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Turns the aff – recreates dichotomies of “wholesomeness”

Owens ‘97

Owens ‘97

A local government concerned about sexually oriented businesses can do several things Zoning restrictions on sexually oriented businesses can be adopted to minimize the adverse effects these uses may have on surrounding neighborhoods. These businesses can be limited to certain zoning districts and be kept a reasonable distance away from residential areas, places of assembly, and other sensitive land uses. Local governments can require premises for adult uses to be separated from one another so as to prevent an unwholesome concentration of adult businesses.

A local government concerned about sexually oriented businesses can require premises for adult uses to be separated from one another so as to prevent an unwholesome concentration of adult businesses

[David W., Gladys Hall Coates Professor of Public Law and Government. UNC School of Government Special Series 15, January 1997. http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/1473 ETB] A local government concerned about the impacts of sexually oriented businesses can do several things. Exhibition of obscenity and indecent exposure—as well as other criminal sexual activity such as prostitution—are crimes and have been totally banned by the state. Zoning restrictions on sexually oriented businesses can be adopted to minimize the adverse effects these uses may have on surrounding neighborhoods. These businesses can be limited to certain zoning districts and be kept a reasonable distance away from residential areas, places of assembly, and other sensitive land uses. Local governments can require premises for adult uses to be separated from one another so as to prevent an unwholesome concentration of adult businesses. Reasonable regulations can also be adopted to govern the operation of adult businesses to reduce the potential for criminal activity and assure responsible operation.

<h4>Turns the aff – recreates dichotomies of “<u><strong>wholesomeness”</h4><p>Owens ‘97</p><p></u></strong>[David W., Gladys Hall Coates Professor of Public Law and Government. UNC School of Government Special Series 15, January 1997. http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/1473 ETB]</p><p><u><mark>A local government concerned about</u></mark> the impacts of <u><mark>sexually oriented businesses</mark> can do several</u> <u>things</u>. Exhibition of obscenity and indecent exposure—as well as other criminal sexual activity such as prostitution—are crimes and have been totally banned by the state. <u>Zoning restrictions on sexually oriented businesses can be adopted to minimize the adverse effects these uses may have on surrounding neighborhoods. These businesses can be limited to certain zoning districts and be kept a reasonable distance away from residential areas, places of assembly, and other sensitive land uses. Local governments <mark>can require premises for adult uses to be separated from one another so as to prevent an unwholesome concentration of adult businesses</mark>.</u> Reasonable regulations can also be adopted to govern the operation of adult businesses to reduce the potential for criminal activity and assure responsible operation.</p>

1NR

Zoning DA

Impact

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round8.docx

N

NDT

8

JMU LM

James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal failure k t regulation municipalities da pepfar cp and case 2nc was legal failure k 1nr was pepfar cp municipalities da and case 2nr was legal failure k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-NDT-Round8.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The affirmative is a politics of accumulation pit against an already prevalent biopolitical paradigm – the result is paradoxically the collapse of the seductive in favor of an endless politics of forced confession which normalizes atrocity

Baudrillard 77

Baudrillard 77 (Jean Baudrillard, Simon’s grandfather, “Forget Foucault,” translated by Nicole Dufresne, pp 37-41) gz

The production channel leads from work to sex, but only by switching tracks; as we move from political to "libidinal" economy we change from a violent and archaic model of socialization to a more subtle and fluid model which is at once more "psychic" and more in touch with the body There is a metamorphosis and a veering away from labor power to drive From one discourse to the other there runs the same ultimatum of pro-duction in the literal sense of the word. The original sense of "production means to render visible, to cause to appear and be made to appear To produce is to force what belongs to another order (that of secrecy and seduction) to materialize. Seduction is that which is everywhere and always opposed to pro-duction; seduction withdraws something from the visible order and so runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear view, whether it be an object, a number, or a concept. Let everything be produced, be read, become real, visible, and marked with the sign of effectiveness; let everything be transcribed into force relations, into conceptual systems or into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.” Ours is a culture of "monstration" and demonstration, of "productive" monstrosity (the "confession" We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a frenzied activation of pleasure we find no seduction in those bodies penetrated by a gaze literally absorbed by the suction of the transparent void Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national product isn't the sexual itself a forced materialization, and isn't the coming of sexuality already part of the Western notion of what is real-the obsession peculiar to our culture with "instancing" and instrumentalizing all things We do not understand, or we vaguely sympathize with, those cultures for which the sexual act has no finality in itself and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body These are cultures which maintain long processes of seduction and sensuousness in which sexuality is one service among others, a long procedure of gifts and counter-gifts the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure What an extraordinary crystallization of the orgastic function, which is itself the materialization of an energetic substance Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation. More and more, all seduction, all manner of seduction disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative calling for the immediate realization of a desire. Our center of gravity has in fact shifted toward an unconscious and libidinal economy which only leaves room for the total naturalization of a desire bound either to fateful drives or to pure and simple mechanical operation, but above all to the imaginary order of repression and liberation. Nowadays, one no longer says: "You've got a soul and you must save it," but: "You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it well." You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it." You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies. It is capital which gives birth in the same movement to the energetic of labor power and to the body we dream of today as the locus of desire and the unconscious Thus, to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy which would be opposed to the bound energy of productive bodies, and to rediscover a phantasmal and instinctual truth of the body in desire, is still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital. This is the nature of desire and of the unconscious: the trash heap of political economy and the psychic metaphor of capital And sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means, in a fantastic extension of the jurisdiction governing private property, for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual capital, unconscious capital. And each individual will be accountable to himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. nothing functions with repression everything functions with production; nothing functions with repression everything functions with liberation Any form of liberation is fomented by repression: the liberation of productive forces is like that of desire There is no exception to the logic of liberation: any force or any liberated form of speech constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power The “desiring machine” only fulfills the destiny of Marxism and psychoanalysis today, on the basis of a productivity cleansed of its contradictions and of a libido cleansed of the Oedipus complex, repression the mirror of production and that of desire will be able to refract each other endlessly "We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.” It is our moral system which remains hidden behind the hypothesis of repression To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not, "sublimated" or not is a sign of utter foolishness there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture in the sense that there has never truly been any sexuality. Sexuality, like political economy, is only montage sexuality as we hear about it and as it "is spoken," is only a simulacrum which experience has forever crossed up, baffled, and surpassed homo sexualis has never had more reality than homo oeconomicus

production leads from work to sex as we move from political to "libidinal" economy There is a metamorphosis from labor power to drive there runs the same ultimatum of pro-duction to render visible, to cause to appear and be made to appear to force what belongs to secrecy and seduction to materialize. seduction withdraws something from the visible order and so runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear view Let everything be produced, be read, become real, visible ; let everything be transcribed into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered Ours is a culture of the "confession" We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a frenzied activation of pleasure; we find no seduction in those bodies penetrated by a gaze absorbed by the suction of the transparent void isn't the sexual itself a forced materialization We do not understand cultures for which the sexual act has no finality and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body These are cultures in which sexuality is a long procedure of gifts and counter-gifts the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation all seduction disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and accelerated circulation is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction It is capital which gives birth to the energetic of labor power to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy is still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital. sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital any force or any liberated form of speech constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power The “desiring machine” only fulfills the destiny of Marxism "We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.” To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not is a sign of utter foolishness there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture there has never truly been any sexuality sexuality is only a simulacrum homo sexualis has never had more reality than that of homo oeconomicus.

The production channel leads from work to sex, but only by switching tracks; as we move from political to "libidinal" economy (the last acquisition of '68), we change from a violent and archaic model of socialization (work) to a more subtle and fluid model which is at once more "psychic" and more in touch with the body (the sexual and the libidinal). There is a metamorphosis and a veering away from labor power to drive (pulsion) , a veering away from a model founded on a system of representations (the famous "ideology") to a model operating on a system of affect (sex being only a kind of anamorphosis of the categorical social imperative) . From one discourse to the other-since it really is a question of discourse-there runs the same ultimatum of pro-duction in the literal sense of the word. The original sense of "production" is not in fact that of material manufacture; rather, it means to render visible, to cause to appear and be made to appear: pro-ducere. Sex is produced as one produces a document, or as an actor is said to appear (se produire) on stage. To produce is to force what belongs to another order (that of secrecy and seduction) to materialize. Seduction is that which is everywhere and always opposed to pro-duction; seduction withdraws something from the visible order and so runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear view, whether it be an object, a number, or a concept. Let everything be produced, be read, become real, visible, and marked with the sign of effectiveness; let everything be transcribed into force relations, into conceptual systems or into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.” Ours is a culture of "monstration" and demonstration, of "productive" monstrosity (the "confession" so well analyzed by Foucault is one of its forms) . We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a frenzied activation of pleasure; we find no seduction in those bodies penetrated by a gaze literally absorbed by the suction of the transparent void. Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national product.5 Pornography is only the paradoxical limit of the sexual, a realistic exacerbation and a mad obsession with the real-this is the "obscene," etymologically speaking and in all senses. But isn't the sexual itself a forced materialization, and isn't the coming of sexuality already part of the Western notion of what is real-the obsession peculiar to our culture with "instancing" and instrumentalizing all things? Just as it is absurd to separate in other cultures the religious, the economic, the political, the juridical, and even the social and other phantasmagorical categories, for the reason that they do not occur there, and because these concepts are like so many venereal diseases with which we infect them in order to "understand" them better, so it is also absurd to give autonomy to the sexual as "instance" and as an irreducible given to which all other "givens" can be reduced. We need to do a critique of sexual Reason, or rather a genealogy of sexual Reason, as Nietzsche has done a genealogy of Morals-because this is our new moral system. One could say of sexuality as of death: "It is a habit to which consciousness has not long been accustomed." We do not understand, or we vaguely sympathize with, those cultures for which the sexual act has no finality in itself and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body. These are cultures which maintain long processes of seduction and sensuousness in which sexuality is one service among others, a long procedure of gifts and counter-gifts; lovemaking is only the eventual outcome of this reciprocity measured to the rhythm of an ineluctable ritual. For us, this no longer has any meaning: for us, the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure—all the rest is "literature." What an extraordinary crystallization of the orgastic function, which is itself the materialization of an energetic substance. Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation. More and more, all seduction, all manner of seduction (which is itself a highly ritualized process), disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative calling for the immediate realization of a desire. Our center of gravity has in fact shifted toward an unconscious and libidinal economy which only leaves room for the total naturalization of a desire bound either to fateful drives or to pure and simple mechanical operation, but above all to the imaginary order of repression and liberation. Nowadays, one no longer says: "You've got a soul and you must save it," but: "You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it well." "You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it." "You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it." "You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it," etc. , etc. This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies. Besides, the body to which we constantly refer has no other reality than that of the sexual and productive model. It is capital which gives birth in the same movement to the energetic of labor power and to the body we dream of today as the locus of desire and the unconscious. This is the body which serves as a sanctuary for psychic energy and drives and which, dominated by these drives and haunted by primary processes, has itself become primary process-and thus an anti-body, the ultimate revolutionary referent. Both are simultaneously conceived in repression, and their apparent antagonism is yet another effect of repression. Thus, to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy which would be opposed to the bound energy of productive bodies, and to rediscover a phantasmal and instinctual truth of the body in desire, is still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital. This is the nature of desire and of the unconscious: the trash heap of political economy and the psychic metaphor of capital. And sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means, in a fantastic extension of the jurisdiction governing private property, for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual capital, unconscious capital. And each individual will be accountable to himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. This is what Foucault tells us (in spite of himself) : nothing functions with repression (repression), everything functions with production; nothing functions with repression (refoulement) , everything functions with liberation. But it is the same thing. Any form of liberation is fomented by repression: the liberation of productive forces is like that of desire; the liberation of bodies is like that of women's liberation, etc. There is no exception to the logic of liberation: any force or any liberated form of speech constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power. This is how "sexual liberation" accomplishes a miracle by uniting in the same revolutionary ideal the two major effects of repression, liberation and sexuality. Historically, this process has been building up for at least two centuries, but today it is in full bloom with the blessing of psychoanalysis- just as political economy and production have only made great strides with Marx's sanction and blessing. It is this conjecture which dominates us completely today, even through the "radical" contestation of Marx and psychoanalysis. It is in this way that the purified axioms of Marxism and psychoanalysis converge in today's only "revolutionary" catchword- that of the “productivity” of “desire.” The “desiring machine” only fulfills, in one single movement, the positive destiny of Marxism and psychoanalysis. They at last come together under less naïve auspices than Reich's, still too strongly marked by the Oedipus complex, the proletariat, repression, and class struggle. Reich had aimed too soon at the synthesis of two disciplines that were both historical and psychological and that were still cluttered with cumbersome elements: his mixture is archaic and his interpretation does not hold up; the times were not yet ready. But today, on the basis of a productivity cleansed of its contradictions, its historical objectives and its determinations and of a libido cleansed in its own way (of the Oedipus complex, repression, and of its too-genital, too familial, determinations) the collusion and synthesis may finally be accomplished to each other's benefit: the mirror of production and that of desire will be able to refract each other endlessly. The category of the sexual and sexual discourse were born in the same way that the category of the clinical and the clinical gaze came into being-where there was nothing before except uncontrolled, senseless, unstable, or highly ritualized forms. And where there was therefore no repression either, that leitmotiv by which we evaluate all earlier societies much more so than ours; we condemn them for being primitive from the technological point of view; these were repressed, non-"liberated" societies which did not even know of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis came to clear the way for sex by telling what was hidden-how incredible is the racism of truth, the evangelical racism of psychoanalysis; everything changes with the coming of the Word. If the question remains unsettled for our culture (repression or not), it is nonetheless without ambiguity for the others: they know neither repression nor the unconscious because they do not know the category of the sexual. "We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.” It is our moral system (psychic and psychoanalytic) which remains hidden behind the hypothesis of repression and which governs our blindness. To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not, "sublimated" or not, in feudal, rural, and primitive societies is a sign of utter foolishness (like reinterpreting religion, ne varietur, as ideology and mystification). And on that basis, then, it becomes possible again to say with Foucault: there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture either-not, however, according to his meaning, but in the sense that there has never truly been any sexuality. Sexuality, like political economy, is only montage (all of whose twists and turns Foucault analyzes); sexuality as we hear about it and as it "is spoken," even as the "id speaks," is only a simulacrum which experience has forever crossed up, baffled, and surpassed, as in any system. The coherence and transparence of homo sexualis has never had more reality than that of homo oeconomicus.

<h4>The affirmative is a politics of accumulation pit against an already prevalent biopolitical paradigm – the result is paradoxically the collapse of the seductive in favor of an endless politics of forced confession which normalizes atrocity</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard 77</u></strong> (Jean Baudrillard, Simon’s grandfather, “Forget Foucault,” translated by Nicole Dufresne, pp 37-41) gz</p><p><u>The <mark>production</mark> channel <mark>leads from work to sex</mark>, but only by switching tracks; <mark>as we move from <strong>political to "libidinal" economy</u></strong></mark> (the last acquisition of '68), <u>we change from a violent and archaic model of socialization</u> (work) <u>to a more subtle and fluid model which is at once more "psychic" and more in touch with the body</u> (the sexual and the libidinal). <u><mark>There is a metamorphosis</mark> and a veering away <strong><mark>from labor power to drive</u></strong></mark> (pulsion) , a veering away from a model founded on a system of representations (the famous "ideology") to a model operating on a system of affect (sex being only a kind of anamorphosis of the categorical social imperative) . <u>From one discourse to the other</u>-since it really is a question of discourse-<u><mark>there runs <strong>the same ultimatum of pro-duction</strong></mark> in the literal sense of the word. The original sense of "production</u>" is not in fact that of material manufacture; rather, it <u>means <mark>to <strong>render visible, to cause to appear and be made to appear</u></strong></mark>: pro-ducere. Sex is produced as one produces a document, or as an actor is said to appear (se produire) on stage. <u>To produce is <mark>to force what belongs to</mark> another order (<strong>that of <mark>secrecy and seduction</strong></mark>) <mark>to materialize. </mark>Seduction is that which is everywhere and always opposed to pro-duction; <mark>seduction <strong>withdraws something from the visible order</strong> and so runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear view</mark>, whether it be an object, a number, or a concept. <mark>Let everything <strong>be produced, be read, become real, visible</mark>, and marked with the sign of effectiveness</strong><mark>; let everything be transcribed </mark>into force relations, into conceptual systems or <strong><mark>into calculable energy</strong>; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and registered</mark>: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.” <mark>Ours is a culture of</mark> "monstration" and demonstration, of "productive" monstrosity (<strong><mark>the "confession"</strong></mark> </u>so well analyzed by Foucault is one of its forms) . <u><mark>We never find any seduction there-nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in a <strong>frenzied activation of pleasure</u></strong>; <u>we find no seduction in those <strong>bodies penetrated by a gaze</mark> literally <mark>absorbed by the suction of the transparent void</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national product</u>.5 </p><p>Pornography is only the paradoxical limit of the sexual, a realistic exacerbation and a mad obsession with the real-this is the "obscene," etymologically speaking and in all senses. But <u><mark>isn't the sexual itself a <strong>forced materialization</strong></mark>, and isn't the coming of sexuality already part of the Western notion of what is real-the obsession peculiar to our culture with "instancing" and <strong>instrumentalizing all things</u></strong>? Just as it is absurd to separate in other cultures the religious, the economic, the political, the juridical, and even the social and other phantasmagorical categories, for the reason that they do not occur there, and because these concepts are like so many venereal diseases with which we infect them in order to "understand" them better, so it is also absurd to give autonomy to the sexual as "instance" and as an irreducible given to which all other "givens" can be reduced. We need to do a critique of sexual Reason, or rather a genealogy of sexual Reason, as Nietzsche has done a genealogy of Morals-because this is our new moral system. One could say of sexuality as of death: "It is a habit to which consciousness has not long been accustomed." </p><p><u><mark>We do not understand</mark>, or we vaguely sympathize with, those <mark>cultures for which the sexual act has no finality</mark> in itself <mark>and for which sexuality does not have the deadly seriousness of an energy to be freed, <strong>a forced ejaculation, a production at all cost, or of a hygienic reckoning of the body</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>These are cultures</mark> which maintain long processes of seduction and sensuousness <mark>in which sexuality is</mark> one service among others, <mark>a long procedure of <strong>gifts and counter-gifts</u></strong></mark>; lovemaking is only the eventual outcome of this reciprocity measured to the rhythm of an ineluctable ritual. For us, this no longer has any meaning: for us, <u><strong><mark>the sexual has become strictly the actualization of a desire in a moment of pleasure</u></strong></mark>—all the rest is "literature." <u>What an extraordinary crystallization of the orgastic function, which is itself the materialization of an energetic substance</u>. </p><p><u><strong><mark>Ours is a culture of premature ejaculation</strong></mark>. More and more, <mark>all seduction</mark>, all manner of seduction</u> (which is itself a highly ritualized process), <u><mark>disappears behind the naturalized sexual imperative</mark> calling for the immediate realization of a desire<strong>. Our center of gravity has in fact shifted toward an unconscious and libidinal economy which only leaves room for the total naturalization of a desire bound either to fateful drives or to pure and simple mechanical operation, but above all to the imaginary order of repression and liberation. </p><p></strong>Nowadays, one no longer says: "You've got a soul and you must save it," but: "<strong><mark>You've got a sexual nature, and you must find out how to use it</mark> well." </p><p></u></strong>"<u><strong><mark>You've got an unconscious, and you must learn how to liberate it</u></strong></mark>." </p><p>"<u><strong><mark>You've got a body, and you must know how to enjoy it</strong></mark>." </p><p></u>"<u><strong><mark>You've got a libido, and you must know how to spend it</u></strong></mark>," etc. , etc. <u><mark>This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and</mark> an <mark>accelerated circulation</mark> of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body <mark>is the <strong>exact replica of the force which rules market value</strong>: capital must circulate</mark>; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; <mark>the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction</u></mark>. <u><strong>This is the form itself which the current realization of value takes. It is the form of capital, and sexuality as a catchword and a model is the way it appears at the level of bodies. </p><p></u></strong>Besides, the body to which we constantly refer has no other reality than that of the sexual and productive model. <u><mark>It is capital which gives birth</mark> in <strong>the same movement <mark>to the energetic of labor power</strong></mark> and to the body we dream of today as the locus of desire and the unconscious</u>. This is the body which serves as a sanctuary for psychic energy and drives and which, dominated by these drives and haunted by primary processes, has itself become primary process-and thus an anti-body, the ultimate revolutionary referent. Both are simultaneously conceived in repression, and their apparent antagonism is yet another effect of repression. <u>Thus, <mark>to rediscover in the secret of bodies an unbound "libidinal" energy</mark> which would be opposed to the bound energy of productive bodies, and to rediscover a phantasmal and instinctual truth of the body in desire, <mark>is <strong>still only to unearth the psychic metaphor of capital.</strong></mark> </p><p>This is the nature of desire and of the unconscious: <strong>the trash heap of political economy and the psychic metaphor of capital</u></strong>. <u>And <mark>sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means</mark>, in a fantastic extension of the jurisdiction governing private property, <mark>for assigning to each individual the management of a certain capital</mark>: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual capital, unconscious capital.</u> <u>And each individual will be accountable to himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. </p><p></u>This is what Foucault tells us (in spite of himself) : <u>nothing functions with repression</u> (repression), <u>everything functions with production; nothing functions with repression</u> (refoulement) , <u>everything functions with liberation</u>. But it is the same thing. <u>Any form of liberation is fomented by repression: the liberation of productive forces is like that of desire</u>; the liberation of bodies is like that of women's liberation, etc. <u>There is no exception to the logic of liberation: <mark>any force or any liberated form of speech <strong>constitutes one more turn in the spiral of power</u></strong></mark>. This is how "sexual liberation" accomplishes a miracle by uniting in the same revolutionary ideal the two major effects of repression, liberation and sexuality. </p><p>Historically, this process has been building up for at least two centuries, but today it is in full bloom with the blessing of psychoanalysis- just as political economy and production have only made great strides with Marx's sanction and blessing. It is this conjecture which dominates us completely today, even through the "radical" contestation of Marx and psychoanalysis.</p><p>It is in this way that the purified axioms of Marxism and psychoanalysis converge in today's only "revolutionary" catchword- that of the “productivity” of “desire.” <u><mark>The “desiring machine” only fulfills</u></mark>, in one single movement, <u><mark>the</u></mark> positive <u><mark>destiny of Marxism</mark> and psychoanalysis</u>. They at last come together under less naïve auspices than Reich's, still too strongly marked by the Oedipus complex, the proletariat, repression, and class struggle. Reich had aimed too soon at the synthesis of two disciplines that were both historical and psychological and that were still cluttered with cumbersome elements: his mixture is archaic and his interpretation does not hold up; the times were not yet ready. But <u>today, on the basis of a productivity cleansed of its contradictions</u>, its historical objectives and its determinations <u>and of a libido cleansed</u> in its own way (<u>of the Oedipus complex, repression</u>, and of its too-genital, too familial, determinations) the collusion and synthesis may finally be accomplished to each other's benefit: <u>the mirror of production and that of desire will be able to refract each other endlessly</u>. The category of the sexual and sexual discourse were born in the same way that the category of the clinical and the clinical gaze came into being-where there was nothing before except uncontrolled, senseless, unstable, or highly ritualized forms. And where there was therefore no repression either, that leitmotiv by which we evaluate all earlier societies much more so than ours; we condemn them for being primitive from the technological point of view; these were repressed, non-"liberated" societies which did not even know of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis came to clear the way for sex by telling what was hidden-how incredible is the racism of truth, the evangelical racism of psychoanalysis; everything changes with the coming of the Word. If the question remains unsettled for our culture (repression or not), it is nonetheless without ambiguity for the others: they know neither repression nor the unconscious because they do not know the category of the sexual. <u><mark>"We act as if the sexual were "repressed" wherever it does not appear in its own right: this is our way of saving sex through the “sex principle.”</mark> It is our moral system</u> (psychic and psychoanalytic) <u>which remains hidden behind the hypothesis of repression</u> and which governs our blindness. <u><mark>To talk about sexuality, "repressed" or not</mark>, "sublimated" or not</u>, in feudal, rural, and primitive societies <u><mark>is a sign of utter foolishness</u></mark> (like reinterpreting religion, ne varietur, as ideology and mystification). And on that basis, then, it becomes possible again to say with Foucault: <u><mark>there is not and there has never been any repression in our culture</u></mark> either-not, however, according to his meaning, but <u>in the sense that <mark>there has never truly been any sexuality</mark>. Sexuality, like political economy, is only montage</u> (all of whose twists and turns Foucault analyzes); <u><mark>sexuality</mark> as we hear about it and as it "is spoken,"</u> even as the "id speaks," <u><mark>is only a simulacrum</mark> which experience has forever crossed up, baffled, and surpassed</u>, as in any system. The coherence and transparence of <u><mark>homo sexualis has never had more reality than</u> that of <u>homo oeconomicus</u>.</p></mark>

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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That turns and outweighs the aff- reinforces stigmatization, denies prostitutes’ rights, increases illegal prostitution, and promotes victimization

Kuo ‘5

Kuo ‘5

The Nevada regulations result not only in a system that reinforces stigmatization and denies their rights, but also creates working conditions that are so unattractive that prostitutes prefer to work in illegal venues. Nevada’s policies altogether disfranchise prostitutes as citizens and rights holders, violate them as workers and persons, and promote dangerous client expectations, all in order to control the “victimizing” prostitute. Nowhere is the importance of conceptual constructs to the construction of policy more evident. Systems of legalization not only promote such representations but carry a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women In Nevada, various unwritten rules circumscribe the behavior of non-prostitute women. Like criminalization, legalization embodies and perpetuates the continued stigmatization of the prostitute and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women. It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens the quality of life of prostitutes, making most of them criminals for noncompliance, and it promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations. It does achieve its purpose: the control of the prostitute body.

The Nevada regulations result not only in a system that reinforces stigmatization and denies their rights but also creates working conditions that are so unattractive that prostitutes prefer to work in illegal venues Nevada’s policies disfranchise prostitutes violate them as persons and promote dangerous client expectations to control the “victimizing” prostitute legalization not only promote such representations but carry a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women Like criminalization, legalization embodies and perpetuates stigmatization and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens quality of life and promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations It does achieve its purpose: the control of the prostitute body.

[Lenore, Professor of Women's Studies at California State University, Fresno. Prostitution Policy: Revolutionizing Practice Through a Gendered Perspective. ETB] The Nevada regulations result not only in a system that reinforces the stigmatization of prostitutes and denies them their most basic rights, but also creates a working environment and conditions that are so unattractive that legal brothels are hard pressed to find women who will work in them. It is for good reason that prostitutes in general prefer to work in illegal venues. Nevada’s policies altogether disfranchise prostitutes as citizens and rights holders, violate them as workers and persons, and promote dangerous client expectations, all in order to control the “victimizing” prostitute. Nowhere is the importance of conceptual constructs to the construction of policy more evident. Systems of legalization not only promote such representations of prostitutes but carry along, on this tide of misogynistic control, a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women. In Nevada, various unwritten rules circumscribe the behavior of non-prostitute women. As Pillard Notes: One of the most curious unwritten rules is that [in Winnemucca] no non-establishment female can visit any of the brothels or even drive through the area. [Winnemucca] police chief [Lee] Jones told in an interview that this rule was enforced to protect customers of these brothels. Apparently there is some concern that an angry wife could drive through the Line [a public road] looking for her husband’s car. Like criminalization, legalization embodies and perpetuates the continued stigmatization of the prostitute and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women. It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens the quality of life of prostitutes, making most of them criminals for noncompliance, and it promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations. It does, however, effectively achieve its purpose: the control of the prostitute body.

<h4>That <u>turns and outweighs the aff<strong>- reinforces stigmatization, denies prostitutes’ rights, increases illegal prostitution, and promotes victimization</h4><p>Kuo ‘5</p><p></u></strong>[Lenore, Professor of Women's Studies at California State University, Fresno. Prostitution Policy: Revolutionizing Practice Through a Gendered Perspective. ETB]</p><p><u><mark>The Nevada regulations</u> <u>result not only in a system that <strong>reinforces</strong> </u></mark>the<u> <strong><mark>stigmatization</strong></mark> </u>of prostitutes<u> <mark>and <strong>denies</strong></mark> </u>them<u> <strong><mark>their</strong> </u></mark>most basic<u> <strong><mark>rights</strong></mark>, <mark>but also creates</mark> </u>a<u> <mark>working </u></mark>environment and<u> <mark>conditions that are <strong>so unattractive</strong> that </u></mark>legal brothels are hard pressed to find women who will work in them. It is for good reason that<u> <mark>prostitutes </u></mark>in general<u> <strong><mark>prefer to work in illegal venues</strong></mark>. <mark>Nevada’s policies </mark>altogether <strong><mark>disfranchise prostitutes</strong> </mark>as citizens and rights holders, <strong><mark>violate them</strong> as </mark>workers and <mark>persons</mark>, <mark>and <strong>promote dangerous client expectations</strong></mark>, all in order <strong><mark>to control the “victimizing” prostitute</mark>. </strong>Nowhere is the importance of conceptual constructs to the construction of policy more evident. Systems of <strong><mark>legalization not only promote such representations</strong> </u></mark>of prostitutes<u> <strong><mark>but carry</strong> </u></mark>along, on this tide of misogynistic control,<u> <strong><mark>a correlating contempt for non-prostitute women</u></strong></mark>. <u>In Nevada, various unwritten rules circumscribe the behavior of non-prostitute women. </u>As Pillard Notes: One of the most curious unwritten rules is that [in Winnemucca] no non-establishment female can visit any of the brothels or even drive through the area. [Winnemucca] police chief [Lee] Jones told in an interview that this rule was enforced to protect customers of these brothels. Apparently there is some concern that an angry wife could drive through the Line [a public road] looking for her husband’s car. <u><strong><mark>Like criminalization, legalization embodies and perpetuates</strong></mark> the continued <strong><mark>stigmatization</strong> </mark>of the prostitute <strong><mark>and maintains the correlative status of nonprostitute women</strong></mark>.</u> <u><strong><mark>It violates bodily autonomy and actively worsens </strong></mark>the <strong><mark>quality of life </strong></mark>of prostitutes, making most of them criminals for noncompliance, <mark>and </mark>it <mark>promotes the spread of STDs through unrealistic expectations</mark>. <mark>It does</u></mark>, however, effectively <u><mark>achieve its purpose: the</mark> <mark>control of the prostitute body.</p></u></mark>

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James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal failure k t regulation municipalities da pepfar cp and case 2nc was legal failure k 1nr was pepfar cp municipalities da and case 2nr was legal failure k and case

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Their euphemism clouds the debate – that means it can’t deconstruct medical norms which prohibit suicide

PCCEF No Date

PCCEF No Date

Rather than using the phrase “physician-assisted suicide” the state agency will now use the vague and misleading language PCCEF Vice-President Stevens, commented, ”Advocates are trying to control how Oregonians think about suicide to manipulate the public and the press by manipulating the language. They use euphemisms like ‘death with dignity’. ’Suicide’ is the plain English term that means taking one’s own life, whether assisted by a physician or not. “Substituting a euphemism does not clarify what is happening in either a legal or medical sense. It is a transparent attempt to cloud the debate on this issue

Rather than using the phrase “physician-assisted suicide” , the state agency will now use vague language Advocates are trying to control how Oregonians think about suicide to manipulate the public and the press by manipulating the language. ’Suicide’ is the plain English term that means taking one’s own life Substituting a euphemism does not clarify what is happening in either a legal or medical sense. It is a transparent attempt to cloud the debate on this issue

Physicians for Compassionate Care Education Foundation, http://www.pccef.org/articles/art50.htm SJE Physicians for Compassionate Care Education Foundation (PCCEF) is very concerned regarding the influence that proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) have on the Oregon State Department of Human Services. Rather than using the phrase “physician-assisted suicide” to describe this practice, the state agency will now use the vague and misleading language favored by one side in our statewide debate on assisted suicide.¶ ¶ DHS appears to have been bullied by the leaders and attorneys of the pro-PAS organization in Oregon. ¶ PCCEF Vice-President, Dr. Kenneth Stevens, commented, ”Advocates of assisted suicide are not content with having written the physician-assisted suicide law in Oregon, facilitating suicide in several instances, and campaigning to spread it to other states. Now they are trying to control how Oregonians think about suicide—and to do this, they’ve been threatening public agencies.¶ He added, “The proponents of assisted suicide have always tried to manipulate the public and the press by manipulating the language. They use euphemisms like ‘death with dignity’. When they feel those euphemisms have become worn-out they invent new ones. ’Suicide’ is the plain English term that means taking one’s own life, whether assisted by a physician or not.”¶ “Substituting a euphemism does not clarify what is happening in either a legal or medical sense. It is a transparent attempt to cloud the debate on this issue.” ¶ We call on DHS not to give in to intimidation by pro-PAS lobbyists, and to use standard, objective terminology when issuing its reports.

<h4><u>Their euphemism clouds the debate – that means it can’t deconstruct medical norms which prohibit suicide</h4><p><strong>PCCEF No Date</p><p></u></strong>Physicians for Compassionate Care Education Foundation, http://www.pccef.org/articles/art50.htm SJE</p><p>Physicians for Compassionate Care Education Foundation (PCCEF) is very concerned regarding the influence that proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) have on the Oregon State Department of Human Services. <u><mark>Rather than using the phrase “physician-assisted suicide”</u></mark> to describe this practice<mark>, <u>the state agency will now use</mark> the <mark>vague</mark> and misleading <mark>language</u></mark> favored by one side in our statewide debate on assisted suicide.¶ ¶ DHS appears to have been bullied by the leaders and attorneys of the pro-PAS organization in Oregon. ¶ <u>PCCEF Vice-President</u>, Dr. Kenneth <u>Stevens, commented, ”<mark>Advocates</mark> </u>of assisted suicide are not content with having written the physician-assisted suicide law in Oregon, facilitating suicide in several instances, and campaigning to spread it to other states. Now they <u><mark>are trying to control how Oregonians think about suicide</u></mark>—and to do this, they’ve been threatening public agencies.¶ He added, “The proponents of assisted suicide have always tried<u> <mark>to manipulate the public and the press by manipulating the language.</mark> They use euphemisms like ‘death with dignity’.</u> When they feel those euphemisms have become worn-out they invent new ones. <u><mark>’Suicide’ is the plain English term that means taking one’s own life</mark>, whether assisted by a physician or not.</u>”¶ <u><strong>“<mark>Substituting a euphemism does not clarify what is happening in either a legal or medical sense. It is a transparent attempt to cloud the debate on this issue</u></strong></mark>.” ¶ We call on DHS not to give in to intimidation by pro-PAS lobbyists, and to use standard, objective terminology when issuing its reports.</p>

JPIC

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This is a form of tyranny of the self which is the foundation of microfascism

Baudrillard '93

Baudrillard '93 (Jean, The transparency of evil : essays on extreme phenomena / Jean Baudrillard ; translated by James Benedict. London : New York : Verso, 1993. P. 167-168)

At all events, it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself. In this sense the entire movement for liberation and emancipation, inasmuch as it is predicated on a demand for greater autonomy – or, in other words, on a more complete introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom – is a regression. Whatever it may be that comes to us from elsewhere, even the worst exploitation, the very fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive. This is why alienation has its advantages, even though it is so often denounced as the dispossession of the self, with the other treated in consequence as an age-old enemy holding the alienated part of us captive. The inverse theory, that of disalienation, is equally simplistic, holding as it does that the subject merely has to reappropriate his alienated will and his alienated desire. From this perspective everything that befalls the subject as a result of his own efforts is good, because it is authentic; while everything that comes from outside the subject is dubbed inauthentic, merely because it does not fall within the sphere of his freedom. Exactly the opposite position is the one that has to be stressed, while at the same time broadening the paradox. For just as it is better to be controlled by someone else rather than by oneself, it is likewise always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else rather than by oneself. It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me – including my own existence. I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one. The source of all interplay, of everything that is in play, of all passion, of all seduction, is that which is completely foreign to us, yet has power over us. That which is Other, that which we have to seduce

At all events, it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself. In this sense the entire movement for liberation and emancipation, inasmuch as it is predicated on a demand for greater autonomy – or, in other words, on a more complete introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom – is a regression. Whatever it may be that comes to us from elsewhere, even the worst exploitation, the very fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive. This is why alienation has its advantages, even though it is so often denounced as the dispossession of the self, with the other treated in consequence as an age-old enemy holding the alienated part of us captive. The inverse theory, that of disalienation, is equally simplistic, holding as it does that the subject merely has to reappropriate his alienated will and his alienated desire. From this perspective everything that befalls the subject as a result of his own efforts is good, because it is authentic; while everything that comes from outside the subject is dubbed inauthentic, merely because it does not fall within the sphere of his freedom. Exactly the opposite position is the one that has to be stressed, while at the same time broadening the paradox. For just as it is better to be controlled by someone else rather than by oneself, it is likewise always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else rather than by oneself. It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me – including my own existence. I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one. The source of all interplay, of everything that is in play, of all passion, of all seduction, is that which is completely foreign to us, yet has power over us. That which is Other, that which we have to seduce.

<h4>This is a form of tyranny of the self which is the foundation of microfascism</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard '93</u></strong> (Jean, The transparency of evil : essays on extreme phenomena / Jean Baudrillard ; translated by James Benedict. London :<u> New York : Verso, 1993. P. 167-168)</p><p>At all events, it is better to be controlled by someone else than by oneself. Better to be oppressed, exploited, persecuted and manipulated by someone other than oneself.</p><p>In this sense the entire movement for liberation and emancipation, inasmuch as it is predicated on a demand for greater autonomy – or, in other words, on a more complete introjection of all forms of control and constraint under the banner of freedom – is a regression. Whatever it may be that comes to us from elsewhere, even the worst exploitation, the very fact that it comes from elsewhere is positive. This is why alienation has its advantages, even though it is so often denounced as the dispossession of the self, with the other treated in consequence as an age-old enemy holding the alienated part of us captive. The inverse theory, that of disalienation, is equally simplistic, holding as it does that the subject merely has to reappropriate his alienated will and his alienated desire. From this perspective everything that befalls the subject as a result of his own efforts is good, because it is authentic; while everything that comes from outside the subject is dubbed inauthentic, merely because it does not fall within the sphere of his freedom. </p><p>Exactly the opposite position is the one that has to be stressed, while at the same time broadening the paradox. For just as it is better to be controlled by someone else rather than by oneself, it is likewise always better to be made happy, or unhappy, by someone else rather than by oneself. It is always better to depend in life on something that does not depend on us. In this way I can avoid any kind of servitude, I am not obliged to submit to something that does not depend on me – including my own existence. I am free of my birth – and in the same sense I can be free of my death. There has never been any true freedom apart from this one. The source of all interplay, of everything that is in play, of all passion, of all seduction, is that which is completely foreign to us, yet has power over us. That which is Other, that which we have to seduce</u>.</p>

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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Perm do both

<h4>Perm do both</h4>

JPIC

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Legalization becomes a new form of controlling women’s bodies and sexuality through regulation

Kim ‘7

Kim ‘7

regulation of prostitution turn into another form of controlling women's bodies and sexuality Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through registration requirements and health exam s Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the tools to build their own business

regulation of prostitution turn into another form of controlling women's bodies and sexuality Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through registration requirements and health exam s Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the tools to build their own business

[Ji Hye, J.D. expected from Washington University in 2008; 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 493. ETB] The regulation of prostitution has great potential to turn into merely another form of controlling women's bodies and sexuality. n203 Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through the registration requirements and mandatory health examinations. n204 For a regulatory regime to work, compulsory registration of prostitutes may be required, "branding a woman for life as a prostitute and making her rescue and rehabilitation far more [*519] difficult." n205 It is possible that a small cooperative network of brothels could be created, as exists in the Netherlands. There, prostitutes have general control of their work, yielding the best working conditions. n206 However, prostitutes find it difficult to organize in such a manner. n207 Many prostitutes enter prostitution to escape abuses or economic desperation, and will usually settle for any work that a procurer offers. n208 Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the necessary tools to build their own business, making such an alternative largely unattainable in Korea.

<h4><u><strong>Legalization becomes a new form of controlling women’s bodies and sexuality through regulation</h4><p>Kim ‘7</p><p></u></strong>[Ji Hye, J.D. expected from Washington University in 2008; 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 493. ETB]</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>regulation of prostitution</u></strong> </mark>has great potential to <u><strong><mark>turn into</u></strong> </mark>merely <u><strong><mark>another form of controlling</u></strong> <u><strong>women's bodies and sexuality</u></strong></mark>. n203 <u><mark>Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through </u></mark>the <u><mark>registration requirements and </u></mark>mandatory <u><mark>health exam</u></mark>ination<u><mark>s</u></mark>. n204 For a regulatory regime to work, compulsory registration of prostitutes may be required, "branding a woman for life as a prostitute and making her rescue and rehabilitation far more [*519] difficult." n205 It is possible that a small cooperative network of brothels could be created, as exists in the Netherlands. There, prostitutes have general control of their work, yielding the best working conditions. n206 However, prostitutes find it difficult to organize in such a manner. n207 Many prostitutes enter prostitution to escape abuses or economic desperation, and will usually settle for any work that a procurer offers. n208 <u><mark>Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the</u> </mark>necessary <u><mark>tools to build their own business</u></mark>, making such an alternative largely unattainable in Korea.</p>

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James Taylor, Joel Rollins, Jonah Feldman

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal failure k t regulation municipalities da pepfar cp and case 2nc was legal failure k 1nr was pepfar cp municipalities da and case 2nr was legal failure k and case

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Perm do CP

<h4>Perm do CP</h4>

JPIC

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable

Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010

Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything

Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.¶ Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50]¶ In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice:¶ ¶ "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

<h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010</strong><mark> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <strong><mark>military and corporate research</strong></mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <strong><mark>social conditioning</strong></mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <strong><mark>concentration of privilege</strong></mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the <strong>intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that <strong>they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</strong></mark> waged on a daily basis</u>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death</strong> is</mark> our <strong><mark>banal acceptance</strong> of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <strong><mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u>The cemetery no longer exists because <strong><mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function</strong>: they <mark>are <strong>ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>.¶ Yet <u>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <strong><mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</strong></mark>.</u> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is <strong>counter-offensive</strong></mark> and comes from a strange source: in <strong>every system</strong> at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it <strong>reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <strong><mark>generated its own antithesis</strong></mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</strong></mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, <strong>the silent majorities</strong> that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the <strong>ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</strong></mark> to the socia</u>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><mark>a system is abolished only by <strong>pushing it into hyperlogic</strong></mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u>.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</strong></mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <strong><mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><mark>they are insistent on <strong>saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’</strong>, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been <strong>stripped of all that makes life worth living</strong></mark>, when it is as good as social death</u>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u>human survivors act so repugnantly that <strong>we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50]¶ In reality, “<u><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because <strong>they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><mark>seeking to <strong>consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "<u><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <strong><mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: <strong>the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the <strong>messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></mark> might suffice:¶ ¶ "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that <strong>cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <strong><mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>

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Link turn comes before the link – the aff’s contestation reformulates how suicide is understood, that is prior to any stigmatization

<h4>Link turn comes before the link – the aff’s contestation reformulates how suicide is understood, that is prior to any stigmatization</h4>

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This ensures the perpetuation of colonialism – the academy is necessary and sufficient for mass suffering

Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 6-7) gz

a war on scholarly dissent has raged for two or three decades now and has intensified since 9/11 The stakes here are high. These dissenting scholars and the knowledges they produce are constructed by right-wing critics as a threat to U.S. power and global hegemony, as has been the case in earlier moments in U.S. history, particularly during the Cold War what is really at work in these attacks are the logics of racism, warfare, and nationalism that undergird U.S. imperialism and also the architecture of the U.S. academy these logics shape a systemic structure of repression of academic knowledge that counters the imperial, nation-building project. the U.S. academy is an “imperial university.” As in all imperial and colonial nations, intellectuals and scholarship play an important role—directly or indirectly, willingly or unwittingly—in legitimizing American exceptionalism and rationalizing U.S. expansionism and repression, domestically and globally U.S. imperialism is characterized by deterritorialized, flexible, and covert practices of subjugation and violence and as such does not resemble historical forms of European colonialism that depended on territorial colonialism As a settler-colonial nation, it has over time developed various strategies of control that include proxy wars, secret interventions, and client regimes aimed at maintaining its political, economic, and military dominance around the globe, as well as cultural interventions and “soft power.” The chapters here help to illuminate and historicize the role of the U.S. university in legitimizing notions of Manifest Destiny and foundational mythologies of settler colonialism and exceptional democracy the academy’s role in supporting state policies is crucial, even—and especially—as a presumably liberal institution it is precisely the support of a liberal class that is always critical for the maintenance of “benevolent empire As U.S. military and overseas interventions are increasingly framed as humanitarian wars—to save oppressed others and rescue victimized women—it is liberal ideologies of gender, sexuality, religion, pluralism, and democracy that are key to uphold the state of permanent war that is core to U.S. imperialism and racial statecraft has three fronts: military, cultural, and academic the academic battleground is part of the culture wars that emerge in a militarized nation, one that is always presumably under threat, externally or internally. Debates about national identity and national culture shape the battles over academic freedom and the role of the university in defining the racial boundaries of the nation and its “proper” subjects and “proper” politics. pedagogies of nationhood, race, gender, sexuality, class, and culture within the imperial nation are fundamentally intertwined with the interests of neoliberal capital and the possibilities of economic dominance

a war on scholarly dissent has raged for decades scholars are constructed as a threat to U.S. power what is at work are the logics of racism, warfare, and nationalism that undergird imperialism and the architecture of the U.S. academy the U.S. academy is an “imperial university intellectuals play an important role in legitimizing American exceptionalism domestically and globally U.S. imperialism is deterritorialized, flexible, and covert As a settler-colonial nation, it has developed strategies of control that include proxy wars, secret interventions, and client regimes as well as cultural interventions and “soft power the academy’s role is crucial especially as a liberal institution the liberal class is critical for benevolent empire As interventions are framed as humanitarian wars it is liberal ideologies that are key to uphold the state of permanent war core to U.S. imperialism and racial statecraft has three fronts: military, cultural, and academic the academic battleground is part of the culture wars that emerge in a militarized nation always presumably under threat Debates about national culture shape the role of the university in defining proper” subjects pedagogies of nationhood are fundamentally intertwined with neoliberal capital

This edited volume offers reports from the trenches of a war on scholarly dissent that has raged for two or three decades now and has intensified since 9/11, analyzed by some of the very scholars who have been targeted or have directly engaged in these battles. The stakes here are high. These dissenting scholars and the knowledges they produce are constructed by right-wing critics as a threat to U.S. power and global hegemony, as has been the case in earlier moments in U.S. history, particularly during the Cold War. Much discussion of incidents where academics have been denied tenure or publicly attacked for their critique of U.S. foreign or domestic policies, as in earlier moments, has centered on the important question of academic freedom. However, the chapters in this book break new ground by demonstrating that what is really at work in these attacks are the logics of racism, warfare, and nationalism that undergird U.S. imperialism and also the architecture of the U.S. academy. Our argument here is that these logics shape a systemic structure of repression of academic knowledge that counters the imperial, nation-building project. The premise of this book is that the U.S. academy is an “imperial university.” As in all imperial and colonial nations, intellectuals and scholarship play an important role—directly or indirectly, willingly or unwittingly—in legitimizing American exceptionalism and rationalizing U.S. expansionism and repression, domestically and globally. The title of this book, then, is not a rhetorical flourish but offers a concept that is grounded in the particular imperial formation of the United States, one that is in many ways ambiguous and shape-shifting. 3 It is important to note that U.S. imperialism is characterized by deterritorialized, flexible, and covert practices of subjugation and violence and as such does not resemble historical forms of European colonialism that depended on territorial colonialism.4 As a settler-colonial nation, it has over time developed various strategies of control that include proxy wars, secret interventions, and client regimes aimed at maintaining its political, economic, and military dominance around the globe, as well as cultural interventions and “soft power.” The chapters here help to illuminate and historicize the role of the U.S. university in legitimizing notions of Manifest Destiny and foundational mythologies of settler colonialism and exceptional democracy as well as the attempts by scholars and students to challenge and subvert them. This book demonstrates the ways in which the academy’s role in supporting state policies is crucial, even—and especially—as a presumably liberal institution. Indeed, it is precisely the support of a liberal class that is always critical for the maintenance of “benevolent empire.”5 As U.S. military and overseas interventions are increasingly framed as humanitarian wars—to save oppressed others and rescue victimized women—it is liberal ideologies of gender, sexuality, religion, pluralism, and democracy that are key to uphold.6 The university is a key battleground in these culture wars and in producing as well as contesting knowledges about the state of the nation. We argue that the state of permanent war that is core to U.S. imperialism and racial statecraft has three fronts: military, cultural, and academic. Our conceptualization of the imperial university links these fronts of war, for the academic battleground is part of the culture wars that emerge in a militarized nation, one that is always presumably under threat, externally or internally. Debates about national identity and national culture shape the battles over academic freedom and the role of the university in defining the racial boundaries of the nation and its “proper” subjects and “proper” politics. Furthermore, pedagogies of nationhood, race, gender, sexuality, class, and culture within the imperial nation are fundamentally intertwined with the interests of neoliberal capital and the possibilities of economic dominance.

<h4>This ensures the perpetuation of colonialism – the academy is necessary and sufficient for mass suffering</h4><p><u><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</u></strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 6-7) <u>gz</p><p></u>This edited volume offers reports from the trenches of <u><strong><mark>a war on scholarly dissent</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>has raged for</mark> two or three <mark>decades</mark> now and has intensified since 9/11</u>, analyzed by some of the very scholars who have been targeted or have directly engaged in these battles. <u>The stakes here are high. These dissenting <mark>scholars</mark> and the knowledges they produce <mark>are <strong>constructed</mark> by right-wing critics <mark>as a threat to U.S. power</mark> and global hegemony</strong>, as has been the case in earlier moments in U.S. history, particularly during the Cold War</u>. Much discussion of incidents where academics have been denied tenure or publicly attacked for their critique of U.S. foreign or domestic policies, as in earlier moments, has centered on the important question of academic freedom. However, the chapters in this book break new ground by demonstrating that <u><mark>what is</mark> really <mark>at work</mark> in these attacks <mark>are the logics of <strong>racism, warfare, and nationalism that undergird</mark> U.S. <mark>imperialism</strong> and</mark> also <mark>the architecture of the U.S.</mark> <mark>academy</u></mark>. Our argument here is that <u>these logics shape a systemic structure of repression of academic knowledge that counters the imperial, nation-building project.</p><p></u>The premise of this book is that <u><strong><mark>the U.S. academy is an “imperial university</mark>.” </strong>As in all imperial and colonial nations, <mark>intellectuals</mark> and scholarship <mark>play an important role</mark>—directly or indirectly, willingly or unwittingly—<mark>in <strong>legitimizing American exceptionalism</strong></mark> and rationalizing U.S. expansionism and repression, <mark>domestically and globally</u></mark>. The title of this book, then, is not a rhetorical flourish but offers a concept that is grounded in the particular imperial formation of the United States, one that is in many ways ambiguous and shape-shifting. 3 It is important to note that <u><mark>U.S. imperialism is</mark> characterized by <strong><mark>deterritorialized, flexible, and covert</mark> practices of subjugation and violence</strong> and as such does not resemble historical forms of European colonialism that depended on territorial colonialism</u>.4 <u><mark>As a <strong>settler-colonial nation</strong>, it has</mark> over time <mark>developed</mark> various <mark>strategies of control that include <strong>proxy wars, secret interventions, and client regimes</strong></mark> aimed at maintaining its political, economic, and military dominance around the globe, <mark>as well as cultural interventions and “soft power</mark>.” The chapters here help to illuminate and historicize the role of the U.S. university in <strong>legitimizing notions of Manifest Destiny</strong> and foundational mythologies of <strong>settler colonialism and exceptional democracy</u></strong> as well as the attempts by scholars and students to challenge and subvert them.</p><p>This book demonstrates the ways in which <u><strong><mark>the academy’s role</mark> in supporting state policies <mark>is crucial</strong></mark>, even—and <mark>especially</mark>—<mark>as a</mark> presumably <mark>liberal institution</u></mark>. Indeed, <u>it is precisely <mark>the </mark>support of a <mark>liberal class</mark> that <mark>is</mark> always <mark>critical for</mark> the maintenance of “<strong><mark>benevolent empire</u></strong></mark>.”5 <u><mark>As</mark> U.S. military and overseas <mark>interventions are</mark> increasingly <strong><mark>framed as humanitarian wars</strong></mark>—to save oppressed others and rescue victimized women—<mark>it is liberal ideologies</mark> of gender, sexuality, religion, pluralism, and democracy <mark>that are key to uphold</u></mark>.6 The university is a key battleground in these culture wars and in producing as well as contesting knowledges about the state of the nation.</p><p>We argue that <u><mark>the <strong>state of permanent war</strong></mark> that is <mark>core to U.S. imperialism and racial statecraft has three fronts: military, cultural, and academic</u></mark>. Our conceptualization of the imperial university links these fronts of war, for <u><mark>the academic battleground is part of the culture wars that emerge in a militarized nation</mark>, one that is <mark>always presumably under threat</mark>, externally or internally. <mark>Debates about </mark>national identity and <mark>national culture shape</mark> the battles over academic freedom and <mark>the role of the university in defining</mark> the racial boundaries of the nation and its “<mark>proper” subjects</mark> and “proper” politics.</u> Furthermore, <u><mark>pedagogies of nationhood</mark>, race, gender, sexuality, class, and culture within the imperial nation <mark>are fundamentally intertwined with</mark> the interests of <mark>neoliberal capital</mark> and the possibilities of economic dominance</u>.</p>

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1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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They stigmatize worse – treating the word “suicide” as unspeakable violently stigmatizes people who take their own lives

<h4>They stigmatize worse – treating the word “suicide” as unspeakable violently stigmatizes people who take their own lives</h4>

JPIC

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The alternative to stop fighting power – it’s dead – we refuse the affirmative’s praxis of chasing windmills

Baudrillard 77

Jean Baudrillard. Forget Foucault. Translated by Nicole Dufresne. 1977. Page 50-54.

Foucault unmasks the final illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself. Power is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the real (always more and more of the real) power returns to its own identity again as a final principle: it is the last term, the irreducible web, the last tale that can be told; it is what structures the indeterminate equation of the word power is never there and its institution is only a simulation it is no more reality than economic accumulation Whether of time, value, the subject, etc., the axiom and the myth of a real govern us everywhere, although we know that nothing is ever amassed Something in us disaccumulates unto death, undoes, destroys, liquidates, and disconnects so that we can resist the pressure of the real, and live we see no difference here between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has become meaningless because power is reversible To have power or not, to take it or lose it, to incarnate it or to challenge it: if this were power, it would not even exist power is not an institution it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation Neither central, nor unilateral, nor dominant, power is distributional it is an immanent, unlimited field of forces if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic," it would long ago have been overthrown everywhere. It would have collapsed under antagonistic forces. Yet this has never happened why don't "dominated" masses immediately overthrow power? against Foucault's vision we must say that power is something that is exchanged. Not in the economical sense, but in the sense that power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction, challenge, and ruse And if power cannot be exchanged in this sense, it simply disappears. We must say that power seduces The one-sidedness of a force relation never exists, a one-sidedness upon which a power "structure" might be established, or a form of "reality" for power which is linear in the traditional vision but spiraling in Foucault. Unilateral or segmentary: this is the dream of power imposed on us by reason Seduction is stronger than power because it is reversible Seduction does not partake of the real order. It never belongs to the order of force seduction envelops the whole real process of power with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation-without which neither power nor production would even exist Besides, the real has never interested anyone. It is the locus of disenchantment Do you think that power, economy, sex would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them the real is no more than a stockpile of dead matter It makes us feel secure to evaluate this stock of what is real the horizon of speech, sexuality, or desire can still carry on; there will always be something to liberate, to enjoy, and to exchange now that's real, that's substantial That's power

Power is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the real (always more and more of the real) power returns to its own identity again as a final principle: it is the last term the last tale that can be told power is never there and its institution is only a simulation the myth of a real govern us everywhere, although we know that nothing is ever amassed we see no difference here between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has become meaningless To have power or not, to take it or lose it, to incarnate it or to challenge it: if this were power, it would not even exist power is not an institution power is distributional it is an immanent, unlimited field of forces if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic," It would have collapsed under antagonistic forces power is something that is exchanged power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction, challenge, and ruse And if power cannot be exchanged in this sense, it simply disappears. We must say that power seduces The one-sidedness of a force relation never exists a form of "reality" for power which is linear in the traditional vision is the dream of power imposed on us by reason the real has never interested anyone. It is the locus of disenchantment the real is no more than a stockpile of dead matter It makes us feel secure to evaluate this stock of what is real there will always be something to liberate, to enjoy, and to exchange with others through words That's power

With Foucault, we always brush against political determination in its last instance. One form dominates and is diffracted into the models characteristic of the prison, the military, the asylum, and disciplinary action. This form is no longer rooted in ordinary relations of production (these, on the contrary are modeled after it); this form seems to find its procedural system within itself and this represents enormous progress over the illusion of establishing power in a substance of production or of desire. Foucault unmasks all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself. Power is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the real (always more and more of the real), effecting a quadrature, nomenclature, and dictature without appeal; nowhere does it cancel itself out, become entangled in itself, or mingle with death. In this sense, even if it has no finality and no last judgment, power returns to its own identity again as a final principle: it is the last term, the irreducible web, the last tale that can be told; it is what structures the indeterminate equation of the word. According to Foucault, this is the come-on that power offers, and it is not simply a discursive trap. What Foucault does not see is that power is never there and that its institution, like the institution of spatial perspective versus "real" space in the Renaissance, is only a simulation of perspective-it is no more reality than economic accumulation-and what a tremendous trap that is. Whether of time, value, the subject, etc., the axiom and the myth of a real or possible accumulation govern us everywhere, although we know that nothing is ever amassed and that stockpiles are self-consuming, like modern megalopolis, or like overloaded memories. Any attempt at accumulation is ruined in advance by the void. * Something in us disaccumulates unto death, undoes, destroys, liquidates, and disconnects so that we can resist the pressure of the real, and live. Something at the bottom of the whole system of production resists the infinite expansion of production-otherwise, we would all be already buried. There is something in power that resists as well, and we see no difference here between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has become meaningless, not because the roles are interchangeable but because power is in its form reversible, because on one side and the other something holds out against the unilateral exercise and the infinite expansion of power, just as elsewhere against the infinite expansion of production. This resistance is not a "desire" it is what causes power to come undone in exact proportion to its logical and irreversible extension. And it's taking place everywhere today. In fact, the whole analysis of power needs to be reconsidered. To have power or not, to take it or lose it, to incarnate it or to challenge it: if this were power, it would not even exist. Foucault tells us something else; power is something that functions; " ... power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (The History of Sexuality, p. 93). Neither central, nor unilateral, nor dominant, power is distributional; like a vector, it operates through relays and transmissions. Because it is an immanent, unlimited field of forces, we still do not understand what power runs into and against what it stumbles since it is expansion, pure magnetization. However, if power were this magnetic infiltration ad infinitum of the social field, it would long ago have ceased meeting with any resistance. Inversely, if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic," it would long ago have been overthrown everywhere. It would have collapsed under the pressure of antagonistic forces. Yet this has never happened, apart from a few "historical" exceptions. For "materialist" thinking, this can only appear to be an internally insoluble problem: why don't "dominated" masses immediately overthrow power? Why fascism? Against this unilateral theory (but we understand why it survives, particularly among "revolutionaries" –they would really like power for themselves), against this native vision, but also against Foucault's functional vision in terms of relays and transmissions, we must say that power is something that is exchanged. Not in the economical sense, but in the sense that power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction, challenge, and ruse (neither axis nor indefinite relay, but a cycle). And if power cannot be exchanged in this sense, it simply disappears. We must say that power seduces, but not in the vulgar sense of a complicit form of desire on the part of those who are dominated- this comes down to basing it in the desire of others, which is really going overboard in taking people for idiots-no, power seduces by that reversibility which haunts it, and upon which a minimal symbolic cycle is set up. Dominators and dominated exist no more than victims and executioners. (While exploiters and exploited do in fact exist, they are on different sides because there is no reversibility in production, which is precisely the point: nothing essential happens at that level) With power there are no antagonistic positions: it is carried out according to a cycle of seduction. The one-sidedness of a force relation never exists, a one-sidedness upon which a power "structure" might be established, or a form of "reality" for power and its perpetual movement, which is linear and final in the traditional vision but radiating and spiraling in Foucault. Unilateral or segmentary: this is the dream of power imposed on us by reason. But nothing yearns to be that way; everything seeks its own death, including power. Or rather-but this is the same thing-everything wants to be exchanged, reversed, or abolished in a cycle (this is in fact why neither repression nor the unconscious exists: reversibility is always already there). That alone is what seduces deep down, and that alone constitutes pure jouissance, while power only satisfies a particular form of hegemonic logic belonging to reason. Seduction is elsewhere. Seduction is stronger than power because it is a reversible and mortal process, while power wants to be irreversible like value, as well as cumulative and immortal like value. Power shares all the illusions of the real and of production; it wants to belong to the order of the real and so falls over into the imaginary and into self superstition (helped by theories which analyze it even if only to challenge it). Seduction, however, does not partake of the real order. It never belongs to the order of force or to force relations. It is precisely for this reason that seduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation-without which neither power nor production would even exist. Behind power, or at the very heart of power and of production, there is a void which gives them today a last glimmer of reality. Without that which reverses them, cancels them, and seduces them, they would never have attained reality. Besides, the real has never interested anyone. It is the locus of disenchantment par excellence, the locus of simulacrum of accumulation against death. Nothing could be worse. It is the imaginary catastrophe standing behind them that sometimes makes reality and the truth fascinating. Do you think that power, economy, sex-all the real's big numbers-would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them which originates precisely in the inversed mirror where they are reflected and continually reversed, and where their imaginary catastrophe generates a tangible and immanent gratification? Today especially, the real is no more than a stockpile of dead matter, dead bodies, and dead language. It still makes us feel secure today to evaluate this stock of what is real (let's not talk about energy: the ecological complaint hides the fact that it is not material energy which is disappearing on the species' horizon but the energy of the real, the reality of the real and of every serious possibility, capitalistic or revolutionary, of managing the real). If the horizon of production has vanished, then the horizon of speech, sexuality, or desire can still carry on; there will always be something to liberate, to enjoy, and to exchange with others through words: now that's real, that's substantial, that's prospective stock. That's power.

<h4>The alternative to stop fighting power – it’s dead – we refuse the affirmative’s praxis of chasing windmills</h4><p>Jean <u><strong>Baudrillard</u></strong>. Forget Foucault. Translated by Nicole Dufresne. 19<u><strong>77</u></strong>. Page 50-54.</p><p>With Foucault, we always brush against political determination in its last instance. One form dominates and is diffracted into the models characteristic of the prison, the military, the asylum, and disciplinary action. This form is no longer rooted in ordinary relations of production (these, on the contrary are modeled after it); this form seems to find its procedural system within itself and this represents enormous progress over the illusion of establishing power in a substance of production or of desire. <u>Foucault unmasks</u> all <u>the final</u> or causal <u>illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself. <mark>Power is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the real (always more and more of the real)</u></mark>, effecting a quadrature, nomenclature, and dictature without appeal; nowhere does it cancel itself out, become entangled in itself, or mingle with death. In this sense, even if it has no finality and no last judgment, <u><mark>power returns to its own identity again as a final principle: it is the last term</mark>, the irreducible web, <mark>the last tale that can be told</mark>; it is what structures the indeterminate equation of the word</u>.</p><p>According to Foucault, this is the come-on that power offers, and it is not simply a discursive trap. What Foucault does not see is that <u><mark>power is never there and</u></mark> that <u><mark>its institution</u></mark>, like the institution of spatial perspective versus "real" space in the Renaissance, <u><mark>is only a simulation</u></mark> of perspective-<u>it is no more reality than economic accumulation</u>-and what a tremendous trap that is. <u>Whether of time, value, the subject, etc., the axiom and <mark>the myth of a real</u></mark> or possible accumulation <u><mark>govern us everywhere, although we know that nothing is ever amassed</u></mark> and that stockpiles are self-consuming, like modern megalopolis, or like overloaded memories. Any attempt at accumulation is ruined in advance by the void. * <u>Something in us disaccumulates unto death, undoes, destroys, liquidates, and disconnects so that we can resist the pressure of the real, and live</u>. Something at the bottom of the whole system of production resists the infinite expansion of production-otherwise, we would all be already buried. There is something in power that resists as well, and <u><mark>we see no difference here between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has become meaningless</u></mark>, not because the roles are interchangeable but <u>because power is</u> in its form <u>reversible</u>, because on one side and the other something holds out against the unilateral exercise and the infinite expansion of power, just as elsewhere against the infinite expansion of production. This resistance is not a "desire" it is what causes power to come undone in exact proportion to its logical and irreversible extension. And it's taking place everywhere today.</p><p>In fact, the whole analysis of power needs to be reconsidered. <u><mark>To have power or not, to take it or lose it, to incarnate it or to challenge it: if this were power, it would not even exist</u></mark>. Foucault tells us something else; power is something that functions; " ... <u><mark>power is not an institution</u></mark>, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; <u>it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation</u> in a particular society" (The History of Sexuality, p. 93). <u>Neither central, nor unilateral, nor dominant, <mark>power is distributional</u></mark>; like a vector, it operates through relays and transmissions. Because <u><mark>it is an immanent, unlimited field of forces</u></mark>, we still do not understand what power runs into and against what it stumbles since it is expansion, pure magnetization. However, if power were this magnetic infiltration ad infinitum of the social field, it would long ago have ceased meeting with any resistance. Inversely, <u><mark>if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic,"</mark> it would long ago have been overthrown everywhere. <mark>It would have collapsed under</u></mark> the pressure of <u><mark>antagonistic forces</mark>. Yet this has never happened</u>, apart from a few "historical" exceptions. For "materialist" thinking, this can only appear to be an internally insoluble problem: <u>why don't "dominated" masses immediately overthrow power?</u> Why fascism? Against this unilateral theory (but we understand why it survives, particularly among "revolutionaries" –they would really like power for themselves), against this native vision, but also <u>against Foucault's</u> functional <u>vision</u> in terms of relays and transmissions, <u>we must say that <mark>power is something that is exchanged</mark>. Not in the economical sense, but in the sense that <mark>power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction, challenge, and ruse</u></mark> (neither axis nor indefinite relay, but a cycle). <u><mark>And if power cannot be exchanged in this sense, it simply disappears. We must say that power seduces</u></mark>, but not in the vulgar sense of a complicit form of desire on the part of those who are dominated- this comes down to basing it in the desire of others, which is really going overboard in taking people for idiots-no, power seduces by that reversibility which haunts it, and upon which a minimal symbolic cycle is set up. Dominators and dominated exist no more than victims and executioners. (While exploiters and exploited do in fact exist, they are on different sides because there is no reversibility in production, which is precisely the point: nothing essential happens at that level) With power there are no antagonistic positions: it is carried out according to a cycle of seduction.</p><p><u><mark>The one-sidedness of a force relation never exists</mark>, a one-sidedness upon which a power "structure" might be established, or <mark>a form of "reality" for power</u></mark> and its perpetual movement, <u><mark>which is linear</u></mark> and final <u><mark>in the traditional vision</mark> but</u> radiating and <u>spiraling in Foucault. Unilateral or segmentary: this <mark>is the dream of power imposed on us by reason</u></mark>. But nothing yearns to be that way; everything seeks its own death, including power. Or rather-but this is the same thing-everything wants to be exchanged, reversed, or abolished in a cycle (this is in fact why neither repression nor the unconscious exists: reversibility is always already there). That alone is what seduces deep down, and that alone constitutes pure jouissance, while power only satisfies a particular form of hegemonic logic belonging to reason. Seduction is elsewhere.</p><p><u>Seduction is stronger than power because it is</u> a <u>reversible</u> and mortal process, while power wants to be irreversible like value, as well as cumulative and immortal like value. Power shares all the illusions of the real and of production; it wants to belong to the order of the real and so falls over into the imaginary and into self superstition (helped by theories which analyze it even if only to challenge it). <u>Seduction</u>, however, <u>does not partake of the real order. It never belongs to the order of force</u> or to force relations. It is precisely for this reason that <u>seduction envelops the whole real process of power</u>, as well as the whole real order of production, <u>with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation-without which neither power nor production would even exist</u>.</p><p>Behind power, or at the very heart of power and of production, there is a void which gives them today a last glimmer of reality. Without that which reverses them, cancels them, and seduces them, they would never have attained reality.</p><p><u>Besides, <mark>the real has never interested anyone. It is the locus of disenchantment</u></mark> par excellence, the locus of simulacrum of accumulation against death. Nothing could be worse. It is the imaginary catastrophe standing behind them that sometimes makes reality and the truth fascinating. <u>Do you think that power, economy, sex</u>-all the real's big numbers-<u>would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them</u> which originates precisely in the inversed mirror where they are reflected and continually reversed, and where their imaginary catastrophe generates a tangible and immanent gratification? Today especially, <u><mark>the real is no more than a stockpile of dead matter</u></mark>, dead bodies, and dead language. <u><mark>It</u></mark> still <u><mark>makes us feel secure</u></mark> today <u><mark>to evaluate this stock of what is real</u></mark> (let's not talk about energy: the ecological complaint hides the fact that it is not material energy which is disappearing on the species' horizon but the energy of the real, the reality of the real and of every serious possibility, capitalistic or revolutionary, of managing the real). If the horizon of production has vanished, then <u>the horizon of speech, sexuality, or desire can still carry on; <mark>there will always be something to liberate, to enjoy, and to exchange</u> with others through words</mark>: <u>now that's real, that's substantial</u>, that's prospective stock. <u><mark>That's power</u></mark>.</p>

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1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.

<h4>We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.</h4>

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1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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Any attempt to put linguistic analysis as a voting issue through a process of decision-making destroys politics and allows militarism to continue unfettered oppressive practices against the marginalized

Schram 95

Schram 95 Schram, Bryn Mawr College social theory and policy professor, 1995 (Sanford F. The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty, pg 20-26, ldg)

This increasingly common strategy, however, overlooks at least three major pitfalls to the politics of renaming." First, many renamings are part of a politics of euphemisms that conspires to legitimate things in ways consonant with hegemonic discourse. This is done by stressing what is consistent and de-emphasizing what is inconsistent with prevailing discourse They are also distracting the economic-minded from the social democratic politics that such policy changes represent." This is a slippery politics best pursued with attention to how such renamings may reinforce entrenched institutional practices One reason it is so hard to tell when true cultural revolutions have occurred is that societies are terribly good at co-opting their opponents; something that starts out to destroy the prevailing social construction of reality ends up being a part of it Destruction itself becomes institutionalized." According to Jeffrey Goldfarb, cynicism has lost its critical edge and has become the common denominator of the very society that cynical criticism sought to debu If this is the case, politically crafted characterizations can easily get co-opted by a cynical society that already anticipates the political character of such selective renamings The politics of renaming itself gets interpreted as a form of cynicism that uses renamings in a disingenuous fashion in order to achieve political ends. Renaming not only loses credibility but also corrupts the terms used. This danger is ever present, given the limits of language Because all terms are partial and incomplete characterizations, every new term can be invalidated as not capturing all that needs to be said about any topic With time, the odds increase that a new term will lose its potency as it fails to emphasize neglected dimensions of a problem Where disabled was once an improvement over handicapped, other terms are now deployed to make society inclusive of all people, however differentially situated. The "disabled" are now "physically challenged" or "mentally challenged?' Proponents of a politics of renaming risk their personal credibility as well. Proponents of a politics of renaming often pose a double bind for their audiences It calls for stressing the special needs of the group while at the same time denying that the group has needs different from those of anyone This can be legitimate, but it is surely almost always bound to be difficult. Insisting that people use terms that imply sameness and difference simultaneously is a good way to ensure such terms do not get used. This encourages the complaint that proponents of new terms are less interested in meeting people's needs than in demonstrating who is more sophisticated and sensitive Others turn away, asking why they cannot still be involved in trying to right wrongs even if they cannot correct their use of terminology," Right-minded, if wrong-worded, people fear being labeled as the enemy; important allies are lost on the high ground of linguistic purity Euphemisms also encourage self-censorship. The politics of renaming discourages its proponents from being able to respond to inconvenient information inconsistent with the operative euphemism. Yet those who oppose it are free to dominate interpretations of the inconvenient facts. This is bad politics The politics of renaming overlooks that life may be more complicated than attempts to regulate the categories of analysis A result of self-censorship, however, is that an important subject is left to be studied by the wrong people. Although analyzing cultural differences may not tell us much about poverty and may be dangerous in a racist society, leaving it to others to study culture and poverty can be a real mistake as well. Culture in their hands almost always becomes "culture of poverty."" A politics of renaming risks reducing the discussants to only those who help reinforce existing prejudices.

renamings are part of a politics of euphemisms that conspires to legitimate things with hegemonic discourse. This is a slippery politics best pursued with attention to how such renamings may reinforce entrenched institutional practices Destruction itself becomes institutionalized politically crafted characterizations can easily get co-opted by a cynical society The politics of renaming itself gets interpreted as a form of cynicism that uses renamings in a disingenuous fashion in order to achieve political ends. Renaming not only loses credibility but also corrupts the terms used. With time, the odds increase that a new term will lose its potency Euphemisms encourage self-censorship. The politics of renaming discourages its proponents from being able to respond to inconvenient information Yet those who oppose it are free to dominate interpretations of the inconvenient facts. This is bad politics

Renaming points to the profoundly political character of labels. Labels operate as sources of power that serve to frame identities and interests. They predispose actors to treat the subjects in question in certain ways, whether they are street people or social policies. This increasingly common strategy, however, overlooks at least three major pitfalls to the politics of renaming." Each reflects a failure to appreciate language's inability to say all that is meant by any act of signification. First, many renamings are part of a politics of euphemisms that conspires to legitimate things in ways consonant with hegemonic discourse. This is done by stressing what is consistent and de-emphasizing what is inconsistent with prevailing discourse. When welfare advocates urge the nation to invest in its most important economic resource, its children, they are seeking to recharacterize efforts on behalf of poor families as critical for the country's international economic success in a way that is entirely consonant with the economistic biases of the dominant order. They are also distracting the economic-minded from the social democratic politics that such policy changes represent." This is a slippery politics best pursued with attention to how such renamings may reinforce entrenched institutional practices." Yet Walter Truett Anderson's characterization of what happened to the "cultural revolution" of the 1960s has relevance here: One reason it is so hard to tell when true cultural revolutions have occurred is that societies are terribly good at co-opting their opponents; something that starts out to destroy the prevailing social construction of reality ends up being a part of it. Culture and counterculture overlap and merge in countless ways. And the hostility, toward established social constructions of reality that produced strikingly new movements and behaviors in the early decades of this century, and peaked in the 1960s, is now a familiar part of the cultural scene. Destruction itself becomes institutionalized." According to Jeffrey Goldfarb, cynicism has lost its critical edge and has become the common denominator of the very society that cynical criticism sought to debunk .21 If this is the case, politically crafted characterizations can easily get co-opted by a cynical society that already anticipates the political character of such selective renamings. The politics of renaming itself gets interpreted as a form of cynicism that uses renamings in a disingenuous fashion in order to achieve political ends. Renaming not only loses credibility but also corrupts the terms used. This danger is ever present, given the limits of language. Because all terms are partial and incomplete characterizations, every new term can be invalidated as not capturing all that needs to be said about any topic. With time, the odds increase that a new term will lose its potency as it fails to emphasize neglected dimensions of a problem. As newer concerns replace the ones that helped inspire the terminological shift, newer terms will be introduced to ad- dress what has been neglected. Where disabled was once an improvement over handicapped, other terms are now deployed to make society inclusive of all people, however differentially situated. The "disabled" are now "physically challenged" or "mentally challenged?' The politics of renaming promotes higher and higher levels of neutralizing language." Yet a neutralized language is itself already a partial reading even if it is only implicitly biased in favor of some attributes over others. Neutrality is always relative to the prevailing context As the context changes, what was once neutral becomes seen as biased. Implicit moves of emphasis and de-emphasis become more visible in a new light. "Physically" and "mentally challenged" already begin to look insufficiently affirmative as efforts intensify to include people with such attributes in all avenues of contemporary life.24 Not just terms risk being corrupted by a politics of renaming. Proponents of a politics of renaming risk their personal credibility as well. Proponents of a politics of renaming often pose a double bind for their audiences. The politics of renaming often seeks to highlight sameness and difference si-multaneously.25 It calls for stressing the special needs of the group while at the same time denying that the group has needs different from those of anyone else. Whether it is women, people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled, or even "the homeless:' renaming seeks to both affirm and deny difference. This can be legitimate, but it is surely almost always bound to be difficult. Women can have special needs, such as during pregnancy, that make it unfair to hold them to male standards; however, once those different circumstances are taken into account, it becomes inappropriate to assume that men and women are fundamentally different in socially significant ways .21 Yet emphasizing special work arrangements for women, such as paid maternity leave, may reinforce sexist stereotyping that dooms women to inferior positions in the labor force. Under these circumstances, advocates of particular renamings can easily be accused of paralyzing their audience and immobilizing potential sup- porters. Insisting that people use terms that imply sameness and difference simultaneously is a good way to ensure such terms do not get used. This encourages the complaint that proponents of new terms are less interested in meeting people's needs than in demonstrating who is more sophisticated and sensitive. Others turn away, asking why they cannot still be involved in trying to right wrongs even if they cannot correct their use of terminology," Right-minded, if wrong-worded, people fear being labeled as the enemy; important allies are lost on the high ground of linguistic purity. Euphemisms also encourage self-censorship. The politics of renaming discourages its proponents from being able to respond to inconvenient information inconsistent with the operative euphemism. Yet those who oppose it are free to dominate interpretations of the inconvenient facts. This is bad politics. Rather than suppressing stories about the poor, for instance, it would be much better to promote actively as many intelligent interpretations as possible. The politics of renaming overlooks that life may be more complicated than attempts to regulate the categories of analysis. Take, for instance, the curious negative example of "culture?' Some scholars have been quite insistent that it is almost always incorrect to speak about culture as a factor in explaining poverty, especially among African Americans .211 Whereas some might suggest that attempts to discourage examining cultural differences, say in family structure, are a form of self-censorship, others might want to argue that it is just clearheaded, informed analysis that deemphasizes culture's relationship to poverty.29 Still others suggest that the question of what should or should not be discussed cannot be divorced from the fact that when blacks talk publicly in this country it is always in a racist society that uses their words to reinforce their subordination. Open disagreement among African Americans will be exploited by whites to delegitimate any challenges to racism and to affirm the idea that black marginalization is self-generated.3° Emphasizing cultural differences between blacks and whites and exposing internal "problems" in the black community minimize how "problems" across races and structural political-economic factors, including especially the racist and sexist practices of institutionalized society, are the primary causes of poverty. Yet it is distinctly possible that although theories proclaiming a "culture of poverty" are incorrect, cultural variation itself may be an important issue in need of examination." For instance, there is much to be gained from contrasting the extended-family tradition among African Americans with the welfare system of white society, which is dedicated to reinforcing the nuclear two-parent family.32 A result of self-censorship, however, is that an important subject is left to be studied by the wrong people. Although analyzing cultural differences may not tell us much about poverty and may be dangerous in a racist society, leaving it to others to study culture and poverty can be a real mistake as well. Culture in their hands almost always becomes "culture of poverty."" A politics of renaming risks reducing the discussants to only those who help reinforce existing prejudices.

<h4>Any attempt to put linguistic analysis as a voting issue through a process of decision-making <u>destroys politics</u> and allows militarism to <u>continue unfettered oppressive practices against the marginalized</h4><p><strong>Schram 95</p><p></u></strong>Schram, Bryn Mawr College social theory and policy professor, 1995 (Sanford F. The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty, pg 20-26, ldg)</p><p><u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>Renaming points to the profoundly political character of labels. Labels operate as sources of power that serve to frame identities and interests. They predispose actors to treat the subjects in question in certain ways, whether they are street people or social policies. <u>This increasingly common strategy, however, overlooks at least three major pitfalls to the politics of renaming."</u> Each reflects a failure to appreciate language's inability to say all that is meant by any act of signification. <u>First, many <mark>renamings</mark> <mark>are</mark> <mark>part of a politics of euphemisms</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>conspires to legitimate</mark> <mark>things</mark> in ways consonant <mark>with hegemonic discourse.</mark> This is done by stressing what is consistent and de-emphasizing what is inconsistent with prevailing discourse</u>. When welfare advocates urge the nation to invest in its most important economic resource, its children, they are seeking to recharacterize efforts on behalf of poor families as critical for the country's international economic success in a way that is entirely consonant with the economistic biases of the dominant order. <u>They are also distracting the economic-minded from the social democratic politics that such policy changes represent." <mark>This is a slippery politics best pursued with attention to how such renamings may reinforce entrenched institutional practices</u></mark>." Yet Walter Truett Anderson's characterization of what happened to the "cultural revolution" of the 1960s has relevance here: <u>One reason it is so hard to tell when true cultural revolutions have occurred is that societies are terribly good at co-opting their opponents; something that starts out to destroy the prevailing social construction of reality ends up being a part of it</u>. Culture and counterculture overlap and merge in countless ways. And the hostility, toward established social constructions of reality that produced strikingly new movements and behaviors in the early decades of this century, and peaked in the 1960s, is now a familiar part of the cultural scene. <u><mark>Destruction itself becomes institutionalized</mark>." According to Jeffrey Goldfarb, cynicism has lost its critical edge and has become the common denominator of the very society that cynical criticism sought to debu</u>nk .21 <u>If this is the case, <strong><mark>politically crafted characterizations can easily get co-opted by a cynical society</strong></mark> that already anticipates the political character of such selective renamings</u>. <u><strong><mark>The politics of renaming itself gets interpreted as a form of cynicism that uses renamings in a disingenuous fashion in order to achieve political ends.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Renaming not only loses credibility but also corrupts the terms used.</mark> This danger is ever present, given the limits of language</u>. <u>Because all terms are partial and incomplete characterizations, every new term can be invalidated as not capturing all that needs to be said about any topic</u>. <u><mark>With time, the odds increase that a new term will lose its potency</mark> as it fails to emphasize neglected dimensions of a problem</u>. As newer concerns replace the ones that helped inspire the terminological shift, newer terms will be introduced to ad- dress what has been neglected. <u>Where disabled was once an improvement over handicapped, other terms are now deployed to make society inclusive of all people, however differentially situated. The "disabled" are now "physically challenged" or "mentally challenged?' </u>The politics of renaming promotes higher and higher levels of neutralizing language." Yet a neutralized language is itself already a partial reading even if it is only implicitly biased in favor of some attributes over others. Neutrality is always relative to the prevailing context As the context changes, what was once neutral becomes seen as biased. Implicit moves of emphasis and de-emphasis become more visible in a new light. "Physically" and "mentally challenged" already begin to look insufficiently affirmative as efforts intensify to include people with such attributes in all avenues of contemporary life.24 Not just terms risk being corrupted by a politics of renaming. <u>Proponents of a politics of renaming risk their personal credibility as well. Proponents of a politics of renaming often pose a double bind for their audiences</u>. The politics of renaming often seeks to highlight sameness and difference si-multaneously.25 <u>It calls for stressing the special needs of the group while at the same time denying that the group has needs different from those of anyone</u> else. Whether it is women, people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled, or even "the homeless:' renaming seeks to both affirm and deny difference. <u>This can be legitimate, but it is surely almost always bound to be difficult. </u>Women can have special needs, such as during pregnancy, that make it unfair to hold them to male standards; however, once those different circumstances are taken into account, it becomes inappropriate to assume that men and women are fundamentally different in socially significant ways .21 Yet emphasizing special work arrangements for women, such as paid maternity leave, may reinforce sexist stereotyping that dooms women to inferior positions in the labor force. Under these circumstances, advocates of particular renamings can easily be accused of paralyzing their audience and immobilizing potential sup- porters. <u>Insisting that people use terms that imply sameness and difference simultaneously is a good way to ensure such terms do not get used.</u> <u>This encourages the complaint that proponents of new terms are less interested in meeting people's needs than in demonstrating who is more sophisticated and sensitive</u>. <u>Others turn away, asking why they cannot still be involved in trying to right wrongs even if they cannot correct their use of terminology," Right-minded, if wrong-worded, people fear being labeled as the enemy; important allies are lost on the high ground of linguistic purity</u>. <u><strong><mark>Euphemisms </mark>also <mark>encourage self-censorship.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>The politics of renaming discourages its proponents from being able to respond to inconvenient information</mark> inconsistent with the operative euphemism. <mark>Yet those who oppose it are free to dominate interpretations of the inconvenient facts. This is bad politics</u></mark>. Rather than suppressing stories about the poor, for instance, it would be much better to promote actively as many intelligent interpretations as possible. <u>The politics of renaming overlooks that life may be more complicated than attempts to regulate the categories of analysis</u>. Take, for instance, the curious negative example of "culture?' Some scholars have been quite insistent that it is almost always incorrect to speak about culture as a factor in explaining poverty, especially among African Americans .211 Whereas some might suggest that attempts to discourage examining cultural differences, say in family structure, are a form of self-censorship, others might want to argue that it is just clearheaded, informed analysis that deemphasizes culture's relationship to poverty.29 Still others suggest that the question of what should or should not be discussed cannot be divorced from the fact that when blacks talk publicly in this country it is always in a racist society that uses their words to reinforce their subordination. Open disagreement among African Americans will be exploited by whites to delegitimate any challenges to racism and to affirm the idea that black marginalization is self-generated.3° Emphasizing cultural differences between blacks and whites and exposing internal "problems" in the black community minimize how "problems" across races and structural political-economic factors, including especially the racist and sexist practices of institutionalized society, are the primary causes of poverty. Yet it is distinctly possible that although theories proclaiming a "culture of poverty" are incorrect, cultural variation itself may be an important issue in need of examination." For instance, there is much to be gained from contrasting the extended-family tradition among African Americans with the welfare system of white society, which is dedicated to reinforcing the nuclear two-parent family.32 <u>A result of self-censorship, however, is that an important subject is left to be studied by the wrong people. Although analyzing cultural differences may not tell us much about poverty and may be dangerous in a racist society, leaving it to others to study culture and poverty can be a real mistake as well. Culture in their hands almost always becomes "culture of poverty."" A politics of renaming risks reducing the discussants to only those who help reinforce existing prejudices.</p></u>

JPIC

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It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.

<h4>It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.</h4>

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1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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The aff is itself a form of exhaustion which draws out the tools of the system and redeploys them against itself, which means our suicide is not productive but destructive – that’s our argument about how recognizing the impossibility of the liberal project of autonomous rights poses a countermemory that unravels atomistic subjectivity

<h4>The aff is itself a form of exhaustion which draws out the tools of the system and redeploys them against itself, which means our suicide is not productive but destructive – that’s our argument about how recognizing the impossibility of the liberal project of autonomous rights poses a countermemory that unravels atomistic subjectivity</h4>

Fernando

O/V

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Legalize means regulation by the government – the 1AC decriminalizes

Polak 2k

Polak 2k Frederick Polak Canada: Wire: Federal Gov't Won't Appeal Marijuana Ruling Dutch: The Failure of US Drug Policy ME: Drug War Unwinnable Without Legalization Canada: Pot ruling won't be appealed Canada: First medical marijuana crop harvested DND: US MA: Editorial: Reefer Madness DND: US OR: PUB LTE: Bulletin Changes Stance DND: US ME: Judge Amends Bail To OK Marijuana Use DND: US VA: Ky. Pot Growers Lacing Va. Lands DND: US NE: State Patrol On Prowl For Marijuana Harvesters Re: L.A.P.D. neat stuff sort of bad strategy? Hemp candidate fairness REGULATION vs LEGALIZATION Sun, 1 Oct 2000 Volume 1 : Number 631 http://thc-foundation.com/restore/631.txt

Prisons are populated by unimaginable numbers of blacks and latinos, who would not have to go to prison if drugs were not illegal drug prohibition may have been initiated with good intentions, but it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health, leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption If there is one area where lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy. Take the expression 'fighting drugs'. What is called 'fighting drugs' is in reality straightforward promotion of unsafe forms of drug use and of the illegal drugs trade". My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems all of them better than the present situation ‘Legalization' is sometimes used as an invective but in reality legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market by Government' Governmental policies should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved."

prohibition may have good intentions but it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption If one area lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems all of them better than the present situation Legalization' is sometimes used as an invective but in reality legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market by Government' Governmental policies should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved."

In South and Central American countries there is much resistance against American policies towards Colombia. Developments in Canada in this field are also particularly interesting. Opposition against American prohibitionism has now reached proportions that can - to my mind - not much longer remain without political consequences. The important Canadian newspaper 'Ottawa Citizen' has this month published a series of thirteen articles by Dan Gardner about the failure of the 'war on drugs'. These articles were serialized in local newspapers all over Canada. Dan Gardner refers to Netherlands' policies with approval and respect, like, for that matter, is the case in most serious publications on this subject. Gardner gives a cool and clear description of the terrible damages caused by the war on drugs. Many Canadians have now for the first time read about the racist effects of this war. Prisons are populated by unimaginable numbers of blacks and latinos, who would not have to go to prison if drugs were not illegal. The 'inner circle' of the drugwarriors must by now have serious worries about its future. These developments are probably the reason why the U.S. - who no doubt would prefer to leave it to European countries to criticize the drug policies of its loyal ally Holland - started, in the last two years, to launch violent attacks themselves against the Dutch, via their highest drugs-official ex-general McCaffrey and via the DEA, both through the U.S. embassy in The Hague and from Washington. What is Bill Kok going to say to Bill Clinton today? Suppose he had three minutes time for this item on the agenda of the talks. I do not expect him to do it, but what he should of course say is something like this: "Dear Bill, drug prohibition may have been initiated with good intentions, but it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health, leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption. If there is one area where lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy. Take the expression 'fighting drugs'. What is called 'fighting drugs' is in reality straightforward promotion of unsafe forms of drug use and of the illegal drugs trade". What Kok should also say: "In many countries complaints become loud that rational developments in drug policy can not be implemented, because this is supposed to be contrary to the UN drug conventions, which prohibit such action. Yet the experience gained with the existence of 'coffeeshops' in the Netherlands as well as developments in cannabis use show clearly, that some basic suppositions underlying drug prohibition are wrong. We, in Holland, with our liberal policies do not have more, but fewer addicts, as our former minister of foreign affairs Van Mierlo - in his capacity as vice prime minister, so also in my name - stated clearly in his address to the UNGASS, the UN drug-summit in 1998 in New York. But we never hear you about such facts!" "Would that be because our data indicate that we need not worry so much about what would happen after legalization? Anyhow, you do attack us ever more fiercely about production of XTC in the Netherlands. As if the drug trade can be blamed exclusively on the country where production takes place. The truth is really very simple. As long as there is a strong demand for drugs, there will be production and criminalization will only make the trade more lucrative. It does not matter whether drugs come from one country or another. The point is that they should never have been made illegal." And then Wim Kok could sum up with the following remarks: "My criticism of your American approach is not just coming from my country, but can be heard - if you want to listen - in many capitals. An example: just as during the Vietnam war, resistance to your policies is now growing in countries like Canada. Have you taken note of the articles published this month in the 'Ottawa Citizen'? That paper draws a devastating picture of American drug policy. If your advisors have not drawn your attention to these articles by Dan Gardner, I would suggest you fire them immediately." "Of course there is not just one way of dealing with the drugs issue, only one way to regulate this market. My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems, all of them better than the present situation of leaving organization of this market to criminal forces. ‘Legalization' is sometimes used as an invective here, but in reality legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market by Responsible Government'. Use and abuse of drugs will increase only marginally, or even decrease. Just like now, mainly cultural trends and social developments will determine preferences for specific substances and levels of use. Governmental policies can only marginally influence these trends and preferences and should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved."

<h4><u><strong>Legalize means regulation by the government – the 1AC decriminalizes</h4><p>Polak 2k</p><p></u></strong>Frederick Polak Canada: Wire: Federal Gov't Won't Appeal Marijuana Ruling Dutch: The Failure of US Drug Policy ME: Drug War Unwinnable Without Legalization Canada: Pot ruling won't be appealed Canada: First medical marijuana crop harvested DND: US MA: Editorial: Reefer Madness DND: US OR: PUB LTE: Bulletin Changes Stance DND: US ME: Judge Amends Bail To OK Marijuana Use DND: US VA: Ky. Pot Growers Lacing Va. Lands DND: US NE: State Patrol On Prowl For Marijuana Harvesters Re: L.A.P.D. neat stuff sort of bad strategy? Hemp candidate fairness REGULATION vs LEGALIZATION Sun, 1 Oct 2000 Volume 1 : Number 631 <u>http://thc-foundation.com/restore/631.txt</p><p></u>In South and Central American countries there is much resistance against American policies towards Colombia. Developments in Canada in this field are also particularly interesting. Opposition against American prohibitionism has now reached proportions that can - to my mind - not much longer remain without political consequences. The important Canadian newspaper 'Ottawa Citizen' has this month published a series of thirteen articles by Dan Gardner about the failure of the 'war on drugs'. These articles were serialized in local newspapers all over Canada. Dan Gardner refers to Netherlands' policies with approval and respect, like, for that matter, is the case in most serious publications on this subject. Gardner gives a cool and clear description of the terrible damages caused by the war on drugs. Many Canadians have now for the first time read about the racist effects of this war. <u>Prisons are populated by unimaginable numbers of blacks and latinos, who would not have to go to prison if drugs were not illegal</u>. The 'inner circle' of the drugwarriors must by now have serious worries about its future. These developments are probably the reason why the U.S. - who no doubt would prefer to leave it to European countries to criticize the drug policies of its loyal ally Holland - started, in the last two years, to launch violent attacks themselves against the Dutch, via their highest drugs-official ex-general McCaffrey and via the DEA, both through the U.S. embassy in The Hague and from Washington. What is Bill Kok going to say to Bill Clinton today? Suppose he had three minutes time for this item on the agenda of the talks. I do not expect him to do it, but what he should of course say is something like this: "Dear Bill, <u>drug <mark>prohibition may have</mark> been initiated with <mark>good intentions</mark>, <strong><mark>but</strong></mark> <mark>it has degenerated into a policy that is damaging to public health</mark>, <mark>leading to racial discrimination and fomenting corruption</u></mark>. <u><mark>If</mark> there is <mark>one area</mark> where <mark>lies dominate the political scene it must be in drug policy</mark>. Take the expression 'fighting drugs'. What is called 'fighting drugs' is in reality straightforward promotion of unsafe forms of drug use and of the illegal drugs trade". </u>What Kok should also say: "In many countries complaints become loud that rational developments in drug policy can not be implemented, because this is supposed to be contrary to the UN drug conventions, which prohibit such action. Yet the experience gained with the existence of 'coffeeshops' in the Netherlands as well as developments in cannabis use show clearly, that some basic suppositions underlying drug prohibition are wrong. We, in Holland, with our liberal policies do not have more, but fewer addicts, as our former minister of foreign affairs Van Mierlo - in his capacity as vice prime minister, so also in my name - stated clearly in his address to the UNGASS, the UN drug-summit in 1998 in New York. But we never hear you about such facts!" "Would that be because our data indicate that we need not worry so much about what would happen after legalization? Anyhow, you do attack us ever more fiercely about production of XTC in the Netherlands. As if the drug trade can be blamed exclusively on the country where production takes place. The truth is really very simple. As long as there is a strong demand for drugs, there will be production and criminalization will only make the trade more lucrative. It does not matter whether drugs come from one country or another. The point is that they should never have been made illegal." And then Wim Kok could sum up with the following remarks: "My criticism of your American approach is not just coming from my country, but can be heard - if you want to listen - in many capitals. An example: just as during the Vietnam war, resistance to your policies is now growing in countries like Canada. Have you taken note of the articles published this month in the 'Ottawa Citizen'? That paper draws a devastating picture of American drug policy. If your advisors have not drawn your attention to these articles by Dan Gardner, I would suggest you fire them immediately." "Of course there is not just one way of dealing with the drugs issue, only one way to regulate this market. <u><strong><mark>My advisors tell me it is not difficult to conceive various systems</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>all of them better than the present situation</u></strong></mark> of leaving organization of this market to criminal forces. <u>‘<mark>Legalization' is</mark> <mark>sometimes used as an invective</u></mark> here, <u><strong><mark>but in reality</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>legalization means 'Regulation of the Drug Market</strong> <strong>by</u></strong></mark> Responsible <u><strong><mark>Government'</u></strong></mark>. Use and abuse of drugs will increase only marginally, or even decrease. Just like now, mainly cultural trends and social developments will determine preferences for specific substances and levels of use. <u><mark>Governmental policies</u></mark> can only marginally influence these trends and preferences and <u><mark>should concentrate on the promotion of responsible, controlled use and on limitation of the risks involved."</p></u></mark>

1NC

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Lindsey Van Luvanee

1AC was marijuana 1NC was politics of pain the plan pik and case 2nc was politics of pain 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was case and the pik

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No internal link between the plan text and the solvency

Schlag 90 , page lexis)

Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

normative legal thought will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it doesn't seem concerned with worldly questions about effectiveness of its own discourse It just goes along and proposes prescribes and resolves despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects legal thought remains unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics persons who are never in a position to put any of its advice into effect.

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

<h4>No internal link between the plan text and the solvency</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 90</u> </strong>(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november<u><strong>, page lexis)</p><p></u></strong>In fact, <u><mark>normative legal thought </mark>is so much in a hurry that it <mark>will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it</mark>.</u> For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? <u>Normative legal thought <mark>doesn't seem</mark> overly <mark>concerned with</mark> such <mark>worldly</mark> <mark>questions</mark> <mark>about</mark> the character and the <mark>effectiveness of its own discourse</mark>. <mark>It just goes along and proposes</mark>, recommends, <mark>prescribes</mark>, solves, <mark>and resolves</mark>. Yet <mark>despite its</mark> <mark>obvious</mark> <mark>desire</mark> <mark>to have worldly effects</mark>, worldly consequences, normative <mark>legal thought remains</mark> seemingly <mark>unconcerned that for all practical purposes,</mark> <mark>its only consumers are legal academics</u></mark> and perhaps a few law students -- <u><mark>persons who are</mark> virtually <mark>never in a position to put any of its</mark> wonderful normative <mark>advice into effect.</p></u></mark>

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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The medical system is autoimmune - accepting the pure excess of physician-assisted suicide creates fissures within it that allows for deconstruction

Hardes 13

Hardes 13 (Jennifer J. Hardes, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, “Fear, Sovereignty, and the Right to Die” January 16, 2013, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/3/1/66/htm, KB)

In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how sovereignty appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself. It necessarily posits a universal essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate its allegedly “benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves to divide us from one another, which ensures we are not a threat to the state sovereign. sovereignty appeals to other universals such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.” These are “necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and preclude the need for a “decision” that is overtly “forceful.” Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent foundations to slip by. when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order. sovereignty is entirely deconstructable right-to-die cases provide some insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility. when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself it must “exceed” itself. This excess can create openings this excess might be “autoimmune” Autoimmunity might be read as the idea that sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own potential and its own demise. sovereignty might sometimes make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this very closure. Two examples seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death First, the construction of the individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. Liberal categories such as rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law However, in granting this self-protection, liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection, where “protection” might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second , the autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving both conditionally and unconditionally Liberty an “absolute” that conditions and makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty. liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty, should not be thought only as a universal category that protects us and renders us under a sovereign order to be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly rather than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, we might think of how we can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.” autoimmunity can create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the autos or the self-sameness—the absolute sovereign. one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond this essential link to fear and murder. This democracy to come might help us think autoimmunity as the changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the closures sovereignty necessarily demands. Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.

sovereignty posits its “benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves to divide us which ensures we are not a threat sovereignty is entirely deconstructable right-to-die cases provide insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility This excess can create openings sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.

6. Conclusion: Excessive Sovereigns If sovereignty is found to be groundless, it is also excessive according to Derrida. This discussion of the performance of sovereign indivisibility illustrates the necessary relation between sovereignty and unconditionality. In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how sovereignty appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself. It necessarily posits a universal essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate its allegedly “benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. This serves, as I have argued, to continue to divide us from one another, which ensures we are not a threat to the state sovereign. In addition, sovereignty appeals to other universals such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.” These are “necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and therefore preclude the need for a “decision” that is overtly “forceful.” Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent—indeed “rogue”—foundations to slip by. Furthermore, when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order. This goes some way to explain why right-to-die cases have failed on appeal in UK law to date. All is not lost, however. As Derrida posits, sovereignty is entirely deconstructable, and, as this paper has explored, right-to-die cases provide some insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility. Arguably, when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself, which it inevitably must—as indicated by those universals expressed above—it must also “exceed” itself. This excess may be violent and destructive, yet can also create openings. Therefore, this excess might be thought as “autoimmune” [19]. Autoimmunity might be read as the idea that sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own potential and also its own demise. Thus, sovereignty might sometimes make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this very closure. Two examples seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death. First, the construction of the individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. Liberal categories such as personhood, property, and rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law (which is not universally a “bad” thing because, not only can immunization in many instances be useful, but quite often legal protection is desirable). However, in granting this self-protection, liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection, where “protection” might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second, on a broader scale, the autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving thought both conditionally and unconditionally. Liberty, like other unconditionals such as hospitality and gift-giving, is an “absolute” that conditions and thereby makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty. This materialization is only a performance as such, since liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty, therefore, should not be thought only as a universal category that protects us from the other and renders us under a sovereign order to be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly—more responsibly. In this case, rather than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, we might think of how we can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.” In short, autoimmunity can be violent and destructive, as much as it can also create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the autos or the self-sameness—the absolute sovereign. Derrida presents autoimmunity as a movement or iteration that might be better thought as a broad instance of historical patterns of shifting ways of becoming. For example, autoimmunity in this regard is understood as iterations of change, as modes of closure and openness. Like the potential creativity in destruction, autoimmunity presents opportunities for openness in such violent attempts at closure (e.g., closure of the “immunized individual” or closure in terms of the “sovereign decision”). As indicated, one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond this essential link to fear and murder. Could we consider the right to die a compassionate gift, or a gift of death? As I close this paper, I want to also create an opening of sorts by gesturing to where Derrida takes us in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign. In the eighth session, Derrida speaks of Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence being “a correlate of the power of the as such.” Moreover, transcendence, Derrida writes, is “shared in Mitsein, in the common opening to beings” ([20], p. 227). In these reflections on Heidegger, Derrida, it seems, identifies something worth retaining. This value appears to lie in the possibility of the relation between transcendence and the as such, between the unconditional being-with, and the being-in-solitude, or conditional sovereignty. In our musings over liberty, the impossible possibility of sovereignty, and the capacity to exceed and to be more open, could we imagine a variation of the Heidegerrian Mitsein-to-come? A Derridean openness to otherness? As Derrida writes, sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the process of autoimmunising itself, of betraying itself by betraying the democracy that nonetheless can never do without it ([12], p. 101). This democracy to come, the possibility of being-with, might help us think autoimmunity as the changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the closures sovereignty necessarily demands. Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.

<h4><u>The medical system is autoimmune - accepting the pure excess of physician-assisted suicide creates fissures within it that allows for deconstruction</h4><p><strong>Hardes 13</p><p></u></strong>(Jennifer J. Hardes, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, “Fear, Sovereignty, and the Right to Die” January 16, 2013, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/3/1/66/htm<u><strong>, KB)</p><p></u></strong>6. Conclusion: Excessive Sovereigns If sovereignty is found to be groundless, it is also excessive according to Derrida. This discussion of the performance of sovereign indivisibility illustrates the necessary relation between sovereignty and unconditionality. <u>In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how <mark>sovereignty</mark> appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself.</u> <u>It necessarily <mark>posits </mark>a universal essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate <mark>its</mark> allegedly <mark>“benevolent” role as a guarantor of life. <strong>This serves</u></strong></mark>, as I have argued, <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> continue to <u><strong><mark>divide us </mark>from one another, <mark>which ensures we are not a threat</mark> to the state sovereign.</u></strong> In addition, <u>sovereignty appeals to other universals such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.”</u> <u>These are “necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and</u> therefore <u>preclude the need for a “decision” that is overtly “forceful.”</u> <u><strong>Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent</u></strong>—indeed “rogue”—<u><strong>foundations to slip by.</u></strong> Furthermore, <u>when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order.</u> This goes some way to explain why right-to-die cases have failed on appeal in UK law to date. All is not lost, however. As Derrida posits, <u><strong><mark>sovereignty is entirely deconstructable</u></strong></mark>, and, as this paper has explored, <u><mark>right-to-die cases provide</mark> some <mark>insight into the shaky foundations that sustain sovereign performances of indivisibility</mark>.</u> Arguably, <u>when sovereignty must appeal to something beyond itself</u>, which it inevitably must—as indicated by those universals expressed above—<u>it must</u> also <u>“exceed” itself. <strong><mark>This excess</u></strong></mark> may be violent and destructive, yet <u><strong><mark>can</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>create openings</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, <u>this excess might be</u> thought as <u>“autoimmune”</u> [19]. <u>Autoimmunity might be read as the idea that <mark>sovereignty contains within it the conditions of</mark> its own potential and</u> also <u><mark>its own demise.</u></mark> Thus, <u>sovereignty might sometimes make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, <strong>but there always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this very closure.</u></strong> <u>Two examples seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death</u>. <u>First, the construction of the individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. Liberal categories such as</u> personhood, property, and <u>rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law </u>(which is not universally a “bad” thing because, not only can immunization in many instances be useful, but quite often legal protection is desirable). <u>However, in granting this self-protection, <strong>liberal individualism can also be the condition of its own demise.</strong> <mark>In the case where an individual needs another to help him or her die, <strong>the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection</strong></mark>, where “protection” might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second</u>, on a broader scale<u>, the autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving</u> thought <u>both conditionally and unconditionally</u>. <u>Liberty</u>, like other unconditionals such as hospitality and gift-giving, is <u>an “absolute” that conditions and</u> thereby <u>makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty.</u> This materialization is only a performance as such, since <u>liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty,</u> therefore, <u>should not be thought only as a universal category that protects us</u> from the other <u>and renders us under a sovereign order to be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly</u>—more responsibly. In this case, <u>rather than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, <strong>we might think of how we can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.”</strong> </u>In short, <u><strong>autoimmunity</u></strong> can be violent and destructive, as much as it <u><strong>can</u></strong> also <u><strong>create openness, indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the autos or the self-sameness—the absolute sovereign.</u></strong> Derrida presents autoimmunity as a movement or iteration that might be better thought as a broad instance of historical patterns of shifting ways of becoming. For example, autoimmunity in this regard is understood as iterations of change, as modes of closure and openness. Like the potential creativity in destruction, autoimmunity presents opportunities for openness in such violent attempts at closure (e.g., closure of the “immunized individual” or closure in terms of the “sovereign decision”). As indicated, <u>one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond this essential link to fear and murder.</u> Could we consider the right to die a compassionate gift, or a gift of death? As I close this paper, I want to also create an opening of sorts by gesturing to where Derrida takes us in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign. In the eighth session, Derrida speaks of Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence being “a correlate of the power of the as such.” Moreover, transcendence, Derrida writes, is “shared in Mitsein, in the common opening to beings” ([20], p. 227). In these reflections on Heidegger, Derrida, it seems, identifies something worth retaining. This value appears to lie in the possibility of the relation between transcendence and the as such, between the unconditional being-with, and the being-in-solitude, or conditional sovereignty. In our musings over liberty, the impossible possibility of sovereignty, and the capacity to exceed and to be more open, could we imagine a variation of the Heidegerrian Mitsein-to-come? A Derridean openness to otherness? As Derrida writes, sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the process of autoimmunising itself, of betraying itself by betraying the democracy that nonetheless can never do without it ([12], p. 101). <u>This democracy to come</u>, the possibility of being-with, <u>might help us think autoimmunity as the changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the closures sovereignty necessarily demands.</u> <u><strong><mark>Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving.</p></u></strong></mark>

Fernando

Suicide w/in Systems

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NYU IZ

Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Vote Negative our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making meaningful debate impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground

<h4>Vote Negative our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates making meaningful debate impossible which makes it impossible to be negative – voting issue for limits and ground</h4>

1NC

1

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1

Kansas HaRe

Lindsey Van Luvanee

1AC was marijuana 1NC was politics of pain the plan pik and case 2nc was politics of pain 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was case and the pik

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The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act

Delgado 91

Delgado 91 (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april)

Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Schlag, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. Normativity enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us.

Are we better off for engaging in normative talk Schlag described normativity as a vacuous, self-referential system form and no substance meaning nothing Normativity enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world to redefine what would make a claim on us

But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all [*954] form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. n82 This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest [*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.

<h4>The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act</h4><p><u><strong>Delgado 91</u></strong> (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april)</p><p>But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? <u><mark>Are we better off for engaging in normative talk</mark>, either as speakers or listeners?</u><strong> </strong>Pierre<strong> <u></strong><mark>Schlag</mark>, </u>for example,<u> has <mark>described</mark> <mark>normativity</mark> as a zero -- <mark>as</mark> <mark>a vacuous, self-referential system</mark> of talk, all </u>[*954] <u><mark>form</mark> <mark>and no substance</mark>, <mark>meaning nothing</mark>, and about itself. </u>n82 <u>This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.</u> 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that <u>intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. </u>n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. <u><mark>Normativity</u></mark> thus <u><mark>enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world</mark>, <mark>to</mark> tune out or <mark>redefine what would</mark> otherwise <mark>make a claim on</mark> <mark>us</mark>.</u> In the legal system, the clearest [*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.</p>

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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Affirming suicide within systems of domination exhausts the exchange-value of death – they abandon the system, we deconstruct it

Baudrillard ’93

Baudrillard ’93 (Jean, the holographic 2pac of philosophy, Symbolic Exchange and Death, SAGE Pub 1993, First Published 1976, p. 175-176) [m leap]

every death and all violence that escapes the State monopoly is subversive; it is a prefiguration of the abolition of power a piece of death and violence is snatched from the State monopoly in order to be put back into the savage, direct and symbolic reciprocity of death just as something in the poem or the artwork is retrieved from the terrorist economy of signification in order to be put back into the consumption of signs Only what is not exchanged as values, that is, sex, death, madness and violence, is fascinating, and for this reason is universally repressed Millions of war dead are exchanged as values in accordance with a general equivalence: 'dying for the fatherland' Murder, death and violation are legalised provided that they can be reconverted into value in accordance with the same process that mediatises labour Only certain deaths, certain practices, escape this convertibility; they alone are subversive suicide has taken on a different extension and definition, to the point of becoming, in the context of the offensive reversibility of death, the form of subversion itself an act of subverting institutional death and turning it against the system that imposes it: through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society in accordance with its own norms, by inverting the authorities and reinstating reversibility where it had completely disappeared, while at the same time regaining the advantage suicides become political in this sense they make an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach, since it is total defeat for a system not to be able to attain total perfection. All that is needed is that the slightest thing escapes its rationality. The prohibition of suicide coincides with the advent of the law of value. Whether religious, moral or economic, the same law states 'no-one has the right to remove any capital or value' Yet each individual is a parcel of capital and therefore has no right to destroy himself [or herself] It is against this orthodoxy of value that the suicide revolts by destroying the parcel of capital he [or she] has at his [or her] disposal It is therefore symptomatic that suicide increases in a society saturated by the law of value, as a challenge to its fundamental rule all subversion of and resistance to this system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal. Those actions at least that strike at its vitals. For the majority of so-called 'political' or 'revolutionary' practices are content to exchange their survival with the system, that is, to convert their death into cash. There are rarely suicides that stand against the controlled production and exchange of death, against the exchange-value of death not its use-value but its value as rupture, contagious dissolution and negation. Also suicidal are all political practices (demos, disorder, provocation, etc.) whose objective is to arouse repression, the 'repressive nature of the system', not as a secondary consequence, but as the immediacy of death: the game of death unmasks the system's own function of death The order has possession of death, but it cannot play it out – only those who set death playing against itself win

every death that escapes the State monopoly is subversive a prefiguration of the abolition of power a piece of death is snatched from the State monopoly in order to be put back into the symbolic reciprocity of death just as something in the poem is retrieved from the terrorist economy of signification death are legalised provided they can be reconverted into value in accordance with the same process that mediatises labour suicide an act of subverting institutional death and turning it against the system that imposes it: through suicide, the individual condemns society in accordance with its own norms, by reinstating reversibility where it had completely disappeared it is total defeat for a system not to be able to attain total perfection. The prohibition of suicide coincides with the advent of the law of value. It is against this orthodoxy of value that the suicide revolts by destroying the parcel of capital he [or she] has at his [or her] disposal suicide increases in a society saturated by the law of value, as a challenge to its fundamental rule Those actions strike at its vitals. the game of death unmasks the system's own function of death

This is why every death and all violence that escapes the State monopoly is subversive; it is a prefiguration of the abolition of power. Hence the fascination wielded by great murderers, bandits or outlaws, which is in fact closely akin to that associated with works of art: a piece of death and violence is snatched from the State monopoly in order to be put back into the savage, direct and symbolic reciprocity of death, just as something in feasting and expenditure is retrieved from the economic in order to be put back into useless and sacrificial exchange, and just as something in the poem or the artwork is retrieved from the terrorist economy of signification in order to be put back into the consumption of signs. This alone is what is fascinating in our system. Only what is not exchanged as values, that is, sex, death, madness and violence, is fascinating, and for this reason is universally repressed. Millions of war dead are exchanged as values in accordance with a general equivalence: 'dying for the fatherland'; we might say they can be converted into gold, the world has not lost them altogether. Murder, death and violation are legalised everywhere, if not legal, provided that they can be reconverted into value in accordance with the same process that mediatises labour. Only certain deaths, certain practices, escape this convertibility; they alone are subversive, but do not often make the headlines. Amongst these is suicide, which in our societies has taken on a different extension and definition, to the point of becoming, in the context of the offensive reversibility of death, the form of subversion itself. While there are fewer and fewer executions, more and more commit suicide in prison, an act of subverting [detournement] institutional death and turning it against the system that imposes it: through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society in accordance with its own norms, by inverting the authorities and reinstating reversibility where it had completely disappeared, while at the same time regaining the advantage. Even suicides outside prison become political in this sense (hari-kiri by fire is only the most spectacular form of this): they make an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach, since it is total defeat for a system not to be able to attain total perfection. All that is needed is that the slightest thing escapes its rationality. The prohibition of suicide coincides with the advent of the law of value. Whether religious, moral or economic, the same law states 'no-one has the right to remove any capital or value' Yet each individual is a parcel of capital (just as every Christian is a soul to be saved), and therefore has no right to destroy himself [or herself]. It is against this orthodoxy of value that the suicide revolts by destroying the parcel of capital he [or she] has at his [or her] disposal. This is unpardonable: we will go so far as to hang the suicide for having succeeded. It is therefore symptomatic that suicide increases in a society saturated by the law of value, as a challenge to its fundamental rule. But we must also take another look at its definition: if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, all subversion of and resistance to this system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal. Those actions at least that strike at its vitals. For the majority of so-called 'political' or 'revolutionary' practices are content to exchange their survival with the system, that is, to convert their death into cash. There are rarely suicides that stand against the controlled production and exchange of death, against the exchange-value of death; not its use-value (for death is perhaps the only thing that has no use-value, which can never be referred back to need, and so can unquestionably be turned into a weapon) but its value as rupture, contagious dissolution and negation. The Palestinians or the rebellious Blacks setting fire to their own district become suicidal, as is resistance to the security forces in all its forms, as are the neurotic behaviour and multiple breakdowns by which we challenge the system's capacity to ever fully integrate us. Also suicidal are all political practices (demos, disorder, provocation, etc.) whose objective is to arouse repression, the 'repressive nature of the system', not as a secondary consequence, but as the immediacy of death: the game of death unmasks the system's own function of death. The order has possession of death, but it cannot play it out – only those who set death playing against itself win.

<h4>Affirming suicide within systems of domination exhausts the exchange-value of death – they abandon the system, we deconstruct it</h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard ’93 </u></strong>(Jean, the holographic 2pac of philosophy, Symbolic Exchange and Death, SAGE Pub 1993, First Published 1976, p. 175-176<u>) [m leap]</p><p></u>This is why <u><strong><mark>every death</mark> and all violence <mark>that escapes the State monopoly is subversive</strong></mark>; it is <mark>a prefiguration of the <strong>abolition of power</u></strong></mark>. Hence the fascination wielded by great murderers, bandits or outlaws, which is in fact closely akin to that associated with works of art: <u><strong><mark>a piece of death</mark> and violence <mark>is snatched from the State monopoly in order to be put back into the</mark> savage, direct and <mark>symbolic reciprocity of death</u></strong></mark>, just as something in feasting and expenditure is retrieved from the economic in order to be put back into useless and sacrificial exchange, and <u><mark>just as something in the poem</mark> or the artwork <mark>is retrieved from the terrorist economy of signification</mark> in order to be put back into the consumption of signs</u>. This alone is what is fascinating in our system. <u>Only <strong>what is not exchanged as values</strong>, that is, sex, death, madness and violence, is fascinating, and for this reason is <strong>universally repressed</u></strong>. <u>Millions of war dead are exchanged as values in accordance with a general equivalence: 'dying for the fatherland'</u>; we might say they can be converted into gold, the world has not lost them altogether. <u>Murder, <mark>death</mark> and violation <mark>are legalised</u></mark> everywhere, if not legal, <u><mark>provided</mark> that <mark>they can be <strong>reconverted into value in accordance with the same process that mediatises labour</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Only certain deaths, certain practices, escape this convertibility; they alone are subversive</u></strong>, but do not often make the headlines. Amongst these is <u><strong><mark>suicide</u></strong></mark>, which in our societies <u>has taken on a different extension and definition, to the point of <strong>becoming, in the context of the offensive reversibility of death, the form of subversion itself</u></strong>. While there are fewer and fewer executions, more and more commit suicide in prison, <u><strong><mark>an act of subverting</u></strong></mark> [detournement] <u><strong><mark>institutional death and turning it against the system that imposes it:</u></strong> <u><strong>through suicide, the individual</mark> tries and <mark>condemns society in accordance with its own norms, by</mark> inverting the authorities and <mark>reinstating reversibility where it had completely disappeared</mark>, while at the same time regaining the advantage</u></strong>. Even <u>suicides</u> outside prison <u>become political in this sense</u> (hari-kiri by fire is only the most spectacular form of this): <u>they make an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach, <strong>since <mark>it is total defeat for a system not to be able to attain total perfection.</mark> All that is needed is that the slightest thing escapes its rationality</strong>. <strong><mark>The prohibition of suicide coincides with the advent of the law of value.</mark> </strong>Whether religious, moral or economic, the same law states 'no-one has the right to remove any capital or value' Yet each individual is a parcel of capital</u> (just as every Christian is a soul to be saved), <u>and therefore has no right to destroy himself [or herself]</u>. <u><strong><mark>It is against this orthodoxy of value that the suicide revolts by destroying the parcel of capital he [or she] has at his [or her] disposal</u></strong></mark>. This is unpardonable: we will go so far as to hang the suicide for having succeeded. <u><strong>It is therefore symptomatic that <mark>suicide increases in a society saturated by the law of value, as a challenge to its fundamental rule</u></strong></mark>. But we must also take another look at its definition: if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, <u>all subversion of and resistance to this system is reciprocally, by its very nature, <strong>suicidal</strong>. <mark>Those actions</mark> at least that <strong><mark>strike at its vitals.</strong></mark> For the majority of so-called 'political' or 'revolutionary' practices are content to <strong>exchange their survival with the system, </strong>that is, <strong>to convert their death into cash</strong>. There are rarely suicides that stand <strong>against the controlled production and exchange of death</strong>, <strong>against the exchange-value of death</u></strong>; <u>not its use-value </u>(for death is perhaps the only thing that has no use-value, which can never be referred back to need, and so can unquestionably be turned into a weapon) <u>but</u> <u><strong>its value as rupture, contagious dissolution and negation. </u></strong>The Palestinians or the rebellious Blacks setting fire to their own district become suicidal, as is resistance to the security forces in all its forms, as are the neurotic behaviour and multiple breakdowns by which we challenge the system's capacity to ever fully integrate us. <u>Also suicidal are all political practices (demos, disorder, provocation, etc.) whose objective is to arouse repression, the 'repressive nature of the system', <strong>not as a secondary consequence, but as the immediacy of death:</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the game of death unmasks the system's own function of death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The order has possession of death, but it cannot play it out – only those who set death playing against itself win</u></strong>.</p>

Fernando

Suicide w/in Systems

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Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Next off is the politics of pain

<h4>Next off is the politics of pain</h4>

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Lindsey Van Luvanee

1AC was marijuana 1NC was politics of pain the plan pik and case 2nc was politics of pain 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was case and the pik

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The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis

Schlag 90

Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

normative legal thought takes place in a field of pain and death normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have to the field of pain and death. normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices

normative legal thought takes place in a field of pain and death playing language games utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays uninterested in considering its own normative thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing pain What is missing is any serious questioning of the routine of normative thought have to the field of pain and death the pattern of the bureaucratic distribution of pain and the death the normative appeal turns us away from recognizing that thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate normative legal thought rather than assisting stands in the way.

All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.

<h4>The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 90</u> </strong>(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)</p><p>All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this <u><mark>normative legal thought</u></mark>, as Robert Cover explained,<u> <mark>takes place in a field of pain and death</u></mark>. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, <u>normative legal thought is <mark>playing language games</mark> -- <mark>utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays</mark>, and thus, utterly <mark>uninterested in considering its own</mark> rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death.</u> <u>To be sure, <mark>normative</mark> legal <mark>thinkers are often genuinely concerned with</mark> <mark>reducing</mark> the <mark>pain</mark> and the death</u>. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. <u><mark>What is missing</mark> in normative legal thought <mark>is any serious questioning</mark>, let alone tracing, <mark>of</mark> the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, <mark>the routine of normative </mark>legal <mark>thought have</u></mark> (or do not have) <u><mark>to the field of pain and death</mark>.</u> And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that <u>normative legal thought is <mark>the pattern</mark>, is the operation <mark>of the bureaucratic distribution</mark> and the institutional allocation <mark>of</mark> the <mark>pain</mark> <mark>and the death</mark>.</u> n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that <u><mark>the normative appeal </mark>of normative legal thought systematically <mark>turns us away from recognizing that</mark> normative legal <mark>thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate</mark>. The problem for us is that <mark>normative legal thought</mark>, <mark>rather than assisting</mark> in the understanding of present political and moral situations, <mark>stands in the way.</mark> It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. </u>n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation,<strong> <u></strong>it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices</u> -- academic and otherwise.</p>

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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We are all fated for death, but how we reach it point matters. There is a big difference between the indifference as passivity and positive indifference which draws the system out. Our genealogy is not resistance, but a tracing out of the system which allows us to meet our fate with a positive indifference that causes the system to collapse.

Ashley Woodward. “Was Baudrillard A Nihilist?” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies 5.1 (January 2008).

Baudrillard sees a dis-intensified, “cold” or “ludic” seduction as the dynamic force which underlies capitalist exchange [w]ith a vague collusion between supply and demand, seduction becomes nothing more than an exchange value, serving the circulation of exchanges and the lubrication of social relations. What remains of the enchantment within which one could lose oneself “cold” seduction is seduction reduced to that distance required for simulated systems to operate Cold seduction is reduced to the function of lubricating the economic and social relations which ensure the smooth operation of the capitalist system it is seduction reduced to the playfulness of the capitalist system in which nothing is really at stake

Baudrillard sees a dis-intensified, “cold” seduction as the dynamic force which underlies capitalist exchange seduction becomes nothing more than an exchange value, serving the circulation of exchanges and the lubrication of social relations. What remains of the enchantment within which one could lose oneself? cold” seduction is reduced to distance required for simulated systems to operate lubricating the economic and social relations which ensure the smooth operation of the capitalist system reduced to the playfulness of the capitalist system in which nothing is really at stake

This pessimistic hypothesis, which we might identify as another moment of passive nihilism in Baudrillard’s thought, is well illustrated in his brief reflections on the fate of seduction in the capitalist system. In Seduction, he sees a dis-intensified, “cold” or “ludic” seduction as the dynamic force which underlies capitalist exchange. He writes that: [w]ith a vague collusion between supply and demand, seduction becomes nothing more than an exchange value, serving the circulation of exchanges and the lubrication of social relations. What remains of the enchantment of that labyrinthine structure within which one could lose oneself? In effect, “cold” seduction is seduction reduced to that distance which is required for simulated systems to operate. Baudrillard understands this form of seduction as involving a maximal diffusion throughout the system and a minimal intensity of seductive effects. Cold seduction operates according to the same principle of reversibility and challenge accorded to seduction in general, but is reduced to the function of lubricating the economic and social relations which ensure the smooth operation of the capitalist system. Baudrillard calls this form of seduction “ludic,” since it is seduction reduced to the playfulness of the capitalist system in which nothing is really at stake (since all moves in the economic game consolidate the strength of the system of exchange itself).

<h4>We are all fated for death, but how we reach it point matters. There is a big difference between the indifference as passivity and positive indifference which draws the system out. Our genealogy is not resistance, but a tracing out of the system which allows us to meet our fate with a positive indifference that causes the system to collapse. </h4><p>Ashley <u>Woodward</u>. “Was Baudrillard A Nihilist?” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies 5.1 (January 20<u>08</u>).</p><p>This pessimistic hypothesis, which we might identify as another moment of passive nihilism in <u><mark>Baudrillard</u></mark>’s thought, is well illustrated in his brief reflections on the fate of seduction in the capitalist system. In Seduction, he <u><mark>sees a dis-intensified, “cold”</mark> or “ludic” <mark>seduction as the dynamic force which underlies capitalist exchange</u></mark>. He writes that:</p><p><u>[w]ith a vague collusion between supply and demand, <mark>seduction becomes nothing more than an exchange value, serving the circulation of exchanges and the lubrication of social relations. What remains of the enchantment</u></mark> of that labyrinthine structure <u><mark>within which one could lose oneself</u>?</p><p></mark>In effect, <u>“<mark>cold” seduction is </mark>seduction <mark>reduced to </mark>that <mark>distance</u></mark> which is <u><mark>required for simulated systems to operate</u></mark>. Baudrillard understands this form of seduction as involving a maximal diffusion throughout the system and a minimal intensity of seductive effects. <u>Cold seduction</u> operates according to the same principle of reversibility and challenge accorded to seduction in general, but <u>is reduced to the function of <strong><mark>lubricating the economic and social relations which ensure the smooth operation of the capitalist system</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard calls this form of seduction “ludic,” since <u>it is seduction <mark>reduced to the playfulness of the capitalist system in which nothing is really at stake</u></mark> (since all moves in the economic game consolidate the strength of the system of exchange itself).</p>

Fernando

Genealogy

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NDT

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NYU IZ

Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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Modernity’s symbolic ordering of death is sovereign control reinforced through legal discourses – the 9-0 decision in Washington v. Glucksberg demonstrated the state’s power to regulate death, allowing the politicization of death where life has no juridical value

Parry 5

Parry 5

Death is no longer something that just happens. Rather it is a process, planned in advance and monitored and controlled by lawyers, doctors, family members, legislatures, government officials in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected a claimed right to assisted suicide, In the companion case the Court determined that rational legislators could distinguish between acts that directly cause death and acts that merely allow death to happen The message is that state governments have significant latitude to regulate the end of life. Individuals can make their own choices through such things as living wills, but are not exceptions to state control. Rather, they are processes that are approved and regulated by the state for our benefit. the phenomenon that merits attention is the increasing medicalization, bureaucratization, and politicization of death, to which law responds in a way that only confirms these developments. , Agamben describes how “the concept ‘death,’ oscillates from one pole to the other with the greatest indeterminacy Agamben’s claim that “the sovereignty of the living man over his own life [through a legal right to take one’s own life] has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide.”

Death no longer just happens it ¶ is a process monitored and controlled by lawyers, ¶ doctors , government officials in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected a claimed right to assisted ¶ suicide, In the companion case the Court ¶ determined that rational legislators could distinguish between acts that ¶ cause death and acts that allow death The message state governments have significant latitude to regulate the end of life. living wills are not exceptions to ¶ state control. they are processes that are approved and regulated by the ¶ state for our benefit. the phenomenon that merits attention ¶ is the increasing medicalization, bureaucratization, and politicization of death, ¶ to which law responds in a way that only confirms these developments. Agamben describes how death oscillates with the greatest indeterminacy the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a ¶ threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can be killed without the commission of a homicide.”

John T., Visiting Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; Associate Professor, University of ¶ Pittsburgh School of Law, ““SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]”: BIOPOLITICS AND THE ¶ COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH,” Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 9:4, p. 853-877 SJE A final way of getting at the heart of constitutional biopolitics and the ¶ inefficacy of resistance to it based on ideas of federalism and individual rights ¶ is to go one step beyond the regulation of pain medication to the regulation of ¶ end of life decisions. Death is no longer something that just happens. Rather it ¶ is a process, planned in advance and monitored and controlled by lawyers, ¶ doctors, family members, legislatures, government officials, and the person ¶ who is dying. It is the concern, in short, of biopolitics. ¶ The Supreme Court has heard three cases, so far, dealing with the right to ¶ refuse medical treatment and assertions of a right to control one’s own death. In ¶ Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court assumed there is ¶ a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, even when refusal would lead ¶ to death—but it also allowed states to mandate a clear and convincing evidence ¶ standard to ensure that a purported desire to refuse treatment is “real.”85 Then, ¶ in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected a claimed right to assisted ¶ suicide, but a majority also hinted that terminally ill people who are in great ¶ pain have a right to use pain-killing medication even if such medication would ¶ hasten the end of life.86 In the companion case of Vacco v. Quill, the Court ¶ determined that rational legislators could distinguish between acts that directly ¶ cause death (such as assisted suicide) and acts that merely allow death to ¶ happen (such as withdrawing life support).87 The message of all three cases is ¶ that state governments have significant latitude to regulate the end of life. ¶ Individuals can make their own choices through such things as living wills, but ¶ preparing, recognizing, and implementing a living will are not exceptions to ¶ state control. Rather, they are processes that are approved and regulated by the ¶ state for our benefit. ¶ Yet my narrative here is not really about the law of suicide, assisted ¶ suicide, and refusal of treatment. Rather, the phenomenon that merits attention ¶ is the increasing medicalization, bureaucratization, and politicization of death, ¶ to which law responds in a way that only confirms these developments. Dying, ¶ that is, becomes articulated as a right and a litigation issue at the same time that ¶ the definition of life and death becomes medically complex and a topic of ¶ intense political concern. ¶ Thus, Agamben describes how “the concept ‘death,’ far from having ¶ become more exact, now oscillates from one pole to the other with the greatest indeterminacy.” This description played out last spring in the controversy ¶ over the eventual death of Terri Schiavo. But for medical intervention, she ¶ would have died long before, and the issue was whether medical personnel ¶ could withdraw food and hydration and whether anyone else would be allowed ¶ to provide it. The questions of whether Schiavo was already “dead,” or as good ¶ as dead, or whether, if she was still “alive,” her life was worth living, were ¶ debated around the country. Her last days give weight to Agamben’s claim that ¶ “the sovereignty of the living man over his own life [through a legal right to ¶ take one’s own life] has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a ¶ threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, ¶ therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide.”

<h4><strong>Modernity’s symbolic ordering of death is sovereign control reinforced through legal discourses – the 9-0 decision in Washington v. Glucksberg demonstrated the state’s power to regulate death, allowing the politicization of death where life has no juridical value</h4><p>Parry 5</p><p></strong>John T., Visiting Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; Associate Professor, University of ¶ Pittsburgh School of Law, ““SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]”: BIOPOLITICS AND THE ¶ COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH,” Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 9:4, p. 853-877 SJE</p><p><u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>A final way of getting at the heart of constitutional biopolitics and the ¶ inefficacy of resistance to it based on ideas of federalism and individual rights ¶ is to go one step beyond the regulation of pain medication to the regulation of ¶ end of life decisions. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is <mark>no longer</mark> something that <mark>just happens</mark>. Rather <mark>it </u></strong>¶<u><strong> is a process</mark>, planned in advance and <mark>monitored and controlled by lawyers, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> doctors</mark>, family members, legislatures<mark>, government officials</u></strong></mark>, and the person ¶ who is dying. It is the concern, in short, of biopolitics. ¶ The Supreme Court has heard three cases, so far, dealing with the right to ¶ refuse medical treatment and assertions of a right to control one’s own death. In ¶ Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court assumed there is ¶ a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, even when refusal would lead ¶ to death—but it also allowed states to mandate a clear and convincing evidence ¶ standard to ensure that a purported desire to refuse treatment is “real.”85 Then, ¶ <u><strong><mark>in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected a claimed right to assisted </u></strong>¶<u><strong> suicide,</u></strong></mark> but a majority also hinted that terminally ill people who are in great ¶ pain have a right to use pain-killing medication even if such medication would ¶ hasten the end of life.86 <u><strong><mark>In the companion case</u></strong></mark> of Vacco v. Quill, <u><strong><mark>the Court </u></strong>¶<u><strong> determined that rational legislators could distinguish between acts that </mark>directly </u></strong><mark>¶<u><strong> cause death</u></strong></mark> (such as assisted suicide) <u><strong><mark>and acts that</mark> merely <mark>allow death</mark> to </u></strong>¶<u><strong> happen</u></strong> (such as withdrawing life support).87 <u><strong><mark>The message</u></strong></mark> of all three cases <u><strong>is </u></strong>¶<u><strong> that <mark>state governments have significant latitude to regulate the end of life.</u></strong></mark> ¶ <u><strong>Individuals can make their own choices through such things as <mark>living wills</mark>, but</u></strong> ¶ preparing, recognizing, and implementing a living will <u><strong><mark>are not</mark> <mark>exceptions to </u></strong>¶<u><strong> state control.</mark> Rather, <mark>they are processes that are approved and regulated by the </u></strong>¶<u><strong> state for our benefit.</u></strong></mark> ¶ Yet my narrative here is not really about the law of suicide, assisted ¶ suicide, and refusal of treatment. Rather, <u><strong><mark>the phenomenon that merits attention </u></strong>¶<u><strong> is the increasing medicalization, bureaucratization, and politicization of death, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> to which law responds in a way that only confirms these developments.</u></strong></mark> Dying, ¶ that is, becomes articulated as a right and a litigation issue at the same time that ¶ the definition of life and death becomes medically complex and a topic of ¶ intense political concern. ¶ Thus<u><strong>, <mark>Agamben describes how</mark> “the concept ‘<mark>death</mark>,’</u></strong> far from having ¶ become more exact, now <u><strong><mark>oscillates</mark> from one pole to the other <mark>with the greatest indeterminacy</u></strong></mark>.” This description played out last spring in the controversy ¶ over the eventual death of Terri Schiavo. But for medical intervention, she ¶ would have died long before, and the issue was whether medical personnel ¶ could withdraw food and hydration and whether anyone else would be allowed ¶ to provide it. The questions of whether Schiavo was already “dead,” or as good ¶ as dead, or whether, if she was still “alive,” her life was worth living, were ¶ debated around the country. Her last days give weight to <u><strong>Agamben’s claim that </u></strong>¶<u><strong> “<mark>the sovereignty of the living man over his own life</mark> [through a legal right to </u></strong>¶<u><strong> take one’s own life] <mark>has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a </u></strong>¶<u><strong> threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can</mark>, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> therefore, <mark>be killed without the commission of a homicide.”</p></u></strong></mark>

1AC

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UCO HF

Hingtsman

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It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.

<h4>It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.</h4>

1NC

Off

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ASU ChRa

Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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Aff not autonomy – recognition we’re all destined for death, that’s the arg about the paradox of liberal project of rights

<h4>Aff not autonomy – recognition we’re all destined for death, that’s the arg about the paradox of liberal project of rights</h4>

Fernando

AT: Svendson

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx

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NYU IZ

Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

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The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process rips out the vocal chords of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped

Spivak 88

Spivak 88 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp)

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity Let us now move to consider the margins the silent, silenced center the lowest strata According to Foucault and Deleuze the oppressed, if given the chance can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

radical criticism coming out of the West is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject inaugurates a Subject This subject sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the Power and Desire that would inhabit the subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could occupy its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow The clearest example is the remotely orchestrated heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is the obliteration of the trace of that Other We must now confront the following question can the subaltern speak?

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

<h4>The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process rips out the vocal chords of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped</h4><p><u><strong>Spivak 88</u></strong> (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp)</p><p><u>SOME OF THE most <mark>radical criticism coming out of the West</mark> today <mark>is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while</mark> often <mark>providing a cover for this subject of knowledge</u></mark>. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, <u><mark>this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The</u></mark> much publicized <u><mark>critique of the sovereign subject</mark> thus actually <mark>inaugurates a Subject</mark>. . . . <mark>This</mark> S/<mark>subject</mark>, curiously <mark>sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side</mark> of the international division of labor. <mark>It is impossible for contemporary</u></mark> French <u><mark>intellectuals to imagine the</mark> kind of <mark>Power and Desire that would inhabit the</mark> unnamed <mark>subject of the Other</u></mark> of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, <u><mark>in the constitution of that Other</mark> of Europe, <mark>great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could</mark> cathect, could <mark>occupy</mark> (invest?) <mark>its itinerary</u></mark> — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that <u><mark>the intellectual is complicit in the</mark> persistent <mark>constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow</mark>, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. <mark>The clearest</mark> available <mark>example </mark>of such epistemic violence <mark>is the remotely orchestrated</mark>, fareflung, and <mark>heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other</u></mark>. <u><mark>This project is</mark> also <mark>the</mark> asymetrical <mark>obliteration of the trace of that Other</mark> in its precarious Subjectivity</u>. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . <u>Let us now move to consider the margins</u> (one can just as well say <u>the silent, silenced center</u>) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, <u>the lowest strata</u> of the urban subproletariat. <u>According to Foucault and Deleuze</u> (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) <u>the oppressed, if given the chance</u> (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) <u>can speak and know their conditions. <mark>We must now confront the following question</mark>: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, <mark>can the subaltern speak?</mark> . . . </p></u>

1NC

3

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Kansas HaRe

Lindsey Van Luvanee

1AC was marijuana 1NC was politics of pain the plan pik and case 2nc was politics of pain 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was case and the pik

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The Glucksberg decision provided the foundation for forced life that takes place through death control, creating a community around a state interest in preserving life

Hanafin 9

, KB) The liberal social compact is built on the desire to survive. In this schema man looks constantly ahead to the moment of his death and his legacy. This becomes the be all and end all of life in the shadow of death. it becomes the foundation of the modern liberal order with the creation of the social contract as a means of survival, as a temporary immunity from death The legal regulation of choosing how one dies reveals that the individual’s power to decide how she lives or dies is ignored at best or curbed at worst. The power to decide is taken from the individual in the name of an abstract notion of Life. This is part of a wider management of individual lives or what Baudrillard has termed ‘death control’. In this paradigm what we witness is a forced ‘life for life’s sake’ agony prolonged at all costs the decision is withdrawn from them ‘you shall not die’, not in any old way, anyhow With the exception of a very small number of states the western legal tradition does not condone a right to die using either in the form of voluntary euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide many states allow an individual to make a living will or advance directive, which permits the withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration in the event that the person ever finds herself or himself in a persistent vegetative The Chief Justice delivered two opinions for the Court in June 1997 overruling both the Second and Ninth Circuits’ decisions. Within the judgment the law attempts to summon forth a living figure and refuses to see the dying or dead figures before it. Rehnquist commences his observations in Washington v Glucksberg and evinces the law’s failure to recognise those who would wish to die otherwise than in the legally sanctioned way: our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology we have not retreated from this prohibition. we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every state In this passage, the Chief Justice creates the illusion that there is a uniform view on thiscontested ethical issue. This, however, does not give due consideration to the severa lcontradictory views and practises which coexist. He is interpreting the Constitution in a manner which would give the appearance of unity. The language of Rehnquist posits a particular societal model based on immunity and survival. what is valued most of all is a totalising transcendent being in common of community. This relation is built into the law’s normative framework This may explain how an inalienable right to life is undone when the body politic needs to defend itself or one of its citizens against transgression. This relation to death can be seen as looking to the enforcement of law and exclusion of mere or embodied life. The type of politics implicit in this approach involves discovering the implicit identity of a nation and setting it to work. This conception of politics relies upon and follows from the conception of community as immanent identity. Rehnquist creates the textual illusion of a united homogeneous community. he creates the textual boundaries which enclose the citizen in the state. the law can be seen as a stabilising instrument, a means of suspending in abstract ghostly form identifiable citizens who are simultaneously citizens with an identity. the text of law creates a symbolic unity where none exists in order to secure the state in its territorial and textual space. This illusory wholeness is permanently under siege in the paranoiac discourse of the state and of law. Rehnquist’s exclusion of physician-assisted suicide from the domain of rights might be explained by his regarding such deaths as an instance of worklessness. such deaths add nothing to the survival of his imagined community. They are pure excess, deaths which do not sublate into building community. ironically, state executions and killing in time of war are approved of because they appear to uphold the integrity of the community. They maintain societal solidarity, binding it together against the intruder. what is eclipsed is the actual choice facing the individual who goes before the Court to obtain recognition of his desire to die with dignity. This process is the sedimentation of an ethos into corporeal sensibilities’ the individual’s plea goes unheard.

The liberal social compact is built on the desire to survive. it becomes the foundation of the modern liberal order The power to decide is taken from the individual in the name of an abstract notion of Life. This is part of ‘death control’. we witness a forced ‘life for life’s sake’ … agony prolonged at all costs ‘you shall not die’ what is valued most is a totalising transcendent being in common of community. 3 This relation is built into the law’s normative framework an inalienable right to life is undone when the body politic needs to defend itself or one of its citizens against transgression. This conception of politics relies upon and follows from the conception of community as immanent identity. Rehnquist creates the textual illusion of a united homogeneous community. the text of law creates a symbolic unity where none exists in order to secure the state in its territorial and textual space. Rehnquist’s exclusion of physician-assisted suicide might be explained by his regarding such deaths as worklessness. They are pure excess, deaths which do not sublate into building community. state executions and killing in time of war are approved of because they appear to uphold the integrity of the community

(Hanafin, Patrick, University of London, Birkbeck College, School of Law, “Rights of passage: law and thebiopolitics of dying” Deleuze and Law:Forensic Futures. (2009), http://www.academia.edu/3323193/Rights_of_passage_law_and_the_biopolitics_of_dying, KB) A ‘STRANGE KIND OF PROSOPOPOEIA’ 2 The liberal social compact is built on the desire to survive. In this schema man looks constantly ahead to the moment of his death and his legacy. This becomes the be all and end all of life in the shadow of death. Indeed it becomes the foundation of the modern liberal order with the creation of the social contract as a means of survival, as a temporary immunity from death (see further Cavarero, 1995, pp. 57–90). The legal regulation of choosing how one dies reveals that the individual’s power to decide how she lives or dies is ignored at best or curbed at worst. The power to decide is taken from the individual in the name of an abstract notion of Life. The terminally ill person who desires to die is prevented from doing so by legal obstacles. This is part of a wider management of individual lives or what Jean Baudrillard has termed ‘death control’. In this paradigm what we witness is a forced ‘life for life’s sake’ … agony prolonged at all costs… whether weexecute people or compel their survival… the essential thing is that the decision is withdrawn from them… ‘you shall not die’, not in any old way, anyhow (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 174).I want to look at one legal instantiation of this death bound normative narrative. This example, along with many others which have been decided in a similar way, displays a tendency in the western legal tradition to valorise true life, the disembodied life of pure and abstract thought over mere incarnate life. With the exception of a very small number of states (Belgium, the Netherlands, Oregon, Switzerland), the western legal tradition does not condone a right to die using active means, either in the form of voluntary euthanasia or indeed physician-assisted suicide. On the other hand, many states allow an individual to make what is commonly called a living will or advance directive, which permits the withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration in the event that the person ever finds herself or himself in a persistent vegetative state from which there is no hope of recovery. This model is based on the Christian ethical tradition which distinguishes active from passive means of euthanasia. The case I want to look at in some detail is exemplary of the legacy of this normative model. The United States’ Supreme Court’s adjudication in the jointly heard cases of Washington v Glucksberg and Quill v Vacco (521 U.S. 702 (1997)) came about as the result of decisions on the issue of physician-assisted suicide by the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, which gave constitutional protection to physician-assisted suicide, one on the grounds of the right to privacy, the other on the grounds of equal treatment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Quill v Vacco (80 F.3d 716 (2dCir. 1996) held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rendered statutes which prohibit assisted suicide unlawful. Noting that New York legislation permitted a competent person to refuse medical treatment even if this resulted in the individual’s death, the Court held that assisted suicide should also be permissible on the ground that like persons be treated alike. An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in Compassion in Dying v Washington (79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) ( en banc)) held that the Washington state statute prohibiting a physician from assisting a patient to die was unconstitutional, as it was contrary to the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Both cases were consolidated for hearing by the Supreme Court in January 1997. The Chief Justice delivered two opinions for the Court in June 1997 overruling both the Second and Ninth Circuits’ decisions. In theseopinions he was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. However, Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurrence joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer. Inaddition Justices Stevens and Souter filed separate concurrences. When reading the case one is struck by the manner in which the multiple voices inthe decision reflect the differing stances on life both as survival and possibility. The Supreme Court majority opinion attempts to compose a narrative of order in the face of these unruly bodies who attempt to die before their time or out of time. The narrative of the majority attempts to impose, ‘order through judgment’ (Uhlmann, 1999, p. 139),while the plaintiffs seek ‘an always elusive justice’ (Uhlmann, 1999, p. 139). Within the judgment the law attempts to summon forth a living figure and refuses to see the dying or dead figures before it. This calling forth of a living figure in the face of death is even more pointed as the plaintiffs had already died by the time the Supreme Court justices issued their opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist commences his observations in Washington v Glucksberg in defensive rhetorical mode and, in so doing, evinces the law’s failure to recognise those who would wish to die otherwise than in the legally sanctioned way: our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology and notwithstanding anincreased emphasis on the importance of end of life decision-making, we have not retreated from this prohibition. Against this backdrop of history, tradition, and practice, we now turn to respondents’ constitutional claim(521 U.S. 702 (1997) 719). The backdrop or default is set. The individual is bound by the ‘rights’ which also bind herto an impersonal or state-mediated death. Rehnquist speaks in the rhetoric of warfare: ‘wehave not retreated’. He goes on to construct a particular legal relation to assisted deathand in so doing reveals a certain conception of community: We now enquire whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation’straditions. Here… we are confronted with a consistent and almost universaltradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues to reject ittoday, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold forrespondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every state (521 U.S. 702 (1997) 721–3) .In this passage, the Chief Justice creates the illusion that there is a uniform view on thiscontested ethical issue. This, however, does not give due consideration to the severa lcontradictory views and practises which coexist. He is interpreting the Constitution in a manner which would give the appearance of unity. Rehnquist appeals to a particularinterpretative method and, in so doing, is hailing a particular totalising conception of thenation. The language of Rehnquist posits a particular societal model based on immunity and survival. In this case one could argue that what is valued most of all is a totalising transcendent being in common of community. 3 This relation is built into the law’s normative framework in the natural law model of the sanctity of life. This may help to explain how an inalienable right to life is undone when the body politic needs to defend itself or one of its citizens against transgression. This relation to death can be seen as looking to the enforcement of law and exclusion of mere or embodied life. The type of politics implicit in this approach involves discovering the implicit identity of a nation and setting it to work. This conception of politics as work relies upon and follows from the conception of community as immanent identity. Rehnquist creates the textual illusion of a united homogeneous community. In his judgment he creates the textual boundaries which enclose the citizen in the state. In this regard the law can be seen as a stabilising instrument, a means of suspending in abstract ghostly form identifiable citizens who are simultaneously citizens with an identity. In other words the text of law creates orprovokes a symbolic unity where none exists in order to secure the state in its territorial and textual space. This illusory wholeness or togetherness is permanently under siege in the paranoiac discourse of the state and of law. Rehnquist’s exclusion of physician-assisted suicide from the domain of rights might be explained by his regarding such deaths as an instance of worklessness. For him such deaths add nothing to the survival of his imagined community. They are pure excess, deaths which do not sublate into building community. In this model, ironically, state executions and killing in time of war are approved of because they appear to uphold the integrity of the community. They maintain societal solidarity, binding it together against the intruder. In the decisionof the majority in this case what is eclipsed is the actual choice facing the individual who goes before the Court to obtain recognition of his desire to die with dignity. This process is well described by William Connolly as ‘the sedimentation of an ethos into corporeal sensibilities’ (Connolly, 1999, p. 179). In this model the individual’s plea goes unheard.

<h4>The Glucksberg decision provided the foundation for forced life that takes place through death control, creating a community around a state interest in preserving life</h4><p>Hanafin 9</p><p>(Hanafin, Patrick, University of London, Birkbeck College, School of Law, “Rights of passage: law and thebiopolitics of dying” Deleuze and Law:Forensic Futures. (2009), http://www.academia.edu/3323193/Rights_of_passage_law_and_the_biopolitics_of_dying<u><strong>, KB)</p><p></u></strong>A ‘STRANGE KIND OF PROSOPOPOEIA’ 2 <u><strong><mark>The liberal social compact is built on the desire to survive.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In this schema man looks constantly ahead to the moment of his death and his legacy.</u></strong> <u><strong>This becomes the be all and end all of life in the shadow of death.</u></strong> Indeed <u><strong><mark>it becomes the foundation of the modern liberal order</mark> with the creation of the social contract as a means of survival, as a temporary immunity from death</u></strong> (see further Cavarero, 1995, pp. 57–90). <u><strong>The legal regulation of choosing how one dies reveals that the individual’s power to decide how she lives or dies is ignored at best or curbed at worst.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The power to decide is taken from the individual in the name of an abstract notion of Life.</u></strong></mark> The terminally ill person who desires to die is prevented from doing so by legal obstacles. <u><strong><mark>This is part of</mark> a wider management of individual lives or what</u></strong> Jean <u><strong>Baudrillard has termed <mark>‘death control’.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In this paradigm what <mark>we witness </mark>is <mark>a forced ‘life for life’s sake’</u></strong> … <u><strong>agony prolonged at all costs</u></strong></mark>… whether weexecute people or compel their survival… the essential thing is that <u><strong>the decision is withdrawn from them</u></strong>… <u><strong><mark>‘you shall not die’</mark>, not in any old way, anyhow</u></strong> (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 174).I want to look at one legal instantiation of this death bound normative narrative. This example, along with many others which have been decided in a similar way, displays a tendency in the western legal tradition to valorise true life, the disembodied life of pure and abstract thought over mere incarnate life. <u><strong>With the exception of a very small number of states </u></strong>(Belgium, the Netherlands, Oregon, Switzerland), <u><strong>the western legal tradition does not condone a right to die using</u></strong> active means, <u><strong>either in the form of voluntary euthanasia or</u></strong> indeed <u><strong>physician-assisted suicide</u></strong>. On the other hand, <u><strong>many states allow an individual to make</u></strong> what is commonly called <u><strong>a living will or advance directive, which permits the withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration in the event that the person ever finds herself or himself in a persistent vegetative</u></strong> state from which there is no hope of recovery. This model is based on the Christian ethical tradition which distinguishes active from passive means of euthanasia. The case I want to look at in some detail is exemplary of the legacy of this normative model. The United States’ Supreme Court’s adjudication in the jointly heard cases of Washington v Glucksberg and Quill v Vacco (521 U.S. 702 (1997)) came about as the result of decisions on the issue of physician-assisted suicide by the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, which gave constitutional protection to physician-assisted suicide, one on the grounds of the right to privacy, the other on the grounds of equal treatment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Quill v Vacco (80 F.3d 716 (2dCir. 1996) held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rendered statutes which prohibit assisted suicide unlawful. Noting that New York legislation permitted a competent person to refuse medical treatment even if this resulted in the individual’s death, the Court held that assisted suicide should also be permissible on the ground that like persons be treated alike. An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in Compassion in Dying v Washington (79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) ( en banc)) held that the Washington state statute prohibiting a physician from assisting a patient to die was unconstitutional, as it was contrary to the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Both cases were consolidated for hearing by the Supreme Court in January 1997. <u><strong>The Chief Justice delivered two opinions for the Court in June 1997 overruling both the Second and Ninth Circuits’ decisions.</u></strong> In theseopinions he was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. However, Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurrence joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer. Inaddition Justices Stevens and Souter filed separate concurrences. When reading the case one is struck by the manner in which the multiple voices inthe decision reflect the differing stances on life both as survival and possibility. The Supreme Court majority opinion attempts to compose a narrative of order in the face of these unruly bodies who attempt to die before their time or out of time. The narrative of the majority attempts to impose, ‘order through judgment’ (Uhlmann, 1999, p. 139),while the plaintiffs seek ‘an always elusive justice’ (Uhlmann, 1999, p. 139). <u><strong>Within the judgment the law attempts to summon forth a living figure and refuses to see the dying or dead figures before it.</u></strong> This calling forth of a living figure in the face of death is even more pointed as the plaintiffs had already died by the time the Supreme Court justices issued their opinions. Chief Justice <u><strong>Rehnquist commences his observations in Washington v Glucksberg</u></strong> in defensive rhetorical mode <u><strong>and</u></strong>, in so doing, <u><strong>evinces the law’s failure to recognise those who would wish to die otherwise than in the legally sanctioned way:</u></strong> <u><strong>our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide.</u></strong> <u><strong>Despite changes in medical technology</u></strong> and notwithstanding anincreased emphasis on the importance of end of life decision-making, <u><strong>we have not retreated from this prohibition.</u></strong> Against this backdrop of history, tradition, and practice, we now turn to respondents’ constitutional claim(521 U.S. 702 (1997) 719). The backdrop or default is set. The individual is bound by the ‘rights’ which also bind herto an impersonal or state-mediated death. Rehnquist speaks in the rhetoric of warfare: ‘wehave not retreated’. He goes on to construct a particular legal relation to assisted deathand in so doing reveals a certain conception of community: We now enquire whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation’straditions. Here… we are confronted with a consistent and almost universaltradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues to reject ittoday, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold forrespondents, <u><strong>we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every state</u></strong> (521 U.S. 702 (1997) 721–3) .<u><strong>In this passage, the Chief Justice creates the illusion that there is a uniform view on thiscontested ethical issue. This, however, does not give due consideration to the severa lcontradictory views and practises which coexist. He is interpreting the Constitution in a manner which would give the appearance of unity.</u></strong> Rehnquist appeals to a particularinterpretative method and, in so doing, is hailing a particular totalising conception of thenation. <u><strong>The language of Rehnquist posits a particular societal model based on immunity and survival.</u></strong> In this case one could argue that <u><strong><mark>what is valued most</mark> of all <mark>is a totalising transcendent being in common of community.</strong> </u>3 <u><strong>This relation is built into the law’s normative framework</u></strong></mark> in the natural law model of the sanctity of life. <u><strong>This may</u></strong> help to <u><strong>explain how <mark>an inalienable right to life is undone when the body politic needs to defend itself or one of its citizens against transgression.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This relation to death can be seen as looking to the enforcement of law and exclusion of mere or embodied life.</u></strong> <u><strong>The type of politics</u></strong> <u><strong>implicit in this approach</u></strong> <u><strong>involves discovering the implicit identity of a nation and setting it to work.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This conception of politics</u></strong></mark> as work <u><strong><mark>relies upon and follows from the conception of community as immanent identity.</u></strong> <u><strong>Rehnquist creates the textual illusion of a united homogeneous community.</u></strong></mark> In his judgment <u><strong>he creates the textual boundaries which enclose the citizen in the state.</u></strong> In this regard <u><strong>the law can be seen as a stabilising instrument, a means of suspending in abstract ghostly form identifiable citizens who are simultaneously citizens with an identity.</u></strong> In other words <u><strong><mark>the text of law creates</u></strong></mark> orprovokes <u><strong><mark>a symbolic unity where none exists in order to secure the state in its territorial and textual space.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>This illusory wholeness</u></strong> or togetherness <u><strong>is permanently under siege in the paranoiac discourse of the state and of law.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Rehnquist’s exclusion of physician-assisted suicide </mark>from the domain of rights <mark>might be explained by his regarding such deaths as </mark>an instance of <mark>worklessness.</u></strong></mark> For him <u><strong>such deaths add nothing to the survival of his imagined community.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>They are pure excess, deaths which do not sublate into building community.</u></strong> </mark>In this model, <u><strong>ironically, <mark>state executions and killing in time of war are approved of because they appear to uphold the integrity of the community</mark>. They maintain societal solidarity, binding it together against the intruder. </u></strong>In the decisionof the majority in this case <u><strong>what is eclipsed is the actual choice facing the individual</u></strong> <u><strong>who goes before the Court to obtain recognition of his desire to die with dignity. This process is</u></strong> well described by William Connolly as ‘<u><strong>the sedimentation of an ethos into corporeal sensibilities’</u></strong> (Connolly, 1999, p. 179). In this model <u><strong>the individual’s plea goes unheard.</p></u></strong>

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We’re not self styling we’re a destruction of the self that could style in the first place

<h4>We’re not self styling we’re a destruction of the self that could style in the first place</h4>

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This damage-centered research produces an affective economy of paternalism that creates a model of personhood for the subaltern where to be human, they must be in pain and they dare not resist or suffer the consequences – such a colonial subjectivity re-inscribes the primacy of state power

Tuck and Yang 14. //MD

Tuck and Yang 14. (Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) //MD Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and¶ much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage,¶ or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered¶ researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which¶ harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that¶ reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional¶ resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political,¶ and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both¶ colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce¶ and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position¶ themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change¶ (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality,¶ and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that¶ they are broken.

at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated¶ fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both¶ for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be¶ a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” is not just a rare historical¶ occurrence in anthropology and related fields. much of the¶ work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. many individual scholars have chosen¶ to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their¶ disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch¶ pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody¶ what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the¶ theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent¶ in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the¶ academy is about. No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am¶ still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk. social science¶ research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a¶ recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by¶ telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to¶ untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and¶ forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell¶ their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that¶ is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been¶ critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars Hartman discusses how recognizing¶ the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning¶ class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively¶ by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits¶ of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity¶ require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the¶ socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider¶ violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the¶ legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of¶ punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of¶ subjugation and pained existence?”

at the center is the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s fascination with retelling pain is troubling, both¶ for its voyeurism and consumptive implacability. . pain narratives are what the¶ academy is about. No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk. the forces say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak your pain” new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider¶ violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the¶ legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence.

Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated¶ fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both¶ for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be¶ a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”¶ (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical¶ occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the¶ work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At¶ first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that¶ refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent¶ decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen¶ to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their¶ disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch¶ pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody¶ what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the¶ theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent¶ in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the¶ academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990)¶ portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus:¶ No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am¶ still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science¶ research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a¶ recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage¶ describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by¶ telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to¶ untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and¶ forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell¶ their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that¶ is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain”¶ (hooks, 1990, p. 343). The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been¶ critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007;¶ Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing¶ the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning¶ class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively¶ by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits¶ of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”¶ (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity¶ require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the¶ socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55).¶ Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how¶ the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider¶ violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the¶ legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks,¶ “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of¶ punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of¶ subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55).

<h4><u>This damage-centered research produces an affective economy of paternalism that creates a model of personhood for the subaltern where to be human, they must be in pain and they dare not resist or suffer the consequences – such a colonial subjectivity re-inscribes the primacy of state power</h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14. </u></strong>(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf)<u><strong> //MD</p><p></u></strong>Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that <u><mark>educational </mark>research <mark>and</mark>¶ much of <mark>social science research has been concerned with documenting damage,¶ or empirically substantiating the </mark>oppression and <mark>pain of</mark> Native communities, urban communities, and other <mark>disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered¶ researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which¶ harm must be recorded</mark> or proven <mark>in order to convince an <strong>outside adjudicator</strong> that¶ reparations are deserved. These </mark>reparations presumably <mark>take the form of</mark> additional¶ resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, <mark>political,¶ and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this </mark>theory of change1 <mark>as</mark> both¶ <mark>colonial </mark>and flawed, <mark>because it relies upon <strong>Western notions of power as scarce¶ and concentrated</strong>, and </mark>because it <mark>requires disenfranchised communities to <strong>position¶ themselves</strong> as</mark> both singularly defective and <mark>powerless to make change</u></mark>¶ (2010). Finally, <u>Eve has observed that “won” <mark>reparations rarely become reality,¶ and</mark> that</u> in many cases, <u><mark>communities are left with a narrative that <strong></mark>tells them that¶ they are broken.</p><p></u></strong>Similarly, <u><mark>at the center </mark>of the analysis in this chapter <mark>is </mark>a concern with <mark>the¶ fixation social science research has exhibited in <strong>eliciting pain stories</strong> from communities¶ that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s </mark>demonstrated¶ <mark>fascination with <strong></mark>telling and <mark>retelling</strong> </mark>narratives of <mark>pain is troubling, both¶ for its <strong>voyeurism</strong> and </mark>for its <strong><mark>consumptive implacability.</strong> </mark>Imagining “itself to be¶ a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”</u>¶ (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) <u>is not just a rare historical¶ occurrence in anthropology and related fields.</u> We observe that <u>much of the¶ work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice<mark>.</u></mark> At¶ first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that¶ refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent¶ decades. However, it is our view that while <u>many individual scholars have chosen¶ to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their¶ disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch¶ pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody¶ what it means to do social science. The collection of <mark>pain narratives </mark>and the¶ theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent¶ in the social sciences that one might surmise that they <mark>are </mark>indeed <strong><mark>what the¶ academy is about.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990)¶ portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus:¶ <u><mark>No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about¶ yourself.</mark> <strong>No need to hear your voice.</strong> <strong><mark>Only tell me about your pain.</strong> I want to know¶ your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. </mark>Tell it back to you <mark>in such¶ a way that it has become mine, my own. </mark>Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am¶ still author, authority. <mark>I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the¶ center of my talk.</mark> </u>(p. 343)</p><p>Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of <u>social science¶ research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a¶ recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain.</u> Further, this passage¶ describes the ways in which <u>the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by <strong>the voices on the margins.</u></strong> <u>The researcher-self is made anew by¶ telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to¶ untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and¶ forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell¶ their stories. Yet <mark>the forces </mark>that invite those on the margins to speak also <mark>say, “Do¶ not speak in a voice of resistance. </mark>Only speak from that space in the margin that¶ is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. <strong><mark>Only speak your pain”</u></strong></mark>¶ (hooks, 1990, p. 343).</p><p><u>The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been¶ critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars</u> (Hartman, 1997, 2007;¶ Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya <u>Hartman</u> (1997) <u>discusses how recognizing¶ the personhood of slaves <strong>enhanced the power</strong> of the Southern slaveowning¶ class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively¶ by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits¶ of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human</u> (Hartman, 2007). In response, <u><mark>new¶ laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous¶ with injury”</u></mark> (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), <u><mark>while simultaneously authorizing necessary¶ violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when¶ seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”</u></mark>¶ (p. 55). <u><mark>Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his¶ abjection. <strong>You are in pain, therefore you are.</u></strong> <u></mark>“[T]he recognition of humanity¶ require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the¶ socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person”</u> (p. 55).¶ Furthermore, Hartman describes how <u><strong><mark>slave-as-victim as human accordingly¶ establishes slave-as-agent as criminal.</u></strong></mark> Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how¶ the <u><mark>agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as <strong>outsider¶ violence</strong> that humane society must <strong>reject</strong> while simultaneously upholding the¶ <strong>legitimated violence</strong> of the state to punish such outsider violence.</u></mark> Hartman asks,¶ <u>“Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of¶ punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of¶ subjugation and pained existence?”</u> (p. 55).</p>

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