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Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political

Spanos 8

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)

We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas

We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

<h4>Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>

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./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

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1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

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350 ppm is the red-line threshold – fast-forcing and positive feedbacks mean anything above that is catastrophic

McKibben 7

McKibben 7 (Bill McKibben, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, American environmentalist, author, and journalist who has written extensively on the impact of global warming, no date, but website was founded in 2007 so whatever, http://www.350.org/en/node/48)

The question of what target to aim for against global warming has always been vexed, and for one simple reason: filling the atmosphere with carbon is at base a huge experiment, one we've never conducted before. in the late 1980s we used 550 parts per million CO2—mostly because it was double the pre-Industrial Revolution concentrations and hence easy to model. As time went on, it became clearer that the dangerous thresholds lay somewhere lower, and we began to use 450 parts per million, or 2 degrees Celsius. Science doesn't actually know if 450 ppm and 2 degrees are the same thing these were guesses not based on actual experience In the summer of 2007, though, with the rapid melt of Arctic ice, it became clear that we had already crossed serious thresholds. A number of other signs pointed in the same direction: the spike in methane emissions, likely from thawing permafrost; the melt of high-altitude glacier systems and perennial snowpack in Asia, Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected acidification of seawater. All of these implied the same thing: wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it Jim Hansen gave us a new number, verified for the first time by real-time observation (and new paleo-climatic data). They said that 350 parts per million CO2 was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet "similar to the one on which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted." That number is unrefuted; indeed, a constant flow of additional evidence supports it from many directions. Just this week, for instance, oceanographers reported that longterm atmospheric levels above 360 ppm would doom coral reefs worldwide. It is no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change. climate change was already claiming 300,000 lives per year If the Arctic melts at less than one degree, then two degrees can't be a real target. This is simply how science works. New information drives out the old. targets like 450 implies—to policy makers that we still have atmosphere left in which to put more carbon We don't—not with feedback loops like methane release starting to kick in with a vengeance It's the difference between a doctor telling you that you really should think about changing your diet and a doctor telling you your cholesterol is already too high and a heart attack is imminent. small island nations and less developed country governments have joined leaders like Al Gore in enunciating firmly the 350 target, and equating it with survival. arguing for 350 is not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient. Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further. It's up to us to figure out, this year and in the years ahead, how to meet their bottom line.

550 and 450 p p m were guesses the rapid melt of Arctic ice spike in methane emissions melt of high-altitude glacier systems acidification of seawater. All implied a new number, verified by real-time observation (and paleo-climatic data 350 p p m was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet That number is unrefuted a constant flow of additional evidence supports it It is no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change This is simply how science works. New information drives out the old governments have joined 350 equating it with survival not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further

The question of what target to aim for in the fight against global warming has always been vexed, and for one simple reason: filling the atmosphere with carbon is at base a huge experiment, one we've never conducted before. It's always been tough to judge exactly where the danger lies. At first in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number we routinely used was 550 parts per million CO2—mostly because it was double the pre-Industrial Revolution concentrations and hence easy to model. But it became something of a red line through dint of sheer repetition—I remember writing an op-ed for the New York Times excoriating the Clinton administration for hinting that it might be okay to go past a 550 ceiling. As time went on, it became clearer that the dangerous thresholds lay somewhere lower, and we began to use—almost interchangeably—450 parts per million, or 2 degrees Celsius. Science doesn't actually know if 450 ppm and 2 degrees are the same thing, and no one knows how much change they would produce. Again, these were guesses for the point at which catastrophic damage would begin—they were more plausible, but still not based on actual experience. They also reflected guesses of what was politically possible to achieve. They were completely defensible, given the lack of data (though the 2C target was always problematic strategically since Americans don't use centigrade measurements and hence have no real idea what 2 degrees Celsius means.) In the summer of 2007, though, with the rapid melt of Arctic ice, it became clear that we had already crossed serious thresholds. A number of other signs pointed in the same direction: the spike in methane emissions, likely from thawing permafrost; the melt of high-altitude glacier systems and perennial snowpack in Asia, Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected acidification of seawater. All of these implied the same thing: wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it, even though the atmospheric concentration of CO2 was only 390 parts per million, and the temperature increase still a shade below 1 degree C. In early 2008, Jim Hansen and a team of researchers gave us a new number, verified for the first time by real-time observation (and also by reams of new paleo-climatic data). They said that 350 parts per million CO2 was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet "similar to the one on which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted." That number is unrefuted; indeed, a constant flow of additional evidence supports it from many directions. Just this week, for instance, oceanographers reported that longterm atmospheric levels above 360 ppm would doom coral reefs worldwide. It is, therefore, no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change. The Global Humanitarian Forum reported recently that climate change was already claiming 300,000 lives per year—that should qualify as catastrophic. A new Oxfam report makes very clear the degree of suffering caused by the warming we've already seen, and adds "Warming of 2 degrees C entails a devastating future for at least 600 million people," almost all of them innocent of any role in causing this trouble. If the Arctic melts at less than one degree, then two degrees can't be a real target. This is simply how science works. New information drives out the old. You could, logically, defend targets like 450 or 2 degrees C as the best we could hope for politically, especially if you add that they represent absolute upper limits that we must bounce back below as quickly as possible. But even that is politically problematic, because it implies—to policy makers and the general public—that we still have atmosphere left in which to put more carbon, and time to gradually adjust policies. We don't—not with feedback loops like methane release starting to kick in with a vengeance. It is, we think, far wiser to tell people the best science, in part because it motivates action. It's the difference between a doctor telling you that you really should think about changing your diet and a doctor telling you your cholesterol is already too high and a heart attack is imminent. The second scenario is the one that gets your attention. A number of small island nations and less developed country governments have joined leaders like Al Gore in enunciating firmly the 350 target, and equating it with survival. Climate coalition groups like TckTckTck have also endorsed the target, as have a growing coalition of hundreds of organizational allies. Here's the important thing to remember: arguing for 350 is not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient. We were aware that we wouldn't get an agreement in Copenhagen that rapidly returns us to 350—even if we do everything right it will take decades for the world's oceans and forests to absorb the excess carbon we've already poured into the atmosphere. But that's why we've got to get going now—and at the very least we have a number to explain why the agreement that did emerge is insufficient and needs to be revised quickly and regularly. We can use it to make Copenhagen a real beginning, not an end for years to come the way Kyoto was. In the end, everyone needs to remember that the goal at Copenhagen was not to get a "victory," not to sign an agreement. It's to actually take steps commensurate with the problem. And those steps are dictated, in the end, by science. This negotiation, on the surface, is between America and China and the EU and India and the developing world; between industry and environmentalists; between old and new technology. But at root the real negotiation is between human beings on the one hand, and physics and chemistry on the other. Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further. It's up to us to figure out, this year and in the years ahead, how to meet their bottom line.

<h4>350 ppm is the red-line threshold – fast-forcing and positive feedbacks mean anything above that is catastrophic</h4><p><u><strong>McKibben 7</u></strong> (Bill McKibben, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, American environmentalist, author, and journalist who has written extensively on the impact of global warming, no date, but website was founded in 2007 so whatever, http://www.350.org/en/node/48<u>)</p><p>The question of what target to aim for</u> in the fight <u>against global warming has always been vexed, and for one simple reason: filling the atmosphere with carbon is at base a huge experiment, one we've never conducted before.</u> It's always been tough to judge exactly where the danger lies. At first <u>in the late 1980s</u> and early 1990s, the number <u>we</u> routinely <u>used</u> was <u><mark>550 </mark>parts per million CO2—mostly because it was double the pre-Industrial Revolution concentrations and hence easy to model.</u> But it became something of a red line through dint of sheer repetition—I remember writing an op-ed for the New York Times excoriating the Clinton administration for hinting that it might be okay to go past a 550 ceiling. <u>As time went on, it became clearer that the dangerous thresholds lay somewhere lower, <mark>and </mark>we began to use</u>—almost interchangeably—<u><mark>450 p</mark>arts <mark>p</mark>er <mark>m</mark>illion, or 2 degrees Celsius. Science doesn't actually know if 450 ppm and 2 degrees are the same thing</u>, and no one knows how much change they would produce. Again, <u>these <mark>were guesses</u> </mark>for the point at which catastrophic damage would begin—they were more plausible, but still <u>not based on actual experience</u>. They also reflected guesses of what was politically possible to achieve. They were completely defensible, given the lack of data (though the 2C target was always problematic strategically since Americans don't use centigrade measurements and hence have no real idea what 2 degrees Celsius means.) <u>In the summer of 2007, though, with <mark>the rapid melt of Arctic ice</mark>, it became clear that we had already crossed serious thresholds. A number of other signs pointed in the same direction: the <mark>spike in methane emissions</mark>, likely from thawing permafrost; the <mark>melt of high-altitude glacier systems </mark>and perennial snowpack in Asia, Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected <mark>acidification of seawater. All </mark>of these <mark>implied </mark>the same thing: <strong>wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it</u></strong>, even though the atmospheric concentration of CO2 was only 390 parts per million, and the temperature increase still a shade below 1 degree C. In early 2008, <u>Jim Hansen </u>and a team of researchers <u>gave us <mark>a new number, <strong>verified </mark>for the first time <mark>by real-time observation (and</u></strong></mark> also by reams of <u><strong>new <mark>paleo-climatic data</mark>). They said that <mark>350 p</mark>arts <mark>p</mark>er <mark>m</mark>illion CO2 <mark>was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet</strong> </mark>"similar to the one on which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted." <strong><mark>That number is unrefuted</mark>; indeed, <mark>a constant flow of additional evidence supports it </mark>from many directions</strong>. Just this week, for instance, oceanographers reported that longterm atmospheric levels above 360 ppm would doom coral reefs worldwide. <mark>It is</u></mark>, therefore, <u><strong><mark>no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change</mark>. </u></strong>The Global Humanitarian Forum reported recently that <u>climate change was already claiming 300,000 lives per year</u>—that should qualify as catastrophic. A new Oxfam report makes very clear the degree of suffering caused by the warming we've already seen, and adds "Warming of 2 degrees C entails a devastating future for at least 600 million people," almost all of them innocent of any role in causing this trouble. <u>If the Arctic melts at less than one degree, then two degrees can't be a real target. <strong><mark>This is simply how science works</strong>. New information drives out the old</mark>. </u>You could, logically, defend <u>targets like 450</u> or 2 degrees C as the best we could hope for politically, especially if you add that they represent absolute upper limits that we must bounce back below as quickly as possible. But even that is politically problematic, because it <u>implies—to policy makers</u> and the general public—<u>that we still have atmosphere left in which to put more carbon</u>, and time to gradually adjust policies. <u>We don't—not with feedback loops like methane release starting to kick in with a vengeance</u>. It is, we think, far wiser to tell people the best science, in part because it motivates action. <u>It's the difference between a doctor telling you that you really should think about changing your diet and a doctor telling you your cholesterol is already too high and a heart attack is imminent. </u>The second scenario is the one that gets your attention. A number of <u>small island nations and less developed country <mark>governments have joined </mark>leaders like Al Gore in enunciating firmly the <mark>350 </mark>target, and <strong><mark>equating it with survival</mark>.</u></strong> Climate coalition groups like TckTckTck have also endorsed the target, as have a growing coalition of hundreds of organizational allies. Here's the important thing to remember: <u>arguing for 350 is <mark>not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient</mark>. </u>We were aware that we wouldn't get an agreement in Copenhagen that rapidly returns us to 350—even if we do everything right it will take decades for the world's oceans and forests to absorb the excess carbon we've already poured into the atmosphere. But that's why we've got to get going now—and at the very least we have a number to explain why the agreement that did emerge is insufficient and needs to be revised quickly and regularly. We can use it to make Copenhagen a real beginning, not an end for years to come the way Kyoto was. In the end, everyone needs to remember that the goal at Copenhagen was not to get a "victory," not to sign an agreement. It's to actually take steps commensurate with the problem. And those steps are dictated, in the end, by science. This negotiation, on the surface, is between America and China and the EU and India and the developing world; between industry and environmentalists; between old and new technology. But at root the real negotiation is between human beings on the one hand, and physics and chemistry on the other. <u><strong><mark>Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further</strong></mark>. It's up to us to figure out, this year and in the years ahead, how to meet their bottom line.</p></u>

1NR

Warming

1NR Too Late

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1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

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We resume our genealogy in the seventeenth century at the time of sovereignty’s morph from the power to put to death, to the power to expose life whereby life becomes conditioned by defense of the sovereign –Foucault explains that the West’s transformation of mechanisms of power generates forces and orders them under a system of hierarchization. This symbolic ordering of death evolved to sanitize regimes of dying. Zohreh Bayatrizi explains this ordering as a construction of not death sentences but “life sentences” which normalize death – thou shalt not die violently, thou shalt not die prematurely, thou shalt not kill thyself, thou shalt die an orderly death. The figure posited oppositionally to ordered death IS suicide, which escapes the condition of death on the defense of the sovereign and therefore must be eradicated by the state. This ordering of society around the value of life emerged in the mid-seventeenth century as a moral community posited around normalized figures of life and death, allowing for the development of a juridicomedical culture that preserves life above all else. The medicalization of death is rooted in the concept of normality which lends itself to disciplinary techniques of biopower, creating a medical gaze through which suicide is rendered dangerous – Anne Ryan explains

Anne Ryan, School of Psychology at Massey University, New Zealand, “The Problem with Death: Towards a Genealogy of Euthanasia,” Manawatu Doctoral Research Symposium, 2011 SJE

the modem concept of euthanasia can be traced back to the movement of death and dying from the domain of religion to that of medicine and law during the nineteenth century the physician began to usurp the role of the minister as dying became a medical event. The physician was now charged with helping the patient achieve this easy death subsequent attempts to legalise medical euthanasia had the effect of taking death and dying into the realm of law and public policy the experience of death and dying has been transformed over time by significant advances in medical technologies from a short-term event to one that usually involves a prolonged time of slow decline. ). It is important at this point to emphasize the profound effect of medicalisation on society. Health and medicine are integral to the concept of ‘normality’ that is an essential component of the disciplinary techniques of bio-power that seeks to regulate and transform human life. The medical ‘gaze’ constantly monitoring and regulating our bodies in order to achieve social control of the population. the normalizing role of medicine required a different reorientation in its relationship to death. Developments in Western medicine at the turn of the 19th century lead to a change of focus from the promotion of life through the cure of disease to pathology of death.

during the nineteenth century the physician began to usurp the role of the minister as dying became a medical event. subsequent attempts to legalise medical euthanasia had the effect of taking death and dying into the realm of law and public policy the experience of death and dying has been transformed over time by advances in medical technologies Health and medicine are integral to the concept of ‘normality’ that is an essential component of the disciplinary techniques of bio-power The medical ‘gaze’ constantly regulating our bodies in order to achieve social control of the population. the normalizing role of medicine required a different reorientation in its relationship to death. Developments in Western medicine lead to a change of focus from the promotion of life through cure of disease to pathology of death.

Lavi (2005) argues that the modem concept of euthanasia can be traced back to the movement of death and dying from the domain of religion to that of medicine and law. The meaning of the word ‘euthanasia’ itself has changed radically over the last two hundred years. The term comes from a Greek root meaning ‘well-dying’ and implies a ‘good death’ or ‘easy death'. In this original sense, the Christian world viewed euthanasia as a death blessed by God. The deathbed at this stage was very much a public event and the province of religion, with behaviour surrounding it governed by a book of rules known as ars moriendi or ‘the art of dying'. However, during the nineteenth century the physician began to usurp the role of the minister as dying became a medical event. The physician was now charged with helping the patient achieve this easy death while not hastening it. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century the meaning of euthanasia reflected the assistance of the physician in providing a painless death. This medicalisation of death on the other hand was somewhat problematic because the physician could not cure dying patients: therefore, the option of hastening death by, “medical euthanasia emerged as a possible solution to the problem of dying” (Lavi, 2005, p. 6). The subsequent attempts to legalise medical euthanasia had the effect of taking death and dying into the realm of law and public policy. The causes of death have also changed, particularly over the last century, with deaths from infectious disease giving way to death from more chronic degenerative conditions such as cancer and heart disease. Thus, the experience of death and dying has been transformed over time by significant advances in medical technologies from a short-term event to one that usually involves a prolonged time of slow decline. Alongside this has been the movement away from dying in the home surrounded by friends and family to dying in a hospital or other medical setting being tended to by health professionals (Lyons & Chamberlain, 2006). It is important at this point to emphasize the profound effect of medicalisation on society. Health and medicine are integral to the concept of ‘normality’ that is an essential component of the disciplinary techniques of bio-power that seeks to regulate and transform human life. The medical ‘gaze’ encompasses all aspects of our lives, constantly monitoring and regulating our bodies in order to achieve social control of the population. At no other point in our existence is this medical regime as strict as When we move into frail old age or become terminally ill (Lupton, 1997). Foucault argued that medicine had formed a unique relationship around death and the modem subject. However, in contrast to the changed relationship between power and death that accompanied the shift from sovereign power to bio-power, the normalizing role of medicine required a different reorientation in its relationship to death. Developments in Western medicine at the turn of the 19th century lead to a change of focus from the promotion of life through the cure of disease to concerns regarding the pathology of death. New light was shed on death by examining the anatomy of the corpse in order to determine the nature of disease and illness. Therefore rather than our common perception that medicine’s sole preoccupation is with the maintenance of life, it can in fact be characterized as having a positive relationship with death (Tierney, 2006).

<h4>We resume our genealogy in the seventeenth century at the time of sovereignty’s morph from the power to put to death, to the power to expose life whereby life becomes conditioned by defense of the sovereign –Foucault explains that the West’s transformation of mechanisms of power generates forces and orders them under a system of hierarchization. This symbolic ordering of death evolved to sanitize regimes of dying. Zohreh Bayatrizi explains this ordering as a construction of not death sentences but “life sentences” which normalize death – thou shalt not die violently, thou shalt not die prematurely, thou shalt not kill thyself, thou shalt die an orderly death. The figure posited oppositionally to ordered death IS suicide, which escapes the condition of death on the defense of the sovereign and therefore must be eradicated by the state. This ordering of society around the value of life emerged in the mid-seventeenth century as a moral community posited around normalized figures of life and death, allowing for the development of a juridicomedical culture that preserves life above all else. The medicalization of death is rooted in the concept of normality which lends itself to disciplinary techniques of biopower, creating a medical gaze through which suicide is rendered dangerous – Anne Ryan explains</h4><p>Anne Ryan, School of Psychology at Massey University, New Zealand, “The Problem with Death: Towards a Genealogy of Euthanasia,” Manawatu Doctoral Research Symposium, 2011 SJE</p><p>Lavi (2005) argues that <u><strong>the modem concept of euthanasia can be traced back to the movement of death and dying from the domain of religion to that of medicine and law</u></strong>. The meaning of the word ‘euthanasia’ itself has changed radically over the last two hundred years. The term comes from a Greek root meaning ‘well-dying’ and implies a ‘good death’ or ‘easy death'. In this original sense, the Christian world viewed euthanasia as a death blessed by God. The deathbed at this stage was very much a public event and the province of religion, with behaviour surrounding it governed by a book of rules known as ars moriendi or ‘the art of dying'. However, <u><strong><mark>during the nineteenth century the physician began to usurp the role of the minister as dying became a medical event.</mark> The physician was now charged with helping the patient achieve this easy death</u></strong> while not hastening it. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century the meaning of euthanasia reflected the assistance of the physician in providing a painless death. This medicalisation of death on the other hand was somewhat problematic because the physician could not cure dying patients: therefore, the option of hastening death by, “medical euthanasia emerged as a possible solution to the problem of dying” (Lavi, 2005, p. 6). The <u><strong><mark>subsequent attempts to legalise medical euthanasia had the effect of taking death and dying into the realm of law and public policy</u></strong></mark>. The causes of death have also changed, particularly over the last century, with deaths from infectious disease giving way to death from more chronic degenerative conditions such as cancer and heart disease. Thus, <u><strong><mark>the experience of death and dying has been transformed over time by</mark> significant <mark>advances in medical technologies</mark> from a short-term event to one that usually involves a prolonged time of slow decline.</u></strong> Alongside this has been the movement away from dying in the home surrounded by friends and family to dying in a hospital or other medical setting being tended to by health professionals (Lyons & Chamberlain, 2006<u><strong>). It is important at this point to emphasize the profound effect of medicalisation on society. <mark>Health and medicine are integral to the concept of ‘normality’ that is an essential component of the disciplinary techniques of bio-power</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that seeks to regulate and transform human life. <mark>The medical ‘gaze’</u></strong></mark> encompasses all aspects of our lives, <u><strong><mark>constantly</mark> monitoring and <mark>regulating our bodies in order to achieve social control of the population.</u></strong></mark> At no other point in our existence is this medical regime as strict as When we move into frail old age or become terminally ill (Lupton, 1997). Foucault argued that medicine had formed a unique relationship around death and the modem subject. However, in contrast to the changed relationship between power and death that accompanied the shift from sovereign power to bio-power, <u><strong><mark>the normalizing role of medicine required a different reorientation in its relationship to death. Developments in Western medicine</mark> at the turn of the 19th century <mark>lead to a change of focus from the promotion of life through</mark> the <mark>cure of disease to</u></strong></mark> concerns regarding the <u><strong><mark>pathology of death.</mark> </u></strong>New light was shed on death by examining the anatomy of the corpse in order to determine the nature of disease and illness. Therefore rather than our common perception that medicine’s sole preoccupation is with the maintenance of life, it can in fact be characterized as having a positive relationship with death (Tierney, 2006). </p>

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1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Marijuana legalization is merely a palliative which obscures the broader structures of classist and racialized subjectivity which ensure mass violence – the aff is a neoliberal ruse which benefits only the economic elite

Calhoun 14

Calhoun 14 (Ryan Calhoun, philosophy student at the University of Buffalo, 1-12-14, “Weed Legalization As Privatization, Disempowerment,” http://c4ss.org/content/23632) gz

Marijuana’s legalization seems much more like neoliberal privatization of markets than true liberation of them the decency of these even as weed is legalized, those in prison for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana will remain there those who formerly tried to compete in this market remain locked up in cages. it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address. legalization picks the winners of the weed market from those who were lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to the capital to invest into this expensive business many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it. now facing the age of Big Marijuana

Marijuana’s legalization seems more like neoliberal privatization of markets as weed is legalized, those in prison will remain there those who formerly tried to compete remain locked in cages it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address legalization picks the winners from those lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to capital

Marijuana’s legalization seems much more like neoliberal privatization of markets than true liberation of them. While I do not question the decency of these first major marijuana retailers, there are legitimate concerns. Those most victimized by the state’s rabid oppression of marijuana markets will find themselves very often out of luck, as extensive background checks are required by law, and any drug felony charge is enough to exclude individuals from operating as vendors. TakePart magazine notes in an article that even as weed is legalized, those in prison for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana will remain there. While new businesses boom with customers, those who formerly tried to compete in this market remain locked up in cages. The drug war has affected millions during its hellish tear through Americans’ lives and culture, but it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address. Like with the beltway libertarian conception of privatization, legalization picks the winners of the weed market from those who were lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to the capital to invest into this expensive business. Legalization, at its best, functions as an opposition to continued state violence against drug users and possessors. It is therefore troubling that we find even after this so-called legalization, many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it. It is never by the political means we realize our freedom, but only a hold-back of even worse oppression. We fight an uphill battle against the incredible damage the state does. And now facing the age of Big Marijuana, we might be shocked to find the sorts of restrictions many established pot shops favor. In order to delegitimize street dealers, we have to treat them as inherently dangerous and volatile.

<h4>Marijuana legalization is merely a palliative which obscures the broader structures of classist and racialized subjectivity which ensure mass violence – the aff<u><strong> is a neoliberal ruse which benefits only the economic elite</h4><p>Calhoun 14 </p><p></u></strong>(Ryan Calhoun, philosophy student at the University of Buffalo, 1-12-14, “Weed Legalization As Privatization, Disempowerment,” http://c4ss.org/content/23632) gz</p><p><u><mark>Marijuana’s legalization seems</mark> much <mark>more like <strong>neoliberal privatization of markets</strong></mark> than true liberation of them</u>. While I do not question <u><strong>the decency of these</u></strong> first major marijuana retailers, there are legitimate concerns. Those most victimized by the state’s rabid oppression of marijuana markets will find themselves very often out of luck, as extensive background checks are required by law, and any drug felony charge is enough to exclude individuals from operating as vendors. TakePart magazine notes in an article that <u>even <mark>as weed is legalized, <strong>those in prison</mark> for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana <mark>will remain there</u></strong></mark>. While new businesses boom with customers, <u><mark>those who formerly tried to compete</mark> in this market <mark>remain <strong>locked</mark> up <mark>in cages</strong></mark>. </u>The drug war has affected millions during its hellish tear through Americans’ lives and culture, but <u><mark>it has always been particularly <strong>racialized and classist</strong>. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a <strong>permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address</strong></mark>.</u> Like with the beltway libertarian conception of privatization, <u><mark>legalization <strong>picks the winners</strong></mark> of the weed market <mark>from those</mark> who were <mark>lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who <strong>already have access to</mark> the <mark>capital</mark> to invest into this expensive business</u></strong>. Legalization, at its best, functions as an opposition to continued state violence against drug users and possessors. It is therefore troubling that we find even after this so-called legalization, <u>many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it.</u> It is never by the political means we realize our freedom, but only a hold-back of even worse oppression. We fight an uphill battle against the incredible damage the state does. And <u>now facing the age of <strong>Big Marijuana</u></strong>, we might be shocked to find the sorts of restrictions many established pot shops favor. In order to delegitimize street dealers, we have to treat them as inherently dangerous and volatile.</p>

1NC

Off

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Whitman DL

Justin Kirk

1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

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It won’t be profitable – labor, processing and transport costs – aff studies are speculative and don’t account for added regulatory cost burdens

Johnson 13

Renee Johnson 13 – specialist in agriculture policy @ CRS, “Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity”, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32725.pdf, July 24

the study conclude hemp production “is not likely to generate sizeable profits” and although hemp may be “slightly more profitable than traditional row crops” it is less profitable than other specialty crops” due to the “current state of harvesting and processing technologies, which are labor intensive, and result in high per unit costs U.S. hemp growers could be affected by competition from other world producers as well as production limitations in the U S including yield variability and lack of harvesting innovations and processing facilities as well as difficulty transporting bulk hemp. estimates of profitability from hemp production are highly speculative, and do not include additional costs of growing hemp in a regulated market, such as cost associated with “licensing, monitoring, and verification of commercial hemp

hemp production “is not likely to generate profits although hemp may be “slightly more profitable than row crops it is less profitable than specialty crops” due to the harvesting tech which are labor intensive and result in high costs U.S. hemp growers could be affected by competition from other producers as well as production limitations including yield variability lack of harvesting and processing facilities as well as transporting bulk hemp estimates are highly speculative and do not include additional costs of growing hemp in a regulated market such as licensing, monitoring, and verification of commercial hemp

Similarly, the UW-M study concluded that hemp production “is not likely to generate sizeable profits” and although hemp may be “slightly more profitable than traditional row crops” it is likely “less profitable than other specialty crops” due to the “current state of harvesting and processing technologies, which are quite labor intensive, and result in relatively high per unit costs.”26 The study highlights that U.S. hemp growers could be affected by competition from other world producers as well as by certain production limitations in the United States, including yield variability and lack of harvesting innovations and processing facilities in the United States, as well as difficulty transporting bulk hemp. The study further claims that most estimates of profitability from hemp production are highly speculative, and often do not include additional costs of growing hemp in a regulated market, such as the cost associated with “licensing, monitoring, and verification of commercial hemp.”27

<h4>It won’t be profitable – labor, processing and transport costs – aff studies are speculative and don’t account for added regulatory cost burdens </h4><p>Renee <u><strong>Johnson 13</u></strong> – specialist in agriculture policy @ CRS, “Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity”, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32725.pdf, July 24 </p><p>Similarly, <u>the</u> UW-M <u>study</u> <u>conclude</u>d that <u><mark>hemp production “is not likely to generate</mark> sizeable <mark>profits</mark>” and <mark>although hemp may</mark> <mark>be “slightly more profitable than</mark> traditional <mark>row crops</mark>” <mark>it is</mark> </u>likely “<u><mark>less profitable than</mark> other <mark>specialty crops” due to the</mark> “current state of <mark>harvesting</mark> and processing <mark>tech</mark>nologies, <mark>which are</u></mark> quite<u> <mark>labor intensive</mark>, <mark>and result in</u></mark> relatively <u><mark>high</mark> per unit <mark>costs</u></mark>.”26 The study highlights that <u><mark>U.S. hemp growers could be affected by competition from other</mark> world <mark>producers as well</u> <u>as</u></mark> by certain <u><mark>production limitations</mark> in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u><mark>including yield variability</mark> and <mark>lack of harvesting</mark> innovations <mark>and processing facilities</u></mark> in the United States, <u><mark>as well as</mark> difficulty <mark>transporting bulk hemp</mark>.</u> The study further claims that most <u><mark>estimates</mark> of profitability from hemp production <strong><mark>are highly speculative</strong></mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> often <u><strong><mark>do not include additional costs of growing hemp in a regulated market</strong></mark>, <mark>such as</u></mark> the <u>cost associated with “<mark>licensing, monitoring, and verification of commercial hemp</u><strong></mark>.</strong>”27</p>

1NR

Warming

AT Hemp

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Steve Pointer

1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

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Concluding your critical analysis with the simple statement “legalize the prostitute” ruins the entire point of genealogical investigation in the first place – the goal is to make you feel uncomfortable with everything about how we are currently acting, and that uneasiness cannot be achieved if you’re told exactly what to do

Flyvberg & Richardon 2 – dept of development @ Aalborg University

Flyvberg & Richardon 2 – dept of development @ Aalborg University (Bent, Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning & Tim, University of Sheffield, Department of Town and Regional Planning, Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory, http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf.) JPG

theory shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. It becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent Foucault is a declared opponent of definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’ Foucault’s norms are to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ and in this way ‘to give new impetus to the undefined work of freedom’ Foucault is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with totalitarian implications Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local suggests real opportunities for agency and change ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems can ensure freedom ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault ‘I am attempting, to the contrary to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ This is an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations For Foucault freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice Whereas Habermas emphasises macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point for the fight against domination. Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault says It’s true that people who work in the prison...are not likely to find instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and directly distances himself from the universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out The establishment of genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power.

Foucault’s norms are to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ and to give impetus to the undefined work of freedom’ any form of government must be subjected to analysis and critique Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with totalitarian implications ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise institutions which appear to be neutral and independent such that political violence will be unmasked freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on power relations my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses become problematic, difficult, dangerous Foucault distances himself from the universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas solutions’ of this type are part of the problem. genealogical studies show how things can be done differently genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power

3. Towards Foucault Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. It therefore becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65). Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals, understood as definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170). Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. Foucault’s norms are not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ (Miller 1993, 316) and in this way ‘to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault 1984a, 46). Foucault here is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good. For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate. Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that suggests real opportunities for agency and change (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101). Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective. According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault (1984b, 375-6), ‘I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds: ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. For Foucault praxis and freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom. Whereas Habermas emphasises procedural macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality - having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point of departure for the fight against domination. It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning: It’s true that certain people, such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison...are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993, 235). The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and he directly distances himself from the kinds of universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are themselves part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out only in order to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth--a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14). The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987). The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power. And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues. In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus.

<h4><u>Concluding your critical analysis with the simple statement “legalize the prostitute” ruins the entire point of genealogical investigation in the first place – the goal is to make you feel uncomfortable with everything about how we are currently acting, and that uneasiness cannot be achieved if you’re told exactly what to do</h4><p><strong>Flyvberg & Richardon 2 – dept of development @ Aalborg University</p><p></u></strong>(Bent, Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning & Tim, University of Sheffield, Department of Town and Regional Planning, Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory, http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf.) JPG</p><p>3. Towards Foucault Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, <u><strong>theory</u></strong> engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus <u><strong>shifts from what </strong>should be done<strong> to what </strong>is actually done.</u> This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. <u><strong>It</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians</u></strong>, administrators <u><strong>and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent</u></strong> (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65). Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--<u><strong>Foucault is a declared opponent of</u></strong> ideals, understood as <u>definitive answers<strong> to Kant’s question, </strong>‘What ought I to do?’<strong> or Lenin’s </strong>‘What is to be done?’</u>--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170). Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s norms are</u></strong></mark> not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire <u><strong><mark>to challenge </strong>‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’</u></mark> (Miller 1993, 316) <u><strong><mark>and</mark> in this way ‘<mark>to give</mark> new <mark>impetus</u></strong></mark>, as far and wide as possible, <u><strong><mark>to the undefined work of freedom’</u></strong></mark> (Foucault 1984a, 46). <u><strong>Foucault</u></strong> here <u><strong>is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom <mark>any form of government</mark> - liberal or totalitarian - </strong><mark>must be subjected to analysis and critique</u></mark> based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. <u><strong><mark>Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding</u></strong></mark> independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. <u><strong><mark>Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with</u></strong></mark> the kind of utopian-<u><strong><mark>totalitarian implications</u></strong></mark> that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good. For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate. Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is <u><strong>Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local</u></strong>, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that <u><strong>suggests real opportunities for agency and change</u></strong> (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101). Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective. According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). <u><strong>‘[The juridical system] is </strong>utterly incongruous<strong> with the new methods of power,’</u></strong> says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ <u><strong>The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems</u></strong>, according to Foucault, <u><strong>can ensure freedom</u></strong>, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. <u><strong>‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault</u></strong> (1984b, 375-6), <u><strong>‘I am attempting, to the contrary</u></strong>, apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - <u><strong>to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his <mark>‘political task’ is ‘to criticise</u></strong></mark> the working of <u><strong><mark>institutions which appear to be</mark> both </strong><mark>neutral and independent<strong></mark>; to criticise them in <mark>such</mark> a manner <mark>that</mark> the <mark>political violence</mark> which has always exercised itself</u></strong> obscurely <u><strong>through them <mark>will be unmasked</mark>, so that one can fight them’</u></strong> (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). <u><strong>This is</u></strong> what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as <u><strong>an </strong>effective approach to institutional change<strong>, including change in the institutions of civil society.</u></strong> With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds: ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, <u><strong>Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations</u></strong> in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. <u><strong>For Foucault</u></strong> praxis and <u><strong><mark>freedom are derived not from universals or theories. </strong>Freedom is a practice</u></mark>, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom. <u><strong>Whereas Habermas emphasises</u></strong> procedural <u><strong>macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics</u></strong>, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality - having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. <u><strong><mark>Foucault would </strong>prescribe neither process nor outcome<strong>; he would only recommend </strong>a focus on</mark> conflict and <mark>power relations<strong></mark> as the most effective point</u></strong> of departure <u><strong>for the fight against domination.</u></strong> It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that <u><strong>Foucault has been described as </strong>non-action oriented.</u> <u><strong>Foucault</u></strong> (1981) <u><strong>says</u></strong> about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning: <u><strong>It’s true that</u></strong> certain <u><strong>people</u></strong>, such as those <u><strong>who work in the</u></strong> institutional setting of the <u><strong>prison...are not likely to find</u></strong> advice or <u><strong>instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But <mark>my project is precisely to bring it about that </strong>they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses</mark> that up until then had seemed to go without saying <mark>become problematic, difficult, dangerous</u></mark> (Miller 1993, 235). The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that <u><strong><mark>Foucault </mark>hesitates to give directives for action, and</u></strong> he <u>directly<mark> distances himself from the</u></mark> kinds of <u><mark>universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas</u></mark> which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. <u><strong>Foucault believes that ‘<mark>solutions’ of this type are</u></strong></mark> themselves <u><mark>part of the problem.</u> <u><strong></mark>Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s <mark>genealogical studies</mark> are carried out</u></strong> only in order <u><strong>to <mark>show how things </strong>can<strong> be done differently</mark> to ‘separate out</u></strong>, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth--a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14). <u><strong>The establishment of</u></strong> a concrete <u><strong><mark>genealogy opens </strong>possibilities<strong> for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this</u></strong></mark> particular genesis <u><strong><mark>is not connected to absolute historical necessity.</mark> Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form</u></strong>, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987). The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. <u><strong><mark>Understanding how power works is the </strong>first prerequisite for action<strong>, because action is the exercise of power</mark>.</u></strong> And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues. In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus. </p>

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1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

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It is at this point that communities use the figure of vitality to define themselves in opposition to what is “threatening” to life preservation – the allowance of bodies to be inscribed with measurable attributes enables violence through bodily coding, particularly against bodies deemed “impaired” or “abnormal”. Natasha Saltes explains

Natasha, Queens University, “‘Abnormal’ Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion: Biopolitics and the Paradox of Disability Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 2013 SJE

debates about the relationship between biological life and the state have prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s biopolitics the ‘abnormality’ of impairment are the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization biopolitics is an active and reactive process that politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive biopower is a disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at the population while both are ‘technologies of the body’ Biopower is exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that ‘discipline’ and condition the individualized body through processes of surveillance and training while biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological and political problem and operates through administrative and strategic arrangements of the state and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment It is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’ Foucault defines the normalizing society as ‘a society in which the norm of disciplines and the norm of regulation intersect It is a society in which power dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the population that the underlying principles of the norm are that of ‘qualification and correction’ contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against ‘quantifiable qualities’ Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’

debates about the relationship between biological life) and the state (politics) have ¶ prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s biopolitics the ‘abnormality’ of impairment are the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization biopolitics is an ¶ active process that politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive Biopower is ¶ exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that condition the individualized body biopolitics operates through strategic arrangements of the state and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities It ¶ is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’ It is a society in which power ¶ dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the ¶ population ( Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’

Ongoing debates about the relationship between bodies (biological life) and the state (politics) have ¶ prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s writings and lectures on biopolitics. Among the competing¶ articulations, Lazzarato provides a useful contextualization of the parameters of biopolitics noting that it can be ‘understood as a government-population-political economy relationship [that] refers to a dynamic ¶ of forces that establishes a new relationship between ontology and politics’ (2002: 102). Scholars who ¶ have examined Foucault’s lectures have traced biopolitical themes in his genealogy of race (Su ¶ Rasmussen 2011) showing how otherness emerges as a result of the construction of inferior races (Fassin ¶ 2001). A parallel can be drawn between the otherness of racialization and the ‘abnormality’ of impairment ¶ in that both are the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization. ¶ A common theme that weaves through diverging views of biopolitics is an emphasis on the dyadic ¶ relationship between life and politics. What has been largely overlooked is the notion that biopolitics is an ¶ active and reactive process that politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive and therefore worthy or ¶ risky. In this way, biopolitics operates on its own paradoxical axis in that its strategic aims and methods ¶ are carried out through a range of practices that, according to Esposito, can on one hand be ‘affirmative ¶ and productive and on the other hand negative and lethal’ (2008: 46). To illustrate the underlying ¶ rationalization of biopolitics it is fruitful to return to Foucault and his conception of biopower and ¶ biopolitics in the context of the ‘normalizing society’. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1975-1976, Foucault (2003b) distinguishes between these two ¶ concepts noting that biopower is a disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body ¶ while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at the population. Foucault clarifies that while ¶ both are ‘technologies of the body’ (2003b: 249), the trajectory of power differs for each. Biopower is ¶ exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that ¶ ‘discipline’ and condition the individualized body through processes of surveillance and training while ¶ biopolitics is concerned with the population as a biological and political problem and operates through ¶ administrative and strategic arrangements of the state through ‘forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall ¶ measures’ and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the ¶ effects of the environment’ (2003b: 245-246). ¶ According to Foucault (2003b), the concept that underpins biopower and biopolitics is ‘the norm’ (253). It ¶ is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’ (2003b: ¶ 253). Foucault defines the normalizing society as ‘a society in which the norm of disciplines [biopower] ¶ and the norm of regulation [biopolitics] intersect…’ (2003b: 253). It is a society in which power ¶ dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the ¶ population (Foucault 2003b: 253). Foucault (2003a) suggests that the ‘norm’ is a political concept wherein ¶ processes of power emerge and are legitimized. He claims that the underlying principles of the norm are ¶ that of ‘qualification and correction’ (2003a: 50). Mader observes that processes of ‘qualification and ¶ correction’ are contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against ‘quantifiable qualities’ (2007: 6). ¶ Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’ (2007: 6). Although Foucault recognizes the repressive outcomes of political power exercised through processes ¶ of normalization, he is averse to conceptualizing political power in strictly repressive terms and suggests ¶ that repression is a ‘secondary effect’ (2003a: 52) and that the function of power that emerges in ¶ accordance with the norm is not to ‘exclude and reject’, but is ‘a positive technique of intervention and ¶ transformation, to a sort of normative project’ (2003a: 50). Foucault’s association of the normative project ¶ with positive intervention might seem curious given the underlying themes of power and its relation to ¶ social control that underlie much of his work. Yet, he contends that disciplines of normalization that ¶ emerged in the eighteenth century produced a productive form of power aimed toward ‘transformation and ¶ innovation’ (2003a: 52).

<h4>It is at this point that communities use the figure of vitality to define themselves in opposition to what is “threatening” to life preservation – the allowance of bodies to be inscribed with measurable attributes enables violence through bodily coding, particularly against bodies deemed “impaired” or “abnormal”. Natasha Saltes explains</h4><p>Natasha, Queens University, “‘Abnormal’ Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion: Biopolitics and the Paradox of Disability Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society 2013 SJE</p><p>Ongoing <u><strong><mark>debates about the relationship between</u></strong></mark> bodies (<u><strong><mark>biological life</u></strong>) <u><strong>and the state </u></strong>(politics) <u><strong>have </u>¶<u> prompted scholars to revisit Foucault’s</u></strong></mark> writings and lectures on <u><strong><mark>biopolitics</u></strong></mark>. Among the competing¶ articulations, Lazzarato provides a useful contextualization of the parameters of biopolitics noting that it can be ‘understood as a government-population-political economy relationship [that] refers to a dynamic ¶ of forces that establishes a new relationship between ontology and politics’ (2002: 102). Scholars who ¶ have examined Foucault’s lectures have traced biopolitical themes in his genealogy of race (Su ¶ Rasmussen 2011) showing how otherness emerges as a result of the construction of inferior races (Fassin ¶ 2001). A parallel can be drawn between the otherness of racialization and <u><strong><mark>the ‘abnormality’ of impairment</u></strong></mark> ¶ in that both <u><strong><mark>are the consequences of a biopolitical regime underpinned by normalization</u></strong></mark>. ¶ A common theme that weaves through diverging views of biopolitics is an emphasis on the dyadic ¶ relationship between life and politics. What has been largely overlooked is the notion that <u><strong><mark>biopolitics is an </u>¶<u> active</mark> and reactive <mark>process that politicizes life by locating it within the polarizing paradigm of normality and abnormality and thus categorizing life as either productive or unproductive</u></strong></mark> and therefore worthy or ¶ risky. In this way, biopolitics operates on its own paradoxical axis in that its strategic aims and methods ¶ are carried out through a range of practices that, according to Esposito, can on one hand be ‘affirmative ¶ and productive and on the other hand negative and lethal’ (2008: 46). To illustrate the underlying ¶ rationalization of biopolitics it is fruitful to return to Foucault and his conception of biopower and ¶ biopolitics in the context of the ‘normalizing society’. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1975-1976, Foucault (2003b) distinguishes between these two ¶ concepts noting that <u><strong>biopower is a disciplinary technology of power aimed at the individualized body </u>¶<u> while biopolitics is a regulatory technology of power aimed at the population</u></strong>. Foucault clarifies that <u><strong>while </u>¶<u> both are ‘technologies of the body’</u></strong> (2003b: 249), the trajectory of power differs for each. <u><strong><mark>Biopower is </u>¶<u> exercised through knowledge and power structures embedded within institutional arrangements that</mark> </u>¶<u> ‘discipline’ and <mark>condition the individualized body</mark> through processes of surveillance and training while </u>¶<u> <mark>biopolitics</mark> is concerned with the population as a biological and political problem and <mark>operates through</mark> </u>¶<u> administrative and <mark>strategic arrangements of the state</mark> </u></strong>through ‘forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall ¶ measures’ <u><strong><mark>and intervenes in ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities</mark>, and the </u>¶<u> effects of the environment</u></strong>’ (2003b: 245-246). ¶ According to Foucault (2003b), the concept that underpins biopower and biopolitics is ‘the norm’ (253). <u><strong><mark>It </u></strong>¶<u><strong> is the application of the norm to the body and population that establishes the ‘normalizing society’</u></strong></mark> (2003b: ¶ 253). <u><strong>Foucault defines the normalizing society as ‘a society in which the norm of disciplines </u></strong>[biopower] ¶ <u><strong>and the norm of regulation</u></strong> [biopolitics] <u><strong>intersect</u></strong>…’ (2003b: 253). <u><strong><mark>It is a society in which power </u>¶<u> dominates the ‘organic and the biological’ through control over the life of both the body and the </u>¶<u> population </u></strong>(</mark>Foucault 2003b: 253). Foucault (2003a) suggests that the ‘norm’ is a political concept wherein ¶ processes of power emerge and are legitimized. He claims <u><strong>that the underlying principles of the norm are </u>¶<u> that of ‘qualification and correction’</u></strong> (2003a: 50). Mader observes that processes of ‘qualification and ¶ correction’ are <u><strong>contingent on comparing and measuring bodies against ‘quantifiable qualities’ </u></strong>(2007: 6). ¶ <u><strong><mark>Only when bodies are inscribed with measurable attributes can they be ‘controlled and managed’</u></strong></mark> (2007: 6). Although Foucault recognizes the repressive outcomes of political power exercised through processes ¶ of normalization, he is averse to conceptualizing political power in strictly repressive terms and suggests ¶ that repression is a ‘secondary effect’ (2003a: 52) and that the function of power that emerges in ¶ accordance with the norm is not to ‘exclude and reject’, but is ‘a positive technique of intervention and ¶ transformation, to a sort of normative project’ (2003a: 50). Foucault’s association of the normative project ¶ with positive intervention might seem curious given the underlying themes of power and its relation to ¶ social control that underlie much of his work. Yet, he contends that disciplines of normalization that ¶ emerged in the eighteenth century produced a productive form of power aimed toward ‘transformation and ¶ innovation’ (2003a: 52). </p>

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1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Legalizing prostitution increases sex trafficking, multiple links:

<h4>Legalizing prostitution increases sex trafficking, multiple links: </h4>

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Capitalism causes endless warfare and destroys value to life – turns the case

Robinson 14

Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)

US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.

global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” We are headed towards a global police state The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for obedience States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict the polarization of the world population generates new social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”

However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.

<h4><u><strong>Capitalism causes endless warfare and destroys value to life – turns the case </h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life</strong>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u>as a response by the US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u>There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities</u>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong><mark>We are headed</u></strong></mark> in this regard <u><strong><mark>towards a global police state</u></strong></mark>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong><mark>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse</mark> than Orwell imagined, <mark>because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for</mark> their <mark>obedience</mark> and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u>extreme inequality and social polarization</u> in the global system <u>means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. <strong>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong> <u>The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u>Unloading the surplus through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u>aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u><mark>the polarization of the world population</mark> into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated <mark>generates new</mark> spatial <mark>social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed</mark> and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent.</u> <u>All this and much more are part of the militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>

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Allouche 11 Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

debates on whether scarcity of food or water will lead to conflict comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between resources and population growth most empirical studies do not support these arguments. Tech and capital have dramatically increased productivity the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. alarmist scenarios linked use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. In the Middle East foreign ministers have used this bellicose rhetoric. The evidence seems quite weak. none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited to governmental rhetoric more than two-thirds of 1800 water events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale organized political bodies signed more than 3600 water-related treaties There is no correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Water rich countries have been involved in disputes with other water rich countries perceptions of the amount of available water drives co-operation among riparians the threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the recent historical record. debates over climate change popularised water wars. Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin

Tech and capital have increased productivity humankind has breached resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. None of the various and extensive databases on causes of war show water 80% of incidents were limited to rhetoric two-thirds fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale perceptions of water drives co-operation threat of water wars does not make sense in the light of the historical record

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

<h4>No food wars impact</h4><p><u><strong>Allouche 11</p><p></u></strong>Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11¶ (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)</p><p>The question of resource scarcity has led to many <u>debates on whether scarcity</u> (whether <u>of food or water</u>) <u>will lead to conflict</u> and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars <u>comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between</u> the economic availability of natural <u>resources and population growth</u> since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that <u><strong>most empirical studies do not support</u></strong> any of <u><strong>these</u></strong> neo-Malthusian <u><strong>arguments.</u></strong> <u><mark>Tech</u></mark>nological change <u><mark>and</u></mark> greater inputs of <u><mark>capital have</mark> dramatically <mark>increased</u></mark> labour <u><mark>productivity</u></mark> in agriculture. More generally, <u>the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because</u> during the last two centuries <u><mark>humankind has breached</u></mark> many <u><mark>resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.</u></mark>¶<u> </u>Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of <u><strong>alarmist scenarios</u></strong> have <u>linked</u> the increasing <u>use of water resources and food insecurity with wars.</u> The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ <u><strong>In the Middle East</u></strong>, presidents, prime ministers and <u>foreign ministers have</u> also <u>used this bellicose rhetoric.</u> Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. <u>The evidence seems quite weak.</u> Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, <u>none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.</u>¶<u> </u>The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ <u><mark>None of the <strong>various and extensive databases</strong> on</mark> the <mark>causes of war show water</mark> as a casus belli.</u> Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, <u>Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause</u> for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about <u><mark>80% of</mark> the <mark>incidents</mark> relating to water <mark>were limited</u></mark> purely <u><mark>to</mark> governmental <mark>rhetoric</u></mark> intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, <u>more than <mark>two-thirds</mark> of</u> over <u>1800 water</u>-related ‘<u>events’ <mark>fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale</u></mark> (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), <u>organized political bodies signed</u> between the year 805 and 1984 <u>more than 3600 water-related treaties</u>, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. <u><strong>There is</u></strong> however <u><strong>no</u></strong> direct <u><strong>correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. </u></strong>Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). <u>Water rich countries have been involved in</u> a number of <u>disputes with other</u> relatively <u>water rich countries</u> (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, <u><mark>perceptions of</mark> the amount of available <mark>water</u></mark> shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity <u><mark>drives</u></mark> the process of <u><mark>co-operation</mark> among riparians</u> (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).¶ In terms of international relations, <u><strong>the <mark>threat of water wars</u></strong></mark> due to increasing scarcity <u><strong><mark>does not make</u></strong></mark> much <u><strong><mark>sense in the light of the</mark> recent <mark>historical record</mark>.</u></strong> Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The <u>debates over</u> the likely impacts of <u>climate change</u> have again <u>popularised</u> the idea of <u>water wars.</u> The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). <u>Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin</u> ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).</p>

1NR

Warming

Agriculture

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D3

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UTD BF

Steve Pointer

1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

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cx

college

The result of this normalizing power of the community constructs an ongoing situation of state-commissioned genocide where entire populations can be exterminated in the name of necessity and vitality – Foucault explains

Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality An introduction, pp 136-7, Robert Hurley Translation

Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality An introduction, pp 136-7, Robert Hurley Translation

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them There has been a parallel shift in the right of death to align itself with life-administering power and define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. this formidable power of death now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power working to control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them There has been a parallel shift in the right of death to align itself with life-administering power This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death – and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits – now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

<h4>The result of this normalizing power of the community constructs an ongoing situation of state-commissioned genocide where entire populations can be exterminated in the name of necessity and vitality – Foucault explains</h4><p><u><strong>Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality An introduction, pp 136-7, Robert Hurley Translation</p><p><mark>Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power</mark>. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, <mark>working to</mark> incite, reinforce, <mark>control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them</u></strong></mark>, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. <u><strong><mark>There has been a parallel shift in the right of death</u></strong></mark>, or at least a tendency <u><strong><mark>to align itself with</u></strong></mark> the exigencies of a <u><strong><mark>life-administering power</mark> and</u></strong> to <u><strong>define itself accordingly. <mark>This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life.</u></strong></mark> Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But <u><strong>this formidable power of death</u></strong> – and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits – <u><strong>now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life</u></strong>, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. <u><strong><mark>Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital</u></strong></mark>. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. <u><strong>The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: <mark>the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence</u></strong></mark>. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But <u><strong>the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. <mark>If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power</u></strong>s</mark>, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; <u><strong><mark>it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.</p></u></strong></mark>

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1

Vermont BL

Weitz

1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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1. Best study proves

Cho et al. ‘13

Cho et al. ‘13

[SEO-YOUNG CHO, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin, Germany. AXEL DREHER, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany. ERIC NEUMAYER, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. World Development, 41 (1), 2013, pp. 67-82. ETB]

<h4>1. <u><strong>Best study proves</h4><p>Cho et al. ‘13</p><p></u></strong>[SEO-YOUNG CHO, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin, Germany. AXEL DREHER, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany. ERIC NEUMAYER, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. World Development, 41 (1), 2013, pp. 67-82. ETB]</p>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

N

UNLV

5

Kansas HR

Justin Stanley

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

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The alt is to reject the aff

Engler 08

Engler 08 [Mark, author and analyst with foreign policy in focus, “There is an alternative to corporate rule”]

as long as democratic movements do not have the power to overrule political and economic elites, there exists an important case for just saying "no" -- for first insisting that those now in power stop doing harm. When Wall Street neoliberals and Washington militarists ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions. Their question serves to naturalize very radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal and acceptable states of affairs. They are not. In a situation where power is grossly imbalanced, where crimes are being perpetuated in the name of democracy, and where ever larger sections of public life are being handed over to the market, saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself. In an important respect, the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA. Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions -- not just in Iraq, but also, to mention some particularly ignoble examples of the past 60 years, in Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua -- calling for a moratorium on such military actions, official and covert, is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization. The agenda of corporate globalization, , has relied on forceful maneuvering to come into existence. Neoliberalism involves aggressively opening markets, clearing the way for a previously unheard of level of speculative capital transfer, and dictating the restructuring of local economies. None of these things occur naturally, and they deserve opposition. A moratorium on harmful deals and on further expansion , is a vital immediate demand. Simply refusing each of the mandates of the Washington Consensus -- or at least rejecting the idea that they should be imposed world as a one-size-fits-all uniform would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics. The true utopians in the global economy are people who embraced the market fundamentalist fantasy that unchecked capital would serve the common good. Refuting this idea can be fairly straightforward. When the Washington Consensus demands the privatization of public industry and the division of the commons into private property, an alternative is to keep these things in the hands of the public, defending the provision of public goods as a way of ensuring economic human rights -- If it calls for cuts in social services, an alternative is to reject the cuts, And when IMF bailouts for wealthy investors create a situation in which, to paraphrase author Eduardo Galeano, "risk is socialized while profit is privatized," an alternative is simply to end these bailouts, making speculators bear the cost of their gambles. The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South than currently exists. It would grant countries the freedom to determine their own economic policies, priorities for government spending, and rules for controlling foreign investment. Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look virtually unrecognizable to those who have grown accustomed to Washington-dictated corporate globalization. ever-larger swaths of the globe view the neoliberal doctrine of corporate expansion as a failed and discredited vision. This creates unique opportunities for citizens to fight to bring a democratic globalization into existence many people are already doing so, and, on key issues they are winning. For there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.

there exists an important case for just saying "no" insisting that those in power stop doing harm When neoliberals ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions serves to naturalize radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions calling for a moratorium on actions is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization Simply refusing mandates would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics. The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development. It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look unrecognizable there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.

The ideas, experiences, and proposals of the World Social Forum provide a trove of information for all those who want to construct a new agenda for the global economy. At the same time, as long as democratic movements do not have the power to overrule political and economic elites, there exists an important case for just saying "no" -- for first insisting that those now in power stop doing harm.¶ When Wall Street neoliberals and Washington militarists ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions. Their question serves to naturalize very radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal and acceptable states of affairs. They are not. In a situation where power is grossly imbalanced, where crimes are being perpetuated in the name of democracy, and where ever larger sections of public life are being handed over to the market, saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself.¶ In an important respect, the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA. The neocons' invasion of Iraq has cost thousands of American lives, taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, produced some two million refugees, and is set to squander over a trillion dollars of public funds. It has generated heightened regional tensions, greater instability, and more terrorism.Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions -- not just in Iraq, but also, to mention some particularly ignoble examples of the past 60 years, in Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua -- calling for a moratorium on such military actions, official and covert, is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization.¶ The agenda of corporate globalization, which unfortunately thrived during the Clinton presidency and is still popular within the right wing of the Democratic Party, is subtler. But this, too, has relied on forceful maneuvering to come into existence. Neoliberalism involves aggressively opening markets, clearing the way for a previously unheard of level of speculative capital transfer, and dictating the restructuring of local economies. None of these things occur naturally, and they deserve opposition. A moratorium on harmful "free trade" deals and on further expansion of the WTO, especially into areas beyond the traditional realm of trade, is a vital immediate demand.¶ Simply refusing each of the mandates of the Washington Consensus -- or at least rejecting the idea that they should be imposed world as a one-size-fits-all uniform for development -- would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics. The true utopians in the global economy are people who embraced the market fundamentalist fantasy that unchecked capital would serve the common good. Refuting this idea can be fairly straightforward.¶ Neoliberal corporate globalization prescribes the elimination of tariffs and other protections for local enterprises. An alternative would be to allow poorer countries to keep these intact, reviving what is known in trade agreements as "special and differential treatment." This model would give developing countries more flexibility in choosing to nurture infant industries and to protect agricultural commodities that are important to traditional cultures and to the security of their food supply. When the Washington Consensus demands the privatization of public industry and the division of the commons into private property, an alternative is to keep these things in the hands of the public, defending the provision of public goods as a way of ensuring economic human rights -- including guaranteed public access to water, electricity, and health care.If it calls for cuts in social services, an alternative is to reject the cuts, maintaining or bolstering these services and instead pushing for a redistributive tax system that makes the wealthy pay their fair share.¶ When Washington mandates a more "flexible" labor market -- one without unions or worker protections -- an alternative is to defend living wages, collective bargaining, and the right to associate. And when IMF bailouts for wealthy investors create a situation in which, to paraphrase author Eduardo Galeano, "risk is socialized while profit is privatized," an alternative is simply to end these bailouts, making speculators bear the cost of their gambles.¶ The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South than currently exists. It would grant countries the freedom to determine their own economic policies, priorities for government spending, and rules for controlling foreign investment. Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development. While this does not by itself constitute a vision for ensuring human rights or protecting the environment, it nevertheless represents an important strategic gain. It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look virtually unrecognizable to those who have grown accustomed to Washington-dictated corporate globalization.¶ Those who reject corporate and imperial models of globalization have a wealth of ideas at their disposal, a healthy internal debate to refine their strategies, and a vibrant, growing international network of citizens that see their efforts as part an interconnected whole. They also have very powerful enemies. Fortunately, as we enter the post-Bush era, the international community has voiced a firm rejection of unilateralism and preemptive war. Likewise, ever-larger swaths of the globe view the neoliberal doctrine of corporate expansion as a failed and discredited vision. This creates unique opportunities for citizens to fight to bring a democratic globalization into existence. More exciting still is that many people are already doing so, and, on key issues like debt relief and across entire regions like the Latin America, they are winning. The punditry is increasingly taking notice. For there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.

<h4>The alt is to reject the aff</h4><p><u><strong>Engler 08</u></strong> [Mark, author and analyst with foreign policy in focus, “There is an alternative to corporate rule”]</p><p> </p><p>The ideas, experiences, and proposals of the World Social Forum provide a trove of information for all those who want to construct a new agenda for the global economy. At the same time, <u>as long as democratic movements do not have the power to overrule political and economic elites, <mark>there exists an important case for just saying "no"</mark> -- for first <mark>insisting that those</mark> now <mark>in power stop doing harm</mark>.</u>¶ <u><mark>When</mark> Wall Street <mark>neoliberals</mark> and Washington militarists <mark>ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions</mark>. Their question <mark>serves to naturalize</mark> very <mark>radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal</mark> and acceptable states of affairs. They are not. In a situation where power is grossly imbalanced, where crimes are being perpetuated in the name of democracy, and where ever larger sections of public life are being handed over to the market, <mark>saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself</mark>.</u>¶ <u>In an important respect, <mark>the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA</mark>.</u> The neocons' invasion of Iraq has cost thousands of American lives, taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, produced some two million refugees, and is set to squander over a trillion dollars of public funds. It has generated heightened regional tensions, greater instability, and more terrorism.<u><mark>Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions</mark> -- not just in Iraq, but also, to mention some particularly ignoble examples of the past 60 years, in Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua --</u> <u><mark>calling for a moratorium on</mark> such military <mark>actions</mark>, official and covert, <mark>is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization</mark>.</u>¶ <u>The agenda of corporate globalization,</u> which unfortunately thrived during the Clinton presidency and is still popular within the right wing of the Democratic Party, is subtler. But this, too<u>, has relied on forceful maneuvering to come into existence. Neoliberalism involves aggressively opening markets, clearing the way for a previously unheard of level of speculative capital transfer, and dictating the restructuring of local economies. None of these things occur naturally, and they deserve opposition. A moratorium on harmful</u> "free trade" <u>deals and on further expansion</u> of the WTO, especially into areas beyond the traditional realm of trade<u>, is a vital immediate demand.</u>¶ <u><mark>Simply refusing</mark> each of the <mark>mandates</mark> of the Washington Consensus -- or at least rejecting the idea that they should be imposed world as a one-size-fits-all uniform </u>for development -- <u><strong><mark>would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics.</strong></mark> The true utopians in the global economy are people who embraced the market fundamentalist fantasy that unchecked capital would serve the common good. Refuting this idea can be fairly straightforward.</u>¶ Neoliberal corporate globalization prescribes the elimination of tariffs and other protections for local enterprises. An alternative would be to allow poorer countries to keep these intact, reviving what is known in trade agreements as "special and differential treatment." This model would give developing countries more flexibility in choosing to nurture infant industries and to protect agricultural commodities that are important to traditional cultures and to the security of their food supply. <u>When the Washington Consensus demands the privatization of public industry and the division of the commons into private property, an alternative is to keep these things in the hands of the public, defending the provision of public goods as a way of ensuring economic human rights --</u> including guaranteed public access to water, electricity, and health care.<u>If it calls for cuts in social services, an alternative is to reject the cuts,</u> maintaining or bolstering these services and instead pushing for a redistributive tax system that makes the wealthy pay their fair share.¶ When Washington mandates a more "flexible" labor market -- one without unions or worker protections -- an alternative is to defend living wages, collective bargaining, and the right to associate. <u>And when IMF bailouts for wealthy investors create a situation in which, to paraphrase author Eduardo Galeano, "risk is socialized while profit is privatized," an alternative is simply to end these bailouts, making speculators bear the cost of their gambles.</u>¶ <u><mark>The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South</mark> than currently exists. It would grant countries the freedom to determine their own economic policies, priorities for government spending, and rules for controlling foreign investment. <mark>Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development</u>.</mark> While this does not by itself constitute a vision for ensuring human rights or protecting the environment, it nevertheless represents an important strategic gain. <u><mark>It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look</mark> virtually <mark>unrecognizable</mark> to those who have grown accustomed to Washington-dictated corporate globalization.</u>¶ Those who reject corporate and imperial models of globalization have a wealth of ideas at their disposal, a healthy internal debate to refine their strategies, and a vibrant, growing international network of citizens that see their efforts as part an interconnected whole. They also have very powerful enemies. Fortunately, as we enter the post-Bush era, the international community has voiced a firm rejection of unilateralism and preemptive war. Likewise, <u>ever-larger swaths of the globe view the neoliberal doctrine of corporate expansion as a failed and discredited vision. This creates unique opportunities for citizens to fight to bring a democratic globalization into existence</u>. More exciting still is that <u>many people are already doing so, and, on key issues</u> like debt relief and across entire regions like the Latin America, <u>they are winning.</u> The punditry is increasingly taking notice. <u>For <mark>there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.</p></u></mark>

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ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

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The power structures of normality are not a relic of the seventeenth century, they’re a continuous and systemic construction of symbolic ordering around death which manifests itself in modern PAS discourses primarily concerned with resolving the unruly nature of death – Zohreh Bayatrizi explains that the anxiety around “undignified death” has led to increasing medicalization, legality, and quantification of assisted suicide. This discursive regime of ordering reinforces itself through the legal system: the 9-0 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v Quill asserted a “legitimate state interest” in preserving life that judged any proposed “right to die” unconstitutional, the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act further demonstrated the state’s power to regulate death, normalizing the superiority of life and the state’s claim over it. Todd McDorman explains

Todd F. McDorman, Associate Professor in the Rhetoric Department at Wabash College, “Controlling Death: Bio-Power and the Right-to-Die Controversy” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, September 2005, pp. 257/279 KB

Normalizing the State's Interest in Life: The Root of Domination The response of the state to efforts to choose death has been to develop means of supervision and discipline that create a sort of public knowledge that normalizes the superiority of life and in particular the state's claim over it. through legal instruments statutes and selected Court decisions the importance of preserving the life Of the body became public knowledge the general prohibition against suicide became a more particularized concern with assisted death. The laws and court cases represent examples of authoritative discourses that normalize the state's interest in life and reflect the expansion of bio-power into the RTD. The thread connecting euthanasia, morality, and the state’s prohibition of suicide is codified in William Blackstone’s legal commentaries. Forming the basis of US common law, these commentaries established a presumption against suicide and, later, against assisted suicide and euthanasia By treating the issue as a definitional question prosecution maintained focus on classification deflecting questions of rights and autonomy, and established a legal norm that willfully ending one’s life was not allowed. Such focus allowed the state to overlook mitigating circumstances, the suffering of the individual, and the lack of value life had for the person in question. power is relational it exists in relation to the absence or suppression of resistance and it depends upon that resistance in maintaining its power network. The state consistently has asserted that its interests demand the right to control questions of life and death. New Jersey’s position of Quinlan was an early and clear indication of the state’s anti-euthanasia stance New Jersey’s Attorney General contended that the state’s ‘‘interest ... in the preservation of life,’’ despite Karen’s condition, demanded a ruling in its favor. in Cruzan the brief filed by the federal government claimed the state has a ‘‘profound interest in preserving human life’’ and should be given ‘‘considerable flexibility in adopting rules’’ on euthanasia. they called for the use of an extremely forgiving standard that only measures if a ‘‘rule is ‘reasonably designed’ to serve legitimate state interests.’ Rehnquist’s majority opinion validates and normalizes the state’s claim characterizing Missouri’s ‘‘interest in the protection and preservation of human life’’ as being of the utmost importance and credibility. this normalization of the state’s interest in life is accorded such immense power that it may overwhelm the autonomy of all citizens, since the state may assert its superiority regardless of the rationality and thought involved in an individual’s choice. Perhaps the most visible effort to discipline those who challenge the state’s control over life is observed in Michigan’s prosecution and conviction of RTD icon Jack Kevorkian. The decade-long pursuit of Kevorkian demonstrates the extent of state opposition to individual choice-in-dying and the lengths to which it will go in insuring control over life and death decisions. Kevorkian’s patients were not comatose and had not reached a terminal stage in their illness. In 1997, the government reasserted its opposition to assisted suicide the Clinton administration joined the Justice Department in filing two amicus curiae briefs in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. one of the briefs asserts that ‘‘overriding state interests justify the state’s decision to ban physicians from prescribing lethal medication. The state has an interest of the highest order in prohibiting its physicians from assisting in the purposeful taking of another person’s life. it would have been surprising only if the administration supported an individual’s interest in making end-of-life decisions the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a highly symbolic PAS bill the bill prevents the use of federal funds in paying for procedures connected to suicide assistance The bill served perceptually to reinforce the state’s claim over life. Since the passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act there have been multiple attempts at the federal level to thwart the decision of Oregon residents. These efforts initially consisted of two failed congressional attempts to pass the Pain Relief Promotion Act the 2001 ‘‘Ashcroft Directive’’ attempted to achieve the same result through non-legislative means. this proclamation authorized federal agents to take action against physicians who prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patients the US Congress hastily passed the "Compromise Bill," signed into law by Bush less than forty-eight hours after it was introduced by lawmakers. The intent of the act to normalize the state's control over life is plainly expressed in section two of the bill whereby legal proceedings are justified against any "person who was a party to State court proceedings relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life." The brazen act signals a federal interest to regulate life and death Consistent with the articulation of bio-power, the ‘‘power play’’ at work here is not threatening to end life, but threatening to preserve and monitor it through regulatory means.

The response of the state to efforts to choose death has been to develop means of supervision and discipline that create a public knowledge that normalizes the superiority of life and the state's claim over it. . The laws and court cases represent examples of authoritative discourses that normalize the state's interest in life and reflect the expansion of bio-power into the RTD. By treating the issue as a definitional question prosecution maintained focus on classification deflecting questions of autonomy, and established a legal norm that willfully ending one’s life was not allowed. Such focus allowed the state to overlook the suffering of the individual power is relational it exists in relation to the absence or suppression of resistance The state asserted that its interests demand the right to control questions of life and death. the brief filed by the federal government claimed the state has a ‘‘profound interest in preserving human life’’ they called for the standard that only measures if a ‘‘rule is ‘reasonably designed’ to serve legitimate state interests.’ Rehnquist’s opinion normalizes the state’s claim the state may assert its superiority regardless of the rationality and thought involved in an individual’s choice. In 97, the government reasserted its opposition in Glucksberg asserts that ‘‘overriding state interests justify the state’s ban the House and Senate passed a PAS bill prevents the use of federal funds in paying for suicide assistance. The bill served to reinforce the state’s claim over life. Since the Death with Dignity Act there have been multiple attempts at the federal level to thwart the decision of Oregon These efforts authorized federal agents to take action against physicians who prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patients Congress passed the "Compromise Bill," The intent to normalize the state's control over life is expressed in section two whereby legal proceedings are justified against any "person who was a party to State court proceedings relating to the withholding of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life." The brazen act, signals a federal interest to regulate life and death

Normalizing the State's Interest in Life: The Root of Domination As Foucault previously noted, the willful death Of the citizen through "suicide" has been a controversial issue throughout history. The response of the state to efforts to choose death has been to develop means of supervision and discipline that create a sort of public knowledge that normalizes the superiority of life and in particular the state's claim over it. That is, through legal instruments—statutes and selected Court decisions the importance of preserving the life Of the body became public knowledge. The selected fragments demonstrate the trajectory Of the issue, high- lighting both the state's persistence in regulating or supervising death and the changing nature Of the argument as the general prohibition against suicide became a more particularized concern with assisted death. As a critical rhetoric, this section traces the roots Of domination in exposing what has become the underlying principle for other efforts that discourage or prohibit the RTD. The laws and court cases discussed represent examples of authoritative discourses that normalize the state's interest in life and reflect the expansion of bio-power into the RTD. At least since St. Augustine's condemnation Of suicide, there has been a presumption against the moral and legal legitimacy Of ending one's ife.24 The thread connecting euthanasia, morality, and the state’s prohibition of suicide is codified in William Blackstone’s legal commentaries. Forming the basis of US common law, these commentaries established a presumption against suicide and, later, against assisted suicide or mercy killing and euthanasia.25 The prosecution of early instances of euthanasia or mercy killing as homicide demonstrated the state’s opposition to the practice, through a form of discipline, while signaling state appropriation of, or control over, the body.26 By treating the issue as a definitional question (mercy versus murder), prosecution maintained focus on classification, initially deflecting questions of rights and autonomy, and established a legal norm that willfully ending one’s life was not allowed. Such focus allowed the state to overlook mitigating circumstances, the suffering of the individual, and the lack of value life had for the person in question. By changing their strategy from attempting to distinguish ‘‘mercy killing’’ from ‘‘murder’’ to seeking legal permission for the act, RTD advocates sought to offer resistance, thereby challenging the dominant discourse. Such resistance demonstrates Foucault’s claim that power is relational, that it exists in relation to the absence or suppression of resistance and it depends upon that resistance in maintaining its power network.27 What we observe are the initial makings of a critical rhetoric critique of freedom on the part of activists, changing their strategy in an effort to protect the dying. The shift to examinations of a (constitutionally protected) right intimately connected to individual autonomy brought the legal system fully into the controversy. Almost uniformly, regulatory apparatuses such as state governments, often supported by the medical profession and religious groups, responded by opposing efforts at legal relief. The state consistently has asserted that its interests demand the right to control questions of life and death. New Jersey’s position in Matter of Quinlan (1976) was an early and clear indication of the state’s anti-euthanasia stance. Despite the unanimous opinion of medical experts that Karen Ann Quinlan had no hope of recovery, her father’s request for relief was opposed by Karen’s doctors, the hospital, the county prosecutor, and the State of New Jersey.28 New Jersey’s Attorney General contended that the state’s ‘‘interest ... in the preservation of life,’’ despite Karen’s condition, demanded a ruling in its favor. However in a radical move, the court ignored recognized medical practice and ruled in Quinlan’s favor based upon a right to privacy. Similarly, in Cruzan (1990), the brief filed by the federal government claimed the state has a ‘‘profound interest in preserving human life’’ and should be given ‘‘considerable flexibility in adopting rules’’ on euthanasia. In reasoning that proved persuasive to the Supreme Court, they called for the use of an extremely forgiving standard that only measures if a ‘‘rule is ‘reasonably designed’ to serve legitimate state interests.’’29 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion validates and normalizes the state’s claim, characterizing Missouri’s ‘‘interest in the protection and preservation of human life’’ as being of the utmost importance and credibility.30 As is suggested later in this essay, this normalization of the state’s interest in life is accorded such immense power that it may overwhelm the autonomy of all citizens, since the state may assert its superiority regardless of the rationality and thought involved in an individual’s choice. Perhaps the most dramatically visible*/as well as persistent*/effort to discipline those who challenge the state’s control over life is observed in Michigan’s repeated prosecution and ultimate conviction of RTD icon Jack Kevorkian. The almost decade-long pursuit of Kevorkian demonstrates the extent of state opposition to individual choice-in-dying and the lengths to which it will go in insuring control over life and death decisions. Unlike in Quinlan and Cruzan, Kevorkian’s patients were not comatose, were typically competent, and, on occasion, had not reached a terminal stage in their illness. His suicide assistance continued despite three trials and Michigan’s passage of statutes explicitly designed to prevent his practice.31 Kevorkian’s brazen act of moving from PAS to active euthanasia in the death of Thomas Youk, broadcast on 60 Minutes in November 1998, finally resulted in his conviction after a trial that featured Kevorkian representing himself in court. In 1997, the government reasserted its opposition to the RTD and assisted suicide through two separate courses of action. First, the Clinton administration joined the Justice Department in filing two amicus curiae, or friend-of-the-court, briefs in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. Despite acknowledging the significant interest of the individual in avoiding the protracted suffering, pain, and mental anguish that often accompany terminal illness, one of the briefs asserts that ‘‘overriding state interests justify the state’s decision to ban physicians from prescribing lethal medication. The state has an interest of the highest order in prohibiting its physicians from assisting in the purposeful taking of another person’s life.32 Although the Economist calls the filing surprising considering the Clinton administration’s stress on individual autonomy, this analysis demonstrates that it would have been surprising only if the administration removed itself from the controversy or supported an individual’s interest in making end-of-life decisions.33 Second, in the spring of 1997, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a highly symbolic PAS bill. Initially inaccurately reported by some as a ‘‘ban’’ on assisted suicide, the bill prevents the use of federal funds in paying for procedures connected to suicide assistance. The bill has no effect on patient care but served perceptually to reinforce the state’s claim over life. Passed in the House by a vote of 398/16 and in the Senate by a vote of 99/0, the bill was signed into law by President Clinton.34 Since the passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the most successful effort at resistance, there have been multiple attempts at the federal level to thwart the decision of Oregon residents. These efforts initially consisted of two failed congressional attempts to pass the ironically titled Pain Relief Promotion Act, which ostensibly would have worked to relieve patient pain by a de facto over-ruling of the Oregon law.35 Subsequently, the 6 November 2001 ‘‘Ashcroft Directive’’ attempted to achieve the same result through non-legislative means. A reversal of the policy announced by former Attorney General Janet Reno, this proclamation authorized federal agents to take action against physicians who prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patients*/actions that are legal under the Oregon statute.36 Four Oregon residents in various stages of terminal illness immediately challenged Ashcroft’s directive and, after an initial 2002 district court decision in favor of Oregon and the legitimacy of its death with dignity law, the government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.37 On 26 May 2004, a year after hearing the appeal, that court found the Ashcroft directive an unlawful effort to stifle ‘‘democratic debate about physician-assisted suicide.’’ Undeterred, the federal government made an additional effort to revalidate its power of supervision by persuading the Supreme Court to hear Gonzalez v. Oregon. 38 The most spectacular controversy to illustrate the persistence of the state in using legal instruments to control the body is the Terri Schiavo Saga. This unusually complex case, even by RTD standards, pitted family members against one another in debating proper treatment and garnered a level of media scrutiny likely unparalleled in the already visible controversy. The Case produced novel efforts to preserve the life Of the body in opposition to Court decisions and rebuked appeals, all in favor of Ms. Schiavo's husband and guardian, Michael Schiavo. Florida's Governor Jeb Bush issued an October 2003 executive Order, under the cover Of a special Florida house bill, that prohibited the withholding of nutrition and hydration from Schiavo. The measure was temporarily effective in preserving Schiavo before being rejected as unconstitu- tional, which produced yet further legal wrangling between the parties and drew State and national institutions deeper into the supervision of Ms. Schiavo's treatment. In what was another unprecedented act, the US Congress hastily passed the "Compromise Bill," signed into law by President Bush on 21 March 2005, less than forty-eight hours after it was introduced by lawmakers. The bill was directed specifically at Schiavo for the purpose of granting jurisdiction to a US district court to hear suits brought forth by Schiavo's parents in their efforts to maintain treatment. The intent of the act to normalize the state's control over life is plainly expressed in section two of the bill whereby legal proceedings are justified against any "person who was a party to State court proceedings relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life." The brazen act, ironically championed by states-rights Republicans, signals a federal interest to regulate life and death that threatens to impede the authority of judicial decisions and upset the checks and balances Of the constitutional system. The district court ultimately validated the previous court rulings and, after multiple appeals for hearing were rejected by the US Supreme Court, Terri Schaivo was permitted to die.' The position of the state in each of these instances demonstrates a strong desire to control end-of-life decisions and discipline those who would attempt to evade supervision. The history of the RTD demonstrates that the state has attempted to normalize its ‘‘interest’’ in the body by using a variety of technical, legal discourses to create public knowledge of the abnormality of willfully seeking death. In withholding, restricting, and opposing the RTD, the state is at once demonstrating its dominance and exerting agency-limiting control. Consistent with the articulation of bio-power, the ‘‘power play’’ at work here is not threatening to end life, but threatening to preserve and monitor it through regulatory means. Advocate efforts to establish a ‘‘right’’ to die might best be understood as an attempt to adjust the power flow between the state and the subject, in the process expanding individual agency. Faced with challenges from RTD advocates, the state has responded by appropriating the hospital and creating the powerless vegetative subject, as the next section explores.

<h4>The power structures of normality are not a relic of the seventeenth century, they’re a continuous and systemic construction of symbolic ordering around death which manifests itself in modern PAS discourses primarily concerned with resolving the unruly nature of death – Zohreh Bayatrizi explains that the anxiety around “undignified death” has led to increasing medicalization, legality, and quantification of assisted suicide. This discursive regime of ordering reinforces itself through the legal system: the 9-0 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v Quill asserted a “legitimate state interest” in preserving life that judged any proposed “right to die” unconstitutional, the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act further demonstrated the state’s power to regulate death, normalizing the superiority of life and the state’s claim over it. Todd McDorman explains</h4><p>Todd F. McDorman, Associate Professor in the Rhetoric Department at Wabash College, “Controlling Death: Bio-Power and the Right-to-Die Controversy” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, September 2005, pp. 257/279 KB</p><p><u><strong>Normalizing the State's Interest in Life: The Root of Domination</u></strong> As Foucault previously noted, the willful death Of the citizen through "suicide" has been a controversial issue throughout history. <u><strong><mark>The response of the state to efforts to choose death has been to develop means of supervision and discipline that create a</mark> sort of <mark>public knowledge that normalizes the superiority of life and</mark> in particular <mark>the state's claim over it.</u></strong></mark> That is, <u><strong>through legal instruments</u></strong>—<u><strong>statutes and selected Court decisions</u></strong> <u><strong>the importance of preserving the life Of the body became public knowledge</u></strong>. The selected fragments demonstrate the trajectory Of the issue, high- lighting both the state's persistence in regulating or supervising death and the changing nature Of the argument as <u><strong>the general prohibition against suicide became a more particularized concern with assisted death. </u></strong>As a critical rhetoric, this section traces the roots Of domination in exposing what has become the underlying principle for other efforts that discourage or prohibit the RTD<mark>. <u><strong>The laws and court cases</u></strong></mark> discussed <u><strong><mark>represent examples of authoritative discourses that normalize the state's interest in life and reflect the expansion of bio-power into the RTD.</mark> </u></strong>At least since St. Augustine's condemnation Of suicide, there has been a presumption against the moral and legal legitimacy Of ending one's ife.24 <u><strong>The thread connecting euthanasia, morality, and the state’s prohibition of suicide is codified in William Blackstone’s legal commentaries. Forming the basis of US common law, these commentaries established a presumption against suicide and, later, against assisted suicide</u></strong> or mercy killing <u><strong>and euthanasia</u></strong>.25 The prosecution of early instances of euthanasia or mercy killing as homicide demonstrated the state’s opposition to the practice, through a form of discipline, while signaling state appropriation of, or control over, the body.26 <u><strong><mark>By treating the issue as a definitional question</u></strong></mark> (mercy versus murder), <u><strong><mark>prosecution maintained focus on classification</u></strong></mark>, initially <u><strong><mark>deflecting questions of</mark> rights and <mark>autonomy, and established a legal norm that willfully ending one’s life was not allowed. Such focus allowed the state to overlook</mark> mitigating circumstances, <mark>the suffering of the individual</mark>, and the lack of value life had for the person in question. </u></strong>By changing their strategy from attempting to distinguish ‘‘mercy killing’’ from ‘‘murder’’ to seeking legal permission for the act, RTD advocates sought to offer resistance, thereby challenging the dominant discourse. Such resistance demonstrates Foucault’s claim that <u><strong><mark>power is relational</u></strong></mark>, that <u><strong><mark>it exists in relation to the absence or suppression of resistance</mark> and it depends upon that resistance in maintaining its power network.</u></strong>27 What we observe are the initial makings of a critical rhetoric critique of freedom on the part of activists, changing their strategy in an effort to protect the dying. The shift to examinations of a (constitutionally protected) right intimately connected to individual autonomy brought the legal system fully into the controversy. Almost uniformly, regulatory apparatuses such as state governments, often supported by the medical profession and religious groups, responded by opposing efforts at legal relief. <u><strong><mark>The state</mark> consistently has <mark>asserted that its interests demand the right to control questions of life and death.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>New Jersey’s position</u></strong> in Matter <u><strong>of Quinlan</u></strong> (1976) <u><strong>was an early and clear indication of the state’s anti-euthanasia stance</u></strong>. Despite the unanimous opinion of medical experts that Karen Ann Quinlan had no hope of recovery, her father’s request for relief was opposed by Karen’s doctors, the hospital, the county prosecutor, and the State of New Jersey.28 <u><strong>New Jersey’s Attorney General contended that the state’s ‘‘interest ... in the preservation of life,’’ despite Karen’s condition, demanded a ruling in its favor.</u></strong> However in a radical move, the court ignored recognized medical practice and ruled in Quinlan’s favor based upon a right to privacy. Similarly, <u><strong>in Cruzan</u></strong> (1990), <u><strong><mark>the brief filed by the federal government claimed the state has a ‘‘profound interest in preserving human life’’</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and should be given ‘‘considerable flexibility in adopting rules’’ on euthanasia.</u></strong> In reasoning that proved persuasive to the Supreme Court, <u><strong><mark>they called for the</mark> use of an extremely forgiving <mark>standard that only measures if a ‘‘rule is ‘reasonably designed’ to serve legitimate state interests.’</u></strong></mark>’29 Chief Justice <u><strong><mark>Rehnquist’s</mark> majority <mark>opinion </mark>validates and <mark>normalizes the state’s claim</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>characterizing Missouri’s ‘‘interest in the protection and preservation of human life’’ as being of the utmost importance and credibility.</u></strong>30 As is suggested later in this essay, <u><strong>this normalization of the state’s interest in life is accorded such immense power that it may overwhelm the autonomy of all citizens, since <mark>the state may assert its superiority regardless of the rationality and thought involved in an individual’s choice.</mark> Perhaps the most</u></strong> dramatically <u><strong>visible</u></strong>*/as well as persistent*/<u><strong>effort to discipline those who challenge the state’s control over life is observed in Michigan’s</u></strong> repeated <u><strong>prosecution and</u></strong> ultimate <u><strong>conviction of RTD icon Jack Kevorkian.</u></strong> <u><strong>The</u></strong> almost <u><strong>decade-long pursuit of Kevorkian demonstrates the extent of state opposition to individual choice-in-dying and the lengths to which it will go in insuring control over life and death decisions.</u></strong> Unlike in Quinlan and Cruzan, <u><strong>Kevorkian’s patients were not comatose</u></strong>, were typically competent, <u><strong>and</u></strong>, on occasion, <u><strong>had not reached a terminal stage in their illness.</u></strong> His suicide assistance continued despite three trials and Michigan’s passage of statutes explicitly designed to prevent his practice.31 Kevorkian’s brazen act of moving from PAS to active euthanasia in the death of Thomas Youk, broadcast on 60 Minutes in November 1998, finally resulted in his conviction after a trial that featured Kevorkian representing himself in court. <u><strong><mark>In</mark> 19<mark>97, the government reasserted its opposition</mark> to</u></strong> the RTD and <u><strong>assisted suicide</u></strong> through two separate courses of action. First, <u><strong>the Clinton administration joined the Justice Department in filing two amicus curiae</u></strong>, or friend-of-the-court, <u><strong>briefs <mark>in</mark> Washington v. <mark>Glucksberg </mark>and Vacco v. Quill.</u></strong> Despite acknowledging the significant interest of the individual in avoiding the protracted suffering, pain, and mental anguish that often accompany terminal illness, <u><strong>one of the briefs <mark>asserts that ‘‘overriding state interests justify the state’s</mark> decision to <mark>ban</mark> physicians from prescribing lethal medication.</u></strong> <u><strong>The state has an interest of the highest order in prohibiting its physicians from assisting in the purposeful taking of another person’s life.</u></strong>32 Although the Economist calls the filing surprising considering the Clinton administration’s stress on individual autonomy, this analysis demonstrates that <u><strong>it would have been surprising only if the administration</u></strong> removed itself from the controversy or <u><strong>supported an individual’s interest in making end-of-life decisions</u></strong>.33 Second, in the spring of 1997, <u><strong><mark>the House</mark> of Representatives <mark>and </mark>the <mark>Senate passed a </mark>highly symbolic <mark>PAS bill</u></strong></mark>. Initially inaccurately reported by some as a ‘‘ban’’ on assisted suicide, <u><strong>the bill <mark>prevents the use of federal funds in paying for </mark>procedures connected to <mark>suicide assistance</u></strong>. <u><strong>The bill</u></strong> </mark>has no effect on patient care but <u><strong><mark>served</mark> perceptually <mark>to reinforce the state’s claim over life.</u></strong></mark> Passed in the House by a vote of 398/16 and in the Senate by a vote of 99/0, the bill was signed into law by President Clinton.34 <u><strong><mark>Since the </mark>passage of the Oregon <mark>Death with Dignity Act</u></strong></mark>, the most successful effort at resistance, <u><strong><mark>there have been multiple attempts at the federal level to thwart the decision of Oregon </mark>residents.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>These efforts </mark>initially consisted of two failed congressional attempts to pass the</u></strong> ironically titled <u><strong>Pain Relief Promotion Act</u></strong>, which ostensibly would have worked to relieve patient pain by a de facto over-ruling of the Oregon law.35 Subsequently, <u><strong>the</u></strong> 6 November <u><strong>2001 ‘‘Ashcroft Directive’’ attempted to achieve the same result through non-legislative means.</u></strong> A reversal of the policy announced by former Attorney General Janet Reno, <u><strong>this proclamation <mark>authorized federal agents to take action against physicians who prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patients</u></strong></mark>*/actions that are legal under the Oregon statute.36 Four Oregon residents in various stages of terminal illness immediately challenged Ashcroft’s directive and, after an initial 2002 district court decision in favor of Oregon and the legitimacy of its death with dignity law, the government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.37 On 26 May 2004, a year after hearing the appeal, that court found the Ashcroft directive an unlawful effort to stifle ‘‘democratic debate about physician-assisted suicide.’’ Undeterred, the federal government made an additional effort to revalidate its power of supervision by persuading the Supreme Court to hear Gonzalez v. Oregon. 38 The most spectacular controversy to illustrate the persistence of the state in using legal instruments to control the body is the Terri Schiavo Saga. This unusually complex case, even by RTD standards, pitted family members against one another in debating proper treatment and garnered a level of media scrutiny likely unparalleled in the already visible controversy. The Case produced novel efforts to preserve the life Of the body in opposition to Court decisions and rebuked appeals, all in favor of Ms. Schiavo's husband and guardian, Michael Schiavo. Florida's Governor Jeb Bush issued an October 2003 executive Order, under the cover Of a special Florida house bill, that prohibited the withholding of nutrition and hydration from Schiavo. The measure was temporarily effective in preserving Schiavo before being rejected as unconstitu- tional, which produced yet further legal wrangling between the parties and drew State and national institutions deeper into the supervision of Ms. Schiavo's treatment. In what was another unprecedented act, <u><strong>the US <mark>Congress</mark> hastily <mark>passed the "Compromise Bill,"</mark> signed into law by</u></strong> President <u><strong>Bush</u></strong> on 21 March 2005, <u><strong>less than forty-eight hours after it was introduced by lawmakers. </u></strong>The bill was directed specifically at Schiavo for the purpose of granting jurisdiction to a US district court to hear suits brought forth by Schiavo's parents in their efforts to maintain treatment. <u><strong><mark>The intent </mark>of the act <mark>to normalize the state's control over life is</mark> plainly <mark>expressed in section two </mark>of the bill <mark>whereby legal proceedings are justified against any "person who was a party to State court proceedings relating to the withholding</mark> or withdrawal <mark>of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life."</u></strong> <u><strong>The brazen act</u></strong>,</mark> ironically championed by states-rights Republicans, <u><strong><mark>signals a federal interest to regulate life and death</u></strong></mark> that threatens to impede the authority of judicial decisions and upset the checks and balances Of the constitutional system. The district court ultimately validated the previous court rulings and, after multiple appeals for hearing were rejected by the US Supreme Court, Terri Schaivo was permitted to die.' The position of the state in each of these instances demonstrates a strong desire to control end-of-life decisions and discipline those who would attempt to evade supervision. The history of the RTD demonstrates that the state has attempted to normalize its ‘‘interest’’ in the body by using a variety of technical, legal discourses to create public knowledge of the abnormality of willfully seeking death. In withholding, restricting, and opposing the RTD, the state is at once demonstrating its dominance and exerting agency-limiting control. <u><strong>Consistent with the articulation of bio-power, the ‘‘power play’’ at work here is not threatening to end life, but threatening to preserve and monitor it through regulatory means.</u></strong> Advocate efforts to establish a ‘‘right’’ to die might best be understood as an attempt to adjust the power flow between the state and the subject, in the process expanding individual agency. Faced with challenges from RTD advocates, the state has responded by appropriating the hospital and creating the powerless vegetative subject, as the next section explores.</p>

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1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Hemp isn’t the silver bullet – long timeframe and boom-and-bust cycle

Wishnia 13

Wishnia 13 [Steven Wishnia, Alternet Writer, SATURDAY, FEB 16, 2013 08:00 AM MST, “Can hemp save the economy?” http://www.salon.com/2013/02/16/politicians_are_pushing_to_bring_back_the_hemp_partner/,]

One problem for the industry is that hemp’s decades of illegality left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it. This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier to producing hemp Hemp oil for biofuel is unlikely to be practical. At 50 gallons per acre, even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil for less than three weeks. Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry, says Murphy. Hemp farming there has been through two boom-and-bust cycles since it was legalized

hemp’s illegality left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier Hemp oil for biofuel is unlikely to be practical. even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil for less than three weeks. Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry Hemp farming there has been through two boom-and-bust cycles since it was legalized

One problem for the industry is that hemp’s decades of illegality have left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it. As no hemp has been grown legally in the U.S. since 1957, says Murphy, many parts of the industry would have to be re-established virtually from scratch. To begin with, all the seed stock is gone, except for feral ditchweed. “You’d have to breed again for varieties that work well here,” he says. Kentucky was once a major hemp producer, and it also provided seeds for strains better suited to different latitudes, such as Wisconsin. There were also strains bred for fiber or for larger seeds that yielded more oil. Currently, Murphy says, Canada uses mostly Russian and European stock. Those seeds could also be cross-bred with local feral strains. This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier to producing hemp clothing and paper. Building a new decorticator mill for hemp paper would cost more than $100 million, says Murphy. Several small companies are using hemp for specialized products such as archival-quality, filter, or cigarette papers, but its most likely general use will be when mixed with recycled paper, says Steenstra. “Blend in 10 to 15 percent hemp, and it’s great for making better-quality recycled paper,” he says. When paper gets recycled, he explains, its fibers get shorter, and the long fibers of hemp strengthen it. There are similar issues with clothing. Though Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, Giorgio Armani, and several lesser-known manufacturers are using hemp in clothes, “the whole textile industry is built on short-fiber cotton and synthetics,” says Steenstra. “There’s no infrastructure for processing hemp fiber into textiles.” Hemp oil for biofuel, another use dreamed of in the ‘90s, is unlikely to be practical. At 50 gallons per acre, even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil for less than three weeks. On the other hand, the hemp-food industry is “pretty well settled,” says Murphy. If hemp growing were legalized in the U.S., he adds, a lot of Canadian processors would probably open facilities here. Legalization would also help hemp food break out of its niche-market status. If it received “GRAS” (Generally Recognized As Safe) status from the Food and Drug Administration, major brands would be less reluctant to use it. Until then, he says, Coca-Cola won’t put hemp milk in Odwalla Future Shakes, and we’re not likely to see hempseed Clif Bars. Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry, says Murphy. Hemp farming there has been through two boom-and-bust cycles since it was legalized in 1998. The nation’s production leaped to 35,000 acres in 1999 and plummeted to about 4,000 in 2001, according to a report by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Alberta, Canada’s main hemp-producing province. It soared to 48,000 acres in 2006 and fell to less than 10,000 two years later.

<h4><u><strong>Hemp isn’t the silver bullet – long timeframe and boom-and-bust cycle</h4><p>Wishnia 13 </p><p></u></strong>[Steven Wishnia, Alternet Writer, SATURDAY, FEB 16, 2013 08:00 AM MST, “Can hemp save the economy?” http://www.salon.com/2013/02/16/politicians_are_pushing_to_bring_back_the_hemp_partner/<u><strong><mark>,]</p><p></strong></mark>One problem for the industry is that <mark>hemp’s </mark>decades of <mark>illegality</u> </mark>have <u><strong><mark>left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it</mark>.</u></strong> As no hemp has been grown legally in the U.S. since 1957, says Murphy, many parts of the industry would have to be re-established virtually from scratch. To begin with, all the seed stock is gone, except for feral ditchweed. “You’d have to breed again for varieties that work well here,” he says. Kentucky was once a major hemp producer, and it also provided seeds for strains better suited to different latitudes, such as Wisconsin. There were also strains bred for fiber or for larger seeds that yielded more oil. Currently, Murphy says, Canada uses mostly Russian and European stock. Those seeds could also be cross-bred with local feral strains. <u><mark>This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier </mark>to producing hemp</u> clothing and paper. Building a new decorticator mill for hemp paper would cost more than $100 million, says Murphy. Several small companies are using hemp for specialized products such as archival-quality, filter, or cigarette papers, but its most likely general use will be when mixed with recycled paper, says Steenstra. “Blend in 10 to 15 percent hemp, and it’s great for making better-quality recycled paper,” he says. When paper gets recycled, he explains, its fibers get shorter, and the long fibers of hemp strengthen it. There are similar issues with clothing. Though Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, Giorgio Armani, and several lesser-known manufacturers are using hemp in clothes, “the whole textile industry is built on short-fiber cotton and synthetics,” says Steenstra. “There’s no infrastructure for processing hemp fiber into textiles.” <u><mark>Hemp oil for biofuel</u></mark>, another use dreamed of in the ‘90s, <u><strong><mark>is unlikely to be practical.</u></strong> <u></mark>At 50 gallons per acre, <mark>even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil <strong>for less than three weeks.</u></strong> </mark>On the other hand, the hemp-food industry is “pretty well settled,” says Murphy. If hemp growing were legalized in the U.S., he adds, a lot of Canadian processors would probably open facilities here. Legalization would also help hemp food break out of its niche-market status. If it received “GRAS” (Generally Recognized As Safe) status from the Food and Drug Administration, major brands would be less reluctant to use it. Until then, he says, Coca-Cola won’t put hemp milk in Odwalla Future Shakes, and we’re not likely to see hempseed Clif Bars. <u><mark>Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry</mark>, says Murphy. <mark>Hemp farming there has been through <strong>two boom-and-bust cycles</strong> since it was legalized</u></mark> in 1998. The nation’s production leaped to 35,000 acres in 1999 and plummeted to about 4,000 in 2001, according to a report by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Alberta, Canada’s main hemp-producing province. It soared to 48,000 acres in 2006 and fell to less than 10,000 two years later.</p>

1NC

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1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

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This paper has investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human ¶ trafficking. According to economic theory, there are two effects of unknown magnitude. The ¶ scale effect of legalizing prostitution leads to an expansion of the prostitution market and thus an increase in human trafficking, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked ¶ prostitutes by favoring prostitutes who have legal residence in a country. Our quantitative empirical analysis for a cross-section of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect. On average, countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of reported human trafficking inflows. We have corroborated this quantitative evidence with three brief case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Consistent with the results from our quantitative analysis, the legalization of prostitution has led to substantial scale effects in these cases. Both the cross-country comparisons among Sweden, Denmark and Germany, with their different prostitution regimes, as well as the temporal comparison within Germany before and after the further legalization of prostitution, suggest that any compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes have been small and the substitution effect has therefore been dominated by the scale effect. Naturally, ¶ this qualitative evidence is also somewhat tentative as there is no “smoking gun” proving that ¶ the scale effect dominates the substitution effect and that the legalization of prostitution ¶ definitely increases inward trafficking flows. The problem here lies in the clandestine nature ¶ of both the prostitution and trafficking markets, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to ¶ find hard evidence establishing this relationship. Our central finding, i.e., that countries with ¶ legalized prostitution experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows, is ¶ therefore best regarded as being based on the most reliable existing data, but needs to be ¶ subjected to future scrutiny. More research in this area is definitely warranted, but it will ¶ require the collection of more reliable data to establish firmer conclusions.

<h4><u>This paper has investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human </u>¶<u> trafficking.</u> According to economic theory, there are two effects of unknown magnitude. <u>The </u>¶<u> scale effect of <strong><mark>legalizing prostitution leads to an expansion of the prostitution market and </u></strong></mark>thus<u><strong><mark> an increase in human trafficking</strong></mark>, </u>while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked ¶ prostitutes by favoring prostitutes who have legal residence in a country. <u><mark>Our quantitative </mark>empirical <mark>analysis </mark>for a cross-section <mark>of </mark>up to <mark>150 countries shows </mark>that <mark>the scale effect dominates</u> </mark>the substitution effect. On average, <u><strong><mark>countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of</u></strong> </mark>reported <u><strong><mark>human trafficking</strong> </mark>inflows. <mark>We have corroborated this </mark>quantitative evidence <mark>with </u></mark>three brief <u><mark>case studies </mark>of Sweden, Denmark and Germany.</u> <u>Consistent with the results from our quantitative analysis, the <mark>legalization </mark>of prostitution <mark>has led to substantial scale effects in these cases</u></mark>. <u>Both the <mark>cross-country comparisons </mark>among Sweden, Denmark and Germany, <mark>with </mark>their <mark>different</mark> <mark>prostitution regimes</mark>, as well as the temporal comparison within Germany before and after the further legalization of prostitution, <mark>suggest </mark>that <mark>any compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals </mark>among all prostitutes <mark>have been small and</mark> the substitution effect has <mark>therefore been dominated by the scale </mark>effect. </u>Naturally, ¶ this qualitative evidence is also somewhat tentative as there is no “smoking gun” proving that ¶ the scale effect dominates the substitution effect and that the legalization of prostitution ¶ definitely increases inward trafficking flows. The problem here lies in the clandestine nature ¶ of both the prostitution and trafficking markets, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to ¶ find hard evidence establishing this relationship. <u><strong><mark>Our</u></strong> </mark>central <u><strong><mark>finding</u></strong></mark>, i.e., that countries with ¶ legalized prostitution experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows, <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> ¶ therefore best regarded as being <u><strong><mark>based on the most reliable</strong> </mark>existing <strong><mark>data</u></strong></mark>, but needs to be ¶ subjected to future scrutiny. More research in this area is definitely warranted, but it will ¶ require the collection of more reliable data to establish firmer conclusions. </h4>

1NC

Off

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1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

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The “mental competency standard” employed under current models of PAS reify ableist biases by basing access to death on subjective determinations about “mental imparment,” solidifying the medical complex’s jurisdiction on the terrain of death – Sara Qualls and Julia Kasl-Godley explain

Sara Honn, Professor, Kraemer Family Professor of Aging, Director of Gerontology Center and Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University, and Julia, Ph.D from USC, End-of-Life Issues, Grief, and Bereavement: What Clinicians Need to Know, 2010, p.269-271 SJE

Disability experts have raised concerns about the capability clause. They point to evidence that people without disabilities assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically lower than do people with disabilities A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,” , capacity assessment may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted- suicide policies it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective “clinicians are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use” ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted suicide requests. The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing judgment No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the patient is nor suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment. This clause is meant to provide safeguards but it is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless. the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is that within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence of impaired judgment and mental disorder suicidal ideation is one of the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status, which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies

Disability experts raised concerns about¶ the capability clause capacity assessment is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective. clinicians¶ are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted¶ suicide requests.¶ The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing¶ judgment No medication to end life hall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the¶ patient is nor suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression This clause is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence¶ of impaired judgment suicidal ideation is one of¶ the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the¶ lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or enabling depends solely on their disability status, which experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies

Opponents of assisted suicide concur with the perspective that the capability evaluation clause is unworkable because of conceptual and empirical limitations, hut they view these limitations as an argument against¶ assisted suicide rather than a reason to proceed without such an evaluation¶ (Hendin & Foley, 2008). Disability experts (Coleman, 1992, 2002; Gill,¶ 1992, 1998; Longmore, 2005; 01km, 2005) have raised other concerns about¶ the capability clause. They point to evidence that people without disabilities¶ assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically¶ lower than do people with disabilities, and they wonder whether a request¶ for physician-assisted suicide from a person with disabilities might then “be¶ subject to less scrutiny because the decision makes sense to others” (01km,¶ 2005, p. 70). “A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need¶ for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,”¶ writes Coleman (2002, p. 224). “In other words, when asked to describe¶ the ‘indignities’ that assisted suicide would help people avoid, proponents¶ describe disability” (Coleman, 2002 p. 220). “If professionals think that of¶ course the disabled person would want to die” because of the indignities¶ of disability, “might not these expectations play a disheartening role in some¶ one’s decision to seek physician-assisted suicide?” asks Olkin (2005, p. 70). In conclusion, capacity assessment may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted-¶ suicide policies (Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000, p. 388). Like the Trojan¶ horse, it is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective. As advocates of assisted suicide recognize “clinicians¶ are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use”¶ (Werth et al., 2000, p. 356).¶ Clinicians asked to bring their expertise on assessments of the capability¶ to make requests to die should exercise great caution in what they promise¶ they can deliver. They should he educated and educate others about the¶ limits of scientific knowledge on capability assessment. They should also be¶ aware about the danger, in the absence of scientifically robust standards, that¶ ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted¶ suicide requests.¶ The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing¶ judgment. If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a ¶ psychiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a psychological¶ evaluation. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner¶ shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the¶ patient is nor suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression¶ causing impaired judgment. This clause, like the one about capacity, is meant¶ to provide safeguards against the influence of psychological disorders on¶ judgment, but it is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless. First ¶ of all, it is an “exceedingly minimalist” clause (Burt, 2000. p. 383) because¶ it rules out only mental conditions that impair judgment. In other words,¶ the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these¶ disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards (Burt, 2000; N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005;¶ Sullivan et al., 1998). Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is¶ that within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence¶ of impaired judgment and mental disorder. In fact, suicidal ideation is one of¶ the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment (Sullivan¶ et al., 1998). Based on current clinical standards, the presence of suicidal¶ intention calls for an automatic finding of incompetence and obligates the¶ clinician to suicide prevention, including removal of lethal means. By contrast, within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the¶ lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention¶ (N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005). Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or suicide enabling depends solely on their health or disability status, which disability experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies (Coleman, 2002).

<h4>The “mental competency standard” employed under current models of PAS reify ableist biases by basing access to death on subjective determinations about “mental imparment,” solidifying the medical complex’s jurisdiction on the terrain of death – Sara Qualls and Julia Kasl-Godley explain</h4><p>Sara Honn, Professor, Kraemer Family Professor of Aging, Director of Gerontology Center and Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University, and Julia, Ph.D from USC, End-of-Life Issues, Grief, and Bereavement: What Clinicians Need to Know, 2010, p.269-271 SJE</p><p>Opponents of assisted suicide concur with the perspective that the capability evaluation clause is unworkable because of conceptual and empirical limitations, hut they view these limitations as an argument against¶ assisted suicide rather than a reason to proceed without such an evaluation¶ (Hendin & Foley, 2008). <u><strong><mark>Disability experts</u></strong></mark> (Coleman, 1992, 2002; Gill,¶ 1992, 1998; Longmore, 2005; 01km, 2005) <u><strong>have <mark>raised</u></strong></mark> other <u><strong><mark>concerns about</u>¶<u> the capability clause</mark>. They point to evidence that people without disabilities</u>¶<u> assess the quality of the lives of people with disabilities to be dramatically</u>¶<u> lower than do people with disabilities</u></strong>, and they wonder whether a request¶ for physician-assisted suicide from a person with disabilities might then “be¶ subject to less scrutiny because the decision makes sense to others” (01km,¶ 2005, p. 70). “<u><strong>A ‘competent’ person knows that society considers the need</u>¶<u> for assistance in activities of daily living to be degrading and undignified,”</u></strong>¶ writes Coleman (2002, p. 224). “In other words, when asked to describe¶ the ‘indignities’ that assisted suicide would help people avoid, proponents¶ describe disability” (Coleman, 2002 p. 220). “If professionals think that of¶ course the disabled person would want to die” because of the indignities¶ of disability, “might not these expectations play a disheartening role in some¶ one’s decision to seek physician-assisted suicide?” asks Olkin (2005, p. 70). In conclusion<u><strong>, <mark>capacity assessment</mark> may be “the Trojan horse” of assisted-</u>¶<u> suicide policies</u></strong> (Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000, p. 388). Like the Trojan¶ horse, <u><strong>it <mark>is meant to provide protection, but it hides dangers. Its chief danger is that it is subjective</u></strong>.</mark> As advocates of assisted suicide recognize <u><strong>“<mark>clinicians</u>¶<u> are left to decide on their own [what to use and] how strict a standard to use</mark>”</u></strong>¶ (Werth et al., 2000, p. 356).¶ Clinicians asked to bring their expertise on assessments of the capability¶ to make requests to die should exercise great caution in what they promise¶ they can deliver. They should he educated and educate others about the¶ limits of scientific knowledge on capability assessment. They should also be¶ aware about the danger, in the absence of scientifically robust standards, that¶ <u><strong><mark>ableist biases influence evaluations of the rationality of physician-assisted</u></strong>¶<u><strong> suicide requests.</u>¶<u> The patient must be determined not to suffer from a mental condition impairing</u>¶<u> judgment</u></strong></mark>. If either physician believes the patient's judgment is impaired by a ¶ psychiatric or psychological disorder, the patient must be referred for a psychological¶ evaluation. <u><strong><mark>No medication to end</mark> a patient’s <mark>life</mark> in a humane and dignified manner</u>¶<u> s<mark>hall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the</u>¶<u> patient is nor suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression</u></mark>¶<u> causing impaired judgment. <mark>This clause</u></strong></mark>, like the one about capacity, <u><strong>is meant</u>¶<u> to provide safeguards</u></strong> against the influence of psychological disorders on¶ judgment, <u><strong>but it <mark>is so vague and weak to be practically meaningless</mark>.</u></strong> First ¶ of all, it is an “exceedingly minimalist” clause (Burt, 2000. p. 383) because¶ it rules out only mental conditions that impair judgment. In other words,¶ <u><strong>the clause allows for petitioners to have mental disorders as long as these</u>¶<u> disorders do not impair judgment—an oxymoron based on current U.S. mental evaluation standards</u></strong> (Burt, 2000; N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005;¶ Sullivan et al., 1998). <u><strong>Another paradox in the mental disorder clause is</u>¶<u> that <mark>within current standards, suicidal ideation is a symptom par excellence</u>¶<u> of impaired judgment</mark> and mental disorder</u></strong>. In fact, <u><strong><mark>suicidal ideation is one of</u>¶<u> the few legal justifications for involuntary psychological treatment</u></strong></mark> (Sullivan¶ et al., 1998). Based on current clinical standards, the presence of suicidal¶ intention calls for an automatic finding of incompetence and obligates the¶ clinician to suicide prevention, including removal of lethal means. By contrast, <u><strong><mark>within the physician assisted-suicide competence model, providing the</u>¶<u> lethal means is the main decision to make in response to suicidal intention</u></strong></mark>¶ (N. G. Hamilton & Hamilton, 2005). <u><strong><mark>Whether petitioners receive suicide prevention or </mark>suicide <mark>enabling depends solely on their </mark>health or <mark>disability status, which </mark>disability <mark>experts view as evidence of, and a vehicle for ableist ideologies</u></strong></mark> (Coleman, 2002).</p>

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1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Adaptation solves extinction

Mendelsohn 9

Mendelsohn 9

debate about climate change comes from warnings that climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences The severe impacts by alarmists require a century of no mitigation or little adaptation. the net impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and people will adapt

warnings that climate change is an immediate threat to society are alarmist and misleading society’s behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences impacts require a century of no mitigation or adaptation the impacts will take more than a millennium to unfold

(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. the net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

<h4>Adaptation solves extinction</h4><p><u><strong>Mendelsohn 9</p><p></u></strong>(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf</p><p>The heart of the <u>debate about climate change comes from</u> a number of <u><mark>warnings</u></mark> from scientists and others that give the impression <u><mark>that</u></mark> human induced <u><mark>climate change is an immediate threat to society</u></mark> (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). <u>These statements <mark>are</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></strong></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u><mark>society’s</mark> immediate <mark>behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences</u></mark>. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear <u>that <mark>emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences</u></mark>. <u>The severe <mark>impacts</u></mark> predicted <u>by alarmists <mark>require a century</u></mark> (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) <u><mark>of no mitigation</u></mark>. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no <u><mark>or</mark> little <mark>adaptation</mark>. <mark>the</mark> net</u> economic <u><mark>impacts</u></mark> from climate change over the next 50 years <u><mark>will take more than a </mark>century or even a <mark>millennium to unfold</u></mark> <u>and</u> many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because <u>people will adapt</u>. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses. </p>

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1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

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2. Criminalization is key to removing victims and prosecuting traffickers

Day ‘12

Day ‘12

. ETB] a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates the sex trafficking crisis by obstructing law enforcement's ability to identify pimps and trafficking victims, effectively remove the trafficking victim from the situation, and to successfully prosecute the pimps. the availability of shelters and support services will not motivate trafficking victims, especially those who are minors, to get help for three reason First, many trafficking victims do not consider themselves a victim of human trafficking. Second, pimps manipulate their victims to keep them from seeking help and beat the victims into submission if they otherwise fail to obey Third, police, not shelter operators, are the only agents able to identify trafficking victims and to effectively separate the victims from the enslaving control of their traffickers Even if upon arrest, law enforcement diverted trafficking victims directly into a rehabilitation center, there is nothing to encourage the trafficking victim to stay unless criminal charges are pending Simply making shelters and rehabilitation facilities available will not effectively keep trafficking victims from the psychological and physical clutches of their pimps police jurisdiction over victims through criminal prostitution laws is the only effective, recognized means to rescue trafficking victims. Decriminalization creates ideal conditions for pimps and traffickers, as it prevents the police from arresting them and keeps women and children enslaved.

a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates sex trafficking by obstructing law enforcement's ability to identify pimps and victims, effectively remove the victim and to successfully prosecute the pimps many do not consider themselves a victim pimps manipulate victims to keep them from seeking help and beat the victims into submission police are the only agents able to identify victims and effectively separate the victims from their traffickers there is nothing to encourage the victim to stay unless criminal charges are pending. criminal law is the only means to rescue trafficking victims Decrimin creates ideal conditions for traffickers as it prevents the police from arresting them

[Kristina, ADDRESSING THE SEX TRAFFICKING CRISIS: HOW PROSTITUTION LAWS CAN HELP. 2 Creighton Int'l & Comp. L.J. 149. ETB] 1. Decriminalizing Acts of Prostitution Increases the Demand for Sex and Impedes on Law Enforcement's Ability to Identify Trafficking Victims and The Traffickers¶ Policies on prostitution in Western countries are changing rapidly. n115 Over the past ten years, decriminalizing and legalizing prostitution have been the most popular solutions to combat sex [*163] trafficking. n116 Many people concerned about sex trafficking victims and their need for protection understandably question whether criminalizing such victims under prostitution laws is appropriate or necessary. n117 This comes out of concern for sex trafficking victims and their need for protection, not criminalization. n118 However, a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates the sex trafficking crisis by obstructing law enforcement's ability to identify pimps and trafficking victims, effectively remove the trafficking victim from the situation, and to successfully prosecute the pimps. n119¶ Those in support of decriminalizing prostitution tend to believe that prosecuting trafficked girls is unnecessary if shelters and rehabilitation facilities are made available to them. n120 However, the [*164] availability of such shelters and support services will not motivate trafficking victims, especially those who are minors, to get help for three reasons. n121 First, many trafficking victims do not consider themselves a victim of human trafficking. n122 Second, pimps manipulate their victims to keep them from seeking help and beat the victims into submission if they otherwise fail to obey. n123 Third, police, not shelter operators, are the only agents able to identify trafficking victims and to effectively separate the victims from the enslaving control of their traffickers. n124¶ Even if upon arrest, law enforcement diverted trafficking victims directly into a rehabilitation center, there is nothing to encourage the trafficking victim to stay unless criminal charges are pending. n125 Simply making shelters and rehabilitation facilities available will not effectively keep trafficking victims from the psychological and physical clutches of their pimps. n126 Thus, police jurisdiction over victims through criminal prostitution laws is the only effective, recognized means to rescue trafficking victims. n127 Decriminalization does not help these victims because it creates ideal conditions for pimps and traffickers, as it prevents the police from arresting them and keeps women and children enslaved.

<h4>2. <u><strong>Criminalization is key to removing victims and prosecuting traffickers</h4><p>Day ‘12</p><p></u></strong>[Kristina, ADDRESSING THE SEX TRAFFICKING CRISIS: HOW PROSTITUTION LAWS CAN HELP. 2 Creighton Int'l & Comp. L.J. 149<u><strong>. ETB]</p><p></u></strong>1. Decriminalizing Acts of Prostitution Increases the Demand for Sex and Impedes on Law Enforcement's Ability to Identify Trafficking Victims and The Traffickers¶ Policies on prostitution in Western countries are changing rapidly. n115 Over the past ten years, decriminalizing and legalizing prostitution have been the most popular solutions to combat sex [*163] trafficking. n116 Many people concerned about sex trafficking victims and their need for protection understandably question whether criminalizing such victims under prostitution laws is appropriate or necessary. n117 This comes out of concern for sex trafficking victims and their need for protection, not criminalization. n118 However, <u><strong><mark>a jurisdiction that decriminalizes prostitution exacerbates</strong> </mark>the <strong><mark>sex trafficking </mark>crisis <mark>by obstructing law enforcement's ability to identify pimps and</strong> </mark>trafficking <strong><mark>victims, effectively remove the</strong> </mark>trafficking <strong><mark>victim</strong> </mark>from the situation, <strong><mark>and to successfully prosecute the pimps</strong></mark>.</u> n119¶ Those in support of decriminalizing prostitution tend to believe that prosecuting trafficked girls is unnecessary if shelters and rehabilitation facilities are made available to them. n120 However, <u>the</u> [*164] <u>availability</u> <u>of</u> such <u>shelters and support services will not motivate trafficking victims, especially those who are minors, to get help for three reason</u>s. n121 <u>First, <mark>many </mark>trafficking victims <mark>do not consider themselves a victim </mark>of human trafficking.</u> n122 <u>Second, <mark>pimps manipulate</mark> their <mark>victims to keep them from seeking help and beat the victims into submission </mark>if they otherwise fail to obey</u>. n123 <u>Third, <strong><mark>police</strong></mark>, not shelter operators, <strong><mark>are the only agents able to identify</strong> </mark>trafficking <strong><mark>victims</strong> <strong>and</strong> </mark>to <strong><mark>effectively separate the</strong> <strong>victims from</strong> </mark>the enslaving control of <strong><mark>their traffickers</u></strong></mark>. n124¶ <u>Even if upon arrest, law enforcement diverted trafficking victims directly into a rehabilitation center, <mark>there is nothing to encourage the</mark> trafficking <mark>victim to stay unless criminal charges are pending</u>.</mark> n125 <u>Simply making shelters and rehabilitation facilities available will not effectively keep trafficking victims from the psychological and physical clutches of their pimps</u>. n126 Thus, <u><strong>police jurisdiction over victims through <mark>criminal</strong> </mark>prostitution <strong><mark>law</mark>s<mark> is the only </mark>effective, recognized <mark>means to rescue trafficking victims</strong></mark>.</u> n127 <u><strong><mark>Decrimin</strong></mark>alization</u> does not help these victims because it <u><strong><mark>creates ideal conditions for </strong></mark>pimps and <strong><mark>traffickers</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>as it prevents the police from arresting them</strong></mark> and kee<strong>ps women and children enslaved.</p></u></strong>

1NC

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1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

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Too late to solve - Not even an 80% cut is enough

AP 9

AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions China alone adds 2 degrees to the projections Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050 the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century Global warming is speeding up that means top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago seas should rise a foot every 20 years

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees even if every country cuts emissions projections take into account 80 percent cuts from the U.S. and Europe developing nations aren't cutting their emissions China alone adds 2 degrees Even if the world cuts its emissions by 80 percent the world is still facing a 3-degree increase Global warming is speeding up that means projections from 2007 are overly optimistic

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

<h4>Too late to solve - Not even an 80% cut is enough</h4><p><u><strong>AP 9</u></strong> (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)</p><p><u><mark>Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees</mark> between now and the end of the century <mark>even if every country cuts</mark> greenhouse gas <mark>emissions</u></mark> as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. <u>The <mark>projections take into account 80 percent</mark> emission <mark>cuts from the U.S. and Europe </mark>by 2050, which are not sure things</u>. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. <u>Much of projected rise in temperature is because of <mark>developing nations</mark>, which <mark>aren't</mark> talking much about <mark>cutting their emissions</u></mark>, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. <u><mark>China alone adds</u></mark> nearly <u><mark>2 degrees</mark> to the projections</u>. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. <u><mark>Even if the </mark>developed<mark> world cuts its emissions by 80 percent </mark>and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050</u>, as some experts propose, <u><mark>the world is still facing a 3-degree increase</mark> by the end of the century</u>, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. <u><mark>Global warming is speeding up</u></mark>, especially in the Arctic, and <u><mark>that means</u></mark> that some <u>top-level science <mark>projections from 2007 are</mark> already out of date and <mark>overly optimistic</u></mark>. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." <u>Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought</u>, it looks like the <u>seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago</u>, Corell said. He said <u>seas should rise</u> about <u>a foot every 20</u> to 25 <u>years</u>.</p>

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The drive for life preservation allows for exclusion of women from the sphere of death, either under the determination of supposed “irrationality” or to prevent them from denying their capacity to reproduce. Diane Raymond explains

Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE

Diane, professor of Gender Studies at Simmons College, Ph.D in philosophy from NYU, “’Fatal practices’: A feminist analysis of physician-assisted suicide and Euthanasia” Hypatia Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE

Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where passivity have been the normative ideal. Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures equated suicide with courage and thereby framed the practice as male. Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" might be as inaccurate and overly monolithic a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two, one might argue that, given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. even if we agree that popular discussions of PAS and euthanasia "may be animated by gendered logic all that follows is the more modest conclusion that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice. if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that men are undertreated and women are overtreated the superficial inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might instead reflect a pattern consistent with patriarchal ideology, namely that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women. gender ideology, in valorizing female passivity, may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping dying, suffering women alive. one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.

Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures equated suicide with courage and framed the practice as male Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" might be inaccurate and overly monolithic the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. even if discussions of PAS may be animated by gendered logic all that follows is that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice men are undertreated and women are overtreated. the inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might reflect patriarchal ideology that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women gender ideology may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping suffering women alive

In the section "Gender in Cases, Images, and Practices," Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where female self-sacrifice and passivity have been the normative ideal. That insight leads her to explore the historical and cultural background of suicide and its ideology, suggestively using Greek tragedy, the nineteenth-century cult of True Womanhood, and Carol Gilligan's research to confirm that self-sacrifice has traditionally been associated with women and regarded thereby as a feminine virtue. Yet, while there is no doubt as to the misogynistic history of women's constrained choices, Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history. Many cultures--the Stoic, for example--equated suicide with courage and thereby framed the practice as male. The Greek tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than be taken as slaves, the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, the examples of Hemingway, Kohlberg, and numerous others--these easily recoverable cases suggest that suicide can be seen as part of a masculinist ideology or at least not unproblematically feminine. 10 While a more in-depth analysis would probably reveal much divergence even in ancient Greek practice, Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution" (Wolf 1996, 289) might be as inaccurate and overly monolithic a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average (National Center for Health Statistics Report 1987). Given patriarchal ideology's equation of masculinity with strength and power, men's heightened inability to cope with aging and illness makes sense intuitively. Further, women's lived experiences with multiple forms of dependence and interdependence--pregnancy, childrearing, and so forth--may mitigate some of the anxiety associated with aging, dependence on others, and decreasing physical autonomy.¶ Further, the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice (a "feminine not masculine virtue" [1996, 289]) to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two, one might argue that, given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse, particularly in the domestic sphere, suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act. One need not, however, go that far or make men's behavior normative to challenge Wolf's argument. For even if we agree that popular discussions of PAS and euthanasia "may be animated by unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain gendered logic and felt correctness" (Wolf 1996, 289), all that follows is the more modest conclusion that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice. The gender ideology fleshed out in Wolf's analysis may lead, as suggested earlier, to great reluctance, not eagerness, to allow PAS or euthanasia for women. Indeed, some evidence suggests that if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that men are undertreated and women are overtreated. Steven Miles and Allison August, for example, have examined a number of judicial decisions relating to withdrawal of treatment at end-of-life and find a pattern of acceding to male patients' wishes over females'. They note that women are held to higher evidentiary standards when requests to die are examined, and they remark on the ways in which gendered language in judicial treatments of these cases tends to rob women of their agency. Women and not men, for example, are routinely infantilized by referring to them by their first names ("Debbie" and "Diane" fit this pattern); and men's statements about end-of-life treatment are held to reflect "mature, rational choice" while women's are seen as "unreflective, emotional, or immature" (Miles and August 1990, 87). Karen Quinlan's comments to her mother were thereby dismissed as a "wish" or personal "distaste" and not a genuine expression of her values. In another case, a woman's repeated comments regarding her desire not to be kept on life support were trivialized as no "more than immediate reaction to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another unnecessarily prolonged death" (in Miles and August 1990, 88). Courts seem even to discount women's advance directives, preferring instead to appoint family members as decision-makers for the incompetent woman; in one case, the Court empowered a woman's husband/guardian to make the decision "for" her, despite the fact that she had been an active member of the state's "Euthanasia Council." Women's "overtreatment" at end-of-life may seem odd considering men's greater access to earlier interventions, including more standard diagnostic procedures like angiograms and more "exotic" treatments like organ transplants. But the superficial inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might instead reflect a pattern consistent with patriarchal ideology, namely that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women. If such is the case, then gender ideology, in valorizing female passivity, may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping dying, suffering women alive. Likewise, ideological constructions of masculinity as inextricably aligned with agency, activity, and transcendence might lead to respect for men's medical directives--formal and informal--as well as to gendered distinctions on quality-of-life issues. Those unfamiliar with the ravages of persistent vegetative state (PVS) may picture the comatose or PVS patient as a comfortable "sleeping beauty" waiting for her miraculous awakening; such gendered imagery may help to account for the resistance to withdrawal of life support in the classic Quinlan and Cruzan cases, and the willingness of the Georgia Supreme Court to grant the physicians of Larry McAfee, a C-2 quadriplegic (a non-terminal condition), permission to provide him with the drugs necessary for him to be free of pain when his respirator was disconnected. Wolf's analysis of cultural ideology, while extremely suggestive, needs elaboration and nuance. Further, in the course of that extended analysis we should not be surprised by gaps and inconsistencies, for culture is never monolithic or fixed, and cultural practices do not follow consistently or irresistibly even the most hegemonic ideology. Thus, one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.

<h4>The drive for life preservation allows for exclusion of women from the sphere of death, either under the determination of supposed “irrationality” or to prevent them from denying their capacity to reproduce. Diane Raymond explains </h4><p>Diane, professor of Gender Studies at Simmons College, Ph.D in philosophy from NYU, “’Fatal practices’: A feminist analysis of physician-assisted suicide and Euthanasia” Hypatia<u><strong> Spring 1999. Vol. 14:2 SJE</p><p></u></strong>In the section "Gender in Cases, Images, and Practices," <u><strong>Wolf extends her argument against PAS by grounding the examples just discussed in a gendered context where</u></strong> female self-sacrifice and<u><strong> passivity have been the normative ideal.</u></strong> That insight leads her to explore the historical and cultural background of suicide and its ideology, suggestively using Greek tragedy, the nineteenth-century cult of True Womanhood, and Carol Gilligan's research to confirm that self-sacrifice has traditionally been associated with women and regarded thereby as a feminine virtue. Yet, while there is no doubt as to the misogynistic history of women's constrained choices, <u><strong><mark>Wolf oversimplifies and overgeneralizes that history.</mark> <mark>Many cultures</u></strong></mark>--the Stoic, for example--<u><strong><mark>equated suicide with courage</mark> <mark>and</mark> thereby <mark>framed the practice as male</mark>.</u></strong> The Greek tradition of soldiers throwing themselves on their swords rather than be taken as slaves, the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, the examples of Hemingway, Kohlberg, and numerous others--these easily recoverable cases suggest that suicide can be seen as part of a masculinist ideology or at least not unproblematically feminine. 10 While a more in-depth analysis would probably reveal much divergence even in ancient Greek practice, <u><strong><mark>Wolf's ascription of suicide as a "woman's solution"</u></strong></mark> (Wolf 1996, 289) <u><strong><mark>might</mark> <mark>be</mark> as <mark>inaccurate and overly monolithic</mark> a description of ancient Greek practice and ideology as it appears of the present, where statistics show that older white men kill themselves at a rate five times higher than the national average</u></strong> (National Center for Health Statistics Report 1987). Given patriarchal ideology's equation of masculinity with strength and power, men's heightened inability to cope with aging and illness makes sense intuitively. Further, women's lived experiences with multiple forms of dependence and interdependence--pregnancy, childrearing, and so forth--may mitigate some of the anxiety associated with aging, dependence on others, and decreasing physical autonomy.¶ Further, <u><strong><mark>the slippage in Wolf's argument from self-sacrifice</u></strong></mark> (a "feminine not masculine virtue" [1996, 289]) <u><strong><mark>to suicide makes the argument suspect; rather than conflating the two</mark>, one might argue that, <mark>given that women's historical role has been to endure selflessly all forms of labor and abuse</u></strong></mark>, particularly in the domestic sphere, <u><strong><mark>suicide may for women be the ultimate transgressive act.</u></strong></mark> One need not, however, go that far or make men's behavior normative to challenge Wolf's argument. For <u><strong><mark>even if</mark> we agree that popular <mark>discussions of PAS</mark> and euthanasia "<mark>may be animated by</u></strong></mark> unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain <u><strong><mark>gendered logic</u></strong></mark> and felt correctness" (Wolf 1996, 289), <u><strong><mark>all that follows is </mark>the more modest conclusion <mark>that we must interrogate that logic before making a normative judgment about the practice</mark>. </u></strong>The gender ideology fleshed out in Wolf's analysis may lead, as suggested earlier, to great reluctance, not eagerness, to allow PAS or euthanasia for women. Indeed, some evidence suggests that <u><strong>if there is any gendered difference in end-of-life treatments, it is that <mark>men are undertreated and women are overtreated</u></strong>.</mark> Steven Miles and Allison August, for example, have examined a number of judicial decisions relating to withdrawal of treatment at end-of-life and find a pattern of acceding to male patients' wishes over females'. They note that women are held to higher evidentiary standards when requests to die are examined, and they remark on the ways in which gendered language in judicial treatments of these cases tends to rob women of their agency. Women and not men, for example, are routinely infantilized by referring to them by their first names ("Debbie" and "Diane" fit this pattern); and men's statements about end-of-life treatment are held to reflect "mature, rational choice" while women's are seen as "unreflective, emotional, or immature" (Miles and August 1990, 87). Karen Quinlan's comments to her mother were thereby dismissed as a "wish" or personal "distaste" and not a genuine expression of her values. In another case, a woman's repeated comments regarding her desire not to be kept on life support were trivialized as no "more than immediate reaction to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another unnecessarily prolonged death" (in Miles and August 1990, 88). Courts seem even to discount women's advance directives, preferring instead to appoint family members as decision-makers for the incompetent woman; in one case, the Court empowered a woman's husband/guardian to make the decision "for" her, despite the fact that she had been an active member of the state's "Euthanasia Council." Women's "overtreatment" at end-of-life may seem odd considering men's greater access to earlier interventions, including more standard diagnostic procedures like angiograms and more "exotic" treatments like organ transplants. But <u><strong><mark>the</mark> superficial <mark>inconsistency between men's end-of-life treatments and their greater access to earlier treatment options might</mark> instead <mark>reflect</mark> a pattern consistent with <mark>patriarchal ideology</mark>, namely <mark>that we hold to a higher standard of quality of life for men than for women</mark>.</u></strong> If such is the case, then <u><strong><mark>gender ideology</mark>, in valorizing female passivity, <mark>may actively collude with the medical profession in keeping</mark> dying, <mark>suffering women alive</mark>.</u></strong> Likewise, ideological constructions of masculinity as inextricably aligned with agency, activity, and transcendence might lead to respect for men's medical directives--formal and informal--as well as to gendered distinctions on quality-of-life issues. Those unfamiliar with the ravages of persistent vegetative state (PVS) may picture the comatose or PVS patient as a comfortable "sleeping beauty" waiting for her miraculous awakening; such gendered imagery may help to account for the resistance to withdrawal of life support in the classic Quinlan and Cruzan cases, and the willingness of the Georgia Supreme Court to grant the physicians of Larry McAfee, a C-2 quadriplegic (a non-terminal condition), permission to provide him with the drugs necessary for him to be free of pain when his respirator was disconnected. Wolf's analysis of cultural ideology, while extremely suggestive, needs elaboration and nuance. Further, in the course of that extended analysis we should not be surprised by gaps and inconsistencies, for culture is never monolithic or fixed, and cultural practices do not follow consistently or irresistibly even the most hegemonic ideology. Thus, <u><strong>one can agree wholeheartedly with Wolf's claim that "the very meaning of the patient's request for death is socially constructed" (1996, 299) while rejecting her understanding of that meaning or being willing to entertain multiple interpretations.</p></u></strong>

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3. The links are unique- trafficking is lower in the US than in countries with legal prostitution- case studies prove

Raymond ‘3

Raymond ‘3 [Ph.D. Janice Raymond is a professor at the University of Massachusetts.¶ “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution ¶ And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution.” (Published in simultaneously in hard copy in Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: ¶ pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley ¶ (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003. ETB]

Legalized prostitution are one of the root causes of sex trafficking 80% of women in the brothels of the Netherlands were trafficked from other countries The Netherlands has removed every legal impediment to pimping, procuring and brothels NGOs report traffickers use work permits to bring foreign women into the Dutch prostitution industry, masking the fact that women have been trafficked, by coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex workers” since lifting the ban on brothels in the Netherlands Dutch victim support organizations reported an increase in the number of victims of trafficking, the number of victims from other countries has not diminished The sheer volume of foreign women in the German prostitution industry suggests that these women were trafficked into Germany, a process euphemistically described as facilitated migration. It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of travel and travel documents, and set themselves up in “business” without intervention. . Noting the link between legalization of prostitution and trafficking in Australia, the US Department of State observed: “Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing problem…lax laws – including legalized prostitution in parts of the country – make [anti-trafficking] enforcement difficult at the working level” Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution does not control the sex industry. It expands it. ). Over the last decade, as pimping was legalized, and brothels decriminalized in the year 2000, the sex industry increased by 25% in the Netherlands Most of them are women from other countries who were probably trafficked into the Netherlands prostitution is promoted by associations of sex businesses and organizations comprised of prostitution buyers who consult and collaborate with the government to further their interests. As prostitution has been transformed into “sex work,” and pimps into entrepreneurs, so too this recommendation transforms trafficking into “voluntary migration for sex work.” the Netherlands is targeting poor women for the international sex trade to remedy the inadequacies of the free market of “sexual services.” Prostitution is thus normalized as an “option for the poor.” Legalization of prostitution in Australia, resulted in massive expansion of the sex industry Along with legalization of prostitution, other forms of sexual exploitation, such as tabletop dancing, bondage and discipline centers, peep shows, phone sex, and pornography, have all developed in much more profitable ways than before legalization Prostitution has become an integral part of the tourism boom state sponsored prostitution countries serve as magnets and, ultimately, as conduits ¶ through which significant numbers of women are trafficked to other nations (IOM) has estimated that 500,000 women and children are trafficked in Europe annually In contrast, it has been estimated that 45,000-50,000 women and children are trafficked annually into the United States

Legalized prostitution are one of the root causes of sex trafficking 80% in the Netherlands were trafficked traffickers use work permits to maski that women have been trafficked Dutch ¶ support organizations reported an increase in victims The sheer volume of foreign women in the German industry suggests these women were trafficked It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of travel and set up business” without intervention prostitution is promoted by sex businesses who collaborate with government to further their interests state sponsored prostitution countries serve as magnets and, conduits through which significant numbers of women are trafficked to other nations 500,000 are trafficked in Europe annually In contrast, 45,000 are trafficked into the Un S

Legalized or decriminalized prostitution industries are one of the root causes of sex trafficking. One argument for legalizing prostitution in the Netherlands was ¶ that legalization would help to end the exploitation of desperate immigrant ¶ women who had been trafficked there for prostitution. However, one report found ¶ that 80% of women in the brothels of the Netherlands were trafficked from other countries (Budapest Group, 1999)(1). In 1994, the International Organization of ¶ Migration (IOM) stated that in the Netherlands alone, “nearly 70 % of trafficked ¶ women were from CEEC [Central and Eastern European Countries]” (IOM, 1995, ¶ p. 4). The government of the Netherlands presents itself as a champion of anti-¶ trafficking policies and programs, yet it has removed every legal impediment to ¶ pimping, procuring and brothels. In the year 2000, the Dutch Ministry of Justice ¶ argued in favor of a legal quota of foreign “sex workers,” because the Dutch ¶ prostitution market demanded a variety of “bodies” (Dutting, 2001, p. 16). Also in ¶ 2000, the Dutch government sought and received a judgment from the European ¶ Court recognizing prostitution as an economic activity, thereby enabling women ¶ from the European Union and former Soviet bloc countries to obtain working ¶ permits as “sex workers” in the Dutch sex industry if they could prove that they ¶ are self employed. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe report ¶ that traffickers use the work permits to bring foreign women into the Dutch ¶ prostitution industry, masking the fact that women have been trafficked, by ¶ coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex workers” ¶ (Personal Communication, Representative of the International Human Rights ¶ Network, 1999).¶ In the year since lifting the ban on brothels in the Netherlands, eight Dutch victim ¶ support organizations reported an increase in the number of victims of trafficking, ¶ and twelve victim support organization reported that the number of victims from ¶ other countries has not diminished (Bureau NRM, 2002, p. 75). Forty-three of ¶ the 348 municipalities (12%) in the Netherlands choose to follow a no-brothel ¶ policy, but the Minister of Justice has indicated that the complete banning of ¶ prostitution within any municipality could conflict with the federally guaranteed ¶ “right to free choice of work” (Bureau NRM, 2002, p.19). ¶ ¶ The first steps toward legalization of prostitution in Germany occurred in the ¶ 1980s. By 1993, it was widely recognized that 75% of the women in Germany’s ¶ prostitution industry were foreigners from Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and other countries in South America (Altink, 1993, p. 33). After the fall of the Berlin ¶ wall, 80% of the estimated 10,000 women trafficked into Germany were from ¶ Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries (IOM. 1998a , p. 17). In 2002, ¶ prostitution in Germany was established as a legitimate job after years of being ¶ legalized in tolerance zones. Promotion of prostitution, pimping and brothels are ¶ now legal in Germany. ¶ ¶ The sheer volume of foreign women in the German prostitution industry suggests that these women were trafficked into Germany, a process euphemistically ¶ described as facilitated migration. It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of travel and travel documents, and set themselves up in “business” without intervention. ¶ ¶ In 1984, a Labor government in the Australian State of Victoria introduced ¶ legislation to legalize prostitution in brothels. Subsequent Australian ¶ governments expanded legalization culminating in the Prostitution Control Act of ¶ 1994. Noting the link between legalization of prostitution and trafficking in ¶ Australia, the US Department of State observed: “Trafficking in East Asian ¶ women for the sex trade is a growing problem…lax laws – including legalized ¶ prostitution in parts of the country – make [anti-trafficking] enforcement difficult at ¶ the working level” (U.S. Department of State, 2000, p. 6F). ¶ ¶ 3. Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution does not control the sex ¶ industry. It expands it. ¶ ¶ Contrary to claims that legalization and decriminalization would control the ¶ expansion of the sex industry, prostitution now accounts for 5% of the ¶ Netherlands economy (Daley, 2001, p. 4). Over the last decade, as pimping was ¶ legalized, and brothels decriminalized in the year 2000, the sex industry ¶ increased by 25% in the Netherlands (Daley, 2001, p.4). At any hour of the day, ¶ women of all ages and races, dressed in hardly anything, are put on display in ¶ the notorious windows of Dutch brothels and sex clubs and offered for sale. ¶ Most of them are women from other countries who were probably trafficked into ¶ the Netherlands (Daley, 2001, p. 4). ¶ ¶ In addition to governmental endorsement of prostitution in the Netherlands, ¶ prostitution is also promoted by associations of sex businesses and ¶ organizations comprised of prostitution buyers who consult and collaborate with ¶ the government to further their interests. These include the “Association of ¶ Operators of Relaxation Businesses,” the “Cooperating Consultation of Operators ¶ of Window Prostitution,” and the “Man/Woman and Prostitution Foundation,” a ¶ group of men who regularly use women in prostitution, and whose specific aims ¶ include “to make prostitution and the use of services of prostitutes more accepted ¶ and openly discussible,” and “to protect the interests of clients” (Bureau NRM, ¶ 2002, pp.115-16). Faced with a dwindling number of Dutch women who engage in prostitution ¶ activities and the expanding demand for more female bodies and more exotic ¶ women to service the prostitution market, the Dutch National Rapporteur on ¶ Trafficking has stated that in the future, a solution may be to “offer [to the market] ¶ prostitutes from non EU/EEA[European Union/European Economic Area] ¶ countries, who voluntarily choose to work in prostitution…” These women would ¶ be given “legal and controlled access to the Dutch market” (Bureau NRM, 2002, ¶ p. 140). As prostitution has been transformed into “sex work,” and pimps into ¶ entrepreneurs, so too this recommendation transforms trafficking into “voluntary ¶ migration for sex work.” Looking to the future, the Netherlands is targeting poor ¶ women for the international sex trade to remedy the inadequacies of the free ¶ market of “sexual services.” Prostitution is thus normalized as an “option for the ¶ poor.” ¶ ¶ Legalization of prostitution in the State of Victoria, Australia, resulted in massive ¶ expansion of the sex industry. Along with legalization of prostitution, other forms ¶ of sexual exploitation, such as tabletop dancing, bondage and discipline centers, ¶ peep shows, phone sex, and pornography, have all developed in much more ¶ profitable ways than before legalization (Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001). Prostitution ¶ has become an integral part of the tourism and casino boom in Victoria with ¶ government-sponsored casinos authorizing the redeeming of casino chips at ¶ local brothels (Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001). ¶ ¶ A range of state-sponsored prostitution systems exist in Austria, Denmark, ¶ Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It seems likely that European state sponsored prostitution countries serve as magnets and, ultimately, as conduits ¶ through which significant numbers of women are trafficked to other European ¶ nations. Europe has a high density of women trafficked per square mile ¶ compared to North America, for example. Given the porousness of national ¶ borders facilitated by the Schengen agreement (2), it is not surprising that high ¶ numbers of trafficked women are also present in other European countries that ¶ do not have legalized or decriminalized systems of prostitution. Although ¶ accurate numbers of women trafficked are difficult to obtain, the International ¶ Organization of Migration (IOM) has estimated that 500,000 women and children ¶ are trafficked in Europe annually (IOM, 1998). In contrast, it has been estimated ¶ that 45,000-50,000 women and children are trafficked annually into the United ¶ States (Richard, 1999, p.3).

<h4>3. The links are unique- trafficking is lower in the US than in countries with legal prostitution<u><strong>- case studies prove</h4><p>Raymond ‘3</p><p></u></strong>[Ph.D. Janice Raymond is a professor at the University of Massachusetts.¶ “Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution ¶ And a Legal Response to the Demand for Prostitution.” (Published in simultaneously in hard copy in Journal of Trauma Practice, 2, 2003: ¶ pp. 315-332; and in Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Melissa Farley ¶ (Ed.). Binghamton: Haworth Press, 2003. ETB]</p><p><u><strong><mark>Legalized</u></strong> </mark>or decriminalized <u><strong><mark>prostitution</u></strong> </mark>industries <u><strong><mark>are one of the root causes of sex trafficking</u></strong></mark>. One argument for legalizing prostitution in the Netherlands was ¶ that legalization would help to end the exploitation of desperate immigrant ¶ women who had been trafficked there for prostitution. However, one report found ¶ that <u><strong><mark>80%</strong> </mark>of women <strong><mark>in</strong> </mark>the brothels of <strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>Netherlands were trafficked</strong> </mark>from other countries</u> (Budapest Group, 1999)(1). In 1994, the International Organization of ¶ Migration (IOM) stated that in the Netherlands alone, “nearly 70 % of trafficked ¶ women were from CEEC [Central and Eastern European Countries]” (IOM, 1995, ¶ p. 4). <u>The</u> government of the <u>Netherlands</u> presents itself as a champion of anti-¶ trafficking policies and programs, yet it <u>has removed every legal impediment to </u>¶<u> pimping, procuring and</u> <u>brothels</u>. In the year 2000, the Dutch Ministry of Justice ¶ argued in favor of a legal quota of foreign “sex workers,” because the Dutch ¶ prostitution market demanded a variety of “bodies” (Dutting, 2001, p. 16). Also in ¶ 2000, the Dutch government sought and received a judgment from the European ¶ Court recognizing prostitution as an economic activity, thereby enabling women ¶ from the European Union and former Soviet bloc countries to obtain working ¶ permits as “sex workers” in the Dutch sex industry if they could prove that they ¶ are self employed. Non-governmental organizations (<u>NGOs</u>) in Europe <u>report</u> ¶ that <u><strong><mark>traffickers use</u></strong> </mark>the <u><strong><mark>work permits to</strong> </mark>bring foreign women into the Dutch </u>¶<u> prostitution industry, <strong><mark>maski</strong></mark>ng the fact<strong><mark> that women have been trafficked</strong></mark>, by </u>¶<u> coaching them to describe themselves as independent “migrant sex workers”</u> ¶ (Personal Communication, Representative of the International Human Rights ¶ Network, 1999).¶ In the year <u>since lifting the ban on brothels in the Netherlands</u>, eight <u><mark>Dutch </mark>victim </u><mark>¶<u> support organizations reported an increase in </mark>the number of <mark>victims </mark>of trafficking,</u> ¶ and twelve victim support organization reported that <u>the number of victims from </u>¶<u> other countries has not diminished</u> (Bureau NRM, 2002, p. 75). Forty-three of ¶ the 348 municipalities (12%) in the Netherlands choose to follow a no-brothel ¶ policy, but the Minister of Justice has indicated that the complete banning of ¶ prostitution within any municipality could conflict with the federally guaranteed ¶ “right to free choice of work” (Bureau NRM, 2002, p.19). ¶ ¶ The first steps toward legalization of prostitution in Germany occurred in the ¶ 1980s. By 1993, it was widely recognized that 75% of the women in Germany’s ¶ prostitution industry were foreigners from Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and other countries in South America (Altink, 1993, p. 33). After the fall of the Berlin ¶ wall, 80% of the estimated 10,000 women trafficked into Germany were from ¶ Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries (IOM. 1998a , p. 17). In 2002, ¶ prostitution in Germany was established as a legitimate job after years of being ¶ legalized in tolerance zones. Promotion of prostitution, pimping and brothels are ¶ now legal in Germany. ¶ ¶ <u><mark>The sheer volume of foreign women in the German </mark>prostitution <mark>industry suggests</mark> that <mark>these women were trafficked </mark>into Germany, a process euphemistically </u>¶<u> described as facilitated migration. <strong><mark>It is almost impossible for poor women to facilitate their own migration, underwrite the costs of</mark> <mark>travel</strong> </mark>and travel documents, <strong><mark>and set</strong> </mark>themselves <strong><mark>up</strong> </mark>in “<strong><mark>business” without intervention</strong></mark>. </u>¶<u> </u>¶ In 1984, a Labor government in the Australian State of Victoria introduced ¶ legislation to legalize prostitution in brothels. Subsequent Australian ¶ governments expanded legalization culminating in the Prostitution Control Act of ¶ 1994<u>. Noting the link between legalization of prostitution and trafficking in </u>¶<u> Australia, the US Department of State observed: “Trafficking in East Asian </u>¶<u> women for the sex trade is a growing problem…lax laws – including legalized </u>¶<u> prostitution in parts of the country – make [anti-trafficking] enforcement difficult at </u>¶<u> the working level”</u> (U.S. Department of State, 2000, p. 6F). ¶ ¶ 3. <u>Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution does not control the sex </u>¶<u> industry. It expands it. </u>¶<u> </u>¶ Contrary to claims that legalization and decriminalization would control the ¶ expansion of the sex industry, prostitution now accounts for 5% of the ¶ Netherlands economy (Daley, 2001, p. 4<u>). Over the last decade, as pimping was </u>¶<u> legalized, and brothels decriminalized in the year 2000, the sex industry </u>¶<u> increased by 25% in the Netherlands</u> (Daley, 2001, p.4). At any hour of the day, ¶ women of all ages and races, dressed in hardly anything, are put on display in ¶ the notorious windows of Dutch brothels and sex clubs and offered for sale. ¶ <u>Most of them are women from other countries who were probably trafficked into </u>¶<u> the Netherlands </u>(Daley, 2001, p. 4). ¶ ¶ In addition to governmental endorsement of prostitution in the Netherlands, ¶ <u><mark>prostitution is</u> </mark>also <u><mark>promoted by </mark>associations of <mark>sex businesses </mark>and </u>¶<u> organizations comprised of prostitution buyers <mark>who </mark>consult and <mark>collaborate with </u></mark>¶<u> the <mark>government to further their interests</mark>.</u> These include the “Association of ¶ Operators of Relaxation Businesses,” the “Cooperating Consultation of Operators ¶ of Window Prostitution,” and the “Man/Woman and Prostitution Foundation,” a ¶ group of men who regularly use women in prostitution, and whose specific aims ¶ include “to make prostitution and the use of services of prostitutes more accepted ¶ and openly discussible,” and “to protect the interests of clients” (Bureau NRM, ¶ 2002, pp.115-16). Faced with a dwindling number of Dutch women who engage in prostitution ¶ activities and the expanding demand for more female bodies and more exotic ¶ women to service the prostitution market, the Dutch National Rapporteur on ¶ Trafficking has stated that in the future, a solution may be to “offer [to the market] ¶ prostitutes from non EU/EEA[European Union/European Economic Area] ¶ countries, who voluntarily choose to work in prostitution…” These women would ¶ be given “legal and controlled access to the Dutch market” (Bureau NRM, 2002, ¶ p. 140). <u>As prostitution has been transformed into “sex work,” and pimps into </u>¶<u> entrepreneurs, so too this recommendation transforms trafficking into “voluntary </u>¶<u> migration for sex work.”</u> Looking to the future, <u>the Netherlands is targeting poor </u>¶<u> women for the international sex trade to remedy the inadequacies of the free </u>¶<u> market of “sexual services.” Prostitution is thus normalized as an “option for the </u>¶<u> poor.”</u> ¶ ¶ <u>Legalization of prostitution in</u> the State of Victoria, <u>Australia, resulted in massive </u>¶<u> expansion of the sex industry</u>. <u>Along with legalization of prostitution, other forms </u>¶<u> of sexual exploitation, such as tabletop dancing, bondage and discipline centers, </u>¶<u> peep shows, phone sex, and pornography, have all developed in much more </u>¶<u> profitable ways than before legalization</u> (Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001). <u>Prostitution </u>¶<u> has become an integral part of the tourism</u> and casino <u>boom</u> in Victoria with ¶ government-sponsored casinos authorizing the redeeming of casino chips at ¶ local brothels (Sullivan & Jeffreys, 2001). ¶ ¶ A range of state-sponsored prostitution systems exist in Austria, Denmark, ¶ Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It seems likely that European <u><strong><mark>state sponsored prostitution countries serve as magnets and</strong>, </mark>ultimately, as <strong><mark>conduits </mark>¶ <mark>through which significant numbers of women are trafficked to other</u></strong> </mark>European ¶ <u><strong><mark>nations</u></strong></mark>. Europe has a high density of women trafficked per square mile ¶ compared to North America, for example. Given the porousness of national ¶ borders facilitated by the Schengen agreement (2), it is not surprising that high ¶ numbers of trafficked women are also present in other European countries that ¶ do not have legalized or decriminalized systems of prostitution. Although ¶ accurate numbers of women trafficked are difficult to obtain, the International ¶ Organization of Migration <u>(IOM) has estimated that <strong><mark>500,000 </strong></mark>women and children </u>¶<u> <strong><mark>are trafficked in Europe annually </u></strong></mark>(IOM, 1998). <u><strong><mark>In contrast,</strong></mark> it has been estimated </u>¶<u> that <strong><mark>45,000</strong></mark>-50,000 women and children <strong><mark>are trafficked </strong></mark>annually <strong><mark>into the Un</strong></mark>ited </u>¶<u><mark> <strong>S</strong></mark>tates</u> (Richard, 1999, p.3). </p>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

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UNLV

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Kansas HR

Justin Stanley

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

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Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The emergence of a normalized juridicomedical order allows for state racism to continually entrench itself in the name of preserving sovereignty. Foucault explains again

Michel, “Society Must Be Defended,” (Lectures at College de France), Lecture Four, 1/28/76 SJE

At the time when this discourse was being converted into a revolutionary discourse it was only natural that attempts should he made by one side to recode the old counterhistory in terms of race in the biological and medical sense of that term. You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form and function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them, and it will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle for existence. It is a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest species. the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals, but by medico-normalizing techniques. sovereignty was able to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution

. At the time when this discourse was being converted into a revolutionary discourse it was natural that attempts should he made to recode the old counterhistory in terms¶ of race in the biological and medical sense You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form¶ and function of the discourse on race struggle the theme of historical war will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle¶ for existence. the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses¶ against another: the State is the protector of the integrity superiority of the race. racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political the discourse of race was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State whose vigor were no longer guaranteed by rituals,¶ but by medico-normalizing techniques sovereignty was able¶ to invest or take race and reutilize it¶ for its own strategy. State sovereignty becomes the imperative to¶ protect the race an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution

I think this provides us with a starting point for understanding¶ how and why historical discourse could become a new issue in the¶ mid nineteenth century. At the time when this discourse was being displaced, translated, or converted into a revolutionary discourse, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to be¶ replaced by that of class struggle—and in fact, when I say “the mid-¶ nineteenth century,” that’s too late; it was in the first half of the¶ nineteenth century, as it was [Thiers] who transformed race struggle¶ into class struggle—at the time when this conversion was going on,¶ it was in fact only natural that attempts should he made by one side¶ to recode the old counterhistory not in terms of class, but in terms¶ of races-—races in the biological and medical sense of that term. And¶ it was at the moment when a counterhistory of the revolutionary type¶ was taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shape—¶ but it will be a counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that was¶ present in this discourse. You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form¶ and function of the discourse on race struggle, but it distorts them,¶ and it will be characterized by the fact that the theme of historical war—with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its victories, and its¶ defeats—will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle¶ for existence. It is no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would¶ understand the term, but a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest¶ species. Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided¶ into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so¶ on will he replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically¶ monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not¶ divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,¶ and which are in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreigners¶ have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this¶ society’s by products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,¶ finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into¶ its opposite: the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses¶ against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race. The idea of racial¶ purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that¶ is what replaces the idea of race struggle.¶ I think that racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle, and when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism. The connection between racism and antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,¶ then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice that¶ appears at a given moment in a sort of’ grand antirevolutionary protect.¶ At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was being trans¶ formed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionary¶ thought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism now¶ began to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite literally,¶ revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we could¶ put it this way: Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political¶ discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the singular) was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it,¶ of using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose¶ luster and vigor were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals,¶ but by medico-normalizing techniques. Thanks to the shift from law¶ to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the¶ emancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, sovereignty was able¶ to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it¶ for its own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to¶ protect the race. It becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.

<h4>The emergence of a normalized juridicomedical order allows for state racism to continually entrench itself in the name of preserving sovereignty. Foucault explains again</h4><p>Michel, “Society Must Be Defended,” (Lectures at College de France), Lecture Four, 1/28/76 SJE</p><p>I think this provides us with a starting point for understanding¶ how and why historical discourse could become a new issue in the¶ mid nineteenth century<mark>. <u><strong>At the time when this discourse was being</u></strong></mark> displaced, translated, or <u><strong><mark>converted into a revolutionary discourse</u></strong></mark>, at the time when the notion of race struggle was about to be¶ replaced by that of class struggle—and in fact, when I say “the mid-¶ nineteenth century,” that’s too late; it was in the first half of the¶ nineteenth century, as it was [Thiers] who transformed race struggle¶ into class struggle—at the time when this conversion was going on,¶ <u><strong><mark>it was</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong>only <mark>natural that attempts should he made</mark> by one side</u>¶<u> <mark>to recode the old counterhistory</u></strong></mark> not in terms of class, but <u><strong><mark>in terms</u>¶<u> of race</u></strong></mark>s-—races <u><strong><mark>in the biological and medical sense</mark> of that term.</u></strong> And¶ it was at the moment when a counterhistory of the revolutionary type¶ was taking shape that another counterhistory began to take shape—¶ but it will be a counterhistory in the sense that it adopts a biologicomedical perspective and crushes the historical dimension that was¶ present in this discourse. <u><strong><mark>You thus see the appearance of what will¶ become actual racism. This racism takes over and reconverts the form</u>¶<u> and function of the discourse on race struggle</mark>, but it distorts them,</u>¶<u> and it will be characterized by the fact that <mark>the theme of historical war</u></strong></mark>—with its battles, its invasions. its looting. its victories, and its¶ defeats—<u><strong><mark>will be replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle</u>¶<u> for existence. </mark>It is </u></strong>no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would¶ understand the term, but <u><strong>a struggle in the biological sense: the differentiation of species, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest</u>¶<u> species.</u></strong> Similarly, the theme of the binary society which is divided¶ into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so¶ on will he replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically¶ monist. Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, which do not¶ divide the social body, or the living body of society, into two parts,¶ and which are in a sense accidental, hence the idea that foreigners¶ have infiltrated this society, the theme of the deviants who are this¶ society’s by products. The theme of the counterhistory of races was,¶ finally, that the State was necessarily unjust. It is now inverted into¶ its opposite: <u><strong><mark>the State is no longer an instrument that one race uses</u>¶<u> against another: the State is</mark>, and must be, <mark>the protector of the integrity</mark>, the <mark>superiority</mark>, and the purity <mark>of the race</u></strong>.</mark> The idea of racial¶ purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that¶ is what replaces the idea of race struggle.¶ I think that <u><strong><mark>racism is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and <mark>when counterhistory begins to be converted into a biological racism</u></strong></mark>. The connection between racism and antirevolutionary discourse and politics in the West is not,¶ then, accidental; it is not simple an additional ideological edifice that¶ appears at a given moment in a sort of’ grand antirevolutionary protect.¶ At the moment when the discourse of race struggle was being trans¶ formed into revolutionary discourse, racism was revolutionary¶ thought. Although they had their roots in the discourse of race struggle, the revolutionary project and revolutionary propheticism now¶ began to take a very different direction. Racism is, quite literally,¶ revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Alternatively, we could¶ put it this way: <u><strong>Whereas <mark>the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against the historico-political</u></mark>¶<u> discourse of Roman sovereignty, <mark>the discourse of race</u></strong></mark> (in the singular)<u><strong> <mark>was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it</u></strong></mark>,¶ of <u><strong><mark>using it to preserve the sovereignty of the State</mark>, a sovereignty <mark>whose</u></mark>¶<u> luster and <mark>vigor were no longer guaranteed by</mark> magico-juridical <mark>rituals,</u>¶<u> but by medico-normalizing techniques</mark>.</u></strong> Thanks to the shift from law¶ to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the¶ emancipatorv protect to a concern with purity, <u><strong><mark>sovereignty was able</u>¶<u> to invest or take </mark>over the discourse of <mark>race </mark>struggle <mark>and reutilize it</u>¶<u> for its own strategy. State sovereignty</mark> thus <mark>becomes the imperative to</u>¶<u> protect the race</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It becomes both <mark>an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution</u></mark> that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands, and promises.</p></strong>

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1

Vermont BL

Weitz

1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Warming doesn’t lead to war

Tertrais 11

Tertrais 11—Senior Research Fellow specializing in conflict study @ Fondation pour la recherche stratégique in Paris

Since the dawn of civilization, warmer eras have meant fewer wars. The reason is simple: all things being equal, a colder climate meant reduced crops, more famine and instability Research by climate historians shows a clear correlation between increased warfare and cold periods the correlation has been diminishing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution: as societies modernize, they become less dependent on local agricultural output , if there was any significant link between warfare and warming, the number of conflicts should have been rising in the past two decades. It has not, quite the contrary. Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of wars has diminished Today, there are half as many wars as two decades ago There is even a reverse correlation The average global temperature diminished between 1940 and 1975: during that period, the total number of conflicts was on the rise. But the existence of these data points should contribute to extreme caution about the hypothetical equation according to which a warmer world would be a war-prone world.

warmer eras have meant fewer wars a colder climate meant reduced crops, more famine and instabilit Research by climate historians shows a clear correlation between increased warfare and cold periods there was any significant link between warfare and warming, the number of conflicts should have been rising in the past two decades. It has not, quite the contrary the total number of wars has diminished There is even a reverse correlation The average global temperature diminished between 1940 and 1975: during that period, the total number of conflicts was on the rise. But the existence of these data points should contribute to extreme caution about the hypothetical equation according to which a warmer world would be a war-prone world.

(Bruno, “The Climate Wars Myth” Summer) Since the dawn of civilization, warmer eras have meant fewer wars. The reason is simple: all things being equal, a colder climate meant reduced crops, more famine and instability.4 Research by climate historians shows a clear correlation between increased warfare and cold periods.5 They are particularly clear in Asia and Europe, as well as in Africa.6 Interestingly, the correlation has been diminishing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution: as societies modernize, they become less dependent on local agricultural output.7 Moreover, if there was any significant link between warfare and warming, the number of conflicts should have been rising in the past two decades. It has not, quite the contrary. Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of wars, after having steadily increased since 1945, has diminished. Statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which come from work done at the Uppsala University, clearly show such a decrease. Today, there are half as many wars as two decades ago (17 in 2009 versus 35 in 1989).8 This result is mainly due to the rapid decrease in the number of internal conflicts.9 As with the number of interstate conflicts, civil wars began to decline from the end of the 1970s onwards. Classic international war has, statistically speaking, disappeared from the modern world. According to the SIPRI/Uppsala University data, in 2009, for the sixth year in a row, there was no ongoing interstate war. (Iraq and Afghanistan do not belong to that category.) Such conflicts represented, in the 2000s, three out of a total of 30 wars, thus 10 percent of the total_in a world where the number of states has tripled since the end of the Second World War. There is even a reverse correlation. The average global temperature diminished between 1940 and 1975: during that period, the total number of conflicts was on the rise. Correlation is not causation. (It may be tempting to argue that the modernization of societies leads to two separate, parallel outcomes: global warming and global peace.) But the existence of these data points should contribute to extreme caution about the hypothetical equation according to which a warmer world would be a war-prone world. In 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was attributed jointly to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Rarely was the attribution of a Nobel Peace Prize so blatantly out of sync with geopolitical realities.

<h4>Warming doesn’t lead to war</h4><p><u><strong>Tertrais 11</u></strong>—Senior Research Fellow specializing in conflict study @ Fondation pour la recherche stratégique in Paris </p><p>(Bruno, “The Climate Wars Myth” Summer) </p><p><u>Since the dawn of civilization, <mark>warmer eras have meant fewer wars</mark>. The reason is simple: all things being equal, <mark>a colder climate meant reduced crops, more famine and instabilit</mark>y</u>.4 <u><mark>Research by climate historians shows a clear correlation between increased warfare and cold periods</u></mark>.5 They are particularly clear in Asia and Europe, as well as in Africa.6 Interestingly, <u>the correlation has been diminishing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution: as societies modernize, they become less dependent on local agricultural output</u>.7 Moreover<u>, if <mark>there was any significant link between warfare and warming, the number of conflicts should have been rising in the past two decades. It has not, quite the contrary</mark>. Since the end of the Cold War,</u> <u><mark>the total number of wars</u></mark>, after having steadily increased since 1945, <u><mark>has diminished</u></mark>. Statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which come from work done at the Uppsala University, clearly show such a decrease. <u>Today, there are half as many wars as two decades ago</u> (17 in 2009 versus 35 in 1989).8 This result is mainly due to the rapid decrease in the number of internal conflicts.9 As with the number of interstate conflicts, civil wars began to decline from the end of the 1970s onwards. Classic international war has, statistically speaking, disappeared from the modern world. According to the SIPRI/Uppsala University data, in 2009, for the sixth year in a row, there was no ongoing interstate war. (Iraq and Afghanistan do not belong to that category.) Such conflicts represented, in the 2000s, three out of a total of 30 wars, thus 10 percent of the total_in a world where the number of states has tripled since the end of the Second World War. <u><strong><mark>There is even a reverse correlation</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>The average global temperature diminished between 1940 and 1975: during that period, the total number of conflicts was on the rise.</u></mark> Correlation is not causation. (It may be tempting to argue that the modernization of societies leads to two separate, parallel outcomes: global warming and global peace.) <u><strong><mark>But the existence of these data points should contribute to extreme caution about the hypothetical equation according to which a warmer world would be a war-prone world.</u></strong></mark> In 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was attributed jointly to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Rarely was the attribution of a Nobel Peace Prize so blatantly out of sync with geopolitical realities.</p>

1NC

Hemp

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Whitman DL

Justin Kirk

1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

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The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion

Chow 1993

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?

The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper

(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

<h4>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p><u><strong>Chow</u></strong> – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - <u><strong>1993</p><p></u></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u>to haunt us.</u> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

N

UNLV

5

Kansas HR

Justin Stanley

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

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It is through the framing of these continually morphing power structures that our genealogy must recognize a right to die. Criticism of the regimes surrounding physician assisted suicide through countermemory combined with affirmation of the “right to die” ruptures the discourse of medicalization and subverts biopolitical control over death. Ben Golder explains

2011 SJE

Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, 2011 SJE

Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’ Under these conditions the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is thus intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) by opening up a different perspective upon death in life – that is, the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus. Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed, performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid

Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’. Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics by opening up a different perspective upon death in life the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions’ orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ , work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,¶ performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas¶ Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid¶

In a recent article on this topic, Thomas Tierney neatly illustrates how Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’. In order to do this, Tier- ney reads Foucault’s comments on the ‘right to die’ against the famous intervention of the ‘Dream Team’ (a collection of six eminent liberal/libertarian philosophers, to wit: Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, TM Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Johnson) in their amicus curiae brief in the 1997 US Supreme Court case on assisted suicide, Washington v Glucksberg (see Dworkin et al. 1997). Whereas the latter is ‘concerned with providing to individuals enough control over their deaths so they can avoid a painful and/or degrading demise, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of juridico-medical authority that is aimed at preserving life’, (Tierney, 2006: 626), Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics, that which Tierney calls the ‘juridico-medical order of mod- ernity’, the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’ (Tierney, 2006: 614, 615; see also Thompson, 2004). Under these conditions the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’ (Tierney, 2006: 631) by ‘rais[ing] unsettling questions about the very nature of modern subjects’ (Tierney, 2006: 605). The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is thus intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) by opening up a different perspective upon death in life – that is, the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project (cf. Foucault, 1983: 237). ‘It is quite inconceivable that we not be given the chance’, Foucault writes elsewhere, ‘to prepare ourselves with all the passion, intensity and detail that we wish, including the little extras that we have been dreaming about for such a long time’ (Foucault, 1996: 296–297), that is to make of suicide ‘a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your life’ (1996: 296). The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life (read, for Foucault: the disruption of bio-politicized subjectivity). In contrast, ‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions’ (Tierney, 2006: 632). For all its insistence upon the manner of death needing to reflect autonomous decisions concerning the value of life itself (which would seemingly import some critical perspective upon that life), orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’, like that of the ‘Dream Team’, work to reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus. The liberal narrative reinscribes the death- bound subject of bio-politics in a milieu of suffering (see the pathos-laden conclusion to Dworkin et al., 1997) from which medicine cannot save her and it thus calls upon law¶ and the state to balance the interests of the individual’s dignity against the state’s¶ (bio-political) interest in preserving life. Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,¶ performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas¶ Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid¶ these relations.

<h4>It is through the framing of these continually morphing power structures that our genealogy must recognize a right to die. Criticism of the regimes surrounding physician assisted suicide through countermemory combined with affirmation of the “right to die” ruptures the discourse of medicalization and subverts biopolitical control over death. Ben Golder explains </h4><p>Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, <u><strong><mark>2011 SJE</p><p></u></strong></mark>In a recent article on this topic, Thomas Tierney neatly illustrates how <u><strong><mark>Foucault diverges from orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’</u></strong>.</mark> In order to do this, Tier- ney reads Foucault’s comments on the ‘right to die’ against the famous intervention of the ‘Dream Team’ (a collection of six eminent liberal/libertarian philosophers, to wit: Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, TM Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Johnson) in their amicus curiae brief in the 1997 US Supreme Court case on assisted suicide, Washington v Glucksberg (see Dworkin et al. 1997). Whereas the latter is ‘concerned with providing to individuals enough control over their deaths so they can avoid a painful and/or degrading demise, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of juridico-medical authority that is aimed at preserving life’, (Tierney, 2006: 626), <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s deployment of the ‘right to die’ is intended to contest the forms of subjectivity produced and required by that very ‘juridico-medical authority’. Under contemporary conditions of bio-politics</u></strong></mark>, that which Tierney calls the ‘juridico-medical order of mod- ernity’, <u><strong>the medically-aware subject is enjoined to police his or her own health such that ‘[r]easonable individuals have been eager participants in this modern project of death deferral’</u></strong> (Tierney, 2006: 614, 615; see also Thompson, 2004). <u><strong>Under these conditions <mark>the standard liberal resort to the dignity of the individual and the autonomous terms under which that individual can exit life do nothing to contest the terms under which that life is bio-politically lived and invested by the institutions of medical power. By contrast, Foucault’s interventions on the ‘right to die’ (read alongside his wider critique of biopolitics) actually entail a ‘fundamental challenge to the juridico-medical complex of modernity’</u></strong></mark> (Tierney, 2006: 631) by ‘rais[ing] unsettling questions about the very nature of modern subjects’ (Tierney, 2006: 605). <u><strong><mark>The deployment of rights is intended to reflect back, as it were, upon the politicization of life. Foucault’s assertion of a ‘right to die’ is</mark> thus <mark>intended to problematize the subjective pre-suppositions of medicalized bio-politics</mark> (obedience to discourses of death-deferral and medical self-management) <mark>by opening up a different perspective upon death in life</mark> – that is, <mark>the preparation of one’s own death as an aesthetic project</u></strong></mark> (cf. Foucault, 1983: 237). ‘It is quite inconceivable that we not be given the chance’, Foucault writes elsewhere, ‘to prepare ourselves with all the passion, intensity and detail that we wish, including the little extras that we have been dreaming about for such a long time’ (Foucault, 1996: 296–297), that is to make of suicide ‘a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will enlighten all of your life’ (1996: 296). <u><strong>The crux of the difference between the Foucaultian and the liberal articulations of the ‘right to die’ thus resides in life’s preparation for death and, through this late modern melete thanatou, the consequent ‘enlightenment’ in life </u></strong>(read, for Foucault: the disruption of bio-politicized subjectivity). In contrast, <u><strong><mark>‘by focussing on controlling one’s death [the] liberal perspective does not foster critical reflection upon those convictions by which one lives one’s life, and leaves unchallenged the role of medical authority in shaping those convictions</u></strong>’</mark> (Tierney, 2006: 632). For all its insistence upon the manner of death needing to reflect autonomous decisions concerning the value of life itself (which would seemingly import some critical perspective upon that life), <u><strong><mark>orthodox liberal articulations of the ‘right to die</u></strong>’</mark>, like that of the ‘Dream Team’<mark>, <u><strong>work to</mark> <mark>reinforce a bio-political medical apparatus</mark>. </u></strong>The liberal narrative reinscribes the death- bound subject of bio-politics in a milieu of suffering (see the pathos-laden conclusion to Dworkin et al., 1997) from which medicine cannot save her and it thus calls upon law¶ and the state to balance the interests of the individual’s dignity against the state’s¶ (bio-political) interest in preserving life. <u><strong><mark>Such an approach leaves unquestioned (indeed,</u></strong>¶<u><strong> performatively reinforces) the respective roles of law, state and medicine, whereas</u></strong>¶<u><strong> Foucault’s aesthetic, de-medicalized, anti-statist discourse seeks to subvert or avoid</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></mark>these relations.</p></strong>

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Wake

1

Vermont BL

Weitz

1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Mexico economy resilient and not derailed by cartel violence – previous crises prove

Vardi ‘12

Vardi ‘12 (Nathan Vardi Forbes “The Mexican Miracle: Despite Drug War, Economy Is Booming” 10/15/2012 @ 1:44PM http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/10/15/the-mexican-mircale/, TSW)

Driven by Mexico, Citigroup’s Latin-American consumer banking revenue grew 7% year-over-year in the third quarter We think that Mexico is extremely well-poised for growth was just there not too long ago and with the leadership change there in addition to prospects for reforms and what you are seeing on the ground—that is a high spot definitely When the financial crisis hit the U.S. in 2008, FORBES predicted a “Mexican Meltdown The explosion of the drug war coupled with the sure-to-come drop in exports to the contracting U.S. economy, seemed like it would derail Mexico Mexico’s economy was hit very hard by the financial crisis and its recession was severe, but its recovery miraculously has been even stronger Even with the weak U.S. recovery and the ongoing drug violence, Mexico has boomed Mexican gross domestic product increased by 3.9% and 5.5% in the last two years The Mexican stock market has performed well, with the benchmark IPC index up nearly 13% Pemex recently announced deep-water oil discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico

Mexico is extremely well-poised for growth with the leadership change in addition to reforms When the financial crisis hit in 08, Mexico’s economy was hit hard but its recovery miraculously has been stronger Even with weak U.S. recovery and ongoing drug violence Mexico has boomed g d p increased in the last two years

Driven by Mexico, Citigroup’s Latin-American consumer banking revenue grew 7% year-over-year in the third quarter to $2.4 billion, while the bank’s revenue in Asia was down. “We think that Mexico is extremely well-poised for growth,” Pandit said on Citigroup’s earnings conference call. “I was just there not too long ago and with the leadership change there in addition to prospects for reforms and what you are seeing on the ground—that is a high spot definitely.” Citigroup’s stock was up 4% on Monday. Not too long ago, the idea that big-shot American CEOs would be touting Mexico would have seemed unlikely. When the financial crisis hit the U.S. in 2008, FORBES predicted a “Mexican Meltdown.” The explosion of the drug war between the Mexican drug cartels and the government, coupled with the sure-to-come drop in exports to the contracting U.S. economy, seemed like it would derail Mexico again and ensure that other emerging markets like Brazil would keep passing it by. The U.S. Joint Forces Command lumped Mexico in the same category as Pakistan and worried it was becoming a failed state. Mexico’s economy was hit very hard by the financial crisis and its recession was severe, but its recovery miraculously has been even stronger. Even with the weak U.S. recovery and the ongoing drug violence, Mexico has boomed. Top officials in the Mexican government predict the country’s economic growth could reach 5% in 2012, after gross domestic product increased by 3.9% and 5.5% in the last two years. At the same time, Brazil’s economy has slowed and Mexico is starting to catch up to its regional rival. The Mexican stock market has performed well, with the benchmark IPC index up nearly 13% in 2012 and more than 20% in the last year. Pemex, the state-owned oil company that dominates the Mexican economy, recently announced deep-water oil discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico, suggesting the company might be able to slow the decline of its production.

<h4>Mexico economy resilient and not derailed by cartel violence – previous crises prove</h4><p><u><strong>Vardi ‘12</u></strong> </p><p>(Nathan Vardi Forbes “The Mexican Miracle: Despite Drug War, Economy Is Booming” 10/15/2012 @ 1:44PM http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/10/15/the-mexican-mircale/<u>, TSW)</p><p>Driven by Mexico, Citigroup’s Latin-American consumer banking revenue grew 7% year-over-year in the third quarter </u>to $2.4 billion, while the bank’s revenue in Asia was down. “<u>We think that <mark>Mexico is extremely well-poised for growth</u></mark>,” Pandit said on Citigroup’s earnings conference call. “I <u>was just there not too long ago and <mark>with the leadership change</mark> there <mark>in addition to</mark> prospects for <mark>reforms</mark> and what you are seeing on the ground—that is a high spot definitely</u>.” Citigroup’s stock was up 4% on Monday. Not too long ago, the idea that big-shot American CEOs would be touting Mexico would have seemed unlikely. <u><mark>When</mark> <mark>the financial crisis hit</mark> the U.S. <mark>in</mark> 20<mark>08,</mark> FORBES predicted a “Mexican Meltdown</u>.” <u>The explosion of the drug war</u> between the Mexican drug cartels and the government, <u>coupled with the sure-to-come drop in exports to the contracting U.S. economy, seemed like it would derail Mexico</u> again and ensure that other emerging markets like Brazil would keep passing it by. The U.S. Joint Forces Command lumped Mexico in the same category as Pakistan and worried it was becoming a failed state. <u><strong><mark>Mexico’s economy was hit</mark> very <mark>hard</mark> by the financial crisis and its recession was severe, <mark>but its recovery miraculously has been </mark>even <mark>stronger</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Even with</mark> the <mark>weak U.S. recovery</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <strong><mark>ongoing drug violence</strong></mark>, <mark>Mexico has boomed</u></mark>. Top officials in the <u>Mexican</u> government predict the country’s economic growth could reach 5% in 2012, after <u><mark>g</mark>ross <mark>d</mark>omestic <mark>p</mark>roduct <mark>increased</mark> by 3.9% and 5.5% <mark>in the last two years</u></mark>. At the same time, Brazil’s economy has slowed and Mexico is starting to catch up to its regional rival. <u>The Mexican stock market has performed well, with the benchmark IPC index up nearly 13%</u> in 2012 and more than 20% in the last year. <u>Pemex</u>, the state-owned oil company that dominates the Mexican economy, <u>recently announced deep-water oil discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico</u>, suggesting the company might be able to slow the decline of its production.</p>

1NC

Cartels

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UNLV

1

Whitman DL

Justin Kirk

1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

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Their turn to the state for legalization legitimizes state violence and racist and patriarchal norms; and it removes social responsibility for sexual violence by rending women as vulnerable objects of masculine power

Heberle ‘96

Heberle ‘96

Turning to institutions offers increased legitimacy to the violence of the state and to racist and patriarchal norms vis-a-vis justice movement for women going to the state removes responsibility from society for combatting sexual violence. It individuates women as vulnerable objects of masculinist power and disallows public acknowledgement of the complex logic of sexual violence writ large At best it offers individual women a limited sense of safety and some (increasingly limited) resources In the long run, state-centered, bureaucratic, and legalistic strategies may do more to normalize violence as a constitutive aspect of political life than to prevent sexual violence as a constitutive aspect of social life pointing to the immediacy and "reality" of the problem as the grounds for policy shores up masculinist forms of social power and its ability to define the limits of women's live

Turning to institutions offers increased legitimacy to the violence of the state and to racist and patriarchal norms vis-a-vis justice movement for women going to the state removes responsibility from society for combatting sexual violence. It individuates women as vulnerable objects of masculinist power and disallows public acknowledgement of the complex logic of sexual violence writ large state-centered legalistic strategies may do more to normalize violence than to prevent sexual violence pointing to the reality" of the problem as the grounds for policy shores up masculinist forms of social power and its ability to define the limits of women's live

(Renee."Deconstructive strategies and the movement against sexual violence. " Hypatia  11.4 (1996): 63. GenderWatch (GW) Turning to these institutions offers increased legitimacy to the violence of the state in general and to racist and patriarchal norms vis-a-vis justice and freedom of movement for women in particular. Advocating strong policing strategies as a means of protection places feminist critiques of the racist/patriarchal state in the background in light of the "reality" of sexual violence.14 Further, going to the state can be extremely isolating and removes responsibility from society for combatting sexual violence. It literally individuates women as vulnerable objects of masculinist power (women have to argue their immanent vulnerability in order to prove they were raped and in need of services) and disallows public acknowledgement of the complex logic of sexual violence writ large.15 At best it offers individual women a limited sense of safety and some (increasingly limited) resources. In the long run, however, state-centered, bureaucratic, and legalistic strategies may do more to normalize violence as a constitutive aspect of political life than to prevent sexual violence as a constitutive aspect of social life. Scarry's theory of the inversions of pain and power which invest the reality of pain in the reality of power encourages us to take note of the fragility of the edifice of masculine power. It has been shown that sexual violence escalates to murderous proportions when batterers fear a woman's imminent withdrawal or separation. Women who are battered risk death when they become pregnant, attempt to leave, or file for divorce. In these situations, batterers experience a lack of control and try, through violence, to gain it back-to establish the certainty of "their woman's" commitment. Violence often manifests itself in blows to the woman's stomach to cause a miscarriage. Pregnancy appears as a form of separation and therefore a threat to male power (Jones 1994; Schneider 1992; Walker 1984, 1989). In response to this, the movement often advocates further protectionist strategies in alliance with a masculinist state. The question I raise is not whether those are necessary in the moment for individual women in danger, but whether the habit of continually pointing to the immediacy and "reality" of the problem as the grounds for creating global social and political policy further shores up masculinist forms of social power and its ability to define the limits of women's lives. Remembering the reasons for earlier feminist insistence upon autonomy from the state and inventing alternatives may point us in a direction of isolating sexual violence as a cultural phenomenon due to its inability to affect the terms on whichwomen live their lives (Schechter 1982).

<h4><u><strong>Their turn to the state for legalization legitimizes state violence and racist and patriarchal norms; and it removes social responsibility for sexual violence by rending women as vulnerable objects of masculine power</h4><p>Heberle ‘96</p><p></u></strong>(Renee."Deconstructive strategies and the movement against sexual violence. " Hypatia  11.4 (1996): 63. GenderWatch (GW)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Turning to</u></strong> </mark>these <u><strong><mark>institutions offers increased legitimacy to the violence of the state</u></strong> </mark>in general <u><strong><mark>and to racist and patriarchal norms vis-a-vis justice</u></strong> </mark>and freedom of <u><strong><mark>movement for women</u></strong> </mark>in particular. Advocating strong policing strategies as a means of protection places feminist critiques of the racist/patriarchal state in the background in light of the "reality" of sexual violence.14 Further, <u><strong><mark>going to the state</u></strong></mark> can be extremely isolating and <u><strong><mark>removes responsibility from society for combatting sexual violence. It</u></strong></mark> literally <u><strong><mark>individuates women as vulnerable objects of masculinist power</u></strong> </mark>(women have to argue their immanent vulnerability in order to prove they were raped and in need of services) <u><mark>and disallows public acknowledgement of the complex logic of sexual violence writ large</u></mark>.15 <u>At best it offers individual women a limited sense of safety and some (increasingly limited) resources</u>. <u>In the long run, </u>however, <u><strong><mark>state-centered</strong></mark>, bureaucratic, and <strong><mark>legalistic strategies may do more to normalize violence</strong> </mark>as a constitutive aspect of political life <strong><mark>than to prevent sexual violence</strong> </mark>as a constitutive aspect of social life</u>. Scarry's theory of the inversions of pain and power which invest the reality of pain in the reality of power encourages us to take note of the fragility of the edifice of masculine power. It has been shown that sexual violence escalates to murderous proportions when batterers fear a woman's imminent withdrawal or separation. Women who are battered risk death when they become pregnant, attempt to leave, or file for divorce. In these situations, batterers experience a lack of control and try, through violence, to gain it back-to establish the certainty of "their woman's" commitment. Violence often manifests itself in blows to the woman's stomach to cause a miscarriage. Pregnancy appears as a form of separation and therefore a threat to male power (Jones 1994; Schneider 1992; Walker 1984, 1989). In response to this, the movement often advocates further protectionist strategies in alliance with a masculinist state. The question I raise is not whether those are necessary in the moment for individual women in danger, but whether the habit of continually <u><mark>pointing to the </mark>immediacy and "<mark>reality" of the problem</u> <u>as the grounds for</u> </mark>creating global social and political <u><mark>policy</u> </mark>further <u><strong><mark>shores up masculinist forms of social power and its ability to define the limits of women's live</u></strong></mark>s. Remembering the reasons for earlier feminist insistence upon autonomy from the state and inventing alternatives may point us in a direction of isolating sexual violence as a cultural phenomenon due to its inability to affect the terms on whichwomen live their lives (Schechter 1982). </p>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

N

UNLV

5

Kansas HR

Justin Stanley

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

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This affirmation of a right to die is a non-teleological strategic reversibility against dominant nodes of sovereignty which enables continual contestation. Rights seized in this manner are political tools which construct and reconstruct historical artifacts. Ben Golder again explains

Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, 2011 SJE

rights as the strategic implement-effect of political struggle Foucault’s endorsements of rights as political if the content of a right cannot straightforwardly be derived from a necessary figure of the human and if that human is a contested and volatile construction rights emerge as historical and political artefacts which reflect the contours of ‘the human’ as s/he is variously constructed in discourse and regimes of power. Rights hence appear from this perspective as thoroughly political creations, dependent upon the political/discursive/strategic viability of rights claims the terms of their un/making betray particular exclusions, erasures and disavowals which themselves reflect particular political aims, projects and alliances. rights for Foucault are political in this general sense of being particular constructions, the result and reflection of political claims and value systems which are made and unmade include and exclude for Foucault this imports both a necessary and ongoing concern for what is excluded in the making of claims rights in this sense are political tools used in the service of constructing and reconstructing different social and political visions which compete on the same terrain in agonistic combat from Foucault’s perspective the removal of ontological certainty for rights claims actually excavates a hidden margin of ‘freedom’ Rights must be claimed, must be seized and in this political seizure can be expanded and inhabited as a strategic reversibility or as a counter-investment This political description of rights designates both an ungrounded and a non-teleological conception necessarily open-ended, never-ending, process of contestation which will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being what we are

Foucault’s endorsements of rights as political emerge as historical and political artefacts which reflect the contours of ‘the human’ as s/he is constructed in discourse and regimes of power. Rights appear as thoroughly political creations, dependent upon political/discursive/strategic viability the terms of their un/making betray particular exclusions, erasures and disavowals which themselves reflect political aims rights for Foucault are political in this general sense of being particular constructions rights in this sense are political tools used in the service of constructing and reconstructing different social and political visions which compete on the same terrain in agonistic combat Rights must be claimed, must be seized and in this political seizure can be expanded and inhabited as a strategic reversibility This political description of rights designates an ungrounded and a non-teleological conception necessarily open-ended, never-ending, process of contestation which will, separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being what we are

The second figure is that of rights as the strategic implement-effect of political struggle. Such a figure has (at least) three elements which I shall discuss in reverse order here, starting with the question of the political. To characterize Foucault’s various assertions and endorsements of rights as, in a broad sense, political is to suggest in the first instance several general dimensions of rights that flow from or are compatible with the above figure of the non-necessary, ungrounded ground of rights. That is, if the content of a right cannot straightforwardly be derived from a necessary figure of the human and if that human is rather, as Foucault consistently holds, a contested and volatile construction, then rights emerge as historical and political artefacts which reflect the contours of ‘the human’ as s/he is variously constructed in discourse and regimes of power. Rights hence appear from this perspective as thoroughly political creations, dependent upon the political/discursive/strategic viability of rights claims and their consequent observance and enforcement.17 Rights can be made and unmade (Patton, 2005: 272–273) and, crucially, the terms of their un/making betray particular exclusions, erasures and disavowals which themselves reflect particular political aims, projects and alliances. Foucault’s wider philosophical and political practice is of course animated by and attentive to such concerns. From his early archaeology of Western reason as founded upon the constitutive silence of madness (2006: xxviii)18 to his later analyses of the disciplinary regulation of the ill, the abnormal, the delinquent, etc., Foucault focused upon the ways in which the content of rationality, normality, and so forth was sustained in and through the suppression or discipline of its opposite; hence, in order to ‘find out what our society means by ‘‘sanity’’’, Foucault aptly suggests in a late essay, ‘perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the field of insanity’ (2000i: 329). So, rights for Foucault are political in this general sense of being particular constructions, the result and reflection of political claims and value systems which are made and unmade, and which include and exclude. Moreover, for Foucault this imports both a necessary and ongoing concern for what is excluded in the making of claims. It follows also that he sees the openness and contingency of rights as a promise and not as raising the spectre of nihilism or relativism, or indeed as a tarnishing of the currency of rights. Rights claims on this view proclaim particular political perspectives and hence cannot masquerade as ‘something of an anti-politics – a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against power’ (Brown, 2004: 453), but neither can they be understood qua ‘trumps’, as expressing by their own force some kind of political or ontological priority (Dworkin, 1977). Rather, rights in this sense are political tools used in the service of constructing and reconstructing different social and political visions, tools which compete on the same terrain in agonistic combat (Simons, 1995) with other rights and indeed with other political idioms and visions.19 If from some orthodox perspectives this devalues rights, from the perspective elaborated here it opens up both a politically richer and a more self-reflexive (less disingenuous, less moralistic) rights discourse.20 Thus, from Foucault’s perspective the removal of ontological certainty for rights claims actually excavates a hidden margin of ‘freedom’ – indeed, the critical force of genealogy is directed at exposing false necessities and demonstrating that ‘people ... are much freer than they feel’ (Foucault, quoted in Martin, 1988: 10). Rights must be claimed, must be seized and in this political seizure can be expanded and inhabited – indeed even against their ‘terms’, as a strategic reversibility or as a counter-investment (Foucault, 1979: 100–102; Nietzsche, 1998, II, §12: 50–52). This political description of rights thus designates both an ungrounded and a non-teleological conception, a necessarily open-ended, never-ending, process of contestation, a ‘permanent provocation’ (Foucault, 2000i: 342) which, as Foucault memorably puts it in a slightly different context, will, separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think ... [that is,] to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.

<h4>This affirmation of a right to die is a non-teleological strategic reversibility against dominant nodes of sovereignty which enables continual contestation. Rights seized in this manner are political tools which construct and reconstruct historical artifacts. Ben Golder again explains</h4><p>Ben Golder, Ph.D, Professor at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia), “Foucault’s Critical¶ (Yet Ambivalent)¶ Affirmation:¶ Three Figures of Rights,”Social And Legal Studies, 2011 SJE</p><p>The second figure is that of <u><strong>rights as the strategic implement-effect of political struggle</u></strong>. Such a figure has (at least) three elements which I shall discuss in reverse order here, starting with the question of the political. To characterize <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s</u></strong></mark> various assertions and <u><strong><mark>endorsements of rights as</u></strong></mark>, in a broad sense, <u><strong><mark>political</u></strong></mark> is to suggest in the first instance several general dimensions of rights that flow from or are compatible with the above figure of the non-necessary, ungrounded ground of rights. That is, <u><strong>if the content of a right cannot straightforwardly be derived from a necessary figure of the human and if that human is </u></strong>rather, as Foucault consistently holds, <u><strong>a contested and volatile construction</u></strong>, then <u><strong>rights <mark>emerge as historical and political artefacts which reflect the contours of ‘the human’ as s/he is</mark> variously <mark>constructed in discourse and regimes of power. Rights</mark> hence <mark>appear</mark> from this perspective <mark>as thoroughly political creations, dependent upon </mark>the <mark>political/discursive/strategic viability</mark> of rights claims</u></strong> and their consequent observance and enforcement.17 Rights can be made and unmade (Patton, 2005: 272–273) and, crucially, <u><strong><mark>the terms of their un/making betray particular exclusions, erasures and disavowals which themselves reflect</mark> particular <mark>political aims</mark>, projects and alliances. </u></strong>Foucault’s wider philosophical and political practice is of course animated by and attentive to such concerns. From his early archaeology of Western reason as founded upon the constitutive silence of madness (2006: xxviii)18 to his later analyses of the disciplinary regulation of the ill, the abnormal, the delinquent, etc., Foucault focused upon the ways in which the content of rationality, normality, and so forth was sustained in and through the suppression or discipline of its opposite; hence, in order to ‘find out what our society means by ‘‘sanity’’’, Foucault aptly suggests in a late essay, ‘perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the field of insanity’ (2000i: 329). So, <u><strong><mark>rights for Foucault are political in this general sense of being particular constructions</mark>, the result and reflection of political claims and value systems which are made and unmade</u></strong>, and which <u><strong>include and exclude</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>for Foucault this imports both a necessary and ongoing concern for what is excluded in the making of claims</u></strong>. It follows also that he sees the openness and contingency of rights as a promise and not as raising the spectre of nihilism or relativism, or indeed as a tarnishing of the currency of rights. Rights claims on this view proclaim particular political perspectives and hence cannot masquerade as ‘something of an anti-politics – a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against power’ (Brown, 2004: 453), but neither can they be understood qua ‘trumps’, as expressing by their own force some kind of political or ontological priority (Dworkin, 1977). Rather, <u><strong><mark>rights in this sense are</u></strong> <u><strong>political tools used in the service of constructing and reconstructing different social and political visions</u></strong></mark>, tools <u><strong><mark>which compete on the same terrain in agonistic combat</u></strong></mark> (Simons, 1995) with other rights and indeed with other political idioms and visions.19 If from some orthodox perspectives this devalues rights, from the perspective elaborated here it opens up both a politically richer and a more self-reflexive (less disingenuous, less moralistic) rights discourse.20 Thus, <u><strong>from Foucault’s perspective the removal of ontological certainty for rights claims actually excavates a hidden margin of ‘freedom’</u></strong> – indeed, the critical force of genealogy is directed at exposing false necessities and demonstrating that ‘people ... are much freer than they feel’ (Foucault, quoted in Martin, 1988: 10). <u><strong><mark>Rights must be claimed, must be seized and in this political seizure can be expanded and inhabited</mark> </u></strong>– indeed even against their ‘terms’, <u><strong><mark>as a strategic reversibility</mark> or as a counter-investment</u></strong> (Foucault, 1979: 100–102; Nietzsche, 1998, II, §12: 50–52). <u><strong><mark>This political description of rights</u></strong></mark> thus <u><strong><mark>designates</mark> both <mark>an ungrounded and a non-teleological conception</u></strong></mark>, a <u><strong><mark>necessarily open-ended, never-ending, process of contestation</u></strong></mark>, a ‘permanent provocation’ (Foucault, 2000i: 342) <u><strong><mark>which</u></strong></mark>, as Foucault memorably puts it in a slightly different context, <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong>, <u><strong>separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being</u></strong></mark>, doing, or thinking <u><strong><mark>what we are</u></strong></mark>, do, or think ... [that is,] to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.</p>

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

Vermont BL

Weitz

1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

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Oil shocks have negligible impact on the global economy

Rasmussen and Roitman 12

Rasmussen and Roitman 12 Rasmussen, senior economist at the IMF, and Roitman, economist at the IMF, 2/22/2012¶ [Tobias and Agustin, “Oil Shocks Around the World: Are They Really That Bad?,” http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8944]

Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated Our recent research indicates that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy the US has been an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by price increases Across the world oil price shock episodes have not been associated with decline There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output particularly for OECD economies but the magnitude has been small with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of 1% spread over 2 to 3 years

Conventional wisdom has it that shocks are bad although the magnitude of the effect are still being debated. Our recent research indicates that prices tend to be closely associated with good times for the global economy Across the world, shock episodes have not been associated with decline a 25% increase in prices will cause a loss of real GDP of less than half of 1%, spread over 2 to 3 years

Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the US economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. Our recent research indicates that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy. Indeed, we find that the US has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies, but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will typically cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of 1%, spread over 2 to 3 years.

<h4><u><strong>Oil shocks have negligible impact on the global economy</h4><p>Rasmussen and Roitman 12</p><p></u></strong>Rasmussen, senior economist at the IMF, and Roitman, economist at the IMF, 2/22/2012¶ [Tobias and Agustin, “Oil Shocks Around the World: Are They Really That Bad?,” http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8944<u><strong><mark>]</p><p>Conventional wisdom has it that</mark> oil <mark>shocks are bad</mark> for oil-importing countries</u></strong>. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the US economy, <u><strong><mark>although the magnitude</mark> and channels <mark>of the effect are still being debated</u></strong>. <u><strong>Our recent research indicates that</mark> oil <mark>prices tend to be</mark> surprisingly <mark>closely associated with good times for the global economy</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, we find that <u><strong>the US has been</u></strong> somewhat of <u><strong>an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by</u></strong> oil <u><strong>price increases</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Across the world</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong>oil price <mark>shock episodes have</u></strong></mark> generally <u><strong><mark>not been associated with</u></strong></mark> a contemporaneous <u><strong><mark>decline</u></strong></mark> in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. <u><strong>There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output</u></strong>, <u><strong>particularly for OECD economies</u></strong>, <u><strong>but the magnitude has</u></strong> typically <u><strong>been small</u></strong>. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, <u><strong>with our estimates suggesting that <mark>a 25% increase in</mark> oil <mark>prices will</u></strong></mark> typically <u><strong><mark>cause a loss of real GDP</mark> in oil-importing countries <mark>of less than half of 1%</u></strong>, <u><strong>spread over 2 to 3 years</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC

Cartels

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Whitman DL

Justin Kirk

1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

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Legalization becomes a new form of controlling women’s bodies and sexuality through regulation

Kim ‘7

Kim ‘7

regulation of prostitution turn into another form of controlling women's bodies and sexuality Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through registration requirements and health exam s Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the tools to build their own business, making such an alternative largely unattainable in Korea.

regulation of prostitution turn into another form of controlling women's bodies and sexuality Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through registration requirements and health exam s Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the tools to build their own business

[Ji Hye, J.D. expected from Washington University in 2008; 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 493. ETB] The regulation of prostitution has great potential to turn into merely another form of controlling women's bodies and sexuality. n203 Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through the registration requirements and mandatory health examinations. n204 For a regulatory regime to work, compulsory registration of prostitutes may be required, "branding a woman for life as a prostitute and making her rescue and rehabilitation far more [*519] difficult." n205 It is possible that a small cooperative network of brothels could be created, as exists in the Netherlands. There, prostitutes have general control of their work, yielding the best working conditions. n206 However, prostitutes find it difficult to organize in such a manner. n207 Many prostitutes enter prostitution to escape abuses or economic desperation, and will usually settle for any work that a procurer offers. n208 Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the necessary tools to build their own business, making such an alternative largely unattainable in Korea.

<h4><u><strong>Legalization becomes a new form of controlling women’s bodies and sexuality through regulation</h4><p>Kim ‘7</p><p></u></strong>[Ji Hye, J.D. expected from Washington University in 2008; 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 493. ETB]</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>regulation of prostitution</u></strong> </mark>has great potential to <u><strong><mark>turn into</u></strong> </mark>merely <u><strong><mark>another form of controlling</u></strong> <u><strong>women's bodies and sexuality</u></strong></mark>. n203 <u><mark>Prostitutes would still face stigmatization through </u></mark>the <u><mark>registration requirements and </u></mark>mandatory <u><mark>health exam</u></mark>ination<u><mark>s</u></mark>. n204 For a regulatory regime to work, compulsory registration of prostitutes may be required, "branding a woman for life as a prostitute and making her rescue and rehabilitation far more [*519] difficult." n205 It is possible that a small cooperative network of brothels could be created, as exists in the Netherlands. There, prostitutes have general control of their work, yielding the best working conditions. n206 However, prostitutes find it difficult to organize in such a manner. n207 Many prostitutes enter prostitution to escape abuses or economic desperation, and will usually settle for any work that a procurer offers. n208 <u><mark>Prostitutes are not likely to have the support or the</u> </mark>necessary <u><mark>tools to build their own business<strong></mark>, making such an alternative largely unattainable in Korea.</p></u></strong>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round5.docx

N

UNLV

5

Kansas HR

Justin Stanley

1ac was prostitution 1nc was legal interpolation damage centricism k plan pik sex trafficking da and case 2nc was damage centrism and case 1nr was interpolation plan pik and case 2nr was damage centrism and case

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No econ impact

Drezner 14

Daniel Drezner 14, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

a dog hasn't barked During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force whether through repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007 Interstate violence has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict The decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed the crisis has not generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected

analysts asserted the crisis would lead states to use of force through diversionary wars, arms races, or great power conflict. The aggregate data suggest otherwise the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is the same as 2007 Interstate violence declined as have military expenditures studies confirm the Recession has not triggered violent conflict the crisis has not generated protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."

<h4>No econ impact</h4><p>Daniel <u><strong>Drezner 14</u></strong>, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164</p><p>The final significant outcome addresses <u>a dog</u> that <u>hasn't barked</u>: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. <u>During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple <mark>analysts asserted</mark> that <mark>the</mark> financial <mark>crisis would lead states to</mark> increase their <mark>use of force</u></mark> as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—<u>whether <mark>through</u></mark> greater internal <u>repression, <mark>diversionary wars, arms races, or</mark> a ratcheting up of <mark>great power conflict</u>.</mark> Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. <u><strong><mark>The aggregate data suggest otherwise</strong></mark>, however</u>. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "<u><mark>the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is</mark> approximately <mark>the same as</mark> it was in <mark>2007</u></mark>."43 <u><mark>Interstate violence</u></mark> in particular <u>has <mark>declined</mark> since the start of the financial crisis, <mark>as have military expenditures</u></mark> in most sampled countries. Other <u><mark>studies confirm</mark> that</u> <u><mark>the</mark> Great <mark>Recession has not triggered</mark> any increase in <mark>violent conflict</u></mark>, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 <u>The</u> secular <u>decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed</u>. Rogers Brubaker observes that "<u><mark>the crisis has not</u></mark> to date <u><mark>generated</mark> the surge in <mark>protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion</mark> that might have been expected</u>."</p>

1NC

Cartels

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

N

UNLV

1

Whitman DL

Justin Kirk

1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Political subjects under the state are ahistorical fabrications of being – our praxis of counter-memory exposes the illusion of subjectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up space for radical becoming. Michael Clifford explains

(Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, London, Great Britain. pp. 134-7)

(Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, London, Great Britain. pp. 134-7)

counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the self—this identity—apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects. These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations imposed on us by such a recognition. counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.” Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” It is not a freedom against the office of government, but against governmentality—against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body. by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits. a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.

Counter-memory consists of forgetting who we are a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity Counter-memory holds us at a distance, from ourselves wrenching the self apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange The self becomes foreign We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection identity is suspended through forgetfulness of its necessity Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom by opposing discourses of truth the discourses of genealogy, lift obligations imposed on us by such a recognition counter-memory takes the form of a transgression there is freedom in refusal Counter-memory suspends identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution The purpose of genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit to its dissipation Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects disposing subjectival constraints by exposing contingency Genealogy cuts through the oppressive density of Truth and discovers that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses It is not a freedom against the government, but against governmentality a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped from the politicized body Even the most violent forms of resistance accomplish nothing if they do not open a space of possible transformation a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are

Foucault’s counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. There is freedom in forgetfulness. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the self—this identity—apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of our-selves. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects.22 These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations imposed on us by such a recognition. As a forgetfulness of these obligations, counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, in this transgression—for those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy, says Foucault, “is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.”25 Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition. Genealogy turns the firm posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.”26 Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask. Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. Rather, there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”27 Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity—identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses. Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for it—for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from it—a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. It is not a freedom against the office of government, but against governmentality—against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. At the same time, the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body. In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.”29 That is, by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits.30 This opening is a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.”31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”32 This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.

<h4>Political subjects under the state are ahistorical fabrications of being – our praxis of counter-memory exposes the illusion of subjectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up space for radical becoming. Michael Clifford explains</h4><p><u><strong>(Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, London, Great Britain. pp. 134-7)</p><p></u></strong>Foucault’s <u><strong>counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness”</u></strong> (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 <u><strong><mark>Counter-memory consists of</mark> essentially <mark>forgetting who we are</mark>. It is <mark>a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of</mark> the <mark>moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity</mark>.</u></strong> There is freedom in forgetfulness. <u><strong><mark>Counter-memory holds us at</mark> a remove, <mark>a distance, from ourselves</mark>; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of <mark>wrenching the self</mark>—this identity—<mark>apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange</mark> before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference.</u></strong> Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of our-selves. <u><strong><mark>The self</mark>, as a coherent identity, <mark>becomes foreign</mark> through counter-memory. <mark>We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection</mark>. The power of <mark>identity is suspended through</mark> a <mark>forgetfulness of its necessity</mark>—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain.</u></strong> This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. <u><strong>Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation</u></strong>, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. <u><strong>“<mark>Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom</mark> of open possibilities <mark>by opposing</mark> themselves to the <mark>discourses of truth</mark> through which we recognize ourselves as subjects.</u></strong>22 <u><strong>These counter-discourses, <mark>the discourses of genealogy, lift</mark> the burdensome <mark>obligations imposed on us by such a recognition</mark>.</u></strong> As a forgetfulness of these obligations, <u><strong><mark>counter-memory</mark> always <mark>takes the form of a transgression</mark>.</u></strong> It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. <u><strong>Yet <mark>there is freedom in</mark> this <mark>refusal</mark>,</u></strong> in this transgression—for those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. <u><strong><mark>Counter-memory</mark> counters, or <mark>suspends</mark>, the power of <mark>identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution</mark>. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. <mark>The purpose of genealogy</u></strong></mark>, says Foucault, “<u><strong><mark>is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit </mark>itself <mark>to its dissipation</mark>.”</u></strong>25 <u><strong><mark>Genealogical critique is</mark> <mark>an exposition of our history as subjects</mark> that has the effect of <mark>disposing subjectival constraints by exposing</mark> the <mark>contingency</mark> of their imposition</u></strong>. Genealogy turns the firm posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” <u><strong>Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self</u></strong>, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.”26 <u><strong><mark>Genealogy</mark> disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It <mark>cuts through the oppressive</mark>, assimilating <mark>density of Truth and discovers</mark> in this beguiling haze <mark>that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask</mark>.</u></strong> Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. <u><strong>Behind it <mark>there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress</mark>.</u></strong> Rather, <u><strong>there is <mark>only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities</mark>, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices.</u></strong> Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”27 Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. <u><strong>Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects</u></strong>, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity—<u><strong>identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition</mark>, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; <mark>but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom.</u></strong> Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, <u><strong>genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”</u></strong>28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for it—for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from it—a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. <u><strong><mark>It is not a freedom against the</mark> office of <mark>government, but against governmentality</mark>—against <mark>a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government</mark>.</u></strong> At the same time, <u><strong>the freedom of/through counter-memory is <mark>a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped</mark> like a cloak <mark>from the politicized body</mark>.</u></strong> In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.”29 That is, <u><strong>by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits.</u></strong>30 This opening is <u><strong>a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification.</u></strong> In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.”31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. <u><strong>Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation.</u></strong> Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. <u><strong><mark>Even the most violent forms of resistance</mark> against subjection <mark>accomplish nothing if they do not</mark> gain this freedom, do not <mark>open a space of possible transformation</mark>—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise</u></strong>. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”32 This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that <u><strong>what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity.</u></strong> This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. <u><strong>Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is <mark>a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are</mark>.</p></u></strong>

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

Vermont BL

Weitz

1AC was right to die countermemory geneology 1NC was a countermethod of eulogizing whitness to create a utopian imaginary Links of body divorcing and linear time as disads to Baylor's politics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

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Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

High rates of abuse and mortality in legalized countries

Holman’9

Holman’9

Prostitutes report high incidences of abuse even in countries where prostitution is legal and regulated In the Netherlands, where prostitution is legal, 60% of prostituted women reported suffering physical assaults, 70% experienced verbal threats of physical violence, 40% experienced sexual violence, and 40% had been forced into sexual abuse or prostitution by acquaintances In a survey of legal prostitutes in the U.S., 86% reported that they had been subject to physical violence by buyers A survey of legal sex workers in Australia found that one in five clients still demands unsafe sex In Canada, prostituted women suffer a mortality rate 40 times higher In one international study where 186 prostitutes were interviewed, the women consistently stated that prostitution establishments did little to help them, regardless of whether the brothels were legal or illegal. It is not only the clients who are abusing women. Prostitution exists in legal and illegal environments in largely the same way - prostitutes are controlled and often beaten by pimps and brothel owners who have complete power over the women The only difference is that in countries where prostitution is legal pimps operate as third party businessmen In a survey of prostitutes in the U.S., 76% reported that they had been beaten by their pimp. A similar study which surveyed 146 prostitutes in five countries found that 80% of the women had suffered physical violence from their pimp During a study of prostitution in Germany, where prostitution is legal, 59% of respondents said they did not feel that legalization made them any safer from rape and physical assault

Prostitutes report high incidences of abuse even where prostitution is legal In the Netherlands 60% reported physical assaults 40% experienced sexual violence and 40% had been forced into prostitution in the U.S., 86% reported physical violence by buyers In Canada prostituted women suffer a mortality rate 40 times higher In one international study women consistently stated establishments did little to help them prostitutes are beaten by brothel owners who have complete power over the women A study in five countries found 80% suffered physical violence from their pimp

[Melissa Holman, The University of Texas School of Law, J.D. COMMENT: THE MODERN-DAY SLAVE TRADE: HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ALTER THE VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT IN ORDER TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING MORE EFFECTIVELY. 44 Tex. Int'l L.J. 99. ETB] 1. Prostitutes Working in Regulated Environments Still Suffer High Rates of Abuse¶ ¶ One of the most frequently used arguments in favor of legalizing prostitution is that prostitution is a victimless crime. For example, when discussing a high profile prostitution arrest in 2007, American journalist John Stossel wrote: "Don't prostitutes own their bodies? Shouldn't they be able to freely contract to use their bodies as they wish? Who was hurt here? This is a victimless crime." n179¶ Unfortunately, prostitution is not a victimless crime. Prostitutes report high incidences of abuse even in countries where prostitution is legal and regulated. In the Netherlands, where prostitution is legal, 60% of prostituted women reported suffering physical assaults, 70% experienced verbal threats of physical violence, 40% experienced sexual violence, and 40% had been forced into sexual abuse or prostitution by acquaintances. n180 In a survey of legal prostitutes in the U.S., 86% reported that they had been subject to physical violence by buyers. n181 A survey of legal sex workers in Victoria, Australia (where prostitution is reportedly highly regulated) found that one in five clients still demands unsafe sex. n182 In Canada, where anti-prostitution laws are on the books but are seldom enforced, prostituted women and girls suffer a mortality rate 40 times higher than the national average. n183 [*118] In one international study where 186 prostitutes were interviewed, the women consistently stated that prostitution establishments did little to help them, regardless of whether the brothels were legal or illegal. n184 As one victim stated, "The only time they protect anyone is to protect the customers." n185¶ It is not only the clients who are abusing women. Prostitution exists in legal and illegal environments in largely the same way - prostitutes are controlled and often beaten by pimps and brothel owners who have complete power over the women's finances and well-being. The only difference is that in countries where prostitution is legal, pimps are no longer criminals, but rather operate as third party businessmen and legitimate sexual entrepreneurs. n186 In a survey of prostitutes in the U.S., 76% reported that they had been beaten by their pimp. n187 A similar study which surveyed 146 prostitutes in five countries found that 80% of the women had suffered physical violence from their pimp. n188 During a study of prostitution in Germany, where prostitution is legal, 59% of respondents said they did not feel that legalization made them any safer from rape and physical assault. n189

<h4><u><strong>High rates of abuse and mortality in legalized countries</h4><p>Holman’9</p><p></u></strong>[Melissa Holman, The University of Texas School of Law, J.D. COMMENT: THE MODERN-DAY SLAVE TRADE: HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ALTER THE VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT IN ORDER TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING MORE EFFECTIVELY. 44 Tex. Int'l L.J. 99. ETB]</p><p>1. Prostitutes Working in Regulated Environments Still Suffer High Rates of Abuse¶ ¶ One of the most frequently used arguments in favor of legalizing prostitution is that prostitution is a victimless crime. For example, when discussing a high profile prostitution arrest in 2007, American journalist John Stossel wrote: "Don't prostitutes own their bodies? Shouldn't they be able to freely contract to use their bodies as they wish? Who was hurt here? This is a victimless crime." n179¶ Unfortunately, prostitution is not a victimless crime. <u><strong><mark>Prostitutes report high incidences of abuse even</strong></mark> in countries <strong><mark>where prostitution is legal</strong> </mark>and regulated</u>. <u><strong><mark>In the Netherlands</strong></mark>, where prostitution is legal, <strong><mark>60%</strong></mark> of prostituted women <strong><mark>reported </strong></mark>suffering <strong><mark>physical assaults</strong></mark>, 70% experienced verbal threats of physical violence, <strong><mark>40% experienced sexual violence</mark>, <mark>and 40% had been forced into</strong> </mark>sexual abuse or <strong><mark>prostitution</strong> </mark>by acquaintances</u>. n180 <u>In a survey of legal prostitutes <strong><mark>in the U.S., 86% reported</strong> </mark>that they had been subject to <strong><mark>physical violence by buyers</u></strong></mark>. n181 <u>A survey of legal sex workers in</u> Victoria, <u>Australia</u> (where prostitution is reportedly highly regulated) <u>found that one in five clients still demands unsafe sex</u>. n182 <u><strong><mark>In Canada</strong></mark>,</u> where anti-prostitution laws are on the books but are seldom enforced, <u><strong><mark>prostituted women</u></strong> </mark>and girls <u><strong><mark>suffer a mortality rate 40 times higher</u></strong> </mark>than the national average. n183 [*118] <u><strong><mark>In one international study</strong> </mark>where 186 prostitutes were interviewed, the <strong><mark>women consistently stated</strong> </mark>that prostitution <strong><mark>establishments did little to help them</mark>, regardless of whether the brothels were legal</strong> or illegal.</u> n184 As one victim stated, "The only time they protect anyone is to protect the customers." n185¶ <u>It is not only the clients who are abusing women. <strong>Prostitution exists in legal and illegal environments</strong> in largely <strong>the same way - <mark>prostitutes are </mark>controlled and often <mark>beaten by </mark>pimps and <mark>brothel owners who have complete power over the women</u></strong></mark>'s finances and well-being. <u>The only difference is that in countries where prostitution is legal</u>, <u>pimps</u> are no longer criminals, but rather <u>operate as third party businessmen</u> and legitimate sexual entrepreneurs. n186 <u>In a survey of prostitutes in the U.S., 76% reported that they had been beaten by their pimp.</u> n187 <u><strong><mark>A</strong> </mark>similar <strong><mark>study</strong> </mark>which surveyed 146 prostitutes <strong><mark>in five countries found</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>80%</strong> </mark>of the women had <strong><mark>suffered physical violence from their pimp</u></strong></mark>. n188 <u>During a study of prostitution in Germany, where prostitution is legal, 59% of respondents said they did not feel that legalization made them any safer from rape and physical assault</u>. n189</p>

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