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Modern medicine is built on the grave of Hippocrates – a constant deference to the words promised by each practicing physician –

<h4>Modern medicine is built on the grave of Hippocrates – a constant deference to the words promised by each practicing physician – </h4>

1AC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round6.docx

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Hirn, Fisher, DeLo

1AC Illich 1NC T Cap K Block Cap K New Affs Bad 2NR Cap K New Affs Bad

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round6.docx

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The illegality of PAS bars women from the transgressive act of death in the name of futurity and life preservation, allowing gendered norms to dominate end-of-life care. This regime of medicalization keeps suffering women alive to sustain patriarchal values. Diane Raymond explains

Diane, professor of Gender Studies at Simmons College, Ph.D in philosophy from NYU, “’Fatal practices’: A feminist analysis of physician-assisted suicide and Euthanasia” Hypatia Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE

Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where passivity have been the normative ideal. Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures equated suicide with courage and thereby framed the practice as male. Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" might be as inaccurate and overly monolithic a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two, one might argue that, given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. even if we agree that popular discussions of PAS and euthanasia "may be animated by gendered logic all that follows is the more modest conclusion that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice. if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that men are undertreated and women are overtreated the superficial inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might instead reflect a pattern consistent with patriarchal ideology, namely that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women. gender ideology, in valorizing female passivity, may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping dying, suffering women alive. one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.

Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures equated suicide with courage and framed the practice as male Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" might be inaccurate and overly monolithic the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. even if discussions of PAS may be animated by gendered logic all that follows is that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice men are undertreated and women are overtreated. the inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might reflect patriarchal ideology that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women gender ideology may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping suffering women alive

In the section "Gender in Cases, Images, and Practices," Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where female self-sacrifice and passivity have been the normative ideal. That insight leads her to explore the historical and cultural background of suicide and its ideology, suggestively using Greek tragedy, the nineteenth-century cult of True Womanhood, and Carol Gilligan's research to confirm that self-sacrifice has traditionally been associated with women and regarded thereby as a feminine virtue. Yet, while there is no doubt as to the misogynistic history of women's constrained choices, Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures--the Stoic, for example--equated suicide with courage and thereby framed the practice as male. The Greek tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than be taken as slaves, the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, the examples of Hemingway, Kohlberg, and numerous others--these easily recoverable cases suggest that suicide can be seen as part of a masculinist ideology or at least not unproblematically feminine. 10 While a more in-depth analysis would probably reveal much divergence even in ancient Greek practice, Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" (Wolf 1996, 289) might be as inaccurate and overly monolithic a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average (National Center for Health Statistics Report 1987). Given patriarchal ideology's equation of masculinity with strength and power, men's heightened inability to cope with aging and illness makes sense intuitively. Further, women's lived experiences with multiple forms of dependence and interdependence--pregnancy, childrearing, and so forth--may mitigate some of the anxiety associated with aging, dependence on others, and decreasing physical autonomy.¶ Further, the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice (a "feminine not masculine virtue" [1996, 289]) to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two, one might argue that, given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse, particularly in the domestic sphere, suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. One need not, however, go that far or make men's behavior normative to challenge Wolf's argument. For even if we agree that popular discussions of PAS and euthanasia "may be animated by unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain gendered logic and felt correctness" (Wolf 1996, 289), all that follows is the more modest conclusion that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice. The gender ideology fleshed out in Wolf's analysis may lead, as suggested earlier, to great reluctance, not eagerness, to allow PAS or euthanasia for women. Indeed, some evidence suggests that if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that men are undertreated and women are overtreated. Steven Miles and Allison August, for example, have examined a number of judicial decisions relating to withdrawal of treatment at end-of-life and find a pattern of acceding to male patients' wishes over females'. They note that women are held to higher evidentiary standards when requests to die are examined, and they remark on the ways in which gendered language in judicial treatments of these cases tends to rob women of their agency. Women and not men, for example, are routinely infantilized by referring to them by their first names ("Debbie" and "Diane" fit this pattern); and men's statements about end-of-life treatment are held to reflect "mature, rational choice" while women's are seen as "unreflective, emotional, or immature" (Miles and August 1990, 87). Karen Quinlan's comments to her mother were thereby dismissed as a "wish" or personal "distaste" and not a genuine expression of her values. In another case, a woman's repeated comments regarding her desire not to be kept on life support were trivialized as no "more than immediate reaction to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another unnecessarily prolonged death" (in Miles and August 1990, 88). Courts seem even to discount women's advance directives, preferring instead to appoint family members as decision-makers for the incompetent woman; in one case, the Court empowered a woman's husband/guardian to make the decision "for" her, despite the fact that she had been an active member of the state's "Euthanasia Council." Women's "overtreatment" at end-of-life may seem odd considering men's greater access to earlier interventions, including more standard diagnostic procedures like angiograms and more "exotic" treatments like organ transplants. But the superficial inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might instead reflect a pattern consistent with patriarchal ideology, namely that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women. If such is the case, then gender ideology, in valorizing female passivity, may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping dying, suffering women alive. Likewise, ideological constructions of masculinity as inextricably aligned with agency, activity, and transcendence might lead to respect for men's medical directives--formal and informal--as well as to gendered distinctions on quality-of-life issues. Those unfamiliar with the ravages of persistent vegetative state (PVS) may picture the comatose or PVS patient as a comfortable "sleeping beauty" waiting for her miraculous awakening; such gendered imagery may help to account for the resistance to withdrawal of life support in the classic Quinlan and Cruzan cases, and the willingness of the Georgia Supreme Court to grant the physicians of Larry McAfee, a C-2 quadriplegic (a non-terminal condition), permission to provide him with the drugs necessary for him to be free of pain when his respirator was disconnected. Wolf's analysis of cultural ideology, while extremely suggestive, needs elaboration and nuance. Further, in the course of that extended analysis we should not be surprised by gaps and inconsistencies, for culture is never monolithic or fixed, and cultural practices do not follow consistently or irresistibly even the most hegemonic ideology. Thus, one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.

<h4>The illegality of PAS bars women from the transgressive act of death in the name of futurity and life preservation, allowing gendered norms to dominate end-of-life care. This regime of medicalization keeps suffering women alive to sustain patriarchal values. Diane Raymond explains </h4><p>Diane, professor of Gender Studies at Simmons College, Ph.D in philosophy from NYU, “’Fatal practices’: A feminist analysis of physician-assisted suicide and Euthanasia” Hypatia Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE</p><p>In the section "Gender in Cases, Images, and Practices," <u>Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where</u> female self-sacrifice and<u> passivity have been the normative ideal.</u> That insight leads her to explore the historical and cultural background of suicide and its ideology, suggestively using Greek tragedy, the nineteenth-century cult of True Womanhood, and Carol Gilligan's research to confirm that self-sacrifice has traditionally been associated with women and regarded thereby as a feminine virtue. Yet, while there is no doubt as to the misogynistic history of women's constrained choices, <u><strong><mark>Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history.</strong></mark> <mark>Many cultures</u></mark>--the Stoic, for example--<u><mark>equated suicide with courage</mark> <mark>and</mark> thereby <mark>framed the practice as male</mark>.</u> The Greek tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than be taken as slaves, the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, the examples of Hemingway, Kohlberg, and numerous others--these easily recoverable cases suggest that suicide can be seen as part of a masculinist ideology or at least not unproblematically feminine. 10 While a more in-depth analysis would probably reveal much divergence even in ancient Greek practice, <u><mark>Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution"</u></mark> (Wolf 1996, 289) <u><mark>might</mark> <mark>be</mark> as <mark>inaccurate and overly monolithic</mark> a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average</u> (National Center for Health Statistics Report 1987). Given patriarchal ideology's equation of masculinity with strength and power, men's heightened inability to cope with aging and illness makes sense intuitively. Further, women's lived experiences with multiple forms of dependence and interdependence--pregnancy, childrearing, and so forth--may mitigate some of the anxiety associated with aging, dependence on others, and decreasing physical autonomy.¶ Further, <u><mark>the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice</u></mark> (a "feminine not masculine virtue" [1996, 289]) <u><mark>to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two</mark>, one might argue that, <mark>given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse</u></mark>, particularly in the domestic sphere, <u><strong><mark>suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act.</u></strong></mark> One need not, however, go that far or make men's behavior normative to challenge Wolf's argument. For <u><mark>even if</mark> we agree that popular <mark>discussions of PAS</mark> and euthanasia "<mark>may be animated by</u></mark> unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain <u><mark>gendered logic</u></mark> and felt correctness" (Wolf 1996, 289), <u><mark>all that follows is </mark>the more modest conclusion <mark>that we must <strong>interrogate that logic</strong> before making a normative judgment about the practice</mark>. </u>The gender ideology fleshed out in Wolf's analysis may lead, as suggested earlier, to great reluctance, not eagerness, to allow PAS or euthanasia for women. Indeed, some evidence suggests that <u>if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that <mark>men are undertreated and women are overtreated</u>.</mark> Steven Miles and Allison August, for example, have examined a number of judicial decisions relating to withdrawal of treatment at end-of-life and find a pattern of acceding to male patients' wishes over females'. They note that women are held to higher evidentiary standards when requests to die are examined, and they remark on the ways in which gendered language in judicial treatments of these cases tends to rob women of their agency. Women and not men, for example, are routinely infantilized by referring to them by their first names ("Debbie" and "Diane" fit this pattern); and men's statements about end-of-life treatment are held to reflect "mature, rational choice" while women's are seen as "unreflective, emotional, or immature" (Miles and August 1990, 87). Karen Quinlan's comments to her mother were thereby dismissed as a "wish" or personal "distaste" and not a genuine expression of her values. In another case, a woman's repeated comments regarding her desire not to be kept on life support were trivialized as no "more than immediate reaction to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another unnecessarily prolonged death" (in Miles and August 1990, 88). Courts seem even to discount women's advance directives, preferring instead to appoint family members as decision-makers for the incompetent woman; in one case, the Court empowered a woman's husband/guardian to make the decision "for" her, despite the fact that she had been an active member of the state's "Euthanasia Council." Women's "overtreatment" at end-of-life may seem odd considering men's greater access to earlier interventions, including more standard diagnostic procedures like angiograms and more "exotic" treatments like organ transplants. But <u><mark>the</mark> superficial <mark>inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might</mark> instead <mark>reflect</mark> a pattern consistent with <mark>patriarchal ideology</mark>, namely <mark>that we hold to a <strong>higher standard of quality of life for men than for women</strong></mark>.</u> If such is the case, then <u><strong><mark>gender ideology</mark>, in valorizing female passivity, <mark>may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping</mark> dying, <mark>suffering women alive</mark>.</u></strong> Likewise, ideological constructions of masculinity as inextricably aligned with agency, activity, and transcendence might lead to respect for men's medical directives--formal and informal--as well as to gendered distinctions on quality-of-life issues. Those unfamiliar with the ravages of persistent vegetative state (PVS) may picture the comatose or PVS patient as a comfortable "sleeping beauty" waiting for her miraculous awakening; such gendered imagery may help to account for the resistance to withdrawal of life support in the classic Quinlan and Cruzan cases, and the willingness of the Georgia Supreme Court to grant the physicians of Larry McAfee, a C-2 quadriplegic (a non-terminal condition), permission to provide him with the drugs necessary for him to be free of pain when his respirator was disconnected. Wolf's analysis of cultural ideology, while extremely suggestive, needs elaboration and nuance. Further, in the course of that extended analysis we should not be surprised by gaps and inconsistencies, for culture is never monolithic or fixed, and cultural practices do not follow consistently or irresistibly even the most hegemonic ideology. Thus, <u>one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.</p></u>

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx

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Footnoting DA

Der Derian 95

Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote and then get down to business as usual using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes

A stop-gap solution is to supplement the gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist will note the contested' nature of realism with a footnote and then business as usual This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to commit worse epistemological crimes

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

<h4>Footnoting DA</h4><p><u><strong>Der Derian 95</u></strong> (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)</p><p>But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? <u><mark>A stop-gap solution is to supplement the</u></mark> definitional <u><mark>gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist</u></mark>, mindful of a creeping pluralism, <u><mark>will note the</mark> 'essentially <mark>contested' nature of realism</mark> - duly backed up <mark>with a footnote</u></mark> to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - <u><mark>and then</mark> get down to <mark>business as usual</u></mark>, that is, <u>using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. <mark>This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere</mark>: in exchange for not contesting</u> the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, <u><mark>the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to</mark> then turn around and <mark>commit worse epistemological crimes</u></mark>. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.</p>

2NC

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Perm

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx

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Kentucky

Doubles

George Mason KL

Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box

1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx

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The idea that subjects should be maximally reciprocal destroys the possibility for individual value

Robinson 12

Robinson 12

Baudrillard sees communication and sociality being corrupted into sign-values to be consumed. The loss of genuine, spontaneous, reciprocal human relations is covered up by the standardised production of signs of social warmth and participation. it simulates intimacy. These simulated signs are what now counts as abstract ‘interpersonal skills’. such false sociality is shot through with the flaws of the mode of production, including aggression and frustration. It turns into an entire value-system dressed-up as functionality. It has a constant repressive effect, pacifying social relations. The act of conforming to a model is presented as narcissistic self-assertion through small signified differences. People think they are creating themselves when in fact they are consuming themselves femininity and masculinity are models which govern, rather than express, women and men such models shape how people see each other People set up signs of happiness in the hope that happiness will alight on them. There is a ‘fun system’ of enforced enjoyment, which imposes a duty to happiness and denies any right not to be happy. Consumption is a institution and a system of values with functions of social integration and control. The anarchic consumer is a thing of the past. People are pressured to consume in standard ways this pressure destroys enjoyment from the inside. Consumption is haunted by its inner puritanism, rendering it compulsive and limitless. At the same time as socialising people, it atomises people into private consumption. They mark conformity with the code, not individuality. The system is based on abolishing real difference so as to usher in a process of differentiation Excessive social contact due to urbanism leads to psychological pauperisation. People gain an increased need for objects as signifiers of differentiation Consumption excludes the possibility of enjoyment. because consumption is always collective whereas enjoyment is personal. The disappearance of altruistic forms of integration leads to an expanded role for state repression. Atomisation leads to bureaucratic control, disguised as freedom. The ‘people’ are glorified as long as they do not try to exercise their putative sovereignty on a political or social stage, and instead stick to consuming. Competition leads to generalised fatigue Such fatigue is really a resistance, akin to a slowdown by workers or boredom in school. Such resistance becomes habitual and ‘grows into’ people’s It is a partial revolt necessary to prevent total breakdown, which is instantly available as a source of discontent in crisis situations. The real social effect of the pursuit of system-promoted goals is an exhausting rat-race. The system of unstable, precarious employment creates generalised insecurity and generalised competition for status. The constant treadmill of work leaves some on the scrapheap and others successful but exhausted. the ideology of consumption lulls people into believing that they are affluent, fulfilled, happy and liberated. Baudrillard writes of the production of a new kind of character-armoured subject: the sociometric individual. Sociability is mis-perceived as something personal, while being rendered simply functional. Instead of being autonomous, people display marks of ‘personalisation’. A person transformed is at home everywhere and nowhere – able to display superficial intimacy, but belonging nowhere. Rather than conformity, the system demands of such people that they be maximally sociable and maximally compatible with others across a wide range of situations. Such people are part of an enforced mobilisation, always available as calculable and accountable units for use in political and sociometric planning. They become psychologically dependent on gaining approval, and lose individual transcendental aspirations. This leads to a new social morality. Ideology and individual values are replaced relativity, receptivity, agreement and anxious communication, all of which render people programmable. Baudrillard’s critique extends to politics. The contradiction between ‘services’ and democratic ideology leads to an entire simulation of absent reciprocity. A superficial layer of minimal communication is used to paper over the hostility and social distance which are everywhere. This layer is ‘functional’ enough to personalise and pacify power, but is stripped of every affective and psychological aspect. People can demand signs of sociability and sincerity. But the signs only reproduce the mistrust. They have become empty signs in a closed system, which no longer convey real trust.

The loss of genuine relations is covered up by signs of participation. These simulated signs now count as skills It has a constant repressive effect, pacifying social relations. a ‘fun system’ of enforced enjoyment, which imposes a duty to happiness and denies any right not to be happy. Consumption is social control. it atomises people into private consumption They mark conformity with the code, not individuality. Consumption excludes the possibility of enjoyment. because consumption is always collective whereas enjoyment is personal. Atomisation leads to bureaucratic control, disguised as freedom. people’ are glorified as long as they do not try to exercise their sovereignty and consum The effect of the pursuit of system-promoted goals is an exhausting rat-race. The treadmill of work lulls people into believing that they are liberated. A person transformed is at home everywhere and nowhere but belonging nowhere. individual values are replaced which render people programmable. an simulation of absent reciprocity. A superficial layer of minimal communication is used to paper over the hostility and social distance everywhere

(Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, April 14, 2012, “Jean Baudrillard: Critique of Alienation – Draft 1,” http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-3/ Baudrillard also sees communication and sociality being corrupted into sign-values to be consumed. This occurs through the consumption of ‘services’ based on sociability. The loss of genuine, spontaneous, reciprocal human relations (which require a symbolic dimension) is covered up by the standardised production of signs of social warmth and participation. As with the smile of the salesman, receptionist or PR executive, or the “have a nice day” of McDonald’s, it simulates intimacy. These simulated signs are what now counts as abstract ‘interpersonal skills’. In practice, Baudrillard observes, such false sociality is shot through with the flaws of the mode of production, including aggression and frustration. It turns into an entire value-system dressed-up as functionality. It has a constant repressive effect, pacifying social relations. The act of conforming to a model is presented as narcissistic self-assertion through small signified differences. People think they are creating themselves when in fact they are consuming themselves, or their images. For example, femininity and masculinity are models which govern, rather than express, women and men. Baudrillard believes that such models shape how people see each other, regardless of whether people actually conform to them. Similarly, sites such as holiday resorts are constructed as planned communities and total environments realising a particular ideal of abstract happiness. These sites replace distinct elements with homogeneous ones. People set up signs of happiness in the hope that happiness will alight on them. There is a ‘fun system’ of enforced enjoyment, which imposes a duty (not a right) to happiness and denies any right not to be happy. Consumption is a morality, an institution and a system of values with functions of social integration and control. The anarchic consumer, free to consume or not, is a thing of the past. People are now pressured to consume in standard ways and even to seek out new experiences. Yet this pressure destroys enjoyment from the inside. Consumption is haunted by its inner puritanism, rendering it compulsive and limitless. It is both lived as an affirmative myth, and endured as a kind of social adaptation to a new collective regime. At the same time as socialising people, it atomises people into private consumption. Beauty products and the like often claim to be drawing out an inherent personality, or recovering one which has been lost. In fact they are products of the industrial mass-production of systematic differences. These differences are derived from a model and are only artificially diversified. They mark conformity with the code, not individuality. Baudrillard writes of ‘monopoly concentration of the production of differences’. The system is based on abolishing real difference (and for instance nature) so as to usher in a process of differentiation (and naturalisation, etc). Difference within the code is based on the smallest marginal difference, used as a sign of hierarchy. Excessive social contact due to urbanism leads to psychological pauperisation. People gain an increased need for objects as signifiers of differentiation. Consumption actually excludes the possibility of enjoyment. This is because consumption is always collective, at least indirectly, whereas enjoyment is personal. The disappearance of altruistic forms of integration leads to an expanded role for state repression. Atomisation leads to bureaucratic control, disguised as freedom. Credit is used to condition people into capitalistic forms of action. The ‘people’ or consumers are glorified as long as they do not try to exercise their putative sovereignty on a political or social stage, and instead stick to consuming. Consumer goods are experienced as miraculous, because their production is concealed. They seem as if they come from technology, progress or growth. In fact we have only the signs of affluence, coexisting with ever more impoverished social relations. Competition, generalised across social life as consumption as well as production is ranked, leads to generalised fatigue. Such fatigue is really a resistance, akin to a slowdown by workers or boredom in school. Such resistance, as the only resistance available, becomes habitual and ‘grows into’ people’s bodies. It is a partial revolt necessary to prevent total breakdown, which is also instantly available as a source of discontent in crisis situations. The real social effect of the pursuit of system-promoted goals is an exhausting rat-race. The system of unstable, precarious employment creates generalised insecurity and generalised competition for status. The constant treadmill of work, retraining and status-competition leaves some on the scrapheap and others successful but exhausted. But the ideology of consumption lulls people into believing that they are affluent, fulfilled, happy and liberated. Baudrillard writes of the production of a new kind of character-armoured subject: the sociometric individual. Sociability is mis-perceived as something personal, while in fact being rendered simply functional. Instead of being autonomous, people display marks of ‘personalisation’. A person thus transformed is at home everywhere and nowhere – able to display superficial intimacy, but belonging nowhere. Social action is subordinated to the pursuit of status. Rather than conformity, the system demands of such people that they be maximally sociable and maximally compatible with others across a wide range of situations. Such people are part of an enforced mobilisation, always available as calculable and accountable units for use in political and sociometric planning. They become psychologically dependent on gaining approval, and lose individual transcendental aspirations. This in turn leads to a new social morality. Ideology and individual values are replaced in this morality with relativity, receptivity, agreement and anxious communication, all of which render people programmable. Baudrillard’s critique also extends to politics. The contradiction between ‘services’ and democratic ideology leads to an entire simulation of absent reciprocity. A superficial layer of minimal communication is used to paper over the hostility and social distance which are everywhere. This layer is ‘functional’ enough to personalise and pacify power, but is stripped of every affective and psychological aspect. Instead it is constructed from the calculated model of an ideal relationship. People can no longer trust themselves or each other. It is for this reason that they demand signs of sociability and sincerity. But the signs only reproduce the mistrust. They have become empty signs in a closed system, which no longer convey real trust. The welfare state is criticised as a way to portray an exchange society as if it were a service society, giving back what it takes from workers. Equality and democracy conceal the real system of discrimination, based on whether or not one can decode consumer goods. Furthermore, the system conditions people to constantly want a little more than they have. The system produces the needs it satisfies (through advertising and demand management), produces only for its own needs, and hides behind the alibi of individual needs (inventing an idea of economic man to prop itself up). It rests on real needs being misrecognised. And it produces needs which it then refuses to satisfy, instead using them as inducements to conformity.

<h4>The idea that subjects should be maximally reciprocal destroys the possibility for individual value</h4><p><strong>Robinson 12</strong> </p><p>(Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, April 14, 2012, “Jean Baudrillard: Critique of Alienation – Draft 1,” http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-3/</p><p><u><strong>Baudrillard</u></strong> also <u><strong>sees communication and sociality being corrupted into sign-values to be consumed. </u></strong> This occurs through the consumption of ‘services’ based on sociability. <u><strong><mark>The loss of genuine</mark>, spontaneous, reciprocal human <mark>relations</u></strong></mark> (which require a symbolic dimension) <u><strong><mark>is covered up by</mark> the standardised production of <mark>signs of </mark>social warmth and <mark>participation.</u></strong></mark> As with the smile of the salesman, receptionist or PR executive, or the “have a nice day” of McDonald’s, <u><strong>it simulates intimacy.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>These simulated signs</mark> are what <mark>now count</mark>s <mark>as</mark> abstract ‘interpersonal <mark>skills</mark>’.</u></strong> In practice, Baudrillard observes, <u><strong>such false sociality is shot through with the flaws of the mode of production, including aggression and frustration.</u></strong> <u><strong>It turns into an entire value-system dressed-up as functionality. <mark>It has a constant repressive effect, pacifying social relations.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>The act of conforming to a model is presented as narcissistic self-assertion through small signified differences.</u></strong> <u><strong>People think they are creating themselves when in fact they are consuming themselves</u></strong>, or their images. For example, <u><strong>femininity and masculinity are models which govern, rather than express, women and men</u></strong>. Baudrillard believes that <u><strong>such models shape how people see each other</u></strong>, regardless of whether people actually conform to them. Similarly, sites such as holiday resorts are constructed as planned communities and total environments realising a particular ideal of abstract happiness. These sites replace distinct elements with homogeneous ones. <u><strong>People set up signs of happiness in the hope that happiness will alight on them.</u></strong> <u><strong>There is <mark>a ‘fun system’ of enforced enjoyment, which imposes a duty</u></strong></mark> (not a right) <u><strong><mark>to happiness and denies any right not to be happy.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Consumption is</mark> a</u></strong> morality, an <u><strong>institution and a system of values with functions of <mark>social </mark>integration and <mark>control.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>The anarchic consumer</u></strong>, free to consume or not, <u><strong>is a thing of the past.</u></strong> <u><strong>People are</u></strong> now <u><strong>pressured to consume in standard ways</u></strong> and even to seek out new experiences. Yet <u><strong>this pressure destroys enjoyment from the inside.</u></strong> <u><strong>Consumption is haunted by its inner puritanism, rendering it compulsive and limitless.</u></strong> It is both lived as an affirmative myth, and endured as a kind of social adaptation to a new collective regime. <u><strong>At the same time as socialising people, <mark>it atomises people into private consumption</mark>. </u></strong>Beauty products and the like often claim to be drawing out an inherent personality, or recovering one which has been lost. In fact they are products of the industrial mass-production of systematic differences. These differences are derived from a model and are only artificially diversified. <u><strong><mark>They mark conformity with the code, not individuality.</u></strong></mark> Baudrillard writes of ‘monopoly concentration of the production of differences’. <u><strong>The system is based on abolishing real difference</u></strong> (and for instance nature) <u><strong>so as to usher in a process of differentiation</u></strong> (and naturalisation, etc). Difference within the code is based on the smallest marginal difference, used as a sign of hierarchy. <u><strong>Excessive social contact due to urbanism leads to psychological pauperisation.</u></strong> <u><strong>People gain an increased need for objects as signifiers of differentiation</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Consumption</u></strong></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>excludes the possibility of enjoyment.</u></strong></mark> This is <u><strong><mark>because consumption is always collective</u></strong></mark>, at least indirectly, <u><strong><mark>whereas enjoyment is personal. </mark>The disappearance of altruistic forms of integration leads to an expanded role for state repression.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Atomisation leads to bureaucratic control, disguised as freedom.</u></strong></mark> Credit is used to condition people into capitalistic forms of action. <u><strong>The ‘<mark>people’</u></strong></mark> or consumers <u><strong><mark>are glorified as long as they do not try to exercise their</mark> putative <mark>sovereignty</mark> on a political or social stage, <mark>and </mark>instead stick to <mark>consum</mark>ing.</u></strong> Consumer goods are experienced as miraculous, because their production is concealed. They seem as if they come from technology, progress or growth. In fact we have only the signs of affluence, coexisting with ever more impoverished social relations. <u><strong>Competition</u></strong>, generalised across social life as consumption as well as production is ranked, <u><strong>leads to generalised fatigue</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such fatigue is really a resistance, akin to a slowdown by workers or boredom in school.</u></strong> <u><strong>Such resistance</u></strong>, as the only resistance available, <u><strong>becomes habitual and ‘grows into’ people’s</u></strong> bodies. <u><strong>It is a partial revolt necessary to prevent total breakdown, which is </u></strong>also <u><strong>instantly available as a source of discontent in crisis situations.<mark> The </mark>real social <mark>effect of the pursuit of system-promoted goals is an exhausting rat-race.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>The system of unstable, precarious employment creates generalised insecurity and generalised competition for status.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The </mark>constant <mark>treadmill of work</u></strong></mark>, retraining and status-competition <u><strong>leaves some on the scrapheap and others successful but exhausted.</u></strong> But <u><strong>the ideology of consumption <mark>lulls people into believing that they are</mark> affluent, fulfilled, happy and <mark>liberated.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Baudrillard writes of the production of a new kind of character-armoured subject: the sociometric individual.</u></strong> <u><strong>Sociability is mis-perceived as something personal, while</u></strong> in fact <u><strong>being rendered simply functional. Instead of being autonomous, people display marks of ‘personalisation’. <mark>A person</u></strong></mark> thus <u><strong><mark>transformed is at home everywhere and nowhere </mark>– able to display superficial intimacy, <mark>but belonging nowhere.</u></strong></mark> Social action is subordinated to the pursuit of status. <u><strong>Rather than conformity, the system demands of such people that they be maximally sociable and maximally compatible with others across a wide range of situations.</u></strong> <u><strong>Such people are part of an enforced mobilisation, always available as calculable and accountable units for use in political and sociometric planning.</u></strong> <u><strong>They become psychologically dependent on gaining approval, and lose individual transcendental aspirations.</u></strong> <u><strong>This</u></strong> in turn <u><strong>leads to a new social morality.</u></strong> <u><strong>Ideology and <mark>individual values are replaced</mark> </u></strong>in this morality with <u><strong>relativity, receptivity, agreement and anxious communication, all of <mark>which render people programmable.</mark> Baudrillard’s critique</u></strong> also <u><strong>extends to politics.</u></strong> <u><strong>The contradiction between ‘services’ and democratic ideology leads to <mark>an </mark>entire <mark>simulation of absent reciprocity. A superficial layer of minimal communication is used to paper over the hostility and social distance</mark> which are <mark>everywhere</mark>. This layer is ‘functional’ enough to personalise and pacify power, but is stripped of every affective and psychological aspect.</u></strong> Instead it is constructed from the calculated model of an ideal relationship. <u><strong>People</u></strong> <u><strong>can</u></strong> no longer trust themselves or each other. It is for this reason that they <u><strong>demand signs of sociability and sincerity. But the signs only reproduce the mistrust.</u></strong> <u><strong>They have become empty signs in a closed system, which no longer convey real trust. </u></strong>The welfare state is criticised as a way to portray an exchange society as if it were a service society, giving back what it takes from workers. Equality and democracy conceal the real system of discrimination, based on whether or not one can decode consumer goods. Furthermore, the system conditions people to constantly want a little more than they have. The system produces the needs it satisfies (through advertising and demand management), produces only for its own needs, and hides behind the alibi of individual needs (inventing an idea of economic man to prop itself up). It rests on real needs being misrecognised. And it produces needs which it then refuses to satisfy, instead using them as inducements to conformity.</p>

2AC

FW

AT: Limits

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx

A

NDT

3

UTD LO

Heidt, Shook, Lundberg

1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx

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*Bernie Madoff also caused Know Your Customer requirements that your evidence complains about

Economist 14

Economist 14 The Economist, 1/11/14, “Know your customer, or else…” http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/jpmorgan-chase-and-madoff-case

A consequence of the Madoff case will be that all banks will need to be far tougher on their clients—and not just crooks America’s Bank Secrecy Act requires reporting anything that could have “a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations Should a checking account mean a bank must know all? The Madoff settlement suggests, strongly, that the answer is yes. say goodbye to financial privacy. There could be other consequences adding armies to monitor transactions and pass them on to regulators Banks will become less like an efficient coffee shop competing with new products and more like airports, with oppressive security

A consequence of the Madoff case will be that all banks will need to be far tougher on their clients—and not just crooks. America requires reporting anything that could have “a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations Should a checking account mean a bank must know all? The Madoff settlement suggests, strongly, that the answer is yes. say goodbye to financial privacy

“JPMORGAN as an institution failed and failed miserably,” said Preet Bharara, New York’s federal attorney, when explaining earlier this week a $1.7 billion settlement in the case of the bank’s failure to detect horrendous fraud of Bernard Madoff (pictured). A more intellectually honest announcement might have included indignation about the various government enforcement agencies which were explicitly and repeatedly warned of Mr Madoff’s scam by, among others, another major bank—and then utterly blew inspections without any individual or entity facing censure. A consequence of the Madoff case will be that all banks will need to be far tougher on their clients—and not just crooks. The 40 plus pages released along with the settlement do not make for easy reading, but the government’s case is built around two components. One is the relationship of Mr Madoff with JPMorgan Chase’s investment office in London. At times it invested with Mr Madoff through “feeder” funds, but never directly. It ultimately developed concerns about how these generated returns, and alerted British authorities. Less well known, JPMorgan’s primary relationship with Mr Madoff in America was two large checking accounts. Which raises the question whether, because of these checking accounts, JPMorgan had an obligation to alert American authorities as well? In agreeing to the settlement, JPMorgan has said it should have—though it was not in a position to argue (the simple issuance of a criminal indictment would have been devastating, regardless of whether it succeeded in court). The government’s case rests on the notion that America’s Bank Secrecy Act requires reporting anything that could have “a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations.” Given the expansiveness of America’s laws, that could be almost anything. The government’s information document cites the report sent to British authorities, which says that “the investment performance achieved…appear to be too good to be true—meaning that it probably is.” If that is the standard, American regulatory agencies should be prepared for an electronic tsunami of alerts. There is, apparently, no penalty for over-reporting. The government statement is scathing about JPMorgan’s misunderstanding of Mr Madoff’s business. Banks are required to know their customers, but to what extent? Successful investment-management firms are often secretive about their approach, and rightly so: it is, after all, their secret sauce. Most businesses are complex. Should a checking account in America mean a company must spill all, or even that a bank must know all? The Madoff settlement suggests, strongly, that the answer is yes. So say goodbye to financial privacy. The government will see all. There could be lots of other consequences. Beyond adding armies to monitor transactions and pass them on to regulators, banks will start firing clients because they happen to do business in newly suspect categories. The reasons may not be explained. They may not even be understood by the bank employee relaying the news to the fired customer. Among them will be pursuing business activities abroad in places thought to have activities that violate American law. Or it could be because of a relationship with a politician (making a bank liable to accusations of politically-induced lending) or because of employment with a government of a country that is accused of money laundering. The Madoff settlement will be just one reason for this worrying trend, but it is an important one. The payment of a $1.7 billion for having a toxic client will mean the imposition of rules everywhere. And because they are rules, they won’t merely cover toxic clients. For non-crooks, these will seem arbitrary. Banks will become less like an efficient coffee shop competing with new products and more like airports, with oppressive security. The Madoff settlement may not be JPMorgan’s biggest, but it will have large implications—and not just for the bank. We will all pay.

<h4>*Bernie Madoff also caused Know Your Customer requirements that your evidence complains about</h4><p><u><strong>Economist 14</u></strong> The Economist, 1/11/14, “Know your customer, or else…” http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/jpmorgan-chase-and-madoff-case</p><p>“JPMORGAN as an institution failed and failed miserably,” said Preet Bharara, New York’s federal attorney, when explaining earlier this week a $1.7 billion settlement in the case of the bank’s failure to detect horrendous fraud of Bernard Madoff (pictured). A more intellectually honest announcement might have included indignation about the various government enforcement agencies which were explicitly and repeatedly warned of Mr Madoff’s scam by, among others, another major bank—and then utterly blew inspections without any individual or entity facing censure. <u><mark>A consequence of the Madoff case will be that all banks will need to be far tougher on their clients—and not just crooks</u>.</mark> The 40 plus pages released along with the settlement do not make for easy reading, but the government’s case is built around two components. One is the relationship of Mr Madoff with JPMorgan Chase’s investment office in London. At times it invested with Mr Madoff through “feeder” funds, but never directly. It ultimately developed concerns about how these generated returns, and alerted British authorities. Less well known, JPMorgan’s primary relationship with Mr Madoff in America was two large checking accounts. Which raises the question whether, because of these checking accounts, JPMorgan had an obligation to alert American authorities as well? In agreeing to the settlement, JPMorgan has said it should have—though it was not in a position to argue (the simple issuance of a criminal indictment would have been devastating, regardless of whether it succeeded in court). The government’s case rests on the notion that <u><mark>America</mark>’s Bank Secrecy Act <mark>requires reporting anything that could have “a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations</u></mark>.” Given the expansiveness of America’s laws, that could be almost anything. The government’s information document cites the report sent to British authorities, which says that “the investment performance achieved…appear to be too good to be true—meaning that it probably is.” If that is the standard, American regulatory agencies should be prepared for an electronic tsunami of alerts. There is, apparently, no penalty for over-reporting. The government statement is scathing about JPMorgan’s misunderstanding of Mr Madoff’s business. Banks are required to know their customers, but to what extent? Successful investment-management firms are often secretive about their approach, and rightly so: it is, after all, their secret sauce. Most businesses are complex. <u><mark>Should a checking account</u></mark> in America <u><mark>mean</u></mark> a company must spill all, or even that <u><mark>a bank must know all? The Madoff settlement suggests, strongly, that the answer is yes.</u></mark> So <u><mark>say goodbye to financial privacy</mark>.</u> The government will see all. <u>There could be</u> lots of <u>other consequences</u>. Beyond <u>adding armies to monitor transactions and pass them on to regulators</u>, banks will start firing clients because they happen to do business in newly suspect categories. The reasons may not be explained. They may not even be understood by the bank employee relaying the news to the fired customer. Among them will be pursuing business activities abroad in places thought to have activities that violate American law. Or it could be because of a relationship with a politician (making a bank liable to accusations of politically-induced lending) or because of employment with a government of a country that is accused of money laundering. The Madoff settlement will be just one reason for this worrying trend, but it is an important one. The payment of a $1.7 billion for having a toxic client will mean the imposition of rules everywhere. And because they are rules, they won’t merely cover toxic clients. For non-crooks, these will seem arbitrary. <u>Banks will become less like an efficient coffee shop competing with new products and more like airports, with oppressive security</u>. The Madoff settlement may not be JPMorgan’s biggest, but it will have large implications—and not just for the bank. We will all pay.</p>

1NR

Banks

2NC Alt Cause

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

N

NDT

1

Harvard DH

Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

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Terrorist can’t cross the border through cartel routes and the status quo solves

Powell 11 Texas-from-2341185.php>)

Powell 11 – Houston Chronicle writer (Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”, 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from-2341185.php>)

Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly."

experts say Iranian factions are not crossing the border. organizations want to be unobtrusive as possible The number apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal No credible terrorist threat has been identified DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the border and responds accordingly

Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly."

<h4>Terrorist can’t cross the border through cartel routes and the status quo solves</h4><p><u><strong>Powell 11</u> </strong>– Houston Chronicle writer (Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”, 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-<u><strong>Texas-from-2341185.php>)</p><p></u></strong>Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. <u><strong>Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - <mark>experts say</mark> such <mark>Iranian</mark>-financed <mark>factions are not crossing the</mark> southwest <mark>border.</mark> </u></strong>They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "<u><strong>The last thing these <mark>organizations</mark> want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention</u></strong>," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "<u><strong>They <mark>want to be</mark> as <mark>unobtrusive as possible</mark>." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody,</u></strong> a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. <u><strong>No credible cases <mark>The number</mark> of Iranians <mark>apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal</mark>," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "<mark>No credible terrorist threat has been identified</mark>, however <mark>DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the</mark> Southwest <mark>border and responds accordingly</mark>."</p></u></strong>

1NR

Cartels

No Cartel Terror

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

N

Kentucky

2

Mary Washington SY

Rebecca Steiner

1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Round2.docx

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“I SWEAR by Apollo the physician, I will keep this Oath…

<h4>“I SWEAR by Apollo the physician, I will keep this Oath… </h4>

1AC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round6.docx

A

NDT

6

Kentucky GV

Hirn, Fisher, DeLo

1AC Illich 1NC T Cap K Block Cap K New Affs Bad 2NR Cap K New Affs Bad

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round6.docx

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The spread of biopolitics based on securing a vital community forms and categorizes discursive identities based on sexuality as a means of social control – Marc Spindelman describes how one such identity trope is manifested in PAS discourses through the figure of the gay man with AIDS whose sexuality damned him into seeking death – only rejecting sex as truth overcomes this form of biopower – Thomas Roach explains

Thomas J., Ph.D, professor at Professor of English and Cultural Studies at Bryant University’s Center for Cultural Studies, “Sense and Sexuality: Foucault, Wojnarowicz, and Biopower.” Nebula, Vol. 6:3, Fall 2009 SJE

biopower encourages an art of living: thou shalt live a good life as devised by state informed¶ expert knowledge The family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers¶ cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities that secure a “vital population.” secularized,¶ techniques of pastoral power function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security,¶ sufficient wealth, and citizenship sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the modern state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge sexuality is mobilized as a hermeneutic of desire to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity. The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity—that is, "sexuality"—is thus implemented as a means of social control, deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.

biopower encourages an art of living a good life as devised by state knowledge medicine education cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities that secure a “vital population.” secularized,¶ techniques function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security wealth, and citizenship sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge. sexuality is mobilized to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity. The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity sexuality is implemented as a means of social control, In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.

At the risk of rehearsing the familiar story of biopower's conceptual life, I begin by doing so for¶ two reasons: first, to emphasize the centrality of sexuality in Foucault's rendering of the concept; and¶ second, to show precisely how Hardt and Negri desexualize it. Foucault begins his account in the¶ seventeenth century when a "power over life" emerges as a tendency alongside an earlier, overtly repressive, penal form of power that disciplined subjects through juridical systems. In contrast to a¶ negative form of freedom predicated upon "thou shalt not," which found its logical conclusion in public¶ spectacles of death, biopower encourages an art of living: thou shalt live a good life as devised by state informed¶ expert knowledge; thou shalt do what is best for you, which conveniently coincides with what¶ is best for biopolitical administration. The family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers¶ cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities and¶ forms of life that secure a “vital population.” A docile subject is produced when procedures of¶ totalization combine with techniques of individualization, or, in Foucault’s vocabulary, when the¶ anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population become two poles in the art of¶ governance. These poles correspond chronologically to different historical moments: the anatomopolitics¶ of the body, “the first to be formed it seems […] centered on the body as a machine: its¶ disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces," while the biopolitics of the¶ population, “formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics¶ of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes.”6¶ The anatomo-politics of the body and the¶ biopolitics of the population play two roles in the operation of biopower: the former, analytical,¶ concerning the individual, the latter, quantitative, concerning the population. In an essay entitled "The¶ Subject and Power" we learn that biopower derives from a form of power implemented in archaic¶ Christian institutions—what Foucault designates pastoral power.7¶ Christian pastoral power promised¶ individuals salvation in the afterlife while anchoring one’s earthly life in a community of believers. Its¶ efficacy lay in its ability to govern a population both as individuals and as a mass. Now secularized,¶ techniques of pastoral power function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security,¶ sufficient wealth, and citizenship (334-5). On Foucault's view, sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the modern state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge.¶ In the psychiatrization and medicalization of sexuality the individual becomes legible, recordable,¶ disciplined: sexuality is mobilized as a hermeneutic of desire to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity. At the same time this marker of individuality becomes useful in administering a social¶ totality. Techniques of the state such as the population census, fertility rates, and statistics of life¶ expectancy appeal to this hermeneutic to organize individual subjects into a manageable whole. The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity—that is, "sexuality"—is thus implemented as a means of social control, deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures.¶ In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life, according to Foucault, the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.

<h4>The spread of biopolitics based on securing a vital community forms and categorizes discursive identities based on sexuality as a means of social control – Marc Spindelman describes how one such identity trope is manifested in PAS discourses through the figure of the gay man with AIDS whose sexuality damned him into seeking death – only rejecting sex as truth overcomes this form of biopower – Thomas Roach explains</h4><p>Thomas J., Ph.D, professor at Professor of English and Cultural Studies at Bryant University’s Center for Cultural Studies, “Sense and Sexuality: Foucault, Wojnarowicz, and Biopower.” Nebula, Vol. 6:3, Fall 2009 SJE </p><p><u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>At the risk of rehearsing the familiar story of biopower's conceptual life, I begin by doing so for¶ two reasons: first, to emphasize the centrality of sexuality in Foucault's rendering of the concept; and¶ second, to show precisely how Hardt and Negri desexualize it. Foucault begins his account in the¶ seventeenth century when a "power over life" emerges as a tendency alongside an earlier, overtly repressive, penal form of power that disciplined subjects through juridical systems. In contrast to a¶ negative form of freedom predicated upon "thou shalt not," which found its logical conclusion in public¶ spectacles of death, <u><mark>biopower encourages an art of living</mark>: thou shalt live <mark>a good life as devised by state</mark> informed¶ expert <mark>knowledge</u></mark>; thou shalt do what is best for you, which conveniently coincides with what¶ is best for biopolitical administration. <u>The family, <mark>medicine</mark>, psychiatry, <mark>education</mark>, and employers¶ <mark>cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities </u></mark>and¶ forms of life <u><strong><mark>that secure a “vital population.”</u></strong></mark> A docile subject is produced when procedures of¶ totalization combine with techniques of individualization, or, in Foucault’s vocabulary, when the¶ anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population become two poles in the art of¶ governance. These poles correspond chronologically to different historical moments: the anatomopolitics¶ of the body, “the first to be formed it seems […] centered on the body as a machine: its¶ disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces," while the biopolitics of the¶ population, “formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics¶ of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes.”6¶ The anatomo-politics of the body and the¶ biopolitics of the population play two roles in the operation of biopower: the former, analytical,¶ concerning the individual, the latter, quantitative, concerning the population. In an essay entitled "The¶ Subject and Power" we learn that biopower derives from a form of power implemented in archaic¶ Christian institutions—what Foucault designates pastoral power.7¶ Christian pastoral power promised¶ individuals salvation in the afterlife while anchoring one’s earthly life in a community of believers. Its¶ efficacy lay in its ability to govern a population both as individuals and as a mass. Now <u><mark>secularized,¶ techniques </mark>of pastoral power <mark>function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security</mark>,¶ sufficient <mark>wealth, and citizenship</u></mark> (334-5). On Foucault's view, <u><mark>sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the </mark>modern <mark>state and capital¶ to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge</u>.</mark>¶ In the psychiatrization and medicalization of sexuality the individual becomes legible, recordable,¶ disciplined: <u><mark>sexuality is mobilized</mark> as a hermeneutic of desire <strong><mark>to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten¶ it to an identity.</u></strong></mark> At the same time this marker of individuality becomes useful in administering a social¶ totality. Techniques of the state such as the population census, fertility rates, and statistics of life¶ expectancy appeal to this hermeneutic to organize individual subjects into a manageable whole. <u><mark>The¶ discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity</mark>—that is, "<mark>sexuality</mark>"—<mark>is</mark> thus <mark>implemented as a means of social control,</mark> deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures</u>.¶ <u><strong><mark>In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life</u></strong></mark>, according to Foucault,<u><strong> <mark>the link between sex and¶ truth must be broken.</p></u></strong></mark>

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Depoliticization DA: Their government focused problem-solving approach depoliticizes politics and reduces it to calculations, constraining debate

Peker 06

Peker 06

Efe, Sessional Instructor of Sociology @ Simon Fraser U. Linkopings Universitet. “Following 9/11: George W. Bush’s Discursive Re-articulation of American Social Identity” This is to say that politics is about the rooted organizations of the administrative structure, and the relevant discourse that is established through a consolidated dominant ideology; which create subjects that do not question or look for solutions elsewhere but the boundaries of a particular system. The problem-solving approaches of politics, takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. Edkins terms the process depoliticization referring to the limitation of political action to the calculable, the instrumental, especially in the modern Western democracies: the total domination of rational calculability and planning, the triumph of instrumental reason rationality in the form of such obedience swallows up everything, even the freedom to think”.

politics is about the rooted organizations of the administrative structure, and discourse established through dominant ideology; which create subjects that do not question or look for solutions elsewhere but the boundaries of a particular system problem-solving takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action the limitation of political action to the calculable domination of rational calculability and planning rationality in the form of such obedience swallows up everything, even the freedom to think”.

Efe, Sessional Instructor of Sociology @ Simon Fraser U. Linkopings Universitet. “Following 9/11: George W. Bush’s Discursive Re-articulation of American Social Identity” In her work Poststructuralism and International Relations, Jenny Edkins emphasizes a distinction between what she terms politics and the political. Politics, according to her, has got to do with elections, political parties, the doings of governments and parliaments, the state apparatus, and in the case of international politics, treaties, international agreements, diplomacy, wars, institutions of which states are members… and the actions of statesmen and – women.” This is to say that politics is about the rooted organizations of the administrative structure, and the relevant discourse that is established through a consolidated dominant ideology; which create subjects that do not question or look for solutions elsewhere but the boundaries of a particular system. The problem-solving approaches of politics, as Cox puts it, takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. Edkins terms the process depoliticization or technologization, each of which referring to the limitation of political action to the calculable, the instrumental, especially in the modern Western democracies: the total domination of rational calculability and planning, the triumph of instrumental reason, as Simon Critchley interprets it. The philosophy of this world is essentially rationalistic, Max Horkheimer utters in The End of Reason, and warns us: “rationality in the form of such obedience swallows up everything, even the freedom to think”.

<h4><u>Depoliticization DA: </u><strong>Their government focused problem-solving approach depoliticizes politics and reduces it to calculations, constraining debate</h4><p>Peker 06</p><p><u>Efe, Sessional Instructor of Sociology @ Simon Fraser U. Linkopings Universitet. “Following 9/11: George W. Bush’s Discursive Re-articulation of American Social Identity” </p><p></u></strong>In her work Poststructuralism and International Relations, Jenny Edkins emphasizes a distinction between what she terms politics and the political. Politics, according to her, has got to do with elections, political parties, the doings of governments and parliaments, the state apparatus, and in the case of international politics, treaties, international agreements, diplomacy, wars, institutions of which states are members… and the actions of statesmen and – women.” <u><strong>This is to say that <mark>politics is about the rooted organizations of the administrative structure, and</mark> the relevant <mark>discourse</mark> that is <mark>established through</mark> a consolidated <mark>dominant ideology; which create subjects that do not question or look for solutions elsewhere but the boundaries of a particular system</mark>. The <mark>problem-solving</mark> approaches of politics, </u></strong>as Cox puts it, <u><strong><mark>takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Edkins terms the process depoliticization</u></strong> or technologization, each of which <u><strong>referring to <mark>the limitation of political action to the calculable</mark>, the instrumental, especially in the modern Western democracies: the total <mark>domination of rational calculability and planning</mark>, the triumph of instrumental reason</u></strong>, as Simon Critchley interprets it. The philosophy of this world is essentially rationalistic, Max Horkheimer utters in The End of Reason, and warns us: “<u><strong><mark>rationality in the form of such obedience swallows up everything, even the freedom to think”.</p></u></strong></mark>

2AC

FW

AT: Gov Edu Best

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round3.docx

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3

UTD LO

Heidt, Shook, Lundberg

1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T

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*Here’s more evidence - It’s resilient and rising in popularity

Senechal, their author 14 , Senior Policy Manager, Executive Secretary, ICC Banking Commission, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the G20 and many other intergovernmental bodies, both international and regional, are kept in touch with the views of international business through ICC, “2014: Rethinking Trade and Finance,” google scholar)

Senechal, their author 14 – (2014, collaborative production of the International Chamber of Commerce, edited by Thierry Senechal, Senior Policy Manager, Executive Secretary, ICC Banking Commission, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the G20 and many other intergovernmental bodies, both international and regional, are kept in touch with the views of international business through ICC, “2014: Rethinking Trade and Finance,” google scholar)

Trade finance will never go away It will continue to evolve with market requirements and technological progress. It will become more standardized - over the next few years. The popularity of trade finance securitization will have gained momentum. As world trade continues to grow, a more fluid secondary market will enable banks to meet the ever growing requirements of end users, supporting economic development globally. There is already evidence of ample demand amongst institutional investors.

Trade finance will never go away. It will continue to evolve with market requirements and tech progress. It will become more standardized over the next few years. The popularity of trade finance will gain momentum. As world trade continues to grow, a more fluid secondary market will enable banks to meet the ever growing requirements of end users, supporting economic development globally. There is already evidence of ample demand

> DANI COTTI: Trade finance will never go away. It will continue to evolve with market requirements and technological progress. It will become more standardized - along with many financial instruments - over the next few years. The popularity of trade finance securitization will have gained momentum. As world trade continues to grow, a more fluid secondary market will enable banks to meet the ever growing requirements of end users, supporting economic development globally. There is already evidence of ample demand amongst institutional investors.

<h4>*Here’s more evidence - It’s resilient and rising in popularity</h4><p><u><strong>Senechal, their author 14</u></strong> – (2014, collaborative production of the International Chamber of Commerce, edited by Thierry Senechal<u><strong>, Senior Policy Manager, Executive Secretary, ICC Banking Commission, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the G20 and many other intergovernmental bodies, both international and regional, are kept in touch with the views of international business through ICC, “2014: Rethinking Trade and Finance,” google scholar)</p><p></u></strong>> DANI COTTI: <u><strong><mark>Trade finance will never go away</u></strong>. <u>It will continue to evolve with market requirements and tech</mark>nological <mark>progress. It will become <strong>more standardized</strong></mark> </u>- along with many financial instruments <u>- <mark>over the next few years. The <strong>popularity</strong> of trade finance</mark> securitization <mark>will</mark> have <strong><mark>gain</strong></mark>ed <strong><mark>momentum</strong>. As world trade continues to grow, a more fluid <strong>secondary market</strong> will enable banks to meet the ever growing requirements of end users, <strong>supporting economic development globally</strong>. There is already evidence of ample demand</mark> amongst institutional investors.</p></u>

1NR

Banks

2NC Trade Finance Resilient

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

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1

Harvard DH

Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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US masks its interests under the guise of saving mexico which demonstrates a form of benign imperialism which causes violence

Jalbert 13

Jalbert 13 (Elie Jalbert, BA honors in anthropology at Concordia University, “Emergency as Security: Liberal Empire at Home and Abroad,” pp 31-2, GENDER MODIFIED) gz

U.S. history is fraught with contradiction. There seems to have¶ been a persistent divide between its represented self-image and its¶ actions in the world It has promoted its¶ exceptional nature and asserted its difference from all previous¶ empires, advocating fundamental human rights and opportunity¶ for all, though its society has been one of profound segregation¶ with a foreign policy more often than not brutal,¶ repressive, and indeed essentially imperialistic a foreign policy that then in turn transformed domestic¶ policy by importing its policing practices back home Founded on the genocide of its Indigenous¶ population, the U.S. has defined its brave and free persona by glorifying¶ its revolution that shook off the empire’s grip, yet has been¶ leading a global counterinsurgent “War on Terrorism” that defines¶ resistance as a threat that must be eliminated the contrast of a projected benign history¶ of the quest for freedom and rights with the reality of American¶ ascent to global domination there is “an almost pathological tendency to confuse¶ American ideal with historical political reality,” and a constant¶ tension between “liberty and power, freedom and authority, contract¶ and coercion, and law and violence this sense of exceptionalism to be underpinned by¶ a Spencerian theory of social evolution that presents American industry¶ as the pinnacle of [humanity’s] ever ascending rise to perfection This “social Darwinism” that applied biological notions of survival¶ of the fittest to human society provided legitimacy for rapacious¶ and competitive social and economic practices by presenting them¶ as a natural and normal continuation of evolution toward complexity reminiscent of the Malthusian arguments discussed earlier,¶ that rooted their reasoning in the laws of nature so as to give them¶ an air of inevitability

U.S. history is fraught with contradiction between its self-image and its¶ actions It has asserted its difference from all previous¶ empires, advocating human rights and opportunity though its society has been one of profound segregation with a foreign policy brutal,¶ repressive, and imperialistic importing its policing practices back home Founded on the genocide of its Indigenous¶ population, the U.S. defined its persona by glorifying¶ its revolution yet has been¶ leading a “War on Terrorism” that defines¶ resistance as a threat that must be eliminated there is “a pathological tendency to confuse¶ American ideal with historical reality this sense of exceptionalism presents American industry¶ as the pinnacle of [humanity’s] perfection.¶ This “social Darwinism” that applied survival¶ of the fittest to human society provided legitimacy for rapacious practices by presenting them¶ as a natural continuation of evolution reminiscent of Malthusian arguments that rooted their reasoning in the laws of nature to give them¶ an air of inevitability.

U.S. history is fraught with contradiction. There seems to have¶ been a persistent divide between its represented self-image and its¶ actions in the world. It has viewed itself as a land of the free,¶ where individuals have free reign to maximize their wealth and¶ pursue happiness without the constraints of government inhibiting¶ their freedom, while ignoring the way in which government typically¶ enforced the rights of one group over another (McCaull, 1976)¶ and provided the infrastructure and investments that made development¶ possible (Novak, 2008; Limerick, 2012). It has promoted its¶ exceptional nature and asserted its difference from all previous¶ empires, advocating fundamental human rights and opportunity¶ for all, though its society has been one of profound segregation¶ (Perlstein, 2006), with a foreign policy more often than not brutal,¶ repressive, and indeed essentially imperialistic (Chomsky, 1998;¶ McCoy, 2009)—a foreign policy that then in turn transformed domestic¶ policy by importing its policing practices back home (McCoy¶ & Scarano, 2009; Chomsky, 1999; De Genova, 2010; Steinmetz,¶ 2005, pp. 357–361). Founded on the genocide of its Indigenous¶ population, the U.S. has defined its brave and free persona by glorifying¶ its revolution that shook off the empire’s grip, yet has been¶ leading a global counterinsurgent “War on Terrorism” that defines¶ resistance as a threat that must be eliminated.¶ One such contradiction—the contrast of a projected benign history¶ of the quest for freedom and rights with the reality of American¶ ascent to global domination—is discussed by Novak (2008). In¶ addressing what he calls the “myth of the ‘weak’ American state”,¶ he shows how there is “an almost pathological tendency to confuse¶ American ideal with historical political reality,” and a constant¶ tension between “liberty and power, freedom and authority, contract¶ and coercion, and law and violence” (Novak, 2008, p. 754). In¶ the author’s view, the myth of an American weak state has its¶ roots in an exceptionalist view of the U.S as being a new world exempted¶ from previous political histories by a “so-called ‘natural’¶ development of individualism, private rights, civil society, free labour,¶ and a free economy” (Novak, 2008, pp. 754–755). McCaull¶ (1976) considers this sense of exceptionalism to be underpinned by¶ a Spencerian theory of social evolution that presents American industry¶ as the pinnacle of man’s [humanity’s] ever ascending rise to perfection.¶ This “social Darwinism” that applied biological notions of survival¶ of the fittest to human society provided legitimacy for rapacious¶ and competitive social and economic practices by presenting them¶ as a natural and normal continuation of evolution toward complexity.¶ Spencer’s theory was thus co-opted by American industrialists¶ as a powerful “scientific” tool of laissez faire capitalism legitimation,¶ reminiscent of the Malthusian arguments discussed earlier,¶ that rooted their reasoning in the laws of nature so as to give them¶ an air of inevitability.

<h4>US masks its interests under the guise of saving mexico which demonstrates a form of benign imperialism which causes violence</h4><p><u><strong>Jalbert 13</u></strong> (Elie Jalbert, BA honors in anthropology at Concordia University, “Emergency as Security: Liberal Empire at Home and Abroad,” pp 31-2, GENDER MODIFIED) gz </p><p><u><mark>U.S. history is fraught with contradiction</mark>. There seems to have¶ been a persistent divide <mark>between its</mark> represented <mark>self-image and its¶ actions</mark> in the world</u>. It has viewed itself as a land of the free,¶ where individuals have free reign to maximize their wealth and¶ pursue happiness without the constraints of government inhibiting¶ their freedom, while ignoring the way in which government typically¶ enforced the rights of one group over another (McCaull, 1976)¶ and provided the infrastructure and investments that made development¶ possible (Novak, 2008; Limerick, 2012). <u><mark>It has</mark> promoted its¶ exceptional nature and <mark>asserted its difference from all previous¶ empires, advocating</mark> fundamental <mark>human rights and opportunity</mark>¶ for all, <mark>though its society has been one of profound <strong>segregation</strong></mark>¶ </u>(Perlstein, 2006), <u><mark>with a foreign policy</mark> more often than not <strong><mark>brutal,¶ repressive</strong>, and</mark> indeed essentially <strong><mark>imperialistic</u></strong></mark> (Chomsky, 1998;¶ McCoy, 2009)—<u>a foreign policy that then in turn transformed domestic¶ policy by <strong><mark>importing its policing practices</strong> back home</u></mark> (McCoy¶ & Scarano, 2009; Chomsky, 1999; De Genova, 2010; Steinmetz,¶ 2005, pp. 357–361). <u><strong><mark>Founded on the genocide of its Indigenous¶ population</strong>, the U.S.</mark> has <mark>defined its</mark> brave and free <mark>persona by glorifying¶ its revolution</mark> that shook off the empire’s grip, <mark>yet has been¶ leading a</mark> global counterinsurgent <mark>“War on Terrorism” that <strong>defines¶ resistance as a threat that must be eliminated</u></strong></mark>.¶ One such contradiction—<u>the contrast of a projected benign history¶ of the quest for freedom and rights with the reality of American¶ ascent to <strong>global domination</u></strong>—is discussed by Novak (2008). In¶ addressing what he calls the “myth of the ‘weak’ American state”,¶ he shows how <u><mark>there is “<strong>a</mark>n almost <mark>pathological tendency</strong> to confuse¶ American ideal with historical</mark> political <mark>reality</mark>,” and a constant¶ tension between “<strong>liberty and power</strong>, <strong>freedom and authority</strong>, <strong>contract¶ and coercion</strong>, and <strong>law and violence</u></strong>” (Novak, 2008, p. 754). In¶ the author’s view, the myth of an American weak state has its¶ roots in an exceptionalist view of the U.S as being a new world exempted¶ from previous political histories by a “so-called ‘natural’¶ development of individualism, private rights, civil society, free labour,¶ and a free economy” (Novak, 2008, pp. 754–755). McCaull¶ (1976) considers <u><mark>this sense of exceptionalism</mark> to be underpinned by¶ a Spencerian theory of social evolution that <mark>presents American industry¶ as the <strong>pinnacle of </u></strong></mark>man’s<u><strong> <mark>[humanity’s]</mark> ever ascending rise to <mark>perfection</u></strong>.¶ <u>This “<strong>social Darwinism</strong>” that applied</mark> biological notions of <mark>survival¶ of the fittest to human society provided legitimacy for rapacious</mark>¶ and competitive social and economic <mark>practices by presenting them¶ as a natural</mark> and normal <mark>continuation of evolution</mark> toward complexity</u>.¶ Spencer’s theory was thus co-opted by American industrialists¶ as a powerful “scientific” tool of laissez faire capitalism legitimation,¶ <u><mark>reminiscent of</mark> the <strong><mark>Malthusian arguments</strong></mark> discussed earlier,¶ <mark>that rooted their reasoning in the laws of nature</mark> so as <mark>to give them¶ an air of inevitability</u>.</p></mark>

2NC

K

Link – Mexico

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Kentucky

Doubles

George Mason KL

Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box

1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case

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Terrorism will not cause extinction

Kato ‘8

Kato ‘8

It is encouraging to see the emergence of a new strategic discussion within the United States that recognizes the fact that nonstate actors such as al Qaeda "do not pose an existential threat" to the United States Al Qaeda possesses neither the strategic vision nor the capability to topple the existing world order and U.S. predominance

nonstate actors such as al Qaeda "do not pose an existential threat" Al Qaeda possesses neither the vision nor t capability to topple the world order and U.S. predominance

(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis) The administration has become a prisoner to the newly emergent threats that it faces. It is therefore encouraging to see the emergence of a new strategic discussion within the United States that recognizes the fact that nonstate actors such as al Qaeda "do not pose an existential threat" to the United States. 4 Al Qaeda rejects the expansion of U.S. values, especially in the Middle East, and has proven that it can inflict enormous pain on the United States and its friends and allies and disrupt regions and the globe through terrorist attacks. Yet, it possesses neither the strategic vision nor the capability to topple the existing world order and U.S. predominance. Overreactions based on the overestimation of such threats were the fundamental reasons underlying the failure of the current U.S. strategy. A calm and objective reassessment of the threats and challenges must be the first step toward restoration of the U.S. reputation.

<h4><strong>Terrorism will not cause extinction </h4><p>Kato ‘8</p><p></strong>(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis) </p><p>The administration has become a prisoner to the newly emergent threats that it faces. <u><strong>It is</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>encouraging to see the emergence of a new strategic discussion within the United States that recognizes the fact that <mark>nonstate actors such as al Qaeda "do not pose an existential threat" </mark>to the United States</u></strong>. <strong>4</strong> <u><strong><mark>Al Qaeda</u></strong> </mark>rejects the expansion of U.S. values, especially in the Middle East, and has proven that it can inflict enormous pain on the United States and its friends and allies and disrupt regions and the globe through terrorist attacks. Yet, it <u><strong><mark>possesses neither the</mark> strategic <mark>vision nor t</mark>he <mark>capability to topple the </mark>existing <mark>world order and U.S. predominance</u></strong></mark>. Overreactions based on the overestimation of such threats were the fundamental reasons underlying the failure of the current U.S. strategy. A calm and objective reassessment of the threats and challenges must be the first step toward restoration of the U.S. reputation.</p>

1NR

Cartels

No Nuke Terror

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Mary Washington SY

Rebecca Steiner

1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case

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Legalization of prostitution means government regulation

Jacobson ‘14

Jacobson ‘14

four legal responses to prostitution have arisen: complete criminalization, legalization, complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization Complete criminalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex illegal. Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation Complete decriminalization removes criminal punishment and sanction for the purchase and sale of sex, whereas partial decriminalization continues to make the purchase of sex illegal while decriminalizing the sale of sex

four legal responses to prostitution have arisen complete criminalization legalization complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation.

[Brynn, J.D. Candidate. Seattle University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Political Science, University of Washington, 2010. “Addressing the Tension Between the Dual Identities of the American Prostitute: Criminal and Victim; How Problem-Solving Courts Can Help.” 37 Seattle Univ. L. R. 1023. ETB] Prostitution and its legal status are the subject of a heated global debate. n7 Currently, prostitution is illegal everywhere in the United States except Nevada, where it is legal in several counties. n8 An important consideration of that debate is how prostitution laws affect law enforcement's ability to identify and prosecute sex traffickers, or "pimps" as they are commonly known. n9 To date, there is still no uniform approach to trafficking prosecutions in the United States, and many states continue to criminalize the acts of prostitutes while failing to enforce criminal laws against those who exploit them. n10 As a result of this debate, four legal responses to prostitution have arisen: complete criminalization, legalization, complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization. n11 Complete criminalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex illegal. n12 Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under heavy government regulation. n13 Complete decriminalization removes criminal punishment and sanction for the purchase and sale of sex, whereas partial decriminalization continues to make the purchase of sex illegal while decriminalizing the sale of sex. n14 Based on a utilitarian analysis, which recognizes the value of these four theories, this Comment reaches the conclusion that any scheme of legalization or decriminalization is not the optimal solution to the problem of prostitution because it leaves victims in a worse situation than they are currently in and subjects them to further exploitation. This Comment argues for continued criminalization for prostitution in the United States. An appropriate way to deal with women arrested for prostitution is to set up a problem-solving court, similar to a drug court, which would provide a multidisciplinary approach to helping those trapped in prostitution.

<h4><u><strong>Legalization of prostitution means government regulation</h4><p>Jacobson ‘14</p><p></u></strong>[Brynn, J.D. Candidate. Seattle University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Political Science, University of Washington, 2010. “Addressing the Tension Between the Dual Identities of the American Prostitute: Criminal and Victim; How Problem-Solving Courts Can Help.” 37 Seattle Univ. L. R. 1023. ETB]</p><p>Prostitution and its legal status are the subject of a heated global debate. n7 Currently, prostitution is illegal everywhere in the United States except Nevada, where it is legal in several counties. n8 An important consideration of that debate is how prostitution laws affect law enforcement's ability to identify and prosecute sex traffickers, or "pimps" as they are commonly known. n9 To date, there is still no uniform approach to trafficking prosecutions in the United States, and many states continue to criminalize the acts of prostitutes while failing to enforce criminal laws against those who exploit them. n10 As a result of this debate, <u><mark>four legal responses to prostitution have arisen</mark>: <mark>complete</mark> <mark>criminalization</mark>, <mark>legalization</mark>, <mark>complete decriminalization, and partial decriminalization</u></mark>. n11 <u>Complete criminalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex illegal.</u> n12 <u><mark>Legalization makes both the sale and purchase of sex legal but brings it under <strong>heavy</strong> government regulation</u>.</mark> n13 <u>Complete decriminalization removes criminal punishment and sanction for the purchase and sale of sex, whereas partial decriminalization continues to make the purchase of sex illegal while decriminalizing the sale of sex</u>. n14 Based on a utilitarian analysis, which recognizes the value of these four theories, this Comment reaches the conclusion that any scheme of legalization or decriminalization is not the optimal solution to the problem of prostitution because it leaves victims in a worse situation than they are currently in and subjects them to further exploitation. This Comment argues for continued criminalization for prostitution in the United States. An appropriate way to deal with women arrested for prostitution is to set up a problem-solving court, similar to a drug court, which would provide a multidisciplinary approach to helping those trapped in prostitution.</p>

1NC

Off

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James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal failure k t regulation municipalities da pepfar cp and case 2nc was legal failure k 1nr was pepfar cp municipalities da and case 2nr was legal failure k and case

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I will follow that system of regimen which… I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious…

<h4>I will follow that system of regimen which… I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious…</h4>

1AC

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Hirn, Fisher, DeLo

1AC Illich 1NC T Cap K Block Cap K New Affs Bad 2NR Cap K New Affs Bad

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Status quo justifications for PAS are based on a notion of autonomy which upholds a neoliberal notion of rights and individuation – our project consists of a disruption of those illusory forms of subjectivity – Scott Shershow, when discussing the right to die, posits two important questions: first, “can the political and legal concepts of “rights” or “freedom” apply to something that, so to speak, marks the very limit of all rights and all freedom?” and second “can one really conceive of a right to that which comes inescapably to all whether they like it or not?”

<h4>Status quo justifications for PAS are based on a notion of autonomy which upholds a neoliberal notion of rights and individuation – our project consists of a disruption of those illusory forms of subjectivity – Scott Shershow, when discussing the right to die, posits two important questions: first, “can the political and legal concepts of “rights” or “freedom” apply to something that, so to speak, marks the very limit of all rights and all freedom?” and second “can one really conceive of a right to that which comes inescapably to all whether they like it or not?”<u><strong> </h4></u></strong>

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Deliberative democracy is a floating signifier that can be filled with any number of ideologies. The result is the exploitative violence of an alienated capitalist society.

Dean 07

Dean 07 Jodi Dean Ph.D., Columbia M.A., Columbia, B.A., PrincetonThe Democratic Deadlock, Theory & Event, 10:4, Project Muse | © 2007

The Left, although seemingly opposed to the Bush administration, also appeals to democracy as that which it wishes to restore, redeem, or reach. Why does the Left continue to appeal to democracy to accept this horizon is to accept an impoverished political field, a diminishment of aspirations to something better. We accept the limitation of democracy, convinced that this is as good as it gets. constitutional democracies privilege the wealthy. They exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor. Despite democracy's inability to represent justice in the social field left political theorists continue to appeal to arrangements that can be filled in, by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and conservatisms diametrically opposed to progressive visions of social and economic equality. We proceed as if democracy were already the solution to contemporary political problems rather than symptomatic of them.

Why does the Left continue to appeal to democracy We accept the limitation of democracy, convinced that this is as good as it gets. constitutional democracies privilege the wealthy. They exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor. Despite democracy's inability to represent justice in the social field that theorists continue to appeal to arrangements that can be filled in, by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and conservatisms diametrically opposed to progressive visions of social and economic equality . We proceed as if democracy were already the solution to contemporary political problems rather than symptomatic of them

A commonplace of media punditry in the middle years of the first decade of the twenty-first century concerns the deep divide in American politics. Whether in terms of political parties, red states and blue states, support or opposition to US militarism in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the ongoing culture war between the religious right and the secular left, the United States is depicted as a nation split in its fundamental ethico-political self-understanding. This depiction is misleading. It occludes the way these seeming opponents continue to appeal to democracy. Thus, the administration of George W. Bush presents itself as actively engaged in bringing democracy to the Middle East, as encouraging countries throughout the world to strengthen their democratic institutions. The Left, although seemingly opposed to the Bush administration, also appeals to democracy as that which it wishes to restore, redeem, or reach. Why does the Left continue to appeal to democracy? Is democracy, as Slavoj Žižek asks, the ultimate horizon of political thought?1 For Žižek, to accept this horizon is to accept an impoverished political field, a diminishment of aspirations to something better. We accept the limitation of democracy, convinced that this is as good as it gets. Real existing constitutional democracies privilege the wealthy. They exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor. Crucial determinants of our lives and conditions remain outside the frame of political deliberation and response. The expansion and intensification of networked communications that was supposed to enhance democratic participation integrates and consolidates communicative capitalism.2 Nevertheless, we on the Left continue to present our political hopes as aspirations to democracy. Despite democracy's inability to represent justice in the social field that has emerged in the incompatibility between the global neoliberal economy and states' willingness to retain the promise of social security and collective welfare, left political and cultural theorists continue to appeal to arrangements that can be filled in, substantialized, by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and conservatisms diametrically opposed to progressive visions of social and economic equality. Continuing to appeal to democracy, we fail to emphasize the divisions necessary for politics, divisions that should lead us to organize against the interests of corporations and their stockholders, against the values of the fundamentalists and the individualists, and on behalf of collectivist arrangements designed to redistribute benefits and opportunities more equitably. We proceed as if democracy were already the solution to contemporary political problems rather than symptomatic of them.

<h4><strong>Deliberative democracy is a floating signifier that can be filled with any number of ideologies. The result is the exploitative violence of an alienated capitalist society. </h4><p>Dean 07</p><p></strong>Jodi Dean Ph.D., Columbia M.A., Columbia, B.A., PrincetonThe Democratic Deadlock, Theory & Event, 10:4, Project Muse | ©<u><strong> 2007</p><p></u></strong>A commonplace of media punditry in the middle years of the first decade of the twenty-first century concerns the deep divide in American politics. Whether in terms of political parties, red states and blue states, support or opposition to US militarism in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the ongoing culture war between the religious right and the secular left, the United States is depicted as a nation split in its fundamental ethico-political self-understanding. This depiction is misleading. It occludes the way these seeming opponents continue to appeal to democracy. Thus, the administration of George W. Bush presents itself as actively engaged in bringing democracy to the Middle East, as encouraging countries throughout the world to strengthen their democratic institutions. <u><strong>The Left, although seemingly opposed to the Bush administration, also appeals to democracy as that which it wishes to restore, redeem, or reach. <mark>Why does the Left continue to appeal to democracy</u></strong></mark>? Is democracy, as Slavoj Žižek asks, the ultimate horizon of political thought?1 For Žižek, <u><strong>to accept this horizon is to accept an impoverished political field, a diminishment of aspirations to something better. <mark>We accept the limitation of democracy, convinced that this is as good as it gets</strong>.</u></mark> Real existing <u><strong><mark>constitutional democracies privilege the wealthy. They exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor.</strong></mark> </u>Crucial determinants of our lives and conditions remain outside the frame of political deliberation and response. The expansion and intensification of networked communications that was supposed to enhance democratic participation integrates and consolidates communicative capitalism.2 Nevertheless, we on the Left continue to present our political hopes as aspirations to democracy. <u><strong><mark>Despite democracy's inability to represent justice in the social field</strong> </u>that</mark> has emerged in the incompatibility between the global neoliberal economy and states' willingness to retain the promise of social security and collective welfare, <u><strong>left political</strong> </u>and cultural<u> <strong><mark>theorists continue to appeal to arrangements that can be filled in,</strong></mark> </u>substantialized, <u><strong><mark>by fundamentalisms, nationalisms, populisms, and conservatisms diametrically opposed to progressive visions of social and economic equality</mark>. </u></strong>Continuing to appeal to democracy, we fail to emphasize the divisions necessary for politics, divisions that should lead us to organize against the interests of corporations and their stockholders, against the values of the fundamentalists and the individualists, and on behalf of collectivist arrangements designed to redistribute benefits and opportunities more equitably<mark>.<u> <strong>We proceed as if democracy were already the solution to contemporary political problems rather than symptomatic of them</mark>.</p></u></strong>

2AC

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AT: Gov Edu Best

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1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T

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That is a form of ideological alarmism which masks US involvement in terrorist construction – our evidence cites their internal link author

Longmire 14

Sylvia Longmire 14, Senior lecturer @ Air Force Special Operations School's Dynamics of International Terrorism with MA @ USF in Latin America studies, consultant/Analyst/SME on Mexico's drug war and border security issues retired Air Force captain and former Special Agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, “Avoiding Sensationalism And Fiction In Drug War Reporting”, February 28th, AB

There is a lot of daily drama surrounding Mexico’s drug war reporting on cartel happenings of our border tends to turn sensational to grab headlines generate buzz, or spark controversy to increase readership an overblown and alarmist article can simply be the result of a misinformed an article from World Politics Review titled, “Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If Mexico’s Drug Violence Expands to U.S.” from a writer with a strong professional background that would lead readers to some very wrong conclusions. The “shock factor” began when I read, “Americans must face the possibility that the [Mexican] conflict may also expand northward, This statement is to suck readers in with the notion that Mexican drug cartels could possibly engage in terrorist activity The writer, Steven Metz, expands on this thought by saying The Zetas already have a substantial connection to Hezbollah Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran, it might some day attempt to strike the United States in retribution for American action against Tehran Unfortunately for Metz this information is flat-out wrong not enough people understand the corporate and profit-maximizing interests of cartels any government or law enforcement attention brought upon them by such associations would crush their business operations Drug cartels have less of an interest in working with Hezbollah than our government does Hezbollah and a cartel have two very different goals Hezbollah has a fundamentalist mentality that involves a hatred of the West Los Zetas just want to make money and need a stable government apparatus that they can manipulate Nieto is pulling away from bilateral cooperation to prove that Mexico can handle its own affairs Mexico is not on the verge of collapse despite insurgency It has the 13th largest economy in the world, a strong military, free and fair elections and a broken but existent justice system Somalia it is not. It is very true that cartels have a widespread prese However, the dramatic “possibilities” that Metz outlines in this piece are alarmist and not based on solid or reliable facts—merely conjecture read any report about Mexico’s drug war with a discerning eye for facts, sources, and anything that sounds even remotely outrageous or sensational This is how we writers are held accountable, how we propagate facts, and how we restrain fiction

reporting on cartel happenings tends to turn sensational to grab headlines an overblown and alarmist article can be misinformed that lead readers to wrong conclusions This statement is to suck readers in with the notion that cartels could engage in terrorist activity Metz expands saying Zetas connect to Hezbollah it might strike the U S this information is flat-out wrong not enough people understand the profit interests of cartels any government attention would crush their business operations Drug cartels have less of an interest in working with Hezbollah than our government does Hezbollah and a cartel have two very different goals. Hezbollah has a fundamentalist mentality Zetas just want to make money, and a government they can manipulate Mexico is not on the verge of collapse, despite insurgency It has the 13th largest economy a strong military free fair elections and a broken but existent justice system the dramatic “possibilities Metz outlines are alarmist and not based on facts merely conjecture read any report about Mexico’s drug war with a discerning eye for anything that sounds even remotely sensational

There is a lot of daily drama surrounding Mexico’s drug war. In fact, I often refer to the frequent changes of command, violent territory grabs, and back-room deals between former rivals as something akin to As the Narco-World Turns. As a result of that, I believe that some reporting on cartel happenings on both sides of our southwest border tends to turn sensational, either to grab headlines, generate buzz, or spark controversy in an attempt to increase readership. In some cases, an overblown and alarmist article can simply be the result of a misinformed writer. On February 20, 2014, an associate of mine brought to my attention an article from World Politics Review titled, “Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If Mexico’s Drug Violence Expands to U.S.” I read this article with interest because I assumed it would address border violence spillover and cartel activities within the US. It did, but unfortunately, it wasn’t long before I was shaking my head with disappointment. Here was another article from a writer with a strong professional background that would inevitably lead readers to some very wrong conclusions. The “shock factor” treatment began in the first paragraph when I read, “Americans must face the possibility that the [Mexican] conflict may also expand northward, with inter-gang warfare, assassinations of government officials and outright terrorism in the United States.” This statement is sure to suck readers in, particularly with the notion that Mexican drug cartels could possibly engage in terrorist activity in the US. The writer, Steven Metz, expands on this thought by saying, “The Zetas already have a substantial connection to Hezbollah, based on collaborative narco-trafficking and arms smuggling…Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran, it might some day attempt to strike the United States in retribution for American action against Tehran. If so, it would likely attempt to exploit its connection with the Zetas, pulling the narco-traffickers into a transnational proxy war.” Unfortunately for Metz and his readers, this information is flat-out wrong. I devoted an entire chapter in my forthcoming book, Border Insecurity, to laying out the facts and fiction surrounding the potential (or lack thereof) for cartels and terrorist groups to work together. It seems that not enough people understand the corporate and profit-maximizing interests of cartels, and how any government or law enforcement attention brought upon them by such associations would crush their business operations. Drug cartels have almost less of an interest in working with Hezbollah than our government does in seeing them do so. This isn’t to say that terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations don’t have several things in common, like selling drugs to raise money and using a variety of avenues to launder their ill-gotten proceeds. It’s well known that groups like the PKK in Turkey, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba in South Asia all benefit tremendously from their involvement in the drug trade. However, Hezbollah and a cartel like Los Zetas have two very different goals. Hezbollah has a fundamentalist and Islamist mentality that involves a deep hatred of the West and a desire to spread radical Islam throughout the world. Los Zetas and their rivals just want to make money, and need a stable government apparatus that they can simply manipulate, not control or take over. The statement that “…using the U.S. military against the cartels on Mexican soil could weaken the Mexican government or even cause its collapse…” also demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of the dynamic between our two governments, as well as a highly exaggerated view of what it would take to collapse the Mexican government. It’s true that our relationship with our neighbor to the south is delicate and complicated due to over a century of meddling in Latin America’s affairs. However, the US Department of Defense is extremely aware of Mexico’s desire to assert its sovereignty. Current Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto is pulling away from bilateral cooperation in a likely attempt to prove that Mexico can handle its own affairs—a contrast to his predecessor Felipe Calderón, who drew considerable heat for allowing US drones to fly in Mexico in 2009 in order to provide imagery in support of counterdrug operations. Mexico is not on the verge of collapse, despite a criminal insurgency that has affected many parts of the country. It has the 13th largest economy in the world, a strong military, free and relatively fair elections in a functioning democracy, and a broken but existent justice system. Somalia or Sudan, it is not. It is very true that Mexican cartels—mostly by proxy through lower-level associates and gang members—have a widespread presence in virtually every corner of the US. They supply 90 percent of the illegal drugs on our streets, and engage in violent behavior against each other, migrants, and law enforcement officers on US soil. However, the dramatic “possibilities” that Metz outlines in this piece are alarmist and not based on solid or reliable facts—merely conjecture. The problem is that there is a lot more material out there like this. People will read these articles and assume they are true, then express anger that our government can’t even begin to address this apocalyptic threat. I am solidly in the camp that our government does not give nearly enough credence and attention to the national security threat posed by Mexican cartels, nor does it come close to validating the security concerns of many border residents. However, that doesn’t excuse anyone from publishing information that is not thoroughly researched and based on more than blog “reports” with no obvious author. It’s a disservice to readers, and I encourage you to read any report about Mexico’s drug war or border security—yes, even mine—with a discerning eye for facts, sources, and anything that sounds even remotely outrageous or sensational. This is how we writers are held accountable, how we propagate facts, and how we restrain fiction.

<h4>That is a form of ideological alarmism which masks US involvement in terrorist construction – our evidence cites their internal link author</h4><p>Sylvia <u><strong>Longmire 14</u></strong>, Senior lecturer @ Air Force Special Operations School's Dynamics of International Terrorism with MA @ USF in Latin America studies, consultant/Analyst/SME on Mexico's drug war and border security issues retired Air Force captain and former Special Agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, “Avoiding Sensationalism And Fiction In Drug War Reporting”, February 28th, AB </p><p><u>There is a lot of daily drama surrounding Mexico’s drug war</u>. In fact, I often refer to the frequent changes of command, violent territory grabs, and back-room deals between former rivals as something akin to As the Narco-World Turns. As a result of that, I believe that some <u><strong><mark>reporting</strong> on cartel happenings</u></mark> on both sides <u>of our</u> southwest <u>border <strong><mark>tends to turn</mark> <mark>sensational</u></strong></mark>, either <u><mark>to grab headlines</u></mark>, <u>generate buzz, or spark controversy</u> in an attempt <u>to increase readership</u>. In some cases, <u><strong><mark>an overblown and alarmist article</u></strong> <u>can</mark> simply <mark>be</mark> the result of a <mark>misinformed</u></mark> writer. On February 20, 2014, an associate of mine brought to my attention <u>an article from World Politics Review titled, “Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If Mexico’s Drug Violence Expands to U.S.”</u> I read this article with interest because I assumed it would address border violence spillover and cartel activities within the US. It did, but unfortunately, it wasn’t long before I was shaking my head with disappointment. Here was another article <u>from a writer with a strong professional background <mark>that</mark> would</u> inevitably <u><strong><mark>lead readers to</strong></mark> some very <strong><mark>wrong conclusions</strong></mark>. The “shock factor”</u> treatment <u>began</u> in the first paragraph <u>when I read, “Americans must face the possibility that the [Mexican] conflict may also expand northward,</u> with inter-gang warfare, assassinations of government officials and outright terrorism in the United States.” <u><mark>This statement</u> <u>is</u></mark> sure <u><mark>to suck readers in</u></mark>, particularly <u><mark>with the notion that</mark> Mexican drug <mark>cartels could</mark> possibly <mark>engage in terrorist activity</u></mark> in the US. <u>The writer, Steven <mark>Metz</mark>, <mark>expands</mark> on this thought by <mark>saying</u></mark>, “<u>The <mark>Zetas</mark> already have a substantial <mark>connect</mark>ion <mark>to Hezbollah</u></mark>, based on collaborative narco-trafficking and arms smuggling…<u>Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran, <mark>it</mark> <mark>might</mark> some day attempt to <mark>strike the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates in retribution for American action against Tehran</u>. If so, it would likely attempt to exploit its connection with the Zetas, pulling the narco-traffickers into a transnational proxy war.” <u>Unfortunately for Metz</u> and his readers, <u><strong><mark>this information is flat-out wrong</u></strong></mark>. I devoted an entire chapter in my forthcoming book, Border Insecurity, to laying out the facts and fiction surrounding the potential (or lack thereof) for cartels and terrorist groups to work together. It seems that <u><strong><mark>not enough people</mark> <mark>understand the</strong> </mark>corporate and <strong><mark>profit</strong></mark>-maximizing <strong><mark>interests of cartels</u></strong></mark>, and how <u><mark>any</u></mark> <u><mark>government</mark> or law enforcement <mark>attention</mark> brought upon them by such associations <mark>would <strong>crush their business operations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Drug cartels have</u></strong></mark> almost <u><strong><mark>less of an interest in working with Hezbollah than our government does</u></strong></mark> in seeing them do so. This isn’t to say that terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations don’t have several things in common, like selling drugs to raise money and using a variety of avenues to launder their ill-gotten proceeds. It’s well known that groups like the PKK in Turkey, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba in South Asia all benefit tremendously from their involvement in the drug trade. However, <u><strong><mark>Hezbollah and a cartel</u></strong></mark> like Los Zetas <u><strong><mark>have two very different goals</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Hezbollah has a fundamentalist</u></mark> and Islamist <u><mark>mentality</u></mark> <u>that involves a</u> deep <u>hatred of the West</u> and a desire to spread radical Islam throughout the world. <u>Los <strong><mark>Zetas</u></strong></mark> and their rivals <u><strong><mark>just want to make money</u></strong>, <u>and <strong></mark>need <mark>a</mark> stable <mark>government</mark> apparatus</u></strong> <u>that <mark>they can</mark> </u>simply <u><mark>manipulate</u></mark>, not control or take over. The statement that “…using the U.S. military against the cartels on Mexican soil could weaken the Mexican government or even cause its collapse…” also demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of the dynamic between our two governments, as well as a highly exaggerated view of what it would take to collapse the Mexican government. It’s true that our relationship with our neighbor to the south is delicate and complicated due to over a century of meddling in Latin America’s affairs. However, the US Department of Defense is extremely aware of Mexico’s desire to assert its sovereignty. Current Mexican President Enrique Peña <u>Nieto is pulling away from bilateral cooperation</u> in a likely attempt <u>to prove that Mexico can handle its own affairs</u>—a contrast to his predecessor Felipe Calderón, who drew considerable heat for allowing US drones to fly in Mexico in 2009 in order to provide imagery in support of counterdrug operations. <u><strong><mark>Mexico is not on the verge of collapse</u></strong>, <u>despite</u></mark> a criminal <u><mark>insurgency</u></mark> that has affected many parts of the country. <u><mark>It has the 13th largest economy</mark> in the world, <mark>a strong military</mark>, <mark>free</mark> and </u>relatively <u><mark>fair elections</u></mark> in a functioning democracy, <u><mark>and a broken but existent justice system</u></mark>. <u>Somalia</u> or Sudan, <u>it is not. It is very true that</u> Mexican <u>cartels</u>—mostly by proxy through lower-level associates and gang members—<u>have a widespread prese</u>nce in virtually every corner of the US. They supply 90 percent of the illegal drugs on our streets, and engage in violent behavior against each other, migrants, and law enforcement officers on US soil. <u>However, <strong><mark>the dramatic “possibilities</mark>”</strong> that <mark>Metz outlines</mark> in this piece <strong><mark>are alarmist</mark> <mark>and not based on</mark> solid or reliable <mark>facts</strong></mark>—<mark>merely conjecture</u></mark>. The problem is that there is a lot more material out there like this. People will read these articles and assume they are true, then express anger that our government can’t even begin to address this apocalyptic threat. I am solidly in the camp that our government does not give nearly enough credence and attention to the national security threat posed by Mexican cartels, nor does it come close to validating the security concerns of many border residents. However, that doesn’t excuse anyone from publishing information that is not thoroughly researched and based on more than blog “reports” with no obvious author. It’s a disservice to readers, and I encourage you to <u><strong><mark>read any report about Mexico’s drug war</u></strong></mark> or border security—yes, even mine—<u><strong><mark>with a discerning eye for</mark> facts, sources, and <mark>anything that sounds even remotely </mark>outrageous or <mark>sensational</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is how we writers are held accountable, how we propagate facts, and how we restrain fiction</u>.</p>

2NC

K

Link – Mexico

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Kentucky

Doubles

George Mason KL

Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box

1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case

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Royal votes neg – the next page says decline disincentivizes saber rattling

Royal, their author, 10

Royal, their author, 10—director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books)

There is another trend at play. Economic crises fragment regimes A decrease in cohesion at the leadership level reduces the ability of the state to coalesce a strong political base required to undertake costly balancing measures Schweller builds on earlier studies that link fragmentation with decisions not to balance against rising threats Where cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance unstable regimes that rule over polities will be constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives they will be least likely to enact costly policies even when their nation's survival is at stake

Economic crises fragment regimes A decrease in cohesion at the leadership reduces the ability to coalesce a political base required to undertake costly balancing studies link fragmentation with decisions not to balance unstable regimes they will be least likely to enact costly policies even when their nation's survival is at stake

There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level reduces the ability of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base required to undertake costly balancing measures such as economic costly signals. Schweller (2006) builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions not to balance against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they will be least likely to enact bold and costly policies even when their nation's survival is at stake and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

<h4>Royal votes neg – the next page says decline disincentivizes<strong> saber rattling</h4><p><u>Royal, their author, 10</u></strong>—director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books) </p><p><u>There is</u>, however, <u>another trend at play. <mark>Economic crises</u></mark> tend to <u><mark>fragment regimes</u></mark> and divide polities. <u><mark>A decrease in cohesion at the</u></mark> political <u><mark>leadership</mark> level</u> and at the electorate level <u><strong><mark>reduces the ability</strong></mark> of the state <mark>to coalesce a</u></mark> sufficiently <u>strong <mark>political base <strong>required to undertake costly balancing</mark> measures</u></strong> such as economic costly signals. <u>Schweller</u> (2006) <u>builds on earlier <mark>studies</u></mark> (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) <u>that <mark>link</u></mark> political <u><mark>fragmentation with decisions <strong>not to balance</strong></mark> against rising threats</u> or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. <u>Where</u> political and social <u>cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance</u> against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, '<u><mark>unstable</u></mark> and fragmented <u><mark>regimes</mark> that rule over</u> divided <u>polities will be</u> significantly <u>constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives</u>; <u><mark>they will be least likely to enact</u></mark> bold and <u><mark>costly policies <strong>even when their nation's survival is at stake</u></strong></mark> and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).</p>

1NR

Banks

2NC Trade Finance Resilient

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Harvard DH

Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Empirics prove

Zakaria 9

Zakaria 9 Zakaria, PhD Poli Sci @ Harvard, Editor of Newsweek, 12/12/’9¶ (Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)

there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse It is the same reason that we weathered the crash of 87 recession of 92 the Asian crisis of 97 the Russian default of 98, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The global economic system is more resilient than we think. The world is characterized by major forces for stability The first is great-power peace. the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. by historical standards the globe is free of friction The number of people who have died as a result of conflicts has declined sharply Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Nye has written. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model capitalism albeit with many variants This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy almost all countries were participants. everyone is invested in the same system. Today while nations might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism around the world you see the opposite there have been few successful electoral appeals for socialism or a rejection of the current framework Center-right parties have prospered in recent elections

we weathered the 87 recession of 92 the Asian crisis of 97 the Russian default of 98 and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000 The global economic system is more resilient than we think. The world is characterized by major forces for stability the world's major powers have not competed in geomilitary terms by historical standards the globe is free of friction The world was left with a single workable economic model albeit with many variants almost all countries were participants everyone is invested in the same system while nations might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism around the world you see the opposite there have been few appeals for socialism Center-right parties have prospered

Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.¶ The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today.¶ Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong.¶ This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.

<h4>Empirics prove</h4><p><u><strong>Zakaria 9</p><p></u></strong>Zakaria, PhD Poli Sci @ Harvard, Editor of Newsweek, 12/12/’9¶ (Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)</p><p>Beyond all this, though, I believe <u>there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse</u> in the last year. <u>It is the same reason that <mark>we weathered the</u></mark> stock-market <u>crash of</u> 19<u><mark>87</u></mark>, the <u><mark>recession of</u></mark> 19<u><mark>92</u></mark>, <u><mark>the Asian crisis of</u></mark> 19<u><mark>97</u></mark>, <u><mark>the Russian default of</u></mark> 19<u><mark>98</mark>, <mark>and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000</mark>. <mark>The</u></mark> current <u><mark>global economic system is</u></mark> inherently <u><mark>more resilient than we think.</u> <u>The world</u></mark> today <u><mark>is characterized by</u></mark> three <u><mark>major forces for stability</u></mark>, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.¶ <u>The first is</u> the spread of <u>great-power peace.</u> Since the end of the Cold War, <u><mark>the world's major powers have not competed</mark> with each other <mark>in geomilitary terms</mark>.</u> There have been some political tensions, but measured <u><mark>by historical standards the globe</u></mark> today <u><mark>is</u></mark> stunningly <u><mark>free of friction</u></mark> between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. <u>The number of people who have died as a result of </u>wars, civil <u>conflicts</u>, and terrorism over the last 30 years <u>has declined sharply</u> (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today.¶ <u>Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's</u> Joseph <u>Nye has written.</u> When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. <u>The peace that flowed from the</u> <u>end of the Cold War</u> had a much larger effect because it <u>was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism.</u> <u><mark>The world was left with</mark> a</u> <u>sole superpower but also <mark>a single workable economic model</u></mark>—<u>capitalism</u>—<u><mark>albeit with many variants</u></mark> from Sweden to Hong Kong.¶ <u>This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy</u>; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which <u><mark>almost all countries</u></mark> across the globe <u><mark>were participants</mark>.</u> That means <u><mark>everyone is invested in the same system</mark>.</u> <u>Today</u>, <u><mark>while</u></mark> the <u><mark>nations</u></mark> of Eastern Europe <u><mark>might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism</u></mark> and return to communism. In fact, <u><mark>around the world you see the opposite</u></mark>: even in the midst of this downturn, <u><mark>there have been few</mark> successful electoral <mark>appeals for</u></mark> a turn to <u><mark>socialism</mark> or a rejection of the current framework</u> of political economy. <u><mark>Center-right parties have</u></mark> instead <u><mark>prospered</mark> in recent elections</u> throughout the West.</p>

1NR

Econ

Resilient

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Kentucky

2

Mary Washington SY

Rebecca Steiner

1ac was marihuana legalization with advantages of cartels and econ 1nc was t legalization security kritik gop bad midterms da the marijuana word pic and case 2nc was security 1nr was t and case 2nr was security and case

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They legalize for some forms of prostitution but decrim for independent contractors – that’s a voter

<h4>They legalize for some forms of prostitution but decrim for independent contractors – that’s a voter</h4>

1NC

Off

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8

JMU LM

James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

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I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel…

<h4>I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel…</h4>

1AC

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6

Kentucky GV

Hirn, Fisher, DeLo

1AC Illich 1NC T Cap K Block Cap K New Affs Bad 2NR Cap K New Affs Bad

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Our affirmation of a right to die through PAS entails a recognition of the impossibility of liberalism – death inevitably reaches all of us so the juxtaposition of the project of “rights” with death’s seduction demonstrates the futility and brokenness of the liberal project of autonomy – the paradox of asserting a right to die combined with a process of countermemory constitutes an unstable bomb which destroys the conditions of possibility for liberalism’s death control – Ben Golder explains that

2011 SJE

Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, 2011 SJE

Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’ Under these conditions the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is thus intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) by opening up a different perspective upon death in life – that is, the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus. Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed, performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid these relations.

Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’. Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics by opening up a different perspective upon death in life the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions’ orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ , work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,¶ performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas¶ Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid¶ these relations.

In a recent article on this topic, Thomas Tierney neatly illustrates how Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’. In order to do this, Tier- ney reads Foucault’s comments on the ‘right to die’ against the famous intervention of the ‘Dream Team’ (a collection of six eminent liberal/libertarian philosophers, to wit: Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, TM Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Johnson) in their amicus curiae brief in the 1997 US Supreme Court case on assisted suicide, Washington v Glucksberg (see Dworkin et al. 1997). Whereas the latter is ‘concerned with providing to individuals enough control over their deaths so they can avoid a painful and/or degrading demise, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of juridico-medical authority that is aimed at preserving life’, (Tierney, 2006: 626), Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics, that which Tierney calls the ‘juridico-medical order of mod- ernity’, the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’ (Tierney, 2006: 614, 615; see also Thompson, 2004). Under these conditions the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ (Tierney, 2006: 631) by ‘rais[ing] unsettling questions about the very nature of modern subjects’ (Tierney, 2006: 605). The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is thus intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) by opening up a different perspective upon death in life – that is, the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project (cf. Foucault, 1983: 237). ‘It is quite inconceivable that we not be given the chance’, Foucault writes elsewhere, ‘to prepare ourselves with all the passion, intensity and detail that we wish, including the little extras that we have been dreaming about for such a long time’ (Foucault, 1996: 296–297), that is to make of suicide ‘a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your life’ (1996: 296). The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life (read, for Foucault: the disruption of bio-politicized subjectivity). In contrast, ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions’ (Tierney, 2006: 632). For all its insistence upon the manner of death needing to reflect autonomous decisions concerning the value of life itself (which would seemingly import some critical perspective upon that life), orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’, like that of the ‘Dream Team’, work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus. The liberal narrative reinscribes the death- bound subject of bio-politics in a milieu of suffering (see the pathos-laden conclusion to Dworkin et al., 1997) from which medicine cannot save her and it thus calls upon law¶ and the state to balance the interests of the individual’s dignity against the state’s¶ (bio-political) interest in preserving life. Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,¶ performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas¶ Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid¶ these relations.

<h4>Our affirmation of a right to die through PAS entails a recognition of the impossibility of liberalism – death inevitably reaches all of us so the juxtaposition of the project of “rights” with death’s seduction demonstrates the futility and brokenness of the liberal project of autonomy – the paradox of asserting a right to die combined with a process of countermemory constitutes an unstable bomb which destroys the conditions of possibility for liberalism’s death control – Ben Golder explains that</h4><p>Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, <u><strong><mark>2011 SJE</p><p></u></strong></mark>In a recent article on this topic, Thomas Tierney neatly illustrates how <u><mark>Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’</u>.</mark> In order to do this, Tier- ney reads Foucault’s comments on the ‘right to die’ against the famous intervention of the ‘Dream Team’ (a collection of six eminent liberal/libertarian philosophers, to wit: Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, TM Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Johnson) in their amicus curiae brief in the 1997 US Supreme Court case on assisted suicide, Washington v Glucksberg (see Dworkin et al. 1997). Whereas the latter is ‘concerned with providing to individuals enough control over their deaths so they can avoid a painful and/or degrading demise, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of juridico-medical authority that is aimed at preserving life’, (Tierney, 2006: 626), <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’.</strong> Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics</u></mark>, that which Tierney calls the ‘juridico-medical order of mod- ernity’, <u>the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’</u> (Tierney, 2006: 614, 615; see also Thompson, 2004). <u>Under these conditions <mark>the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, <strong>Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’</u></strong></mark> (Tierney, 2006: 631) by ‘rais[ing] unsettling questions about the very nature of modern subjects’ (Tierney, 2006: 605). <u><mark>The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is</mark> thus <strong><mark>intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics</strong></mark> (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) <strong><mark>by opening up a different perspective upon death in life</strong></mark> – that is, <mark>the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project</u></mark> (cf. Foucault, 1983: 237). ‘It is quite inconceivable that we not be given the chance’, Foucault writes elsewhere, ‘to prepare ourselves with all the passion, intensity and detail that we wish, including the little extras that we have been dreaming about for such a long time’ (Foucault, 1996: 296–297), that is to make of suicide ‘a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your life’ (1996: 296). <u>The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life </u>(read, for Foucault: the disruption of bio-politicized subjectivity). In contrast, <u><mark>‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions</u>’</mark> (Tierney, 2006: 632). For all its insistence upon the manner of death needing to reflect autonomous decisions concerning the value of life itself (which would seemingly import some critical perspective upon that life), <u><mark>orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die</u>’</mark>, like that of the ‘Dream Team’<mark>, <u>work to</mark> <mark>reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus</mark>. </u>The liberal narrative reinscribes the death- bound subject of bio-politics in a milieu of suffering (see the pathos-laden conclusion to Dworkin et al., 1997) from which medicine cannot save her and it thus calls upon law¶ and the state to balance the interests of the individual’s dignity against the state’s¶ (bio-political) interest in preserving life. <u><strong><mark>Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,</u></strong>¶<u><strong> performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas</u></strong>¶<u><strong> Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid</u></strong>¶<u><strong> these relations.</p></u></strong></mark>

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Ethos of Betterment DA: their claims about skills and problem solving reinforce an understanding of education which frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered – this dispassionate construction dooms millions to suffer and reentrenches neoliberalism which makes it a double turn with cap

Mourad 01

Mourad 01

103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759) The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower – a follower of the social order, both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent This situation reflects that the logic of formal education and the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” One must be an “active learner” or else Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect The modern idea that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. these major problems are symptoms of something more basic It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.

The belief is that the human must be made into something better than it was absent a formal education good citizen critical thinker, change agent It must be resolved by rendering the student a rule follower to become competent The individual must be taught how to be an individual Being an individual means obeying the law We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” One must be an “active learner” or else The individual must be rendered into an entity that engages reality in ways are deemed just by educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order The idea that anyone can be rational leads to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational The perpetuation of the given social order in education is about retaining power socializing children to believe in capitalism “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member It does not consider the human as an entity to care for but something to be equipped with skills millions live in poverty in the wealthiest countries the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than caring for people betterment through competency must be replaced by an ethos that acknowledges suffering

(Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is the author of Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized education and its relation to the social good, “Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility” Teachers College Record Volume 103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759) EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower – a follower of the social order, both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? This situation simply reflects that the basic logic of organized formal education and, more generally, the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world” and that children and adults must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One must be an “active learner” or else. Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. Yet under the analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response—one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.

<h4><u>Ethos of Betterment DA</u><strong>: their claims about skills and problem solving reinforce an understanding of education which frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered – this dispassionate construction dooms millions to suffer and reentrenches neoliberalism which makes it a double turn with cap</h4><p>Mourad 01 </p><p></strong>(Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is the author of Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized education and its relation to the social good, “Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility” Teachers College Record Volume<u><strong> 103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759)</p><p></u></strong>EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? <u><strong><mark>The </mark>tacit, unchallenged <mark>belief is that</mark> through education, <mark>the human </mark>being <mark>must be made into something better than it was</mark> or would be <mark>absent a formal education</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become</u></strong>: potential achiever, <u><strong>qualified professional, <mark>good citizen</mark>, “leader,” independent actor, <mark>critical thinker, change agent</mark>, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator</u></strong>. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. <u><strong><mark>It must be resolved</mark>, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately <mark>by rendering the student a rule follower</mark> – a follower of the social order, both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—<mark>to become </mark>a <mark>competent </mark>comrade.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The individual must be taught how to be an individual</mark> in accordance with this balance. <mark>Being an individual means </mark>being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means <mark>obeying the law</u></strong></mark>. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and <u><strong>the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent</u></strong>. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? <u><strong>This situation </u></strong>simply <u><strong>reflects</u></strong> <u><strong>that the </u></strong>basic <u><strong>logic of </u></strong>organized <u><strong>formal education and</u></strong>, more generally, <u><strong>the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people.</u></strong> If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? <u><strong><mark>We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.”</mark> Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name</u></strong>. <u><strong>In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents.</u></strong> <u><strong>That is</u></strong> <u><strong>very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order</u></strong>. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet <u><strong>it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world</u></strong>” and that children and adults <u><strong>must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.”</u></strong> The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. <u><strong><mark>One must be an “active learner” or else</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Why?</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The individual must be</mark> acted upon and <mark>rendered into an entity that engages reality in </mark>the <mark>ways </mark>that <mark>are deemed just by</mark> many <mark>educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order</mark>.</u></strong> Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. <u><strong>This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect</u></strong>. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? <u><strong><mark>The </mark>modern <mark>idea</u></strong></mark>, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, <u><strong><mark>that anyone can be rational leads </mark>quickly <mark>to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational</mark>, as that word is understood according to the social order. <mark>The perpetuation of the given social order in education</mark> as elsewhere <mark>is about</mark> gaining advantage and <mark>retaining power</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about <mark>socializing children to believe in capitalism</mark> as if it is a natural law.</u></strong> Yet under the analysis that I have made here, <u><strong>these major problems are symptoms of something more basic</u></strong>. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. <u><strong>It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural</u></strong>. <u><strong>It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong><mark>“community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member</u></strong></mark>— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that <u><strong>this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>It does not consider the human </mark>being <mark>as an entity to care for but </mark>rather as <mark>something to be</mark> <mark>equipped with skills </mark>and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are <mark>millions</mark> of children and adults that <mark>live in poverty in the wealthiest countries </mark>in human history. It is because <mark>the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances </mark>and maintains <mark>the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than </mark>civility as <mark>caring for people </mark>because they are subject to suffering.</u></strong> <u><strong>The alternative</u></strong> that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It <u><strong>is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them</u></strong>. <u><strong>The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response</u></strong>—<u><strong>one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of <mark>betterment through competency</mark> and opportunity <mark>must be</mark> challenged and <mark>replaced by an </mark>emotionally intelligent <mark>ethos that</mark> expressly and fundamentally <mark>acknowledges suffering </mark>and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.</p></u></strong>

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1AC PAS genealogy- same assimilar to USC PAS 1AC 1NC T- Framework K- Szaz Medicalization of death 2NR T

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Second this constant drive for intervention causes global war

Duffield 8

Duffield 8 (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies Volume 21 Issue 2)

you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics

you cannot have development without containing underdeveloped life this nexus can be traced to the division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant security interconnects containment of migration with measures to integrate migrant communities within consumer society to improve the self-reliance of underdeveloped life in situ It marks a terrain of a global civil war fought on and between the modalities of life itself global civil war connects livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats in the North the need for social cohesion at home while urging intervention abroad this disastrous formula will be defended to the death we are all involved in this war since it mobilizes societies as a whole

This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.

<h4>Second this constant drive for intervention causes global war</h4><p><u><strong>Duffield 8</u></strong> (Mark Duffield, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Bristol, 2008, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies<u> Volume 21 Issue 2)</p><p></u>This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that <u><mark>you cannot have development </mark>or security <mark>without containing</mark> the <strong>circulation of <mark>underdeveloped life</u></strong></mark>. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, <u>the origins of <mark>this nexus can be traced to </mark>decolonization</u>. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, <u>decolonization publicly signalled <mark>the</mark> generic <mark>division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life</mark>, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, <mark>with an <strong>underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant</u></strong></mark>. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, <u>decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally</u>. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, <u>containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration</u>. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. <u>Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.</p><p>The international <mark>security </mark>architecture that emerged with decolonization <mark>interconnects</mark> the <mark>containment of </mark>irregular <mark>migration with measures to integrate migrant communities</mark> already settled <mark>within consumer society</mark> and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives <mark>to improve the self-reliance</mark> and stasis <mark>of underdeveloped life in situ</mark>. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. <mark>It marks</mark> out <mark>a terrain of a <strong>global civil war</strong></mark>, or rather tableau of wars, which is being <strong><mark>fought on and between the modalities of life itself</u></strong></mark>. <u>Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—<strong><mark>global civil war connects </mark>the <mark>livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats</mark> to critical infrastructure <mark>in the North</u></strong></mark>. Since the end of the Cold War, <u>the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on <mark>the need for social cohesion at home while</mark>, at the same time, <mark>urging</mark> a <strong>fresh wave of <mark>intervention abroad</strong></mark> to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West's ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means</u>. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, <u>there is a real possibility that <strong><mark>this disastrous formula</mark> for sharing the world with others <mark>will be defended to the death</u></strong></mark>. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. <u>Reflected within the <strong>globalization of containment</strong>, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become <strong>increasingly violent and coercive</strong>.</u> In one way or another, <u><strong><mark>we are all involved in this war</strong></mark>; it cannot be escaped <mark>since it mobilizes societies as a whole</mark>, including policy makers and academics</u>. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.</p>

2NC

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Link – Mexico

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George Mason KL

Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box

1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx

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They say causality models but diversionary theory fails those

Fravel ‘10

Fravel ‘10 (M. Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict” 26 Oct. 2010 dspace.mit.edu/openaccess-disseminate/1721.1/59524‎) BSH

The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. The cases investigated in this article, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain decision making. The historical record offers stronger evidence for a standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. the research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis complements quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies In addition, the research design used in this article raises questions about studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support , weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home The findings carry implications for future empirical tests of the diversionary hypothesis and the broader relationship between internal and external confli given the common view within the field of international relations that some past conflicts are best explained by diversionary motives, additional case studies are needed to test diversionary claims against plausible alternative explanations in analysis of German decision making before 1914 Copeland finds leadership statements that disconfirm the diversionary hypothesis although smoking-gun evidence in leadership statements may be impossible to find, scholars can use case study methods to test diversionary arguments against alternative explanations. scholars can trace changes in the domestic political environment with foreign policy decision making to identify a clear relationship between domestic political strife and plans to threaten or use force findings also underscore the importance of including appropriate international-level variables in quantitative models of diversion. The inclusion of such variables not only ensures that appropriate scope conditions for the diversionary use of force are present, but they can also control for alternative explanations driven by changes in a state’s international environment Those studies that do include such variables use them as controls for a state’s ability to engage in diversionary behavior such as relative capabilities and major power status or opportunity structures for diversion such as an enduring rivalry or ongoing crisis. few studies include variables that measure a state’s threat environment or other states’ efforts to change the status quo, actions that might also account for dispute escalation. In current models, indicators of domestic conflict are usually included as a separate variable If, the effect of domestic strife is conditional, then diversionary factors are perhaps more appropriately modeled as a multiplicative interaction term Diversion itself, however, may have its limits.

cases raise doubts about the diversionary hypothesis as well as empirical validity the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis complements studies that do not identify a significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, the research design used in this article raises questions about studies that do provide empirical support for diversion the rally effect is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change satisfaction with leaders. Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation leadership statements disconfirm the diversionary hypothesis findings underscore the importance of including appropriate variables in quantitative models of diversion few studies include variables that measure actions that might also account for dispute escalation.

The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Strong empirical support for diversion would identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict. The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms, such as Mansfield and Snyder’s theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish decision making. The historical record, including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger evidence for a standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain. My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.127 In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. 127 Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion. Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated détente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China’s concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian States and the Gulf Cooperation Council.131 The findings from these two cases also carry implications for future empirical tests of the diversionary hypothesis and the broader relationship between internal and external conflict. To start, given the common view within the field of international relations that some past conflicts are best explained by diversionary motives, additional case studies are needed to test diversionary claims against plausible alternative explanations. In other cases that scholars have cast as diversionary, for example, evidence exists that casts doubt upon the hypothesis. Historian Arno Mayer, among others, is often cited as providing support for diversion through his argument that domestic crises accounted for key decisions leading to the outbreak of World War I (as well as other conflicts) in Europe.132 Yet in his analysis of German decision making before 1914, Dale Copeland finds leadership statements that disconfirm the diversionary hypothesis. As early as 1905-06, for instance, Admiral Tirpitz concluded that war in Europe would only “cause chaos at home,” not increase societal cohesion.133 Similarly, the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war is often mentioned as another example of diversion. One of the key pieces of evidence to support his claim comes from a memoir of a Russian official, Count Sergei Witte, who quotes V. K. Pleve, minister of the interior at the time, as stating that “we need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.”134 Geoffrey Blainey notes, however, numerous problems with this statement as evidence of Russian decision making: the quote appeared in a memoir that was penned eight years later, Witte and Pleve were rivals, and Witte in other parts of the memoir that analyzes the war includes no other statements that would support a diversionary explanation.135 These two examples suggest that a thorough audit of other diversionary cases would be helpful. In addition, although smoking-gun evidence in leadership statements may be impossible to find, scholars can use case study methods to test diversionary arguments against alternative explanations. In particular, scholars can trace changes in the domestic political environment with foreign policy decision making to identify a clear relationship between domestic political strife and plans to threaten or use force. Scholars can also examine leadership statements for evidence consistent with diversion, such as concern about their domestic political standing or the anticipated effects of an external conflict on domestic politics. At the same time, my findings also underscore the importance of including appropriate international-level variables in quantitative models of diversion. The inclusion of such variables not only ensures that appropriate scope conditions for the diversionary use of force are present, but they can also control for alternative explanations driven by changes in a state’s international environment. In some cross-national studies, for example, international-level variables are excluded.136 Those studies that do include such variables use them as controls for a state’s ability to engage in diversionary behavior such as relative capabilities and major power status or opportunity structures for diversion such as an enduring rivalry or ongoing crisis.137 Very few studies include variables that measure a state’s threat environment or other states’ efforts to change the status quo, actions that might also account for dispute escalation.138 Finally, even though external security challenges explain the Argentine and Turkish decisions better than diversion, the presence of domestic unrest in both episodes suggests a new avenue for research on the relationship between internal and external conflict. Drawing upon Hein Goemans’ study of war termination, leaders with low levels of public support may have additional incentives to use force when confronting external security threats than leaders with comparatively high levels of support.139 If weak leaders fail to defend their states’ interests abroad, they are even more likely to face punishment at home. In this way, the degree of domestic support that a leader enjoys might function as an intervening or mediating variable that increases the magnitude of the incentive to use force when threatened or challenged by another state. This possible effect, however, is not a diversionary one, as domestic unrest does not create an independent incentive for leaders to deflect attention abroad through the use of force. If the effect of domestic conflict is to magnify or enlarge existing incentives for escalation created by the international environment, new specifications of quantitative models of diversion should also be considered. In current models, indicators of domestic conflict are usually included as a separate variable, suggesting that diversionary factors exert linear additive effects on the odds of conflict. If, however, the effect of domestic strife is conditional, then diversionary factors are perhaps more appropriately modeled as a multiplicative interaction term.140 New specifications might account for the mixed results that past quantitative tests have revealed. Diversion itself, however, may have its limits.

<h4>They say causality models but diversionary theory fails those</h4><p><u><strong>Fravel ‘10</u></strong> (M. Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict” 26 Oct. 2010 dspace.mit.edu/openaccess-disseminate/1721.1/59524‎) BSH</p><p><u>The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. </u>Strong empirical support for diversion would identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict. <u>The <mark>cases </mark>investigated in this article,</u> however, <u><mark>raise doubts about </mark>the strength of <mark>the diversionary hypothesis as well as</mark> the <mark>empirical validity </mark>of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms</u>, such as Mansfield and Snyder’s theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the <u>hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests</u>. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory must demonstrate. Instead, <u>external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain </u>Argentine and Turkish <u>decision making. The historical record</u>, including leadership statements and reasoning, <u>offers stronger evidence for a standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy.</u> Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, <u>the</u> modified most likely <u>research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert.</u> These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. <u>If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain. </u>My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. <u>At the most general level of analysis, <mark>the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis</u></mark> in Argentina and Turkey <u><mark>complements</u></mark> those <u>quantitative <mark>studies</mark> of diversion <mark>that do not identify a</mark> systematic and <mark>significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies</u>,</mark> including the use of force.127 <u>In addition, <mark>the</u></mark> modified most likely <u><mark>research design used in this article raises questions</mark> <mark>about</mark> </u>those quantitative <u><mark>studies that do provide empirical support for diversion</mark> because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest</u>, the <u>underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. </u>The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, <u><strong><mark>the rally effect </mark>that leaders enjoy from an international crisis <mark>is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change </mark>permanently a public’s overall <mark>satisfaction with </mark>its <mark>leaders.</u></strong></mark>128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. 127 Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. <u>Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent</u>. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. <u>Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support</u>, if any, because victory would have been expected.130 Third<u>, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home</u>. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion. <u><mark>Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation</mark> with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home</u>. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated détente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China’s concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian States and the Gulf Cooperation Council.131 <u>The findings</u> from these two cases also <u>carry implications for future empirical tests of the diversionary hypothesis and the broader relationship between internal and external confli</u>ct. To start, <u>given the common view within the field of international relations that some past conflicts are best explained by diversionary motives, additional case studies are needed to test diversionary claims against plausible alternative explanations</u>. In other cases that scholars have cast as diversionary, for example, evidence exists that casts doubt upon the hypothesis. Historian Arno Mayer, among others, is often cited as providing support for diversion through his argument that domestic crises accounted for key decisions leading to the outbreak of World War I (as well as other conflicts) in Europe.132 Yet <u>in </u>his <u>analysis of German decision making before 1914</u>, Dale <u>Copeland finds <mark>leadership statements</mark> that <mark>disconfirm the diversionary hypothesis</u></mark>. As early as 1905-06, for instance, Admiral Tirpitz concluded that war in Europe would only “cause chaos at home,” not increase societal cohesion.133 Similarly, the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war is often mentioned as another example of diversion. One of the key pieces of evidence to support his claim comes from a memoir of a Russian official, Count Sergei Witte, who quotes V. K. Pleve, minister of the interior at the time, as stating that “we need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.”134 Geoffrey Blainey notes, however, numerous problems with this statement as evidence of Russian decision making: the quote appeared in a memoir that was penned eight years later, Witte and Pleve were rivals, and Witte in other parts of the memoir that analyzes the war includes no other statements that would support a diversionary explanation.135 These two examples suggest that a thorough audit of other diversionary cases would be helpful. In addition, <u>although smoking-gun evidence in leadership statements may be impossible to find, scholars can use case study methods to test diversionary arguments against alternative explanations.</u> In particular, <u>scholars can trace changes in the domestic political environment with foreign policy decision making to identify a clear relationship between domestic political strife and plans to threaten or use force</u>. Scholars can also examine leadership statements for evidence consistent with diversion, such as concern about their domestic political standing or the anticipated effects of an external conflict on domestic politics. At the same time, my <u><mark>findings</mark> also <mark>underscore the importance of including appropriate</mark> international-level <mark>variables in quantitative models of diversion</mark>.</u> <u>The inclusion of such variables not only ensures that appropriate scope conditions for the diversionary use of force are present, but they can also control for alternative explanations driven by changes in a state’s international environment</u>. In some cross-national studies, for example, international-level variables are excluded.136 <u>Those studies that do include such variables use them as controls for a state’s ability to engage in diversionary behavior such as relative capabilities and major power status or opportunity structures for diversion such as an enduring rivalry or ongoing crisis.</u>137 Very <u><strong><mark>few studies include variables that measure</strong></mark> a state’s threat environment or other states’ efforts to change the status quo, <strong><mark>actions that might also account for dispute escalation.</u></strong></mark>138 Finally, even though external security challenges explain the Argentine and Turkish decisions better than diversion, the presence of domestic unrest in both episodes suggests a new avenue for research on the relationship between internal and external conflict. Drawing upon Hein Goemans’ study of war termination, leaders with low levels of public support may have additional incentives to use force when confronting external security threats than leaders with comparatively high levels of support.139 If weak leaders fail to defend their states’ interests abroad, they are even more likely to face punishment at home. In this way, the degree of domestic support that a leader enjoys might function as an intervening or mediating variable that increases the magnitude of the incentive to use force when threatened or challenged by another state. This possible effect, however, is not a diversionary one, as domestic unrest does not create an independent incentive for leaders to deflect attention abroad through the use of force. If the effect of domestic conflict is to magnify or enlarge existing incentives for escalation created by the international environment, new specifications of quantitative models of diversion should also be considered. <u>In current models, indicators of domestic conflict are usually included as a separate variable</u>, suggesting that diversionary factors exert linear additive effects on the odds of conflict. <u>If,</u> however, <u>the effect of domestic strife is conditional, then diversionary factors are perhaps more appropriately modeled as a multiplicative interaction term</u>.140 New specifications might account for the mixed results that past quantitative tests have revealed. <u>Diversion itself, however, may have its limits.</p></u>

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2NC Trade Finance Resilient

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Harvard DH

Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Neg ground - they spike out of links to why regulating prostitution is bad

<h4>Neg ground - they spike out of links to why regulating prostitution is bad</h4>

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Off

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JMU LM

James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal failure k t regulation municipalities da pepfar cp and case 2nc was legal failure k 1nr was pepfar cp municipalities da and case 2nr was legal failure k and case

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With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my Art.”

<h4>With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my Art.”</h4>

1AC

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Hirn, Fisher, DeLo

1AC Illich 1NC T Cap K Block Cap K New Affs Bad 2NR Cap K New Affs Bad

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Suicide as escape is a necessary transgression within the cycle of eternal recurrence. Accepting death through the option for suicide imparts meaning onto life’s suffering – Paul Loeb explains

Paul, Dr. of philosophy at University of Puget Sound, Ph.D from Cal Berkeley, “Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption,” Nietzsche on Time and History, Ed. Manuel Dries, p. 163-189 SJE

eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche describes as ‘the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable’ turns out to be the new counter-ideal and the means whereby the human can for the first time will a life-affirming meaning for its past and thereby for its entire existence However, this invocation of eternal recurrence does nothing whatsoever to eliminate the irreversibility of time the human has nostalgically willed the return, and even eternal repetition, of its most treasured and joyous past moments When Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest formulation of life-affirmation that is at all attainable, his point is not that the human animal should aim to will this eternal recurrence and thereby achieve the highest life-affirmation possible his point is that the human can never will this and that therefore the human can never achieve such life-affirmation. Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal recurrence. rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, the thought of eternal recurrence actually multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past to a new and devastating degree. Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’ everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape is impossible the thought of death as escape keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or better life.

eternal recurrence Nietzsche describes as ‘the¶ highest affirmation attainable’ the counter-ideal and means whereby the human can will a life-affirming meaning for its past However, invocation of eternal recurrence does not eliminate the irreversibility of time , the human has willed the eternal repetition, of its most joyous past moments When Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest¶ formulation of life-affirmation his point is not that¶ the human should aim to will this eternal recurrence his point i the human can never will this and that therefore the human can never achieve such life-affirmation. the thought of eternal recurrence multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape¶ is impossible the thought of death as escape¶ keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting¶ meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or¶ better life.

Although Zarathustra does not explicitly introduce his teaching of eternal¶ recurrence in his redemption speech, he obviously points in this direction¶ when he concludes by asking how the creative will might be taught to will¶ backwards so that it might will something higher than any reconciliation¶ with time. According to the consensus reading I have been concerned to¶ criticize, what Zarathustra means by this is that my affirmation of my present¶ state should teach me how to ‘will backwards’—that is, to will the¶ exact repetition of my entire past. And I would not be able to will in this¶ way unless I had successfully redescribed my past as directed inevitably¶ towards my present state. As Nehamas writes: ‘If I am even for a moment¶ such as I would want to be again, then I would accept all my past actions,¶ which, essential to and constitutive of the self I want to repeat, are now¶ newly redescribed’ (1985, p. 160, my emphasis). Or, as Julian Young¶ writes, the key is to ‘“write” my life so that I not merely like it, but like it¶ so much that I can will its recurrence for ever and ever, down to every last¶ detail’ (2003, p. 91), and to do this we must be able to see the kind of personal¶ providence in things that Nietzsche describes in Gay Science 277.¶ Hence eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche describes in Ecce Homo as ‘the¶ highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable’ (EH III Z 1), turns¶ out to be the new counter-ideal and the means whereby the human animal¶ can for the first time will a life-affirming meaning for its past and thereby¶ for its entire existence.¶ However, this invocation of eternal recurrence does nothing whatsoever¶ to eliminate the kind of self-deception pointed out by Nietzsche himself¶ in Gay Science 277. Saying to my past, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated’,¶ or, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated eternally’, does not add any¶ more meaning to my past than saying to it merely, ‘Thus I will it.’ Just as¶ my present willing can do nothing whatsoever to direct my past inevitably¶ towards my present state, so too my present willing can do nothing whatsoever¶ to ensure the repetition of my vanished past. Indeed, this is precisely¶ Nietzsche’s point about the irreversibility of time: ever since its¶ acquisition of a faculty of memory, the human animal has nostalgically¶ willed the return, and even eternal repetition, of its most treasured and¶ joyous past moments. The problem is not that the human animal has never¶ before willed this, and that it should start doing so now. The problem, rather,¶ is that the human animal has always willed this, and that this willing¶ has been of no avail whatsoever. Indeed, it is precisely this impotence, this¶ confrontation with the immovable stone ‘it was’, that has caused the human¶ animal to find its existence and suffering devoid of meaning, to take revenge on life, to formulate the ascetic ideal, and to live its life against¶ life.¶ When, therefore, Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest¶ formulation of life-affirmation that is at all attainable, his point is not that¶ the human animal should aim to will this eternal recurrence and thereby¶ achieve the highest life-affirmation possible.12 Instead, his point is that the human animal can never will this and that therefore the human animal can never achieve such life-affirmation. Indeed, no matter how strong and healthy¶ he deemed himself, perhaps the strongest and healthiest of all of his¶ contemporaries, Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal¶ recurrence. Writing in his notebooks in 1883, Nietzsche exclaims: ‘I do not¶ want life again. How have I borne it? What has made me endure the sight?¶ the vision of the superhuman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm it¶ myself —alas!’ (Nachlaß November 1882–February 1883, KSA 10,¶ 4[81]).13¶ So, rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, the thought of eternal recurrence actually multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past to a new and devastating degree. This is why Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1887 notes that the thought of eternal recurrence builds¶ upon the nihilism that follows the demise of the ascetic ideal—that is, upon¶ the most paralysing thought of ‘continuing with an “in vain”, without aim¶ and purpose’. Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of¶ nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or¶ goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’ (Nachla߶ Summer 1886–Autumn 1887, KSA 12, 5[71], my emphasis). It is not¶ just the thought of meaninglessness, but the thought of meaninglessness¶ eternally. Previously the human animal sought solace in the idea of death¶ and nothingness as an escape from the meaninglessness of its life and suffering.¶ But the thought of eternal recurrence closes off all such escape and¶ condemns the human animal to eternal meaninglessness. As Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1883 notes: ‘everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape¶ is impossible!” (Nachlaß Winter 1883–1884, KSA 10, 24[7]).14¶ Nor can it be replied to this that, because death no longer affords an escape¶ to life’s suffering, there is actually less point to suicide. For in the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that the thought of death as escape¶ keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting¶ meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or¶ better life. Because eternal recurrence undermines both this meaning and¶ this hope, nothing remains to keep humans from giving in to their inherent¶ suicidal instincts.

<h4>Suicide as escape is a necessary transgression within the cycle of eternal recurrence. Accepting death through the option for suicide imparts meaning onto life’s suffering – Paul Loeb explains</h4><p>Paul, Dr. of philosophy at University of Puget Sound, Ph.D from Cal Berkeley, “Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption,” Nietzsche on Time and History, Ed. Manuel Dries, p. 163-189 SJE</p><p>Although Zarathustra does not explicitly introduce his teaching of eternal¶ recurrence in his redemption speech, he obviously points in this direction¶ when he concludes by asking how the creative will might be taught to will¶ backwards so that it might will something higher than any reconciliation¶ with time. According to the consensus reading I have been concerned to¶ criticize, what Zarathustra means by this is that my affirmation of my present¶ state should teach me how to ‘will backwards’—that is, to will the¶ exact repetition of my entire past. And I would not be able to will in this¶ way unless I had successfully redescribed my past as directed inevitably¶ towards my present state. As Nehamas writes: ‘If I am even for a moment¶ such as I would want to be again, then I would accept all my past actions,¶ which, essential to and constitutive of the self I want to repeat, are now¶ newly redescribed’ (1985, p. 160, my emphasis). Or, as Julian Young¶ writes, the key is to ‘“write” my life so that I not merely like it, but like it¶ so much that I can will its recurrence for ever and ever, down to every last¶ detail’ (2003, p. 91), and to do this we must be able to see the kind of personal¶ providence in things that Nietzsche describes in Gay Science 277.¶ Hence <u><mark>eternal recurrence</mark>, which <mark>Nietzsche</u> <u>describes</u></mark> in Ecce Homo <u><mark>as ‘the</u>¶<u> highest</mark> formula of <mark>affirmation</mark> that is at all <mark>attainable’</mark> </u>(EH III Z 1), <u>turns</u>¶<u> out to be <mark>the</mark> <strong>new <mark>counter-ideal</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>means whereby the human</strong></mark> </u>animal¶<u> <strong><mark>can</strong></mark> for the first time <strong><mark>will a life-affirming meaning</strong> for its past</mark> and thereby</u>¶<u> for its entire existence</u>.¶ <u><mark>However, <strong></mark>this <mark>invocation of eternal recurrence does not</strong></mark>hing whatsoever</u>¶<u> to <strong><mark>eliminate the</u></strong></mark> kind of self-deception pointed out by Nietzsche himself¶ in Gay Science 277. Saying to my past, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated’,¶ or, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated eternally’, does not add any¶ more meaning to my past than saying to it merely, ‘Thus I will it.’ Just as¶ my present willing can do nothing whatsoever to direct my past inevitably¶ towards my present state, so too my present willing can do nothing whatsoever¶ to ensure the repetition of my vanished past. Indeed, this is precisely¶ Nietzsche’s point about the <u><strong><mark>irreversibility of time</u></strong></mark>: ever since its¶ acquisition of a faculty of memory<mark>, <u>the human</u></mark> animal <u><mark>has</mark> nostalgically</u>¶<u> <mark>willed the</mark> return, and even <mark>eternal repetition, of its most</mark> treasured and</u>¶<u> <mark>joyous past moments</u></mark>. The problem is not that the human animal has never¶ before willed this, and that it should start doing so now. The problem, rather,¶ is that the human animal has always willed this, and that this willing¶ has been of no avail whatsoever. Indeed, it is precisely this impotence, this¶ confrontation with the immovable stone ‘it was’, that has caused the human¶ animal to find its existence and suffering devoid of meaning, to take revenge on life, to formulate the ascetic ideal, and to live its life against¶ life.¶ <u><mark>When</u></mark>, therefore, <u><mark>Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest</u>¶<u> formulation of life-affirmation</mark> that is at all attainable, <mark>his point is not that</u>¶<u> the human</mark> animal <mark>should aim to will this eternal recurrence</mark> and thereby</u>¶<u> achieve the highest life-affirmation possible</u>.12 Instead, <u><mark>his point i</mark>s that <strong><mark>the human</mark> </u></strong>animal<u><strong> <mark>can never will this and that therefore the human </u></strong></mark>animal<u><strong><mark> can never achieve such life-affirmation.</u></strong></mark> Indeed, no matter how strong and healthy¶ he deemed himself, perhaps the strongest and healthiest of all of his¶ contemporaries, <u>Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal</u>¶<u> recurrence.</u> Writing in his notebooks in 1883, Nietzsche exclaims: ‘I do not¶ want life again. How have I borne it? What has made me endure the sight?¶ the vision of the superhuman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm it¶ myself —alas!’ (Nachlaß November 1882–February 1883, KSA 10,¶ 4[81]).13¶ So, <u>rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, <strong><mark>the thought of eternal recurrence</mark> actually <mark>multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past</strong></mark> to a new and devastating degree.</u> This is why Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1887 notes that the thought of eternal recurrence builds¶ upon the nihilism that follows the demise of the ascetic ideal—that is, upon¶ the most paralysing thought of ‘continuing with an “in vain”, without aim¶ and purpose’. <u>Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of</u>¶<u> nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or</u>¶<u> goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’</u> (Nachla߶ Summer 1886–Autumn 1887, KSA 12, 5[71], my emphasis). It is not¶ just the thought of meaninglessness, but the thought of meaninglessness¶ eternally. Previously the human animal sought solace in the idea of death¶ and nothingness as an escape from the meaninglessness of its life and suffering.¶ But the thought of eternal recurrence closes off all such escape and¶ condemns the human animal to eternal meaninglessness. As Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1883 notes: ‘<u><mark>everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape</u>¶<u> is impossible</u></mark>!” (Nachlaß Winter 1883–1884, KSA 10, 24[7]).14¶ Nor can it be replied to this that, because death no longer affords an escape¶ to life’s suffering, there is actually less point to suicide. For in the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that <u><strong><mark>the thought of death as escape</u></strong>¶<u><strong> keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting</u></strong>¶<u><strong> meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or</u></strong>¶<u><strong> better life.</u></strong></mark> Because eternal recurrence undermines both this meaning and¶ this hope, nothing remains to keep humans from giving in to their inherent¶ suicidal instincts.</p>

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Their testing standards are nonfalsifiable

Mutz 8

Mutz 8 (Diana, Department of Political Science and Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania, “Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 11: 521-538)

Falsifiability is probably the single most intransigent issue in getting normative theory and empirical research to speak to one another in the realm of deliberative theory. Several problems conspire to make deliberative theory elusive in this respect. For some theorists, deliberation is simply defined as intrinsically good. Obviously, such a claim renders empirical research irrelevant But even without the assumption of intrinsic goodness, more complex problems hinder the interaction between empirical studies and political theory deliberation falls short on many of the standards deemed essential to good social science theory Beyond the general issue of falsifiability, deliberative theory falls short of meeting three requirements for productive social theory that are enumerated in virtually any textbook: clearly defined concepts; specification of logical relationships among concepts within the theory; consistency between hypotheses and evidence accumulated to date. When theories cannot meet these three criteria, they are generally unproductive in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon of interest. when empirical researchers attempt to translate deliberative theory into these terms they discover a great deal of conceptual ambiguity as to what should qualify as deliberation. Moreover, the definitions offered by theorists frequently conflate causes (criteria defining deliberation) and effects (its beneficial consequences). Second, the tests of deliberative theory do not develop well-specified explanations for the relationships between deliberation and its many proposed benefits. Third, deliberative theory is inconsistent with much of what is already known about political discourse in group contexts. Many of the hypotheses that flow from the deliberative framework are not well-grounded in either previous theory or empirical evidence

Falsifiability is the single most intransigent issue in getting empirical research in the realm of deliberative theory. deliberation is defined as intrinsically good such a claim renders empirical research irrelevant Beyond falsifiability, deliberative theory falls short of meeting three requirements for theory that are enumerated in virtually any textbook: clearly defined concepts logical relationships among concepts consistency between hypotheses and evidence definitions offered by theorists frequently conflate causes (criteria defining deliberation) and effects (its beneficial consequences). tests do not develop explanations for the relationships between deliberation and its proposed benefits deliberative theory is inconsistent with what is already known about political discourse the deliberative framework are not grounded in empirical evidence

Falsifiability is probably the single most intransigent issue in getting normative theory and empirical research to speak to one another in the realm of deliberative theory. Several problems conspire to make deliberative theory elusive in this respect. For some theorists, deliberation is simply defined as intrinsically good. Obviously, such a claim renders empirical research irrelevant (see, e.g., Stokes 1998). But even without the assumption of intrinsic goodness, more complex problems hinder the interaction between empirical studies and political theory. It is difficult to envision an empirical test that might produce evidence construed by theorists and empiricists alike as disconfirming the claims of deliberative theory. This is because deliberation falls short on many of the standards deemed essential to good social science theory, at least as the theory is currently construed. Beyond the general issue of falsifiability, deliberative theory falls short of meeting three requirements for productive social theory that are enumerated in virtually any textbook: 1. clearly defined concepts; 2. specification of logical relationships among concepts within the theory; 3. consistency between hypotheses and evidence accumulated to date. It is, of course, unfair to criticize a normative theory for lacking the characteristics required of productive social science theory. But criticism is not my main purpose. Instead, I want to take seriously the admonition that the two subfields should talk to one another. To make a dialogue possible, this normative theory must be translated into the terminology of empirical social science and must then be subjected to the standards of theory testing within the social science tradition. It is crucial to address these three problems in order to accumulate useful empirical evidence on the potential of deliberative democracy. Social scientists generally define “theory” as a set of interrelated statements intended to explain and/or make predictions about some aspect of social life. Toward those ends, a good theory is supposed to have well-defined constructs of general theoretical interest. It is supposed to describe logical associations among these constructs (which are most often causal associations), and it should allow for connections between the theoretical constructs and observable entities. When theories cannot meet these three criteria, they are generally unproductive in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon of interest.2 What happens when empirical researchers attempt to translate deliberative theory into these terms? First, as Thompson points out, they discover a great deal of conceptual ambiguity as to what should qualify as deliberation. Moreover, the definitions offered by theorists frequently conflate causes (criteria defining deliberation) and effects (its beneficial consequences). Second, the tests of deliberative theory offered to date typically do not develop well-specified explanations for the relationships between deliberation and its many proposed benefits. Third, deliberative theory is inconsistent with much of what is already known about political discourse in group contexts. Many, though not all, of the hypotheses that flow from the deliberative framework are not well-grounded in either previous theory or empirical evidence.

<h4>Their testing standards are nonfalsifiable</h4><p><strong>Mutz 8</strong> (Diana, Department of Political Science and Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania, “Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 11: 521-538)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Falsifiability is </mark>probably <mark>the single most intransigent issue in getting </mark>normative theory and <mark>empirical research </mark>to speak to one another <mark>in the realm of deliberative theory.</mark> Several problems conspire to make deliberative theory elusive in this respect. For some theorists, <mark>deliberation is </mark>simply <mark>defined as intrinsically good</mark>. Obviously, <mark>such a claim renders empirical research irrelevant</u></strong> </mark>(see, e.g., Stokes 1998). <u><strong>But even without the assumption of intrinsic goodness, more complex problems hinder the interaction between empirical studies and political theory</u></strong>. It is difficult to envision an empirical test that might produce evidence construed by theorists and empiricists alike as disconfirming the claims of deliberative theory. This is because <u><strong>deliberation falls short on many of the standards deemed essential to good social science theory</u></strong>, at least as the theory is currently construed. <u><strong><mark>Beyond </mark>the general issue of <mark>falsifiability, deliberative theory falls short of meeting three requirements for </mark>productive social <mark>theory</u></strong> <u><strong>that are enumerated in virtually any textbook: </u></strong></mark>1. <u><strong><mark>clearly defined concepts</mark>; </u></strong>2. <u><strong>specification of <mark>logical relationships among concepts </mark>within the theory;</u></strong> 3. <u><strong><mark>consistency between hypotheses and evidence </mark>accumulated to date.</u></strong> It is, of course, unfair to criticize a normative theory for lacking the characteristics required of productive social science theory. But criticism is not my main purpose. Instead, I want to take seriously the admonition that the two subfields should talk to one another. To make a dialogue possible, this normative theory must be translated into the terminology of empirical social science and must then be subjected to the standards of theory testing within the social science tradition. It is crucial to address these three problems in order to accumulate useful empirical evidence on the potential of deliberative democracy. Social scientists generally define “theory” as a set of interrelated statements intended to explain and/or make predictions about some aspect of social life. Toward those ends, a good theory is supposed to have well-defined constructs of general theoretical interest. It is supposed to describe logical associations among these constructs (which are most often causal associations), and it should allow for connections between the theoretical constructs and observable entities. <u><strong>When theories cannot meet these three criteria, they are generally unproductive in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon of interest.</u></strong>2 What happens <u><strong>when empirical researchers attempt to translate deliberative theory into these terms</u></strong>? First, as Thompson points out, <u><strong>they discover a great deal of conceptual ambiguity as to what should qualify as deliberation. Moreover, the <mark>definitions offered by theorists frequently conflate causes (criteria defining deliberation) and effects (its beneficial consequences). </mark>Second, the <mark>tests </mark>of deliberative theory</u></strong> offered to date typically <u><strong><mark>do not develop </mark>well-specified <mark>explanations for the relationships between deliberation and its </mark>many <mark>proposed benefits</mark>. Third, <mark>deliberative theory is inconsistent with </mark>much of <mark>what is already known about political discourse </mark>in group contexts. Many</u></strong>, though not all, <u><strong>of the hypotheses that flow from <mark>the deliberative framework are not </mark>well-<mark>grounded in </mark>either previous theory or <mark>empirical evidence</u></strong></mark>.</p>

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Those turn the entire case and cause more structural violence

Mercille 14

Mercille 14 (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz

neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70 the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”

NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry to find work out of desperation Whereas before reforms the economy grew at 3.5 percent this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases average wage decreased from 4.50 to 3.70 manufacturing has added 500,000 jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of 2.3 million in agriculture because of cheaper corn from U.S. agrobusinesses many had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking as low-level dealers, to make ends meet neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering enlarging the market

Since the 1980s, neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, reforms such as NAFTA pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry, both to find work and out of desperation. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. Whereas before reforms were implemented the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent between 1960 and 1979 (annual per capita rate), this dropped to a meager 0.1 percent in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases: for example, in Juárez, the average wage decreased from US$4.50 a day to US$3.70. Since NAFTA went into effect, the manufacturing sector has added some 500,000 to 600,000 net jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of around 2.3 million jobs in agriculture because of cheaper corn imports from subsidized U.S. agrobusinesses. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, many Mexicans had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking, often as low-level dealers, to make ends meet. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by neoliberal reforms has increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering, thereby enlarging the market. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”

<h4>Those turn the entire case and cause more structural violence</h4><p><u><strong>Mercille 14</u></strong> (Julien Mercille, PhD in geography from UCLA, lecturer at the School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy at the University College Dublin, March 2014, “The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives<u> Volume 41 Number 2) gz</p><p></u>Since the 1980s, <u>neoliberal reforms have contributed to increasing the size of the industry</u> (although there are other causes as well) (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). First, drug smuggling has been facilitated by larger trade flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. Cartels started shipping cocaine, cannabis, crystal meth, and heroin on trucks going to the United States (Bowden, 2010). Second, <u>reforms such as <mark>NAFTA <strong>pushed more Mexicans toward the drug industry</strong></mark>, both <mark>to find work</mark> and <mark>out of desperation</mark>. Neoliberalism has had largely negative consequences for the majority of Mexicans. <mark>Whereas before reforms</mark> were implemented <mark>the economy grew at</mark> a rate of <mark>3.5 percent</mark> between 1960 and 1979</u> (annual per capita rate), <u><mark>this dropped to <strong>a meager 0.1 percent</strong> </mark>in the 1980s and 1.6 percent from 1992 to 2007. <strong><mark>NAFTA has not led to job growth or wage increases</strong></mark>: for example, in Juárez, the <mark>average wage decreased <strong>from</mark> US$<mark>4.50</mark> a day <mark>to</mark> US$<mark>3.70</u></strong></mark>. Since NAFTA went into effect, <u>the <mark>manufacturing</mark> sector <mark>has added</mark> some <mark>500,000</mark> to 600,000 net <mark>jobs, but they have been offset by a loss of</mark> around <strong><mark>2.3 million</mark> jobs <mark>in agriculture </strong>because of cheaper corn</mark> imports <mark>from</mark> subsidized <mark>U.S. agrobusinesses</mark>. This has forced farmers to leave their land and either migrate to the United States or move to cities in Mexico’s North, where many have become cheap labor in U.S. manufactures</u> (maquiladoras). The size of the informal economy, in which workers face worse conditions, has increased from 53 percent of the workforce in 1992 to 57 percent in 2004 (Bowden, 2010: 98; Faux, 2006: 40; Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher, 2009). Consequently, <u><mark>many</mark> Mexicans <mark>had little choice but to participate in drug trafficking</mark>, often <mark>as low-level dealers, to make ends meet</u></mark>. The supply of laborers for the cartels increased again around 2000 as maquiladoras faced competition from China’s and India’s cheaper labor. Some companies located in Mexico moved to Asia, leading to further layoffs. <u>Finally, the social dislocation and unemployment caused by <mark>neoliberal reforms has <strong>increased Mexicans’ use of drugs to alleviate suffering</strong></mark>, thereby <mark>enlarging the market</u></mark>. Charles Bowden (2010: 55), a veteran analyst of Mexico, speaking of Juárez, asks, “<u>Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?”</p></u>

2NC

K

Link – Mexico

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx

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Kentucky

Doubles

George Mason KL

Rebecca Steiner, Kelly Young, and Brian Box

1ac was marijuana CSA 1nc was T not CSA GOP bad midterms Waivers CP Security K and case 2nc was Security and Midterms 1nr was Waivers and case 2nr was Security and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx

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Global economy resilient

Zakaria 9

Zakaria 9

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system was crumbling Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to cascading failures country after country. Others predicted economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence One year later, how much has the world really changed? Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks There was some turmoil in Moldova But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. predictions of collapse have not materialized at all.¶ governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By expanding state support for the economy they buffered the worst of the damage social safety nets that cushioned the pain felt by many things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.¶ interventions may be fueling some bubbles Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a powerful economic force. why we have not faced global collapse It is the same reason that we weathered the market crash of 87, the recession of 92, the Asian crisis of 97 the Russian default of 98, and the tech-bubble collapse The global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think

Pundits predicted we were doomed to cascading failures Others predicted shocks would lead to instability One year later, how much has the world changed? Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks There was some turmoil in Moldova But things look nothing like the 30s governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression were determined not to repeat the same mistakes By expanding state support they buffered the worst of the damage social safety nets cushioned the pain the reason that we weathered the market crash of 87, the recession of 92, the Asian crisis of 97, the Russian default of 98, and the tech-bubble collapse The global economic system is resilient

PhD in pol sci from Harvard. Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, 12 December 2009, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html) One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.¶ Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."¶ Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.¶ Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.¶ One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.¶ A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"¶ This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.¶ It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.¶ Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

<h4><u><strong>Global economy resilient </h4><p>Zakaria</u> 9 </p><p></strong>PhD in pol sci from Harvard. Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, 12 December 2009, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html)</p><p><u>One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system</u>, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, <u>was crumbling</u>. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.¶ <u><mark>Pundits</mark> whose bearishness had been vindicated <mark>predicted we were doomed to</u></mark> a long, painful bust, with <u><mark>cascading failures</u></mark> in sector after sector, <u>country after country.</u> In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."¶ <u><mark>Others predicted</u></mark> that these <u>economic <mark>shocks would lead to</mark> political</u> <u><mark>instability</mark> and violence</u> in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.¶ Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.¶ <u><mark>One year later, how much has the world </mark>really <mark>changed?</u></mark> Well, <u><mark>Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks</u></mark> (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. <u><mark>There was some turmoil in Moldova</u></mark> and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. <u><mark>But</mark> overall, <mark>things look nothing like</mark> they did in <mark>the</mark> 19<mark>30s</mark>.</u> The <u>predictions of</u> economic and political <u>collapse have not materialized at all.¶ </u>A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"¶ This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, <u><mark>governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression</mark>, <mark>were determined not to repeat the same mistakes</mark> once this crisis hit. <mark>By</u></mark> massively <u><mark>expanding</u> <u>state support</mark> for the economy</u>—through central banks and national treasuries—<u><mark>they buffered the worst of the damage</u></mark>. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive <u><mark>social safety nets</mark> that</u> have been established across the industrialized world also <u><mark>cushioned the pain</mark> felt by many</u>. Times are still tough, but <u>things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.¶ </u>It's true that the massive state <u>interventions</u> of the past year <u>may be fueling some</u> new <u>bubbles</u>: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. <u>Yet</u> <u>these rallies also</u> <u>demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a</u> very <u>powerful economic force.</u> When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.¶ Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason <u>why we have not faced global collapse</u> in the last year. <u>It is <mark>the</mark> same <mark>reason that we weathered the</mark> </u>stock-<u><mark>market crash of</mark> </u>19<u><mark>87, the recession of</u></mark> 19<u><mark>92, the Asian crisis of</u></mark> 19<u><mark>97</u>, <u>the Russian default of</u></mark> 19<u><mark>98, and the tech-bubble collapse</u></mark> of 2000. <u><mark>The</u></mark> current <u><mark>global economic system is</mark> inherently more <mark>resilient</mark> than we think</u>. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.</p>

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2NC Trade Finance Resilient

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Harvard DH

Eric Short, Chris Thiele, Dan Stout

1ac was online gambling with econ and china advantages 1nc was security edelman and case 2nc was security 1nr was case 2nr was security and case

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Purity and Holiness become the conditions for treatment, resting on the imperative to preserve life which always subordinates a patient’s desire to the health of the body politic –

<h4>Purity and Holiness become the conditions for treatment, resting on the imperative to preserve life which always subordinates a patient’s desire to the health of the body politic – </h4>

1AC

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Kentucky GV

Hirn, Fisher, DeLo

1AC Illich 1NC T Cap K Block Cap K New Affs Bad 2NR Cap K New Affs Bad

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Bidirectionality – they affirm both legalization and decrim which is neg ground

<h4>Bidirectionality – they affirm both legalization and decrim which is neg ground</h4>

1NC

Off

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JMU LM

James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal failure k t regulation municipalities da pepfar cp and case 2nc was legal failure k 1nr was pepfar cp municipalities da and case 2nr was legal failure k and case

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