-discourses, <mark>the discourses of genealogy, lift</mark> the burdensome <mark>obligations imposed on us by such a recognition</mark>.</u></strong> As a forgetfulness of these obligations, <u><strong><mark>counter-memory</mark> always <mark>takes the form of a transgression</mark>.</u></strong> It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. <u><strong>Yet <mark>there is freedom in</mark> this <mark>refusal</mark>,</u></strong> in this transgression—for those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. <u><strong><mark>Counter-memory</mark> counters, or <mark>suspends</mark>, the power of <mark>identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution</mark>. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. <mark>The purpose of genealogy</u></strong></mark>, says Foucault, “<u><strong><mark>is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit </mark>itself <mark>to its dissipation</mark>.”</u></strong>25 <u><strong><mark>Genealogical critique is</mark> <mark>an exposition of our history as subjects</mark> that has the effect of <mark>disposing subjectival constraints by exposing</mark> the <mark>contingency</mark> of their imposition</u></strong>. Genealogy turns the firm posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” <u><strong>Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self</u></strong>, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.”26 <u><strong><mark>Genealogy</mark> disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It <mark>cuts through the oppressive</mark>, assimilating <mark>density of Truth and discovers</mark> in this beguiling haze <mark>that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask</mark>.</u></strong> Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. <u><strong>Behind it <mark>there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress</mark>.</u></strong> Rather, <u><strong>there is <mark>only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities</mark>, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices.</u></strong> Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”27 Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. <u><strong>Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects</u></strong>, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity—<u><strong>identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition</mark>, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; <mark>but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom.</u></strong> Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, <u><strong>genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”</u></strong>28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for it—for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from it—a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. <u><strong><mark>It is not a freedom against the</mark> office of <mark>government, but against governmentality</mark>—against <mark>a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government</mark>.</u></strong> At the same time, <u><strong>the freedom of/through counter-memory is <mark>a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped</mark> like a cloak <mark>from the politicized body</mark>.</u></strong> In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.”29 That is, <u><strong>by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits.</u></strong>30 This opening is <u><strong>a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification.</u></strong> In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.”31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. <u><strong>Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation.</u></strong> Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. <u><strong><mark>Even the most violent forms of resistance</mark> against subjection <mark>accomplish nothing if they do not</mark> gain this freedom, do not <mark>open a space of possible transformation</mark>—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise</u></strong>. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”32 This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that <u><strong>what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity.</u></strong> This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. <u><strong>Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is <mark>a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1ac
null
null
221,971
16
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,850
Their Clifton evidence cites offensive realism – that’s false and colonial
Pan 12
Pan 12 (Chengxin Pan, yup it’s him. PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at Deakin University, November 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise,” pp 46-8, gender modified) gz
some would protest that the ‘China threat’ conclusion stands on¶ the firm ground of realism, and has nothing to do with the way the West¶ identifies itself according to Mearsheimer, in a world of¶ anarchy, ‘states can never be certain about the intentions of other states’ and therefore have to treat each other as a potential threat. such an insatiable demand for transparency from others is itself a telltale¶ sign of the Western quest for certainty, security, and identity as the modern¶ knowing subject the realist first-image of human nature, which is¶ often implicitly invoked in the explanation of the China threat, has less to do¶ with human nature per se than with the Western quest for scientific truth¶ about human society. The Hobbesian ‘discovery’ of the first [hu]man and human¶ nature, as C. B. Macpherson argues, was not the objective knowledge of man¶ per se, but rather a conscious or unconscious autobiographical reflection of¶ Western modern [hu]man and his living condition in a ‘bourgeois market¶ society’ Insofar as the ‘China threat’ paradigm has been informed partly by¶ the Hobbesian fear of every [hu]man against every [hu]man, this China threat¶ representation is best seen as a mirror image of some historically specific and¶ selective self-experience of the West Two specific arguments in the ‘China threat’ discourse are illustrative of¶ this point. The first is the widely-invoked Germany analogy just as Germany’s transition from the¶ statesmanship of Bismarck to the incompetence of his successors contributed¶ to the tragedy of World War I, so too China, which is in the process of a¶ similar transition ‘from two decades of extremely skilful management of its¶ international relationships to a new leadership of uncertain quality’, poses a¶ serious threat to the international order What this Germany analogy can tell us is that the Western knowledge of¶ the China threat is based, more than anything else, on a fear of repetition of a¶ European nightmare scenario. Its fear of China, situated in the broader sense¶ of paranoia that Europe’s past may become Asia’s future is derived less¶ from China’s rise or its uncertain intentions than from the self-righteous¶ certainty about the universality of Western historical trajectory. The America analogy tells a similar story. Kagan argues that ‘if Americans¶ want to understand Chinese power and ambition today, they could start by¶ looking in the mirror’.¶ This is exactly what Mearsheimer has done After¶ extrapolating American history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a¶ status of the unchangeable ‘tragedy’ of great power politics in general,¶ Mearsheimer insists that China will have to, almost slavishly, follow the¶ same path:¶ Clearly, Mearsheimer’s ‘China threat’ assessment is based not so much on¶ what China does in the present as it is on what the US itself did in the past His repeated anxious ‘expectations’ of China testify to a paranoia of both¶ China’s Otherness and its emerging sameness. His fear reflects, in the final¶ analysis, the lingering ambivalence of colonial desire towards the mimicry of¶ the American self-experience by an Oriental Other. The autobiographical¶ nature of the ‘China threat’ discourse is so obvious that many references to¶ the ‘China menace’ (such as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and ‘Chinese Lake’) are¶ directly modelled on the Western/American self. Little wonder that Mel¶ Gurtov, while reading a 2005 US Defense Department report on China’s¶ military threat, found the report’s comments on China ironically more fitting¶ to describe US power and intention than China’s
some protest that the ‘China threat’ stands on¶ the firm ground of realism according to Mearsheimer states can never be certain about intentions have to treat each other as a threat such an insatiable demand for transparency is the Western quest for certainty the realist image has less to do¶ with human nature than with the quest for scientific truth the ‘China threat’ informed by¶ the Hobbesian fear is a mirror image of the West the widely-invoked Germany analogy What this can tell us is that Western knowledge of¶ the China threat is based on paranoia that Europe’s past may become Asia’s future is derived from self-righteous¶ certainty about the universality of Western historical trajectory This is exactly what Mearsheimer has done His repeated anxious ‘expectations’ testify to a paranoia of both¶ China’s Otherness and its emerging sameness. His fear reflects colonial desire towards the mimicry of¶ the American self-experience by an Oriental Other
No doubt, some would protest that the ‘China threat’ conclusion stands on¶ the firm ground of realism, and has nothing to do with the way the West¶ identifies itself. For example, according to Mearsheimer, in a world of¶ anarchy, ‘states can never be certain about the intentions of other states’,20¶ and therefore have to treat each other as a potential threat. Yet, I would argue¶ that such an insatiable demand for transparency from others is itself a telltale¶ sign of the Western quest for certainty, security, and identity as the modern¶ knowing subject. Similarly, the realist first-image of human nature, which is¶ often implicitly invoked in the explanation of the China threat, has less to do¶ with human nature per se than with the Western quest for scientific truth¶ about human society. The Hobbesian ‘discovery’ of the first [hu]man and human¶ nature, as C. B. Macpherson argues, was not the objective knowledge of man¶ per se, but rather a conscious or unconscious autobiographical reflection of¶ Western modern [hu]man and his living condition in a ‘bourgeois market¶ society’.21 Insofar as the ‘China threat’ paradigm has been informed partly by¶ the Hobbesian fear of every [hu]man against every [hu]man, this China threat¶ representation is best seen as a mirror image of some historically specific and¶ selective self-experience of the West. ¶ Two specific arguments in the ‘China threat’ discourse are illustrative of¶ this point. The first is the widely-invoked Germany analogy. Former US¶ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was instrumental in the¶ formation of Washington’s official view of China as a ‘strategic¶ competitor’, 22 was convinced by the ‘obvious and disturbing analogy’¶ between Wilhelmine Germany and today’s China. Though briefly¶ acknowledging the differences between the two powers, he insisted on their¶ many ‘similarities’. For him, just as Germany’s transition from the¶ statesmanship of Bismarck to the incompetence of his successors contributed¶ to the tragedy of World War I, so too China, which is in the process of a¶ similar transition ‘from two decades of extremely skilful management of its¶ international relationships to a new leadership of uncertain quality’, poses a¶ serious threat to the international order.23 In an influential piece published in¶ The National Interest, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen similarly argue¶ that¶ Like Germany a century ago, China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a¶ world already ordered strategically by earlier arrivals; a continental power¶ surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker¶ (with the exception of the United States and, perhaps, Japan); a bustling country¶ with great expectations, dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking¶ order, if only with regard to international prestige and respect. The quest for a¶ rightful “place in the sun” will… inevitably foster growing friction with Japan,¶ Russia, India or the United States.24¶ What this Germany analogy can tell us is that the Western knowledge of¶ the China threat is based, more than anything else, on a fear of repetition of a¶ European nightmare scenario. Its fear of China, situated in the broader sense¶ of paranoia that Europe’s past may become Asia’s future,25¶ is derived less¶ from China’s rise or its uncertain intentions than from the self-righteous¶ certainty about the universality of Western historical trajectory. The America analogy tells a similar story. Kagan argues that ‘if Americans¶ want to understand Chinese power and ambition today, they could start by¶ looking in the mirror’.¶.¶ 26 This is exactly what Mearsheimer has done. After¶ extrapolating American history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a¶ status of the unchangeable ‘tragedy’ of great power politics in general,¶ Mearsheimer insists that China will have to, almost slavishly, follow the¶ same path:¶ for sound strategic reasons, [China] would surely pursue regional hegemony, just¶ as the United States did in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century.¶ So we would expect China to attempt to dominate Japan and Korea, as well as¶ other regional actors, by building military forces that are so powerful that those¶ other states would not dare challenge it. We would also expect China to develop its¶ own version of the Monroe Doctrine, directed at the United States. Just as the¶ United States made it clear to distant great powers that they were not allowed to¶ meddle in the Western Hemisphere, China will make it clear that American¶ interference in Asia is unacceptable.27¶ Clearly, Mearsheimer’s ‘China threat’ assessment is based not so much on¶ what China does in the present as it is on what the US itself did in the past.28¶ His repeated anxious ‘expectations’ of China testify to a paranoia of both¶ China’s Otherness and its emerging sameness. His fear reflects, in the final¶ analysis, the lingering ambivalence of colonial desire towards the mimicry of¶ the American self-experience by an Oriental Other. The autobiographical¶ nature of the ‘China threat’ discourse is so obvious that many references to¶ the ‘China menace’ (such as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and ‘Chinese Lake’) are¶ directly modelled on the Western/American self. Little wonder that Mel¶ Gurtov, while reading a 2005 US Defense Department report on China’s¶ military threat, found the report’s comments on China ironically more fitting¶ to describe US power and intention than China’s.29
5,516
<h4>Their Clifton evidence cites offensive realism – that’s false and colonial</h4><p><u><strong>Pan 12</u></strong> (Chengxin Pan, yup it’s him. PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at Deakin University, November 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise,” pp 46-8, gender modified) gz</p><p>No doubt, <u><mark>some</mark> would <mark>protest that the ‘China threat’</mark> conclusion <mark>stands on¶ the firm ground of realism</mark>, and has nothing to do with the way the West¶ identifies itself</u>. For example, <u><mark>according to Mearsheimer</mark>, in a world of¶ anarchy, ‘<mark>states can never be certain about</mark> the <mark>intentions</mark> of other states’</u>,20¶ <u>and therefore <mark>have to treat each other as a </mark>potential <mark>threat</mark>.</u> Yet, I would argue¶ that <u><mark>such an insatiable demand for transparency</mark> from others <mark>is</mark> itself a telltale¶ sign of <strong><mark>the Western quest for certainty</mark>, security, and identity</strong> as the modern¶ knowing subject</u>. Similarly, <u><mark>the realist</mark> first-<mark>image</mark> of human nature, which is¶ often implicitly invoked in the explanation of the China threat, <mark>has <strong>less to do¶ with human nature</strong></mark> per se <mark>than with the</mark> <strong>Western <mark>quest for scientific truth</strong></mark>¶ about human society. The Hobbesian ‘discovery’ of the first [hu]man and human¶ nature, as C. B. Macpherson argues, was not the objective knowledge of man¶ per se, but rather a conscious or unconscious autobiographical reflection of¶ Western modern [hu]man and his living condition in a ‘bourgeois market¶ society’</u>.21 <u>Insofar as <mark>the ‘China threat’</mark> paradigm has been <mark>informed</mark> partly <mark>by¶ the Hobbesian fear</mark> of every [hu]man against every [hu]man, this China threat¶ representation <mark>is</mark> best seen as <mark>a <strong>mirror image of</mark> some historically specific and¶ selective self-experience of <mark>the West</u></strong></mark>. ¶ <u>Two specific arguments in the ‘China threat’ discourse are illustrative of¶ this point. The first is <mark>the widely-invoked Germany analogy</u></mark>. Former US¶ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was instrumental in the¶ formation of Washington’s official view of China as a ‘strategic¶ competitor’, 22 was convinced by the ‘obvious and disturbing analogy’¶ between Wilhelmine Germany and today’s China. Though briefly¶ acknowledging the differences between the two powers, he insisted on their¶ many ‘similarities’. For him, <u>just as Germany’s transition from the¶ statesmanship of Bismarck to the incompetence of his successors contributed¶ to the tragedy of World War I, so too China, which is in the process of a¶ similar transition ‘from two decades of extremely skilful management of its¶ international relationships to a new leadership of uncertain quality’, poses a¶ serious threat to the international order</u>.23 In an influential piece published in¶ The National Interest, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen similarly argue¶ that¶ Like Germany a century ago, China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a¶ world already ordered strategically by earlier arrivals; a continental power¶ surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker¶ (with the exception of the United States and, perhaps, Japan); a bustling country¶ with great expectations, dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking¶ order, if only with regard to international prestige and respect. The quest for a¶ rightful “place in the sun” will… inevitably foster growing friction with Japan,¶ Russia, India or the United States.24¶ <u><mark>What this</mark> Germany analogy <mark>can tell us is that</mark> the <mark>Western knowledge of¶ the China threat is based</mark>, more than anything else, <mark>on</mark> a <strong>fear of repetition of a¶ European nightmare scenario</strong>. Its fear of China, situated in the broader sense¶ of <strong><mark>paranoia that Europe’s past may become Asia’s future</u></strong></mark>,25¶ <u><mark>is derived</mark> less¶ from China’s rise or its uncertain intentions than <mark>from</mark> the <strong><mark>self-righteous¶ certainty about the universality of Western historical trajectory</mark>.</strong> The America analogy tells a similar story. Kagan argues that ‘if Americans¶ want to understand Chinese power and ambition today, they could start by¶ looking in the mirror’.¶</u>.¶ 26 <u><strong><mark>This is exactly what Mearsheimer has done</u></strong></mark>. <u>After¶ <strong>extrapolating</strong> American history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a¶ status of the <strong>unchangeable ‘tragedy’ of great power politics in general</strong>,¶ Mearsheimer insists that China will have to, almost slavishly, follow the¶ same path:¶ </u>for sound strategic reasons, [China] would surely pursue regional hegemony, just¶ as the United States did in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century.¶ So we would expect China to attempt to dominate Japan and Korea, as well as¶ other regional actors, by building military forces that are so powerful that those¶ other states would not dare challenge it. We would also expect China to develop its¶ own version of the Monroe Doctrine, directed at the United States. Just as the¶ United States made it clear to distant great powers that they were not allowed to¶ meddle in the Western Hemisphere, China will make it clear that American¶ interference in Asia is unacceptable.27¶ <u>Clearly, Mearsheimer’s ‘China threat’ assessment is based <strong>not so much on¶ what China does in the present</strong> as it is on <strong>what the US itself did in the past</u></strong>.28¶ <u><mark>His repeated anxious ‘expectations’</mark> of China <mark>testify to a <strong>paranoia of both¶ China’s Otherness and its emerging sameness</strong>. His fear reflects</mark>, in the final¶ analysis, the lingering ambivalence of <strong><mark>colonial desire towards the mimicry of¶ the American self-experience by an Oriental Other</strong></mark>. The autobiographical¶ nature of the ‘China threat’ discourse is so obvious that many references to¶ the ‘China menace’ (such as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and ‘Chinese Lake’) are¶ directly modelled on the Western/American self. Little wonder that Mel¶ Gurtov, while reading a 2005 US Defense Department report on China’s¶ military threat, found the report’s comments on China ironically more fitting¶ to describe US power and intention than China’s</u>.29</p>
2NC
Security
Link – China
11,907
21
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,851
Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico ensures economic instability, mass social injustice, and enlarged cartel profits which turns the case
Mercille 14
Mercille 14 (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz
neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70 the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”
NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry to find work out of desperation Whereas before reforms the economy grew at 3.5 percent this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases average wage decreased from 4.50 to 3.70 manufacturing has added 500,000 jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of 2.3 million in agriculture because of cheaper corn from U.S. agrobusinesses many had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking as low-level dealers, to make ends meet neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering enlarging the market
Since the 1980s, neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 (annual per capita rate), this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70. Since NAFTA went into effect, the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”
2,307
<h4>Neoliberal restructuring in Mexico ensures economic instability, mass social injustice, and enlarged cartel profits which turns the case</h4><p><u><strong>Mercille 14</u></strong> (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) <u>gz</p><p></u>Since the 1980s, <u>neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry</u> (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, <u>reforms such as <mark>NAFTA <strong>pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry</strong></mark>, both <mark>to find work</mark> and <mark>out of desperation</mark>. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. <mark>Whereas before reforms</mark> were implemented <mark>the economy grew at</mark> a rate of <mark>3.5 percent</mark> between 1960 and 1979</u> (annual per capita rate), <u><mark>this dropped to <strong>a meager 0.1 percent</strong> </mark>in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. <strong><mark>NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases</strong></mark>: for example, in Juárez, the <mark>average wage decreased <strong>from</mark> US$<mark>4.50</mark> a day <mark>to</mark> US$<mark>3.70</u></strong></mark>. Since NAFTA went into effect, <u>the <mark>manufacturing</mark> sector <mark>has added</mark> some <mark>500,000</mark> to 600,000 net <mark>jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of</mark> around <strong><mark>2.3 million</mark> jobs <mark>in agriculture </strong>because of cheaper corn</mark> imports <mark>from</mark> subsidized <mark>U.S. agrobusinesses</mark>. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures</u> (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, <u><mark>many</mark> Mexicans <mark>had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking</mark>, often <mark>as low-level dealers, to make ends meet</u></mark>. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. <u>Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by <mark>neoliberal reforms has <strong>increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering</strong></mark>, thereby <mark>enlarging the market</u></mark>. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “<u>Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”</p></u>
2NC
K
Link – Mexico
429,899
5
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,852
Heg is unsustainable
Layne 10
Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n5422359
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy around 2020. China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia United States of 2010 lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the economy have been accumulating these structural ills would erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits ), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. ." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. hegemony will be literally unaffordable the other big financial players no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts without deep reductions in defense expenditures the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.
China's economy has been growing more rapidly than the United States' China will build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia Weaknesses in the economy have been accumulating structural ills erode the economic foundations of America's preeminence. The Reserve and Treasury have pumped dollars into circulation Add to that the $1 trillion deficits The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' Achilles' heel. hegemony will be unaffordable This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts without reductions in defense expenditures Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.
5,344
<h4>Heg<u><strong> is unsustainable </h4><p>Layne 10</p><p></u></strong>(Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax<u> Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n5422359 </p><p><mark>China's economy has been growing </mark>much <mark>more rapidly than the United States'</u> </mark>over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that <u>it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy</u>, measured by overall GDP, sometime <u>around 2020.</u> Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that <u><mark>China will </mark>use its increasing wealth to <mark>build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia</u></mark>. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The <u>United States of 2010</u> and the world in which it <u>lives are far different from those of 1945. <mark>Weaknesses in the </u></mark>fundamentals of the American <u><mark>economy have been accumulating</u></mark> for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that <u>these <mark>structural ills </mark>would</u> ultimately <u><mark>erode the economic foundations of America's </mark>global <mark>preeminence.</u></mark> A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now <u>the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching.</u> Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. <u><mark>The</mark> Federal <mark>Reserve and Treasury have pumped </mark>massive amounts of <mark>dollars into circulation </mark>in hope of reviving the economy. <mark>Add to that the $1 trillion</mark>-plus budget <mark>deficits</u> </mark>that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security<u>), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability.</u> As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem<u><strong>." </strong><mark>The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' </mark>geopolitical <mark>Achilles' heel. </u></mark>Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, <u><mark>hegemony will be </mark>literally <mark>unaffordable</u></mark>. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, <u>the other big financial players</u> in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and <u>no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat</u>. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, <u>the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar</u> by preventing runaway inflation. <u><mark>This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline </mark>through</u> some combination of <u>budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes<strong>.</u></strong> Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But <u><mark>it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts</u> </mark>in federal spending <u><mark>without</mark> deep <mark>reductions in defense expenditures</u></mark>. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So <u>the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices</u>. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, <u><mark>Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue</mark>.</p></u>
1NR
War on Drugs
Heg
307,654
9
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,853
Always in the middle, our analysis continues with the mutation from the power to put to death, to the power to promote the functioning of life itself; a movement “from a repressive regime of sovereign power that was characterized by the monarch’s right over life and death to a new positive form of power that was concerned with the administration of life”
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Always in the middle, our analysis continues with the mutation from the power to put to death, to the power to promote the functioning of life itself; a movement “from a repressive regime of sovereign power that was characterized by the monarch’s right over life and death to a new positive form of power that was concerned with the administration of life”</h4>
null
null
null
430,018
1
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,854
Group democracy good args - liberalism is incapable of checking the worst excesses of biopolitics
Dean ‘1
Dean ‘1
(Mitchell, Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, 2001, “Demonic Societies: Liberalism, biopolitics, and sovereignty.” Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Hanson and Stepputat, p. 50-1) although liberalism may try to make safe the biopolitical imperative it has shown itself permanently incapable of arresting the emergence of rationalities that make the optimization of the life of some dependent on the disallowing of the life of others Liberalism is fundamentally concerned to govern through what it conceives as processes that are external to the sphere of government limited by the respect for rights and liberties of individual subjects. Liberal rule thus fosters forms of knowledge of vital processes and seeks to govern through their application. to the extent that liberalism depends on the formation of responsible and autonomous subjects through biopolitics and discipline, it fosters the type of governmental practices that are the ground of such rationalities. sovereignty and biopolitics are so heterogeneous to one another that the derivation of political norms from the democratization of the former cannot act as a prophylactic for the possible outcomes of the latter biopolitics captures and expands the division between political life and mere existence, already found within sovereignty. the framework of right can act as a resource for forces engaged in contestation of the effects of biopower; it cannot provide a guarantee as the efficacy of such struggle and may even be the means of the consolidation of those effects.
liberalism shown itself permanently incapable of arresting the emergence of rationalities that make the optimization of the life of some dependent on the disallowing of the life of others sovereignty and biopolitics are so heterogeneous to one another that the derivation of political norms from democratization of the former cannot act as a prophylactic for the outcomes of the latter. the framework of right cannot provide a guarantee and may even be the means of the consolidation of those effects.
(Mitchell, Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, 2001, “Demonic Societies: Liberalism, biopolitics, and sovereignty.” Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Hanson and Stepputat, p. 50-1) Finally, although liberalism may try to make safe the biopolitical imperative of the optimization of life, it has shown itself permanently incapable of arresting—from eugenics to contemporary genetics---the emergence of rationalities that make the optimization of the life of some dependent on the disallowing of the life of others. I can only suggest some general reasons for this. Liberalism is fundamentally concerned to govern through what it conceives as processes that are external to the sphere of government limited by the respect for rights and liberties of individual subjects. Liberal rule thus fosters forms of knowledge of vital processes and seeks to govern through their application. Moreover, to the extent that liberalism depends on the formation of responsible and autonomous subjects through biopolitics and discipline, it fosters the type of governmental practices that are the ground of such rationalities. Further, and perhaps more simply, we might consider the possibility that sovereignty and biopolitics are so heterogeneous to one another that the derivation of political norms from the democratization of the former cannot act as a prophylactic for the possible outcomes of the latter. We might also consider the alternative to this thesis, that biopolitics captures and expands the division between political life and mere existence, already found within sovereignty. In either case, the framework of right and law can act as a resource for forces engaged in contestation of the effects of biopower; it cannot provide a guarantee as the efficacy of such struggle and may even be the means of the consolidation of those effects.
1,871
<h4>Group democracy good args - liberalism is incapable of checking the worst excesses of biopolitics </h4><p><strong>Dean ‘1</strong> </p><p><u><strong>(Mitchell, Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, 2001, “Demonic Societies: Liberalism, biopolitics, and sovereignty.” Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Hanson and Stepputat, p. 50-1)</p><p></u></strong>Finally, <u><strong>although <mark>liberalism</mark> may try to make safe the biopolitical imperative</u></strong> of the optimization of life, <u><strong>it has <mark>shown</u></strong> <u><strong>itself permanently incapable of arresting</u></strong></mark>—from eugenics to contemporary genetics---<u><strong><mark>the emergence of rationalities that make the optimization of the life of some dependent on the disallowing of the life of others</u></strong></mark>. I can only suggest some general reasons for this. <u><strong>Liberalism is fundamentally concerned to govern through what it conceives as processes that are external to the sphere of government limited by the respect for rights and liberties of individual subjects. Liberal rule thus fosters forms of knowledge of vital processes and seeks to govern through their application.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>to the extent that liberalism depends on the formation of responsible and autonomous subjects through biopolitics and discipline, it fosters the type of governmental practices that are the ground of such rationalities.</u></strong> Further, and perhaps more simply, we might consider the possibility that <u><strong><mark>sovereignty and biopolitics are so heterogeneous to one another that the derivation of political norms from</mark> the <mark>democratization of the former cannot act as a prophylactic for the</mark> possible <mark>outcomes of the latter</u></strong>.</mark> We might also consider the alternative to this thesis, that <u><strong>biopolitics captures and expands the division between political life and mere existence, already found within sovereignty. </u></strong>In either case, <u><strong><mark>the framework of right</u></strong></mark> and law <u><strong>can act as a resource for forces engaged in contestation of the effects of biopower; it <mark>cannot provide a guarantee</mark> as the efficacy of such struggle <mark>and may even be the means of the consolidation of those effects.</mark> </p></u></strong>
2AC
Case
AT: Dickinson
202,524
5
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,855
The 1ACs apocalyptic narrative of cyber war ensures serial policy failure
Lawson 2012
Lawson 2012 (Sean Lawson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah. His essays on science, technology, and security have appeared in the journals Social Studies of Science, Security Dialogue, Cold War History and Journal of Information Technology & Politics. "Putting the "war" in cyberwar: Metaphor, analogy, and cybersecurity discourse in the United States"; First Monday, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3848/3270)
Not only does the nuclear deterrence analogy tend to lead its users to “exaggerate the destructive capacity of cyber weapons,” it also results in a tendency to focus on hypothetical worst cases while ignoring actual threats without the potential for decisiveness, the threat of cyber retaliation alone would likely have little deterrent value one would have to rely upon threats of physical retaliation to deter cyber attacks this could encourage an escalation to physical confrontation the threat of massive retaliation has not and will not deter the actual and pervasive “low–level” cyber attacks experienced on a daily basis U.S. capabilities for massive retaliation will likely encourage potential adversaries to constantly seek to pose challenges that fall below the threshold that would trigger massive retaliation a number of other differences between nuclear weapons and cyber weapons render the quest for cyber deterrence inappropriate at best and even potentially counterproductive. it is difficult to know who the attacker is because of online anonymity the “collateral damage” caused by cyber attacks can be unpredictable, which could reduce “the willingness of political leaders to incur the risk of a retaliatory response that goes awry, widening a conflict or creating unfavorable political consequences” language of deterrence and aggression with respect to cyber threats is counterproductive because it results in a self–fulfilling prophecy: actions taken by one state to increase its security can make others feel less secure, resulting in their taking similar actions, which confirms to the first state that it is insecure, and so on
users to “exaggerate the destructive capacity of cyber weapons it results in a tendency to focus on hypothetical worst cases while ignoring actual threats the threat of cyber retaliation would likely have little deterrent value to rely upon threats of cyber attacks could encourage escalation to confrontation the threat of retaliation will not deter actual cyber attacks capabilities for massive retaliation encourage adversaries to seek to pose challenges language of deterrence with respect to cyber threats is counterproductive because it results in a self–fulfilling prophecy actions taken by one state to increase security make others feel less secure resulting in similar actions which confirms the first state that it is insecure
Although in the case of the law of war, cyber war proponents have too quickly abandoned definitions, rules, and norms of war that are and should still be relevant to cyber conflict, in the case of cyber deterrence, many of these same individuals have too quickly adopted a framework that is “deeply flawed and largely unworkable” (Lewis, 2009b). First and foremost, this is the case because, as Martin Libicki of RAND notes, “Cyberspace is its own medium with its own rules. [...] Thus, deterrence and warfighting tenets established in other media do not necessarily translate reliably into cyberspace” [30]. Not only does the nuclear deterrence analogy tend to lead its users to “exaggerate the destructive capacity of cyber weapons,” it also results in a tendency to focus on hypothetical worst cases while ignoring actual threats (Lewis, 2009b). For example, while Raduege admitted that “low–level” attacks are predominant, he nonetheless advocated that national policy should focus on “strategic attacks” that “could one day” occur (Raduege, 2011). This tendency presents several problems. First, if cyber weapon capabilities have been exaggerated, then it is unlikely that strategic cyber attacks, if they did occur, could be decisive in the way that nuclear weapons could be [31]. Ironically, however, without the potential for decisiveness, the threat of cyber retaliation alone would likely have little deterrent value, meaning that one would have to rely upon threats of physical retaliation to deter cyber attacks. In turn, this could encourage an escalation to physical confrontation — that is, assuming the defender follows through on his threat of retaliation, without which any future threats would lose credibility. Second, the threat of massive retaliation, either cyber or physical, has not and will not deter the actual and pervasive “low–level” cyber attacks experienced on a daily basis. It is important to remember that during the Cold War, the threat of massive retaliation did not deter all war. It only deterred all–out nuclear war. As Raduege (2011) notes, the Cold War ended up taking the form of numerous proxy wars fought around the globe, from Southeast Asia to Latin America. Similarly, not only will U.S. capabilities for and threats of massive retaliation in response to cyber attacks not deter the daily occurrence of low–level attacks, it will likely encourage potential adversaries to constantly seek to pose challenges that fall below the threshold that would trigger massive retaliation, either cyber or kinetic. Finally, all of this points to another problem: a simplification of nuclear deterrence and Cold War history. Nuclear strategists confronted these same problems in the 1960s as it became increasingly clear that Eisenhower era threats of “massive retaliation” had lost their credibility and value. This resulted in a robust debate about “flexible response,” escalation, the role of conventional forces in promoting nuclear deterrence, and much more. In short, there was no one nuclear deterrence strategy during the Cold War. Nuclear strategy evolved over time (Freedman, 1989). Unfortunately, current notions of cyber deterrence are more akin to the 1950s strategy of massive retaliation that was ultimately deemed incredible and dangerous in comparison to the later, more nuanced variants of deterrence. Finally, a number of other differences between nuclear weapons and cyber weapons render the quest for cyber deterrence inappropriate at best and even potentially counterproductive. Cyber attacks generally suffer from a crisis of cause and effect. In one variant, this is what cyber war experts call the “attribution problem” — i.e., it is difficult to know who the attacker is because of online anonymity. As Mike McConnell and others have noted, deterrence is impossible without the ability to credibly threaten the attacker. But deterrence is also difficult if one cannot reliably know in advance the effects of one’s response. In cyberspace, the “collateral damage” caused by cyber attacks can be unpredictable, which could reduce “the willingness of political leaders to incur the risk of a retaliatory response that goes awry, widening a conflict or creating unfavorable political consequences” (Lewis, 2009a). The unpredictable results of a cyber response could encourage the use of a more predictable but more deadly physical response. It is for all of these reasons that Myriam Dunn Cavelty warns against the use of the language of deterrence and aggression with respect to cyber threats. Such language is counterproductive because it results in a self–fulfilling prophecy: actions taken by one state to increase its security can make others feel less secure, resulting in their taking similar actions, which confirms to the first state that it is insecure, and so on (Dunn Cavelty, 2010).
4,851
<h4>The 1ACs apocalyptic narrative of cyber war ensures serial policy failure</h4><p><u><strong><mark>Lawson 2012</u></strong></mark> (Sean Lawson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah. His essays on science, technology, and security have appeared in the journals Social Studies of Science, Security Dialogue, Cold War History and Journal of Information Technology & Politics. "Putting the "war" in cyberwar: Metaphor, analogy, and cybersecurity discourse in the United States"; First Monday, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3848/3270)</p><p>Although in the case of the law of war, cyber war proponents have too quickly abandoned definitions, rules, and norms of war that are and should still be relevant to cyber conflict, in the case of cyber deterrence, many of these same individuals have too quickly adopted a framework that is “deeply flawed and largely unworkable” (Lewis, 2009b). First and foremost, this is the case because, as Martin Libicki of RAND notes, “Cyberspace is its own medium with its own rules. [...] Thus, deterrence and warfighting tenets established in other media do not necessarily translate reliably into cyberspace” [30]. <u>Not only does the nuclear deterrence analogy tend to lead its <mark>users to “exaggerate the destructive capacity of cyber weapons</mark>,” <mark>it</mark> also <mark>results in a tendency to focus on hypothetical worst cases while ignoring actual threats</u></mark> (Lewis, 2009b). For example, while Raduege admitted that “low–level” attacks are predominant, he nonetheless advocated that national policy should focus on “strategic attacks” that “could one day” occur (Raduege, 2011). This tendency presents several problems. First, if cyber weapon capabilities have been exaggerated, then it is unlikely that strategic cyber attacks, if they did occur, could be decisive in the way that nuclear weapons could be [31]. Ironically, however, <u>without the potential for decisiveness, <mark>the threat of cyber retaliation</mark> alone <mark>would likely have little deterrent value</u></mark>, meaning that <u>one would have <mark>to rely upon threats</mark> <mark>of</mark> physical retaliation to deter <mark>cyber attacks</u></mark>. In turn, <u>this <mark>could encourage</mark> an <mark>escalation</mark> <mark>to</mark> physical <mark>confrontation</u></mark> — that is, assuming the defender follows through on his threat of retaliation, without which any future threats would lose credibility. Second, <u><mark>the threat of</mark> massive <mark>retaliation</u></mark>, either cyber or physical, <u>has not and <mark>will not deter</mark> the <mark>actual</mark> and pervasive “low–level” <mark>cyber attacks</mark> experienced on a daily basis</u>. It is important to remember that during the Cold War, the threat of massive retaliation did not deter all war. It only deterred all–out nuclear war. As Raduege (2011) notes, the Cold War ended up taking the form of numerous proxy wars fought around the globe, from Southeast Asia to Latin America. Similarly, not only will <u>U.S. <mark>capabilities for</u></mark> and threats of <u><mark>massive retaliation</u></mark> in response to cyber attacks not deter the daily occurrence of low–level attacks, it <u>will likely <mark>encourage</mark> potential <mark>adversaries</mark> <mark>to</mark> constantly <mark>seek</mark> <mark>to pose challenges</mark> that fall below the threshold that would trigger massive retaliation</u>, either cyber or kinetic. Finally, all of this points to another problem: a simplification of nuclear deterrence and Cold War history. Nuclear strategists confronted these same problems in the 1960s as it became increasingly clear that Eisenhower era threats of “massive retaliation” had lost their credibility and value. This resulted in a robust debate about “flexible response,” escalation, the role of conventional forces in promoting nuclear deterrence, and much more. In short, there was no one nuclear deterrence strategy during the Cold War. Nuclear strategy evolved over time (Freedman, 1989). Unfortunately, current notions of cyber deterrence are more akin to the 1950s strategy of massive retaliation that was ultimately deemed incredible and dangerous in comparison to the later, more nuanced variants of deterrence. Finally, <u>a number of other differences between nuclear weapons and cyber weapons render the quest for cyber deterrence inappropriate at best and even potentially counterproductive.</u> Cyber attacks generally suffer from a crisis of cause and effect. In one variant, this is what cyber war experts call the “attribution problem” — i.e., <u>it is difficult to know who the attacker is because of online anonymity</u>. As Mike McConnell and others have noted, deterrence is impossible without the ability to credibly threaten the attacker. But deterrence is also difficult if one cannot reliably know in advance the effects of one’s response. In cyberspace, <u>the “collateral damage” caused by cyber attacks can be unpredictable, which could reduce “the willingness of political leaders to incur the risk of a retaliatory response that goes awry, widening a conflict or creating unfavorable political consequences”</u> (Lewis, 2009a). The unpredictable results of a cyber response could encourage the use of a more predictable but more deadly physical response. It is for all of these reasons that Myriam Dunn Cavelty warns against the use of the <u><mark>language of deterrence</mark> and aggression <mark>with respect to cyber threats</u></mark>. Such language <u><mark>is counterproductive</mark> <mark>because it results in a self–fulfilling prophecy</mark>: <mark>actions taken by one state to increase</mark> its <mark>security</mark> can <mark>make others feel less secure</mark>, <mark>resulting</mark> <mark>in</mark> their taking <mark>similar actions</mark>, <mark>which confirms</mark> to <mark>the first state that it is insecure</mark>, and so on</u> (Dunn Cavelty, 2010).</p>
1NC
null
FBI
91,413
11
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,856
Contemplation disrupts the dominant imaginary – subjectivity is your first concern
Calkivik 10
Calkivik 10 (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/99479/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) gz
To dismantle security as untimely critique is therefore a claim on time interrupting the temporality of process where the “future” becomes a dead referent as it starts to designate nothing other than reproduction of the same, again, again, and again. It is an attempt to reset the account of times to the extent that the times are defined as a crisis of security—whether it be through the pacific discourse of humanitarian concerns, which understands itself as a project to alleviate suffering, or an explicitly militarized one that works through rendering death It embraces a form of thought not disengaged from experience—what actually, as Arendt suggests, would no longer be thought but mere contemplation one that counters the dominant temporality that structures contemporary experience of time informed by the global security project and global capital dismantling security affirms time as it tries to work against a time of a politics that reduces political life to the time of the process, to the realm of calculability If the otherwise is to proceed, possibility of the otherwise must be produced as experience,” which requires engaging with social forms of subjectivity at their deepest structural level and exposing how practices and discourses structure, produce, enable, or distort different senses of time and possibility dismantling security aspires to be a claim on time by going against the doxa of security
To dismantle security is a claim on time interrupting the temporality where the “future” becomes a dead referent to designate nothing other than reproduction of the same, again, again, and again. a form of thought not disengaged from experience would no longer be thought but mere contemplation that counters the dominant temporality to work against a politics that reduces political life to the realm of calculability possibility of the otherwise must be produced as experience,” which requires engaging with social forms of subjectivity at their deepest structural level
To dismantle security as untimely critique is therefore a claim on time. It strives to be untimely not in the sense of fleeing from history, but in terms of interrupting the temporality of process where the “future” becomes a dead referent as it starts to designate nothing other than reproduction of the same, again, again, and again. It is an attempt to reset the account of times to the extent that the times are defined as a crisis of security—whether it be through the pacific discourse of humanitarian concerns, which understands itself as a project to alleviate suffering, or an explicitly militarized one that works through rendering death. It embraces a form of thought not disengaged from experience—what actually, as Arendt suggests, would no longer be thought but mere contemplation284—but one that counters the dominant temporality that structures contemporary experience of time informed by the global security project and global capital. Against its annihilation, dismantling security affirms time as it tries to work against a time of a politics that reduces political life to the time of the process, to the realm of calculability. As Osborne notes, “If the otherwise is to proceed, possibility of the otherwise must be produced as experience,” which requires engaging with social forms of subjectivity at their deepest structural level and exposing how practices and discourses structure, produce, enable, or distort different senses of time and possibility.285 It is with this concern that dismantling security aspires to be a claim on time by going against the doxa of security. By explicating the temporal structure that is enacted by the politics of security, in this chapter I tried to provide one aspect of the notion of untimeliness that dismantling security aims to capture. In the following chapter, I engage with a different sense of time and temporality, this time in relation to critical thought. I elaborate on the meaning of critique as untimely—a form of critique that informs dismantling security as a critical project. After this last move toward taking apart the architecture of security, the last chapter will turn to a discussion of conceptions of politics, which takes inescapable insecurity as precisely the point where a thought of politics starts.
2,289
<h4>Contemplation disrupts the dominant imaginary – subjectivity is your first concern</h4><p><u><strong>Calkivik 10</u></strong> (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/99479/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) gz</p><p><u><mark>To dismantle security</mark> as untimely critique <mark>is</mark> therefore <mark>a <strong>claim on time</u></strong></mark>. It strives to be untimely not in the sense of fleeing from history, but in terms of <u><strong><mark>interrupting the temporality</strong></mark> of process <mark>where the “future” becomes a dead referent</mark> as it starts <mark>to designate nothing other than reproduction of the same, again, again, and again.</mark> It is an attempt to <strong>reset the account of times</strong> to the extent that the times are defined as a crisis of security—whether it be through the pacific discourse of humanitarian concerns, which understands itself as a project to alleviate suffering, or an explicitly militarized one that works through <strong>rendering death</u></strong>. <u>It embraces <mark>a form of thought not disengaged from experience</mark>—what actually, as Arendt suggests, <mark>would no longer be thought but <strong>mere contemplation</u></strong></mark>284—but <u>one <mark>that <strong>counters the dominant temporality</strong></mark> that structures contemporary experience of time informed by the global security project and global capital</u>. Against its annihilation, <u>dismantling security affirms time as it tries <mark>to work against a</mark> time of a <mark>politics that <strong>reduces political life</mark> to the time of the process, <mark>to the realm of calculability</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>As Osborne notes, “<u>If the otherwise is to proceed, <mark>possibility of the otherwise must be <strong>produced as experience</strong>,” which requires <strong>engaging with social forms of subjectivity at their deepest structural level</strong></mark> and exposing how practices and discourses structure, produce, enable, or distort different senses of time and possibility</u>.285 It is with this concern that <u>dismantling security aspires to be a claim on time by going against the doxa of security</u>. By explicating the temporal structure that is enacted by the politics of security, in this chapter I tried to provide one aspect of the notion of untimeliness that dismantling security aims to capture. In the following chapter, I engage with a different sense of time and temporality, this time in relation to critical thought. I elaborate on the meaning of critique as untimely—a form of critique that informs dismantling security as a critical project. After this last move toward taking apart the architecture of security, the last chapter will turn to a discussion of conceptions of politics, which takes inescapable insecurity as precisely the point where a thought of politics starts.</p>
2NC
Security
Alt
430,019
1
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,857
Causes extinction through global civil war
Duffield 8
Duffield 8 (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies Volume 21 Issue 2)
you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics
you cannot have development without containing underdeveloped life this nexus can be traced to the division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant security interconnects containment of migration with measures to integrate migrant communities within consumer society to improve the self-reliance of underdeveloped life in situ It marks a terrain of a global civil war fought on and between the modalities of life itself global civil war connects livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats in the North the need for social cohesion at home while urging intervention abroad this disastrous formula will be defended to the death we are all involved in this war since it mobilizes societies as a whole
This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.
4,009
<h4>Causes extinction through global civil war</h4><p><u><strong>Duffield 8</u></strong> (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies<u> Volume 21 Issue 2)</p><p></u>This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that <u><mark>you cannot have development </mark>or security <mark>without containing</mark> the <strong>circulation of <mark>underdeveloped life</u></strong></mark>. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, <u>the origins of <mark>this nexus can be traced to </mark>decolonization</u>. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, <u>decolonization publicly signalled <mark>the</mark> generic <mark>division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life</mark>, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, <mark>with an <strong>underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant</u></strong></mark>. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, <u>decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally</u>. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, <u>containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration</u>. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. <u>Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.</p><p>The international <mark>security </mark>architecture that emerged with decolonization <mark>interconnects</mark> the <mark>containment of </mark>irregular <mark>migration with measures to integrate migrant communities</mark> already settled <mark>within consumer society</mark> and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives <mark>to improve the self-reliance</mark> and stasis <mark>of underdeveloped life in situ</mark>. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. <mark>It marks</mark> out <mark>a terrain of a <strong>global civil war</strong></mark>, or rather tableau of wars, which is being <strong><mark>fought on and between the modalities of life itself</u></strong></mark>. <u>Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—<strong><mark>global civil war connects </mark>the <mark>livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats</mark> to critical infrastructure <mark>in the North</u></strong></mark>. Since the end of the Cold War, <u>the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on <mark>the need for social cohesion at home while</mark>, at the same time, <mark>urging</mark> a <strong>fresh wave of <mark>intervention abroad</strong></mark> to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means</u>. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, <u>there is a real possibility that <strong><mark>this disastrous formula</mark> for sharing the world with others <mark>will be defended to the death</u></strong></mark>. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. <u>Reflected within the <strong>globalization of containment</strong>, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become <strong>increasingly violent and coercive</strong>.</u> In one way or another, <u><strong><mark>we are all involved in this war</strong></mark>; it cannot be escaped <mark>since it mobilizes societies as a whole</mark>, including policy makers and academics</u>. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.</p>
2NC
K
Link – Mexico
429,900
5
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,858
Past two decades prove
Mearsheimer 2011
Mearsheimer 2011
Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified the United States is now engaged in protracted wars the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts The United States has also been unable to solve foreign-policy problems Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up every administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism
The United States has been at war for two out of every three years since 1989 countries that continuously fight wars build national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior the United States is now engaged in protracted wars the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, The United States has also been unable to solve foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons , every administration has failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; this problem will deteriorate further
(John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis) One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.
3,949
<h4>Past two decades prove</h4><p><u><strong>Mearsheimer 2011</u></strong> </p><p>(John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)</p><p>One year later, Charles <u>Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment</u>" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. <u><strong><mark>The United States has been at war for</mark> a startling <mark>two out of every three years since 1989</mark>, and there is no end in sight</u></strong>. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, <u><strong><mark>countries that continuously fight wars </mark>invariably <mark>build </mark>powerful <mark>national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior</u></strong></mark>; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." <u><strong>Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified</u></strong>. To make matters worse, <u><mark>the United States is now engaged in protracted wars</u> </mark>in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, <u><mark>the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts</u>,</mark> despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. <u><mark>The United States has also been unable to solve</u> </mark>three other major <u><mark>foreign-policy problems</u>. <u>Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment</u></mark> capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And <u>the United States, unable <mark>to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons </mark>in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up</u>. Finally<mark>, <u>every</u> </mark>post-Cold War <u><mark>administration has </mark>tried and <mark>failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; </mark>all indicators are that <mark>this problem will deteriorate further</u> </mark>as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that <u>the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front</u>, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, <u>the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism</u>.</p>
1NR
War on Drugs
Heg
124,029
36
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,859
This configuration of power as a positive affirmation of life “as an end in itself” attempted to protect its citizens from danger and enforce an equivalent ethos of productivity and positivity; necessitating the “right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life”
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<h4>This configuration of power as a positive affirmation of life “as an end in itself” attempted to protect its citizens from danger and enforce an equivalent ethos of productivity and positivity; necessitating the “right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life” </h4>
null
null
null
430,020
1
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
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Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,860
Their link argument is only made possible through the medicalizing order’s neoliberal subjectivity – only removing the justification for the state’s interest in preserving life can resolve the possibility of a “slippery slope”
Staihar 98
Staihar 98 Staihar Steven, University of Idaho Law, State's Unqualified Interest in Preserving Life: A Critique of the Formulations of Life's Sanctity in Washington v. Glucksberg, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 401 (1997-1998), KB
slippery slope concerns are a result of a focus on the "natural investment" in life rather than the liberty to make choices about the sanctity of one's own life. Focusing on the natural intrinsic value of "life in general," the Court concluded that is couched as a limited right to 'physician-assisted suicide' is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain." by construing the state's interest in preserving life in terms of the "natural investment," the majority inevitably created the slippery slope dilemma that it then attempted to resolve. for Justice Stevens, because the state's interest in preserving the contributions each person may make society is diminished for the terminally ill, then 'logically" the terminally ill are more vulnerable to abuse. The slippery slope hyperbole would be absent if the Court had construed the state's interest in preserving life in terms of individual liberty.
by construing the state's interest in preserving life in terms of the "natural investment," the majority created the slippery slope dilemma because the state's interest in preserving the contributions each person may make society is diminished for the terminally ill, then the terminally ill are more vulnerable to abuse. The slope hyperbole would be absent if the Court had construed the state's interest in preserving individual liberty.
But even these slippery slope concerns are, by and large, a result of a focus on the "natural investment" in life in general rather than the liberty to make choices about the sanctity of one's own life. Behind these concerns lies the view that "all euthanasia—even when fully voluntary and rational—is wrong because human life has an objec- tive, intrinsic, value as well as a subjective value for the person whose life it is, and euthanasia dishonors that intrinsic value."116 Focusing on the natural intrinsic value of "life in general," the Court concluded that is couched as a limited right to 'physician-assisted suicide' is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain."'77 Thus, by construing the state's interest in preserving life in terms of the "natural investment," the majority inevitably created the slippery slope dilemma that it then attempted to resolve."8 And for Justice Stevens, because the state's interest in preserving the contributions each person may make society is diminished for the terminally ill, then 'logically" the terminally ill are more vulnerable to abuse. The slippery slope hyperbole would be absent if the Court had construed the state's interest in preserving life in terms of individual liberty. Dworkin argues that those who properly consider the human investment in life disagree with others about what respecting the value of life means.190 The former 'think dying with dignity shows more respect for their own lives—better fits their sense of what is really important in and about human existence—than ending their lives in long agony or senseless sedation"" This is not considered a "pro-death" position; fit is support for the autonomy of the individual during the most personal of Thus, formulating the sanc- tity of life in terms of personal judgrnents about the sanctity of one's own life, demonstrates why, despite the outrage in the Netherlands, 'legalizing no euthanasia is itself harmful to many people"" In es- sence, it explains why allowing competent terminally ill individuals the right to physician-assisted suicide for the sake of the state's interest in life is not a reductio ad absurdum.
2,208
<h4><strong>Their link argument is only made possible through the medicalizing order’s neoliberal subjectivity – only removing the justification for the state’s interest in preserving life can resolve the possibility of a “slippery slope”</h4><p>Staihar 98</p><p></strong>Staihar Steven, University of Idaho Law, State's Unqualified Interest in Preserving Life: A Critique of the Formulations of Life's Sanctity in Washington v. Glucksberg, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 401 (1997-1998), KB</p><p>But even these <u><strong>slippery slope concerns are</u></strong>, by and large, <u><strong>a result of a focus on the "natural investment" in life</u></strong> in general <u><strong>rather than the liberty to make choices about the sanctity of one's own life.</u></strong> Behind these concerns lies the view that "all euthanasia—even when fully voluntary and rational—is wrong because human life has an objec- tive, intrinsic, value as well as a subjective value for the person whose life it is, and euthanasia dishonors that intrinsic value."116 <u><strong>Focusing on the natural intrinsic value of "life in general," the Court concluded that is couched as a limited right to 'physician-assisted suicide' is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain."</u></strong>'77 Thus, <u><strong><mark>by construing the state's interest in preserving life in terms of the "natural investment," the majority</mark> inevitably <mark>created the slippery slope dilemma </mark>that it then attempted to resolve.</u></strong>"8 And <u><strong>for</u></strong> <u><strong>Justice Stevens, <mark>because the state's interest in preserving the contributions each person may make society is diminished for the terminally ill, then</mark> 'logically" <mark>the terminally ill are more vulnerable to abuse.</mark> <mark>The</mark> slippery <mark>slope hyperbole would be absent if the Court had construed the state's interest in preserving </mark>life in terms of <mark>individual liberty.</u></strong></mark> Dworkin argues that those who properly consider the human investment in life disagree with others about what respecting the value of life means.190 The former 'think dying with dignity shows more respect for their own lives—better fits their sense of what is really important in and about human existence—than ending their lives in long agony or senseless sedation"" This is not considered a "pro-death" position; fit is support for the autonomy of the individual during the most personal of Thus, formulating the sanc- tity of life in terms of personal judgrnents about the sanctity of one's own life, demonstrates why, despite the outrage in the Netherlands, 'legalizing no euthanasia is itself harmful to many people"" In es- sence, it explains why allowing competent terminally ill individuals the right to physician-assisted suicide for the sake of the state's interest in life is not a reductio ad absurdum. </p>
2AC
Case
AT: Ableism
430,021
1
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,861
No South China Sea war OR miscalculation
Thayer 13
Thayer 13 (nope - not that Thayer, Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, May 13th 2013, “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/”, AB)
the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the United States The P L A has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes, the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely. A more probable, scenario is that both countries collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea Obama emphasised rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. both countries work separately to secure their interest But they also continue to engage each other on points of mutual interest The Pentagon has consistently sought to keep channels of communication open with China through three established bilateral mechanisms: despite ongoing frictions in their relationship, the United States and China will continue engaging with each other sum, Sino-American relations in the South China Sea are more likely to be characterised by cooperation and friction than a modus vivendi of collaboration or, a worst-case scenario, armed conflict.
developments do not presage conflict between China and the U S the U S has been careful to avoid being entrapped by allies Armed conflict in the S C S appears unlikely A probable scenario is both countries collaborate to maintain security Obama emphasised not containing China they continue to engage each othe The Pentagon sought to keep channels of communication open despite frictions the U S and China will continue engaging Sino-American relations in the South China Sea are characterised by cooperation than armed conflict
China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea is challenging US primacy in the Asia Pacific. Chinese sailors stand on a fishing vessel setting sail for the Spratly Islands, an archipelago disputed between China and other countries including Vietnam and the Philippines (Photo: AAP) Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture by deploying more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through Darwin.Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater military access to the Philippines. But these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the United States. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes, and the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely. Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its policy of rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the US Pacific Command, recently stated, ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the case … it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation’. However, a review of past US–China military-to-military interaction indicates that an agreement to jointly manage security in the South China Sea is unlikely because of continuing strategic mistrust between the two countries. This is also because the currents of regionalism are growing stronger. As such, a third scenario is more likely than the previous two: that China and the United States will maintain a relationship of cooperation and friction. In this scenario, both countries work separately to secure their interests through multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the Enlarged ASEAN Maritime Forum. But they also continue to engage each other on points of mutual interest. The Pentagon has consistently sought to keep channels of communication open with China through three established bilateral mechanisms: Defense Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks. On the one hand, these multilateral mechanisms reveal very little about US–China military relations. Military-to-military contacts between the two countries have gone through repeated cycles of cooperation and suspension, meaning that it has not been possible to isolate purely military-to-military contacts from their political and strategic settings. On the other hand, the channels have accomplished the following: continuing exchange visits by high-level defence officials; regular Defense Consultation Talks; continuing working-level discussions under the MMCA; agreement on the ‘7-point consensus’; and no serious naval incidents since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair. They have also helped to ensure continuing exchange visits by senior military officers; the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the ministerial-level Strategic & Economic Dialogue process; agreement to hold meetings between coast guards; and agreement on a new working group to draft principles to establish a framework for military-to-military cooperation. So the bottom line is that, despite ongoing frictions in their relationship, the United States and China will continue engaging with each other. Both sides understand that military-to-military contacts are a critical component of bilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general. But strategic mistrust will probably persist in the absence of greater transparency in military-to-military relations. In sum, Sino-American relations in the South China Sea are more likely to be characterised by cooperation and friction than a modus vivendi of collaboration or, a worst-case scenario, armed conflict.
4,523
<h4>No South China Sea war OR miscalculation </h4><p><u><strong><mark>Thayer 13</u></strong></mark> (nope - not that Thayer, Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, May 13th 2013, “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/<u>”, AB) </p><p></u>China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea is challenging US primacy in the Asia Pacific. Chinese sailors stand on a fishing vessel setting sail for the Spratly Islands, an archipelago disputed between China and other countries including Vietnam and the Philippines (Photo: AAP) Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, <u>the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture</u> by deploying more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through Darwin.Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater military access to the Philippines. But <u>these <mark>developments <strong>do not presage</strong></mark> armed <strong><mark>conflict</strong> between</mark> <mark>China</mark> <mark>and the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. <u>The</u> <u>P</u>eople’s <u>L</u>iberation <u>A</u>rmy Navy <u>has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes,</u> and <u><mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has been <strong>careful to avoid</strong></mark> <mark>being entrapped by</mark> regional <mark>allies</mark> in their territorial disputes with China. <strong><mark>Armed conflict</strong></mark> between China and the United States <mark>in the S</mark>outh <mark>C</mark>hina <mark>S</mark>ea <strong><mark>appears unlikely</strong></mark>. <mark>A</u></mark>nother, <u>more <mark>probable</mark>, <mark>scenario</mark> <mark>is</mark> that <mark>both countries</u></mark> will find a modus vivendi enabling them to <u><strong><mark>collaborate</strong></mark> <mark>to <strong>maintain security</strong></mark> in the South China Sea</u>. The <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> administration has repeatedly <u><mark>emphasised</u></mark> that its policy of <u>rebalancing to Asia is <strong><mark>not</strong></mark> directed at <strong><mark>containing</mark> <mark>China</strong></mark>.</u> For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the US Pacific Command, recently stated, ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the case … it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation’. However, a review of past US–China military-to-military interaction indicates that an agreement to jointly manage security in the South China Sea is unlikely because of continuing strategic mistrust between the two countries. This is also because the currents of regionalism are growing stronger. As such, a third scenario is more likely than the previous two: that China and the United States will maintain a relationship of cooperation and friction. In this scenario, <u>both countries work separately to secure their interest</u>s through multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the Enlarged ASEAN Maritime Forum. <u>But <mark>they</mark> also <mark>continue to engage each othe</mark>r on points of mutual interest</u>. <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>Pentagon</mark> has consistently <mark>sought to <strong>keep channels of communication open</strong></mark> with China through three established bilateral mechanisms:</u> Defense Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks. On the one hand, these multilateral mechanisms reveal very little about US–China military relations. Military-to-military contacts between the two countries have gone through repeated cycles of cooperation and suspension, meaning that it has not been possible to isolate purely military-to-military contacts from their political and strategic settings. On the other hand, the channels have accomplished the following: continuing exchange visits by high-level defence officials; regular Defense Consultation Talks; continuing working-level discussions under the MMCA; agreement on the ‘7-point consensus’; and no serious naval incidents since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair. They have also helped to ensure continuing exchange visits by senior military officers; the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the ministerial-level Strategic & Economic Dialogue process; agreement to hold meetings between coast guards; and agreement on a new working group to draft principles to establish a framework for military-to-military cooperation. So the bottom line is that, <u><strong><mark>despite</strong></mark> ongoing <strong><mark>frictions</strong></mark> in their relationship, <mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>and China</mark> <mark>will</mark> <mark>continue engaging</mark> with each other</u>. Both sides understand that military-to-military contacts are a critical component of bilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general. But strategic mistrust will probably persist in the absence of greater transparency in military-to-military relations. In <u>sum, <mark>Sino-American relations</mark> <mark>in the South China Sea are</mark> more likely to be <mark>characterised</mark> <mark>by cooperation</mark> and friction <mark>than</mark> a modus vivendi of collaboration or, a worst-case scenario, <mark>armed conflict</mark>.</p></u>
1NC
null
FBI
70,123
57
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,862
rejecting the aff allows a recalibration of china studies through autoethnographic skepticism
Pan 12
Pan 12 (Chengxin Pan, yup it’s him. PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at Deakin University, November 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise,” pp 150-3) gz
one cannot help but¶ wonder: How to study China? what are the alternative ways of knowing this important country? I am sceptical of some of their under-¶ lying ontological and epistemological premises about what China is and what¶ China knowledge should mean Yet, from the¶ beginning, this knowledge/reality dichotomy has been problematised. Since¶ there is no China-in-itself outside knowledge, representation or discourse,¶ what we refer to as ‘China’ must already be coloured by such representations Without reference to representations we cannot for a moment speak of China¶ or do China studies. Given that China does not exist independently of dis-¶ course and that any study becomes part of its object of study, I should say¶ that this analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China¶ in the proper sense of the word.¶ underlying those question is the belief that deconstruction is essen-¶ tially destructive However, as Derrida notes, deconstruction is ‘a way of taking a¶ position’ rather than merely ‘a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-¶ making destruction’ To the extent that methodology is always implied in ontol-¶ ogy and epistemology, my ontological and epistemological critique is not an¶ exercise of esoteric verbal incantation, but carries important methodological¶ messages for China watching it is no longer adequate for us to be¶ merely ‘China’ specialists who are otherwise blissfully ‘ignorant of the world¶ beyond China’ China watching needs autoethnography or ‘self-watching’ to¶ consciously make itself part of its own object of critical analysis whereby the¶ necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in¶ perspective the Western represen-¶ tations of China’s rise, predicated on some particular ways of Western self-¶ imagination, are necessarily self-reflective in that sense. And yet, such¶ narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean by¶ ‘self-watching’. the unconscious Western self-imagination as the¶ modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world and refuses to¶ critically look at itself) is the very antithesis of self-watching Self-watching requires at once discarding this positivist self-¶ (un)consciousness and cultivating a critically reflective, philosophising mind ‘The philosophizing mind’ ‘never simply thinks about¶ an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its¶ own thought about that object’. we¶ have to examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations,¶ how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we¶ describe them, and what purposes they serve for us’ in 1972, John¶ Fairbank put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America’s Cold-¶ War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear, a fear¶ inspired not by China but by America’s experience with Nazi and Stalinist¶ totalitarian regimes reflectivity¶ is hardly visible in today’s ‘China’s rise’ literature Yet it is imperative that such self-criticism should occur, which entails¶ problematising China watchers’ own thought, vocabularies and taken-for-¶ granted self-identity as disinterested rational observers. It requires us to pause¶ and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why we constantly fear¶ China, rather than taking that fear as given: ‘We are wary of China because¶ we are wary of China’. it¶ requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation of the latent¶ (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism¶ decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalism knowledge and¶ China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and peda-¶ gogical guises China knowledge is always inextricably¶ linked with the general dynamism of Western knowledge, desire and power¶ in global politics. Its self-reflection should thus extend to the shared collec-¶ tive self of the West, its assumed identity and associated foreign policy¶ since China watchers both rely on and contribute to their collective¶ Western self-imagination in their understanding of China, it is crucial that¶ they look at their collective Western self in the mirror the¶ same China may take on quite different meanings when we are willing to¶ subject ourselves to similar scrutiny. We may better appreciate why China¶ looks the way it does when we are more self-conscious of the various lenses,¶ paradigms, and fore-meanings through which we do China watching. Con-¶ versely, we cannot fully comprehend why the Chinese behave in a certain¶ way until we pay attention to what we have done (to them), past and present Such self-knowledge on the part of the West is essential to a better grasp of¶ China The imagined Western self is integral to the real world,¶ and critical self-reflection also helps reconnect China watching to the ‘real’¶ world of power relations to which it always belongs. By making one better¶ aware of this connection, it helps open up space for emancipatory knowledge The criterion of such self-illumination is that not only the object but we ourselves¶ fall squarely within our field of vision. We become visible to ourselves, not just¶ vaguely as a knowing subject as such but in a certain role hitherto hidden from us,¶ in a situation hitherto impenetrable to us, and with motivations of which we have¶ not hitherto been aware the¶ extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing¶ personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality’ Such revelation is not a sign of ignorance, but an essential building block in¶ the edifice of China knowledge the knowing subject can¶ emancipate itself from its delusion about its own being
How to study China? Since¶ there is no China-in-itself outside knowledge China’ must be coloured by representations analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China deconstruction is ‘a way of taking a¶ position’ China watching needs autoethnography to¶ make itself part of its own object of critical analysis Western represen-¶ tations of China’s rise are self-reflective And yet, such¶ narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean the¶ modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world is the very antithesis Self-watching requires discarding this positivist self-¶ (un)consciousness it is imperative that such self-criticism entails¶ problematising China watchers’ own thought, vocabularies it¶ requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation The imagined Western self is integral to the real world it helps open up space for emancipatory knowledge
Until now, my focus seems to have been mainly on how not to understand¶ China’s rise. While deconstruction is all well and good, one cannot help but¶ wonder: How to study China? If those paradigms are problematic or less than¶ adequate, what are the alternative ways of knowing this important country? ¶ These questions sound reasonable enough. Be it scholars or practitioners,¶ when faced with an apparently unprecedented transition from a transatlantic¶ century to a transpacific century led by the ‘rise’ of China (and India), one is¶ naturally anxious to know what China is up to and how to best respond to it.¶ Yet, however understandable this desire may be, this book has hesitated to¶ directly volunteer answers to those questions, or at least its implicit answers¶ would be unlikely to satisfy those demands on their own terms. There are¶ several reasons for this. To begin with, I am sceptical of some of their under-¶ lying ontological and epistemological premises about what China is and what¶ China knowledge should mean. For example, those questions seem to assume¶ that this book is merely a study of China studies (or a particular section of¶ China studies), rather than a study of China per se. Hence their insistence on¶ knowing how we might go about studying China proper. Yet, from the¶ beginning, this knowledge/reality dichotomy has been problematised. Since¶ there is no China-in-itself outside knowledge, representation or discourse,¶ what we refer to as ‘China’ must already be coloured by such representations.¶ Without reference to representations we cannot for a moment speak of China¶ or do China studies. Given that China does not exist independently of dis-¶ course and that any study becomes part of its object of study, I should say¶ that this analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China¶ in the proper sense of the word.¶ Also, underlying those question is the belief that deconstruction is essen-¶ tially destructive and thus has little constructive to contribute to China¶ studies. However, as Derrida notes, deconstruction is ‘a way of taking a¶ position’ rather than merely ‘a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-¶ making destruction’. 8 By way of deconstruction, this book has hoped to¶ generate both critical and constructive reflections on the way we think about¶ the nature of China knowledge as well as the way such knowledge can be¶ better produced. To the extent that methodology is always implied in ontol-¶ ogy and epistemology, my ontological and epistemological critique is not an¶ exercise of esoteric verbal incantation, but carries important methodological¶ messages for China watching, even though such messages could well be¶ dismissed as hollow, mystifying or even alien by conventional standards.¶ One message from this study is that it is no longer adequate for us to be¶ merely ‘China’ specialists who are otherwise blissfully ‘ignorant of the world¶ beyond China’.9 China watching needs autoethnography or ‘self-watching’ to¶ consciously make itself part of its own object of critical analysis whereby the¶ necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in¶ perspective. All research, to be sure, must already contain some level of¶ reflectivity, be it about methods of inquiry, hypothesis testing, empirical¶ evidence, data collection, or clarity of expression. And the Western represen-¶ tations of China’s rise, predicated on some particular ways of Western self-¶ imagination, are necessarily self-reflective in that sense. And yet, such¶ narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean by¶ ‘self-watching’. In fact, the unconscious Western self-imagination as the¶ modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world and refuses to¶ critically look at itself) is the very antithesis of self-watching.¶ Self-watching, I suggest, requires at once discarding this positivist self-¶ (un)consciousness and cultivating a critically reflective, philosophising mind.¶ ‘The philosophizing mind’, wrote Collingwood, ‘never simply thinks about¶ an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its¶ own thought about that object’. ¶ 10 This position is similar to that of ‘ironists’.¶ According to Richard Rorty, ironists are ‘never quite able to take themselves¶ seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe them-¶ selves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of¶ their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves’.11¶ In the concluding chapter of his Scratches on Our Minds, Harold Isaacs¶ seemed to have endorsed such ‘ironist’ approaches to China studies: ‘we¶ have to examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations,¶ how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we¶ describe them, and what purposes they serve for us’.12 Back in 1972, John¶ Fairbank put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America’s Cold-¶ War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear, a fear¶ inspired not by China but by America’s experience with Nazi and Stalinist¶ totalitarian regimes.13 These examples clearly show the possibility of reflec-¶ tive China watching, but alas, as noted from the beginning, such reflectivity¶ is hardly visible in today’s ‘China’s rise’ literature. Indeed, without the trace¶ of a single author, the two dominant China paradigms hinge onto a ubiqui-¶ tous collective psyche and emotion that is often difficult to see, let alone to¶ criticise from within.¶ Yet it is imperative that such self-criticism should occur, which entails¶ problematising China watchers’ own thought, vocabularies and taken-for-¶ granted self-identity as disinterested rational observers. It requires us to pause¶ and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why we constantly fear¶ China, rather than taking that fear as given: ‘We are wary of China because¶ we are wary of China’. Self-watching demands an ironist awareness of the¶ contingency, instability, and provinciality of mainstream China knowledge,¶ its intertextual and emotional link to the fears and fantasies in the Western¶ self-imagination, the political economy of its production, and the attendant¶ normative, ethical and practical consequences both for dealing with China¶ and for serving the power and special interests at home. Put it differently, it¶ requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation of the latent¶ (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism¶ decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalism knowledge and¶ China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and peda-¶ gogical guises.¶ In this context, self-reflection cannot be confined to individual China¶ watchers or even the China watching community. Never a purely personal¶ pursuit or even a disciplinary matter, China knowledge is always inextricably¶ linked with the general dynamism of Western knowledge, desire and power¶ in global politics. Its self-reflection should thus extend to the shared collec-¶ tive self of the West, its assumed identity and associated foreign policy¶ (China policy in particular). If China can be seen as a being-in-the-world,¶ these issues are part and parcel of the world in which China finds itself and¶ relates to others. But until now they have largely escaped the attention of¶ China watchers. Maybe it is because these are primarily the business of¶ scholars of Western/American culture, history and foreign relations, rather¶ than that of China scholars. After all, there is a need for division of labour in¶ social sciences. True, for various reasons it is unrealistic to expect China¶ scholars to be at the same time experts on those ‘non-China’ issues. Never-¶ theless, since China watchers both rely on and contribute to their collective¶ Western self-imagination in their understanding of China, it is crucial that¶ they look at their collective Western self in the mirror. Take the negative¶ image of China’s brutal Soviet-style sports system for example. Every now¶ and then, such an image will be reliably brought up to reinforce China’s¶ Otherness more generally. But if the ways American young talents are trained¶ are put under the same spotlight, the difference between the US and China is¶ no longer as vast as it appears.14 In doing so, the previous China image is no¶ longer as defensible as it seems. In brief, the broader point here is that the¶ same China may take on quite different meanings when we are willing to¶ subject ourselves to similar scrutiny. We may better appreciate why China¶ looks the way it does when we are more self-conscious of the various lenses,¶ paradigms, and fore-meanings through which we do China watching. Con-¶ versely, we cannot fully comprehend why the Chinese behave in a certain¶ way until we pay attention to what we have done (to them), past and present.¶ Such self-knowledge on the part of the West is essential to a better grasp of¶ China. Without the former, China knowledge is incomplete and suspect.¶ Yet, to many, self-reflection is at best a luxurious distraction. At worst it¶ amounts to navel-gazing and could turn into ‘a prolix and self-indulgent¶ discourse that is divorced from the real world’.15 Such concern is hardly¶ justified, however. The imagined Western self is integral to the real world,¶ and critical self-reflection also helps reconnect China watching to the ‘real’¶ world of power relations to which it always belongs. By making one better¶ aware of this connection, it helps open up space for emancipatory knowledge.¶ As Mannheim notes:¶ The criterion of such self-illumination is that not only the object but we ourselves¶ fall squarely within our field of vision. We become visible to ourselves, not just¶ vaguely as a knowing subject as such but in a certain role hitherto hidden from us,¶ in a situation hitherto impenetrable to us, and with motivations of which we have¶ not hitherto been aware. In such a moment the inner connection between our role,¶ our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly¶ draws upon us. Hence the paradox underlying these experiences, namely the op-¶ portunity for relative emancipation from social determination, increases propor-¶ tionately with insight into this determination.16¶ Still, there may be a lingering fear that excessive reflectivity could undo¶ much of the hard-won China knowledge. But again to quote Mannheim, ‘the¶ extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing¶ personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality’.17 Even¶ when that does expose our lack of knowledge about China, all is not lost.¶ Such revelation is not a sign of ignorance, but an essential building block in¶ the edifice of China knowledge. Confucius told us that ‘To say that you know¶ when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know—¶ that is [the way to acquire] knowledge’.18 Thus, the knowing subject can¶ emancipate itself from its delusion about its own being;19 the real meaning of¶ ignorance is that one claims to know when one does not or cannot know.
11,192
<h4>rejecting the aff allows a recalibration of china studies through autoethnographic<u> skepticism</h4><p><strong>Pan 12</u></strong> (Chengxin Pan, yup it’s him. PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at Deakin University, November 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise,” pp 150-3) gz</p><p>Until now, my focus seems to have been mainly on how not to understand¶ China’s rise. While deconstruction is all well and good, <u>one cannot help but¶ wonder: <mark>How to study China?</u></mark> If those paradigms are problematic or less than¶ adequate, <u>what are the alternative ways of knowing this important country?</u> ¶ These questions sound reasonable enough. Be it scholars or practitioners,¶ when faced with an apparently unprecedented transition from a transatlantic¶ century to a transpacific century led by the ‘rise’ of China (and India), one is¶ naturally anxious to know what China is up to and how to best respond to it.¶ Yet, however understandable this desire may be, this book has hesitated to¶ directly volunteer answers to those questions, or at least its implicit answers¶ would be unlikely to satisfy those demands on their own terms. There are¶ several reasons for this. To begin with, <u>I am sceptical of some of their under-¶ lying ontological and epistemological premises about what China is and what¶ China knowledge should mean</u>. For example, those questions seem to assume¶ that this book is merely a study of China studies (or a particular section of¶ China studies), rather than a study of China per se. Hence their insistence on¶ knowing how we might go about studying China proper. <u>Yet, from the¶ beginning, <strong>this knowledge/reality dichotomy has been problematised</strong>. <mark>Since¶ <strong>there is no China-in-itself</strong> outside knowledge</mark>, representation or discourse,¶ what we refer to as ‘<mark>China’ must</mark> <strong>already <mark>be coloured by</mark> such <mark>representations</u></strong></mark>.¶ <u>Without reference to representations we cannot for a moment speak of China¶ or do China studies. Given that China does not exist independently of dis-¶ course and that any study becomes part of its object of study, I should say¶ that this <mark>analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China</mark>¶ in the proper sense of the word.¶ </u>Also, <u>underlying those question is the belief that deconstruction is essen-¶ tially destructive</u> and thus has little constructive to contribute to China¶ studies. <u>However, as Derrida notes, <strong><mark>deconstruction is ‘a way of taking a¶ position’</strong></mark> rather than merely ‘a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-¶ making destruction’</u>. 8 By way of deconstruction, this book has hoped to¶ generate both critical and constructive reflections on the way we think about¶ the nature of China knowledge as well as the way such knowledge can be¶ better produced. <u>To the extent that methodology is always implied in ontol-¶ ogy and epistemology, my ontological and epistemological critique is not an¶ exercise of esoteric verbal incantation, but carries <strong>important methodological¶ messages</strong> for China watching</u>, even though such messages could well be¶ dismissed as hollow, mystifying or even alien by conventional standards.¶ One message from this study is that <u>it is no longer adequate for us to be¶ merely ‘China’ specialists who are otherwise blissfully ‘ignorant of the world¶ beyond China’</u>.9 <u><mark>China watching needs <strong>autoethnography</strong></mark> or <strong>‘self-watching’</strong> <mark>to¶ </mark>consciously <mark>make itself part of its own object of critical analysis</mark> whereby the¶ necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in¶ perspective</u>. All research, to be sure, must already contain some level of¶ reflectivity, be it about methods of inquiry, hypothesis testing, empirical¶ evidence, data collection, or clarity of expression. And <u>the <mark>Western represen-¶ tations of China’s rise</mark>, predicated on some particular ways of Western self-¶ imagination, <mark>are</mark> necessarily <mark>self-reflective</mark> in that sense. <mark>And yet, such¶ <strong>narrow technical reflectivity</strong> or <strong>narcissistic posturing</strong> is <strong>not what I mean</strong></mark> by¶ ‘self-watching’.</u> In fact, <u>the unconscious Western self-imagination as <strong><mark>the¶ modern knowing subject</strong> (who <strong>sets itself apart from the world</strong></mark> and refuses to¶ critically look at itself) <mark>is the very <strong>antithesis</mark> of self-watching</u></strong>.¶ <u><mark>Self-watching</u></mark>, I suggest, <u><mark>requires</mark> at once <strong><mark>discarding this positivist self-¶ (un)consciousness</strong></mark> and cultivating a <strong>critically reflective</strong>, philosophising mind</u>.¶ <u>‘The philosophizing mind’</u>, wrote Collingwood, <u>‘never simply thinks about¶ an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its¶ own thought about that object’.</u> ¶ 10 This position is similar to that of ‘ironists’.¶ According to Richard Rorty, ironists are ‘never quite able to take themselves¶ seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe them-¶ selves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of¶ their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves’.11¶ In the concluding chapter of his Scratches on Our Minds, Harold Isaacs¶ seemed to have endorsed such ‘ironist’ approaches to China studies: ‘<u>we¶ have to examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations,¶ how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we¶ describe them, and what purposes they serve for us’</u>.12 Back <u>in 1972, John¶ Fairbank put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America’s Cold-¶ War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear, a fear¶ inspired not by China but by America’s experience with Nazi and Stalinist¶ totalitarian regimes</u>.13 These examples clearly show the possibility of reflec-¶ tive China watching, but alas, as noted from the beginning, such <u>reflectivity¶ is <strong>hardly visible</strong> in today’s ‘China’s rise’ literature</u>. Indeed, without the trace¶ of a single author, the two dominant China paradigms hinge onto a ubiqui-¶ tous collective psyche and emotion that is often difficult to see, let alone to¶ criticise from within.¶ <u>Yet <mark>it is imperative that such self-criticism</mark> should occur, which <mark>entails¶ <strong>problematising China watchers’ own thought, vocabularies</strong></mark> and taken-for-¶ granted self-identity as <strong>disinterested rational observers</strong>. It requires us to <strong>pause</strong>¶ and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why we constantly fear¶ China, rather than taking that fear as given: ‘We are wary of China because¶ we are wary of China’.</u> Self-watching demands an ironist awareness of the¶ contingency, instability, and provinciality of mainstream China knowledge,¶ its intertextual and emotional link to the fears and fantasies in the Western¶ self-imagination, the political economy of its production, and the attendant¶ normative, ethical and practical consequences both for dealing with China¶ and for serving the power and special interests at home. Put it differently, <u><mark>it¶ requires a deconstructive move of <strong>intellectual decolonisation</strong></mark> of the latent¶ (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism¶ decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalism knowledge and¶ China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and peda-¶ gogical guises</u>.¶ In this context, self-reflection cannot be confined to individual China¶ watchers or even the China watching community. Never a purely personal¶ pursuit or even a disciplinary matter, <u>China knowledge is always inextricably¶ linked with the general dynamism of Western knowledge, desire and power¶ in global politics. Its self-reflection should thus extend to the shared collec-¶ tive self of the West, its assumed identity and associated foreign policy¶ </u>(China policy in particular). If China can be seen as a being-in-the-world,¶ these issues are part and parcel of the world in which China finds itself and¶ relates to others. But until now they have largely escaped the attention of¶ China watchers. Maybe it is because these are primarily the business of¶ scholars of Western/American culture, history and foreign relations, rather¶ than that of China scholars. After all, there is a need for division of labour in¶ social sciences. True, for various reasons it is unrealistic to expect China¶ scholars to be at the same time experts on those ‘non-China’ issues. Never-¶ theless, <u>since China watchers both rely on and contribute to their collective¶ Western self-imagination in their understanding of China, it is crucial that¶ they look at their collective Western self in the mirror</u>. Take the negative¶ image of China’s brutal Soviet-style sports system for example. Every now¶ and then, such an image will be reliably brought up to reinforce China’s¶ Otherness more generally. But if the ways American young talents are trained¶ are put under the same spotlight, the difference between the US and China is¶ no longer as vast as it appears.14 In doing so, the previous China image is no¶ longer as defensible as it seems. In brief, the broader point here is that <u>the¶ same China may take on quite different meanings when we are willing to¶ subject ourselves to similar scrutiny. We may better appreciate why China¶ looks the way it does when we are more self-conscious of the various lenses,¶ paradigms, and fore-meanings through which we do China watching. Con-¶ versely, we cannot fully comprehend why the Chinese behave in a certain¶ way until we pay attention to what we have done (to them), past and present</u>.¶ <u>Such self-knowledge on the part of the West is essential to a better grasp of¶ China</u>. Without the former, China knowledge is incomplete and suspect.¶ Yet, to many, self-reflection is at best a luxurious distraction. At worst it¶ amounts to navel-gazing and could turn into ‘a prolix and self-indulgent¶ discourse that is divorced from the real world’.15 Such concern is hardly¶ justified, however. <u><mark>The imagined Western self is <strong>integral to the real world</strong></mark>,¶ and critical self-reflection also helps reconnect China watching to the ‘real’¶ world of power relations to which it always belongs. By making one better¶ aware of this connection, <mark>it helps <strong>open up space for emancipatory knowledge</u></strong></mark>.¶ As Mannheim notes:¶ <u>The criterion of such self-illumination is that not only the object but we ourselves¶ fall squarely within our field of vision. We become visible to ourselves, not just¶ vaguely as a knowing subject as such but in a certain role hitherto hidden from us,¶ in a situation hitherto impenetrable to us, and with motivations of which we have¶ not hitherto been aware</u>. In such a moment the inner connection between our role,¶ our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly¶ draws upon us. Hence the paradox underlying these experiences, namely the op-¶ portunity for relative emancipation from social determination, increases propor-¶ tionately with insight into this determination.16¶ Still, there may be a lingering fear that excessive reflectivity could undo¶ much of the hard-won China knowledge. But again to quote Mannheim, ‘<u>the¶ extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing¶ personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality’</u>.17 Even¶ when that does expose our lack of knowledge about China, all is not lost.¶ <u>Such revelation is not a sign of ignorance, but an essential building block in¶ the edifice of China knowledge</u>. Confucius told us that ‘To say that you know¶ when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know—¶ that is [the way to acquire] knowledge’.18 Thus, <u><strong>the knowing subject can¶ emancipate itself from its delusion about its own being</u></strong>;19 the real meaning of¶ ignorance is that one claims to know when one does not or cannot know.</p>
2NC
Security
Alt
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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
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Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
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college
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finishing Jackson which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identifiable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field.¶ Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the field, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.
terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it vastly over-exaggerated of dubious provenance a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths pursue alternative intellectual and political projects
null
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<h4>finishing Jackson</h4><p><u>which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself</u> (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, <u><mark>‘terrorism’ is constituted by</mark> and through</u> an identifiable set of <u><mark>discursive practices</u></mark> – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law – <u>which</u> thus <u>make it a contingent ‘reality’</u> for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, <u><strong><mark>terrorism does not exist outside</mark> of <mark>the definitions and practices which</mark> seek to <mark>enclose it</u></strong></mark>, including those of the terrorism studies field.¶ Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that <u>the threat of terrorism to</u> Western or <u>international security is</u> <u><strong>vastly over-exaggerated</u></strong> (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004).¶ More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005).¶ Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006).¶ In sum, <u>much of <mark>what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is</u></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>of dubious provenance</u></strong></mark>. In <u><mark>a</mark> <mark>major review</mark> of the field,</u> Andrew Silke <u>has <mark>described it as</u> ‘<u><strong>a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths</u></strong></mark> <u>whose reach extends</u> <u>even to the most learned and experienced’</u> (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. <u>This</u> kind of <u><mark>critical destabilisation is useful for</u> <u>opening up</mark> the <mark>space</mark> needed <mark>to ask new</mark> kinds of analytical and normative <mark>questions and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>pursue alternative intellectual and political projects</u></strong></mark>.</p>
2NC
K
Link – Terror
430,022
1
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,864
Retrenchment doesn’t cause conflict, lashout, or draw-in - all their studies are wrong
MacDonald 11
MacDonald 11 Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44
The issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable pessimists counsel retrenchment is dangerous Kagan warns, "A reduction would unnerve allies and undercut cooperation Kaplan argues being more of an offshore balancer may encourage regional bullies These arguments have grim implications for international politics if the pessimists are correct politicians and interests groups in the U S will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments despite their high costs Policymakers will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case as a practical or probable policy This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers we challenge the claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers peaceful retrenchment is the most common response even over short time spans When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies draw down obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations great powers retrench for the same reason they expand great power politics compel them declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes Faced with diminishing resources great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation Great powers rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict retrenchment can be successful States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers
The issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable Kagan warns reduction would undercut cooperation we question the evidence of pessimists This article fills gaps by systematically examining the relationship between decline and responses of great powers peaceful retrenchment is most common great powers facing decline are less likely to initiate or escalate disputes great powers moderate their ambitions retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation
How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. The central issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable or probable. Some pessimists counsel that retrenchment is a dangerous policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, warns, "A reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert Kaplan likewise argues, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3¶ Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7¶ These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, politicians and interests groups in the United States will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure.9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11¶ In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.¶ First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common MARKED response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.¶ Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.¶ Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.
7,052
<h4>Retrenchment doesn’t cause conflict, lashout<u><strong>, or draw-in - all their studies are wrong </h4><p>MacDonald 11</p><p>Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44</p><p></u></strong>How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. <u><mark>The</u></mark> central <u><mark>issue is whether</u> <u><strong>prompt retrenchment</u></strong> <u>is</u> <u>desirable</u></mark> or probable. Some <u>pessimists counsel</u> that <u>retrenchment is</u> a <u>dangerous</u> policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert <u><strong><mark>Kagan</u></strong></mark>, for example, <u><mark>warns</mark>, "A <mark>reduction</u></mark> in defense spending . . . <u><mark>would</mark> unnerve</u> American <u>allies and <mark>undercut</u></mark> efforts to gain greater <u><mark>cooperation</u></mark>. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert <u>Kaplan</u> likewise <u>argues</u>, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on <u>being more of an offshore balancer</u>. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention <u>may encourage regional bullies</u>. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3¶ Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7¶ <u>These arguments have</u> <u>grim implications for</u> contemporary <u>international politics</u>. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, <u><strong>if the pessimists are correct</u></strong>, <u>politicians and interests groups in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will be</u> <u><strong>unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments</u></strong>. <u>Perceptions of weakness and</u> <u><strong>declining U.S. credibility</u></strong> <u>will encourage policymakers to</u> <u><strong>hold on to burdensome overseas commitments</u></strong>, <u>despite their high costs</u> in blood and treasure.9 <u>Policymakers</u> in Washington <u>will</u> <u><strong>struggle to retire</u></strong> <u>from profitless military engagements</u> and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11¶ In this article, <u><strong><mark>we question the</mark> logic and <mark>evidence of</mark> the retrenchment <mark>pessimists</u></strong></mark>. To date <u>there has been</u> <u><strong>neither a comprehensive study</u></strong> <u>of great power retrenchment</u> <u>nor a study that lays out the case</u> for retrenchment <u>as a practical or probable policy</u>. <u><mark>This article fills</mark> these <mark>gaps by</u> <u><strong>systematically examining the relationship between</mark> acute relative <mark>decline and</mark> the <mark>responses of great powers</u></strong></mark>. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.¶ First, <u>we challenge the</u> retrenchment pessimists' <u>claim that</u> <u><strong>domestic or international constraints</u></strong> <u>inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench</u>. In fact, <u>when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers</u>, <u><strong><mark>peaceful retrenchment is</mark> the <mark>most common</mark> </p><p></u></strong>MARKED</p><p><u><strong>response</u></strong>, <u>even over short time spans</u>. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. <u>When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies</u> or adversaries, <u>draw down</u> their military <u>obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations</u>.¶ Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, <u>great powers retrench for the same reason they expand</u>: the rigors of <u><strong>great power politics compel them</u></strong> to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and <u>declining great powers face</u> <u>powerful incentives to contract their interests in a</u> <u>prompt and proportionate manner.</u> Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.¶ Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that <u><mark>great powers facing</mark> acute <mark>decline are</u> <u><strong>less likely to initiate or escalate</mark> militarized interstate <mark>disputes</u></strong></mark>. <u>Faced with diminishing resources</u>, <u><mark>great powers</u> <u><strong>moderate their</mark> foreign policy <mark>ambitions</u></strong></mark> <u>and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value</u>. <u><strong>Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions</u></strong> <u>of critics,</u> <u><strong><mark>retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation</u></strong></mark>. <u>Great powers</u> are able to <u>rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict</u>. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, <u>retrenchment can be successful</u>. <u>States that retrench</u> <u><strong>often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers</u></strong>. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.</p>
1NR
War on Drugs
A2: Backlash
21,952
120
16,984
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
564,723
N
Fullerton
3
Michigan AP
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana with a war on drugs advantage 1nc was ontological security k neolib k afropessimism k nearly all spec and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Fullerton-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,865
These processes of liberalism and normalization work to banish unruly or unproductive deaths from the normalized social sphere – liberalism operates through the construction of not death sentences but “life sentences” which normalize death – “thou shalt not die violently, thou shalt not die prematurely, thou shalt not kill thyself…thou shalt die an orderly death” – in modern political culture, disorderly death is manifested in the figure that takes its own life – because of its very construction, “suicide challenge[s] the moral integrity of a society that held life as the ultimate personal, political, economic, and collective good”
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<h4>These processes of liberalism and normalization work to banish unruly or unproductive deaths from the normalized social sphere – liberalism operates through the construction of not death sentences but “life sentences” which normalize death – “thou shalt not die violently, thou shalt not die prematurely, thou shalt not kill thyself…thou shalt die an orderly death” – in modern political culture, disorderly death is manifested in the figure that takes its own life – because of its very construction, “suicide challenge[s] the moral integrity of a society that held life as the ultimate personal, political, economic, and collective good” </h4>
null
null
null
430,023
1
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,866
Link turn comes before the link – genealogical criticism of biological life which is always already politicized unmasks the ways in which bodies are stigmatized and cast out of the normalized structures of vitality
Anders 13
Anders 13
Foucault's work is relevant for contemporary disability studies because of his theorization of the body as a thoroughly and inexorably politicized space. In his genealogical studies, Foucault undertakes the task to "expose a body totally imprinted by history and by the process of history's destruction of the body" Foucault's work challenges the traditional "social model" of disability insofar as it reifies and naturalizes "impairments" as the transhistorical and neutral foundations of disability. impairments themselves are created by social and economic arrangements and conditions that can be transformed Foucault's work challenges us to recognize that the "difficult physical realities" of disability are themselves socially constructed and to undertake the task of diagnosing the forces that produce them any attempt to understand modern political struggles and the claims of rights discourse must begin by recognizing such claims as a political response to what he characterizes as the triumph of biopower. biopower is the proper name for the emergence and integrated exercise of both a technology of discipline, which produces docile bodies, and the normative regulation of populations Biopower extends the mechanisms of disciplinary societies through an intensification of individuals' relationships to themselves and their own self-governance: "it is a form of power that makes individuals subjects
Foucault's work is relevant for contemporary disability studies because of his theorization of the body as a thoroughly and inexorably politicized space. In genealogical studies, Foucault undertakes the task to "expose a body totally imprinted by history Foucault's work challenges the traditional "social model" of disability insofar as it reifies and naturalizes "impairments" as the transhistorical and neutral foundations of disability. impairments are created by social and economic arrangements and conditions that can be transformed Foucault's work challenges us to recognize that the "difficult physical realities" of disability are themselves socially constructed and to undertake the task of diagnosing the forces that produce them any attempt to understand rights discourse must begin by recognizing such claims as a political response to biopower which produces the normative regulation of populations
Abram, professor at University of Minnesota Duluth, “Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control,” Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33:3, 2013, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268 SJE First and foremost, Foucault's work is relevant for contemporary disability studies because of his theorization of the body as a thoroughly and inexorably politicized space. In his genealogical studies, Foucault undertakes the task to "expose a body totally imprinted by history and by the process of history's destruction of the body" ("Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 357). Foucault's work challenges the traditional "social model" of disability insofar as it reifies and naturalizes "impairments" as the transhistorical and neutral foundations of disability. Building on continuing critique of the "social model," Tremain employs Foucault's work to argue that impairments themselves are not "intrinsic defects that demand to be corrected or eliminated (as the 'medical model' assumes)" but rather are "created by social and economic arrangements and conditions that can be transformed" (Tremain, "Biopower …" 598). Foucault's work challenges us to recognize that the "difficult physical realities" of disability are themselves socially constructed and to undertake the task of diagnosing the forces that produce them. 4 There is no outside to the historical effects and socio-political operations of power on the body.¶ Second, and complementarily, Foucault theorizes the modern social field in terms of biopolitics. He argues any attempt to understand modern political struggles and the claims of rights discourse must begin by recognizing such claims as a political response to what he characterizes as the triumph of biopower. As Foucault describes it, biopower is the proper name for the emergence and integrated exercise of both a technology of discipline, which produces docile bodies, and the normative regulation of populations; it takes life itself as the object of its exercise: "One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it the point of death" (The History of Sexuality 138). While biopower takes life as its object of exercise, it does so by applying itself to the "everyday life categories of the individual." Biopower extends the mechanisms of disciplinary societies through an intensification of individuals' relationships to themselves and their own self-governance: "it is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, "The Subject and Power" 130).
2,754
<h4><strong>Link turn comes before the link – genealogical criticism of biological life which is always already politicized unmasks the ways in which bodies are stigmatized and cast out of the normalized structures of vitality</h4><p>Anders 13</p><p></strong>Abram, professor at University of Minnesota Duluth, “Foucault and "the Right to Life": From Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control,” Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33:3, 2013, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340/3268 SJE</p><p>First and foremost, <u><strong><mark>Foucault's work is relevant for contemporary disability studies because of his theorization of the body as a thoroughly and inexorably politicized space. In</mark> his <mark>genealogical studies, Foucault undertakes the task to "expose a body totally imprinted by history</mark> and by the process of history's destruction of the body"</u></strong> ("Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 357). <u><strong><mark>Foucault's work challenges the traditional "social model" of disability insofar as it reifies and naturalizes "impairments" as the transhistorical and neutral foundations of disability.</u></strong></mark> Building on continuing critique of the "social model," Tremain employs Foucault's work to argue that <u><strong><mark>impairments</mark> themselves <mark>are</u></strong></mark> not "intrinsic defects that demand to be corrected or eliminated (as the 'medical model' assumes)" but rather are "<u><strong><mark>created by social and economic arrangements and conditions that can be transformed</u></strong></mark>" (Tremain, "Biopower …" 598). <u><strong><mark>Foucault's work challenges us to recognize that the "difficult physical realities" of disability are themselves socially constructed</u></strong> <u><strong>and to undertake the task of diagnosing the forces that produce them</u></strong></mark>. 4 There is no outside to the historical effects and socio-political operations of power on the body.¶ Second, and complementarily, Foucault theorizes the modern social field in terms of biopolitics. He argues <u><strong><mark>any attempt to understand</mark> modern political struggles and the claims of <mark>rights discourse must begin by recognizing such claims as a political response to</mark> what he characterizes as the triumph of <mark>biopower</mark>.</u></strong> As Foucault describes it, <u><strong>biopower is the proper name for the emergence and integrated exercise of both a technology of discipline, <mark>which produces</mark> docile bodies, and <mark>the normative regulation of populations</u></strong></mark>; it takes life itself as the object of its exercise: "One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it the point of death" (The History of Sexuality 138). While biopower takes life as its object of exercise, it does so by applying itself to the "everyday life categories of the individual." <u><strong>Biopower extends the mechanisms of disciplinary societies through an intensification of individuals' relationships to themselves and their own self-governance: "it is a form of power that makes individuals subjects</u></strong>. There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, "The Subject and Power" 130).</p>
2AC
Case
AT: Ableism
214,190
2
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,867
Deferral disad – the perm relies on a politics of hope which beholds the possibility of security’s affective recuperation – refuse this politics in favor of one governed by pause
Massumi ‘14
Massumi ‘14 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, “The Remains of the Day,” On Violence, Vol 1 2013-14)
the tendency I am diagnosing is self-operating. It operates independently of the personal qualities of those in power. As a person, I find Obama honorable and reasonable to a fault And yet … he has been swept up. His return to the deliberative reason of traditional liberal democratic process has been a tragi-comic failure But the way in which Obama has at the same time made the exception to the rules the rule, in the name of national security – that definitely works. It's likely to prove indefinitely effective. It is likely to be Obama's most lasting "contribution". It is what makes the "everything has changed" of 9-11 just "more of the same." For the unforeseable future. Because the unforeseeable future is threat, and that puts us right back in the loop. Please don't misunderstand this as appeal to a more effective return to the liberal-deliberative model. This path has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired ever. The circularity of the future cause at the heart of preemption as a positive and productive power, as a force of history in its own right, has seen to that. All signs indicate that political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing, as permanently and unrefusably as the spectrum of politics has moved onto a war footing. A logic of war has become the logic of politics. There is likely no going back If resistance is possible, it must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace that has become the space of life. This means engaging the operative logic of preemption on its own terrains. This in turn means, in the most literal sense, a struggle for the future (perhaps through practices of slowness, against the preemptive addiction to rapid response?). It also means engaging it on the level of affect: reclaiming legitimation in a different affective key. Not the key of hope. Hope is more of a deferral of the present to the future than it is a way of bringing the future into the present according to a different operative logic. To hope is to look dreamy-eyed toward the future – cringingg with the halfacknowledged certainty that when the future comes, in this broken world, it will be enough to make you cry. The only way to keep up the spirit is to defer to the future again, eyes wet with hope all over again.
Obama has made the exception to the rules the rule Because the unforeseeable future is threat, that puts us right back in the loop don't misunderstand this as appeal to the liberal-deliberative model. This has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing permanently war has become politics. resistance must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace This means engaging preemption on its own terrains. a struggle for the future through practices of slowness Hope is a deferral to the future
It is important to emphasize this: the tendency I am diagnosing is self-operating. It operates independently of the personal qualities of those in power. As a person, I find Obama honorable and reasonable to a fault. No one is more sincerely deliberative. No president in recent memory has shown such infinite patience for working out differences and reaching compromise. Rarely has the United States seen such dedication in a president to the civil sphere as the seat of deliberative representative democracy, to the point that he has even tried to play down that old standard, the politics of fear. And yet … he has been swept up. His return to the deliberative reason of traditional liberal democratic process has been a tragi-comic failure. Rarely has a president proven so painfully ineffectual. Rarely has the power of reason of State seemed so faint. But the way in which Obama has at the same time made the exception to the rules the rule, in the name of national security – that definitely works. It's likely to prove indefinitely effective. It is likely to be Obama's most lasting "contribution". It is what makes the "everything has changed" of 9-11 just "more of the same." For the unforeseable future. Because the unforeseeable future is threat, and that puts us right back in the loop. Please don't misunderstand this as appeal to a more effective return to the liberal-deliberative model. This path has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired anytime soon, if ever. The circularity of the future cause at the heart of preemption as a positive and productive power, as a force of history in its own right, has seen to that. All signs indicate that political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing, as permanently and unrefusably as the spectrum of politics has moved onto a war footing. A logic of war has become the logic of politics. In the 19th century Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Now politics is the continuation of war by the same means. There is likely no going back. If resistance is possible, it must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace that has become the space of life. This means engaging the operative logic of preemption on its own terrains. This in turn means, in the most literal sense, a struggle for the future (perhaps through practices of slowness, against the preemptive addiction to rapid response?). It also means engaging it on the level of affect: reclaiming legitimation in a different affective key. Not the key of hope. Hope is more of a deferral of the present to the future than it is a way of bringing the future into the present according to a different operative logic. To hope is to look dreamy-eyed toward the future – cringingg with the halfacknowledged certainty that when the future comes, in this broken world, it will be enough to make you cry. The only way to keep up the spirit is to defer to the future again, eyes wet with hope all over again.
3,001
<h4><u>Deferral disad</u> – the perm relies on a politics of hope which beholds the possibility of security’s affective recuperation – refuse this politics in favor of one <u>governed by pause</h4><p><strong>Massumi ‘14</u> </strong>(Brian, professor in the Communication Department of the University of Montreal, “The Remains of the Day,” On Violence<u>, Vol 1 2013-14)</p><p></u>It is important to emphasize this: <u>the tendency I am diagnosing is self-operating. It operates independently of the personal qualities of those in power. As a person, I find Obama honorable and reasonable to a fault</u>. No one is more sincerely deliberative. No president in recent memory has shown such infinite patience for working out differences and reaching compromise. Rarely has the United States seen such dedication in a president to the civil sphere as the seat of deliberative representative democracy, to the point that he has even tried to play down that old standard, the politics of fear. <u>And yet … he has been swept up. His return to the deliberative reason of traditional liberal democratic process has been a tragi-comic failure</u>. Rarely has a president proven so painfully ineffectual. Rarely has the power of reason of State seemed so faint. <u>But the way in which <mark>Obama has</mark> at the same time <mark>made the exception to the rules the rule</mark>, in the name of national security – that definitely works. It's likely to prove indefinitely effective. It is likely to be Obama's most lasting "contribution". It is what makes the "everything has changed" of 9-11 just "more of the same." For the unforeseable future. <mark>Because the unforeseeable future is threat, </mark>and <mark>that puts us right back in the loop</mark>.</p><p>Please <mark>don't misunderstand this as appeal to </mark>a more effective return to <mark>the liberal-deliberative model. This</mark> path <mark>has been effectively short-circuited. The circuits are burned. They won't be rewired</u></mark> anytime soon, if <u>ever. The circularity of the future cause at the heart of preemption as a positive and productive power, as a force of history in its own right, has seen to that. All signs indicate that <mark>political legitimation has moved onto an affective footing</mark>, as <mark>permanently</mark> and unrefusably as the spectrum of politics has moved onto a war footing. A logic of <mark>war has become </mark>the logic of <mark>politics.</u></mark> In the 19th century Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Now politics is the continuation of war by the same means. <u>There is likely no going back</u>.<u><strong> </p><p></strong>If <mark>resistance</mark> is possible, it <mark>must engage in that full-spectrum battlespace</mark> that has become the space of life. <mark>This means engaging </mark>the operative logic of <mark>preemption on its own terrains.</mark> This in turn means, in the most literal sense, <mark>a struggle for the future</mark> (perhaps <mark>through practices of slowness</mark>,</u> <u>against the preemptive addiction to rapid response?). It also means engaging it on the level of affect: reclaiming legitimation in a different affective key.</p><p>Not the key of hope. <mark>Hope is</mark> more of <mark>a deferral</mark> of the present <mark>to the future</mark> than it is a way of bringing the future into the present according to a different operative logic. To hope is to look dreamy-eyed toward the future – cringingg with the halfacknowledged certainty that when the future comes, in this broken world, it will be enough to make you cry. The only way to keep up the spirit is to defer to the future again, eyes wet with hope all over again.</p></u>
2NC
Security
Perm
417,557
23
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,868
China threat discourse is a fantasy constructed upon a western-propagated differentiation which is profoundly racist and actualizes the threat
Turner 13
Turner 13—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]
Pan argues the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers. the PRC's capabilities appear threatening from understandings about the U S itself T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’ China ‘threats’ to the U St have always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements. American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence Campbell suggests dangers in the international realm are threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’ interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a U S defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’ when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. they have always existed as dangers to that identity a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity racial and ideological deemed most fundamental to its being representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such a Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western U S this discursive process of separating China from the U S has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies such crises were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U S was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the U S are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign. This is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth. this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved They assume the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded US China policy must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states. it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies. Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the U S it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China. the U S has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the U S have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the U S functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced
T]here is no “Chinese reality” that can speak for itself’ interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign through discourses of difference American discourses have made the US foreign from China nineteenth-century racial discourses separated China from a U S defined by Caucasian foundations Cold War discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the US. These discourses constitute a boundary ‘dangers’ from China have been perceived through the lens of American identity a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect American identity racial and ideological the capabilities and intentions are only part of the story. the processes by which China is made foreign are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy American discourses of China have never been produced objectively US China policy perpetuates discursive difference ‘threats’ from China have been fantasised, socially constructed products of discourse China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions they have framed the boundaries of political possibility
In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan argues that the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.15 Pan does not deny the importance of the PRC's capabilities but asserts that they appear threatening from understandings about the United States itself. ‘[T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself’, Pan argues. ‘[T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17¶ The analysis which follows demonstrates that China ‘threats’ to the United States have to some extent always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence.¶ The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible … is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21¶ Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States.¶ It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated.¶ As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.24¶ Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced.¶ US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then, US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the United States. As the case study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30¶ In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced.
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<h4>China threat discourse is a fantasy constructed upon a western-propagated differentiation which is profoundly racist and actualizes the threat</h4><p><u><strong>Turner 13</u></strong>—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]</p><p>In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin <u>Pan argues</u> that <u>the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.</u>15 Pan does not deny the importance of <u>the PRC's capabilities</u> but asserts that they <u>appear threatening from understandings about the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>itself</u>. ‘[<u><mark>T]here is no</mark> such thing as <mark>“Chinese reality” that can</mark> automatically <mark>speak for itself</u>’</mark>, Pan argues. ‘[<u>T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’</u>.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17¶ The analysis which follows demonstrates that <u>China ‘threats’ to the U</u>nited <u>St</u>ates <u>have</u> to some extent <u>always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse.</u> Michel <u>Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.</u>18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, <u>American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence</u>.¶ The article draws in part from the work of David <u>Campbell</u> who <u>suggests</u> that <u>dangers in the international realm are</u> invariably <u>threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible</u> … <u>is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’</u>19 As a result, <u><strong><mark>interpretations of global danger</strong> can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign</mark> from one another <mark>through discourses of</mark> separation and <mark>difference</u></mark>.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that <u>particular <mark>American discourses have</mark> historically <mark>made the US foreign from China</mark>.</u> Case study one for example demonstrates that <u><mark>nineteenth-century racial discourses</mark> of non-white immigrant Chinese <mark>separated China from a U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates largely <u><mark>defined by</mark> its presumed <mark>Caucasian foundations</mark>.</u> In case study two we see that <u><mark>Cold War</mark> ideological <mark>discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the</mark> democratic-capitalist <mark>US. These</mark> types of <mark>discourses</mark> are shown to have <strong><mark>constitute</mark>d <mark>a</mark> ‘specific sort of <mark>boundary</strong></mark> producing political performance’</u>.21¶ Across the history of Sino-US relations then <u>when <mark>‘dangers’ from China</mark> have emerged, they <mark>have</mark> always <mark>been perceived through the lens of American identity</mark>.</u> In consequence, <u>they have always existed as dangers to that identity</u>. In this analysis it is argued that <u><mark>a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to <strong>protect</mark> components of <mark>American identity</u></strong></mark> (primarily <u><strong><mark>racial and ideological</u></strong></mark>) <u>deemed most fundamental to its being</u>. As such, <u>representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity.</u> The case study analyses which follow reveal that <u>this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such a</u>s those within the administration of President Harry <u>Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.¶ It is demonstrated that, twice before, <u>this <strong>discursive process</strong> of separating China from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has <strong>resulted in a crisis of American identity</strong>. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies</u>.22 Case studies one and two expose how <u>such crises</u> have previously emerged. These moments <u>were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War.</u> Case study three shows that <u>while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated</u>.¶ As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then <u><mark>the capabilities and intentions </mark>of a ‘rising’ China <mark>are only part of the story.</mark> International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and <mark>the <strong>processes by which China is made foreign</strong></mark> from, and potentially dangerous to, the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>are <strong>inseparable from the enactment of US China policy</strong></mark>. This is because</u>, to reaffirm, <u><mark>American discourses of China have never been produced objectively</mark> or in the absence of purpose or intent.</u> <u>Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.</u>23 <u>This is</u> not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is <u>to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.</u>24¶ Accordingly, <u>this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved</u>.25 <u>They assume</u>, for instance, <u>the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure</u> that <u>particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded</u>.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced.¶ <u>US China policy</u>, however, <u>must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.</u>27 In fact, <u>it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.</u>28 <u>Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes</u>, then, <u><mark>US China policy</mark> itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. As the case study analyses show, <u>it <mark>perpetuates discursive difference</mark> through the rhetoric and actions</u> (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) <u>by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.</u>29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity</u>.30¶ In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, <u>throughout history <mark>‘threats’ from China</mark> towards the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They <mark>have</u></mark> in part <u><mark>been fantasised, socially constructed products of</mark> American <mark>discourse</mark>. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that <mark>China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions</u></mark>. Second, <u>representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, <mark>they have <strong>framed the boundaries of political possibility</strong></mark> so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded.</u> Third, <u>US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced</u>.</p>
1NC
null
FBI
16,088
54
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
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48,386
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Baylor EvZo
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Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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null
1,004
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,869
Their terrorism advantage is epistemologically suspect---the ballot is crucial to reject state-sponsored knowledge that legitimizes global violence
Raphael 9
Raphael 9
‘terrorism studies’ has emerged a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’ has operated by establishing research agendas this community has significant influence when it comes to the formulation of government policy in the U S terrorism studies has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power these scholars have fed their ‘knowledge’ straight into the policymaking process in the US The close relationship between academic terrorism studies and the US state means it is critically important to analyse the research output particularly because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts throughout the literature is a positivist assumption that the research is apolitical and objective There is no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars This reification of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process core experts insulate US policy from critique expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny Examining this research is important, given that the ‘threat’ has led the US to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security with profound consequences for human security of people in the region claims made by terrorism experts replicate official US government analyses. through a uncritical reliance on selective US government sources combined with frequent unsubstantiated assertion the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions counterterrorism’ campaigns often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence terrorism studies have produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems the research output can serve a particular ideological function for US foreign policy it has served the interests of US state power through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South
terrorism studies’ has significant influence scholars fed ‘knowledge’ into policymaking close relationship between terrorism studies and the state means it is important to analyse research because of the aura of objectivity by experts throughout is a positivist assumption that research is apolitical There is no reflexivity This reification of academic knowledge is reinforced by those in power experts insulate US policy from critique it becomes vital to subject terrorism studies to scrutiny this led the US to intervene throughout the South with profound consequences for human security terrorism experts replicate government analyses through uncritical reliance on government sources with frequent unsubstantiated assertion experts silence’ the way terrorism is used as a strategy through legitimising extensive coercive interventions
IR, Kingston University (Sam, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 49-51) ellipses in orig. Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of ‘terrorism studies’ has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‘security studies’ (Reid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of ‘terrorism’, as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenomenon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Horgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identify a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992: 2–3). That is, there exists a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’ who have ‘recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. This community, or ‘network of productive authors’, has operated by establishing research agendas, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid, 1993, 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terrorism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2¶ Further, this community has traditionally had significant influence when it comes to the formulation of government policy, particularly in the United States. It is not the case that the academic field of terrorism studies operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 180; Burnett and Whyte, 2005), it is a community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Government agencies (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989: 142–190; RAND, 2004). Likewise, a high proportion of ‘core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, these scholars have fed their ‘knowledge’ straight into the policymaking process in the US.3¶ The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explicitly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This reification of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region.¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is, ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19).¶ These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.
7,789
<h4>Their terrorism advantage is epistemologically suspect---the ballot is crucial to reject state-sponsored knowledge that legitimizes global violence </h4><p><u><strong>Raphael 9</p><p></u></strong>IR, Kingston University (Sam, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 49-51) ellipses in orig.</p><p>Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of <u>‘<mark>terrorism studies’</mark> has emerged</u> from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‘security studies’ (Reid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of ‘terrorism’, as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenomenon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Horgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identify a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992: 2–3). That is, there exists <u>a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’</u> who have ‘recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. This community, or ‘network of productive authors’, <u>has operated by establishing research agendas</u>, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid, 1993, 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terrorism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2¶ Further, <u>this community <mark>has</u></mark> traditionally had <u><strong><mark>significant influence</u></strong></mark> <u>when it comes to the formulation of government policy</u>, particularly <u>in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. It is not the case that the academic field of <u>terrorism studies</u> operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 180; Burnett and Whyte, 2005), it is a community which <u>has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power</u>, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Government agencies (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989: 142–190; RAND, 2004). Likewise, a high proportion of ‘core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, <u>these <mark>scholars</mark> have</u> <u><strong><mark>fed </mark>their <mark>‘knowledge’ </mark>straight <mark>into </mark>the <mark>policymaking </mark>process</u></strong> <u>in the US</u>.3¶ <u>The <mark>close relationship between</u></mark> the <u>academic</u> field of <u><mark>terrorism studies and the</mark> US <mark>state means</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>it is </mark>critically <mark>important to analyse</mark> the <mark>research</mark> output</u></strong> from key experts within the community. This is <u>particularly</u> the case <u><mark>because of</u> <u>the</u> <u><strong>aura of objectivity</u></strong> <u></mark>surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated <mark>by</mark> academic <mark>experts</u></mark>. Running <u><mark>throughout</mark> the</u> core <u>literature <mark>is a</u> <u><strong>positivist assumption</u></strong></mark>, explicitly stated or otherwise, <u><mark>that</mark> the <mark>research</u></mark> conducted <u><mark>is</u> <u><strong>apolitical </mark>and objective</u></strong> (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). <u><mark>There is</u></mark> little to <u><strong><mark>no reflexivity</u></strong></mark> <u>on behalf of the scholars</u>, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. <u><mark>This</u> <u><strong>reification of academic knowledge</u></strong></mark> <u>about terrorism <mark>is reinforced by those in</mark> positions of <mark>power</mark> in the US</u> who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ <u>The representation of terrorism expertise as</u> <u>‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’</u> and ‘facts’ <u>has significance for its</u> <u><strong>contribution to the policymaking process</u></strong> in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, <u>core <mark>experts</u></mark> tend to <u><strong><mark>insulate</u></strong></mark> the broad direction of <u><strong><mark>US policy from critique</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that <u>expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers</u> (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, <u><mark>it becomes</u> <u><strong>vital to subject</mark> the content of <mark>terrorism studies to </mark>close <mark>scrutiny</u></strong></mark>. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. <u>Examining <mark>this</u></mark> aspect of <u>research is important, given that</u> <u>the ‘threat’</u> from this form of terrorism <u>has</u> <u><strong><mark>led the US</u></strong></mark> and its allies <u><strong><mark>to intervene throughout the South</u></strong></mark> <u>on behalf of their national security</u>, <u><mark>with</u> <u><strong>profound consequences</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>for</u></mark> the <u><mark>human security</mark> of people in the region</u>.¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important <u>claims made by</u> key <u><mark>terrorism experts</u></mark> simply <u><strong><mark>replicate</mark> official US <mark>government analyses</strong></mark>.</u> This replication is facilitated primarily <u><mark>through</mark> a</u> sustained and <u><strong><mark>uncritical reliance on</mark> selective US <mark>government sources</u></strong></mark>, <u>combined <mark>with</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>frequent</u></strong></mark> use of <u><strong><mark>unsubstantiated assertion</u></strong></mark>. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, <u>the field tends to</u> <u><strong>insulate from critique</u></strong> <u>those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat</u>. In particular, the <u><strong><mark>experts</mark> overwhelmingly ‘<mark>silence’</u></strong> <u>the</u> <u><strong>way terrorism is</mark> itself often <mark>used as a</mark> central <mark>strategy </mark>within US-led counterterrorist interventions</u></strong> in the South. That is, ‘<u>counterterrorism’ campaigns</u> executed or supported by Washington <u>often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence</u> (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19).¶ These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in <u>terrorism studies have</u>, wittingly or otherwise, <u>produced a body of work</u> <u><strong>plagued by substantive problems</u></strong> which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, <u>the research output can</u> be seen to <u>serve a</u> very <u>particular ideological function for US foreign policy</u>. Across the past thirty years, <u>it has</u> largely <u>served the interests of US state power</u>, primarily <u><mark>through</u> <u><strong>legitimising</mark> an <mark>extensive</mark> set of <mark>coercive interventions</u></strong></mark> <u>in the global South</u> undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.</p>
2NC
K
Link – Terror
95,901
9
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
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Ev.....
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Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,870
Particularly this regime of ordering replicated itself in the realm of legality – the 9-0 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v Quill asserted a “legitimate state interest” in preserving life that judged any proposed “right to die” unconstitutional – this state-level codification had previously been witnessed in Cruzan v. Director when the Rehnquist Court claimed the state maintains “a profound interest in preserving human life” and was supported extra-judicially through the Congressional passage of the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act as well as the “Palm Sunday Compromise” bill, both of which attempted to at best control and at worst prohibit physician assisted suicide
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<h4>Particularly this regime of ordering replicated itself in the realm of legality – the 9-0 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v Quill asserted a “legitimate state interest” in preserving life that judged any proposed “right to die” unconstitutional – this state-level codification had previously been witnessed in Cruzan v. Director when the Rehnquist Court claimed the state maintains “a profound interest in preserving human life” and was supported extra-judicially through the Congressional passage of the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act as well as the “Palm Sunday Compromise” bill, both of which attempted to at best control and at worst prohibit physician assisted suicide</h4>
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430,024
1
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
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Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,871
Case turns and outweighs extinction – Bayatrizi 8 says survival based ethics foster violent regulation of life that shore up security as the major purpose of sovereignty, makes violence and global civil war inevitable - means we control the terminal uniqueness to any of their extinction claims.
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<h4><strong>Case turns and outweighs extinction – Bayatrizi 8 says survival based ethics foster violent regulation of life that shore up security as the major purpose of sovereignty, makes violence and global civil war inevitable - means we control the terminal uniqueness to any of their extinction claims.</h4></strong>
2AC
Case
AT: Extinction First
430,025
1
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
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Baylor
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2,014
cx
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740,872
Missile defense systems fail- tests prove only a 50% success rate
Nichols 13
Nichols 13 Tom Nichols. The War Room: Meanwhile, a missile defense test fails http://tomnichols.net/blog/2013/07/07/meanwhile-a-missile-defense-test-fails/ 07/07/13 [aw]
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency once again missed hitting its desired target during flight test of an interceptor missile he failure of the $214-million test involved a ground-based defense system, designed by Boeing to defend the U.S. from long-range ballistic missile attacks. The Missile Defense Agency now has a testing record of eight hits out of 16 intercept attempts with the “hit-to-kill” warheads. The last successful intercept occurred in December 2008. 16 attempts, 8 hits. “Washington will have to risk a U.S. city on a coin toss.” The even if were 80 or 90 percent effective, will have no impact on decision-making during a crisis, because the President and his advisors will have to assume that any failure rate means, in effect, that the system does not, for any practical purpose exist.”
The Pentagon’s Agency again missed hitting its desired target failure of the $214-million test involved a ground-based defense system, designed by Boeing The Missile Defense Agency now has a testing record of eight hits out of 16 attempts The last successful intercept occurred in 2008 Washington will have to risk a U.S. city on a coin toss even if were 90 percent effective the President will have to assume that any failure rate means, in effect, that the system does not, for any practical purpose exist.”
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency once again missed hitting its desired target during flight test of an interceptor missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base, northwest of Santa Barbara. The failure of the $214-million test Friday involved a ground-based defense system, designed by Boeing Co., to defend the U.S. from long-range ballistic missile attacks. The Missile Defense Agency now has a testing record of eight hits out of 16 intercept attempts with the “hit-to-kill” warheads. The last successful intercept occurred in December 2008. So, let’s review: 16 attempts, 8 hits. Even if you take the cosine of the Finagle Factor and re-enooberate with a Kludge Constant, you still get a rate of 50 percent against missiles in tests planned far in advance against launches whose characteristics are completely known. The optimist says: “A small country will have to risk a 50/50 failure with a launch against us.” The pessimist says: “Washington will have to risk a U.S. city on a coin toss.” The guy still in touch in political reality says: “No national leader thinks in any of these terms, and this system, even if were 80 or 90 percent effective, will have no impact on decision-making during a crisis, because the President and his advisors will have to assume that any failure rate means, in effect, that the system does not, for any practical purpose exist.”
1,367
<h4><u><strong>Missile defense systems fail- tests prove only a 50% success rate</h4><p>Nichols 13</p><p></u></strong>Tom Nichols. The War Room: Meanwhile, a missile defense test fails http://tomnichols.net/blog/2013/07/07/meanwhile-a-missile-defense-test-fails/<u><strong> 07/07/13 [aw]</p><p></strong><mark>The Pentagon’s</mark> Missile Defense <mark>Agency</mark> once <mark>again missed hitting its desired target</mark> during flight test of an interceptor missile</u> from Vandenberg Air Force Base, northwest of Santa Barbara. T<u>he <mark>failure of the $214-million test</u></mark> Friday <u><mark>involved a ground-based defense system, designed by Boeing</mark> </u>Co., <u>to defend the U.S. from long-range ballistic missile attacks. <mark>The Missile Defense Agency now has a testing record of eight hits out of 16</mark> intercept <mark>attempts</mark> with the “hit-to-kill” warheads. <mark>The last successful intercept occurred in</mark> December <mark>2008</mark>. </u>So, let’s review: <u>16 attempts, 8</u> <u>hits.</u> Even if you take the cosine of the Finagle Factor and re-enooberate with a Kludge Constant, you still get a rate of 50 percent against missiles in tests planned far in advance against launches whose characteristics are completely known. The optimist says: “A small country will have to risk a 50/50 failure with a launch against us.” The pessimist says: <u>“<mark>Washington will have to risk a U.S. city on a coin toss</mark>.” The</u> guy still in touch in political reality says: “No national leader thinks in any of these terms, and this system, <u><mark>even if were</mark> 80 or <mark>90 percent effective</mark>, will have no impact on decision-making during a crisis, because <mark>the President</mark> and his advisors <mark>will have to assume that any failure rate means, in effect, that the system does not, for any practical purpose exist.”</p></u></mark>
1NC
null
FBI
430,026
1
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
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Baylor
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We have the conclusion! Their predictions make serial policy failure inevitable
Kurasawa 4
Kurasawa 4 – Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf
transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Foremost among thepossible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing ofunwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutionsmay seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of realitybeyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopiascan operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendasor commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions Much more common, however, isthe opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmismand resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions(the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order.
doomsday scenarios. produce a culture of fear by stretching interpretations of reality dystopias operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay alarmism undermine a viable practice of farsightedness The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, producing a heteronomous social order
Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among thepossible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing ofunwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutionsmay seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of realitybeyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopiascan operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendasor commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more common, however, isthe opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmismand resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions(the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.
4,280
<h4>We have the conclusion! Their predictions make serial policy failure inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Kurasawa 4</u></strong> – Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf</p><p>Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that <u>transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future </u>(II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and <u>until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. </u>Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. <u>Foremost among thepossible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing ofunwarranted and unfounded <mark>doomsday scenarios. </mark>State and market institutionsmay seek to <mark>produce a culture of fear by</mark> deliberately <mark>stretching interpretations of reality</mark>beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive <mark>dystopias</mark>can <mark>operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas</mark>or commercial interests <mark>that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny</mark> and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’</u>; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; <u>the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis</u>; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. <u>Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions</u>. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 <u>Much more common, however, isthe opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it.<mark> This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay</mark>, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, <mark>alarmism</mark>and resignation would, if widely accepted, <mark>undermine a viable practice of farsightedness</mark>. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. <mark>The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions</mark>(the state, the market, techno-science) <mark>in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, </mark>thus effectively <mark>producing a heteronomous social order</mark>.</u> How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice. </p>
2NC
Edelman
A2: Kurasawa
16,056
71
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
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Creates a that drive for certainty causes endless global warfare
Burke, 7
Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)
the causes of war based on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities or interests are important but flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. ontological certainty takes the form of existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects their militaristic force embody and reinforce a norm of war and because they enact an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force . The epistemology of violence foreign policy doctrine claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order technique quickly passes into ontology First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined being implies action, the action that is war 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time
causes of war based on insecurities over a bedrock of reason they mobilise knowledge and power They are truth-systems which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained ontological certainty amounts to a drive for ideational hegemony that limits debate within the boundaries of a closed system of logic an epistemology of violence joined to an ontology of violence each quicken the resort to war and its escalation militaristic force reinforce a norm of war they enact an 'enframing' which humans are merely instruments for use and destruction foreign policy doctrine use force to achieve a desired end supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which admits no questioning. 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon being implies war
This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.
10,773
<h4>Creates a that drive for certainty causes endless global warfare</h4><p><u><strong>Burke, 7</u></strong> (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)</p><p>This essay develops a theory about <u>the <mark>causes of war</u></mark> -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses <u><mark>based</u></mark> either <u><mark>on</mark> a given sequence of events, threats, <mark>insecurities</u></mark> and political manipulation, <u>or</u> the play of institutional, economic or political<u> interests</u> (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors <u>are important</u> to be sure, and should not be discounted, <u>but</u> they <u>flow <mark>over a</mark> deeper <mark>bedrock of </mark>modern <mark>reason</u></mark> that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly <u><mark>they mobilise</mark> forms of <mark>knowledge and power</mark> together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale</u>. But they run deeper than that. <u><mark>They are truth-systems</mark> of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being <mark>which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained</mark> as it is.</u> I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for <u><mark>ontological certainty</u></mark> and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it <u>takes the form of</u> the <u>existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it <mark>amounts to</u></mark> a hard and exclusivist claim: <u><mark>a drive for ideational hegemony</mark> and closure <mark>that limits debate</mark> and questioning, that confines it <mark>within the boundaries of a</mark> particular, <mark>closed system of logic</u></mark>, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here <u>we are witness to <mark>an epistemology of violence</mark> (strategy) <mark>joined to an ontology of violence</mark> (the national security state</u>). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because <u><mark>each</mark> alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to <mark>quicken the resort to war and</mark> to lead to <mark>its escalation</mark> either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects</u>. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of <u>their <mark>militaristic force</u></mark> -- they <u>embody and <mark>reinforce a norm of war</u></mark> -- <u>and because <mark>they enact</u></mark> what Martin Heidegger calls <u><mark>an 'enframing' </mark>image of technology and being in <mark>which humans are merely</mark> utilitarian <mark>instruments for use</mark>, control <mark>and destruction</mark>, and force</u> -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action<u><strong>. </strong>The epistemology of violence</u> I describe here (strategic science and <u><mark>foreign policy doctrine</u></mark>) <u>claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which <mark>use force</mark> and coercion <mark>to achieve a desired end</mark>, an end that is <mark>supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order</u></mark>. However in practice, <u>technique quickly passes into ontology</u>. This it does in two ways. <u>First, instrumental <mark>violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which</mark> itself <mark>admits no questioning. </mark>The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation</u>. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, <u><mark>'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon</mark>, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined</u>. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, <u><mark>being implies</mark> action, the action that is <mark>war</u></mark>. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that <u>'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state</u>. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that <u>obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth</u>. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- <u>tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made</u> The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: <u>if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have</u>, as Heidegger suggests, <u>come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them?</u> Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. <u>The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time</u>, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.</p>
2NC
K
Link – Terror
74,766
131
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
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2,014
cx
college
2
740,875
Indeed, “[t]he exclusion of physician-assisted suicide…might be explained by looking on this death as an instance of worklessness. It adds nothing to the survival of the community. It has no utility, it does not defend the state or individual against attack. It is pure excess, a death which does not sublate into building community. This is the ultimate threat to the body politic.”
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<h4>Indeed, “[t]he exclusion of physician-assisted suicide…might be explained by looking on this death as an instance of worklessness. It adds nothing to the survival of the community. It has no utility, it does not defend the state or individual against attack. It is pure excess, a death which does not sublate into building community. This is the ultimate threat to the body politic.”</h4>
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430,027
1
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
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48,386
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18,750
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2,014
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college
2
740,876
Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end
Weizman 11
Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)
The theological origins of the lesser argument cast a long shadow on the present. the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by Ignatieff Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states Exceptions’ do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility
the lesser evil argument is invoked in ethics international relations the ‘war on terror’ and human rights evocation of the ‘good’ seems invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion Exceptions’ do not destroy the rule but save it State violence takes part in a necro-economy in which destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion in relation to the harm they purportedly prevent Lesser evil arguments defend assassinations killings demolitions, deportation, torture chemical weapons human shields, and targeting of civilians it is through lesser evil that societies maintain regimes of neo-colonization even according to an economy of losses and gains the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive measures are tolerated with the result that a greater evil may be reached
The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay The Order of Evils. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17
6,124
<h4>Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end</h4><p><strong>Weizman 11</strong> (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)</p><p><u>The theological origins of <mark>the lesser </u>evil<u> argument</mark> cast a long shadow on the present.</u> In fact <u>the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and <mark>is invoked in</mark> such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational <mark>ethics</mark> and <mark>international relations</mark>, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of <mark>the ‘war on terror’ and</mark> the efforts of <mark>human rights</mark> and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very <mark>evocation of the ‘good’</mark> <mark>seems</mark> to everywhere <mark>invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion</mark>.</u> If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. <u>In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by</u> former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael <u>Ignatieff</u>. In his book The Lesser Evil, <u>Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states</u>.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘<u><mark>Exceptions’</u></mark>, Ignatieff states, ‘<u><mark>do not destroy the rule but save it</mark>, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort</u>.’12 <u>The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. <mark>State violence</mark> in this model <mark>takes part in a necro-economy in which</mark> various types of <mark>destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion</mark>, not only <mark>in relation to</mark> the damage they produce, but to <mark>the harm they purportedly prevent</mark> and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm</u>. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 <u><mark>Lesser evil arguments</mark> are now used to <mark>defend</mark> anything from targeted <mark>assassinations</mark> and mercy <mark>killings</mark>, house <mark>demolitions, deportation, torture</u></mark>,15 <u>to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal <mark>chemical weapons</mark>, the use of <mark>human shields, and</mark> even ‘the intentional <mark>targeting of</mark> some <mark>civilians</mark> if it could save more innocent lives than they cost</u>.’16 <u>In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil.</u> Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, <u><mark>it is through</mark> this use of the <mark>lesser evil that societies</mark> that see themselves as democratic can <mark>maintain regimes of</mark> occupation and <mark>neo-colonization</u></mark>. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. <u>The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, <mark>even according to</mark> the terms of <mark>an economy of losses and gains</mark>, the conception of <mark>the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive</mark>: less brutal <mark>measures are</mark> also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and <mark>tolerated</mark> – and hence more frequently used, <mark>with the result that a greater evil may be reached</mark> cumulatively, </u>Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay The Order of Evils. In this book <u>Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility</u>.17</p>
2AC
Case
AT: Extinction First
11,341
85
16,993
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564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
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740,877
Heg doesn’t solve anything
Fettweis, 11
Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO
there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between U.S. activism and international stability the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true During the 90s the U S cut back on its defense spending . By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990 if trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict is plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U S military none took any action that would suggest such a belief No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending . If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should pose a problem the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending the rest of the world can operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
there is no evidence to support a relationship between U.S. activism and stability During the 90s the U S cut defense The verdict is plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U S cut its forces. No militaries enhanced no security dilemmas or arms races no regional balancing incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the U S cut its military peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. global policeman.
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
4,559
<h4>Heg doesn’t solve anything</h4><p><u><strong>Fettweis, 11</u></strong> <u>Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO</p><p></u>It is perhaps worth noting that <u><mark>there is <strong>no evidence</strong> to support a</mark> direct <mark>relationship between</u></mark> the relative level of <u><mark>U.S. activism and <strong></mark>international <mark>stability</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u>the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true</u>. <u><mark>During the</u></mark> 19<u><mark>90s</u></mark>, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>cut</u></mark> <u>back on its <mark>defense</mark> spending</u> fairly substantially<u>. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990</u>.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, <u>if</u> the pacific <u>trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but</u> <u>a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. <mark>The verdict</u></mark> from the past two decades <u><mark>is</u></mark> fairly <u><mark>plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U</u><strong></mark>nited <u></strong><mark>S</u><strong></mark>tates <u></strong><mark>cut its forces. </mark>No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>military</u>, or at least <u>none took any action that would suggest</u> <u>such a belief</u>. <u><strong><mark>No militaries</mark> were <mark>enhanced</strong></mark> to address power vacuums, <strong><mark>no security dilemmas</mark> drove insecurity <mark>or arms races</strong></mark>, and <strong><mark>no regional balancing </mark>occurred</strong> once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished</u>. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. <u>The <strong><mark>incidence and magnitude</mark> <mark>of global conflict declined</strong> while the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates <mark>cut its military</mark> spending</u> under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled<u>. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should</u> at least <u>pose a problem</u>. As it stands, <u>the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current <mark>peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S.</mark> military spending</u>. Evidently <u>the rest of the world can operate</u> quite <u>effectively without the presence of a <mark>global policeman.</mark> Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.</p></u>
1NC
null
Cartels
42,650
583
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,878
More evidence
Skyes 14
Skyes 14 (Alan O., Robert A. Kindler Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, "An Economic Perspective on As Such/Facial versus As Applied Challenges in the WTO and U.S. Constitutional Systems," Journal of Legal Analysis, March 5, Winter 2013 5 (2))
Suppose that in the event of harm to a potential claimant, the claimant will have a remedy that is fully and accurately compensatory, in the sense that it restores the welfare of the claimant such challenges are simply unnecessary and can easily prove counterproductive. An injured party’s remedies may prove inadequate for three types of reasons. First, the substantive law at issue may afford no remedy for inefficient harms. the incentive for injurers to take economically worthwhile precautions against accidental harm will be lost, even if the remedy for intentionally inflicted harms is fully compensatory. A second possible reason for inadequate remedies is legal error The third reason why remedies may prove inadequate is simply that they may fail to afford full and accurate compensation for harm suffered. With particular reference to the WTO and the U.S. serious concerns arise in this regard. Under WTO law, a violator incurs no formal sanction until a complaining member has brought a case, received a favorable adjudication, and the violator has exhausted a “reasonable period of time” The practical result is that a violator can break the rules for a period of years before any formal sanction is triggered, Commentators refer to this system as the “three-year free pass.” it may be doubted that the formal remedy for WTO violations after the expiration of the “reasonable period” can compensate complainants even for the prospective harm suffered due to the ongoing violation Small countries cannot use trade sanctions to improve their terms of trade, and complain that retaliatory measures amount to “shooting themselves in the foot.” In the U.S. Constitutional system, remedies are also limited in many cases. damages for past harm suffered may not be available at all, the remedy may be limited to an order directing the government to desist from the conduct in question going forward Measures to restore the status quo ante may as a practical matter prove infeasible.
Suppose that in the event of harm to a claimant, the claimant will have a remedy that is compensatory challenges are unnecessary and counterproductive the substantive law at issue may afford no remedy A second reason for inadequate remedies is legal error The third reason is that they may fail to afford accurate compensation With particular reference to the WTO and the U.S. serious concerns arise . Under WTO law, a violator incurs no formal sanction until a complaining member has brought a case and the violator has exhausted a “reasonable period of time it may be doubted that the formal remedy after the expiration of the “reasonable period can compensate complainants Small countries cannot use trade sanctions to improve their terms of trade, and complain that retaliatory measures amount to “shooting themselves in the foot.” In the U.S. system, remedies are limited damages for past harm suffered may not be available the remedy may be limited to an order
Suppose that in the event of (at least any inefficient) harm to a potential claimant, the claimant will have an as applied challenge and a remedy that is fully and accurately compensatory, in the sense that it restores the welfare of the claimant to its level before the occurrence of the harm. Assume further that no third parties are affected by the potential respondent’s conduct. Under these assumptions, as such challenges are simply unnecessary and can easily prove counterproductive. The potential complainant by assumption is insulated from harm, the respondent will internalize costs of inefficient harm to the complainant, and the respondent will be induced to act efficiently.48 If a claimant can bring an as such challenge nevertheless, it will simply impose unnecessary costs on the respondent, and a claimant may even pursue a challenge strategically to try and extract surplus. Putting aside third party externalities, these observations suggest that as such challenges are undesirable if claimants can bring successful as applied challenges following inefficient harm and receive full compensation (ignoring litigation cost complications for the moment). Conversely, inadequacy of the ex post remedy is a necessary condition for as such challenges to become desirable from an economic standpoint although, as shall be seen, it is by no means sufficient. An injured party’s remedies may prove inadequate for three types of reasons. First, the substantive law at issue may afford no remedy for inefficient harms. For example, imagine a system of tort law under which no injury is compensable unless it is intentionally inflicted. Under these circumstances, the incentive for injurers to take economically worthwhile precautions against accidental harm will be lost, even if the remedy for intentionally inflicted harms is fully compensatory. Although inefficiencies in the substantive law represent an important class of problems in many fields, they afford little basis for choosing between as such and as applied challenges. If the underlying substantive law fails to condemn inefficient behavior (or prevents efficient behavior), it seems unlikely that either type of challenge can promote efficiency. Accordingly, I will assume that the underlying substantive law is efficient, in the sense that it at least allows a claim for relief whenever the complainant suffers inefficient harm. A second possible reason for inadequate remedies is legal error in ex postadjudication. The complainant with a meritorious as applied challenge may be denied relief by mistake. I will not dwell on this possibility either, however, because it seems unlikely to afford a compelling case for as such challenges. Indeed, for reasons that are developed later, a pre-enforcement as such challenge may be more likely to result in error than a post-enforcement as applied challenge. The third reason why remedies may prove inadequate is simply that they may fail to afford full and accurate compensation for harm suffered. With particular reference to the WTO and the U.S. Constitutional systems, serious concerns arise in this regard. Under WTO law, a violator incurs no formal sanction until a complaining member has brought a case, received a favorable adjudication, and the violator has exhausted a “reasonable period of time” to bring its behavior into compliance.49 The practical result is that a violator can break the rules for a period of years before any formal sanction is triggered, and indeed can avoid any formal sanction completely by curing the violation within the “reasonable period.” Commentators sometimes refer to this system as the “three-year free pass.” In addition, it may be doubted that the formal remedy for WTO violations after the expiration of the “reasonable period”—trade sanctions imposed by the complainant—can compensate complainants even for the prospective harm suffered due to the ongoing violation.50 Small countries, for example, cannot use trade sanctions to improve their terms of trade, and often complain that retaliatory measures amount to “shooting themselves in the foot.” Larger countries with the ability to improve their terms of trade through sanctions may also be undercompensated for prospective harm because of the principle that trade sanctions must be “equivalent” to the harm caused by the violation, a vague standard administered in somewhat unclear fashion by WTO arbitrators. If the arbitrators allow only the level of retaliation that restores the complainant’s terms of trade, for example, then the complainant is undercompensated because of the decline in trade volume due to the violation.51 In the U.S. Constitutional system, remedies are also limited in many cases. Depending on the particular constitutional violation in question, damages for past harm suffered may not be available at all, and the remedy may be limited to an order directing the government to desist from the conduct in question going forward (such as an order declaring that the enforcement of a statute against the plaintiff was unconstitutional). Likewise, some violations may involve conduct that irreparably alters the future course of affairs, such as restrictions on speech or voting that affect the outcome of an election. Measures to restore the status quo ante may as a practical matter prove infeasible.
5,345
<h4><strong>More evidence </h4><p>Skyes 14 <u></strong>(Alan O., Robert A. Kindler Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, "An Economic Perspective on As Such/Facial versus As Applied Challenges in the WTO and U.S. Constitutional Systems," Journal of Legal Analysis, March 5, Winter 2013 5 (2))</p><p><mark>Suppose that in the event of</u></mark> (at least any inefficient) <u><mark>harm to a</mark> potential <mark>claimant, the claimant will have</u></mark> an as applied challenge and <u><mark>a remedy that is</mark> fully and accurately <mark>compensatory</mark>, in the sense that it restores the welfare of the claimant</u> to its level before the occurrence of the harm. Assume further that no third parties are affected by the potential respondent’s conduct. Under these assumptions, as <u>such <mark>challenges are</mark> simply <mark>unnecessary and</mark> can easily prove <mark>counterproductive</mark>. </u>The potential complainant by assumption is insulated from harm, the respondent will internalize costs of inefficient harm to the complainant, and the respondent will be induced to act efficiently.48 If a claimant can bring an as such challenge nevertheless, it will simply impose unnecessary costs on the respondent, and a claimant may even pursue a challenge strategically to try and extract surplus. Putting aside third party externalities, these observations suggest that as such challenges are undesirable if claimants can bring successful as applied challenges following inefficient harm and receive full compensation (ignoring litigation cost complications for the moment). Conversely, inadequacy of the ex post remedy is a necessary condition for as such challenges to become desirable from an economic standpoint although, as shall be seen, it is by no means sufficient. <u>An injured party’s remedies may prove inadequate for three types of reasons. First, <mark>the substantive law at issue may afford no remedy</mark> for inefficient harms. </u>For example, imagine a system of tort law under which no injury is compensable unless it is intentionally inflicted. Under these circumstances, <u>the incentive for injurers to take economically worthwhile precautions against accidental harm will be lost, even if the remedy for intentionally inflicted harms is fully compensatory.</u> Although inefficiencies in the substantive law represent an important class of problems in many fields, they afford little basis for choosing between as such and as applied challenges. If the underlying substantive law fails to condemn inefficient behavior (or prevents efficient behavior), it seems unlikely that either type of challenge can promote efficiency. Accordingly, I will assume that the underlying substantive law is efficient, in the sense that it at least allows a claim for relief whenever the complainant suffers inefficient harm. <u><mark>A second</mark> possible <mark>reason for inadequate remedies is legal error</mark> </u>in ex postadjudication. The complainant with a meritorious as applied challenge may be denied relief by mistake. I will not dwell on this possibility either, however, because it seems unlikely to afford a compelling case for as such challenges. Indeed, for reasons that are developed later, a pre-enforcement as such challenge may be more likely to result in error than a post-enforcement as applied challenge. <u><mark>The third reason</mark> why remedies may prove inadequate <mark>is</mark> simply <mark>that they may fail to afford</mark> full and <mark>accurate compensation</mark> for harm suffered.</u> <u><mark>With particular reference to the WTO and the U.S.</u></mark> Constitutional systems, <u><mark>serious concerns arise</mark> in this regard<mark>. Under WTO law, a violator incurs no formal sanction until a complaining member has brought a case</mark>, received a favorable adjudication, <mark>and the violator has exhausted a “reasonable period of time</mark>”</u> to bring its behavior into compliance.49 <u>The practical result is that a violator can break the rules for a period of years before any formal sanction is triggered,</u> and indeed can avoid any formal sanction completely by curing the violation within the “reasonable period.” <u>Commentators</u> sometimes <u>refer to this system as the “three-year free pass.”</u> In addition, <u><mark>it may be doubted that the formal remedy</mark> for WTO violations <mark>after the expiration of the “reasonable period</mark>”</u>—trade sanctions imposed by the complainant—<u><mark>can compensate complainants</mark> even for the prospective harm suffered due to the ongoing violation</u>.50 <u><mark>Small countries</u></mark>, for example, <u><mark>cannot use trade sanctions to improve their terms of trade, and</u></mark> often <u><mark>complain that retaliatory measures amount to “shooting themselves in the foot.”</mark> </u>Larger countries with the ability to improve their terms of trade through sanctions may also be undercompensated for prospective harm because of the principle that trade sanctions must be “equivalent” to the harm caused by the violation, a vague standard administered in somewhat unclear fashion by WTO arbitrators. If the arbitrators allow only the level of retaliation that restores the complainant’s terms of trade, for example, then the complainant is undercompensated because of the decline in trade volume due to the violation.51 <u><mark>In the U.S.</mark> Constitutional <mark>system, remedies are</mark> also <mark>limited</mark> in many cases.</u> Depending on the particular constitutional violation in question, <u><mark>damages for past harm suffered may not be available</mark> at all,</u> and <u><mark>the remedy may be limited to an order</mark> directing the government to desist from the conduct in question going forward </u>(such as an order declaring that the enforcement of a statute against the plaintiff was unconstitutional). Likewise, some violations may involve conduct that irreparably alters the future course of affairs, such as restrictions on speech or voting that affect the outcome of an election. <u>Measures to restore the status quo ante may as a practical matter prove infeasible.</p></u>
1NR
China
Compliance doesn’t solve
220,882
9
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,879
Problematizing the construction of hegemonic narconarratives is capable of crafting a world contra cartel violence
Zavala 14
Zavala 14 (Oswaldo, Associate Professor of contemporary Latin American literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and at the College of Staten Island, “Imagining the U.S.-Mexico Drug War: The Critical Limits of Narconarratives” Comparative Literature 66:3, p. 357)
As the drug business expands ubiquitously, corroding all dimensions of the social tissue of both Mexico and the U.S., it is understandable that narconarratives analogously struggle to provide sometimes desperate explanations of the situation accounts present a country that is being taken over by dark ahistorical forces that can only be expressed in mythic and archetypical terms: spontaneous, exotic, senseless, and random violence; unstoppable corruption; the inevitable triumph of evil With their romantic focus on death as an ontological destiny and their emphasis on an imagined narcocultura that makes victims of the official institutions of justice, most narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy that the Mexican state relies upon in order to legitimize its actions in the drug war most of the narconarratives written during the last decade in Mexico reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through the articulation of deliberately political counternarratives can light be shed on drug trafficking as one of the many dimensions of official power in both countries. critical narconarratives must abandon the exhausted myths of drug lords and their fantastic kingdoms and stop objectifying drug trafficking as a problem external to official power in Mexico and the U.S. and instead propose a careful historical revision of its place inside that power: drug trafficking as power itself.
narconarratives present a country taken over by dark ahistorical forces expressed in mythic and archetypical terms spontaneous, exotic, senseless violence; corruption; the triumph of evil. With their focus on death as an ontological destiny narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy to legitimize the drug war narconarratives reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through deliberately political counternarratives can light be shed on drug trafficking critical narconarratives must abandon myths of drug lords and their kingdoms and instead propose a careful historical revision of its place inside that power
In Julio Cortázar’s celebrated short story “Casa tomada” (“House Taken Over”), two siblings are gradually expelled from their home as invisible forces take over each room. Since the nature of these forces is never accounted for, the text invites virtually endless explanations and interpretations of their exile. As the drug business expands ubiquitously, corroding all dimensions of the social tissue of both Mexico and the U.S., it is understandable that narconarratives analogously struggle to provide sometimes desperate explanations of the situation. Thus, such accounts present a country that is being taken over by dark ahistorical forces that can only be expressed in mythic and archetypical terms: spontaneous, exotic, senseless, and random violence; unstoppable corruption; the inevitable triumph of evil. With their romantic focus on death as an ontological destiny and their emphasis on an imagined narcocultura that makes victims of the official institutions of justice, most narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy that the Mexican state relies upon in order to legitimize its actions in the drug war. In short, most of the narconarratives written during the last decade in Mexico reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through the articulation of deliberately political counternarratives can light be shed on drug trafficking as one of the many dimensions of official power in both countries. To achieve this, critical narconarratives must abandon the exhausted myths of drug lords and their fantastic kingdoms and stop objectifying drug trafficking as a problem external to official power in Mexico and the U.S. and instead propose a careful historical revision of its place inside that power: drug trafficking as power itself.
1,779
<h4>Problematizing the construction of hegemonic narconarratives is capable of crafting a world contra cartel violence</h4><p><u><strong>Zavala 14</u></strong> (Oswaldo, Associate Professor of contemporary Latin American literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and at the College of Staten Island, “Imagining the U.S.-Mexico Drug War: The Critical Limits of Narconarratives<u>” Comparative Literature 66:3, p. 357) </p><p></u>In Julio Cortázar’s celebrated short story “Casa tomada” (“House Taken Over”), two siblings are gradually expelled from their home as invisible forces take over each room. Since the nature of these forces is never accounted for, the text invites virtually endless explanations and interpretations of their exile. <u>As the drug business expands ubiquitously, corroding all dimensions of the social tissue of both Mexico and the U.S., it is understandable that <mark>narconarratives</mark> analogously struggle to provide sometimes desperate explanations of the situation</u>. Thus, such <u>accounts <mark>present a country</mark> that is being <strong><mark>taken over by dark ahistorical forces</strong></mark> that can only be <mark>expressed in mythic and archetypical terms</mark>: <strong><mark>spontaneous, exotic, senseless</mark>, and random <mark>violence; </mark>unstoppable <mark>corruption; the </mark>inevitable <mark>triumph of evil</u></strong>. <u>With their</mark> romantic <mark>focus on death as an ontological destiny</mark> and their emphasis on an imagined narcocultura that makes victims of the official institutions of justice, most <strong><mark>narconarratives propagate an illusory enemy</strong></mark> that the Mexican state relies upon in order <mark>to legitimize</mark> its actions in <mark>the drug war</u></mark>. In short, <u>most of the <mark>narconarratives</mark> written during the last decade in Mexico <mark>reify the simulacrum of truth constructed by official propaganda. Only through</mark> the articulation of <strong><mark>deliberately political counternarratives</strong> can light be shed on drug trafficking</mark> as one of the many dimensions of official power in both countries.</u> To achieve this, <u><mark>critical narconarratives must <strong>abandon</mark> the exhausted <mark>myths of drug lords and their</mark> fantastic <mark>kingdoms</strong></mark> and stop objectifying drug trafficking as a problem external to official power in Mexico and the U.S. <mark>and instead propose a <strong>careful historical revision of its place inside that power</strong></mark>: drug trafficking as power itself.</p></u>
2NC
K
Alt
429,902
2
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,880
The exclusion of unruly death, in no way, gestures toward a pacifist society devoid of war or conflict – quite the contrary, “although bio-power seeks domination over life, it has not in fact turned away from death” – sovereign protection over life is not passively defensive but rather an active process of expulsion and destruction of anything deemed dangerous or unproductive to the social order which culminates in mass genocide and annihilation – Zohreh Bayatrizi explains that
SJE
Zohreh Bayatrizi, professor of Social Theory at the University of Alberta, Ph.D from University of British Columbia, Life Sentences: The Modern Ordering of Mortality, modified SJE
The drive to protect life against the threat of disorderly death has significance not only within national borders but also internationally. In practice, however, the principle of the sanctity of life has been upheld in a morally inconsistent manner the moral commitment to the value of life has always been qualified and conditional: it has meant respect for the life of some but not all people By waging wars and colonial campaigns or by presiding over a system of distribution of wealth in the world that leaves many to die from hunger, the ‘civilized,’ life-respecting countries of the West have, arguably, imposed more death on one another or on the rest of the world than any of the vilest empires that history can remember. The pilot who drops bombs from a safe distance is a national hero, the terrorist who blows [themselves] up is a coward, the child dying from hunger is a non-person, and Terri Schiavo is a cause célèbre for a morally confused culture of respect for life this moral inconsistency is integral to the dynamics of the Western culture of life and death. Foucault has argued that racism and violence on a mass scale is inscribed in Western political order: the Holocaust, as well as the looming possibility of a nuclear war during the Cold War, both stemmed, ironically, from the modern Western political imperative to take charge of life and how it is lived. Wars are no longer waged to defend the sovereign, but rather, they are undertaken ‘on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity massacres have become vital’ , ‘the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence’ Agamben explain this ironic contradiction in terms of the creation of categories of living non-citizens (within national borders as well as on a global scale) and their subsequent exclusion from participation in the politicolegal realm. Invoking the homo sacer who falls outside of legal and political protections and thus can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed Agamben argues that sovereignty ancient or modern, is characterized by the exceptional right to define and exclude homo sacer or bare life from the politicolegal realm Balibar has argued that under modern capitalist political-economic conditions, the whole world is divided into life zones and death zones, the former occupied by affluent countries, while the latter host millions of the world’s inhabitants who are subjected to various forms of extreme violence, being subject to hunger, war, and genocide the existence of such zones is beneficial for the workings of Western capitalism, as they leave millions of people too concerned with the naked question of survival to democratically participate in securing their political and economic rights against global powers.
The drive to protect life against disorderly¶ death has significance internationally the¶ moral commitment to life has always been qualified and¶ conditional: respect for the life of some but not all people By waging wars and¶ colonial campaigns the life-respecting countries of the West have imposed¶ more death on the rest of the world than any of the¶ vilest empires The pilot who drops bombs from a safe distance is a national hero, the terrorist who blows [themselves] up is a coward Foucault has argued¶ that racism and violence on a mass scale is inscribed in Western political order the Holocaust,¶ as well as the possibility of nuclear war during the Cold¶ War, both stemmed from the modern Western political¶ imperative to take charge of life Wars are no longer¶ waged to defend the sovereign, but rather, they are undertaken ‘on¶ behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized¶ for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity massacres have become vital’ ‘the power to expose a whole population to death is¶ the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued¶ existence’ the creation of non-citizens and their subsequent¶ exclusion from the politicolegal realm the homo sacer falls outside of legal and¶ political protections and thus can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed under modern capitalist political-economic¶ conditions, the whole world is divided into life zones and death zones,¶ the latter host millions of the world’s inhabitants who are subjected to various forms of extreme violence
The drive to protect life against the threat of anarchic and disorderly¶ death has significance not only within national borders but also internationally. The United Nations measures ‘human development,’ in¶ part, in terms of longevity, health, and infant mortality, and, as a con¶ sequence, international aid is often targeted to address high mortality¶ rates in poor countries. Moreover, provisions are made within international laws and conventions to protect all citizens of the world against¶ genocide, war crimes, and arbitrary killings.¶ In practice, however, the principle of the sanctity of life has been¶ upheld in a morally inconsistent manner. Beginning with Hobbes, the¶ moral commitment to the value of life has always been qualified and¶ conditional: it has meant respect for the life of some but not all people.¶ Hobbes himself argues that the prohibition against war only applies to¶ civil wars — wars of ‘us’ against ‘us’ — and not wars aimed at the domination of ‘other’ peoples by ‘us’ (Leviathan, xx). By waging wars and¶ colonial campaigns or by presiding over a system of distribution of¶ wealth in the world that leaves many to die from hunger, the ‘civilized,’ life-respecting countries of the West have, arguably, imposed¶ more death on one another or on the rest of the world than any of the¶ vilest empires that history can remember. The case of Terri Schiavo,¶ which I first discussed in the introductory chapter of this book, is ¶ instructive. In the spring of 2005, when this conclusion was originally¶ being drawn up, a genocidal campaign was being waged in Sudan,¶ many civilians were struggling with the ‘collateral damage’ of the war¶ on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thousands of people in the¶ world’s poorest countries were dying prematurely from easily preventable causes. As all this was unfolding, the United States came to¶ grips with a moral crisis over the question whether it was right or¶ wrong to let one person, Terri Schiavo, die after being in a persistent¶ vegetative state for years. The pilot who drops bombs from a safe distance is a national hero, the terrorist who blows himself [themselves] up is a coward,¶ the child dying from hunger is a non-person, and Terri Schiavo is a¶ cause célèbre for a morally confused culture of respect for life.¶ The writings of Foucault (1990, 2003), Agamben (1998, 2005), and¶ Bauman (1992, 1998), as well as those of postcolonial writers such as ¶ Balibar (2001), suggest that this moral inconsistency is integral to the¶ dynamics of the Western culture of life and death. Foucault has argued¶ that racism and violence on a mass scale is inscribed in Western political order: ‘For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a¶ living being with the additional capacity for political existence;¶ modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living¶ being into question’ (1990: 143). According to this view, the Holocaust,¶ as well as the looming possibility of a nuclear war during the Cold¶ War, both stemmed, ironically, from the modern Western political¶ imperative to take charge of life and how it is lived. Wars are no longer¶ waged to defend the sovereign, but rather, they are undertaken ‘on¶ behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized¶ for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity:¶ massacres have become vital’ (ibid.: 137). Similarly, today the ‘naked¶ question of survival’ (ibid.) is reinvoked to justify the actions of those¶ who endanger the lives of thousands of civilians around the world in¶ the name of a pre-emptive ‘war on terror,’ undertaken to protect their¶ own citizens and civilization from the mere potential of terrorist,¶ nuclear, and biological attacks at some uncertain point in the future. In¶ all of these cases, ‘the power to expose a whole population to death is¶ the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued¶ existence’ (ibid.).¶ Giorgio Agamben and Etienne Balibar explain this ironic contradiction in terms of the creation of categories of living non-citizens (within¶ national borders as well as on a global scale) and their subsequent¶ exclusion from participation in the politicolegal realm. Invoking the¶ ancient figure of homo sacer — the person who falls outside of legal and¶ political protections and thus can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed — Agamben argues that sovereignty ancient or modern, is characterized by the exceptional right to define and exclude homo sacer or¶ bare life from the politicolegal realm: ‘What is at stake is, once again,¶ the definition of a life that may be killed without the commission of¶ homicide’ (1998: 165). Agamben describes the Nazi concentration¶ camps, as well as contemporary refugee camps in the heart of Europe¶ and elsewhere, as zones of exception, which function to exclude¶ certain categories of people from the legal protections afforded ordinary citizens who are integrated in the political community (ibid.: 147).¶ Balibar has argued that under modern capitalist political-economic¶ conditions, the whole world is divided into life zones and death zones,¶ the former occupied by the citizens of affluent, stable, and mostly ¶ Western countries, while the latter host millions of the world’s inhabitants who are subjected to various forms of extreme violence, including primarily, the lack of access to political participation, as well as¶ being subject to hunger, war, and genocide. For Balibar (2001: 10),¶ although it is not always clear whether the life zones are responsible¶ for the creation of the death zones, what is less in doubt is that the existence of such zones is beneficial for the workings of Western capitalism, as they leave millions of people too concerned with the naked¶ question of survival to democratically participate in securing their¶ political and economic rights against global powers.
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<h4>The exclusion of unruly death, in no way, gestures toward a pacifist society devoid of war or conflict – quite the contrary, “although bio-power seeks domination over life, it has not in fact turned away from death” – sovereign protection over life is not passively defensive but rather an active process of expulsion and destruction of anything deemed dangerous or unproductive to the social order which culminates in mass genocide and annihilation – Zohreh Bayatrizi explains that</h4><p>Zohreh Bayatrizi, professor of Social Theory at the University of Alberta, Ph.D from University of British Columbia, Life Sentences: The Modern Ordering of Mortality, modified <u><strong>SJE</p><p></strong><mark>The drive to protect life against </mark>the threat of</u> anarchic and <u><mark>disorderly</u>¶<u> death has significance</mark> not only within national borders but also <mark>internationally</mark>. </u>The United Nations measures ‘human development,’ in¶ part, in terms of longevity, health, and infant mortality, and, as a con¶ sequence, international aid is often targeted to address high mortality¶ rates in poor countries. Moreover, provisions are made within international laws and conventions to protect all citizens of the world against¶ genocide, war crimes, and arbitrary killings.¶ <u>In practice, however, the principle of the sanctity of life has been</u>¶<u> upheld in a morally inconsistent manner</u>. Beginning with Hobbes, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong>¶<u><strong> moral commitment to </mark>the value of <mark>life has always been qualified and</u></strong>¶<u><strong> conditional:</mark> it has meant <mark>respect for the life of some but not all people</u></strong></mark>.¶ Hobbes himself argues that the prohibition against war only applies to¶ civil wars — wars of ‘us’ against ‘us’ — and not wars aimed at the domination of ‘other’ peoples by ‘us’ (Leviathan, xx). <u><mark>By waging wars and</u>¶<u> colonial campaigns </mark>or by presiding over a system of distribution of</u>¶<u> wealth in the world that leaves many to die from hunger, <mark>the</mark> ‘civilized,’ <mark>life-respecting countries of the West have</mark>, arguably, <mark>imposed</u>¶<u> more death on</mark> one another or on <mark>the rest of the world than any of the</u>¶<u> vilest empires</mark> that history can remember. </u>The case of Terri Schiavo,¶ which I first discussed in the introductory chapter of this book, is ¶ instructive. In the spring of 2005, when this conclusion was originally¶ being drawn up, a genocidal campaign was being waged in Sudan,¶ many civilians were struggling with the ‘collateral damage’ of the war¶ on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thousands of people in the¶ world’s poorest countries were dying prematurely from easily preventable causes. As all this was unfolding, the United States came to¶ grips with a moral crisis over the question whether it was right or¶ wrong to let one person, Terri Schiavo, die after being in a persistent¶ vegetative state for years. <u><mark>The pilot who drops bombs from a safe distance is a national hero, the terrorist who blows </u></mark>himself<u><mark> [themselves] up is a coward</mark>,</u>¶<u> the child dying from hunger is a non-person, and Terri Schiavo is a</u>¶<u> cause célèbre for a morally confused culture of respect for life</u>.¶ The writings of Foucault (1990, 2003), Agamben (1998, 2005), and¶ Bauman (1992, 1998), as well as those of postcolonial writers such as ¶ Balibar (2001), suggest that <u>this moral inconsistency is integral to the</u>¶<u> dynamics of the Western culture of life and death. <mark>Foucault has argued</u>¶<u> that racism and violence on a mass scale is inscribed in Western political order</mark>:</u> ‘For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a¶ living being with the additional capacity for political existence;¶ modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living¶ being into question’ (1990: 143). According to this view, <u><mark>the Holocaust,</u>¶<u> as well as the </mark>looming <mark>possibility of</mark> a <mark>nuclear war during the Cold</u>¶<u> War, both stemmed</mark>, ironically, <mark>from the modern Western political</u>¶<u> imperative to take charge of life</mark> and how it is lived. <mark>Wars are no longer</u>¶<u> waged to defend the sovereign, but rather, they are undertaken ‘on</u>¶<u> behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized</u>¶<u> for the purpose of <strong>wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity</u></strong></mark>:¶ <u><strong><mark>massacres have become vital’</u></strong></mark> (ibid.: 137). Similarly, today the ‘naked¶ question of survival’ (ibid.) is reinvoked to justify the actions of those¶ who endanger the lives of thousands of civilians around the world in¶ the name of a pre-emptive ‘war on terror,’ undertaken to protect their¶ own citizens and civilization from the mere potential of terrorist,¶ nuclear, and biological attacks at some uncertain point in the future. In¶ all of these cases<u><strong>, <mark>‘the power to expose a whole population to death is</u></strong>¶<u><strong> the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued</u></strong>¶<u><strong> existence’</u></strong></mark> (ibid.).¶ Giorgio <u>Agamben</u> and Etienne Balibar <u>explain this ironic contradiction in terms of <mark>the creation of</mark> categories of living <mark>non-citizens</mark> (within</u>¶<u> national borders as well as on a global scale) <mark>and their subsequent</u>¶<u> exclusion from </mark>participation in <mark>the politicolegal realm</mark>. Invoking <mark>the</u></mark>¶ ancient figure of <u><mark>homo sacer</u></mark> — the person <u>who <mark>falls outside of legal and</u>¶<u> political protections and thus can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed</u></mark> — <u>Agamben argues that sovereignty ancient or modern, is characterized by the exceptional right to define and exclude homo sacer or</u>¶<u> bare life from the politicolegal realm</u>: ‘What is at stake is, once again,¶ the definition of a life that may be killed without the commission of¶ homicide’ (1998: 165). Agamben describes the Nazi concentration¶ camps, as well as contemporary refugee camps in the heart of Europe¶ and elsewhere, as zones of exception, which function to exclude¶ certain categories of people from the legal protections afforded ordinary citizens who are integrated in the political community (ibid.: 147).¶ <u>Balibar has argued that <mark>under modern capitalist political-economic</u>¶<u> conditions, the whole world is divided into life zones and death zones,</u>¶<u></mark> the former occupied by</u> the citizens of <u>affluent</u>, stable, and mostly ¶ Western <u>countries, while <mark>the latter host millions of the world’s inhabitants who are subjected to various forms of extreme violence</mark>,</u> including primarily, the lack of access to political participation, as well as¶ <u>being subject to hunger, war, and genocide</u>. For Balibar (2001: 10),¶ although it is not always clear whether the life zones are responsible¶ for the creation of the death zones, what is less in doubt is that <u>the existence of such zones is beneficial for the workings of Western capitalism, as they leave millions of people too concerned with the naked</u>¶<u> question of survival to democratically participate in securing their</u>¶<u> political and economic rights against global powers.</p></u>
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Sovereignty is autoimmune - accepting the pure excess of physician-assisted suicide creates fissures within it that allows for deconstruction
Hardes 13
Hardes 13 (Jennifer J. Hardes, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, “Fear, Sovereignty, and the Right to Die” January 16, 2013, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/3/1/66/htm, KB)
In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how sovereignty appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself. It necessarily posits a universal essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate its allegedly “benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves to divide us from one another, which ensures we are not a threat to the state sovereign. sovereignty appeals to other universals such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.” These are “necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and preclude the need for a “decision” that is overtly “forceful.” Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent foundations to slip by. when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order. sovereignty is entirely deconstructable right-to-die cases provide some insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility. when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself it must “exceed” itself. This excess can create openings this excess might be “autoimmune” Autoimmunity might be read as the idea that sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own potential and its own demise. sovereignty might sometimes make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this very closure. Two examples seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death First, the construction of the individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. Liberal categories such as rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law However, in granting this self-protection, liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection, where “protection” might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second , the autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving both conditionally and unconditionally Liberty an “absolute” that conditions and makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty. liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty, should not be thought only as a universal category that protects us and renders us under a sovereign order to be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly rather than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, we might think of how we can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.” autoimmunity can create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the autos or the self-sameness—the absolute sovereign. one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond this essential link to fear and murder. This democracy to come might help us think autoimmunity as the changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the closures sovereignty necessarily demands. Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.
sovereignty posits its “benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves to divide us which ensures we are not a threat sovereignty is entirely deconstructable right-to-die cases provide insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself it must “exceed” itself. This excess can create openings sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own demise. sovereignty might make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this closure. Liberal categories such as rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law in granting this self-protection, liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection autoimmunity can create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the the absolute sovereign. Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.
6. Conclusion: Excessive Sovereigns If sovereignty is found to be groundless, it is also excessive according to Derrida. This discussion of the performance of sovereign indivisibility illustrates the necessary relation between sovereignty and unconditionality. In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how sovereignty appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself. It necessarily posits a universal essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate its allegedly “benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves, as I have argued, to continue to divide us from one another, which ensures we are not a threat to the state sovereign. In addition, sovereignty appeals to other universals such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.” These are “necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and therefore preclude the need for a “decision” that is overtly “forceful.” Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent—indeed “rogue”—foundations to slip by. Furthermore, when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order. This goes some way to explain why right-to-die cases have failed on appeal in UK law to date. All is not lost, however. As Derrida posits, sovereignty is entirely deconstructable, and, as this paper has explored, right-to-die cases provide some insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility. Arguably, when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself, which it inevitably must—as indicated by those universals expressed above—it must also “exceed” itself. This excess may be violent and destructive, yet can also create openings. Therefore, this excess might be thought as “autoimmune” [19]. Autoimmunity might be read as the idea that sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own potential and also its own demise. Thus, sovereignty might sometimes make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this very closure. Two examples seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death. First, the construction of the individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. Liberal categories such as personhood, property, and rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law (which is not universally a “bad” thing because, not only can immunization in many instances be useful, but quite often legal protection is desirable). However, in granting this self-protection, liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection, where “protection” might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second, on a broader scale, the autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving thought both conditionally and unconditionally. Liberty, like other unconditionals such as hospitality and gift-giving, is an “absolute” that conditions and thereby makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty. This materialization is only a performance as such, since liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty, therefore, should not be thought only as a universal category that protects us from the other and renders us under a sovereign order to be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly—more responsibly. In this case, rather than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, we might think of how we can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.” In short, autoimmunity can be violent and destructive, as much as it can also create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the autos or the self-sameness—the absolute sovereign. Derrida presents autoimmunity as a movement or iteration that might be better thought as a broad instance of historical patterns of shifting ways of becoming. For example, autoimmunity in this regard is understood as iterations of change, as modes of closure and openness. Like the potential creativity in destruction, autoimmunity presents opportunities for openness in such violent attempts at closure (e.g., closure of the “immunized individual” or closure in terms of the “sovereign decision”). As indicated, one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond this essential link to fear and murder. Could we consider the right to die a compassionate gift, or a gift of death? As I close this paper, I want to also create an opening of sorts by gesturing to where Derrida takes us in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign. In the eighth session, Derrida speaks of Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence being “a correlate of the power of the as such.” Moreover, transcendence, Derrida writes, is “shared in Mitsein, in the common opening to beings” ([20], p. 227). In these reflections on Heidegger, Derrida, it seems, identifies something worth retaining. This value appears to lie in the possibility of the relation between transcendence and the as such, between the unconditional being-with, and the being-in-solitude, or conditional sovereignty. In our musings over liberty, the impossible possibility of sovereignty, and the capacity to exceed and to be more open, could we imagine a variation of the Heidegerrian Mitsein-to-come? A Derridean openness to otherness? As Derrida writes, sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the process of autoimmunising itself, of betraying itself by betraying the democracy that nonetheless can never do without it ([12], p. 101). This democracy to come, the possibility of being-with, might help us think autoimmunity as the changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the closures sovereignty necessarily demands. Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.
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<h4>Sovereignty is autoimmune - accepting the pure excess of physician-assisted suicide creates fissures within it<strong> that allows for deconstruction</h4><p>Hardes 13</p><p></strong>(Jennifer J. Hardes, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, “Fear, Sovereignty, and the Right to Die” January 16, 2013, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/3/1/66/htm<u><strong>, KB)</p><p></u></strong>6. Conclusion: Excessive Sovereigns If sovereignty is found to be groundless, it is also excessive according to Derrida. This discussion of the performance of sovereign indivisibility illustrates the necessary relation between sovereignty and unconditionality. <u><strong>In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how <mark>sovereignty</mark> appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself.</u></strong> <u><strong>It necessarily <mark>posits </mark>a universal essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate <mark>its</mark> allegedly <mark>“benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves</u></strong></mark>, as I have argued, <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> continue to <u><strong><mark>divide us </mark>from one another, <mark>which ensures we are not a threat</mark> to the state sovereign.</u></strong> In addition, <u><strong>sovereignty appeals to other universals such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.”</u></strong> <u><strong>These are “necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>preclude the need for a “decision” that is overtly “forceful.”</u></strong> <u><strong>Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent</u></strong>—indeed “rogue”—<u><strong>foundations to slip by.</u></strong> Furthermore, <u><strong>when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order.</u></strong> This goes some way to explain why right-to-die cases have failed on appeal in UK law to date. All is not lost, however. As Derrida posits, <u><strong><mark>sovereignty is entirely deconstructable</u></strong></mark>, and, as this paper has explored, <u><strong><mark>right-to-die cases provide</mark> some <mark>insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility</mark>.</u></strong> Arguably, <u><strong><mark>when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself</u></strong></mark>, which it inevitably must—as indicated by those universals expressed above—<u><strong><mark>it must</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>“exceed” itself. This excess</u></strong></mark> may be violent and destructive, yet <u><strong><mark>can</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>create openings</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, <u><strong>this excess might be</u></strong> thought as <u><strong>“autoimmune”</u></strong> [19]. <u><strong>Autoimmunity might be read as the idea that <mark>sovereignty contains within it the conditions of</mark> its own potential and</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>its own demise.</u></strong></mark> Thus, <u><strong><mark>sovereignty might </mark>sometimes <mark>make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this </mark>very <mark>closure.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Two examples seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death</u></strong>. <u><strong>First, the construction of the individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. <mark>Liberal categories such as</u></strong></mark> personhood, property, and <u><strong><mark>rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law</mark> </u></strong>(which is not universally a “bad” thing because, not only can immunization in many instances be useful, but quite often legal protection is desirable). <u><strong>However, <mark>in granting this self-protection, liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise.</mark> <mark>In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection</mark>, where “protection” might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second</u></strong>, on a broader scale<u><strong>, the autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving</u></strong> thought <u><strong>both conditionally and unconditionally</u></strong>. <u><strong>Liberty</u></strong>, like other unconditionals such as hospitality and gift-giving, is <u><strong>an “absolute” that conditions and</u></strong> thereby <u><strong>makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty.</u></strong> This materialization is only a performance as such, since <u><strong>liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty,</u></strong> therefore, <u><strong>should not be thought only as a universal category that protects us</u></strong> from the other <u><strong>and renders us under a sovereign order to be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly</u></strong>—more responsibly. In this case, <u><strong>rather than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, we might think of how we can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.” </u></strong>In short, <u><strong><mark>autoimmunity</u></strong></mark> can be violent and destructive, as much as it <u><strong><mark>can</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the</mark> autos or the self-sameness—<mark>the absolute sovereign.</u></strong></mark> Derrida presents autoimmunity as a movement or iteration that might be better thought as a broad instance of historical patterns of shifting ways of becoming. For example, autoimmunity in this regard is understood as iterations of change, as modes of closure and openness. Like the potential creativity in destruction, autoimmunity presents opportunities for openness in such violent attempts at closure (e.g., closure of the “immunized individual” or closure in terms of the “sovereign decision”). As indicated, <u><strong>one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond this essential link to fear and murder.</u></strong> Could we consider the right to die a compassionate gift, or a gift of death? As I close this paper, I want to also create an opening of sorts by gesturing to where Derrida takes us in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign. In the eighth session, Derrida speaks of Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence being “a correlate of the power of the as such.” Moreover, transcendence, Derrida writes, is “shared in Mitsein, in the common opening to beings” ([20], p. 227). In these reflections on Heidegger, Derrida, it seems, identifies something worth retaining. This value appears to lie in the possibility of the relation between transcendence and the as such, between the unconditional being-with, and the being-in-solitude, or conditional sovereignty. In our musings over liberty, the impossible possibility of sovereignty, and the capacity to exceed and to be more open, could we imagine a variation of the Heidegerrian Mitsein-to-come? A Derridean openness to otherness? As Derrida writes, sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the process of autoimmunising itself, of betraying itself by betraying the democracy that nonetheless can never do without it ([12], p. 101). <u><strong>This democracy to come</u></strong>, the possibility of being-with, <u><strong>might help us think autoimmunity as the changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the closures sovereignty necessarily demands.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.</p></u></strong></mark>
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Medicalization
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Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence
Gulli 13 , pg. 5
Gulli 13 Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5
we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in Gaza or France from once again trying its luck in Africa though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007 the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony this killing, just like Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.
sovereign power and authority rest on violence and terror struggle for dominance is impaired and made brutal by lack of heg U S heg has vanished drive for domination has to show raw violence traditional justifications democracy and freedom have now become weak because the contempt the (the US show toward morality punishment remains a limit Not so for dominant nations: who will stop the U S from striking anywhere they rely on a military machine drones and diplomacy, is an outpost for military operations and global policing incarnated by Africom Domination without hegemony’ captures the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty in the light of the bifurcation of financial and military power with the catastrophic war against Iraq US hegemony entered terminal crisis.” the U S relationship to the world is best described ‘domination without heg ’ What can the US do ? Not much, short of brutal dominance you can kill the bin Ladens without gaining heg the ill-concealed fury for loss of heg becomes visible power as care is what should replace hegemony
I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony.¶ ‘Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” He continues:¶ Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.
5,034
<h4>Hegemony is impossible – attempts to preserve it only guarantee global sovereign violence</h4><p><u><strong>Gulli 13</u></strong> Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence<u><strong>, pg. 5</p><p></u></strong>I think that <u>we have now an understanding of what the situation is: <strong>The <mark>sovereign </mark>everywhere</strong>, be it the political or financial elite, <strong>fakes the legitimacy</strong> on which its <mark>power and authority </mark>supposedly rest</u>. <u>In truth, they <strong><mark>rest on violence and terror</strong></mark>, or the threat thereof</u>. <u>This is an <strong>obvious and essential aspect</strong> of the singularity of the present crisis</u>. In this sense, <u>the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the <mark>struggle for dominance is </mark>at one and the same time <mark>impaired and made </mark>more <mark>brutal by <strong></mark>the <mark>lack of heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. This is true in general, but <u>it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, <strong>the <mark>U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates</strong>, whose <mark>heg</mark>emony <mark>has</mark> <strong>diminished or <mark>vanished</strong></mark>.</u> <u>It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard</u>. <u>Lacking hegemony, the <strong>sheer <mark>drive for domination</strong> has to show</mark> <strong>its true face</strong>, its <strong><mark>raw violence</u></strong></mark>. <u>The usual, <mark>traditional <strong></mark>ideological <mark>justifications </mark>for dominance</strong> (such as bringing <mark>democracy and freedom</mark> here and there) <mark>have now become <strong></mark>very <mark>weak</strong> because </u></mark>of <u><strong><mark>the contempt</strong> </mark>that <mark>the </mark>dominant nations <mark>(the US </mark>and its most powerful allies) <strong>regularly <mark>show</strong> toward </mark>legality, <mark>morality</mark>, and humanity</u>. Of course, <u>the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of <mark>punishment</mark>, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the <strong>I</strong>nternational <strong>C</strong>riminal <strong>C</strong>ourt, <mark>remains a </u></mark>clear<u><mark> limit</mark>, a possibility.</u> <u><strong><mark>Not so for </mark>the <mark>dominant nations</u></strong>: <u>who will stop the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates<mark> from striking anywhere </mark>at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in</u> the <u>Gaza</u> Strip, <u>or</u> envious <u>France from once again trying its luck in Africa</u>? Yet, <u>though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their <strong>structural, ontological and historical, weakness</u></strong>. <u>All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) <strong>only heighten the brutality</strong> in the exertion of <strong>what remains of their dominance</u></strong>. <u>Although <mark>they rely on a <strong></mark>highly sophisticated <mark>military machine</strong></mark> (the technology of <mark>drones</mark> is a clear instance of this) <mark>and </mark>on an equally sophisticated <mark>diplomacy, </mark>which has <strong>traditionally</strong> been and <strong>increasingly</strong> <mark>is an outpost for <strong>military operations and global policing</strong></mark> (now excellently <strong><mark>incarnated by Africom</strong></mark>), <strong>they know that they have lost their hegemony</u></strong>.¶ ‘<u><strong><mark>Domination without hegemony’</u></strong></mark> <u>is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007</u>). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), <u>the phrase <mark>captures the </mark>singularity of the <mark>global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty</mark>, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future</u>” (1994/2010: 221). <u>It acquires particular meaning <mark>in the light of</mark> Arrighi’s notion of <strong><mark>the bifurcation of financial and military power</mark>.</u></strong> Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, <u>early in the twenty-first century, and certainly <mark>with the </mark>ill-advised and <mark>catastrophic war against Iraq</mark>, “the US belle époque came to an end and <mark>US </mark>world <mark>hegemony entered <strong></mark>what in all likelihood is its <mark>terminal crisis.”</u></strong></mark> He continues:¶ <u>Although <mark>the U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its <mark>relationship to </mark>the rest of <mark>the world is </mark>now <mark>best described </mark>as one of <strong><mark>‘domination without heg</mark>emony<mark>’</u></strong></mark> (1994/2010: 384). <u><mark>What can the US do </mark>next<mark>? <strong>Not much, short of brutal dominance</u></strong></mark>. In the last few years, <u>we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too</u> (Noam Chomsky has often noted that <u>bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime</u>), <u>it is certain that <mark>you can kill <strong></mark>all <mark>the bin Ladens </mark>of the world <mark>without gaining </mark>back a bit of <mark>heg</mark>emony</u></strong>. In fact, <u>this killing, just like</u> G. W. <u>Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a <strong>Mafia-style</strong> regolamento di conti more than any other thing</u>. Barack <u>Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old</u> Abdulrahman <u>al-Awlaki, whose fate many have <strong>correctly compared</strong> to <strong>that of</strong> 17-year-old Trayvon Martin</u> (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), <u>but it is precisely in cases like this one that <strong>the weakness at the heart of empire</strong>, <mark>the ill-concealed</mark> and uncontrolled <strong><mark>fury for</mark> the <mark>loss of heg</mark>emony</strong>, <mark>becomes visible</u></mark>. <u>The frenzy denies the possibility of <strong><mark>power as care</strong></mark>, which <mark>is <strong>what should replace hegemony</strong></mark>, let alone domination</u>. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about <u>the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence</u>. <u>What is needed is rather <strong>a radical alternative</strong> in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, <strong>a poetic rather than military and financial shift.</p></u></strong>
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1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
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11 alt causes to noncompliance – we only have to win one
Grimmett 11
Jeanne J. Grimmett 11, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service, 3/11/11, “WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases,” http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1817&context=key_workplace
Although the U S has complied with adverse rulings in many past WTO) disputes there are currently 11 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented or the U S has taken action and the dispute has not been fully resolved Remaining unsettled are long-standing disputes with the EU) regarding a music copyright statute and a provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba a dispute with Japan over antidumping The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act remains the target of sanctions by EU and Japan the U S and Antigua have been consulting on the resolution of Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions Congress repealed a WTO-inconsistent cotton program at issue in Brazil’s complaint but other programs were also successfully challenged and the U S was later found not to have fully complied Five pending cases involve the U.S. practice of “zeroing The U.S. practice was successfully challenged by the EU Japan Mexico and South Korea resulting in broad WTO prohibitions on U.S. use of the practice It has yet to fully comply
Although the U S complied with adverse rulings in many past disputes, there 11 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented Remaining unsettled are long-standing disputes with the EU) regarding copyright property confiscated by Cuba Japan over antidumping a WTO-inconsistent cotton program were challenged and the U S was found not to have complied Five pending cases involve zeroing challenged by the EU Japan Mexico and South Korea resulting in broad WTO prohibitions on U.S. use
Although the United States has complied with adverse rulings in many past World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes, there are currently 11 cases in which rulings have not yet been implemented or the United States has taken action and the dispute has not been fully resolved. Under WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period of time to comply with an adverse WTO decision. While the Member is expected to remove the offending measure by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available if the Member has not acted or taken sufficient action by this time. Either disputing party may request a compliance panel if there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied. Remaining unsettled are long-standing disputes with the European Union (EU) regarding a music copyright statute (DS160) and a statutory trademark provision affecting property confiscated by Cuba (DS176), as well as a dispute with Japan over a provision of U.S. antidumping law (DS184). The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“Byrd Amendment”), which was held WTO-inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed effective October 2005, remains the target of sanctions by complainants EU and Japan due to continued payments to U.S. firms authorized under the repeal legislation (P.L. 109-171) (DS217/DS234). Congress placed limits on funds that are available for these distributions in December 2010 (P.L. 111-291, § 822). In addition, the United States and Antigua have been consulting on the resolution of outstanding issues in Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions (DS285). Compensation agreements entered into by the United States with various WTO Members in exchange for the withdrawal by the United States of its WTO gambling commitments, an action taken by the United States to resolve the case, will not enter into effect until issues with Antigua are resolved. Congress repealed a WTO-inconsistent cotton program at issue in Brazil’s 2002 complaint over U.S. cotton subsidies in P.L. 109-171, but other programs were also successfully challenged and the United States was later found not to have fully complied (DS267). The United States since made statutory and administrative changes affecting the export credit guarantee program faulted in the case. While Brazil obtained authorization from the WTO to retaliate in the case, the two countries entered into a preliminary agreement in April 2010 that forestalled the imposition of sanctions and signed a framework agreement in June 2010 aimed at permanently resolving the dispute. The latter includes Brazil’s pledge not to impose sanctions during the life of the agreement and contemplates possible legislative resolution of the dispute in the 2012 farm bill. Brazil had earlier announced that it was entitled to impose $829.3 million in annual retaliation, $591 million of which would consist of import surcharges on U.S. goods. Five pending cases involve the U.S. practice of “zeroing,” under which the Department of Commerce (DOC), in calculating dumping margins in antidumping (AD) proceedings, disregards non-dumped sales. The U.S. practice was successfully challenged by the EU (DS294/DS350), Japan (DS322), Mexico (DS344), and South Korea (DS402), resulting in broad WTO prohibitions on U.S. use of the practice. The United States took administrative action to resolve one aspect of DS294 by abandoning zeroing in original AD investigations as of 2007. It has yet to fully comply, however, either in this case or in DS350, DS322, or DS344. While the EU and Japan requested the WTO to authorize sanctions, each agreed to suspend U.S.-requested arbitration of their proposals in 2010 on the understanding that the United States would resolve outstanding issues in a timely fashion. To this end, DOC in December 2010 proposed to eliminate the use of zeroing in later stages of U.S. AD proceedings. A compliance panel proceeding is currently under way in the dispute with Mexico (DS344). An adverse panel report was adopted in Korea’s challenge (DS402) on February 24, 2011.
4,104
<h4>11 alt causes to noncompliance – we only have to win one</h4><p>Jeanne J. <u><strong>Grimmett 11</u></strong>, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service, 3/11/11, “WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases,” http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1817&context=key_workplace</p><p><u><mark>Although the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>has <mark>complied with adverse rulings in many past</u></mark> World Trade Organization (<u>WTO) <mark>disputes</u>, <u>there</mark> are currently</u> <u><mark>11 cases</u> <u>in which rulings have not yet been implemented</mark> or the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has taken action and the dispute has not been fully resolved</u>. Under WTO dispute settlement rules, a WTO Member will generally be given a reasonable period of time to comply with an adverse WTO decision. While the Member is expected to remove the offending measure by the end of this period, compensation and temporary retaliation are available if the Member has not acted or taken sufficient action by this time. Either disputing party may request a compliance panel if there is disagreement over whether a Member has complied. <u><mark>Remaining unsettled are</u> <u>long-standing disputes</u> <u>with the</u></mark> European Union (<u><mark>EU) regarding</mark> a music <mark>copyright</mark> statute</u> (DS160) <u>and a</u> statutory trademark <u>provision affecting <mark>property confiscated by Cuba</u></mark> (DS176), as well as <u>a dispute with <mark>Japan over</u></mark> a provision of U.S. <u><mark>antidumping</u></mark> law (DS184). <u>The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act</u> of 2000 (“Byrd Amendment”), which was held WTO-inconsistent in January 2003 and repealed effective October 2005, <u>remains the target of sanctions by</u> complainants <u>EU and Japan</u> due to continued payments to U.S. firms authorized under the repeal legislation (P.L. 109-171) (DS217/DS234). Congress placed limits on funds that are available for these distributions in December 2010 (P.L. 111-291, § 822). In addition, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Antigua have been consulting on the resolution of</u> outstanding issues in <u>Antigua’s challenge of U.S. online gambling restrictions</u> (DS285). Compensation agreements entered into by the United States with various WTO Members in exchange for the withdrawal by the United States of its WTO gambling commitments, an action taken by the United States to resolve the case, will not enter into effect until issues with Antigua are resolved. <u>Congress repealed <mark>a WTO-inconsistent cotton program</mark> at issue in Brazil’s</u> 2002 <u>complaint</u> over U.S. cotton subsidies in P.L. 109-171, <u>but</u> <u>other programs <mark>were</mark> also successfully <mark>challenged and</u> <u>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>was</mark> later <mark>found not to have</mark> fully <mark>complied</u></mark> (DS267). The United States since made statutory and administrative changes affecting the export credit guarantee program faulted in the case. While Brazil obtained authorization from the WTO to retaliate in the case, the two countries entered into a preliminary agreement in April 2010 that forestalled the imposition of sanctions and signed a framework agreement in June 2010 aimed at permanently resolving the dispute. The latter includes Brazil’s pledge not to impose sanctions during the life of the agreement and contemplates possible legislative resolution of the dispute in the 2012 farm bill. Brazil had earlier announced that it was entitled to impose $829.3 million in annual retaliation, $591 million of which would consist of import surcharges on U.S. goods. <u><mark>Five pending cases involve</mark> the U.S. practice of “<mark>zeroing</u></mark>,” under which the Department of Commerce (DOC), in calculating dumping margins in antidumping (AD) proceedings, disregards non-dumped sales. <u>The U.S. practice was successfully <mark>challenged by the EU</u></mark> (DS294/DS350), <u><mark>Japan</u></mark> (DS322), <u><mark>Mexico</u></mark> (DS344), <u><mark>and South Korea</u></mark> (DS402), <u><mark>resulting in broad WTO prohibitions on U.S. use</mark> of the practice</u>. The United States took administrative action to resolve one aspect of DS294 by abandoning zeroing in original AD investigations as of 2007. <u>It has yet to fully comply</u>, however, either in this case or in DS350, DS322, or DS344. While the EU and Japan requested the WTO to authorize sanctions, each agreed to suspend U.S.-requested arbitration of their proposals in 2010 on the understanding that the United States would resolve outstanding issues in a timely fashion. To this end, DOC in December 2010 proposed to eliminate the use of zeroing in later stages of U.S. AD proceedings. A compliance panel proceeding is currently under way in the dispute with Mexico (DS344). An adverse panel report was adopted in Korea’s challenge (DS402) on February 24, 2011.</p>
1NR
China
2NC Noncompliance Alt Causes
430,029
3
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,884
Rodwell’s argument is that we need to understand how language is shaped by historical context – that’s the point of the kritik – our argument isn’t that language creates reality but that we can’t understand reality except as mediated through language – Rodwell concedes this
Rodwell 5
Rodwell 5 (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm) gz
I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives
I do not wish to argue language is not important that would be unrealistic the creation of identity defining ones self in opposition to an ‘other’ does take place. Masses of evidence clearly demonstrates there is a discursive pattern surrounding politics
In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position.
1,347
<h4>Rodwell’s argument is that we need to understand how language is shaped by historical context – that’s the point of the kritik – our argument isn’t that language creates reality but that we can’t understand reality except as mediated through language – Rodwell concedes this</h4><p><u><strong>Rodwell 5</u></strong> (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm) gz </p><p>In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. <u><mark>I do not wish to argue</mark> that <mark>language is not important</mark>, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) <mark>that would be unrealistic</mark>. One cannot help but be convinced that <mark>the creation of identity</mark>, of <mark>defining ones self</mark> (or one nation, or societies self) <mark>in opposition to an ‘other’ does</mark> indeed <mark>take place. Masses of</mark> written and aural <mark>evidence</mark> collated by Jackson <mark>clearly demonstrates</mark> that <mark>there is a discursive pattern surrounding</mark> post 9/11 U.S. <mark>politics</mark> and society</u>. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper <u>it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives</u>. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position.</p>
2NC
K
A2: Rodwell
1,600
163
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
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Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,885
Through this imperative of productivity and the protection of the community, a process of normalization began which established an ideal model of subjectivity and parceled out degrees of deviance to those that did not fit that ideal – bodies coded as “impaired” or “abnormal” became “frightening” or “dangerous” which provided the conditions of possibility for violence – Natasha Saltes explains that
null
Natasha, Queens University, “‘Abnormal’ Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion: Biopolitics and the Paradox of Disability Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 2013 SJE
debates about the relationship between bodies (biological life and the state (politics) have prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s writings and lectures on biopolitics otherness emerges as a result of the construction of inferior races A parallel can be drawn between the otherness of racialization and the ‘abnormality’ of impairment both are the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization biopolitics is an active and reactive process that politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive and therefore worthy or ¶ risky biopower is a disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at the population while both are ‘technologies of the body’ Biopower is exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that ‘discipline’ and condition the individualized body through processes of surveillance and training while biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological and political problem and operates through administrative and strategic arrangements of the state and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment It is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’ Foucault defines the normalizing society as ‘a society in which the norm of disciplines and the norm of regulation intersect It is a society in which power dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the population that the underlying principles of the norm are that of ‘qualification and correction’ contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against ‘quantifiable qualities’ Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’
debates about the relationship between bodies and (politics) have ¶ prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s biopolitics otherness emerges as a result of the construction of inferior races A parallel can be drawn between the otherness of racialization and the ‘abnormality’ of impairment both are the consequences of biopolitical normalization biopolitics politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive Biopower is ¶ exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that condition the individualized body It ¶ is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’ Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’
Ongoing debates about the relationship between bodies (biological life) and the state (politics) have ¶ prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s writings and lectures on biopolitics. Among the competing¶ articulations, Lazzarato provides a useful contextualization of the parameters of biopolitics noting that it can be ‘understood as a government-population-political economy relationship [that] refers to a dynamic ¶ of forces that establishes a new relationship between ontology and politics’ (2002: 102). Scholars who ¶ have examined Foucault’s lectures have traced biopolitical themes in his genealogy of race (Su ¶ Rasmussen 2011) showing how otherness emerges as a result of the construction of inferior races (Fassin ¶ 2001). A parallel can be drawn between the otherness of racialization and the ‘abnormality’ of impairment ¶ in that both are the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization. ¶ A common theme that weaves through diverging views of biopolitics is an emphasis on the dyadic ¶ relationship between life and politics. What has been largely overlooked is the notion that biopolitics is an ¶ active and reactive process that politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive and therefore worthy or ¶ risky. In this way, biopolitics operates on its own paradoxical axis in that its strategic aims and methods ¶ are carried out through a range of practices that, according to Esposito, can on one hand be ‘affirmative ¶ and productive and on the other hand negative and lethal’ (2008: 46). To illustrate the underlying ¶ rationalization of biopolitics it is fruitful to return to Foucault and his conception of biopower and ¶ biopolitics in the context of the ‘normalizing society’. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1975-1976, Foucault (2003b) distinguishes between these two ¶ concepts noting that biopower is a disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body ¶ while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at the population. Foucault clarifies that while ¶ both are ‘technologies of the body’ (2003b: 249), the trajectory of power differs for each. Biopower is ¶ exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that ¶ ‘discipline’ and condition the individualized body through processes of surveillance and training while ¶ biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological and political problem and operates through ¶ administrative and strategic arrangements of the state through ‘forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall ¶ measures’ and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the ¶ effects of the environment’ (2003b: 245-246). ¶ According to Foucault (2003b), the concept that underpins biopower and biopolitics is ‘the norm’ (253). It ¶ is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’ (2003b: ¶ 253). Foucault defines the normalizing society as ‘a society in which the norm of disciplines [biopower] ¶ and the norm of regulation [biopolitics] intersect…’ (2003b: 253). It is a society in which power ¶ dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the ¶ population (Foucault 2003b: 253). Foucault (2003a) suggests that the ‘norm’ is a political concept wherein ¶ processes of power emerge and are legitimized. He claims that the underlying principles of the norm are ¶ that of ‘qualification and correction’ (2003a: 50). Mader observes that processes of ‘qualification and ¶ correction’ are contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against ‘quantifiable qualities’ (2007: 6). ¶ Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’ (2007: 6). Although Foucault recognizes the repressive outcomes of political power exercised through processes ¶ of normalization, he is averse to conceptualizing political power in strictly repressive terms and suggests ¶ that repression is a ‘secondary effect’ (2003a: 52) and that the function of power that emerges in ¶ accordance with the norm is not to ‘exclude and reject’, but is ‘a positive technique of intervention and ¶ transformation, to a sort of normative project’ (2003a: 50). Foucault’s association of the normative project ¶ with positive intervention might seem curious given the underlying themes of power and its relation to ¶ social control that underlie much of his work. Yet, he contends that disciplines of normalization that ¶ emerged in the eighteenth century produced a productive form of power aimed toward ‘transformation and ¶ innovation’ (2003a: 52).
4,767
<h4>Through this imperative of productivity and the protection of the community, a process of normalization began which established an ideal model of subjectivity and parceled out degrees of deviance to those that did not fit that ideal – bodies coded as “impaired” or “abnormal” became “frightening” or “dangerous” which provided the conditions of possibility for violence – Natasha Saltes explains that</h4><p>Natasha, Queens University, “‘Abnormal’ Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion: Biopolitics and the Paradox of Disability Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 2013 SJE</p><p>Ongoing <u><mark>debates about the relationship between bodies</mark> (biological life</u>) <u><mark>and </mark>the state <mark>(politics) have </u>¶<u> prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s</mark> writings and lectures on <mark>biopolitics</u></mark>. Among the competing¶ articulations, Lazzarato provides a useful contextualization of the parameters of biopolitics noting that it can be ‘understood as a government-population-political economy relationship [that] refers to a dynamic ¶ of forces that establishes a new relationship between ontology and politics’ (2002: 102). Scholars who ¶ have examined Foucault’s lectures have traced biopolitical themes in his genealogy of race (Su ¶ Rasmussen 2011) showing how <u><mark>otherness emerges as a result of the <strong>construction of inferior races</u></strong></mark> (Fassin ¶ 2001). <u><mark>A parallel can be drawn between the <strong>otherness of racialization</strong> and</u> <u><strong>the ‘abnormality’ of impairment</u></strong></mark> ¶ in that <u><strong><mark>both are the consequences of </mark>a <mark>biopolitical </mark>regime underpinned by <mark>normalization</u></strong></mark>. ¶ A common theme that weaves through diverging views of biopolitics is an emphasis on the dyadic ¶ relationship between life and politics. What has been largely overlooked is the notion that <u><mark>biopolitics </mark>is an </u>¶<u> active and reactive process that <strong><mark>politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive</u></strong></mark> <u>and therefore worthy or ¶ risky</u>. In this way, biopolitics operates on its own paradoxical axis in that its strategic aims and methods ¶ are carried out through a range of practices that, according to Esposito, can on one hand be ‘affirmative ¶ and productive and on the other hand negative and lethal’ (2008: 46). To illustrate the underlying ¶ rationalization of biopolitics it is fruitful to return to Foucault and his conception of biopower and ¶ biopolitics in the context of the ‘normalizing society’. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1975-1976, Foucault (2003b) distinguishes between these two ¶ concepts noting that <u>biopower is a disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body </u>¶<u> while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at the population</u>. Foucault clarifies that <u>while </u>¶<u> both are ‘technologies of the body’</u> (2003b: 249), the trajectory of power differs for each. <u><mark>Biopower is </u>¶<u> exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that</mark> </u>¶<u> ‘discipline’ and <mark>condition the individualized body</mark> through processes of surveillance and training while </u>¶<u> biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological and political problem and operates through </u>¶<u> administrative and strategic arrangements of the state </u>through ‘forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall ¶ measures’ <u>and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the </u>¶<u> effects of the environment</u>’ (2003b: 245-246). ¶ According to Foucault (2003b), the concept that underpins biopower and biopolitics is ‘the norm’ (253). <u><strong><mark>It </u></strong>¶<u><strong> is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’</u></strong></mark> (2003b: ¶ 253). <u>Foucault defines the normalizing society as ‘a society in which the norm of disciplines </u>[biopower] ¶ <u>and the norm of regulation</u> [biopolitics] <u>intersect</u>…’ (2003b: 253). <u>It is a society in which power </u>¶<u> dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the </u>¶<u> population </u>(Foucault 2003b: 253). Foucault (2003a) suggests that the ‘norm’ is a political concept wherein ¶ processes of power emerge and are legitimized. He claims <u>that the underlying principles of the norm are </u>¶<u> that of ‘qualification and correction’</u> (2003a: 50). Mader observes that processes of ‘qualification and ¶ correction’ are <u>contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against ‘quantifiable qualities’ </u>(2007: 6). ¶ <u><strong><mark>Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’</u></strong></mark> (2007: 6). Although Foucault recognizes the repressive outcomes of political power exercised through processes ¶ of normalization, he is averse to conceptualizing political power in strictly repressive terms and suggests ¶ that repression is a ‘secondary effect’ (2003a: 52) and that the function of power that emerges in ¶ accordance with the norm is not to ‘exclude and reject’, but is ‘a positive technique of intervention and ¶ transformation, to a sort of normative project’ (2003a: 50). Foucault’s association of the normative project ¶ with positive intervention might seem curious given the underlying themes of power and its relation to ¶ social control that underlie much of his work. Yet, he contends that disciplines of normalization that ¶ emerged in the eighteenth century produced a productive form of power aimed toward ‘transformation and ¶ innovation’ (2003a: 52). </p>
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null
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111,948
11
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,886
Their authors ignore multiple methods of PAS – computerized assistance de-medicalizes death
Ost 10
Ost 10
Howarth and Leaman refer to the process of de-medicalisation as 'the point at which the medicalisation of social life is turned back, or reversed'. The potential for de-medicalisation is growing In an age in which patients have much easier access to infor- mation on the Internet about medical conditions, information which once remained within the medical realm de-medicalisation is more likely to occur when patients are empowered and patient rights are championed and prioritised For as long as we have relied on medicine and physicians in our attempts to prolong life and keep death at bay, death and medicalisation have gradually and increasingly gone hand in hand. dying has become an illness death has become a medical event. there have been developments in end-of-life care that mark a move away from a more med- icalised death. campaigns for a 'right to die' can be perceived as attempts to prioritise individual autonomy and remove doctors' control over death For those who find themselves in such a desperate situation that they decide to end their own lives there are a variety of medical and non-medical means of committing suicide However, these methods are only available to those who have the physical ability to make use of them and thus, those who lack this ability are left requiring another person's assistance to die. Salem argues that PAS presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide as long as the physician is Ill charge of assisting physician-assisted suicide entails the medicalisatlon of the act of suicide however less medicalised and completely de-medicalised instances of assisted death do occur. A well- publicised example of partially de-medicalised assisted death occurred in Australia during the short period in which assisted suicide and euthanasia were lawful in the Northern Territory. Dr Nitschke devised a process of computerised assisted death. He provided patients With intravenous access and connected the infusion tubing to a laptop computer. The patients then had to answer three questions which appeared on the computer screen by pressing certain keys. The final question was 'If you press this button, you will receive a lethal injection and die in 15 seconds— Do you wish to proceed?' If the patient answered all the questions affirmatively, the computer automatically switched on a previously prepared solution of a fatal dose of the sedative Nembutal." the process 'allowed me to leave the immediate personal space of the patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient when the button was pushed' Thus far from removing the human lement, de-medicalising-assisted death in this way can remove the external presence of a medic and enable the act of dying to be a more personal and private experience for the person to share with those she or he is closest to.
de-medicalisation is more likely to occur when patients are empowered and patient rights are championed and prioritised For as long as we have relied on medicine and physicians in our attempts to prolong life and keep death at bay, death and medicalisation have increasingly gone hand in hand dying has become an illness campaigns for a 'right to die' can be perceived as attempts to prioritise individual autonomy and remove doctors' control over death completely de-medicalised instances of assisted death do occur. A example of partially de-medicalised assisted death occurred in Australia during the period in which assisted suicide were lawful Nitschke devised a process of computerised assisted death He connected the infusion tubing to a laptop computer. The patients had to answer questions which appeared on the computer screen The final question was 'If you press this button, you will receive a lethal injection and die in 15 seconds— Do you wish to proceed?' the computer switched on a fatal dose the process 'allowed me to leave the personal space of the patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient de-medicalising-assisted death in this way can remove the external presence of a medic
SUZANNE OST, Law School, Lancaster University, “THE DE-MEDICALISATION OF ASSISTED DYING: IS A LESS MEDICALISED MODEL THE WAY FORWARD?” Medical Law Review, 18, Winter 2010, pp. 497–540, KB Conversely, de-medicalisation can be defined as ‘stripping away medicine as a dominant frame of reference to reveal the “true” ’ nature of a phenomenon.15 Howarth and Leaman refer to the process of de-medicalisation as 'the point at which the medicalisation of social life is turned back, or reversed'. 16 The potential for de-medicalisation is growing In an age in which patients have much easier access to infor- mation on the Internet about medical conditions, information which once remained within the medical realm. 17 And de-medicalisation is more likely to occur when patients are empowered and patient rights are championed and prioritised, as IS currently the case In contempor- ary Western society. No doubt one of the most prominent examples of de-medicalisation is the de-medicalising of normal childbirth in the UK. The 1970s saw the medicalisation of child birth, with a hospital birth being the recommended norm, I but in more recent times, orgamsations such as the National Childbirth Trust campaign for midwife-led birth centres and encou women to have natural births and consider giving birth at home. And during thei r later years in power, the pre- vious Labour government indicated a preference for a community-based midwifery model and woman-focused, family-centred maternity ser- vices. 21 A further example of de-medicalisation can be found in the concept of neurodiversity. The neurodlversity movement emerged from within the autistic community in the late 1990s. Armstrong explains that neurodiversity's 'basic premise is that atypical neurological wiring is part of the normal spectrum of human differences and is to be tolerated and respected like any other human difference such as race, gender, sexual preference, or cultural background'. Followers of neu- rodiversity reject the categonsation of autism as an illness that needs curing. For as long as we have relied on medicine and physicians in our attempts to prolong life and keep death at bay, death and medicalisation have gradually and increasingly gone hand in hand. In the words of Ian Kennedy, dying has become an illness.2S And death, in many cases, has become a medical event. 26 Notably, however, medicalised aspects are absent from what Seale and van der Geest have argued is an almost universal notion of a 'good death'. 27 Yet a 2006 survey suggests that only one in three vrople in the UK will experience a death free from any medical involve- ment.28 Medical intervention at the end of life could involve, for example, the provision and subsequent withdrawal of life-sustaining treat- ment, or terminal sedation. One effect of medical intervention to prolong life has been to extend lives which, to those subiectively experiencing these lives, may be lacking in quality. Partly as a consequence of this, but also to offer individuals alternatives to dying in a medical setting, there have been developments in end-of-life care that mark a move away from a more med- icalised death. The palliative care and natural death movements can both be cited as prominent examples of de-medicalisation. Moreover, campaigns for a 'right to die' can be perceived as attempts to prioritise individual autonomy and remove doctors' control over death. For those who find themselves in such a desperate situation that they decide to end their own lives (whether this is the result of their medical condition or other factors or events in their lives), there are a variety of medical and non-medical means of committing suicide.32 However, these methods are only available to those who have the physical ability to make use of them and thus, those who lack this ability are left requiring another person's assistance to die. Significantly, legal, ethical, and social discourses surrounding assisted dying and laws that have per- mitted assisted dying have tended to focus on the assistance of doctors, the provision of medicine to cause death, and medical grounds for requesting death, that is, pain and suffering derived from medical con- ditions.33 As such, medicine has provided the main frame of reference, a vital component of the phenomenon of assisted death. The common phrase 'physician-assisted suicide' (PAS) makes this abundantly clear. Salem argues that PAS: presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide ...as long as the physician is Ill charge of assisting the — either by his or her presence or by supplying the patient medical means to perform the act — physician-assisted suicide entails the medicalisatlon of the act of suicide _ the decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically — the 'private', 'intimate', 'self- determinating' decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event. Given that assistance in suicide is requested in order to bring an end to suffering and distress, it is not surprising that the cause of death also tends to be medicalised, and is commonly perceived as such, since medication is considered to offer the quickest, humane non-violent end.35 As I will discuss in this paper, however, less medicalised and completely de-medicalised instances of assisted death do occur. A well- publicised example of partially de-medicalised assisted death occurred in Australia in 1996, during the short period in which assisted suicide and euthanasia were lawful in the Northern Territory. 36 Dr Philip Nitschke devised a process of computerised assisted death. He provided patients With intravenous access and connected the infusion tubing to a laptop computer. The patients then had to answer three questions which appeared on the computer screen by pressing certain keys. The final question was as follows: 'If you press this button, you will receive a lethal injection and die in 15 seconds— Do you wish to proceed?' If the patient answered all the questions affirmatively, the computer automatically switched on a previously prepared solution of a fatal dose of the sedative Nembutal." The use of modern technology might make this example of partially de-medicalised assisted death seem somehow dehumamsed. However, Nitschke stated in an Interview that the process 'allowed me to leave the immediate personal space of the patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient when the button was pushed' .3 Thus, arguably, far from removing the human lement, de-medicalising-assisted death in this way can remove the external presence of a medic and enable the act of dying to be a more personal and private experience for the person to share with those she or he is closest to. This IS at least one reason that can be given in support of calls for the de-medicalisation of assisted death which have appeared of late in the academic literature.
6,966
<h4><strong>Their authors ignore multiple methods of PAS – computerized assistance de-medicalizes death </h4><p>Ost 10</p><p></strong>SUZANNE OST, Law School, Lancaster University, “THE DE-MEDICALISATION OF ASSISTED DYING: IS A LESS MEDICALISED MODEL THE WAY FORWARD?” Medical Law Review, 18, Winter 2010, pp. 497–540, KB</p><p>Conversely, de-medicalisation can be defined as ‘stripping away medicine as a dominant frame of reference to reveal the “true” ’ nature of a phenomenon.15 <u><strong>Howarth and Leaman refer to the process of de-medicalisation as 'the point at which the medicalisation of social life is turned back, or reversed'.</u></strong> 16 <u><strong>The potential for de-medicalisation is growing In an age in which patients have much easier access to infor- mation on the Internet about medical conditions, information which once remained within the medical realm</u></strong>. 17 And <u><strong><mark>de-medicalisation is more likely to occur when patients are empowered and patient rights are championed and prioritised</u></strong></mark>, as IS currently the case In contempor- ary Western society. No doubt one of the most prominent examples of de-medicalisation is the de-medicalising of normal childbirth in the UK. The 1970s saw the medicalisation of child birth, with a hospital birth being the recommended norm, I but in more recent times, orgamsations such as the National Childbirth Trust campaign for midwife-led birth centres and encou women to have natural births and consider giving birth at home. And during thei r later years in power, the pre- vious Labour government indicated a preference for a community-based midwifery model and woman-focused, family-centred maternity ser- vices. 21 A further example of de-medicalisation can be found in the concept of neurodiversity. The neurodlversity movement emerged from within the autistic community in the late 1990s. Armstrong explains that neurodiversity's 'basic premise is that atypical neurological wiring is part of the normal spectrum of human differences and is to be tolerated and respected like any other human difference such as race, gender, sexual preference, or cultural background'. Followers of neu- rodiversity reject the categonsation of autism as an illness that needs curing. <u><strong><mark>For as long as we have relied on medicine and physicians in our attempts to prolong life and keep death at bay, death and medicalisation have</mark> gradually and <mark>increasingly gone hand in hand</mark>.</u></strong> In the words of Ian Kennedy, <u><strong><mark>dying has become an illness</u></strong></mark>.2S And <u><strong>death</u></strong>, in many cases, <u><strong>has become a medical event.</u></strong> 26 Notably, however, medicalised aspects are absent from what Seale and van der Geest have argued is an almost universal notion of a 'good death'. 27 Yet a 2006 survey suggests that only one in three vrople in the UK will experience a death free from any medical involve- ment.28 Medical intervention at the end of life could involve, for example, the provision and subsequent withdrawal of life-sustaining treat- ment, or terminal sedation. One effect of medical intervention to prolong life has been to extend lives which, to those subiectively experiencing these lives, may be lacking in quality. Partly as a consequence of this, but also to offer individuals alternatives to dying in a medical setting, <u><strong>there have been developments in end-of-life care that mark a move away from a more med- icalised death.</u></strong> The palliative care and natural death movements can both be cited as prominent examples of de-medicalisation. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>campaigns for a 'right to die' can be perceived as attempts to prioritise individual autonomy and remove doctors' control over death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For those who find themselves in such a desperate situation that they decide to end their own lives</u></strong> (whether this is the result of their medical condition or other factors or events in their lives), <u><strong>there are a variety of medical and non-medical means of committing suicide</u></strong>.32 <u><strong>However, these methods are only available to those who have the physical ability to make use of them and thus, those who lack this ability are left requiring another person's assistance to die.</u></strong> Significantly, legal, ethical, and social discourses surrounding assisted dying and laws that have per- mitted assisted dying have tended to focus on the assistance of doctors, the provision of medicine to cause death, and medical grounds for requesting death, that is, pain and suffering derived from medical con- ditions.33 As such, medicine has provided the main frame of reference, a vital component of the phenomenon of assisted death. The common phrase 'physician-assisted suicide' (PAS) makes this abundantly clear. <u><strong>Salem argues that PAS</u></strong>: <u><strong>presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide</u></strong> ...<u><strong>as long as the physician is Ill charge of assisting</u></strong> the — either by his or her presence or by supplying the patient medical means to perform the act — <u><strong>physician-assisted suicide entails the medicalisatlon of the act of suicide</u></strong> _ the decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically — the 'private', 'intimate', 'self- determinating' decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event. Given that assistance in suicide is requested in order to bring an end to suffering and distress, it is not surprising that the cause of death also tends to be medicalised, and is commonly perceived as such, since medication is considered to offer the quickest, humane non-violent end.35 As I will discuss in this paper, <u><strong>however</u></strong>, <u><strong>less medicalised and <mark>completely de-medicalised instances of assisted death do occur.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>A</mark> well- publicised <mark>example of partially de-medicalised assisted death occurred in Australia</u></strong></mark> in 1996, <u><strong><mark>during the</mark> short <mark>period in which assisted suicide</mark> and euthanasia <mark>were lawful</mark> in the Northern Territory.</u></strong> 36 <u><strong>Dr</u></strong> Philip <u><strong><mark>Nitschke devised a process of computerised assisted death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>He</mark> provided patients With intravenous access and <mark>connected the infusion tubing to a laptop computer. The</mark> <mark>patients</mark> then <mark>had to answer</mark> three <mark>questions which appeared on the computer screen</mark> by pressing certain keys. <mark>The final question was</u></strong></mark> as follows: <u><strong><mark>'If you press this button, you will receive a lethal injection and die in 15 seconds— Do you wish to proceed?'</mark> If the patient answered all the questions affirmatively, <mark>the computer</mark> automatically <mark>switched on a</mark> previously prepared solution of a <mark>fatal dose</mark> of the sedative Nembutal."</u></strong> The use of modern technology might make this example of partially de-medicalised assisted death seem somehow dehumamsed. However, Nitschke stated in an Interview that <u><strong><mark>the process 'allowed me to leave the</mark> immediate <mark>personal space of the patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient</mark> when the button was pushed' </u></strong>.3 <u><strong>Thus</u></strong>, arguably, <u><strong>far from removing the human lement, <mark>de-medicalising-assisted death in this way can remove the external presence of a medic</mark> and enable the act of dying to be a more personal and private experience for the person to share with those she or he is closest to.</u></strong> This IS at least one reason that can be given in support of calls for the de-medicalisation of assisted death which have appeared of late in the academic literature. </p>
2AC
Medicalization
AT: Extinction First
430,030
1
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,887
Oil shock not likely and no impact
Yetiv ‘12
Yetiv ‘12 [Steve A. Yetiv is a professor of political science and international studies at Old Dominion University. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/oil-shock-not-as-likely-as-you-think/508788 ETB]
Concerns have spread that military conflict would cause a major shock to oil prices, scholars, market analysts and oil traders often overestimate the effect geopolitical events will have on prices. The Saudis are ready to use their spare capacity to make up for any disruption as the Saudi oil minister recently noted. In the event of war, the U S would coordinate an oil release with the I E A IEA members hold enough oil to withstand a total cutoff of imports for 90 days Even if the IEA does not act, the U S has strategic oil reserves it could release on its own. That capacity could defray the loss tensions sparked fears that Iran would close the Hormuz it does not have the capability to challenge the US Navy Libya’s oil exports are likely to reach pre-conflict levels in the next three months Europe’s economic woes, the lackluster US economy and China’s slowing growth are restraining global demand
scholars, market analysts and oil traders overestimate the effect geopolitical events will have on prices The Saudis are ready to use their spare capacity to make up for any disruption In the event of war, the U S would coordinate an oil release with the I E A IEA members hold enough oil to withstand a total cutoff of imports for 90 days Even if the IEA does not act, the U S has strategic oil reserves it could release on its own. That capacity could defray the loss Libya’s oil exports are likely to reach pre-conflict levels in the next three months Europe’s economic woes, the lackluster US economy and China’s slowing growth are restraining global demand
Oil prices are up more than 30 percent from six months ago amid fears that Israel or the United States may strike Iran. Concerns have spread that military conflict would cause a major shock to oil prices, damaging the US and global economies. While the situation is serious, such predictions are unlikely to pan out. Understanding how such fears are exaggerated would clarify the stakes in the standoff and underscore how scholars, market analysts and oil traders often overestimate the effect geopolitical events will have on prices. For starters, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been at loggerheads since Iran’s 1979 revolution, with Tehran intermittently trying to undermine the Saudi regime. The last thing Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia wants is a nuclear Shiite Iran to which it would have to kowtow. The Saudis are ready to use their spare and idle oil capacity to make up for any disruption in the 2.4 million barrels Iran exports per day, as the Saudi oil minister recently noted. In the event of war, it is almost certain that the United States would coordinate an oil release with the International Energy Agency. The IEA requires each of its 28 members to hold enough oil in the form of international oil company stocks and/or strategic petroleum reserves to withstand a total cutoff of imports for 90 days. When the US-led coalition attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait in 1991, a US-IEA joint release helped significantly lower world oil prices. Even if the IEA does not act, the United States has strategic oil reserves it could release on its own. IEA members hold more than 1.6 billion barrels of oil, with the United States alone holding well over 700 million barrels. That capacity could be used to defray the loss of Iran’s oil exports for many months. President Obama referred to this capacity Friday when noting that new sanctions that target Iran’s oil exports on Iran would not harm allies. Recent tensions sparked fears that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 17 percent of the world’s oil flows. Tehran can certainly disrupt oil transit, but, whatever its threats, it does not have the capability to challenge the US Navy for long. Such a fight would be one of history’s biggest mismatches. Another concern is that terror groups Hamas and Hezbollah, which are linked to Iran and sometimes viewed as its proxies, would attack Israel if the Jewish state or the United States strikes Iran. That is quite possible. But such conflicts have little to do with oil disruptions. Oil traders would eventually understand that an Israeli border conflict means little for oil prices unless it triggers a wider Middle East battle, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The chances of that are slim unless one believes that Sunni, Arab Egypt — a state in chaos — would suddenly align with Shiite, Persian Iran, an unprecedented alliance. And without Egypt, a broader war is not possible. Those concerned about the fallout of a war with Iran should also consider that Libya’s oil exports, which were cut off from February to October last year, are likely to reach pre-conflict levels in the next three to six months. That is one less constraint on the global oil supply. We should also consider that Europe’s economic woes, the lackluster US economy and China’s slowing rate of growth are restraining the global demand for oil. Prices would jump much more if an Iran war coincided with higher global economic growth and oil demand.
3,444
<h4><u><strong>Oil shock not likely and no impact</h4><p>Yetiv ‘12</p><p></u></strong>[Steve A. Yetiv is a professor of political science and international studies at Old Dominion University. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/oil-shock-not-as-likely-as-you-think/508788 ETB]</p><p>Oil prices are up more than 30 percent from six months ago amid fears that Israel or the United States may strike Iran. <u>Concerns have spread</u> <u>that military conflict would cause a major shock to oil prices,</u> damaging the US and global economies. While the situation is serious, such predictions are unlikely to pan out. Understanding how such fears are exaggerated would clarify the stakes in the standoff and underscore how <u><mark>scholars, market analysts and oil traders </mark>often <mark>overestimate the effect geopolitical events will have on prices</mark>.</u> For starters, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been at loggerheads since Iran’s 1979 revolution, with Tehran intermittently trying to undermine the Saudi regime. The last thing Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia wants is a nuclear Shiite Iran to which it would have to kowtow. <u><mark>The Saudis are ready to use their spare</u> </mark>and idle oil <u><mark>capacity to make up for any disruption </u></mark>in the 2.4 million barrels Iran exports per day,<u> as the Saudi oil minister recently noted. <mark>In the event of war,</u></mark> it is almost certain that <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>would coordinate an oil release with the I</u></mark>nternational <u><mark>E</u></mark>nergy <u><mark>A</u></mark>gency. The <u><mark>IEA</u> </mark>requires each of its 28 <u><mark>members</u> </mark>to <u><mark>hold enough oil</u> </mark>in the form of international oil company stocks and/or strategic petroleum reserves <u><mark>to withstand a total cutoff of imports for 90 days</u></mark>. When the US-led coalition attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait in 1991, a US-IEA joint release helped significantly lower world oil prices. <u><mark>Even if the IEA does not act, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>has strategic oil reserves it could release on its own.</u></mark> IEA members hold more than 1.6 billion barrels of oil, with the United States alone holding well over 700 million barrels. <u><mark>That capacity could</mark> </u>be used to <u><mark>defray the loss</u> </mark>of Iran’s oil exports for many months. President Obama referred to this capacity Friday when noting that new sanctions that target Iran’s oil exports on Iran would not harm allies. Recent <u>tensions sparked fears that Iran would close the</u> Strait of <u>Hormuz</u>, through which 17 percent of the world’s oil flows. Tehran can certainly disrupt oil transit, but, whatever its threats, <u>it does not have the capability to challenge the US Navy</u> for long. Such a fight would be one of history’s biggest mismatches. Another concern is that terror groups Hamas and Hezbollah, which are linked to Iran and sometimes viewed as its proxies, would attack Israel if the Jewish state or the United States strikes Iran. That is quite possible. But such conflicts have little to do with oil disruptions. Oil traders would eventually understand that an Israeli border conflict means little for oil prices unless it triggers a wider Middle East battle, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The chances of that are slim unless one believes that Sunni, Arab Egypt — a state in chaos — would suddenly align with Shiite, Persian Iran, an unprecedented alliance. And without Egypt, a broader war is not possible. Those concerned about the fallout of a war with Iran should also consider that <u><mark>Libya’s oil exports</u></mark>, which were cut off from February to October last year, <u><mark>are likely to reach pre-conflict levels in the next three</u> </mark>to six <u><mark>months</u></mark>. That is one less constraint on the global oil supply. We should also consider that <u><mark>Europe’s economic woes, the lackluster US economy and China’s slowing</u> </mark>rate of <u><mark>growth are restraining</u> </mark>the <u><mark>global demand</u> </mark>for oil. Prices would jump much more if an Iran war coincided with higher global economic growth and oil demand. </p>
1NC
null
Cartels
429,943
2
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
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18,750
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,888
DSM is fine
Armstrong, 14
Armstrong, 14 – Shiro, economist and Fellow at the Crawford School of Public Policy. He is Co-Director of the Australia-Japan Research Centre, Editor of the East Asia Forum, Director of the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research and Research Associate at the Center on Japanese Economy and Business at the Columbia Business School (“Economic Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and the Global Trading System,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol 1, Is 3, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.54/full //Red)
A major role of the WTO is dispute resolution The dispute settlement function of the WTO is active and robust. While the number of WTO panels established to resolve disputes seems to have decreased in the wake of the financial crisis it has rebounded strongly since 2010 The number of disputes brought has grown, and the number of disputes that have been resolved or upheld demonstrates the relevance and importance of the mechanism The recent ruling against China on its restrictions on rare earth metals exports and China's acceptance of that ruling, provide considerable confidence in the disputes settlement process under the WTO. the way in which the ruling was handled is an important sign of faith in the WTO. The United States, Japan, EU and China resolved the dispute peacefully without resorting to embargos, a trade war or any form of conflict. This is but one example of confidence in the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism
dispute settlement is active and robust has rebounded strongly since 2010 number of disputes resolved or upheld demonstrates the relevance The recent ruling against China on rare earth and China's acceptance provide considerable confidence in the settlement process the way in which the ruling was handled is an important sign of faith in the WTO The U S Japan, EU and China resolved the dispute peacefully without resorting to embargos
A major role of the GATT/WTO is in dispute resolution and the confidence that members, including developing countries, have in fair and equal treatment. That trade disputes can be settled in a universally (among members) accepted legal setting means that retaliation and escalation do not occur outside of the WTO rules, nor do these spill over into sensitive political problems. The dispute settlement function of the WTO is active and robust. While the number of WTO panels established to resolve disputes seems to have decreased in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), it has rebounded strongly since 2010 (see Figure 2). The number of disputes brought against trading partners by developing countries has grown, and the number of disputes that have been resolved or upheld demonstrates the relevance and importance of the mechanism. The relative number of disputes initiated by developing nations has increased (see Figure 3) as has their relative importance in the disputes resolution space. The establishment of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in 2001 further demonstrates the ability of the WTO to adapt in order to remain relevant to developing countries (Bown & McCulloch 2010). The WTO's legitimacy depends on its relevance to developing as well as developed country members. The recent ruling against China on its restrictions on rare earth metals exports, 2 and China's acceptance of that ruling, 3 provide considerable confidence in the disputes settlement process under the WTO. Whether China's purpose in restraining exports was for consolidation of the domestic industry and environmental reasons, the manner in which that policy was executed and the anxiety it caused the international community—especially Japan, which relied heavily on Chinese rare earth supplies—meant that the way in which the ruling was handled is an important sign of faith in the WTO. The United States, Japan, EU and China resolved the dispute peacefully in the appropriate forum without resorting to embargos, a trade war or any form of conflict. This is but one example of confidence in the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism preventing a trade dispute from escalating into more serious conflict.
2,205
<h4>DSM is fine</h4><p><strong>Armstrong, 14 </strong>– Shiro, economist and Fellow at the Crawford School of Public Policy. He is Co-Director of the Australia-Japan Research Centre, Editor of the East Asia Forum, Director of the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research and Research Associate at the Center on Japanese Economy and Business at the Columbia Business School (“Economic Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and the Global Trading System,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol 1, Is 3, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.54/full //Red)</p><p><u>A major role of the</u> GATT/<u>WTO</u> <u>is</u> in <u>dispute resolution</u> and the confidence that members, including developing countries, have in fair and equal treatment. That trade disputes can be settled in a universally (among members) accepted legal setting means that retaliation and escalation do not occur outside of the WTO rules, nor do these spill over into sensitive political problems.</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>dispute</mark> <mark>settlement</mark> function of the WTO <mark>is active and robust</mark>.</u></strong> <u>While the number of WTO panels established to resolve disputes seems to have decreased in the wake of the</u> global <u>financial crisis</u> (GFC), <u><strong>it <mark>has rebounded strongly since 2010</u></strong></mark> (see Figure 2). <u><strong>The number of disputes</strong> brought</u> against trading partners by developing countries <u>has grown, and the <mark>number of disputes</mark> that have been <mark>resolved or upheld demonstrates the relevance</mark> and importance of the mechanism</u>. The relative number of disputes initiated by developing nations has increased (see Figure 3) as has their relative importance in the disputes resolution space. The establishment of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in 2001 further demonstrates the ability of the WTO to adapt in order to remain relevant to developing countries (Bown & McCulloch 2010).</p><p>The WTO's legitimacy depends on its relevance to developing as well as developed country members.</p><p><u><mark>The recent ruling against China on</mark> its restrictions on <mark>rare earth</mark> metals exports</u>, 2 <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>China's acceptance</mark> of that ruling, </u></strong>3 <u><strong><mark>provide considerable confidence in the</mark> disputes <mark>settlement process</mark> under the WTO.</u></strong> Whether China's purpose in restraining exports was for consolidation of the domestic industry and environmental reasons, the manner in which that policy was executed and the anxiety it caused the international community—especially Japan, which relied heavily on Chinese rare earth supplies—meant that <u><strong><mark>the way in which the ruling was handled is an important sign of faith in the WTO</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, <mark>Japan, EU and China resolved the dispute peacefully</u></mark> in the appropriate forum <u><mark>without resorting to embargos</mark>, a trade war or any form of conflict. This is but one example of confidence in the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism</u> preventing a trade dispute from escalating into more serious conflict.</p>
1NR
China
2NC DSM Defense
346,211
65
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
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18,750
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1,004
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,889
Marihuana legalization implies regulation and commercial status
Ferner 12
Ferner 12
legalization without any qualification means that the substance would be treated like any other article of commerce with substance-specific regulations seeking only to shape the behavior of producers and consumers, not to eliminate market activity For marijuana, that is often interpreted to mean an ounce or less. Amendment 64 seeks to legalize marijuana in large-scale commercial production and distribution for profit and not just for medical use
legalization means that the substance would be treated like any other article of commerce, with specific regulations seeking to shape the behavior of producers and consumers
Matt, Denver editor for the Huffington Post “'Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs To Know' Authors Discuss Risks And Rewards Of Legal Weed,” September 4, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/04/marijuana-legalization-research_n_1850470.html The term legalization without any qualification means that the substance would be treated more or less like any other article of commerce, with substance-specific regulations seeking only to shape the behavior of producers and consumers, not to eliminate market activity. So, alcohol is legal even though it can only be purchased by those over the age of 21, and automobiles are legal even though manufacturers selling in the U.S. have to meet a range of regulatory requirements, including those pertaining to emissions, fuel economy, and crash safety. Decriminalization refers to reducing sanctions only for those possessing quantities suitable for personal consumption. For marijuana, that is often interpreted to mean an ounce or less. Amendment 64 seeks to legalize marijuana in the first, more sweeping sense of allowing large-scale commercial production and distribution for profit and not just for medical use. Its Section 3 pertains to legalization of personal use, but the subsequent sections legalize – with respect to state law – commercial production and sale
1,321
<h4><u><strong>Marihuana legalization implies regulation and commercial status</h4><p>Ferner 12 </p><p></u></strong>Matt, Denver editor for the Huffington Post “'Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs To Know' Authors Discuss Risks And Rewards Of Legal Weed,” September 4, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/04/marijuana-legalization-research_n_1850470.html</p><p>The term <u><mark>legalization</mark> without any qualification <mark>means that the substance would be treated</u></mark> more or less <u><mark>like any other article of commerce</u>,</mark> <u><mark>with</mark> substance-<mark>specific</mark> <mark>regulations seeking</mark> only <mark>to shape the behavior of producers and consumers</mark>, not to eliminate market activity</u>. So, alcohol is legal even though it can only be purchased by those over the age of 21, and automobiles are legal even though manufacturers selling in the U.S. have to meet a range of regulatory requirements, including those pertaining to emissions, fuel economy, and crash safety. Decriminalization refers to reducing sanctions only for those possessing quantities suitable for personal consumption. <u>For marijuana, that is often interpreted to mean an ounce or less.</u> <u>Amendment 64 seeks to legalize marijuana in</u> the first, more sweeping sense of allowing <u>large-scale commercial production and distribution for profit and not just for medical use</u>. Its Section 3 pertains to legalization of personal use, but the subsequent sections legalize – with respect to state law – commercial production and sale</p>
1NR
T
CI
430,032
34
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,890
In particular, these discourses of normality have been inscribed upon suicidal bodies – liberalism meets the call to take one’s life by applying to those bodies “impersonal social and medical factors such as madness and malaise” resulting in the coding of those bodies as deserving of violence
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<h4>In particular, these discourses of normality have been inscribed upon suicidal bodies – liberalism meets the call to take one’s life by applying to those bodies “impersonal social and medical factors such as madness and malaise” resulting in the coding of those bodies as deserving of violence</h4>
null
null
null
430,031
1
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,891
United States is a linguistic referent
Valsiner ‘12
Valsiner ‘12
most of the people have had a direct or indirect impact on their life as result of acts performed by people in accordance to what the United Sates means for them Yet people are able to recognize that the United States is not a thing Nobody has ever been able to touch the United States If I forget to ask for a visa it is not the United States that will prevent me from entering, but a police officer
people have a direct impact on their life as result of acts performed by people in accordance to what the U S means the U S is not a thing Nobody has ever been able to touch the U S If I forget to ask for a visa it is not the U S that will prevent me from entering, but a police officer
Jaan The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology https://books.google.com/books?id=WljI1r2e-SUC&pg=PA243&lpg=PA243&dq=%22the+united+states+means%22+people&source=bl&ots=3vBpoL9XCg&sig=Gg43ejwLbebceYvWUmn7o78jVh0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WaioVLeoMIW1oQSPg4HYAQ&ved=0CCAQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=%22the%20united%20states%20means%22%20people&f=false Maybe most of the people of the world have somehow had a direct or indirect impact on their life as result of acts performed by other people in accordance to what the United Sates means for them. And those other people, in turn, have experienced the United States in terms of the acts that other people performed in accordance with it- and so forth, in an infinite intertwining of infinite dimensionality. Yet, people are able to recognize that the United States is not a thing (as I have defined above— Namely, an entity endowed with substantial consistence. Nobody has ever been able to touch the United States or invite them to dinner. If I forget to ask for a visa, I will not be able to enter “the United States.” Yet I am aware that it is not the United States that will prevent me from entering, but someone—a frontier police officer—who will do it as if she were executing the United States will—that is, in accordance with what “the United States” means for her/him. Moreover, the frontier police officer will be able to have a commitment to her action insofar as she regards “the United States” as if it was an existing entity.
1,471
<h4><strong>United States is a linguistic referent</h4><p>Valsiner ‘12</p><p></strong>Jaan The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology</p><p>https://books.google.com/books?id=WljI1r2e-SUC&pg=PA243&lpg=PA243&dq=%22the+united+states+means%22+people&source=bl&ots=3vBpoL9XCg&sig=Gg43ejwLbebceYvWUmn7o78jVh0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WaioVLeoMIW1oQSPg4HYAQ&ved=0CCAQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=%22the%20united%20states%20means%22%20people&f=false</p><p>Maybe <u><strong>most of the <mark>people</u></strong></mark> of the world <u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> somehow <u><strong>had</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>a direct</mark> or indirect <mark>impact on their life as result of acts performed by</u></strong></mark> other <u><strong><mark>people</u></strong> <u><strong>in accordance to what the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>ates <mark>means</mark> for them</u></strong>. And those other people, in turn, have experienced the United States in terms of the acts that other people performed in accordance with it- and so forth, in an infinite intertwining of infinite dimensionality. <u><strong>Yet</u></strong>, <u><strong>people are able to recognize that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is not a thing</u></strong></mark> (as I have defined above— Namely, an entity endowed with substantial consistence. <u><strong><mark>Nobody has ever been able to touch the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong> or invite them to dinner. <u><strong><mark>If I forget to ask for a visa</u></strong></mark>, I will not be able to enter “the United States.” Yet I am aware that <u><strong><mark>it is not the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>that will prevent me from entering, but</mark> </u></strong>someone—<u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark> frontier <u><strong><mark>police officer</u></strong></mark>—who will do it as if she were executing the United States will—that is, in accordance with what “the United States” means for her/him. Moreover, the frontier police officer will be able to have a commitment to her action insofar as she regards “the United States” as if it was an existing entity.</p>
2AC
FW
AT: Extinction First
222,110
5
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,892
Diversification is true in the context of the zetas
Felbab-Brown, ’13
Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies, “Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime,” F E B R U A R Y ’13, Brookings
In Mexico a prioritization strategy has already encountered difficulties the Calderón administration tried to prioritize targeting the most violent groups the tactical gains were ephemeral Decapitation only translated into the emergence of the still highly violent Cabelleros Templarios Rather than being defeated the Zetas have been displaced to new areas the fracturing of the DTOs have not reduced the power of the criminal groups Smaller groups do not have less power vis-à-vis state authorities if law enforcement institutions in a local area continue to be corrupt and eviscerated and if out-of-area law enforcement units have limited knowledge of local dynamics unlike Boston or Colombia great number of DTOs and associated gangs in Mexico makes it difficult for law enforcement to ascertain who is perpetrating violence In Colombia the market was essentially dominated by two groups In Mexico many of the DTOs have splintered youth gangs have been contracted by DTOs for particular operations a sense that all enforcement is overwhelmed and lacks knowledge of local crime dynamics has tempted and allowed criminals outside major criminal groups to perpetrate serious crimes and has given rise to proliferation of kidnapping, extortion, and even homicides Mexico’s law enforcement agencies, as well as the military Often are only able to guess who is perpetrating killings in particular areas especially if more than two DTOs operate there scale effects matter a great deal in collecting intelligence in a very murky environment But good intelligence is critical for promptly responding to misbehavior Implementing targeted deterrence in one neighborhood of a city with one city-level police force is immeasurably easier than implementing a nuanced strategy that needs to be carefully-calibrated at a country level with many competing law enforcement agencies involved. Political sensitivities are also inherent in such a strategy Targeting the most violent groups entails going palpably easier on the less violent ones Persuading one’s constituency and external allies that such a strategy is in fact sound requires skilled leadership the political controversy surrounding the prioritized focus on violence and not drug distribution per se was one of the Achilles’ heels of GPAE and brought about its demise
prioritization encountered difficulties Rather than being defeated, the Zetas have been displaced to new areas the fracturing of the DTOs have not reduced power Smaller groups do not have less power vis-à-vis state authorities DTOs splintered enforcement lacks knowledge and allowed serious crimes and has given rise to proliferation of kidnapping, extortion, and even homicides
In Mexico, however, such a prioritization strategy has already encountered difficulties. Particularly during its latter years, the Calderón administration tried in fact to prioritize targeting the most violent groups—La Familia Michoacana in Michoacán and Los Zetas in northern Mexico. However, the tactical gains were ephemeral. Decapitation of La Familia Michoacana only translated into the emergence of the still highly violent Los Cabelleros Templarios. Rather than being clearly defeated, the Zetas have primarily been displaced to new areas, including Monterrey and Nuevo León and close to the southern border of Mexico. (They have also set up robust operations in Central America.) Overall, the fracturing of the DTOs and the associated violence have not clearly reduced the power of the criminal groups. Smaller groups do not necessarily have less power vis-à-vis state authorities if law enforcement institutions in a local area continue to be corrupt and eviscerated and if out-of-area law enforcement units have limited knowledge of local dynamics.42 One reason for this unsatisfactory outcome is that unlike in Boston in the 1990s or in Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, the great number of DTOs and associated gangs in Mexico makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to ascertain who is perpetrating what violence. In Colombia, the market was essentially dominated by two groups—the Medellín and Cali DTOs—and hence a sequential targeting strategy there had the luxury of relatively clear intelligence of whom to target. In Mexico, partially as a result of law enforcement actions, many of the DTOs have splintered, new offshoots have emerged, and youth gangs have been contracted by DTOs for particular operations, creating a challenging intelligence environment. Moreover, a sense that all enforcement is overwhelmed and lacks knowledge of local crime dynamics has tempted and allowed criminals outside of the major criminal groups, including petty criminals, to perpetrate serious crimes, and has given rise to the proliferation of kidnapping, extortion, and even homicides. The success of Operation Ceasefire in Boston critically hinged upon the preexisting deterrence capacity of the police. When the Boston police commissioner at the time (Paul Evans) indicated that he would focus his forces on the most violent gang, the gang believed that his forces had the capacity to undertake such a focused policy and that the gang’s leaders would face serious consequences. Mexico’s law enforcement agencies, as well as the military, have unfortunately been lacking in such credibility. Often they are only able to guess who is perpetrating killings in particular areas, especially if more than two DTOs operate there. In fact, the reason the Calderón administration stopped reporting its count of cartel killings in 2012 was that it could not objectively determine the cause of many deaths, given that less than 10 percent of crimes in the country were investigated. Moreover, scale effects matter a great deal in collecting intelligence in a very murky, violent environment. But good intelligence is critical for promptly but selectively responding to misbehavior, as targeted deterrence requires. Implementing a targeted deterrence strategy in one neighborhood of a city with one city-level police force is immeasurably easier than implementing such a nuanced strategy that needs to be carefully-calibrated at a country level with many—competing—law enforcement agencies involved. Political sensitivities are also inherent in such a targeted-deterrence strategy. Targeting the most violent criminal groups entails going palpably easier on the less violent ones and signaling that peaceful drug distribution, for example, will be prosecuted with lesser priority than distributing drugs violently. Persuading one’s constituency and external allies that such a strategy is in fact sound requires skilled leadership. In Rio, citizens have embraced such a strategy under the UPP and reelected the city’s mayor and endorsed his key security officials. But a decade earlier, the political controversy surrounding the prioritized focus on violence and not drug distribution per se was one of the Achilles’ heels of GPAE and brought about its demise. In fact, throughout its reign, the Calderón administration had to fend off accusations that it was going easier on the Sinaloa cartel.
4,402
<h4>Diversification is true in the context of the zetas </h4><p>Vanda <u><strong>Felbab-Brown,</u></strong> a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies, “Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime,” F E B R U A R Y <u><strong>’13</u></strong>, Brookings</p><p><u>In Mexico</u>, however, such <u>a <mark>prioritization</mark> strategy has already <mark>encountered difficulties</u></mark>. Particularly during its latter years, <u>the Calderón administration tried</u> in fact <u>to prioritize targeting the most violent groups</u>—La Familia Michoacana in Michoacán and Los Zetas in northern Mexico. However, <u>the tactical gains were ephemeral</u>. <u>Decapitation </u>of La Familia Michoacana <u>only translated into the emergence of the</u> <u>still highly violent</u> Los <u>Cabelleros Templarios</u>. <u><mark>Rather than being</u></mark> clearly <u><mark>defeated</u>, <u>the</u> <u>Zetas have</mark> </u>primarily <u><mark>been displaced to new areas</u></mark>, including Monterrey and Nuevo León and close to the southern border of Mexico. (They have also set up robust operations in Central America.) Overall, <u><mark>the fracturing of the DTOs</u></mark> and the associated violence <u><mark>have <strong>not</mark> </u></strong>clearly <u><strong><mark>reduced</mark> the <mark>power</mark> of the criminal groups</u></strong>. <u><mark>Smaller groups do not</u></mark> necessarily <u><mark>have less power vis-à-vis state</mark> <mark>authorities</mark> if law enforcement institutions in a local area continue to be corrupt and eviscerated and if</u> <u>out-of-area law enforcement units have <strong>limited knowledge of local dynamics</u></strong>.42 One reason for this unsatisfactory outcome is that <u>unlike </u>in <u>Boston </u>in the 1990s <u>or </u>in <u>Colombia </u>in the 1980s and early 1990s, the <u>great number of DTOs and associated gangs in Mexico makes it difficult for law enforcement</u> agencies <u>to ascertain who is perpetrating</u> what <u>violence</u>. <u>In Colombia</u>, <u>the market was essentially dominated by two groups</u>—the Medellín and Cali DTOs—and hence a sequential targeting strategy there had the luxury of relatively clear intelligence of whom to target. <u>In Mexico</u>, partially as a result of law enforcement actions, <u>many of the <mark>DTOs</mark> have <mark>splintered</u></mark>, new offshoots have emerged, and <u>youth gangs have been contracted by DTOs for particular operations</u>, creating a challenging intelligence environment. Moreover, <u>a sense that all <mark>enforcement</mark> is overwhelmed and <mark>lacks knowledge</mark> of local crime dynamics has tempted <mark>and allowed</mark> criminals</u> <u><strong>outside </u></strong>of the <u><strong>major criminal groups</u></strong>, including petty criminals, <u><strong>to perpetrate <mark>serious</u></strong> <u><strong>crimes</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</mark> <mark>has given rise to</u></mark> the <u><mark>proliferation of kidnapping, extortion, and even homicides</u></mark>. The success of Operation Ceasefire in Boston critically hinged upon the preexisting deterrence capacity of the police. When the Boston police commissioner at the time (Paul Evans) indicated that he would focus his forces on the most violent gang, the gang believed that his forces had the capacity to undertake such a focused policy and that the gang’s leaders would face serious consequences. <u>Mexico’s law enforcement agencies, as well as the military</u>, have unfortunately been lacking in such credibility. <u>Often </u>they <u>are only able to guess who is perpetrating killings in particular areas</u>, <u><strong>especially if more than two DTOs operate there</u></strong>. In fact, the reason the Calderón administration stopped reporting its count of cartel killings in 2012 was that it could not objectively determine the cause of many deaths, given that less than 10 percent of crimes in the country were investigated. Moreover, <u>scale effects <strong>matter a great deal</strong> in collecting intelligence in a very murky</u>, violent <u>environment</u>. <u>But good intelligence is critical for promptly</u> but selectively <u>responding to misbehavior</u>, as targeted deterrence requires. <u>Implementing </u>a <u>targeted deterrence</u> strategy <u>in one neighborhood of a city with one city-level police force is</u> <u><strong>immeasurably easier</u></strong> <u>than implementing</u> such <u>a nuanced strategy that needs to be carefully-calibrated at a country level with many</u>—<u>competing</u>—<u>law enforcement agencies involved. Political sensitivities are also inherent</u> <u>in such a</u> targeted-deterrence <u>strategy</u>. <u>Targeting the most violent</u> criminal <u>groups entails going palpably easier on the less violent ones</u> and signaling that peaceful drug distribution, for example, will be prosecuted with lesser priority than distributing drugs violently. <u>Persuading one’s constituency and external allies that such a strategy is in fact sound requires skilled leadership</u>. In Rio, citizens have embraced such a strategy under the UPP and reelected the city’s mayor and endorsed his key security officials. But a decade earlier, <u>the political controversy surrounding the prioritized focus on violence and not drug distribution per se was one of the Achilles’ heels of GPAE and brought about its demise</u>. In fact, throughout its reign, the Calderón administration had to fend off accusations that it was going easier on the Sinaloa cartel.</p>
1NC
null
Cartels
430,033
5
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,893
No China war - they'll be restrained
Stutter 3/19/14
Stutter 3/19/14
Forecasts talk of an inevitable U.S.-China conflict However, enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America Domestic preoccupations Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern Though China has regional ambitions domestic concerns get overall priority. Xi is preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership for many years Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting Obama Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues but Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower. Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces constructive relations “Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive, assertive policy tendencies through interdependence in bilateral relationships China’s insecurity in Asia Asian stability is essential for China’s economic growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the U S poses grave dangers.
enduring circumstances hold Chinese leaders from confronting America Chinese growth and party rule require stability Though China has regional ambitions, domestic concerns get priority Xi is preoccupied with leadership legitimacy Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting Obama Growing economic interdependence reinforces constructive relations. Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive tendencies through bilateral relationships Asian stability is essential for China’s growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule China certainly calculates confronting the U S poses grave dangers.
Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, China-US Focus, March 19, 2014, "Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia", http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/ Forecasts talk of U.S. retreat from domineering China or an inevitable U.S.-China conflict. However, enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America, the regional leader. Domestic preoccupations Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability. And protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern. Though China also has regional and global ambitions, domestic concerns get overall priority. President Xi Jinping is preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy, pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership for many years. Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting President Obama in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship. Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues that involve the United States, but thus far Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower. Mutual interdependence Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces constructive relations. Respective “Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive, assertive, or other negative policy tendencies through webs of interdependence in bilateral and multilateral relationships. China’s insecurity in Asia Nearby Asia is China’s top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g. Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world (China is Africa’s biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea). Asian stability is essential for China’s economic growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery, China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the United States poses grave dangers.
2,188
<h4><u><strong>No China war - they'll be restrained</h4><p>Stutter 3/19/14</p><p></u></strong>Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, China-US Focus, March 19, 2014, "Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia", http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/</p><p><u>Forecasts talk of</u> U.S. retreat from domineering China or <u>an inevitable U.S.-China conflict</u>. <u><strong>However, <mark>enduring circumstances hold</mark> back <mark>Chinese leaders from confronting America</u></strong></mark>, the regional leader.</p><p><u><strong>Domestic preoccupations</p><p></strong><mark>Chinese</mark> economic <mark>growth and</mark> one-<mark>party rule require stability</u></mark>. And <u><strong>protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern</u></strong>. <u><mark>Though China</u></mark> also <u><mark>has regional</u></mark> and global <u><mark>ambitions</u>, <u><strong>domestic concerns get</mark> overall <mark>priority</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>President <u><mark>Xi</u></mark> Jinping <u><mark>is</u> <u><strong>preoccupied with</mark> uncertain <mark>leadership legitimacy</u></strong></mark>, <u>pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. <mark>Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership</mark> for many years</u>. <u><strong><mark>Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting</u></strong></mark> President <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship. <u>Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues</u> that involve the United States, <u><strong>but</u></strong> thus far <u><strong>Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.</p><p></u></strong>Mutual interdependence </p><p><u><strong><mark>Growing economic</mark> and other U.S.-China <mark>interdependence reinforces constructive relations</u></strong>.</mark> Respective <u><strong>“<mark>Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive</mark>, assertive</u></strong>, or other negative <u><strong>policy <mark>tendencies through</u></strong></mark> webs of <u><strong>interdependence in <mark>bilateral</u></strong></mark> and multilateral <u><strong><mark>relationships</u></strong></mark>. </p><p><u><strong>China’s insecurity in Asia </p><p></u></strong>Nearby Asia is China’s top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g. Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world (China is Africa’s biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea). <u><strong><mark>Asian stability is essential for China’s</mark> economic <mark>growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery</u>, <u><strong><mark>China</mark> almost <mark>certainly calculates</mark> that seriously <mark>confronting the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>poses grave dangers.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
China
2NC China War
95,968
92
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,894
In-Depth Debates about how to legalize are key – decrim is distinct and a negative startegy
Keller ‘13
Keller ‘13 (Bill Keller was executive editor of The New York Times from 2003 to 2011 and was an Op-Ed columnist from 2001 to 2003 and again from 2011 to 2014. From July 2003 until September 2011, he was the executive editor of The Times, presiding over the newsroom during a time of journalistic distinction, economic challenge, and transformation. During his eight years in that role, The Times sustained and built its formidable newsgathering staff, winning 18 Pulitzer Prizes, and expanded its audience by mastering the journalistic potential of the Internet. The newsroom also participated in the creation of a digital subscription plan to help secure the company’s economic future. Mr. Keller was succeeded by Jill Abramson, a former investigative reporter and Washington bureau chief who had been one of his two top deputies since 2003. Before becoming executive editor, Mr. Keller had spent two years as a senior writer for The New York Times Magazine and an Op-Ed columnist. He served as managing editor from 1997 to September 2001 after having been the newspaper’s foreign editor from June 1995 to 1997.“How to Legalize Pot” May 19, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/opinion/keller-how-to-legalize-pot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, TSW)
THE first time I talked to Kleiman a drug policy expert at U.C.L.A., was in 2002 he explained why legalization of marijuana was a bad idea Sure the government should remove penalties for possession, use and cultivation of small amounts But he worried that a robust commercial marketplace would inevitably lead to much more consumption So I was interested to learn, 11 years later ding the team hired to advise Washington State as it designs something the modern world has never seen: a fully legal commercial market in cannabi The marijuana debate has entered a new stage the most important question is no longer whether marijuana will be legalized how At some point you have to say, a law that people don’t obey is a bad law he suspects that the best hope of minimizing its harm may be a well-regulated market , but what does that look like A few places have had limited legalization many jurisdictions have decriminalized and 18 states have approved medical use The biggest shadow hanging over this project is the Department of Justice. Federal law still makes felons of anyone who trades in cannabis federal authorities have left a lot of room They could declare that they will prosecute only drug producers who grow more than a certain amount, and those who traffic across state lines. One practical challenge facing the legalization pioneers is how to keep the marijuana market from being swallowed by a few big profiteers powerful oligopoly with every incentive to turn us into a nation of stone the likely best model is something resembling the wine industry — a fragmented market, many producers, none dominant. This could be done by limiting the size of licensed purveyors. It would help, too, to let individuals grow a few plants at home something Colorado’s new law permits but Washington’s does not, because polling showed Washingtonians didn’t want that. Among the things on the to-do list: certifying labs to test for potency and contamination Devising rules on labeling, so users know what they’re getting. Hiring inspectors, to make sure the sellers comply. Establishing limits on advertising, And all these rules must account not just for smoking but for pastries beverages inhalers One of the selling points of legalization is that states can take a cut of what will be, according to estimates, a $35 billion to $45 billion industry and earmark some of these new tax revenues for good causes. New York decriminalized possession of small amounts of pot way back in 1977, with the condition that there be no “public display.” The lawmakers meant to assure that you partied at home, not in the parks or on the sidewalks. They did not envision that this provision would create a pretext for throwing young black and Latino men in jail. If we can’t get our medical marijuana house in order, how do we expect voters to deal with legalizatio
THE first time I talked to a drug policy expert at U.C.L.A., in 02 he explained why legalization of marijuana was a bad idea Sure the government should remove penaltie But a robust commercial marketplace would inevitably lead to much more consumption So I was interested to learn, 11 years later ding the team hired to advise Washington State as it designs something the modern world has never seen: a fully legal commercial market in cannabi The marijuana debate has entered a new stage the most important question is no longer whether marijuana will be legalized how a well-regulated , but what does that look like A few places have had limited legalization many jurisdictions have decriminalized and 18 states have approved medical use . Federal law still makes felons of anyone who trades in cannabis federal authorities have left a lot of room They could declare that they will prosecute only drug producers who grow more than a certain amount, and those who traffic across state lines. One practical challenge facing the legalization pioneers is how to keep the marijuana market from being swallowed by a few big profiteers Among the things on the to-do list: certifying labs to test for potency and contamination Devising rules on labeling, so users know what they’re getting. Hiring inspectors, to make sure the sellers comply. Establishing limits on advertising, And all these rules must account not just for smoking but for pastries beverages inhalers One of the selling points of legalization is that states can take a cut
THE first time I talked to Mark Kleiman, a drug policy expert at U.C.L.A., was in 2002, and he explained why legalization of marijuana was a bad idea. Sure, he said, the government should remove penalties for possession, use and cultivation of small amounts. He did not favor making outlaws of people for enjoying a drug that is less injurious than alcohol or tobacco. But he worried that a robust commercial marketplace would inevitably lead to much more consumption. You don’t have to be a prohibitionist to recognize that pot, especially in adolescents and very heavy users, can seriously mess with your brain. So I was interested to learn, 11 years later, that Kleiman is leading the team hired to advise Washington State as it designs something the modern world has never seen: a fully legal commercial market in cannabis. Washington is one of the first two states (Colorado is the other) to legalize the production, sale and consumption of marijuana as a recreational drug for consumers 21 and over. The marijuana debate has entered a new stage. Today the most interesting and important question is no longer whether marijuana will be legalized — eventually, bit by bit, it will be — but how. “At some point you have to say, a law that people don’t obey is a bad law,” Kleiman told me when I asked how his views had evolved. He has not come to believe marijuana is harmless, but he suspects that the best hope of minimizing its harm may be a well-regulated market. Ah, but what does that look like? A few places, like the Netherlands, have had limited legalization; many jurisdictions have decriminalized personal use; and 18 states in this country have approved the drug for medical use. (Twelve others, including New York, are considering it.) But Washington and Colorado have set out to invent a whole industry from scratch and, in theory, to avoid the shortcomings of other markets in legal vices — tobacco, alcohol, gambling — that lurched into being without much forethought, and have supplied, along with much pleasure, much misery. The biggest shadow hanging over this project is the Department of Justice. Federal law still makes felons of anyone who trades in cannabis. Despite the tolerant drift of the polls, despite evidence indicating that states with medical marijuana programs have not, as opponents feared, experienced an increase in use by teenagers, despite new moves toward legalization in Latin America, no one expects Congress to remove cannabis from the list of criminal substances any time soon. (“Not until the second Hillary Clinton administration,” Kleiman says.) But federal authorities have always left a lot of room for local discretion on marijuana enforcement. They could, for example, declare that they will prosecute only drug producers who grow more than a certain amount, and those who traffic across state lines. Attorney General Eric Holder, perhaps preoccupied with scandal management, has been slow to come up with enforcement guidelines that could give the states a comfort zone in which to experiment. One practical challenge facing the legalization pioneers is how to keep the marijuana market from being swallowed by a few big profiteers — the pot equivalent of Big Tobacco, or even the actual tobacco industry — a powerful oligopoly with every incentive to turn us into a nation of stoners. There is nothing inherently evil about the profit motive, but there is evidence that pot dealers, like purveyors of alcohol, get the bulk of their profit from those who use the product to excess. “When you get a for-profit producer or distributor industry going, their incentives are to increase sales,” said Jonathan Caulkins of Carnegie Mellon, another member of the Washington consulting team. “And the vast majority of sales go to people who are daily or near-daily consumers.” What Kleiman and his colleagues (speaking for themselves, not Washington State) imagine as the likely best model is something resembling the wine industry — a fragmented market, many producers, none dominant. This could be done by limiting the size of licensed purveyors. It would help, too, to let individuals grow a few plants at home — something Colorado’s new law permits but Washington’s does not, because polling showed Washingtonians didn’t want that. If you read the proposal Kleiman’s team submitted to Washington State, you may be a little boggled by the complexities of turning an illicit herb into a regulated, safe, consumer-friendly business. Among the things on the to-do list: certifying labs to test for potency and contamination. (Pot can contain, among other nasty things, pesticides, molds and salmonella.) Devising rules on labeling, so users know what they’re getting. Hiring inspectors, to make sure the sellers comply. Establishing limits on advertising, because you don’t want allowing to become promoting. And all these rules must account not just for smoking but for pot pastries, pot candies, pot-infused beverages, pot lozenges, pot ice cream, pot vapor inhalers. One of the selling points of legalization is that states can take a cut of what will be, according to estimates, a $35 billion to $45 billion industry and earmark some of these new tax revenues for good causes. It’s the same tactic used to win public approval of lotteries — and with the same danger: that some worthy government function comes to depend on creating more addicts. And how do you divvy up the revenues? How much goes to offset health consequences? How much goes to enforcement? How do you calibrate taxes so the price of pot is high enough to discourage excessive use, but not so high that a cheap black market arises? All this regulating is almost enough to take the fun out of drugs. And then there is the issue of drugged driving. Much about the chemistry of marijuana in human beings remains uncertain, in part because the government has not supported much research. So no one has come up with a pot version of the breathalyzer to determine quickly whether a driver is impaired. In the absence of solid research, some legalization advocates insist stoned drivers are more cautious, and thus safer. (Hands up if you want Harold and Kumar driving your taxi. Or piloting your airplane.) On this and much else, Washington and Colorado will probably be making it up as they go, waiting for science to catch up. And experience tells us they are sure to get some things wrong. New York decriminalized possession of small amounts of pot way back in 1977, with the condition that there be no “public display.” The lawmakers meant to assure that you partied at home, not in the parks or on the sidewalks. They did not envision that this provision would create a pretext for throwing young black and Latino men in jail. When police in New York City stop and frisk, which they do a lot in rougher neighborhoods, they order their targets to turn out their pockets and — whoa, public display, come with us, son! Gov. Andrew Cuomo is promoting an amendment to curb that abuse of power. On the opposite coast, California demonstrates a different kind of unintended consequences. The state’s medical marijuana law is such a free-for-all that in Los Angeles there are now said to be more pot dispensaries than Starbucks outlets. Even advocates of full legalization say things have gotten out of hand. “It’s a bit of a farce when you can watch people come out of a dispensary, go around the corner and resell their drugs,” said Gavin Newsom, the lieutenant governor and former San Francisco mayor, who favors legalization. “If we can’t get our medical marijuana house in order, how do we expect voters to deal with legalization?” He is now part of a group discussing how to impose more order on California’s medical marijuana market, with an eye to offering broader legalization in 2016. And, he told me, his state will be paying close attention to Washington and Colorado, hoping somebody can, as Mark Kleiman puts it, “design a system that gets us to ‘orderly’ without getting us to ‘way too stoned.’ ”
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<h4>In-Depth Debates about how to legalize are key – decrim is distinct and a negative <u><strong>startegy</h4><p>Keller ‘13</p><p></u></strong>(Bill Keller was executive editor of The New York Times from 2003 to 2011 and was an Op-Ed columnist from 2001 to 2003 and again from 2011 to 2014. From July 2003 until September 2011, he was the executive editor of The Times, presiding over the newsroom during a time of journalistic distinction, economic challenge, and transformation. During his eight years in that role, The Times sustained and built its formidable newsgathering staff, winning 18 Pulitzer Prizes, and expanded its audience by mastering the journalistic potential of the Internet. The newsroom also participated in the creation of a digital subscription plan to help secure the company’s economic future. Mr. Keller was succeeded by Jill Abramson, a former investigative reporter and Washington bureau chief who had been one of his two top deputies since 2003. Before becoming executive editor, Mr. Keller had spent two years as a senior writer for The New York Times Magazine and an Op-Ed columnist. He served as managing editor from 1997 to September 2001 after having been the newspaper’s foreign editor from June 1995 to 1997.“How to Legalize Pot” May 19, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/opinion/keller-how-to-legalize-pot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, TSW)</p><p><u><mark>THE first time I talked to</u></mark> Mark <u>Kleiman</u>, <u><mark>a drug policy expert at U.C.L.A.,</u></mark> <u>was <mark>in</mark> 20<mark>02</u></mark>, and <u><mark>he explained why legalization of marijuana was a bad idea</u></mark>. <u><mark>Sure</u></mark>, he said, <u><mark>the government should remove penaltie</mark>s for possession, use and cultivation of small amounts</u>. He did not favor making outlaws of people for enjoying a drug that is less injurious than alcohol or tobacco. <u><mark>But</mark> he worried that <mark>a robust commercial</mark> <mark>marketplace would inevitably lead to much more consumption</u></mark>. You don’t have to be a prohibitionist to recognize that pot, especially in adolescents and very heavy users, can seriously mess with your brain. <u><mark>So I was interested to learn, 11 years later</u></mark>, that Kleiman is lea<u><mark>ding the team hired to advise Washington State as it designs something the modern world has never seen: a fully legal commercial market in cannabi</u></mark>s. Washington is one of the first two states (Colorado is the other) to legalize the production, sale and consumption of marijuana as a recreational drug for consumers 21 and over. <u><strong><mark>The marijuana debate has entered a new stage</u></strong></mark>. Today <u><strong><mark>the most</u></strong></mark> interesting and <u><strong><mark>important question is no longer whether marijuana will be legalized</mark> </u></strong>— eventually, bit by bit, it will be — but <u><strong><mark>how</u></strong></mark>. “<u>At some point you have to say, a law that people don’t obey is a bad law</u>,” Kleiman told me when I asked how his views had evolved. He has not come to believe marijuana is harmless, but <u>he suspects that the best hope of minimizing its harm may be <mark>a well-regulated</mark> market</u>. Ah<u><strong><mark>, but what does that look like</u></strong></mark>? <u><mark>A few places</u></mark>, like the Netherlands, <u><mark>have had limited legalization</u></mark>; <u><mark>many jurisdictions have decriminalized</u></mark> personal use; <u><mark>and 18 states</u></mark> in this country <u><mark>have approved</u></mark> the drug for <u><mark>medical use</u></mark>. (Twelve others, including New York, are considering it.) But Washington and Colorado have set out to invent a whole industry from scratch and, in theory, to avoid the shortcomings of other markets in legal vices — tobacco, alcohol, gambling — that lurched into being without much forethought, and have supplied, along with much pleasure, much misery. <u>The</u> <u>biggest shadow hanging over this project is the Department of Justice<mark>. Federal law still makes felons of anyone who trades in cannabis</u></mark>. Despite the tolerant drift of the polls, despite evidence indicating that states with medical marijuana programs have not, as opponents feared, experienced an increase in use by teenagers, despite new moves toward legalization in Latin America, no one expects Congress to remove cannabis from the list of criminal substances any time soon. (“Not until the second Hillary Clinton administration,” Kleiman says.) But <u><mark>federal authorities have</u></mark> always <u><mark>left a lot of room</u></mark> for local discretion on marijuana enforcement. <u><mark>They could</u></mark>, for example, <u><mark>declare that they will prosecute only drug producers who grow more than a certain amount, and those who traffic across state lines.</u></mark> Attorney General Eric Holder, perhaps preoccupied with scandal management, has been slow to come up with enforcement guidelines that could give the states a comfort zone in which to experiment. <u><mark>One practical challenge facing the legalization pioneers is how to keep the marijuana market from being swallowed by a few big profiteers</u></mark> — the pot equivalent of Big Tobacco, or even the actual tobacco industry — a <u>powerful oligopoly with every incentive to turn us into a nation of stone</u>rs. There is nothing inherently evil about the profit motive, but there is evidence that pot dealers, like purveyors of alcohol, get the bulk of their profit from those who use the product to excess. “When you get a for-profit producer or distributor industry going, their incentives are to increase sales,” said Jonathan Caulkins of Carnegie Mellon, another member of the Washington consulting team. “And the vast majority of sales go to people who are daily or near-daily consumers.” What Kleiman and his colleagues (speaking for themselves, not Washington State) imagine as <u>the likely best model is something resembling the wine industry — a fragmented market, many producers, none dominant.</u> <u>This could be done by limiting the size of licensed purveyors. It would help, too, to let individuals grow a few plants at home</u> — <u>something Colorado’s new law permits but Washington’s does not, because polling showed Washingtonians didn’t want that. </u>If you read the proposal Kleiman’s team submitted to Washington State, you may be a little boggled by the complexities of turning an illicit herb into a regulated, safe, consumer-friendly business. <u><mark>Among the things on the to-do list: certifying labs to test for potency and contamination</u></mark>. (Pot can contain, among other nasty things, pesticides, molds and salmonella.) <u><mark>Devising rules on labeling, so users know what they’re getting. Hiring inspectors, to make sure the sellers comply. Establishing limits on advertising,</u></mark> because you don’t want allowing to become promoting. <u><mark>And all these rules must account not just for smoking but</mark> <mark>for</u></mark> pot <u><mark>pastries</u></mark>, pot candies, pot-infused <u><mark>beverages</u></mark>, pot lozenges, pot ice cream, pot vapor <u><mark>inhalers</u></mark>. <u><mark>One of the selling points of legalization is that states can take a cut</u></mark> <u>of what will be, according to estimates, a $35 billion to $45 billion industry and earmark some of these new tax revenues for good causes.</u> It’s the same tactic used to win public approval of lotteries — and with the same danger: that some worthy government function comes to depend on creating more addicts. And how do you divvy up the revenues? How much goes to offset health consequences? How much goes to enforcement? How do you calibrate taxes so the price of pot is high enough to discourage excessive use, but not so high that a cheap black market arises? All this regulating is almost enough to take the fun out of drugs. And then there is the issue of drugged driving. Much about the chemistry of marijuana in human beings remains uncertain, in part because the government has not supported much research. So no one has come up with a pot version of the breathalyzer to determine quickly whether a driver is impaired. In the absence of solid research, some legalization advocates insist stoned drivers are more cautious, and thus safer. (Hands up if you want Harold and Kumar driving your taxi. Or piloting your airplane.) On this and much else, Washington and Colorado will probably be making it up as they go, waiting for science to catch up. And experience tells us they are sure to get some things wrong. <u>New York decriminalized possession of small amounts of pot way back in 1977, with the condition that there be no “public display.” The lawmakers meant to assure that you partied at home, not in the parks or on the sidewalks. They did not envision that this provision would create a pretext for throwing young black and Latino men in jail. </u>When police in New York City stop and frisk, which they do a lot in rougher neighborhoods, they order their targets to turn out their pockets and — whoa, public display, come with us, son! Gov. Andrew Cuomo is promoting an amendment to curb that abuse of power. On the opposite coast, California demonstrates a different kind of unintended consequences. The state’s medical marijuana law is such a free-for-all that in Los Angeles there are now said to be more pot dispensaries than Starbucks outlets. Even advocates of full legalization say things have gotten out of hand. “It’s a bit of a farce when you can watch people come out of a dispensary, go around the corner and resell their drugs,” said Gavin Newsom, the lieutenant governor and former San Francisco mayor, who favors legalization. “<u>If we can’t get our medical marijuana house in order, how do we expect voters to deal with legalizatio</u>n?” He is now part of a group discussing how to impose more order on California’s medical marijuana market, with an eye to offering broader legalization in 2016. And, he told me, his state will be paying close attention to Washington and Colorado, hoping somebody can, as Mark Kleiman puts it, “design a system that gets us to ‘orderly’ without getting us to ‘way too stoned.’ ”</p>
1NR
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Topic Education DA
430,034
1
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
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48,386
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Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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1,004
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NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,895
Legalize means remove restrictions
Sumner 11
Sumner 11 [L.W. Sumner (a Canadian philosopher notable for his work on normative and applied ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. Sumner is University Professor Emeritus of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto.) “Assisted Death: A study in Ethics and Law” Oxford University Press, pg. 165-166, CBE]
The contrast between legalization and decriminalization is frequently invoked for a number of practices that the state likes to control, including assisted death By decriminalizing a practice I mean repealing any and all criminal Statutes governing that practice Decriminalization is consistent with regulating the practice by Other, non—criminal, legal means Legalization is consistent with imposing no restrictions on it whatever—leaving it completely unregulated—or with permitting it subject to a regulatory regime.
Decriminalization is consistent with regulating the practice by Other, non—criminal, legal means Legalization is consistent with imposing no restrictions leaving it completely unregulated
Before we get to the main business of the chapter, a terminological note is in order. Throughout the discussion I have consistently spoken about legalizing assisted death rather than decriminalizing it. The contrast between legalization and decriminalization is frequently invoked for a number of practices that the state likes to control, including (besides assisted death) prostitution, drug use, and abortion. Despite the popularity of the distinction, however, there appears to be no common understanding of exactly what it means. So the best thing I can do is to state as clearly as possible what I mean by it. I By decriminalizing a practice I mean repealing any and all criminal Statutes governing that practice. Decriminalization is consistent with regulating (or even prohibiting) the practice by Other, non—criminal, legal means. This is the sense in which abortion has been decriminalized in Canada: the previous criminal statute regulating the practice was struck down by the Supreme Court in its 1988 Morgentaler decision and was never replaced either in whole or in part. There is, therefore, no criminal regulation of abortion in Canada today; nonetheless, the practice IS still regulated in Other ways (through provincial licensing laws, certification requirements for medical practitioners, hospital regulations concerning late-term abortions, require- ments of competent medical practice, etc.). In most other countries there is still criminal legislation governing abortion, though it may be just as liberal in its effect as the current regime in Canada; in those cases abortion has not been decriminalized, though it has been legalized. By legalizing a practice I mean making some legal provision for it i.e. not completely prohibiting it. Legalization is consistent with imposing no restrictions on it whatever—leaving it completely unregulated—or with permitting it subject to a regulatory regime. Abortion was legalized, but not decrim- inalized, in Canada in 1969 when the previous criminal statute was amended to stipulate conditions under which performing an abortion would not be an offence.
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<h4><strong>Legalize means remove restrictions</h4><p>Sumner 11</p><p></strong>[L.W. Sumner (a Canadian philosopher notable for his work on normative and applied ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. Sumner is University Professor Emeritus of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto.) “Assisted Death: A study in Ethics and Law” Oxford University Press, pg. 165-166, CBE]</p><p>Before we get to the main business of the chapter, a terminological note is in order. Throughout the discussion I have consistently spoken about legalizing assisted death rather than decriminalizing it. <u><strong>The contrast between legalization and decriminalization is frequently invoked for a number of practices that the state likes to control, including</u></strong> (besides <u><strong>assisted death</u></strong>) prostitution, drug use, and abortion. Despite the popularity of the distinction, however, there appears to be no common understanding of exactly what it means. So the best thing I can do is to state as clearly as possible what I mean by it. I <u><strong>By</u></strong> <u><strong>decriminalizing a practice</u></strong> <u><strong>I mean repealing any and all criminal Statutes governing that practice</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Decriminalization is consistent with regulating</u></strong></mark> (or even prohibiting) <u><strong><mark>the practice by Other, non—criminal, legal means</u></strong></mark>. This is the sense in which abortion has been decriminalized in Canada: the previous criminal statute regulating the practice was struck down by the Supreme Court in its 1988 Morgentaler decision and was never replaced either in whole or in part. There is, therefore, no criminal regulation of abortion in Canada today; nonetheless, the practice IS still regulated in Other ways (through provincial licensing laws, certification requirements for medical practitioners, hospital regulations concerning late-term abortions, require- ments of competent medical practice, etc.). In most other countries there is still criminal legislation governing abortion, though it may be just as liberal in its effect as the current regime in Canada; in those cases abortion has not been decriminalized, though it has been legalized. By legalizing a practice I mean making some legal provision for it i.e. not completely prohibiting it. <u><strong><mark>Legalization is consistent with imposing no restrictions</mark> on it whatever—<mark>leaving it completely unregulated</mark>—or with permitting it subject to a regulatory regime.</u></strong> Abortion was legalized, but not decrim- inalized, in Canada in 1969 when the previous criminal statute was amended to stipulate conditions under which performing an abortion would not be an offence. </p>
2AC
FW
AT: Extinction First
430,035
2
16,993
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3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
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740,896
The preference for high magnitude impacts is based upon a form of privileged narcissism – arbitrarily flip that for this debate
Mignolo ‘7
Mignolo ‘7 (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)
The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5
rhetoric of modernity occluded—under its rhetoric of salvation and the good life the dispensability of human lives not all massive killings have been recorded with the same value and visibility. The criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign of imperial politics the enunciator becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have institutional power to rank according to a racist classification
The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human lives from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5
1,322
<h4><u>The preference for high magnitude impacts is based upon a form of privileged narcissism – arbitrarily flip that for this debate</h4><p><strong>Mignolo ‘7</strong> (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)</p><p>The <mark>rhetoric of modernity</mark> (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) <mark>occluded—under its </mark>triumphant <mark>rhetoric of salvation and the good life</mark> for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and <mark>the <strong>dispensability of human lives</mark> </strong>from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, <mark>not all </mark>the <mark>massive killings have been recorded with the same value and</mark> the same <mark>visibility. The </mark>unspoken <mark>criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign</mark> (from a de-colonial interpretation) <mark>of </mark>the hidden <mark>imperial </mark>identity <mark>politics</mark>: that is, <mark>the </mark>value of human lives to which the life of the <mark>enunciator </mark>belongs <mark>becomes the <strong>measuring stick</strong> to evaluate other human lives who do not have </mark>the intellectual option and <mark>institutional power to</mark> tell the story and to classify events according to a <mark>rank</mark>ing of human lives; that is, <mark>according to a racist classification</mark>.5</p></u>
2NC
K
OV
5,117
160
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,897
This too has been codified in the legal system – though some laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide have been lifted, one of the earliest pro-PAS measures, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, employs “mental competency” standards which embrace a paternalistic view of disabled bodies as unable to ever act on their own which reinforces ableism – Sara Qualls and Julia Kasl-Godley explain that
null
Sara Honn, Professor, Kraemer Family Professor of Aging, Director of Gerontology Center and Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University, and Julia, Ph.D from USC, End-of-Life Issues, Grief, and Bereavement: What Clinicians Need to Know, 2010, p.269-271 SJE
Disability experts have raised concerns about the capability clause. They point to evidence that people without disabilities assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically lower than do people with disabilities A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,” , capacity assessment may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted- suicide policies it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective “clinicians are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use” ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted suicide requests. The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing judgment No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment. This clause is meant to provide safeguards but it is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless. the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is that within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence of impaired judgment and mental disorder suicidal ideation is one of the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status, which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies
Disability experts raised concerns about¶ the capability clause capacity assessment is meant to provide protection, but it is subjective. clinicians¶ are left to decide on their own how strict a standard to use ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted¶ suicide requests.¶ The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing¶ judgment No medication shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the¶ patient is not suffering from a disorder This clause is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence¶ of impaired judgment suicidal ideation is one of¶ the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the¶ lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or enabling depends solely on their disability status, which experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies
Opponents of assisted suicide concur with the perspective that the capability evaluation clause is unworkable because of conceptual and empirical limitations, but they view these limitations as an argument against¶ assisted suicide rather than a reason to proceed without such an evaluation¶ (Hendin & Foley, 2008). Disability experts (Coleman, 1992, 2002; Gill,¶ 1992, 1998; Longmore, 2005; 01km, 2005) have raised other concerns about¶ the capability clause. They point to evidence that people without disabilities¶ assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically¶ lower than do people with disabilities, and they wonder whether a request¶ for physician-assisted suicide from a person with disabilities might then “be¶ subject to less scrutiny because the decision makes sense to others” (01km,¶ 2005, p. 70). “A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need¶ for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,”¶ writes Coleman (2002, p. 224). “In other words, when asked to describe¶ the ‘indignities’ that assisted suicide would help people avoid, proponents¶ describe disability” (Coleman, 2002 p. 220). “If professionals think that of¶ course the disabled person would want to die” because of the indignities¶ of disability, “might not these expectations play a disheartening role in some¶ one’s decision to seek physician-assisted suicide?” asks Olkin (2005, p. 70). In conclusion, capacity assessment may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted-¶ suicide policies (Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000, p. 388). Like the Trojan¶ horse, it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective. As advocates of assisted suicide recognize “clinicians¶ are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use”¶ (Werth et al., 2000, p. 356).¶ Clinicians asked to bring their expertise on assessments of the capability¶ to make requests to die should exercise great caution in what they promise¶ they can deliver. They should he educated and educate others about the¶ limits of scientific knowledge on capability assessment. They should also be¶ aware about the danger, in the absence of scientifically robust standards, that¶ ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted¶ suicide requests.¶ The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing¶ judgment. If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a ¶ psychiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a psychological¶ evaluation. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner¶ shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the¶ patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression¶ causing impaired judgment. This clause, like the one about capacity, is meant¶ to provide safeguards against the influence of psychological disorders on¶ judgment, but it is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless. First ¶ of all, it is an “exceedingly minimalist” clause (Burt, 2000. p. 383) because¶ it rules out only mental conditions that impair judgment. In other words,¶ the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these¶ disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards (Burt, 2000; N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005;¶ Sullivan et al., 1998). Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is¶ that within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence¶ of impaired judgment and mental disorder. In fact, suicidal ideation is one of¶ the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment (Sullivan¶ et al., 1998). Based on current clinical standards, the presence of suicidal¶ intention calls for an automatic finding of incompetence and obligates the¶ clinician to suicide prevention, including removal of lethal means. By contrast, within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the¶ lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention¶ (N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005). Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status, which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies (Coleman, 2002).
4,402
<h4>This too has been codified in the legal system – though some laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide have been lifted, one of the earliest pro-PAS measures, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, employs “mental competency” standards which embrace a paternalistic view of disabled bodies as unable to ever act on their own which reinforces ableism – Sara Qualls and Julia Kasl-Godley explain that</h4><p>Sara Honn, Professor, Kraemer Family Professor of Aging, Director of Gerontology Center and Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University, and Julia, Ph.D from USC, End-of-Life Issues, Grief, and Bereavement: What Clinicians Need to Know, 2010, p.269-271 SJE</p><p>Opponents of assisted suicide concur with the perspective that the capability evaluation clause is unworkable because of conceptual and empirical limitations, but they view these limitations as an argument against¶ assisted suicide rather than a reason to proceed without such an evaluation¶ (Hendin & Foley, 2008). <u><mark>Disability experts</u></mark> (Coleman, 1992, 2002; Gill,¶ 1992, 1998; Longmore, 2005; 01km, 2005) <u>have <mark>raised</u></mark> other <u><mark>concerns about</u>¶<u> the capability clause</mark>. They point to evidence that people without disabilities</u>¶<u> assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically</u>¶<u> lower than do people with disabilities</u>, and they wonder whether a request¶ for physician-assisted suicide from a person with disabilities might then “be¶ subject to less scrutiny because the decision makes sense to others” (01km,¶ 2005, p. 70). “<u>A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need</u>¶<u> for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,”</u>¶ writes Coleman (2002, p. 224). “In other words, when asked to describe¶ the ‘indignities’ that assisted suicide would help people avoid, proponents¶ describe disability” (Coleman, 2002 p. 220). “If professionals think that of¶ course the disabled person would want to die” because of the indignities¶ of disability, “might not these expectations play a disheartening role in some¶ one’s decision to seek physician-assisted suicide?” asks Olkin (2005, p. 70). In conclusion<u>, <mark>capacity assessment</mark> may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted-</u>¶<u> suicide policies</u> (Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000, p. 388). Like the Trojan¶ horse, <u>it <mark>is meant to provide protection, but </mark>it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that <mark>it is subjective</u>.</mark> As advocates of assisted suicide recognize <u>“<mark>clinicians</u>¶<u> are left to decide on their own </mark>[what to use and] <mark>how strict a standard to use</mark>”</u>¶ (Werth et al., 2000, p. 356).¶ Clinicians asked to bring their expertise on assessments of the capability¶ to make requests to die should exercise great caution in what they promise¶ they can deliver. They should he educated and educate others about the¶ limits of scientific knowledge on capability assessment. They should also be¶ aware about the danger, in the absence of scientifically robust standards, that¶ <u><strong><mark>ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted</u></strong>¶<u><strong> suicide requests</strong>.</u>¶<u> The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing</u>¶<u> judgment</u></mark>. If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a ¶ psychiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a psychological¶ evaluation. <u><mark>No medication </mark>to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner</u>¶<u> <mark>shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the</u>¶<u> patient is not suffering from a </mark>psychiatric or psychological <mark>disorder </mark>or depression</u>¶<u> causing impaired judgment. <mark>This clause</u></mark>, like the one about capacity, <u>is meant</u>¶<u> to provide safeguards</u> against the influence of psychological disorders on¶ judgment, <u>but it <mark>is <strong>so vague and weak to be practically meaningless</strong></mark>.</u> First ¶ of all, it is an “exceedingly minimalist” clause (Burt, 2000. p. 383) because¶ it rules out only mental conditions that impair judgment. In other words,¶ <u>the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these</u>¶<u> disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards</u> (Burt, 2000; N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005;¶ Sullivan et al., 1998). <u>Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is</u>¶<u> that <mark>within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence</u>¶<u> of impaired judgment</mark> and mental disorder</u>. In fact, <u><mark>suicidal ideation is one of</u>¶<u> the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment</u></mark> (Sullivan¶ et al., 1998). Based on current clinical standards, the presence of suicidal¶ intention calls for an automatic finding of incompetence and obligates the¶ clinician to suicide prevention, including removal of lethal means. By contrast, <u><mark>within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the</u>¶<u> lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention</u></mark>¶ (N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005). <u><strong><mark>Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or </mark>suicide <mark>enabling depends solely on their </mark>health or <mark>disability status, which </mark>disability <mark>experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies</u></strong></mark> (Coleman, 2002).</p>
null
null
null
429,998
5
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,898
No US/China war - nukes and geography
Keck 13 , AB)
Keck 13 (Zachary Keck, Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, July 12th 2013, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War” http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/, AB)
, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash even if they remain fiercely competitive nuclear weapons make bad politics it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways in Europe many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. China and the U.S. are separated by the Pacific Ocean which will also weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another In many of the violent power transitions of the past the rival states were located in close proximity to one another when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War the difficulty of projecting power across large distances reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests. Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential Thus, while every effort should be made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is nearly unthinkable one will occur.
a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of nuclear weapons and geography both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the reason why they won’t clash it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange geography has a history Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain fears China and the U.S. are separated which weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception In many violent power transitions rival states were located in proximity when great power conflict has been avoided states have considerable distance
But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography. The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures. Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways. First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries—according to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power. This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, in Europe where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival. Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. Besides being immensely large countries, China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent power transitions of the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast, when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: the difficulty of projecting power across large distances—particularly bodies of waters— reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests. True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijing’s neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least. Thus, while every effort should be made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is nearly unthinkable one will occur.
5,752
<h4>No US/China war - nukes and geography </h4><p><u><strong><mark>Keck 13</u></strong></mark> (Zachary Keck, Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, July 12th 2013, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War” http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/<u><strong>, AB)</p><p></u></strong>But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace<u>, <mark>a U.S.-China war is <strong>virtually unthinkable</strong></mark> <mark>because of</mark> two other factors: <strong><mark>nuclear weapons</strong> and <strong>geography</u></strong></mark>. <u>The fact that <mark>both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is</mark> <mark>the</mark> most obvious <mark>reason</mark>s<mark> why <strong>they won’t clash</u></strong></mark>, <u>even if they remain fiercely competitive</u>. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and <u>nuclear weapons make</u> war extremely <u>bad politics</u>. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, <u><mark>it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange</mark> between China and the United States</u>. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures. Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, <u><mark>geography has a history</mark> of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways</u>. First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries—according to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power. This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, <u>in Europe</u> where <u>many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities </u>to such a degree <u>that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival</u>. <u><mark>Neither China</u> <u>nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain</mark> such <mark>fears</mark>, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. </u>Besides being immensely large countries, <u><mark>China and the U.S. are</mark> </u>also <u><mark>separated</mark> by the Pacific Ocean</u>, <u><mark>which</mark> will also <mark>weaken</mark> <mark>their sense of insecurity and threat perception</mark> towards one another</u>. <u><mark>In</mark> <mark>many</mark> of the <mark>violent power</mark> <mark>transitions</mark> of the past</u>, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, <u>the <mark>rival states were located in</mark> close <mark>proximity</mark> to one another</u>. By contrast, <u><mark>when great power conflict has been avoided</mark>, the <mark>states have</mark> often had <mark>considerable distance</mark> between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War</u>. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: <u>the difficulty of projecting power across large distances</u>—particularly bodies of waters— <u>reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests. </u>True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijing’s neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. <u>Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential</u>, if history is any guide at least. <u>Thus, while every effort should be made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is nearly unthinkable one will occur. </p></u>
1NR
China
2NC China War
36,146
306
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
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Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
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null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,899
It’s arbitrary and undermines research
Resnick 1
Resnick 1 Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2
a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk exacerbating misperceptions Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research
a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an ad hoc fashion risk misperceptions Scholars undercut valuable research
In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.
557
<h4><u><strong>It’s arbitrary and undermines research</h4><p>Resnick 1</p><p></u></strong>Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2</p><p>In matters of national security, establishing <u><mark>a clear definition of terms is a precondition</u></mark> for effective policymaking. <u><mark>Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an</mark> erratic, <mark>ad hoc fashion risk</u></mark> alienating their constituencies. They also risk <u>exacerbating <mark>misperceptions</u></mark> and hostility among those the policies target. <u><mark>Scholars</mark> who commit the same error <mark>undercut</mark> their ability to conduct <mark>valuable</mark> empirical <mark>research</u></mark>. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.</p>
1NR
T
Reasonability
61,001
186
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,900
This vested interest in preserving a vital community categorizes life according to purity, creating a vicious form of state racism used to protect sovereignty. Foucault explains
null
Michel, “Society Must Be Defended,” (Lectures at College de France), Lecture Four, 1/28/76 SJE
At the time when this discourse was being converted into a revolutionary discourse it was only natural that attempts should he made by one side to recode the old counterhistory in terms of race in the biological and medical sense of that term. You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form and function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them, and it will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle for existence. It is a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest species. the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals, but by medico-normalizing techniques. sovereignty was able to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution
. At the time when this discourse was being converted into a revolutionary discourse it was natural that attempts should he made to recode the old counterhistory in terms¶ of race in the biological and medical sense You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form¶ and function of the discourse on race struggle the theme of historical war will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle¶ for existence. the State is no longer an instrument one race uses¶ against another: the State is the protector of the superiority of the race. racism is born when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political the discourse of race was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State whose vigor were guaranteed by medico-normalizing techniques sovereignty was able¶ to take race for its own strategy. State sovereignty becomes the imperative to¶ protect the race an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution
I think this provides us with a starting point for understanding¶ how and why historical discourse could become a new issue in the¶ mid nineteenth century. At the time when this discourse was being displaced, translated, or converted into a revolutionary discourse, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to be¶ replaced by that of class struggle—and in fact, when I say “the mid-¶ nineteenth century,” that’s too late; it was in the first half of the¶ nineteenth century, as it was [Thiers] who transformed race struggle¶ into class struggle—at the time when this conversion was going on,¶ it was in fact only natural that attempts should he made by one side¶ to recode the old counterhistory not in terms of class, but in terms¶ of races-—races in the biological and medical sense of that term. And¶ it was at the moment when a counterhistory of the revolutionary type¶ was taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shape—¶ but it will be a counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that was¶ present in this discourse. You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form¶ and function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them,¶ and it will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war—with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its victories, and its¶ defeats—will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle¶ for existence. It is no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would¶ understand the term, but a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest¶ species. Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided¶ into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so¶ on will he replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically¶ monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not¶ divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,¶ and which are in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreigners¶ have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this¶ society’s by products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,¶ finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into¶ its opposite: the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses¶ against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race. The idea of racial¶ purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that¶ is what replaces the idea of race struggle.¶ I think that racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle, and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism. The connection between racism and antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,¶ then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice that¶ appears at a given moment in a sort of’ grand antirevolutionary protect.¶ At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was being trans¶ formed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionary¶ thought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism now¶ began to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite literally,¶ revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we could¶ put it this way: Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political¶ discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the singular) was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it,¶ of using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose¶ luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals,¶ but by medico-normalizing techniques. Thanks to the shift from law¶ to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the¶ emancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, sovereignty was able¶ to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it¶ for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to¶ protect the race. It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.
4,575
<h4>This vested interest in preserving a vital community categorizes life according to purity, creating a vicious form of state racism used to protect sovereignty. Foucault explains</h4><p>Michel, “Society Must Be Defended,” (Lectures at College de France), Lecture Four, 1/28/76 SJE</p><p>I think this provides us with a starting point for understanding¶ how and why historical discourse could become a new issue in the¶ mid nineteenth century<mark>. <u>At the time when this discourse was being</u></mark> displaced, translated, or <u><mark>converted into a revolutionary discourse</u></mark>, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to be¶ replaced by that of class struggle—and in fact, when I say “the mid-¶ nineteenth century,” that’s too late; it was in the first half of the¶ nineteenth century, as it was [Thiers] who transformed race struggle¶ into class struggle—at the time when this conversion was going on,¶ <u><mark>it was</u></mark> in fact <u>only <mark>natural that attempts should he made</mark> by one side</u>¶<u> <mark>to recode the old counterhistory</u></mark> not in terms of class, but <u><mark>in terms</u>¶<u> of race</u></mark>s-—races <u><mark>in the biological and medical sense</mark> of that term.</u> And¶ it was at the moment when a counterhistory of the revolutionary type¶ was taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shape—¶ but it will be a counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that was¶ present in this discourse. <u><strong><mark>You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism.</strong> This racism takes over and reconverts the form</u>¶<u> and function of the discourse on race struggle</mark>, but it distorts them,</u>¶<u> and it will be characterized by the fact that <mark>the theme of historical war</u></mark>—with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its victories, and its¶ defeats—<u><mark>will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle</u>¶<u> for existence. </mark>It is </u>no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would¶ understand the term, but <u>a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest</u>¶<u> species.</u> Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided¶ into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so¶ on will he replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically¶ monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not¶ divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,¶ and which are in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreigners¶ have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this¶ society’s by products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,¶ finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into¶ its opposite: <u><mark>the State is no longer an instrument </mark>that <mark>one race uses</u>¶<u> against another: the State is</mark>, and must be, <mark>the protector of the </mark>integrity, the <mark>superiority</mark>, and the purity <mark>of the race</u>.</mark> The idea of racial¶ purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that¶ is what replaces the idea of race struggle.¶ I think that <u><strong><mark>racism is born </mark>at the point <mark>when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle</u></strong></mark>, <u>and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism</u>. The connection between racism and antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,¶ then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice that¶ appears at a given moment in a sort of’ grand antirevolutionary protect.¶ At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was being trans¶ formed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionary¶ thought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism now¶ began to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite literally,¶ revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we could¶ put it this way: <u>Whereas <mark>the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political</u></mark>¶<u> discourse of Roman sovereignty, <mark>the discourse of race</u></mark> (in the singular)<u> <mark>was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it</u></mark>,¶ of <u><strong><mark>using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State</strong></mark>, a sovereignty <mark>whose</u></mark>¶<u> luster and <mark>vigor were </mark>no longer <mark>guaranteed by</mark> magico-juridical rituals,</u>¶<u> but by <strong><mark>medico-normalizing techniques</strong></mark>.</u> Thanks to the shift from law¶ to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the¶ emancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, <u><mark>sovereignty was able</u>¶<u> to </mark>invest or <mark>take </mark>over the discourse of <mark>race </mark>struggle and reutilize it</u>¶<u> <mark>for its own strategy. State sovereignty</mark> thus <mark>becomes the imperative to</u>¶<u> protect the race</u></mark>. <u><strong>It becomes both <mark>an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution</u></strong></mark> that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.</p>
null
null
null
221,997
5
16,994
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
564,700
A
NDT
7
NYU IZ
Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,901
Superstasis DA: The genealogical approach demands the rejection of subjectively fixed transcendental structures critique can operate inside of – our disruption of those regimes of rational synthesis forces us to think otherwise
Kazarian 2k
Kazarian 2k
Foucault wants to substitute a domain of experience" that "is neither inner experience, nor the¶ fundamental structures of scientific knowledge," nor "a group of historical contents constituted by the¶ simultaneous rejection of fixed historical meaning, subjective interiority, and¶ transcendental structures of any sort. one has to¶ make one’s own history, fabricate history, as if through fiction, in terms of how it would¶ be traversed by the question of the relationships between structures of rationality¶ which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjection which are linked to¶ it Unlike critical analysis which operates on a domain that is pre-formed according to a fixed abstract regime of "possible experience" that ultimately amounts to nothing other than possible truth,¶ and which attempts to subordinate the imagination to the dictates of rational synthesis Foucault’s “critical attitude,” gives analysis itself the¶ operative valence not of synthesis but of disruption and dispersal, so that the work of¶ analysis makes it not only possible but indeed necessary to think otherwise.¶ he argues for a new form of critical analysis¶ that is "genealogical and which in order "not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream¶ of freedom…must also be…experimental" it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is important for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the¶ contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer¶ being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think
Foucault wants a domain of experience constituted by the rejection of fixed historical meaning and¶ transcendental structures of any sort Unlike analysis which operates on a domain pre-formed according to a fixed abstract regime of¶ "possible experience" that amounts to nothing other than possible truth,¶ and attempts to subordinate the imagination to¶ the dictates of rational synthesis Foucault’s “critical attitude,” gives analysis the valence of disruption and dispersal, so that the work of¶ analysis makes it necessary to think otherwise. he argues for a form of analysis¶ that is "genealogical and which in order "not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream¶ of freedom…must also be…experimental" it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is important for us to do and to know it will separate out, the possibility of no longer¶ being what we are
Edward P, professor of philosophy at Rowan University, “On Limits—Critique, Transgression, and the Practice of Freedom in Foucault,” December 2000 SJE For this Kantian model of critique, Foucault wants to substitute a procedure that¶ he initially defines not in terms of its methods but rather in terms of the field in which it would operate: a "domain of experience" that "is neither inner experience, nor the¶ fundamental structures of scientific knowledge," nor "a group of historical contents¶ elaborated elsewhere, treated by historians and received as ready-made facts"¶ (Foucault 1978, 44). This domain of experience, which I will call "archaeologicalgenealogical"¶ for reasons that will become clear below, is thus constituted by the¶ simultaneous rejection of fixed historical meaning, subjective interiority, and¶ transcendental structures of any sort. This is just what makes it a domain of¶ experience in Foucault’s sense of that term. It includes not only the possibility of¶ analytical action, but more importantly that of invention—which is why Foucault, even¶ as he is careful to note that this "domain of experience…in no way excludes any¶ other" (Foucault, 1978, 44), claims in almost the same breath that here, "one has to¶ make one’s own history, fabricate history, as if through fiction, in terms of how it would¶ be traversed by the question of the relationships between structures of rationality¶ which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjection which are linked to¶ it" (Foucault 1978, 45). Unlike critical analysis a la Kantian transcendental philosophy,¶ which operates on a domain that is pre-formed according to a fixed abstract regime of¶ "possible experience" that ultimately amounts to nothing other than possible truth,¶ and which attempts to subordinate the imagination (productive and reproductive) to¶ the dictates of rational synthesis a priori, Foucault’s “critical attitude,” proceeding¶ entirely within and through an analysis of the contingencies of history and engaging¶ these by means of an imaginative variation, ultimately gives analysis itself the¶ operative valence not of synthesis but of disruption and dispersal, so that the work of¶ analysis makes it not only possible but indeed necessary to think otherwise.¶ What I have described above is no different from what Foucault describes at the¶ end of "What is Enlightenment?" when he argues for a new form of critical analysis¶ that is "genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method" (Foucault 1984,¶ 315), and which, precisely in order "not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream¶ of freedom…must also be…experimental" (Foucault 1984, 316). Glossing these two¶ points, Foucault begins by arguing directly against transcendental criticism:¶ Archaeological—and not transcendental—in the sense that it will not seek to¶ identify the universal structures of all knowledge [connaissance] or of all¶ possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that¶ articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And…¶ genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is important for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the¶ contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer¶ being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think (Foucault 1984, 315-6).
3,395
<h4><u>Superstasis DA</u><strong>: The genealogical approach demands the rejection of subjectively fixed transcendental structures critique can operate inside of – our disruption of those regimes of rational synthesis forces us to think otherwise</h4><p>Kazarian 2k</p><p></strong>Edward P, professor of philosophy at Rowan University, “On Limits—Critique, Transgression, and the Practice of Freedom in Foucault,” December 2000 SJE</p><p>For this Kantian model of critique, <u><strong><mark>Foucault wants</mark> to substitute <mark>a</mark> </u></strong>procedure that¶ he initially defines not in terms of its methods but rather in terms of the field in which it would operate: a "<u><strong><mark>domain of experience</mark>" that "is neither inner experience, nor the</strong>¶<strong> fundamental structures of scientific knowledge," nor "a group of historical contents</u></strong>¶ elaborated elsewhere, treated by historians and received as ready-made facts"¶ (Foucault 1978, 44). This domain of experience, which I will call "archaeologicalgenealogical"¶ for reasons that will become clear below, is thus <u><strong><mark>constituted by the</strong></mark>¶<strong> simultaneous <mark>rejection of fixed historical meaning</mark>, subjective interiority, <mark>and</strong>¶<strong> transcendental structures of any sort</mark>.</u></strong> This is just what makes it a domain of¶ experience in Foucault’s sense of that term. It includes not only the possibility of¶ analytical action, but more importantly that of invention—which is why Foucault, even¶ as he is careful to note that this "domain of experience…in no way excludes any¶ other" (Foucault, 1978, 44), claims in almost the same breath that here, "<u><strong>one has to</strong>¶<strong> make one’s own history, fabricate history, as if through fiction, in terms of how it would</strong>¶<strong> be traversed by the question of the relationships between structures of rationality</strong>¶<strong> which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjection which are linked to</strong>¶<strong> it</u></strong>" (Foucault 1978, 45). <u><strong><mark>Unlike</mark> critical <mark>analysis</u></strong></mark> a la Kantian transcendental philosophy,¶ <u><strong><mark>which operates on a domain </mark>that is<mark> pre-formed according to a fixed abstract regime of</u></strong>¶<u><strong> "possible experience" that</mark> ultimately <mark>amounts to nothing other than possible truth,</strong>¶<strong> and</mark> which <mark>attempts to subordinate the imagination</mark> </u></strong>(productive and reproductive) <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong>¶<u><strong> the dictates of rational synthesis</u></strong></mark> a priori, <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s “critical attitude,”</u></strong></mark> proceeding¶ entirely within and through an analysis of the contingencies of history and engaging¶ these by means of an imaginative variation, ultimately <u><strong><mark>gives analysis</mark> itself <mark>the</strong></mark>¶<strong> operative <mark>valence</mark> not of synthesis but <mark>of disruption and dispersal, so that the work of</strong>¶<strong> analysis makes it</mark> not only possible but indeed <mark>necessary to think otherwise.</strong></mark>¶</u> What I have described above is no different from what Foucault describes at the¶ end of "What is Enlightenment?" when <u><strong><mark>he argues for a</mark> new <mark>form of</mark> critical <mark>analysis</strong>¶<strong> that is "genealogical</u></strong></mark> in its design and archaeological in its method" (Foucault 1984,¶ 315), <u><strong><mark>and which</u></strong></mark>, precisely <u><strong><mark>in order "not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream</strong>¶<strong> of freedom…must also be…experimental"</u></strong></mark> (Foucault 1984, 316). Glossing these two¶ points, Foucault begins by arguing directly against transcendental criticism:¶ Archaeological—and not transcendental—in the sense that it will not seek to¶ identify the universal structures of all knowledge [connaissance] or of all¶ possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that¶ articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And…¶ genealogical in the sense that <u><strong><mark>it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is important for us to do and to know</mark>; but <mark>it will separate out, </mark>from the</strong>¶<strong> contingency that has made us what we are, <mark>the possibility of no longer</strong>¶<strong> being</mark>, doing, or thinking <mark>what we are</mark>, do, or think</u></strong> (Foucault 1984, 315-6).</p>
2AC
FW
AT: Limits
222,092
2
16,993
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
564,698
A
NDT
3
UTD LO
Heidt, Shook, Lundberg
1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,902
they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence
Kappeler 95
Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)
'We are the war, I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere . I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords or upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon political disillusionment. our insight that indeed we are not responsible tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions we participate in 'organized irresponsibility' we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the president, the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make war possible universal responsibility becomes universal acquittal Decisions to unleash war are taken at particular levels of power focusing on the stage where major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our own competence leading to 'powerlessness' and disillusionment. it seems to absolve us from having to see any relation between our actions and events we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, 'What would I do if I were the president we regard mega spheres as the only worthwhile ones we shape 'our values' according war and violence.
War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
6,053
<h4>they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence</h4><p><u><strong>Kappeler 95</u></strong> (Susanne, The Will to Violence<u>, pgs 9-11)</p><p></u>War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.<u> 'We are the war,</u>' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': <u><mark>I do not know what war is</u></mark>, I want to tell my friend, <u><mark>but I see it everywhere</mark> . </u>It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And <u>I am afraid that <mark>we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make</mark> this <mark>war possible</mark> , we permit it to happen</u>. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. '<u>We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords </u>and politicians and profiteers<u> or</u>, as Ulrich Beck says, <u>upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and</u> where the conception of<u> <mark>universal responsibility becomes</mark> the equivalent of a <mark>universal acquittal</u></mark>. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations.<u> <mark>Decisions to unleash</mark> a <mark>war are</mark> indeed <mark>taken at particular levels of power</mark> by those in a position to make them </u>and to command such collective action. <u>We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of <mark>focusing on the stage where</mark> the <mark>major dramas of power take place</mark> <mark>tends to obscure our</mark> sight in relation to our <mark>own</mark> sphere of <mark>competence</mark>, our own power and our own responsibility - <mark>leading to</mark> the </u>well- known<u> illusion of our </u>apparent<u> <mark>'powerlessness' and</mark> its accompanying phenomenon </u>- our so-called<u> political <mark>disillusionment.</mark> </u>Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet<u> our insight that indeed we are not responsible</u> for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president <u>tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action</u>. In particular, <u><mark>it seems to absolve us from having to</mark> try to <mark>see any relation between our</mark> own <mark>actions and</mark> those <mark>events</mark>, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions</u>. It not only shows that <u>we participate in</u> what Beck calls <u>'organized irresponsibility'</u>, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For<u> we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything</u> , say, <u>about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because <mark>we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why</mark> many of <mark>those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics,</mark> in the style of <mark>'What would I do if I were the</mark> general, </u>the prime minister,<u> the <mark>president</mark>, </u>the foreign minister or<u> the minister of defence?' Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega spheres</mark> of action <mark>as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, </u>and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. <u>We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way <mark>we shape 'our</mark> feelings, our relationships, our <mark>values' according</mark> to the structures and the values of <mark>war and violence.</p></u></mark>
2NC
K
Framework
1,240,688
53
16,990
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
564,708
N
Kentucky
Doubles
George Mason KL
Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box
1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,903
*Framing issue—all of this is industry fear-mongering
Admati 2013
Admati 2013 (Anat R [George G.C. Parker Professor of Finance and Economics, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University]; TRANSCRIPT: FINANCIAL REGULATION REFORM: POLITICS, IMPLEMENTATION AND ALTERNATIVES; 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 71; kdf)
policymakers will have their narratives and their "analyses. A favorable narrative holds that everything in banking is "just a liquidity problem The narrative is convenient, because runs appear as a natural disaster The banks lobby using very flawed claims, and they are successful because they are rarely challenged either be-cause those involved do not know how to challenge the claims or because they do not want to challenge the claims. The public gets scared by the threats made by the lobbyists about all the terrible things that would happen if regulators try to make banks safer.
policymakers have their narratives and "analyses." A favorable narrative holds that everything in banking is "just a liquidity problem The narrative is convenient, because runs appear as a natural disaster banks lobby using very flawed claims, and are successful because they are rarely challenged The public gets scared by the threats about all the terrible things that would happen if regulators try to make banks safer
In most countries, and certainly in the U.S., particularly after the [*80] Dodd-Frank Act, regulators have sufficient authority to keep the system safe. Yet they are failing. For example, for the third year, the Federal Reserve has allowed most large U.S. banks to pay dividends to shareholders. The policy chooses the banks' interests over those of the public. There is no justification for allowing these payouts by the banks. The payouts benefit primarily the bankers them-selves, or those whose holdings are concentrated in the banks. Diversified shareholders and the public are exposed to unnecessary risk and the system is made more fragile. The stress tests are very flawed and unconvincing. Why are policymakers failing? If you listen to them, they will have their narratives and their "analyses." A favorable narrative holds that everything in banking is "just a liquidity problem." Think of it as the "plumbing narrative." The narrative is convenient, because it starts with runs and breakdowns that appear as if they are a natural disaster, thus avoiding the question of why regulators and supervisors allowed these risks to build up. The banks lobby using very flawed claims, and they are successful because they are rarely challenged either be-cause those involved do not know how to challenge the claims (they might in fact agree with them), or because they do not want to challenge the claims. The public gets scared by the threats made by the lobbyists about all the terrible things that would happen if regulators try to make banks safer.
1,555
<h4>*Framing issue—all of this is industry fear-mongering</h4><p><u><strong>Admati 2013</u></strong> (Anat R [George G.C. Parker Professor of Finance and Economics, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University]; TRANSCRIPT: FINANCIAL REGULATION REFORM: POLITICS, IMPLEMENTATION AND ALTERNATIVES; 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 71; kdf<u>)</p><p></u>In most countries, and certainly in the U.S., particularly after the [*80] Dodd-Frank Act, regulators have sufficient authority to keep the system safe. Yet they are failing. For example, for the third year, the Federal Reserve has allowed most large U.S. banks to pay dividends to shareholders. The policy chooses the banks' interests over those of the public. There is no justification for allowing these payouts by the banks. The payouts benefit primarily the bankers them-selves, or those whose holdings are concentrated in the banks. Diversified shareholders and the public are exposed to unnecessary risk and the system is made more fragile. The stress tests are very flawed and unconvincing. Why are <u><mark>policymakers</u> </mark>failing? If you listen to them, they <u>will <mark>have their narratives and </mark>their <mark>"analyses.</u>" <u><strong>A favorable narrative holds that everything in banking is "just a liquidity problem</u></strong></mark>." Think of it as the "plumbing narrative." <u><mark>The narrative is convenient, because</u></mark> it starts with <u><mark>runs</u></mark> and breakdowns that <u><mark>appear as</u></mark> if they are <u><mark>a natural disaster</u></mark>, thus avoiding the question of why regulators and supervisors allowed these risks to build up. <u>The <strong><mark>banks lobby using very flawed claims</strong>,</u> <u>and</mark> they <mark>are successful because they are rarely challenged</mark> either be-cause those involved do not know how to challenge the claims</u> (they might in fact agree with them), <u>or because they do not want to challenge the claims. <strong><mark>The public gets scared by the threats</mark> made by the lobbyists <mark>about all the terrible things that would happen if regulators try to make banks safer</strong></mark>.</p></u>
1NR
Banks
2NC No Burden
430,036
2
16,987
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
564,729
N
NDT
1
Harvard DH
Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout
1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
740,904
Legalization can’t solve cartels – non-drug diversification
Herrington 12
Herrington 12 (Luke M Herrington, MA in Global and International Studies from the University of Kansas, editor at large at E-IR, 8-24-12, “Marijuana Legalization: Panacea in the War on Drugs or Stoners Blowing Smoke?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/24/marijuana-lagalization-panacea-in-the-war-on-drugs-or-stoners-blowing-smoke/) gz
legalization cannot work for an important reason: thanks to the benefits of globalization, cartels have diversified Mexican cartels have benefited, especially by offering partnerships to Colombian suppliers, other Mexican gangs, and new groups, such as Russians, Ukrainians, and Chinese the Mexican cartels can take advantage of their geographical location to involve themselves in almost every aspect of the black market cartel operations no longer just focus on the meagre $88 billion cocaine trade, or the export of marijuana to the U.S. Various cartels are also involved in trafficking opiates and amphetamines money laundering, extortion, and protection rackets diversify cartel portfolios. they are involved in illegal immigration and human trafficking, as well as the arms trade, and the illicit oil trade, which itself is worth more than the entire cocaine market in Mexico The illicit oil trade represents one of the primary reasons why legalization might not work cartels have siphoned off and attempted to sell an estimated $300 million in stolen crude to U.S. companies. the cartels would still have access to an equally large source of revenue
legalization cannot work thanks to globalization, cartels have diversified cartels offer partnerships to Colombian suppliers, other Mexican gangs Russians, Ukrainians, and Chinese to involve themselves in every aspect of the black market operations no longer focus on the export of marijuana to the U.S. cartels are also involved in opiates and amphetamines money laundering, extortion, and protection rackets illegal immigration human trafficking arms trade, and the illicit oil trade cartels have siphoned off and attempted to sell stolen crude to an equally large source of revenue
Dickinson argues that legalization cannot work for an important reason: thanks to the benefits of globalization, cartels have diversified. Naím concurs that Mexican cartels have benefited, especially by offering partnerships to Colombian suppliers, other Mexican gangs, and new groups, such as Russians, Ukrainians, and Chinese. In this way, the Mexican cartels can take advantage of their geographical location to involve themselves in almost every aspect of the black market. Mexican cartels are organizations based off of territorial control. In fact, these organizations help their fellow traffickers access the U.S., extracting tolls of up to 60% of the value of a shipment in the process. Obviously, cartel operations no longer just focus on the meagre $88 billion cocaine trade, or the export of marijuana to the U.S. Various cartels are also involved in trafficking opiates and amphetamines. Additionally, money laundering, extortion, and protection rackets diversify cartel portfolios. Moreover, they are involved in illegal immigration and human trafficking, as well as the arms trade, and the illicit oil trade, which itself is worth more than the entire cocaine market in Mexico. [16] The illicit oil trade is one of the most alarming aspects of cartel diversification, and it represents one of the primary reasons why legalization might not work. Oil is one of Mexico’s largest legitimate exports, but cartels have siphoned off and attempted to sell an estimated $300 million in stolen crude to U.S. companies. Obviously, every country is different, but this would problematise the Uruguayan model of selling marijuana to fight cocaine if it were implemented in Mexico. Essentially, “if the cocaine trade dried up, the cartels would still have access to an equally large source of revenue.” [17] According to Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond, and Peter H. Reuter, the authors of “Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico,” a RAND Corporation Report on California’s attempt to legalize marijuana, the legalization of the drug in the U.S. most populace state would also have little effect on the cartels’ profit margins. California only accounts for a seventh of marijuana consumption in the U.S., and domestic production there is already very high. Thus, if the referendum on marijuana legalization had passed, the cartels’ “drug export revenue losses would [have been] very small, on the order of 2-4 percent,” assume the authors of the report. In fact, they go on, the only way legalization in California could have hurt the cartels would have been if the state smuggled its marijuana crop to the rest of the U.S. at a rate too low for the cartels to have competed. [18]
2,720
<h4><strong>Legalization can’t solve cartels – non-drug diversification</h4><p>Herrington 12</strong> (Luke M Herrington, MA in Global and International Studies from the University of Kansas, editor at large at E-IR, 8-24-12, “Marijuana Legalization: Panacea in the War on Drugs or Stoners Blowing Smoke?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/24/marijuana-lagalization-panacea-in-the-war-on-drugs-or-stoners-blowing-smoke/) gz</p><p>Dickinson argues that <u><strong><mark>legalization cannot work</mark> for an important reason: <mark>thanks to</mark> the benefits of <mark>globalization, cartels have diversified</u></strong></mark>. Naím concurs that <u><strong>Mexican <mark>cartels</mark> have benefited, especially by <mark>offer</mark>ing <mark>partnerships to Colombian suppliers, other Mexican gangs</mark>, and new groups, such as <mark>Russians, Ukrainians, and Chinese</u></strong></mark>. In this way, <u><strong>the Mexican cartels can take advantage of their geographical location <mark>to involve themselves in</mark> almost <mark>every aspect of the black market</u></strong></mark>. Mexican cartels are organizations based off of territorial control. In fact, these organizations help their fellow traffickers access the U.S., extracting tolls of up to 60% of the value of a shipment in the process. Obviously, <u><strong>cartel <mark>operations no longer</mark> just <mark>focus on</mark> the meagre $88 billion cocaine trade, or <mark>the export of marijuana to the U.S.</mark> Various <mark>cartels are also involved in</mark> trafficking <mark>opiates and amphetamines</u></strong></mark>. Additionally, <u><strong><mark>money laundering, extortion, and protection rackets</mark> diversify cartel portfolios.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>they are involved in <mark>illegal immigration</mark> and <mark>human trafficking</mark>, as well as the <mark>arms trade, and the illicit oil trade</mark>, which itself is worth more than the entire cocaine market in Mexico</u></strong>. [16] <u><strong>The illicit oil trade</u></strong> is one of the most alarming aspects of cartel diversification, and it <u><strong>represents one of the primary reasons why legalization might not work</u></strong>. Oil is one of Mexico’s largest legitimate exports, but <u><strong><mark>cartels have siphoned off and attempted to sell </mark>an estimated $300 million in <mark>stolen crude</mark> to U.S. companies.</u></strong> Obviously, every country is different, but this would problematise the Uruguayan model of selling marijuana to fight cocaine if it were implemented in Mexico. Essentially, “if the cocaine trade dried up, <u><strong>the cartels would still have access <mark>to an equally large source of revenue</u></strong></mark>.” [17] According to Beau Kilmer, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond, and Peter H. Reuter, the authors of “Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico,” a RAND Corporation Report on California’s attempt to legalize marijuana, the legalization of the drug in the U.S. most populace state would also have little effect on the cartels’ profit margins. California only accounts for a seventh of marijuana consumption in the U.S., and domestic production there is already very high. Thus, if the referendum on marijuana legalization had passed, the cartels’ “drug export revenue losses would [have been] very small, on the order of 2-4 percent,” assume the authors of the report. In fact, they go on, the only way legalization in California could have hurt the cartels would have been if the state smuggled its marijuana crop to the rest of the U.S. at a rate too low for the cartels to have competed. [18]</p>
1NR
Cartels
Diversification
430,037
1
16,989
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
564,705
N
Kentucky
2
Mary Washington SY
Rebecca Steiner
1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2